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By John Eldred Howard

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN FRANCE



THE RISE TO POWER



### **General Bonaparte**

From the victory medal designed by Duvivier and issued by the Institute of France on the signature of the treaty of Campo Formio.

*Enlarged; the reverse of this medal is shown, actual size, on page 70.*

Letters and Documents  
of  
NAPOLEON

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*Selected and translated by*  
JOHN ELDRED HOWARD

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VOLUME ONE  
*The Rise to Power*

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IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER  
GEORGE CHARLES HOWARD

1859-1942



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## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Frenchmen often complain that foreigners see only the military aspects of Napoleon's career and forget the work of civil construction he carried out in France. It is probably true that his domestic achievement is less well-known abroad and it was certainly as great as and far more lasting and valuable than all his military victories. The empire he conquered fell in his own lifetime and most of the battles he fought were ultimately meaningless; the administrative, legal and educational systems, the roads, canals, buildings and industries he created have survived till the present day and together form an unequalled contribution to the well-being of his countrymen. If they are more aware of this than are foreigners that is not surprising, for they are more closely touched by it, whereas the ancestors of the foreigners had to do with Napoleon almost exclusively on the battlefield. But Frenchmen and foreigners alike can justly be accused of neglecting another of his legacies that is at least as remarkable as any other—his writings. The pen may be mightier than the sword, but for most people actions speak louder than words, and 'Napoleon the soldier and statesman has generally overshadowed Napoleon the writer'.\*

During the past hundred years almost the whole of the vast corpus of his papers has been published in France, but in a form such as to ensure that little of it has been widely read. Translations into English have been few and small and, however interesting, have barely touched the most important material; readers of other languages have been no better served. During the same period the output of works written by others about Napoleon has been immense. Like Alexander and Charlemagne he has enthralled later generations as much as he dominated his own and it is quite likely that more books have been written about him than about any other secular figure in history; Kircheisen's bibliography, compiled early in the twentieth century, was incomplete but still listed about a hundred thousand items, and the flow has continued unabated ever since. Meanwhile, what he himself wrote has remained in comparative oblivion.

Yet what Napoleon wrote is the essential raw material for understanding the man and the history of his time. If we are to approach the truth many other sources must be taken into account to supplement and correct it, for the grain of salt it is always desirable to have ready when reading the words of statesmen is more than ever necessary here; Napoleon's letters and documents are inevitably one-sided, often prejudiced, sometimes deliberately misleading; they cannot in the nature of things tell the whole story. They were still the most important factor in twenty years of European history and they provide the most direct

\* N. Tomiche: *Napoléon Ecrivain*, p. 4.

route to an understanding of his character. Biographies and history books may give a truer picture, but some reality and something of value is lost when his own words and thoughts are distilled through the mind of the historian. Moreover, his own words are in no way dull or difficult to read; they deal with important and exciting events in an exciting manner and even today there is no suggestion of the old-fashioned about them.

'Bonaparte,' wrote Bourrienne, 'like Xenophon and Caesar, excelled in the art of expressing thought.\* Contemporaries and posterity, admirers and opponents have alike found little to criticize and much to praise in his spoken and written utterances, and in his case there was little distinction between the two. Madame de Staël, a bitter enemy, was 'struck by his superiority whenever she heard him speak', † and writers from her day till our own have admired both the form and the content of his work. For Thiers he was the greatest writer of his time, for Sainte-Beuve the greatest of the century. Such propositions suggest his stature, but they must be seen in perspective. Napoleon's output is certainly a literary monument, but at least the greater part of it and all that is of value cannot properly be compared with the work of professional writers. He was not a man of letters but a ruler, and what he wrote was an instrument perfectly adjusted to the needs of his role. In the words of Sainte-Beuve again, 'it has the stamp of the lion'. ‡

Napoleon the writer is in fact quite as interesting as Napoleon the soldier and statesman, and in one respect his success in this less spectacular activity was a greater personal achievement. In war or politics or diplomacy his problems were external and he could apply his talents to them without the hindrance of any inadequacy in his personal equipment. It was no doubt irritating to be a poor rider in the midst of great horsemen, but that and similar handicaps were trivial; there were, too, flaws in his character and judgment that were to lead him in the end to St. Helena, but of them he was unaware. As a writer he had to overcome the seemingly insuperable barrier of a very imperfect command of the language he used with such skill.

(Napoleon did not learn French until he was over nine years old. He may have picked up a few words from his father, one of the few Corsicans of his time who knew the language, but he neither heard it spoken nor received any systematic instruction in it until he landed in France at the end of 1778. He retained a noticeable accent to the end of his days, often mispronouncing words so that they were barely recognizable. His vocabulary was weak and he was sometimes driven to inventing his own words, usually rather expressive ones. His spelling

\* *Mémoires*, Bk. I, Ch. 15.

† *Considérations sur la Révolution française*, Vol. I, p. 494 (ed. 1862).

‡ *Causeries de Lundi*, Vol. I, p. 144 (ed. 1852).

was atrocious, his grammar faulty, his range of constructions limited, his handwriting almost indecipherable. The secretaries to whom most of his work was dictated could correct some minor faults, but there was much that they could not hide even had they had the time or the wish to do so. Those few who received private letters and the many who suffered under the daily avalanche of autograph minutes saw every outrage he committed on their tongue.

That, in France of all countries, this state of affairs did not damage his career is surprising. That he himself was content with it contrasts oddly with his striving after precision and perfection in so many other respects. By an effort of will, if he chose to make it, he could overcome his faults, for the early autograph letters to Marie-Louise, those written before they met, are entirely free from spelling mistakes and grammatical errors and are written in a hand that, if far from elegant, is at least more legible than his usual scrawl. But he seldom bothered, and he even contrived to turn his failings to advantage: Stendhal admired 'the very imperfection of his language, always slightly tinged with foreignness'.\* His command of words made his faults unimportant and placed a perfect tool at the service of his other qualities. It was indeed integrally related to them, for the soldier, the statesman and the writer were inseparable aspects of the same talent.

The voice of the lion is inappropriate to lesser beasts. Napoleon's developed style is unique. It owes a good deal to classical models; nothing at all to any French precursor or contemporary. There are rightly echoes of his words and thoughts as well as of his actions in the work of Victor Hugo, that self-appointed 'guardian of the treasures of the glory of the Empire'.† Apart from that, though his style is easily copied, it has never been so.

Napoleon's abilities came to maturity suddenly and seemingly complete in the Italian campaign of 1796. At Toulon and during the next two years he showed undoubted gifts as a soldier, but there was precious little about him during that period and nothing at all in his earlier life to herald what was to come. In Italy his mastery of generalship, politics and diplomacy was constantly at as high a pitch as it was ever to reach. His mastery of language followed the same course. In youth he turned out a flood of history, fiction, philosophy, autobiography, all of it the kind of stuff that many another young intellectual has produced and done better and, if he is wise, destroyed before anyone has seen it. It is derivative, turgid and long-winded, without an idea or allusion or turn of phrase that is original. Its authorship gives it interest, but, that apart, it is tedious and valueless. In Italy his language was

\* *Mémoires sur Napoléon*, Ch. 51.

† From his poem on the death of the Duchess of Abrantes in *Les Rayons et les Ombres*.

individual, simple, direct and wholly effective; the stamp of the lion was already there.

The reason for this sudden development of his style can be surmised, and it is one which explains a good deal about the form of his writing after it occurred. He always read prodigiously and in youth, his mind filled with borrowed ideas and stylistic models, he sought to copy the writers who impressed him. His aim was essentially literary, but that was not his bent and the result was failure. But young Buonaparte was also a trained soldier who had studied and meditated on every aspect of his profession. He knew that the style of the debating clubs and the philosophic salons was ill-adapted to leading armies to victory, and when at length he had an army to command he at once instinctively found a style fitted to his purpose. He was no longer concerned with literary forms or with any other aspects of his letters, orders, reports and proclamations than that they should produce the results he intended. Like his staff or his transport system they were a means to an end.

Like so much else in his life, the beginning of this change can be traced back to Toulon. Except for the one story, *Clisson et Eugénie*, written during his imprisonment in 1794, the last and certainly the best of his purely literary output was the *Souper de Beaucaire*, produced immediately before he joined the siege. The fact that that piece was written with the deliberate aim of persuading the people of Provence to accept Jacobin rule may account for its quality, but as to form and style it must still be classed with his earlier work. Thereafter he was engaged in severely practical problems and his manner of writing changed abruptly to conform with them. There was still occasionally a literary tone, especially in private letters, but everything he wrote between 1793 and 1796 had more in common with what was to succeed it than with what had gone before. A few pieces can even stand comparison with his later work, but most certainly cannot; they are flat, ill-organized and confused. Reading them one has the feeling that, just as he had begun his career but was still beset by doubts and difficulties, so too he had put his literary style on the right lines but was only in his apprenticeship. In Italy, and for most of his life thereafter, he was inspired.

All his life Napoleon was conscious of the power of words to influence events. He knew that armies march, treaties are made, policies formed, nations moved to action only as a result of words, and that the way these are chosen and used profoundly influences their effectiveness. His harsh control over the press and theatre and shocking treatment of many creative writers issued from a genuine if misplaced fear for the success of his policies and the security of his regime. By contrast he deluged France in a sea of paper that would have delighted a modern civil service and over which he himself exercised a firm ultimate control.

He would carefully revise the drafts of public documents, often showing in marginal notes or covering letters why one phrase was to be preferred to another. His subordinates received constant admonition and advice about their own style and sometimes stern but wise criticism of what they wrote; often enough their papers were returned to them for redrafting. 'Words must be weighed,' he said to Eugène.

To Eugène he also wrote: 'The circular is too long-winded; authority reasons less and explains itself more briefly. You would have done better to write six lines.'<sup>\*</sup> To Murat: 'Your Order of the Day is wretched. Good God! Where should we be if I had to write four pages to tell the soldiers not to let themselves be disarmed? You never learnt that from me.'<sup>†</sup> Such comments abound; they show both the value he placed on the right use of words and his faith in his own ability to achieve it. The brevity that he urges he almost always practised. To waste words was to waste time, and that 'seemed to him a calamity'; 'in politics as in war', he said, 'the lost moment never returns'.<sup>‡</sup> But he also knew that the fewer the words, provided they are the right ones, the more influence they will wield. 'I have read the proclamation,' he wrote to Lucien, 'it is worthless. There are too many words and not enough ideas. That is not the way to speak to the people.'<sup>§</sup> That was in 1792, a time when he could well have profited from his own advice, yet already he was clearly aware of language as a means of power and of how it should be used.

This constant concern with problems of verbal expression together with his growing experience inevitably led to some development in his own style even during the years of his maturity. It is also significant that he was brought up during the twilight years of the French classical tradition and that when he died the romantic era was approaching its height; no educated man could live through such a change in cultural and especially in literary thought and remain untouched by it, and Napoleon was more sensitive than most men to what was going on.

For a short period the French Revolution breathed new life into classicism, though in a form that Boileau might not altogether have approved. The orators of the assemblies looked back for models to Demosthenes and Cicero, and the threadbare artillery officer looked back with them, but rather towards the soldiers and historians. Bonaparte was no Latinist, but he read and re-read the classics in translation and for years his own work proclaimed his debt to them. His troops are 'phalanxes' and 'legions'; Alexander, Scipio, Brutus, Caesar, all the heroes of antiquity recur in his pages; phrases, whole sentences even,

<sup>\*</sup> *Correspondance*, No. 8908.    <sup>†</sup> Lecestre: *Lettres inédites de Napoléon I*, No. 270.

<sup>‡</sup> *Correspondance*, XXX, p. 264.

<sup>§</sup> Masson and Biagi: *Napoléon Inconnu*, Vol. II, p. 396.

are lifted out of Xenophon, Lucian, Livy, Tacitus; his papers abound in Latin constructions and sometimes read like parodies of Caesar. 'It is Rome itself that arises and speaks,' said Sorel.\* It is not surprising that he spurned the comic title of 'Proclamator-Elector' proffered by Sieyès, nor any more so that he chose to call himself 'Consul'.

But as the Consulate advanced this classical tone became less marked and with the coming of the Empire it disappeared almost completely. His language grew more French, but also more concise and more individual: Alexander and Caesar made way for Charlemagne, Henri IV, Condé and Turenne; the spirit of Greece and Rome were replaced by the glories of France and invocations of a Christian deity. This was all consonant with the mystique of advancing romanticism, and maybe Napoleon was simply following the idiom of his time. All the same, he was himself one of the most important creators of that idiom and the gradual change in his literary tone perfectly matches the changing demands of his personal position. It was proper for the revolutionary general to recall antique heroes as he smote the enemies of the Republic. The better to govern, the agnostic, republican Consul saw fit to bring back the bigoted, illiberal Church and proclaim himself a Christian ruler, even if he did treat the Pope worse than a recalcitrant subject. The Emperor had to fear rather than appeal to classical models; more appropriate traditions were to be found in the history of France, while the only possible precedent for his oecumenical title—and a far-fetched one at that—lay in the mediaeval crown that fumbling Habsburg hands dropped at his feet.

Such things are examples of what he called 'tact'. By it he meant the right touch, the perfect appropriateness of means to ends, and it was something he himself almost always achieved and whose absence in the work of others he unfailingly recognized. The changes in his style over the course of years are slight; all that he wrote after 1796 is recognizably by the same hand and there are plenty of verbal and syntactical favourites that he used throughout his life. The triumph of tact is far more obvious in the stylistic flexibility he always had at his command. He believed there is an appropriate mode for each subject, each person, each community, and that if the ruler is to achieve his aims he must be able to call them up at will. His own writing has an adaptability resembling the suppleness of his military manœuvring that enabled him always to react correctly to changing conditions and so never to be taken by surprise. It was perfectly done and from the style alone it is often possible to tell whom he is addressing.

Only his letters to his wives, to whom he wrote almost daily when they were apart, were altogether personal and untinged by considerations of policy; when policy arises at all it appears as straightforward

\* Quoted by A. Périer: *Napoléon Journaliste*, p. 13.

instructions. His first letters to Josephine were love-letters. They are long and often incoherent, sometimes in their contrivances recalling earlier literary efforts, but undoubtedly written from the heart, rarely saying much of his work, but lavishing praise, protesting his own jealous passion, uninhibited in sexual intimacy. One wonders whether Josephine read them; they are hardly legible and she did not then care much. Later, when she did begin to care, after the crisis of 1798, a metamorphosis took place. Thereafter she received short, polite, sometimes bantering notes, giving a few brief details of his health and activities, a few words of advice, a few formal phrases of affection; very rarely, and that mostly after they were divorced, did the real depth of his feeling for her break through. To the silly, faithless Marie-Louise he wrote similar but longer letters, giving more information and more advice and with a solicitude at once gallant and paternal.

Tact dominated everything else. If writing to a priest 'the language must be sought in the spirit of religion, not in that of philosophy'.\* In Egypt it was easy, from some of his papers, to think him a Moslem. Letters about finance are mostly columns of figures. His staff and soldiers received precise, detailed orders leaving no room for misunderstanding or for the 'ifs' and 'buts' that infuriated him. He was harsh in rebuke but generous in praise, and with each he surely stimulated to greater effort. For the common man he would often refer to 'his star', or Destiny or the will of God; the educated got reasoned, forceful argument. Each letter is exactly adjusted to the personality of the recipient and carefully designed to produce the intended effect; it is unlikely that any of those addressed realized how far they were being managed.

There is the same sure touch in his work as propagandist, in the proclamations, pamphlets and journalism by which he sought 'to govern the masses without them perceiving it'.† He always found the telling appeal to tradition or national pride, to the love of liberty or plain self-interest. He gave almost daily instructions about the content and tone of the press, constantly ordering articles to be written and correcting the drafts; sometimes, usually in reply to attacks by foreign journals, he himself dictated articles which Thiers found 'jewels of reason, eloquence and style'. It is perhaps as an orator that he showed both at his best and his weakest. His set orations on formal occasions were competent and sometimes inspiring, though they could also be rather dull and pompous; but he had little confidence in debate against political opposition and neither the matter nor the manner of his few speeches of that kind had much to commend it. At the other end of the scale, we know by all accounts that with a few words to his troops he could rouse them to an ecstasy of devotion. The same effect was produced on a wider

\* *Correspondance*, No. 12379.

† *Correspondance*, No. 8001.

scale by the orders of the day and military bulletins that are the masterpieces of his written work.

Whatever he wrote he never lost sight of the purpose he had in view and would not be deflected from it by such things as ethical principle or regard for objective truth. If it was generally desirable and often vitally necessary to adhere to the facts, there were also times when it suited his purpose better to dissemble or mislead or lie. 'Newspapers are not history', he said, 'any more than bulletins are history.'\* In fact he saw little point, and sometimes great danger, in any writing, whether his own or another's, that did not promote his policies or enhance his prestige, and this was as true of history as of anything else. When he ordered Bignon to write an account of the diplomatic events of his reign he saw this as a contribution not only to learning but also to 'the glory of the nation and my own'.

He himself enjoyed and profited from reading history and often professed a desire to write it; and in the end the opportunity came. The last phase of his life was largely spent in dictating his *Memoirs* to the companions of St. Helena. These jumbled volumes are often written with fire, but as history they are utterly perverse. Defeated and exiled, Napoleon still had an end in view: to justify himself to posterity. So he presented an image of himself, not as he was, but as the figure he saw with unerring instinct would draw devotion and love: the heroic leader of France and arbiter of Europe who was also a man of peace and democracy, the incarnation of the Revolution. Even then his touch was sure, for the *Memoirs* played their part in forming what we know as the Napoleonic Legend.

Viewed as a whole Napoleon's papers do much more than show his capacity for influencing people; they show day by day the course of what was in both its achievement and its failure an epic career, and they afford an incomparable insight into the mind of a man of genius. Such men generally leave finished masterpieces for us to admire, with perhaps a few tantalizing hints of the processes behind them. With Napoleon the processes are revealed, for in what he wrote he unconsciously displayed the whole of his working mind. To aid our understanding he added some consciously proffered information; he was never reticent about himself and, although by no means given to introspective musing, he was capable of acute self-analysis and frequently passed on the results for the instruction and edification of his subordinates. His 'great talent, which most distinguished him', he thought, was 'to see everything clearly . . . to see the heart of the question in all its aspects'.† That talent he surely had and his letters show it. They show others too: the mental range that made him equally at home with statesmen or scientists and with simple soldiers;

\* *Correspondance*, No. 21360.

† *Correspondance*, XXIX, p. 308.



the capacity for work that enabled him in a short, full life to produce a written output so vast; the memory which often surprised his ablest counsellors; the mania for detail that never deflected him from the central issues; the search for accuracy that led him always to demand precise statistics in place of 'reports that waste my time' and 'résumés that say nothing'.\*

There are, of course, some things they do not show and others that they distort. The decorum of his letters hides much of the vulgarity that gradually eroded the refinement of his mind and personality as surely as the morbid fat on his body overlay the delicate frame and ascetic features. Face to face he could treat minister or marshal, foreign ambassador or brother sovereign with outrageous discourtesy; his angrier letters are blistering, but he usually deleted the most wounding acerbities before they were dispatched. And if his letters sometimes present him as better than he was the reverse is also true. The curt order to shoot the Turkish prisoners at Jaffa is a brutal document; but it gives no idea of the agony of mind in which it was given when, after three days of hopeless search for an alternative, he yielded to the united pressure of his staff and generals. Napoleon was often cruel or unfair, but fundamentally he was humane and just, even though in this as in other aspects of his character there was a steady deterioration; the young Bonaparte would not have described the ghastly debris of Borodino as 'the most beautiful battlefield I have ever seen'. But the savage floggings and field punishments that disgraced every other European army of the time were unknown in his, and by and large the French nation followed him willingly to disaster simply for his personal qualities of creative ability and inspired leadership: 'the praise of a great commander is a soldier's highest reward'.†

To say, as Fisher did, that Napoleon had 'the grandest intellectual gifts ever vouchsafed to man'‡ is an overstatement. Even in the strictest sense there were lacunae. His vaunted understanding of science was genuine, but hardly profound, while his appreciation of the arts, though idiosyncratic, seldom rose above the banal. He could jest about the corruption of power but could not apply the moral. He could not see that the consulship for life was the negation of the democracy and republicanism in which he once truly believed, nor what the inevitable consequences must be: 'If you take the first step, you will take the last.'§ He could not see how undignified was the revolutionary soldier who joined the squalid dynastic game of the monarchs, nor how it must corrupt his dukes, princes and kings who had once been proud of the simple title 'Citizen Minister', 'Citizen General': 'You should have

\* *Correspondance*, No. 9789.

† Tolstoy: *War and Peace*, Bk. III, Ch. 19. Trans. Maude.

‡ *Napoleon*, p. 247.

§ Kipling: *How far to Saint Helena*.

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remained First Consul,' Carnot once said to him, 'you were the only one in Europe, and look at the company you are in now.'<sup>\*</sup> He could not see that though he united France and strengthened and enriched it his own policies were inexorably destroying its resources, above all its human resources. 'Take care of Vandamme,' he wrote to Davout in 1813, 'fighting men are getting scarce.'<sup>†</sup> They were indeed; more than a million Frenchmen had already died on the battlefield at his behest. Knowing his powers to be great, he believed them boundless and failed to realize that the opposition, criticism and advice he spurned and suppressed might sometimes be right and might save even him from error. Yet his powers were indeed great and, despite all his faults and failures, in his chosen sphere of war and government there is no more than a handful of men in all recorded history who are his undoubted equals. No comparable figure in this or any sphere has so totally revealed his mind.

#### A NOTE ON THE SELECTION AND TEXT

Many thousands of Napoleon's original papers are in existence. Some of them have had strange histories, but by far the largest groups are now in the Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. Some are in other official French collections and in many public museums and libraries in France and elsewhere; there are also a few large and many small private collections scattered throughout the world. The emergence of hitherto unsuspected documents is still surprisingly frequent, but how many have been lost beyond recall cannot be known.<sup>‡</sup>

A substantial proportion of this material has been published, and for the purpose of this translation there is no need to go outside the printed texts. But the printed versions are not always such reliable transcriptions as could be wished, and anyone involved in the study of Napoleonic documents must also bear in mind two problems concerning the authenticity of the original papers.

<sup>\*</sup> Quoted by S. J. Watson: *Carnot*, p. 200.

<sup>†</sup> Lecestre: *Lettres inédites de Napoléon I*, No. 1001.

<sup>‡</sup> Usually it is single documents or small groups that come to light, but there have been several major discoveries. The last was in 1934. Until then only six or seven of Napoleon's letters to Marie Louise were known, but in that year a collection of over 300, described only as 'the property of a nobleman to whom they have descended by inheritance', mysteriously appeared in a London saleroom where they were bought on behalf of the Bibliothèque Nationale. (The corresponding letters from Marie Louise to Napoleon were found as late as 1955 among the Swedish royal archives.)

The first arises from the fact that this is a field rich in forgery, some of it motivated by political or personal, some by purely mercenary ends.\* Many examples have been exposed, but it is likely that a few still find a place in the accepted canon; it is unlikely that many do.

The second problem arises from the methods of work in Napoleon's offices and the consequent nature of much of the material itself. Apart from short minutes Napoleon wrote little with his own hand after 1793, and, since copies were seldom kept of the purely private letters and rough notes that form the bulk of this autograph material, it is probably these papers which have suffered from the highest mortality rate. But, forgery apart, there can be no doubt of the authenticity of such autograph papers as do exist. Nor is there any difficulty over the many bulletins, proclamations and other pieces which were prepared for printed publication; here the original printed version constitutes the authentic text, although in many cases earlier MS. drafts have survived to throw interesting light on the process of composition.

All else was dictated. Napoleon spoke quickly and none dared ask him to repeat himself; though his secretaries and other victims of his method developed a form of shorthand, they were often reduced to taking down no more than the briefest notes of what he said. From these notes a draft was later prepared which might, if the matter was important, be shown to the Emperor and corrected. A final copy for signature and dispatch was then prepared, the draft being retained as the file copy. Sometimes the pressure of work was such that the draft stage was omitted and the original note became the only record kept. Some letters were also copied out again after reaching their recipients; several copies of a letter to a minister, for instance, might be needed for action in different sections of the ministry. Thus it sometimes happens that the original note, the draft, the final letter and one or more later copies of a single communication are all in existence, and in such cases it sometimes happens that no two of the various texts are identical.

Two questions arise. First, while all such variant forms of a letter are in a way genuine, which is to be considered the most authoritative? It seems reasonable to grant this position to the final letter signed by Napoleon and received by his correspondent, with the note or draft rated next in value and later copies, where only copyists' errors can account for divergences, somewhat lower. Many of the printed sources are based on drafts or copies, a fact which is sometimes, but not always made clear. Where the draft or copy is the sole extant version there is, of course, nothing to be said; but it must be noted that in some cases an original source of higher authenticity than the printed

\* Forgeries of this last kind include, as well as outright inventions, carefully made facsimiles of genuine documents; textually these should be no less, perhaps more reliable than copies made on a typewriter for honest purposes.

version does exist. The importance of this varies: it is seldom that the main substance of a letter differs from one source to another, though occasional additions or deletions are met; but the wording often differs substantially and this may to some extent alter the sense.\*

Secondly, how far can any letter produced by this method really be attributed to Napoleon and how far must the secretaries be held responsible for the form, if not the substance, of much put out in his name? All three principal secretaries claimed, justly, to have achieved a perfect imitation of his style, but none of them claimed responsibility for his compositions beyond the most trivial level. Some conjecture is perhaps legitimate, but most scholarly opinion holds that all but a small amount of the material can safely be regarded as almost wholly Napoleon's own work. This does not, of course, apply to many ceremonial letters and formal documents which were prepared in the ministries for his signature; these properly take their place among his official papers, but few would suggest that he had much to do with them.

During the lifetime of the Emperor and the thirty years following his death several collections of his letters, orders, proclamations and other documents were published. Many of these were marred by corruptions and forgeries, all were of limited scope and none contain any genuine material not to be found in later compilations. Though some of them have interesting features on their own account, from the point of view of the true Napoleonic canon they can be ignored.†

In 1852 there appeared the first volume of the *Mémoires du Roi Joseph*, a work completed in ten volumes and edited by the Baron du Casse. In form it is a collection of Joseph's correspondence together with a brief commentary, and it includes transcriptions of nearly but not quite all known letters addressed to him by Napoleon. This is the earliest printed source to which the student need refer. It is also said to have inspired in Napoleon III the idea of issuing a comprehensive official collection of his uncle's papers.

However that may be, in 1854 an imperial decree set up a committee charged with 'collecting, arranging and publishing the correspondence of Napoleon I concerning the different branches of public affairs'. The

\* No. 434 is a mild example. The text given in the *Correspondance* is reproduced from the draft, where the last paragraph reads: *Je crois politique et d'une stricte justice qu'il y ait au moins huit à dix militaires dans le Sénat*. The final letter, signed by Bonaparte and, presumably, received by Sieyès, is in my own possession. Here the corresponding paragraph reads: *Je crois politique et d'une rigoureuse justice qu'il y ait dans le Sénat conservateur, au moins huit ou dix anciens militaires*. The addition of the word *anciens* does slightly affect the meaning.

† The same must be said of some later collections. As will become clear, not all the books mentioned by name in this Note are free from error; but, taken together, they do form the most complete and accurate printed source of Napoleon's writings. The greatest caution is needed in using any others.

first volume appeared in 1859, the fifteenth in 1864, by which time the committee, publishing the material in strict chronological order, had reached the middle of the year 1807. The committee was then disbanded and replaced by a new body, under the presidency of Prince Jerome Napoleon, which added a further seventeen volumes, thereby completing the entire work almost on the eve of the downfall of the second Empire.

These thirty-two volumes of the *Correspondance de Napoléon I* run to an average length of 700 pages each. They contain, in the first twenty-eight volumes, 22,067 numbered letters and documents and, in the last four and unnumbered, a great deal of the material dictated at Saint Helena. They form the indispensable main source for any serious study of Napoleon's writings.\*

Yet, despite its bulk and the care with which it was compiled, the *Correspondance* is neither complete nor altogether reliable. The committees cannot be blamed for including a few papers that have since been shown to be forgeries, while their over-enthusiastic inclusion of a few with which Napoleon, through physical absence, can have had nothing to do, though a trap for the unwary, is not discreditable. Nor can they be blamed for omitting documents whose existence was unknown to them; they did make every effort to locate them, but some have come to light since. It was not unreasonable for them also to exclude laws and similar lengthy constitutional and political documents which were easily accessible elsewhere. But in addition to this the committees placed a very restrictive interpretation on the words 'public affairs' in their terms of reference, and they therefore omitted all papers considered to be of a purely private and family nature. On the ground that Napoleon had himself stated that his public career began at the siege of Toulon, they also printed nothing of a date earlier than October, 1793. Thus two sources rich in interest were closed. A further large mass of material was rejected on grounds of triviality, although much of it is by no means devoid of interest. All these omissions were unfortunate, though in view of the political circumstances and the size of the task they were perhaps understandable. At least they were openly acknowledged.

Far more questionable was the deliberate but covert suppression of

\* The *Correspondance* was published by the Imperial Printing House in a finely printed and handsomely produced limited edition in quarto format. All sets of this were presented to national libraries, foreign potentates, descendants of the great figures of the empire, etc. Simultaneously, a badly printed commercial edition in octavo format was published by Plon, Nourrit & Cie. Apart from the not infrequent misprints in the latter, the texts of the two editions are identical. In 1875 the specifically military papers in the *Correspondance* were extracted in the Ministry of War and published separately in ten volumes under the title *Correspondance militaire de Napoléon I*.

letters which throw an unfavourable light on the Emperor's character, motives and policies. Napoleon III himself had a hand in this, and indeed it was as a result of the publication of papers considered unsuitable that the first committee was replaced by a new one in charge of a member of the imperial family with strong views on the limits of the permissible. Despite the inclusion of a historian of the standing of Mérimée among its members, the first committee was in fact by no means guiltless: but the second (which incidentally included Sainte-Beuve) was far worse. The prince's declared aim was to publish those letters which Napoleon himself might have published 'had he outlived himself and wished to show to posterity his character and his system'. To this end a policy of ruthless suppression was adopted and was often applied to letters whose publication would, one suspects, have worried their author a good deal less than it worried his descendants. A barrier of dynastic pride and courtly delicacy has thus excluded from a great compilation very many papers of the utmost historical importance.

Nor is this all. If many letters which should have been included were omitted, some which were published were emasculated in the process. Offending words and passages were left out, sometimes with no indication at all that anything is missing, sometimes on an untenable plea of illegibility.\* Then too, though no doubt from other motives, the conclusions and signatures of letters were formalized in the printed texts in a way that often involves departure from the original and sometimes leads almost to historical falsification. In the case of letters signed by someone other than Napoleon the signature is, incredibly, omitted and the words 'By order of the Emperor (First Consul, etc.)' inserted, whether or not they appear in the original and despite the fact that the style sometimes shows clearly that they were composed by another.†

\* Examples cited to illustrate various points arising in this Note are drawn from papers actually included in the first volume of the translation; many more can be found among those excluded from it or of a later date. This is particularly so in the present instance, the sins of the second committee being so much the more frequent and heinous. The following are examples of the first committee's work. In No. 49 the last two paragraphs are omitted, presumably on account of their 'private' nature. So are the words 'A thousand things to Julie' in No. 620, although the full text had already been published in the *Mémoires de Roi Joseph* (where the letter is incorrectly dated) and although similar phrases are not left out of other letters (the self-same words, for instance, in No. 703). The first and last paragraphs of No. 453 and the last paragraph of No. 740 are omitted for reasons unknown. No indication is given of any of these omissions.

† Nos. 490 and 586 obviously express Bonaparte's intentions and almost certainly his specific instructions; yet it is hardly necessary to examine the original documents to know that the first was written by Talleyrand and the second by Berthier. In the *Correspondance* both conclude with the words 'By order of the First Consul'. In the case of No. 579 these words do not even appear on the original, yet in the *Correspondance* they replace the words 'I salute you. Dupont'. This letter is in a style indistinguishable from Bonaparte's and it may well have



After 1804, when the signature 'Napoleon' was adopted, this name is invariably printed in full at the foot of letters signed by him, although he more often used the forms 'Napole', 'Napol', 'Nap', 'Np' or 'N'.

Publication of the *Correspondance* at once stimulated historians to fill in the wide gaps it contains, and for some time there was a stream, subsiding later to a trickle, of books that have vastly expanded the printed sources of Napoleon's writing. The following are all collections devoted wholly to this purpose. Four books that went far towards publishing the letters secretly suppressed by the committees are: *Supplément à la Correspondance de Napoléon I* by du Casse, 1887; *Lettres inédites de Napoléon I* by L. Lecestre, 2 vols. 1897; *Lettres inédites de Napoléon I* by L. de Brotonne, 1898, and *Dernières Lettres inédites de Napoléon I* by the same editor, 2 vols. 1903. *Napoléon Inconnu* by F. Masson, 2 vols. 1895, is the main source for the early writings up to the autumn of 1793, *Lettres de Napoléon à Joséphine* by L. Cerf, 1928, an important source for letters omitted from the *Correspondance* as being private. Much of the material in *Lettres inédites de Napoléon à Marie Louise* by L. Madelin, 1935, would no doubt have been similarly omitted had it been available at the time. Other compilations offer, in the main, further papers which have come to light since 1870 or gleanings among those omitted from the *Correspondance* on grounds of triviality or repetition; most, as their titles imply, cover particular aspects or periods of the Emperor's career. They are: *Le Registre de l'Île d'Elbe: lettres et ordres inédites de Napoléon I, 28 mai 1814-22 février 1815* by L. G. Pelissier, 1897; *Lettres, Ordres et Décrets de Napoléon I en 1812-14* by Vicomte de Grouchy, 1897; *Supplément à la Correspondance de Napoléon I: l'Empereur et la Pologne*, anonymous, 1908; *Lettres de l'Empereur Napoléon du 1 août au 18 octobre 1813* by X, 1909; *En marge de la Correspondance de Napoléon I: Pièces inédites concernant la Pologne* by A. Skalkowski, 1911; *Ordres et Apostilles de Napoléon, 1799-1815* by A. Chuquet, 4 vols. 1911-12; *Correspondance inédite de Napoléon I conservée aux Archives de la Guerre, 1804-12* by E. Picard and L. Tuetey, 5 vols. 1912-13, and *Inédits Napoléoniens* by A. Chuquet, 2 vols. 1913-19.

All of these books contain important material, though not all of them are confined to matter unpublished elsewhere, even, in some cases, when they claim to be so. Nor are they all immune to the same kind of criticism as can be levelled at the *Correspondance*: the positive

been dictated by him; it was none the less written in the form of a personal letter from Dupont to Lannes. (The propriety of including such letters in a selection devoted to Napoleon may be questioned; done sparingly in the case of interesting and important papers which obviously express his thought it seems to me reasonable.) The last sentence of the postscript to No. 669 together with Bourrienne's signature are omitted in the *Correspondance*.

pressures of the Second Empire had been removed by the time they were produced, but political opinions and personal prejudices lingered on and, in any case, Napoleon for long aroused—perhaps still arouses—passions of love and hate capable of outweighing the academic standards of well-trained and able scholars. It is not without significance that du Casse had been aide-de-camp to Prince Jerome, and his handling of the work of the second committee is very different from that of its stern critics, Lecestre and de Brotonne; but the fact that these two quarrelled violently with one another also led to the exposure of numerous flaws in their own books. Several of the editors go even further than the committees in omitting the heads and endings of letters and some of them have committed accidental but sometimes serious errors.\* It must in fairness be added that several, particularly among the later ones, have worked with scrupulous accuracy and honesty.

In addition to these complete collections a fair number of papers have appeared in historical works devoted to Napoleon and his period. Especially important in this respect are: *Les Rois Frères de Napoléon* and *Mémoires du Roi Jérôme*, both by du Casse; *Napoléon et sa Famille* and *Napoléon et les Femmes*, both by Masson; *Napoléon et le Roi Louis* by M. F. Rocquain, and *Napoléon et Alexandre* by A. Vandal. Some, too, have been published in periodicals such as the *English Historical Review*, XIII, 533, and various issues of *La Revue Historique*, *La Revue des Deux Mondes* and *l'Amateur d'autographes*.

Owing to duplications the total number of separate papers printed in all these various sources cannot easily be estimated; together with laws and similar officially published documents it probably amounts to some 45,000. This is not the whole of the extant Napoleonic canon, but it is undoubtedly a very substantial proportion of it. A number of hitherto unpublished papers of varying importance are known to exist and others may come to light in the course of time; there are also many thousands of trivial minutes and purely formal documents whose publication would be supererogatory.

Little of this large mass of material has been made available in English translations. In 1855 a two-volume selection from the *Mémoires du Roi Joseph* was published by an anonymous translator under the title *Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon with his brother Joseph*; it contains about a quarter of the Napoleonic letters contained in the original. In 1884 appeared Capt. D. A. Bingham's *Letters and Despatches*

\* Inaccurate dates and incorrect addresses, as well as minor misprints, must be watched for in several cases. An example of something more serious—and incomprehensible—is to be found on p. 13 of the *Supplément à la Correspondance de Napoléon I.* Here du Casse gives the text of No. 203, correctly dated and headed Milan; at the end and as though forming part of the same letter he prints all but the first paragraph of No. 54, which was in fact written from Paris nearly eighteen months earlier.

of the First Napoleon. This was a selection from the *Correspondance* together with a few papers dating from before Toulon which were drawn from suspect sources and include some forgeries; the work ran to three volumes, but about half the space is occupied by a somewhat facetious commentary whose tone seems to have governed the choice of most of the documents included. Lady Mary Loyd's *New Letters of Napoleon*, 1898, gives about half those published in Lecestre's two volumes, and about half those in Picard and Tuetey's five were translated in *Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon I*, 3 vols. 1918. Cerf's book was translated by H. W. Bunn as *Letters of Napoleon to Josephine*\* in 1931, Madelin's anonymously as *The Letters of Napoleon to Marie Louise* in 1935. In 1934 J. M. Thompson produced a small general selection of 300 pieces under the title *Letters of Napoleon*. Finally, Mr. Somerset de Chair published a translation of the *Souper de Beaucaire* in 1945 and in 1948 a substantial selection of *Napoleon's Memoirs*.

These books are of very varied quality; while Mr. de Chair's are models of their kind, some of the others are neither so wisely chosen nor so felicitously translated. Some of them were published only in England, others only in the United States; most of them are out of print and hard to come by. But even the determined reader who assembles them all hardly has a balanced selection at his disposal. He has much that is interesting, but most of it is peripheral to the great mass of political, military and diplomatic papers that form the central core of Napoleon's writings. Only Bingham and Thompson give general selections, and of these the first is hardly to be recommended on any count, while the second is on so tiny a scale as to do no more than whet the appetite; it gives only the slightest sketch of Napoleon as a man and no impression at all of his career or his policies. †

The aim of the present translation is to offer a substantial selection of Napoleon's papers, neglecting no significant aspect of his life but maintaining a proper balance between the important and the secondary. The secondary, the private, even the trivial, cannot be entirely ignored;

\* This American volume was not published in Great Britain. N. F. Hall's *Letters of Napoleon and Josephine*, which appeared in London in 1901, is textually unreliable.

† It ill becomes one translator to carp at the minor errors of others unless they positively distort the sense of the original. But in No. 172 Bonaparte's complaint against Despinoy was his failure to fight at the head of his troops, not, as Thompson (his No. 23) puts it, that he 'Doesn't use his head'; in No. 411 (his No. 49) Thompson translated *croisière* as 'cruiser', which it does not mean, thus understating the danger Bonaparte had to fear. From a scholar of the highest standing these are more than trivial inaccuracies. Bingham produced some real monstrosities; for instance in No. 232 (his Vol. I, p. 151) he gives only the second paragraph and makes it appear to apply only to Bernadotte's division and to be a deliberate slight on that general and his troops. The reverse is the truth.

they often throw valuable light on his character and thought and they are sometimes entertaining. But their interest arises from the fact that Napoleon was a great historic figure, and a representative selection of his papers must be dominated by the official documents by which for twenty years he dominated history.

To give the whole of the Napoleonic canon would fill sixty or more large volumes, and to make a comparatively small selection from this huge amount of material is not easy. There is hardly any of it that is not in some way interesting, though perhaps a quarter can be eliminated without great hardship. The use of a painfully rigorous standard raises this proportion to more than one half, and further inroads can be made by the regrettable but necessary exclusion of certain episodes or aspects of them. There remains a fifth or a quarter that demands inclusion if a representative selection is to be made. Yet even that is far too heavy a burden for the translator if not for the reader; the desirable must yield to the possible and these remaining papers be further reduced by two-thirds or more, to some 5 or 6 per cent. of the whole. At this point perhaps 1 per cent. select themselves, for they are documents that could not reasonably be left out. A little help can be gained by giving a slight preference to those referring to England and the United States and by representing some episodes less fully than others—not, it must be hoped, to an extent that mars the harmony of the whole. Beyond that there can be no solution other than an agonizing personal choice; there is much that it is hard to leave aside.

There are a few French words of the period—the days and months of the revolutionary calendar, *décade*, *chouan*, etc.—for which there are no English equivalents or whose equivalents distort the specialized meaning they then had; these are left in their original or in slightly anglicized forms and a note explaining the meaning is given at the first use of each. For ease of understanding distances, weights and measures are converted to modern English practice, though the league (three miles) is retained. For the same reason, military ranks are translated by their English equivalents, though this does some violence to the French language and incidentally deprives the chiefs of staff of the imperial armies of the honorific title of 'Major-General'; they remain simply 'Chief of Staff'. Admirals always appear as 'Admiral' although they were often addressed as 'General'. Early in the Revolution the very complicated royal coinage gave way to the simpler *centime*, *franc*, and *louis* (later *napoléon*), but occasional survivals occur and these are converted to the more familiar currency.\*

By Napoleon's time French orthography and grammar had already


\* 100 *centimes*—1 *franc*; 20 *francs*—1 *louis* or *napoléon*. There was also a ten *centime* unit called a *décime*, which has since disappeared. The *louis* and *napoléon* were worth slightly less than the English gold sovereign.

become fixed in their present form, but there was still a good deal of fluidity in the spelling of surnames: Talleyrand is sometimes referred to as Tallerand, Sieyès as Syeyès, Davout as Davoust, and the accent was frequently omitted from such names as Kléber, Schérer and Sérurier. These variations were widespread and had nothing to do with the fact that Napoleon's own spelling left much to be desired. The modern form is used in all such cases.


Letterheads have been formalized and the office and often the location of addressees added; names are supplied where addressees were addressed by their offices. As to endings and signatures, the printed sources are perforce followed in most cases, even though liable to be incomplete and inaccurate. To check each text against the original document would be a herculean task and is not always possible; but it has been done in a few cases and the text amended if necessary. In particular the correct signatures have been added to those few papers which were obviously composed as well as signed by persons other than Napoleon. A few corrections gleaned from other authoritative sources have been made.

Round brackets ( ) and any words contained in them appear in the original text. The few words in square brackets [ ] have been added during translation to avoid obscurity. The subject matter of documents minuted by Napoleon and, occasionally, of omitted passages is indicated in italic type also in square brackets. Omissions are shown by dots . . . , except in the case of complete paragraphs in documents whose paragraphs are numbered. A very few papers have been abridged in *précis* form and this is mentioned in footnotes. A solid line — represents a gap in the original. The use of inverted commas and of italics in the body of the texts follows the sources; as a result, alien words of French origin are treated as denizens and are not, as they would normally be, italicized.


The short notes appearing at the head of each section are not intended to provide more than an essential minimum of contextual information. It would be easy to write several books of explanatory matter around the texts; but since anything of that kind can be included only at the expense of the translation, it must be ruthlessly restricted. The footnotes, too, are generally limited to such few as seem necessary to ensure intelligibility.



NAPOLEON'S FAMILY TREE




Below, left: House of Beauharnais; right: House of Clary



REVOLUTIONARY AND IMPERIAL FRANCE


The thick line shows, approximately, the frontier before 1792 and after 1815.





DEPARTMENTS AND MILITARY DISTRICTS

*Inset: Department of the Seine*



PARIS DURING THE REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE

VOLUME ONE

# The Rise to Power

Bonaparte

B

Bonaparte

Bonaparte

Bonaparte

Auguste Maret

**Some early Signatures**

From above: 1794; 1796, to Josephine; 1798; 1801; 1802, proxy signature by the Secretary of State, Maret, who was empowered during the Consulate so to sign formal documents; Maret's own signature.

*Actual size*

## Preface

Though he had already then been head of the French state for over six months, Napoleon's rise to power may be said to have been completed when he returned to Paris after the Marengo campaign. That was at the beginning of July, 1800, just six weeks before his thirty-first birthday. Up till that time his life had passed through a series of phases, each in a sense logically complete in itself. The sections in this volume follow these natural divisions of his career, though they vary widely as to the proportion of the available material that they contain.

The first twenty-four years of Bonaparte's life covered his childhood in Corsica, his education at Autun, Brienne and Paris and nearly eight years as a commissioned officer in the French army. Yet despite its variety this period had a unity of its own, for it was the period both of his obscurity and of his emotional attachment to Corsica, during which he was more interested and involved in the affairs of his native island than in those of France and indeed looked upon the French as alien conquerors. At the end of it, disillusioned with his compatriots, he renounced his Corsican attachment and almost simultaneously stepped into the pages of history. The next two and a half years, lying 'between the time when he was nothing and the time when he was everything', form another distinct period, one characterized by alternating success and frustration and brought to a close by marriage and his first command of an army in the field.

Regrettably but necessarily these two periods are together represented by but a single short section, *The Early Years*, of seventy-four documents. The thirty letters, short notes and extracts dating from before Toulon can give little idea of the prolific essays, histories, notes, novels and dialogues with which he filled notebook after notebook for seven or eight years; all they can do is show something of the development of his life and give a glimpse of a few of his activities, interests and ideas. There is far less extant material of the next period and the forty-three papers translated form almost one-third of what is available in the printed sources.

Between March, 1796, and December, 1797, Bonaparte first demonstrated the real extent of his powers. The Italian campaigns and their aftermath faced him with situations as difficult and complex as any he was to meet, and he handled them all with intense energy and, despite his inexperience, with masterly ability. The 2,500 or so surviving documents that he produced while doing so contain some of the most interesting he ever wrote. *Italy*, the longest section in the volume, contains 195 of them. This is not enough to give a clear picture of a most intricate series of events, but the most important documents are included, as are examples of his battle orders and orders of the day and

of the remarkable love letters to Josephine; the military, political, diplomatic, administrative and personal aspects of the period are all represented.

After Italy came Egypt, which, with its brief prologue, the projected invasion of England, lasted almost exactly the same length of time; but it has left behind rather fewer documents—some 2,000. The 144 given in the section *Egypt* include all those concerned with the proposed invasion, but, except for these, purely military papers have been left aside in order to allow more space for those showing how Bonaparte handled the novel political and administrative problems the expedition entailed; a few naval papers of outstanding interest are included. The main course of the military events can be followed in his despatches to the Directory.

Immediately after his return from Egypt there opened the final critical phase of the rise to power. Two sections of this translation, overlapping in time, cover the seven months from Brumaire to the battle of Marengo with a total of 267 documents or about a quarter of those available. *Brumaire* contains almost all those concerned with the *coup d'état* itself together with a selection of later pieces to give some idea of the way he set about organizing his government and tackling the manifold difficulties facing it. In *Marengo* are grouped a substantial proportion of all Bonaparte's military documents dealing with the campaign; they give a clear picture of the planning, movements and operations with the exception of the three days immediately preceding the battle, from which, unfortunately, none of his own papers have come down to us.

A short final section has been added. Though they came after Bonaparte was firmly installed as First Consul, the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens form a natural epilogue to this first stage of his career, for while the Revolution was ended at Brumaire it was only through them that its legacy, the revolutionary war, was brought to a close. *Lunéville and Amiens* gives seventy diplomatic papers dealing with the negotiations that led up to them. These are almost all that he himself wrote; in the main his guidance was given verbally to Talleyrand and correspondence remained in the hands of the minister.

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## *The Early Years*

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~~1848~~  
~~5. 6/11/48~~  
LIBERTÉ,  
RÉPUBLIQUE



ÉGALITÉ,  
FRANÇAISE,

*Paris le 8 Brumaire, an 4*

*Paris le 7 Brumaire*  
*L'an 4.*  
*Le*

~~R. BARRAS, Représentant du Peuple, Général~~  
en chef de l'Armée de l'intérieur,

Letter-head of the Army of the Interior

Showing Barras' name crossed out, the letter being dated 7 Brumaire, Year 4, or four days after Buonaparte replaced him in the command.

*Actual size.*



**N**APOLEON WAS BORN AT AJACCIO IN CORSICA ON THE FIFTEENTH of August, 1769. He was a French subject since a year earlier the island had been ceded by Genoa to France, but for some years previously the inhabitants had achieved practical independence and they fought bitterly but unsuccessfully against the French troops sent to repress them. In the spring of 1769 they were finally defeated; Paoli, their leader, fled, to settle later in London, and his supporters, of whom Carlo Buonaparte was one, unwillingly accepted French rule. These facts were of much importance for the first twenty-four years of Napoleon's life.

Little is known of his early childhood, but it seems to have been happy and carefree, and he had an elementary education at the school of the Abbé Rocco. His family was among the most prominent in the island, but even by Corsican standards it was not rich and Carlo was an easy-going spendthrift. In other ways he was an excellent father. Since he could claim noble birth his children were eligible for free places in the royal military schools and with the help of the French governor, Marbeuf, he succeeded in placing Napoleon at Brienne. Later he also placed Lucien there and Marianna at the girls' college of St. Cyr. In December, 1778, he took Joseph and Napoleon to the college at Autun, where they were to learn French, and four months later Napoleon moved to Brienne. He proved to be very good at mathematics, fair at history and geography, but very poor at languages. After five years at Brienne he passed into the Royal Military College at Paris and a year later he was commissioned into the Artillery Regiment of la Fère, then stationed at Valence.\*

The first extant document written by Buonaparte is a long letter to one of his uncles dated July, 1784; the second appears as No. 1 in this translation. Soon he became a prolific writer: letters, essays on every subject from love to politics and military science, autobiographical jottings, stories and projects for books came in profusion; he read widely and made copious notes on his reading (No. 10). Much of this throws light on the author; little is of intrinsic merit, though some of his letters, such as the series to Joseph in 1792 (Nos. 22-26), give interesting accounts of the Revolution. Apart from this literary activity and his regular duties, after the death of his father in 1785 he became responsible for the family interests in France; he supervised Lucien's and later

\* His own little note (No. 9) tells the bare outline of his life until June, 1788. The record can be continued as follows: he remained with his regiment at Auxonne till September, 1789; he was in Corsica from then until February, 1791, when he returned to Auxonne, moving to Valence in June on being transferred to the 4th Artillery Regiment (formerly of Grenoble); with a gap of five months in Paris between May and October, 1792, he was again in Corsica from October, 1791, till June, 1793. Thereafter his true career began. He was promoted full lieutenant in June, 1791, captain a year later.

Louis's education (No. 16), watched over Marianna (Nos. 23, 27) and tried unsuccessfully to obtain the money owed to the Buonapartes by the French state (No. 13).

But throughout these early years his real interest lay in Corsica, and for the first eight years after he was commissioned almost two-thirds of his time was spent there. Though educated in France and an officer in the French army, he felt the French to be not only alien but the oppressors of his own nation (No. 4). Corsican independence was his aim and Paoli his hero, and when he planned a large historical and propagandist work on the subject he sought the general's approval (No. 14). At the same time he was strongly influenced by French political thought and believed that the principles of the Revolution should be adopted in Corsica, which would find its true independence through their application. It was therefore as a leader of the revolutionary party that in 1790 he began to play a prominent part in the island's turbulent politics. A few months later Paoli returned and, though he was fêted on his way through Paris, it soon became clear that he was quite out of sympathy with these ideas. By 1793 Corsica was in a state of civil war, and the French government, overburdened with war and revolt at home, was unable to help the small republican party. The Buonaparte house was sacked and Napoleon himself narrowly escaped capture and death. On 11 June he abandoned Corsica for good and sailed with all his family to France, having a few days earlier written a last account of the island's affairs (No. 29). A year later, at the invitation of the Paolists, Corsica was occupied by the English.

While his family settled in Marseilles Buonaparte joined part of his regiment attached to the Army of Italy at Nice. There he was employed in organizing the coastal batteries and in that capacity on 3 July he wrote No. 30 to the Minister of War; a day or two later he was sent to Avignon to collect supplies. The royalist revolt which swept through the southern cities after the triumph of the Jacobins had already broken out, and it seems that he joined Carteaux's little army in its attack on the insurgents at Avignon, but after the capture of the town, when Carteaux moved on to bring Marseilles and Toulon to heel, he stayed to carry out his task and also spent some time in writing and publishing *The Supper at Beaucaire*. This, his best-known political pamphlet, is a dialogue in which he appeals to the rebels to surrender; the main argument is the hopelessness of their military position, but he also makes a political defence of Jacobinism and an attack on the treasonable nature of the revolt.

Marseilles fell on 25 August and Carteaux moved the Army of the South to attack Toulon. This was a harder problem, for not only was the town in a strong and well-fortified position but by agreement with the British an English fleet under Hood had moved into the roads and

landed some 12,000 British and allied troops. At the very first action Dommartin, Carteaux's artillery commander, was wounded; shortly afterwards Buonaparte was passing through the army area on his way back to Nice and Saliceti, Representative of the People\* with the army and a fellow Corsican who knew something of him, at once put him under requisition to take Dommartin's place. He was also promoted major.

There is no doubt that Buonaparte played an important part in the capture of the town; numerous reports attest his capacity, energy and courage, and he was to find among his superiors there loyal patrons who recognized his abilities. He carried the main responsibility for executing the plan of attack against l'Eguillette and the fleet, but the plan itself had been agreed between the generals and Representatives on the spot and had equally been devised in Paris before ever he reached the scene; despite the suggestion in No. 33, it was not 'his' plan, and a dozen others with more justification but fewer historians to support them claimed it as their own. It is often also glossed over that he was formally in command of the artillery only until 6 November, when General du Teil took over; conscious of the weakness of his own rank Buonaparte had himself asked in No. 31 for such an appointment to be made, though du Teil entirely endorsed and supported his subordinate's plans (Nos. 31-36).

With the fall of Toulon his services were rewarded by immediate promotion to the rank of brigadier-general and the post of Commander of Artillery in the Army of Italy together with a special assignment to reorganize the coastal defences so as to hold the English fleet at bay and protect the vital shipping lanes linking the southern ports. During the first half of 1794 he was mainly at work on this (Nos. 37-39, 42-43), but he also commanded his artillery in the spring offensive along the coast. This brought him into close association with the Representative, Augustin Robespierre, brother of Maximilian, who reported on him as an officer of 'transcendant merit'. It also gave him a first view of the problems of warfare on the Piedmontese frontier and in May he drew up a plan for the campaign in Italy which was strongly supported by the Representatives but was vetoed in Paris in favour of a far more limited operation.

On 23 July, the Revolution of Thermidor, Robespierre fell, and all those considered his supporters were placed in jeopardy. On 8 August Buonaparte was arrested and lodged in the Fort Carré at Antibes. While there he rejected an offer by his aides-de-camp Junot and Marmont to secure his escape (No. 44) and sent off what seemed his last report on the coastal defences (No. 45). But the Representatives were well aware of his value to the army and no evidence could be found

\* For the role of the Representatives of the People, see p. 81 below.

against him; on 20 August he was released and reinstated and so took part in the small but successful autumn operations against the Austrians which he recounts in No. 47. At the end of that letter he refers to the forthcoming expedition to drive the English from Corsica and the winter was spent in preparing for this. The fleet sailed on 5 March, 1795, with Buonaparte in command of the landing artillery, but it was brought to action, sustained heavy loss and damage and was forced to return. His post with the Army of Italy having been given to Casabianca, he was now unemployed, and at the end of April he was summoned to Paris.

He reached the capital at the end of May and there began another long series of letters to Joseph, who was still at Marseilles and shortly moved to Genoa (No. 48, etc.); these are again interesting for his impressions of the social and political life of Paris as well as information about the family and his own doings. He was almost at once posted to command an infantry brigade in the Army of the West, but this had few attractions and on a plea of ill-health he refrained from taking it up. He then obtained far more interesting work in the Topographical Office\* of the Committee of Public Safety, which placed him at the centre of the operational planning for all the armies (No. 56). At about the same time he offered to lead a military mission to Turkey, a proposal that was strongly supported by some members of the Committee but was finally refused on the ground that his abilities were needed at home (Nos. 56-57).

On 13 Vendémiaire (5 October), after weeks of simmering ferment (Nos. 60-61), the royalist faction in Paris revolted. Barras, the nominal commander of the Army of the Interior, called in Buonaparte who quickly and effectively suppressed the rising (Nos. 62-63). Before the month was out he was given the formal command of the Army of the Interior and the Paris Military District. At about the same time he met Josephine; † before the end of the year they were lovers (No. 69), and on 9 March, 1796, they were married (No. 74).

One other factor of great importance during this period of his life was his continued interest in the Italian theatre of war. With his know-

\* This important office was, as its name implies, originally no more than a map section. When the Committee of Public Safety assumed the virtual government of France it quickly expanded into a large department in which was centralized almost all military intelligence and operational planning. It continued under the Directory, and was retained by Buonaparte when he came to power as a means of direct communication with the armies by-passing the Ministry of War.

† Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie came of an old family settled in Martinique and was born in 1763. In 1779 she married Viscount Alexandre de Beauharnais, who reached high command in the revolutionary wars but was guillotined during the Terror; she, too, was arrested but was saved by Thermidor. There were two children of this marriage: Eugène, born in 1781, and Hortense, two years younger.

ledge of the area and the problems it presented he could not approve the timorous operations being carried out. In the summer of 1795 he prepared two papers (No. 53) setting out in detail what he thought the right plan of campaign. These had little practical effect, but in the following January he wrote two further notes (No. 70) criticizing current operations and restating his own plans. These were sent to Schérer, the army commander, who replied that they could not be carried out and that if they were to be tried the man who had prepared them should do it; he also offered to resign. Schérer was taken at his word, and on 2 March Buonaparte was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

### THE DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION

During the earlier stages of the Revolution Buonaparte had been little more than an interested spectator, but after his return in 1793 the politics of France affected him more directly. That event coincided with the outbreak of the Terror, of which he saw a good deal since it was at its most violent in the southern towns. Though wisely reticent, his opinions at that time tended towards Jacobinism; but there is little doubt that he liked organized terror as little as mob rule, and he probably approved of the effects of Thermidor despite the momentary danger in which it placed him. For a further two years he remained politically insignificant, but with the regime of the Directory he was from start to finish intimately concerned.

The Constitution of the Year III vested all executive power in a board of five Directors elected by the councils. One Director retired annually, and a quorum of three was needed for their acts to be valid. Directors must be forty years of age and they could not personally command troops. Legislative power rested with two councils chosen by electoral colleges in the departments, one-third of their members being replaced each year. Legislators could hold no other public office, must be French citizens with full rights and, absence on official business apart, must have resided in the Republic for ten years before election. The Council of Five Hundred, with 500 members who must be twenty-five years old, proposed, discussed, amended and voted all draft laws. The Council of the Ancients, with 250 members of at least forty years of age, discussed and voted for or against all bills passed by the lower house. The councils could form no permanent committee but could form themselves into *ad hoc* secret general committees for discussion only; all other meetings were public. They could not hold joint sessions but must sit in the same commune, which was to be determined by the Ancients. A specially recruited Legislative Guard was assigned to them and the government could not bring other troops within twelve leagues of their seat.

This constitution was voted by the Convention on 22 August, 1795, and approved by the electorate in September. It came into force on 1 November when La Reveillère-Lépeaux, Letourneur, Rewbel, Barras and Carnot were chosen Directors.

The Thermidorians had suppressed the Terror, but they were themselves ex-terrorists, republicans and regicides. Large sections of the public now held far more reactionary views and, under the influence of secretly returned emigrants supported by English gold, were frankly royalist. To prevent their own political extinction and probable proscription the men of Thermidor therefore passed, together with the constitution, a Law of Two Thirds, by which at the first election two-thirds of the members of the councils should be chosen from the membership of the lapsed Convention. It was this law that provoked the insurrection of Vendémiaire. There was thus a fatal dichotomy, at first between the public and the whole constitutional apparatus and later, as subsequent elections brought royalists into the councils, between these and the Directors. The result was the series of more or less violent *coups d'état* which afflicted the history of the Directory and paved the way for Brumaire.


#### THE REPUBLICAN CALENDAR

On 5 October, 1793, a new republican calendar was legally introduced in France, the aim being partly to further the dissociation between the new secular society and Christian tradition and partly to achieve a more 'reasonable' system than the Gregorian. Preparation of the scheme was the work of a committee in which the mathematicians Monge and Lagrange and the poet Fabre d'Eglantine were the most active members. The new calendar was backdated to the proclamation of the Republic on 22 September, 1792, which thus became the first day of the new Year I.


The year was divided into twelve months of thirty days each, the months, in their order in the calendar, being named: Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire, Nivôse, Pluviôse, Ventôse, Germinal, Floréal, Prairial, Messidor, Thermidor and Fructidor. Since these months included a total of only 360 days, 5 'complementary days', or 'sansculottides', were added at the end of each year; i.e. after 30 Fructidor. A sixth complementary day was added in leap years. Translation between the two calendars is complicated by the fact that the leap day is in one case added in September and in the other in February and that the leap years do not in any case coincide. (In this translation Gregorian in addition to Republican dates are given at the head of all documents dated according to the latter system. Republican dates within the texts are not so translated, but they can be identified by reference to appropriate letter-heads.)

Each month was divided into three periods of ten days, known as 'decades', and the days of the decade were named: Primidi, Duodi, Tridi, Quartidi, Quintidi, Sextidi, Septidi, Octidi, Nonidi, Décadi. Décadi was the legal day of rest and the complementary days were also given over to festivals and holidays.

The republican calendar was discontinued and the Gregorian restored as from 1 January, 1806 (11 Nivôse, Year XIV).



CORSICA



TOULON

## I

**To Monsieur Carlo Buonaparte***At Ajaccio**Royal Military School, Brienne**12 October, 1784*

My dear Father,

Your letter, as you can imagine, has not given me much pleasure; but the interests of your health and of the family are very dear to me and have forced me to approve your early return to Corsica, which has consoled me for everything.

Besides, being assured of the continuance of your kindness and love and your eagerness to help me in every way, how could I not be happy and content? I hasten to ask you for news of the effect the waters have had on your health and to assure you of my respectful devotion and eternal gratitude.

I am pleased that Joseph has gone to Corsica with you, provided that he is here on 1 November, that is about a year from now. Joseph can come here, because Father Patrault, my mathematics master, whom you know, is not leaving. Consequently the Principal has told me to assure you that he will be well received here and can come with confidence. Father Patrault is an excellent teacher and has assured me that he will take charge of him with pleasure, and, if my brother is ready to work, we can take the artillery examination together . . . My dear Father, for several reasons I hope you will place him at Brienne rather than Metz. 1. Because that will be a consolation for Joseph, Lucien and me . . . 2. It is not usual at Metz to learn in six months what Joseph must know for the examination; since my brother knows no mathematics, they would put him with the children. These and many other reasons should decide you to send him here . . .

Please send me Boswel's *History of Corsica*\* and other histories or memoirs concerning that kingdom. You need have no fear; I will take care of them and bring them back to Corsica with me when I come.

Good-bye, my dear Father. Lucien embraces you with all his heart. He works well and did very well at the public exercise. The inspector will be here on the 15th or 16th of this month at the latest. When he leaves I will let you know what he said to me. Give my respects to Minana† Saveria, Aunt Gertrude, Uncle Nicolino, Aunt Touta, etc. . . . Please take care of them. Send me news of them and tell me they are happy. I end by wishing you health as good as my own.

Your humble and obedient son,

DE BUONAPARTE

\* He means *An Account of Corsica* by James Boswell.

† A Corsican diminutive for 'mother'. Saveria was his paternal grandmother, Gertrude his paternal aunt, Nicolino her husband, Nicolo Paravicini. Aunt Touta is unidentified.



2

**To Archdeacon Lucciano Buonaparte***At Ajaccio**Royal Military School, Paris**23 March, 1785*

My dear Uncle,

It would be useless to tell you how affected I have been by the tragedy that has befallen us. We have lost in him a father, and God knows what a father he was, what his tenderness and love for us! Alas! In everything he was the protector of our youth. You have lost in him an obedient and grateful nephew. You know better than I how much he loved you. I will even dare to say that through his death our country has lost an enlightened and disinterested citizen. That dignity with which he has several times been honoured shows the confidence his compatriots had in him, and yet heaven lets him die, and where? A hundred leagues from home, in a strange country, far from all he held most dear. One son, it is true, was present at that terrible moment; that must have been a great consolation to him, but certainly not to be compared with the triple joy he would have felt if he had ended his career in his own house, beside his wife and all his family. But the supreme Being has not allowed it to be so. His will is immutable. He alone can console us. Alas! Though he has taken from us what we held most dear, he has at least left those who alone can replace him. Agree, then, to be for us as the father we have lost. Our affection and gratitude will be equal to so great a service. I end by wishing that your health may be like my own.

NAPOLEONE DI BUONAPARTE

3

**To Madame Letizia Buonaparte***At Ajaccio**Royal Military School, Paris**28 March, 1785*

My dear Mother,

Today, when time has calmed a little the first transports of my grief, I hasten to show you the gratitude that your goodness towards us inspires in me. Be consoled, dear Mother; circumstances demand it. We will redouble our care and thankfulness and be happy if by our obedience we can make good a little the boundless loss of a dearly loved husband. I end, my dear Mother, as my sorrow demands, by begging you to calm your own. My health is perfect, and every day I pray that heaven may grant you the same. Give my respects to Aunt Gertrude,

Your very affectionate son,

NAPOLEON DI BUONAPARTE

P.S. The queen of France gave birth to a prince, named Duke of Normandy, at 7.0 in the evening on 27 March.

**Note***Valence**3 May, 1786*

Always alone in the midst of men, I come home to dream and give myself up to the full force of my melancholy. What is its subject today? Death. In the dawn of my life, I can hope to live a long time. I have been away from my country for six or seven years. What pleasures shall I not taste when, in four months, I again see my relatives and my compatriots? Can I not expect, from the tender feelings that memories of my childhood pleasures bring, that my happiness will be complete? So what madness makes me wish to destroy myself? What to do with my life, no doubt. Since I must die, is it not best to kill oneself? If I were already over sixty, I would respect the prejudices of my contemporaries and wait patiently for nature to run its course; but since I am beginning to know sorrow and nothing gives me pleasure, why should I put up with days that bring me no good? How far men are removed from nature! How vile, cowardly and grovelling they are! What sight shall I see in my country? My compatriots in chains and fearfully kissing the hand that oppresses them. They are no longer those brave Corsicans whom a hero inspired with his own virtues, enemies of tyrants, luxury and vile courtiers. Proud and filled with a noble sense of his personal importance, a Corsican was happy if he had spent the day in public affairs. The night passed in the tender arms of a beloved wife. Reason and enthusiasm wiped out all the troubles of the day. Love and nature made his nights like those of the gods. But, when liberty came, those happy times vanished like dreams! Frenchmen, not satisfied with having ravished everything we held dear, you have even corrupted our morals. So the picture of my country as it now is and the impossibility of changing it is an added reason for escaping from a land where duty forces me to praise men whom honour should lead me to hate. How am I to behave when I go back to my native land, and what am I to say? When his country is no more, a good patriot should die. If I could deliver my countrymen by destroying one man, I would go on the instant and sink the avenging blade in the tyrant's breast. My life is a burden because nothing gives me pleasure and everything is painful. It is a burden because the men among whom I live and shall probably always live are as different from me as the moon is from the sun. So I cannot live the one kind of life that would be bearable and therefore everything is distasteful.\*

\* Buonaparte was far from being as solitary as this piece suggests. He had a close friendship with his contemporary de Mazis and an easy enough relationship with his other fellow officers. But he had little social life outside the regiment at this time: what little money he could save was spent on books and his leisure in reading.

5

**To Monsieur Paul Borde***Bookseller, at Geneva**Valence**29 July, 1786*

I am writing to you direct, Sir, to ask you to send me the *Memoirs of Mme de Valens* and *Claude Anet* to follow on from the *Confessions* of J.-J. Rousseau.

I also beg you to send me the last two volumes of the *History of the Corsican Revolutions* by the Abbé Germanes. I shall be obliged if you will let me have a note of the works on the island of Corsica which you have or could procure for me quickly.

I await your reply to send you the money due.

Please address your letter: 'To Monsieur Buonaparte, artillery officer in the Regiment of La Fère, in garrison at Valence, Dauphiné.'

I am, Sir, with perfect consideration, your very humble and obedient, etc.

BUONAPARTE

*Artillery officer*

6

**To Doctor Tissot, F.R.S.\****At Lausanne**Ajaccio**1 April, 1787*

Sir,

You have spent your days in treating humanity and your reputation has reached even into the mountains of Corsica where medicine is not much used. It is true that the short but glorious eulogy you gave to their beloved general is title enough to the gratitude of my compatriots, which I am delighted to find myself in a position to offer you.

Not having the honour of being known to you and with no right other than the respect I have for your works, I yet dare approach you to ask advice for one of my uncles who has the gout. You may think little of my consultation when you learn that the patient in question is seventy years old; but consider, Sir, that some live to be a hundred and more, and, by his constitution, my uncle should be of this privileged number: of medium build, neither too sedentary nor too little so, having never been afflicted by those violent passions which disorder the natural economy, having had hardly any illness throughout his life; I will not say, like Fontenelle, that he had those two great qualities for living: a good body and an evil heart . . . An old Genoese sufferer

\* Tissot was a celebrated doctor, though better known for his book on onanism than his *Treatise on the Health of Men of Letters*, where he had mentioned Paoli in the same context as Caesar, Mahomet, and Cromwell. The sufferer from gout was the Archdeacon Lucien Buonaparte. Tissot did not reply and wrote on the back of the letter: 'Unanswered, of little interest.'

from the gout once foretold that he would be afflicted by this discomfort, a prediction based on the fact that my uncle has very small feet and hands and a large head. I imagine you will judge the outcome of this prediction as no more than coincidence.

His gout struck him at the age of thirty-two . . . He eats well, digests well, talks, reads, sleeps and passes his days, but without movement, without being able to enjoy the sweetness of the sun. He implores the aid of your science, if not to cure him, at least to move this troublesome malady into another place.

Humanity, Sir, leads me to hope that you will deign to answer this poorly phrased consultation. I myself have been afflicted with an ague, which makes me doubt whether you will be able to read this scrawl. I finish, Sir, by expressing the high regard that reading your works has inspired in me and the sincere gratitude that I hope to owe to you.

I am, Sir, with the deepest respect, your very humble and obedient servant.

BUONAPARTE

*Artillery officer in the Regiment of La Fère*

7

**To the Marshal Duke of Ségur**

*Minister of War*

*Ajaccio*

*21 April, 1787*

REGIMENT OF LA FÈRE

*Memorandum requesting leave*

Mr. Napoleon de Buonaparte, 2nd lieutenant in the artillery Regiment of La Fère, begs my Lord the Marshal of Ségur to grant him leave for five and a half months to date from 16 May next, which he needs for the recovery of his health, in accordance with the enclosed certificate of the doctor and surgeon. In view of my lack of means and costly treatment, I request that the leave should be granted with pay.

BUONAPARTE

8

**Note**

*Hotel de Cherbourg, Paris*

*22 November, 1787*

I left the Rue des Italiens and walked quickly down the avenues of the Palais-Royal. With my mind as usual filled with lively thoughts, I was indifferent to the cold; but imagination cooled, and I began to feel the rigour of the season and entered the gallery. I was nearly at those iron gates when my eyes lighted on a woman. From the time of day, from her figure and youth I could not doubt that she was a whore. I stared at her; she stopped, not in their usual grenadier manner, but in a way that exactly matched her movement. This harmony struck me.

Encouraged by her reticence, I spoke to her—I who am repelled more than most by her trade and feel myself sullied by a single glance. But before her pale face, frail body and soft voice I did not hesitate. Either, I thought, this is a person who will be useful for the inquiry I want to make, or else she is only a half-wit.

'You must be pretty cold,' I said; 'how can you stand walking in the avenues?'

'Oh, Sir, hope keeps me going. I must finish my evening.'

The indifference with which she said it, the unconcern of her reply caught my interest and I moved beside her.

'You don't look very strong. I am surprised you are not worn out by your trade.'

'Oh, dear me, Sir! I have got to do something.'

'That may be, but is there no work better for your health?'

'No, Sir, one must live.'

I was delighted, for at least she was answering me, and such success had not crowned every attempt I had made.

'You must be from some southern country, since you can face the cold.'

'I am from Nantes in Brittany.'

'I know that country. Mademoiselle, you must give me the pleasure of telling me how you lost your virginity.'

'It was an officer who took it.'

'Does that annoy you?'

'Oh, yes, I should say so! My sister is well set up now. Why shouldn't I have been?'

'How did you come to Paris?'

'The officer who degraded me deserted me. I had to escape a mother's anger. A second appeared, brought me to Paris, deserted me; and a third, whom I lived with for three years, followed him. He is French, but his business has taken him to London, and he is there now. Let's go to your place.'

'What shall we do there?'

'Come on, we will get warm and you will have your pleasure.'

9

Note

*Presumed Auxonne*  
*Presumed June/July 1788*

PERIODS OF MY LIFE

Born in 1769 on 15 August.

Left for France 15 December, 1778.

Arrived at Autun 1 January, 1779.

Left for Brienne 12 May, 1779.

Left for the School at Paris 30 October, 1784.

Left for the Regiment of La Fère as a second lieutenant 30 October, 1785.

Left Valence for six months leave at Ajaccio, 1786, 1 September.

Thus I returned to my country 7 years 9 months after my departure, aged 17 years 1 month. I was an officer at the age of 16 years 15 days.

Arriving on 15 September, 1786, I left on 12 September, 1787, for Paris, whence I left again for Corsica which I reached on 1 January, 1788, and left on 1 June for Auxonne.

## 10

**Notes on the History of England\****Auxonne**Begun July 1788*

It is probable that the British Isles were peopled by Gaulish colonies. The agreement between the customs, religion, etc., of the people in the southern part of the island and those of the Gauls leaves no doubt of this; but to the north of the river Tyne the east seems to have been inhabited by Scythians or Scandinavians. The Scots came from Ireland before the invasion of Julius Caesar. Their huts were small and made of branches covered with mud; their villages were in the woods. The people of the county of Kent knew agriculture, but those in the interior lived on milk, fruit and by hunting. The use of dress was little known. The inhabitants of the south, trading with the Phoenicians, wore animal skins. Diodorus Siculus praises their honesty and frugality. Women were held in common . . .

*Religion.* They worshipped the Supreme Being under the name of Esus or Hesus, whose symbol was the oak. The woods were their temples. The oak was regarded as the residence of the Almighty. Flowers sprinkled with salt water were the sole offering they made to their Gods, but soon after worshipping the gods of the Phoenicians they ended by immolating even men.

Their priests were called druids from the Celtic word *Deru* which means oak. The power of the priesthood did not content the druids and they soon extended their authority over all public acts . . . The Bards or poets enjoyed the greatest credit . . .

A.D. 61. Boadicea having claimed the inheritance of her husband Prasutagus, the Roman praetor, Catus Decianus, had her publicly whipped and handed over the princesses her daughters to his soldiers. Furious, she made the Romans pay dear for the indignity. It is reckoned that she had 80,000 massacred in the sack of a single town. Finally she was defeated in battle and took poison.

\* Made while reading John Barrow's *New and Impartial History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Preliminaries of Peace in 1763*. Were they to be given in full, these notes would occupy some fifty pages of this translation.

The Romans left the island in 446 . . .

1215. The barons and the nation in general demanded restoration of the liberties granted by Stephen and Henry I. They took to arms and seized London; the fugitive King granted their demand and the charter called *Magna Charta*, the foundation of English liberty.

*Magna Charta* confirms freedom of election for the clergy; says that ecclesiastics will not be fined in proportion to their benefices, but in accordance with their patrimonial property; fixes the dues of earldoms, baronies and other fiefs; ordains that the barons will recover the lands of their vassals confiscated for felony a year and a day after coming into the hands of the King; that widows cannot be forced to marry against their will; that no scutage or grant in aid may be levied without the consent of the Council of State, except in the case of paying a ransom for the King . . . that no free man may be arrested, imprisoned or deprived of his free-holds, liberty or free customs except by the legal judgement of his peers . . .

1688. The King tried in vain to abolish the penal laws and the Test Act. But the good English saw with horror the steps taken by the King to overturn the Constitution. They united and resolved to oppose these ambitious projects. On his own authority James abolished the penal laws and allowed liberty of conscience. But the Bishop of London and Archbishop of Canterbury, Sancroft, refused to publish this law. They were sent to the Tower as having issued licentious libels against the King . . .

The officers of James's army told him that they could not in conscience fight against the Prince of Orange who was at the head of the national association. On 23 December the King fled from England with his son, the Duke of Berwick . . .

Parliament declared that, James II having sought to exceed the Constitution by breaking the original contract between the sovereign and his subjects, having violated the fundamental laws and abandoned the kingdom, the Throne was vacant. The Earls of Rochester and Nottingham proposed the election of a protector, as though the king were mad. These lords were the leaders of the Tory party. But by two votes a new sovereign was preferred. It was decided by a majority of seven votes that an original contract did exist between the subjects and the King . . .

## II

### Dissertation on the Authority of Kings

*Auxonne*

23 October, 1788

This work will begin with the origin and growth of the name of king in mens' minds. Military government is favourable to it. The

work will then enter into details of the usurped authority enjoyed by the kings in the twelve kingdoms of Europe.

There have been very few kings who have not deserved to be dethroned.\*

12

## To Madame Letizia Buonaparte

At Ajaccio

*Auxonne*

12 January, 1789

My health is at last restored, so I can write to you at length. This country is very unhealthy because of the marshes surrounding it and the frequent flooding of the river which fills all the ditches with water and this gives off infected vapour. I have had several periods of continuous fever which would leave me for a few days only to attack me again. That made me weak, gave me delirium and made me undergo a long convalescence. Today, now that the weather has improved and the snow, ice, winds and fog have disappeared, I am out and about again. I have taken the opportunity of writing to M. de Campy. As soon as I have his reply I will let you know. This unhappy period in the finances of France is seriously delaying discussion of our affair. But let us hope that we shall be compensated for everything and shall not lose through our long and painful wait. †

The King has just secured a loan of 30 millions. The Discount Bank has supplied it at 5 per cent. repayable in 1792. That means the operations of the States General can be awaited patiently. Discord seems to have thrown the apple among the Three Orders, and the Third Estate has already carried the day as to the number of deputies it will have, but that victory will not mean much unless it also obtains voting by numbers instead of by Order which is as old as the monarchy. The Clergy and Nobility seem disposed to defend their ancient rights and prerogatives strongly. Apart from these general divisions, there is not a province where there are not four or five quarrels about different things. In any case, the letters of summons have not yet been sent, so the States cannot meet before May or June. The King of Spain, as you know, died a few months ago. The King of England has gone mad, and after long discussions the Regency has been given to the Prince of Wales. The Emperor is in danger. They say he has dropsy of the chest. The cold has stopped work in the countryside. Denmark, which wanted to come out against Sweden, has been prevented by the declarations of Berlin and London.

It seems that the Council of War is busy drawing up our regulations. We shall know in a month and shall see what they want to do with us.

\* This project appears never to have been written.

† See No. 13 below.



But it looks as if the Engineers will be roughly handled. Two months ago they were talking of reducing them to 150 officers. That is not a pleasant prospect for them, though in fact there are 350 and that is certainly too many. What changes are there in Corsica? . . . Send me news of Joseph. Has he stayed or gone to Pisa . . . Marianna is well.

I have good reason to be worried. I have had no news from Corsica since October. So write to me at once.

13

### To the Intendant of Corsica

*At Versailles*

*Auxonne*

*2 April, 1789*

Pardon me, Sir, if, even in the centre of pleasures, I pursue you with my affairs. It is three years since we were promised indemnity for the cancellation of our contract for the establishment of a plantation of mulberries; it is three years since the deed was drawn up and you were so good as to forward it to the Court, but we have heard nothing further.

This delay is seriously harming our situation, which this undertaking has much damaged. You are aware of the justice of our claims and I am now asking your kindness, as the protector of justice, in helping us to obtain it.

You know, Sir, that last year we delivered but 4,000 or 5,000 trees, although we had 10,000 ready to transplant. This year we have delivered only some hundreds, although the King should still have taken 10,000. This cultivation is ruining us, and I cannot hide from you that the plantation is now in a very bad state.

But something must be done, and it is not just that we should continue to suffer. I await the honour of your reply and will then at once take steps as a result. I am charmed that this circumstance gives me the occasion to recall myself to you.

BUONAPARTE

14

### To General Paoli

*At London*

*Auxonne*

*12th June, 1789*

General,

I was born as our country was dying. Thirty thousand Frenchmen spued onto our coasts, drowning the throne of liberty in rivers of blood: such was the horrible sight which first struck my gaze. The cries of the dying, the groans of the oppressed, the tears of despair surrounded my cradle.

You left the island, and the hope of happiness went with you; slavery

was the price of our submission: crushed under the triple chains of the soldier, the lawyer and the tax collector, our compatriots live despised . . . Is that not the cruellest torture for a man of feeling? Did the unfortunate Peruvian know a more wounding pain as he perished beneath the iron of the Spaniard?

To justify themselves, traitors to our country, vile souls corrupted by love of sordid gain, have spread calumnies against the national government and against your person in particular. Writers have accepted them as truths and are transmitting them to posterity.

Reading them my anger grew hot and I determined to sweep away this fog born of ignorance. An early study of the French language, prolonged observation and memories drawn from the papers of patriots has led me to hope for some success. I wish to compare your administration with the present administration. I wish to blacken with the brush of infamy those who have betrayed the common cause. I want to call those who govern before the tribunal of public opinion, point out their impositions, uncover their secret intrigues and, if possible, interest the virtuous minister who governs the State in the deplorable fate afflicting us so cruelly . . .

I am still young, and my undertaking may be rash, but love of truth, of our country, of my compatriots, and the enthusiasm which leads me always to hope for an improvement in our condition will support me. If, General, you will deign to approve a work which will concern you so closely; if you will deign to encourage the efforts of a young man whose birth you witnessed and whose parents were always attached to the right party, I shall dare to look for some success.

I hope at some time to be able to go to London to tell you of the sentiments you have roused in me and to discuss the miseries of our country with you, but distance presents an obstacle; the day may come when I can overcome it.

Whatever may be the success of my work, I know that it will rouse against me the numerous cohort of French officials who govern our island and whom I attack; but what does that matter if it is in the interest of our country. I shall hear the wicked roar and, if the thunder falls, I will retire into my conscience, remember the legitimacy of my motives and thenceforward I shall be able to face it.

Allow me, General, to offer you the homage of my family and, why should I not say, of my compatriots. They sigh at the memory of a time when they hoped for liberty. My mother, Madame Letizia, asks me to remember to you the years at Corte.

I end, with respect, General,

Your very humble and obedient servant,

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE  
*Officer in the Regiment of La Fère*

**To Archdeacon Fesch***At Ajaccio**Serve, Dauphiné**8 February, 1791*

I am in a poor man's cabin where it is pleasant to write to you after a long conversation with these worthy souls. It is four in the afternoon and the weather is chilly; I have been for a walk; snow is not far off, but has not yet fallen. Everywhere I find the peasants very firm in their views, especially in Dauphiné, where they are all ready to die in support of the Constitution.

At Valence I found the people resolute, the soldiers patriotic and the officers aristocratic; but there is an exception, since the president of the club is a captain named Du Cerbeau . . .

Everywhere the women are royalist. That is not surprising; liberty is a prettier woman, who eclipses them.

All the priests of Dauphiné have taken the civic oath and are laughing at the ravings of the bishops.

We must not grumble too much about our Department; I know those in office at Valence and they are worth less than ours. . . .

What is called good society is three-quarter aristocratic; that is to say, it hides behind the mask of the partisans of the English constitution.

It is true that Peretti threatened Mirabeau with a knife, and that does no honour to our nation. The Patriotic Society should give a complete Corsican costume to Mirabeau: cap, coat, breeches, cartridge-pouch, dagger, pistol and musket. That would make a good impression . . .

I embrace you, my dear Fesch. The coach is coming and I must join it. We shall sleep at Saint-Vallier.

BUONAPARTE

**To Monsieur Joseph Buonaparte***At Ajaccio**Auxonne**Easter Day (24 April), 1791*

Fesch, to whom I have written at length, can give you some information as to the way you should go about settling the business of the plantation. It is time you took this in hand seriously. When you have done all that has to be done at Bastia, I will try to bring it to a conclusion by petitioning the National Assembly.

Louis has written five or six letters; I don't know what gibberish is in them.

He is studying hard and learning to write French. I am teaching him mathematics and geography and he is reading history. He will be an excellent pupil. All the women round here love him. He has quite the proper French manner; when he goes into company he bows with

grace and says the correct things with as much gravity and dignity as if he were thirty. I can easily see that he will be the best of the four of us, and at least none of us will have had so fine an education.

You may not find his progress in writing very great, but remember that so far his master has only taught him to cut his pens and write capitals. You will be better pleased with his spelling. He is a charming pupil and works because he likes it rather than from self-respect . . .

The treasurer Conti will need a clerk or two. Could he not take Lucien? The treasurer of Saint-Jean-de-Losne has three clerks . . .

Your address [to the Societies of Friends of the Constitution] was thought better than I feared. It has had a very good effect.

Farewell.

17

### To Monsieur le Sancquer

*Chief Clerk, Ministry of War*

*Auxonne*

*3 June, 1791*

Sir,

Far from Paris and without connexions it is in you that I place my hope. The friendship which you were pleased to show to my father leads me to hope that you will help me.

It appears to me that in the reorganization of the service I shall be transferred to another regiment; that distresses me from every point of view, so long as there are officers immediately below me on the list who would change without displeasure. I have a brother with me who is destined for the service; I have made myself responsible for his education, which would be impossible in another regiment.

Had the orders already appeared, I would not approach you. I know that in that case I could but obey; but as things are I flatter myself that you will take an interest in my case.

I shall retain a grateful memory of your kindness.

With respect,

BUONAPARTE

18

### Notes on Rousseau\*

*Valence*

*June/October, 1791*

Page 76. It is in the consciousness of his moral freedom that man shows the spirituality of his nature . . .

The only goods that he knows in the universe are food, a female and sleep. The only ills he fears are pain and hunger. *I do not believe that.*

\* *Essay on the Origins of Inequality among Men.*

Page 84. In the primitive state, having no house, nor cabin, nor property of any kind, each halted at random and often for but a single night; the males and females coupled fortuitously as they met and in accordance with opportunity and desire; they parted with the same ease . . . *I believe none of this.*

Page 111. Let us conclude that, wandering in the forests without industry, speech or homes, without war or contact, with no need for his kind nor any desire to harm them, perhaps even without knowing another individually, primitive man . . . *I do not believe any of that.*

#### MY REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF NATURE

I do not think man has ever wandered solitary, without contact with or need of his kind. On the contrary, I believe that man, passing from childhood into adolescence, has felt a need for others, has joined a woman and chosen a cavern to be the base for his hunting, his refuge from the storm and at night, his food store. The union was strengthened by habit and by the bond of children; but it could be broken capriciously. I believe that two savages met when hunting, met again, found friendship and had the desire to bring their homes together. In that moment the natural clan was born. I think this clan lived happily because it had abundant food, shelter against the climate and beautiful products, that it lived happily because it enjoyed natural feelings and natural religion. I think that for a great many centuries the earth was divided between a very few such clans, widely separated and unknown. With the centuries the clans multiplied and had to enter into relations. Then the earth could not provide for them without cultivation, and property and social relations and soon governments were born. From then on there was exchange of goods and tastes. Imagination left the hole where it had long been hidden. Selfishness, suspicion and pride arose and there were pale ambitious men who seized control of affairs and healthy young rascals who seduced the wives and frequented harlots.

My object is not to prove this series of stages through which men have passed on their road to the social condition, but only to prove that they have never lived wandering without homes, or contacts or other needs than that of the male and female coupling furtively as they met in accordance with opportunity and desire. Why is it supposed that man ate in the state of nature? Because there is no example of a man existing except by this means. I believe that in the state of nature man had the same faculties of feeling and reasoning. He must have made use of them for there is no example of a man existing without using these two faculties. To feel is the need of the heart, as to eat is that of the body. To feel is to become attached, to love. Man must have known pity, friendship, love. Thence gratitude, veneration,

respect. If it had been otherwise, if it were true to say that sentiment and reason are not inherent in man, but only fruits of society, then there would be no natural sentiment or reason; no duty of virtue; no happiness in virtue. It will not be the citizen of Geneva who will tell us that.

19

### To Monsieur Sucy

*War Commissary, at Valence*

Corte

17 February, 1792

Circumstances have forced me, dear Sucy, to remain in Corsica longer than the duty of my employment allowed. I know that, yet I have nothing with which to reproach myself; dearer and more sacred duties justify me.

Now that I am more free, I would like to come and join you, but first I would like your advice. How am I placed as a result of the review of 1 January? Has my post been filled and what steps should I take?\*

I am at Corte. M. Volney is here and in a few days we are leaving on a tour of the island. M. de Volney, known in the Republic of Letters for his *Voyage in Egypt*, his essays on agriculture and his *Meditation on Ruins*, is equally so in the memory of patriots for his constancy in supporting the good party in the Constituent Assembly. He wishes to settle here and pass his life quietly in the midst of a simple people, a fertile soil and the perpetual spring of our country.

I received your letter several months ago; you gave me good news of our friends on the Rhône, which pleased me. Tell them that I take a deserved interest in their health and happiness.

I see no point in your showing my letter to these gentlemen of the regiment; it is for you alone to make me speed my departure; on receiving your letter, I will leave.

My compliments to Gouvion, Berthon and Vaubois. My respect and friendship, dear Sucy. Your, etc.

BUONAPARTE

20

### To Monsieur Sucy

*War Commissary, at Valence*

Corte

27 February, 1792

In difficult times the place of honour for a good Corsican is his own country. With this idea my friends have demanded that I stay among them; but since I do not wish to fail in my duty I was proposing to offer my resignation. Then the general officer of the department

\* He had in fact been struck off the Army List as absent without leave. But owing to the shortage of officers due to emigration he had no difficulty in securing reinstatement.

offered me a *modus vivendi* which has reconciled everything. He has offered me the post of adjutant-major in the volunteer battalions.\* This commission will delay the moment when we can renew our acquaintance, but I hope not for long if affairs go well.

You have completely neglected me, Sir, for it is a long time since I heard from you.

Things are going well here and I hope that when you read this the political troubles will have ended, at least for this campaign; our enemies would be very foolish to hasten the opening of hostilities, as they must know well that a defensive position ruins us as much as a war.

If you take the trouble to think of an old friend, send me news. If your nation loses its courage at this moment it will cease to exist for ever.

If you still have connexions with Saint-Etienne, I beg you to have a pair of double-barrelled pistols made for me . . . I will pay up to seven or eight louis in five-franc assignats . . .

BUONAPARTE

21

## Battalion Regulations

*Corsican National Guard*

*Ajaccio  
April, 1792*

The adjutant-major must hold the rolls of all the companies and of the officers and N.C.O.s with their rank and service so that he is at all times in a position to give ordinary and extraordinary orders to each one.

He must attend the daily midday parade, inspect the guard and march it off to relieve the old guard.

Immediately the guard is mounted the orderly sergeant and corporals of the different companies will report to the adjutant-major, who will read the orders. Officers required for duty will be informed by the N.C.O. of the duty company.

The duties of an adjutant-major demand energy and discipline; he must be a man entirely devoted to his service. It is round him that the whole command of the battalion revolves. After the parade he must report the position to the battalion commander.

CAPTAIN

The captain is responsible for the discipline of his company. He must supervise the issue of pay and ensure that no soldier is absent without

\* Regular officers were entitled to hold commissions in the National Guards without forfeiting their position or seniority in their own regiments. At the beginning of April Buonaparte was elected lieutenant-colonel of the 2nd Battalion of the Corsican National Guard, and it was in this capacity that he issued the regulations given in No. 21.

leave. He himself cannot grant more than — without the permission of the battalion commander.

There will be an orderly captain for each day. His duties will be to attend the midday roll-call of the battalion, to receive the rolls of the companies, to punish those absent and to render a report to the battalion commander. In the evening, at retreat, he will inspect the various quarters to ensure that all is quiet and receive the rolls from the sergeant-majors. He will inform the guard sergeant and orderly sergeants of his whereabouts so that he can be found in case of need.

#### LIEUTENANT

The lieutenants must supervise the training of their platoons. There will be a daily duty lieutenant with one man per company, a sergeant and a corporal to police headquarters. At 9.0 a.m. daily the duty lieutenant will send one of the corporals to the battalion commander with his report.

#### SERGEANT-MAJOR

It is the sergeant-major who is principally responsible for the company accounts. On pay days he will draw up the total due to those present in his company, will have it signed by the company commander and take it to the quartermaster treasurer. The sergeant-major must record all movements of the company and report them daily to the adjutant-major and weekly to the war commissary . . .

At 9.0 a.m. daily the sergeant-majors will report to the lieutenant-colonel. There they will present requests for leave and the requirements of their companies. They will then report to their captains any orders given. They will call the roll of their companies at midday and in the evening and will report the roll to the orderly captain.

#### SERGEANT AND CORPORAL

For each company there will be an orderly sergeant and corporal who must remain at the Seminary. They will receive orders from the adjutant-major daily at midday, will warn the officers of their company ordered for duty and inform the sergeant-major that so many men of the company are ordered for such a time . . .

#### VOLUNTEERS

There will be one volunteer per company on guard and one at call on picket, who must be at headquarters at 1.30 p.m. The men on picket will return to their quarters at night. Volunteers will be present at roll-call at midday at the Seminary and at night in their quarters. They must turn in at retreat as do regular soldiers.

A volunteer must not walk out armed. They are forbidden to carry dagger or pistols. They are required to obey their corporals.

**BUONAPARTE**  
*Lieutenant-Colonel*



22

**To Monsieur Joseph Buonaparte***At Ajaccio**Paris**29 May, 1792*

I reached Paris yesterday. For the moment I have put up at the hotel where Pozzo di Borgo, Leonetti and Peraldi\* are staying. It is too dear, so I shall move today or tomorrow. I have seen Pozzo di Borgo only for a moment; we were restrained, but friendly.

Paris is in great convulsions. It is flooded with foreigners and there are many discontented. For three nights the city has been lit up. The national guards guarding the King at the Tuileries have been doubled. The Household Corps, which is said to be very undesirably composed, is to be disbanded.

News from the frontiers is still the same. They will probably retire so as to fight a defensive. Desertion among the officers is excessive; in every way the position is critical . . .

They tell me that Pozzo di Borgo stands very well with the Minister of War.

I have not seen Marianna yet. I shall go the day after tomorrow . . .

Keep on close terms with Paoli. He is everything and can do everything. In the future he is going to be more than anyone foresees . . .

I shall go to the Assembly for the first time today. This one has not got the same reputation as the Constituent.

Give my news to the family. Write to me at once. I embrace you.

BUONAPARTE

23

**To Monsieur Joseph Buonaparte***At Ajaccio**Paris**18 June, 1792*

There are three parties in France: one wants the Constitution as it is because it thinks it good; another thinks it bad, but desires liberty and adopts its principles. It wants change, but wants it through the provisions of the Constitution, that is by the Revising Court which should take place in a few years time. These two parties are united and at the moment they seek the same end, the maintenance of order, of the law and all the established authorities; they make war against the foreigners; thus, we confuse them and treat them as one. The second party wants the Constitution, but instead of the King it would have a Senate. This is the party of the Jacobins and calls itself republican. They would take advantage of the Queen's brother making war on us to bring this great revolution about. The third party thinks the Constitution absurd and would like a despot. Even among these there are many who would

\* Corsican deputies to the National Assembly.

like the two chambers or some moderate system, but the whole party thinks that nothing will ever be achieved without the help of enemy armies . . .

The day before yesterday I saw Marianna, who is well. She begged me to take her away if they ever change their institutions.

Whether she leaves now or stays another four years, it is clear she will not get a dowry.\* Seven or eight have left at the age of twenty without getting it. It seems certain that the school is going to be either abolished or altogether changed from what it is like now. Marianna is young and would easily adapt herself to the new ways . . . So, my dear brother, if, as I suppose, you are at Ajaccio and you think her marriage could be arranged, write to me and I will bring her. If you think that very uncertain, then we could run the risk of leaving her, since we cannot tell how things will turn out. One reason that influences me much is that I feel she would be unhappy in Corsica if she stays in her convent until she is twenty, whereas today she would make the change without noticing it. Lose no time in writing me what you think about this.

You must try to see if Lucien can stay with the General. It is more than ever probable that all this will end in our independence . . .

BUONAPARTE

24

## To Monsieur Joseph Buonaparte

*At Ajaccio*

*Paris*

*22 June, 1792*

M. de la Fayette has written to the Assembly against the Jacobins. His letter, which many believe a forgery, is very strong. M. de la Fayette, most of the army officers, all honest men, the ministers, the administration of Paris are on one side; the majority of the Assembly, the Jacobins and the populace are on the other. The Jacobins no longer show any restraint against La Fayette, whom they picture as an assassin and a scoundrel. The Jacobins are fools who have no common sense. The day before yesterday seven or eight thousand men, armed with pikes, axes, swords, guns, spits or sharp sticks, went to the Assembly with a petition. From there they went to the King. The gardens of the Tuileries were shut and 15,000 national guards were guarding it. They broke down the gates, entered the palace, levelled cannon against the King's apartment and offered him two cockades, one white, the other tricolour. They gave him the choice. Choose, they said, whether you will reign here or at Coblenz. The King did well. He chose the red cap. The Queen and the royal Prince did the same. Then they drank with

\* Formerly, girls leaving Saint-Cyr at the age of twenty to be married had received a dowry of 3,000 francs.

the King. They remained in the palace for four hours. That has supplied plenty of material for the aristocratic declarations of the Feuillantins. But it is none the less true that it was unconstitutional and a very dangerous example. It is hard to foresee what will become of the empire in such stormy circumstances . . .

I am sending you a copy of the *Cabinet of Fashions*. That is for Paoletta.

I will await your answer about Marianna. I am more undecided than ever. I have been a month in Paris and still the papers about the Plantation have not come. I foresaw well enough what would happen . . .

Cataneo of Calvi is here. Oh, the misery of human folly! He has almost gone off his head; he gambles all day, often loses, has sold his clothes and has only an old blue coat left. I pity him. He has not been to see his daughter for three years. The girl thinks he is in Corsica. This news is for you alone . . .

BUONAPARTE

25

### To Monsieur Lucien Buonaparte

At Ucciani\*

Paris

3 July, 1792

I am sending you the proposals of the committee on public education; nothing has yet been decided, and the Assembly cannot consider it at such an inflammable moment. Read it with attention, my dear Lucien, and profit by it; it is not a masterpiece, but it is good all the same.

Sensible men have found Lafayette's step necessary but dangerous for liberty. In times of revolution an example is a law and that general has just given a pretty dangerous example. The people, that is to say the lowest classes, are roused, and no doubt there is going to be trouble. It may be such as to hasten the ruin of the Constitution.

Those at the top are poor creatures. It must be admitted, when you see things at first hand, that the people are not worth the trouble taken in winning their favour. You know the history of Ajaccio; that of Paris is exactly the same; perhaps men are here even a little smaller, nastier, more slanderous and censorious. You have to see things close to to realize that enthusiasm is but enthusiasm and that the French are an old nation without ties.

Everyone seeks his own interests and wants to succeed at the price of no matter what horror and calumny; intrigue is as base as ever. All that destroys ambition. People pity those who have to play a prominent

\* In the hills above Ajaccio, where Letizia Buonaparte, Lucien, and the younger children were spending the summer.

part, especially when they need not; to live quietly and enjoy one's family and one's own life, that, my dear brother, is the life you should lead if you have an income of 4,000 or 5,000 francs and you are twenty-five or more so that imagination no longer troubles you.

I embrace you and urge you to be moderate in everything; in everything, you understand, if you want to live happily.

BUONAPARTE

26

**To Monsieur Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Corte*

*Paris*

*7 August, 1792*

The day after tomorrow they are going to discuss the deposition of the King. Everything points to violent events and many are leaving Paris. It has been decreed that monks and nuns must leave their houses. The property of the congregations is confiscated, etc.

The affair of the Ajaccio battalion, which I have not bothered about since it interests me little at a time such as this, has been sent from the War Ministry to the Minister of Justice, because they can see no military offence in it. That is what I most wanted, so the matter is ended . . .

I think I shall soon decide to resign from the battalion. Then, whatever happens, I shall be established in France . . .

Keep yourself in a position to come as a deputy to the next legislature; otherwise you will always play a sorry role in Corsica.

Write to me still under cover of Leonetti or Pietri, who will forward my letters . . .

Since I have been here I have been studying astronomy. It is a good occupation and a superb science. With my mathematical knowledge it needs little effort to learn it. That is one more important acquisition.

If I had consulted only the interests of the family and my own inclination, I should have come to Corsica. But you are all agreed in thinking that I ought to go to my regiment. So I shall go.

My work is finished, corrected, copied, but this is not the moment to have it printed.\* In any case, I no longer have the ambition to be an author . . .

My health is better. Tell Lucien I will write to him soon.

BUONAPARTE

\* He is probably, but not certainly, referring to the Lyons dissertation. This was an essay submitted for a prize which the Abbé Raynal had offered through the Academy of Lyons. The set subject was: *What are the most important truths and opinions that men should be taught for their happiness?* The essay did not win the prize and is of little merit; it is mainly a hotch-potch of second-hand ideas culled from Rousseau and other writers.

27

**To the Municipality of Versailles***Paris**1 September, 1792*

Gentlemen,

Buonaparte, brother and tutor of Miss Marianna Buonaparte, has the honour to inform you that, in view of the Law of 7 August and more particularly the additional article decreed on the 16th of the same month suppressing the House of Saint-Louis, he wishes to invoke the law and return his said sister to her family. Urgent matters of public service obliging him to leave Paris without delay, he begs you to order that she shall enjoy the benefit of the law of the 16th and that the treasurer of the district be authorized to pay her the twenty sous per league to Ajaccio in Corsica where she is to proceed in order to join her mother.

With respect,  
BUONAPARTE

28

**To Lieutenant Costa***Corsican National Guard, at Bonifacio**Ajaccio**18 October, 1792*

My dear Costa, I have learned of your desire to see me with the greatest pleasure, but without surprise; I assure you that my own is no less. You know my feelings for you well enough. Your captain has told me briefly of all the complaints you have . . . This time once again a letter from Robaglia announces that supplies will not arrive till Saturday. Tell your volunteers that this is the last time such a thing will happen, and that in future I shall be there and all will go as it should.

I wished to come straight to Bonifacio and put things right, but the general has sent for me, so I must go to Corte. I shall be with you as soon as possible . . . The latest news is that the enemy has abandoned Verdun and Longwy and crossed the river . . . Savoy and the county of Nice have been taken and Sardinia will soon be attacked. The soldiers of liberty will always triumph over the hired slaves of a few tyrants . . .

BUONAPARTE

29

**Note on the Situation in Corsica***Bastia**1 June, 1793*

There are two different powers in Corsica: the Commissioners of the Convention and General Paoli. There are two armed forces in opposition: on one side the continental troops of the Republic together with

a few battalions of Corsican light infantry; on the other the National Guards under the command of Paoli. There are several political opinions in Corsica: the Independents, the Republicans and the Aristocrats.

How have these two powers come about? What are their respective positions? . . . What are their military resources? . . .

All who made and supported the Revolution in Corsica ardently desired the return of General Paoli. They believed him a friend of liberty, for he had seemed a martyr for it. But it was not long before they saw the unlimited ambition of the old chief, who wanted all to see with his eyes and judge with his conscience . . . After the crisis of August he dissimulated no more. He thought France lost and prepared to kick her himself, but the victories of Dumouriez and the commission of lieutenant-general commanding in Corsica which the Executive Power gave him made him withdraw, but only to strike the better. Commanding all the troops, he removed all the regular forces from the maritime fortresses and replaced them by Corsican national guards, of whom he felt surer; he created four companies to which he appointed as officers those who had lost their fathers in the war of 1768 against France and who therefore, according to the custom of the island, had a vendetta against the French.

When the departmental administration was formed he had Pozzo di Borgo made procurator. That man has some ability and energy . . . He was the man whom Paoli needed and whom he need not fear. The rest of the administration was composed of fools who could be led easily.

Paoli then found himself in control of the fortresses and all the military resources, the Department and the gendarmerie, which was commanded by his nephew Leonetti; but he lacked the military chest and a paymaster at his own disposal. He had the effrontery to make the Department suspend the paymaster Aréna and substitute one of his own creatures. That move went far to reveal his criminal plans to Paris . . .

Then the Sardinian expedition occurred. Paoli was required to prepare 4,000 Corsicans and Sémonville came to inform him. That was a critical moment for him; he knew he must hide his real aims and feared lest they be uncovered at a moment when the Republic had a considerable fleet and was victorious over all her enemies. But he was clever enough to appear obliging and yet to prevent his forces from going to Sardinia, just as he had prevented them from joining the Army of the South. He did not want the Corsicans to become gallicized, nor did he want to weaken himself.

He had plenty of pretexts to cover these schemings. He would say to friends whom he distrusted: 'It is true I am trying to bring the fortresses under Corsican control; it is true I do not want them to leave home, but the reason is simple: we must be ready to hold firm in the event

of a counter-revolution and offer a refuge to the Mountain in the Convention.'

He has often been heard to complain at the keenness of Corsicans to join the armies, particularly at Cagliari, 'in order to make war,' as he said, 'on our dearest ally, the one king who helped us in the days of trouble for Corsica.'

After the declaration of war against England all were struck by his readiness to praise the generosity, goodness, virtue, power and wealth of that nation. By that time his plans were clear, and all those who were attached to him but preferred their country to him began to draw away. . . . He is plunging his country into civil war; drawing it out of association with France, which alone can make for its happiness, abusing the confidence of the Republic against which he makes war with its own arms and money. . . . Paoli has goodness and sweetness on his face, but hatred and vengeance in his heart . . .

The Convention sent Commissioners to Corsica. He poisoned the mind of the nation against them. The Department sent no one to receive them; he himself feigned illness; the gendarmerie arrested members of their suite under their eyes . . . He wanted to make the Commissioners bow before him, for he feared them . . .

One of them, the able Saliceti, on the pretext of seeing his family, went to Corte and saw Paoli, who flattered him and, finding the Commissioners apparently willing to ignore everything, had them recognized by the Department. Meanwhile, all true Republicans made haste to join them. The patriotic districts and authorities sent deputations. Partly by cunning and partly by force the forts of Bastia and Saint-Florent were seized, and the Commissioners were slowly gaining ground and supplanting the Paolist party when the Convention's decree suspending Paoli and summoning him to Paris arrived and precipitated matters.

Instead of going to Paris, Paoli took to arms, reinforced the garrison of Ajaccio . . . sent agents into all parts, arrested the principal patriots and frightened others by burning the houses and destroying the property of those most respected by the people.

All this took place while he was writing fine letters to the Convention claiming that age and infirmity prevented him, much against his will, from going to Paris, but without mentioning that Pozzo di Borgo, who had not the same excuses, was still in his office.

The good patriots of Calvi . . . drove out the battalion stationed there and took the commander prisoner. They found correspondence for two years between him and Paoli which revealed the whole depth of his perfidy. . . .

With 400 men and two frigates the Commissioners sailed for Ajaccio, where they should have found at least 1,000 good patriots (since apart

from a small party led by Peraldi the whole town was for France) . . . They had an artillery train and would have forced the citadel and driven out the rebels. They left Saint-Florent with the greatest secrecy, but were seven days at sea owing to bad weather. Paoli had time to send 2,000 men to Ajaccio, to arrest sixty of the best patriots, to seize all the ports and to burn and devastate the property of the Buonapartes, of Multedo, the Deputy to the Convention, and several others. The Commissioners no longer held superiority and had to return. . . .

The Commissioners of the Convention in Corsica regard Paoli and his adherents as rebels . . .

The Department is trying to have the Commissioners regarded as agents of a faction which would place Egalité on the Throne. It has had the impudence to print such a stupidity . . . Paoli tells any who will listen that the Commissioners are agents of the Genoese, but that is only for the populace and has never been printed . . .

The Republic has 3,100 continental troops in Corsica and about 1,200 Corsicans on the pay-roll, total 4,300. It has a fairly good field artillery and lacks nothing. Bastia, Calvi, Saint-Florent, Cape Corso and the Nebbio are in its power.

Paoli can count on 6,000 men, but they are farmers as well as soldiers. He holds Ajaccio, Bonifacio and the rest of Corsica. He has thirty tons of powder and two poor field guns . . .

If 5,000 men and a few warships were sent, Paoli would be forced to withdraw.

Ajaccio is the most important port for the Republic and should be captured first. Holding the other three ports already, once we were masters of Ajaccio we should be masters of the interior as well. At the worst, Paoli could be left in the mountains where he would be of no importance and would soon be destroyed by the people themselves. In any case, he would be of no interest in the eyes of a maritime power if he did not hold the port of Ajaccio.

Three ships of the line are needed to threaten Ajaccio and in that way it would not be necessary to fire a shot. They need not fear the Spaniards, since they have Calvi and Saint-Florent for refuge.

What is the strength of the different factions?

The Independence party, completely devoted to Paoli, is very small, but it is numerous when allied to the Aristocrats. But the Republican party would be the strongest but for the large number of prisoners and the tactics of Paoli. He wheedles, threatens, burns and allows pillage. At the same time he asserts that the Commissioners have been abandoned by France and will receive no help, since the Convention has changed its mind. He maintains as well that France is lost and that he will soon have the help of England. In such a situation good men are uncertain and afraid; the doubtful become bad. And, besides, the active



and restless spirit natural to the Corsicans is involved. All must take sides, and it seems better to be on that which is winning and which does the burning and looting; at the pinch it is better to eat than be eaten.

It will be different when a force is visible. Then the good will come together, bringing the doubtful with them and the wicked will either flee or put up a useless resistance.

Paoli is seventy. He has never had a warlike spirit and rides a horse with difficulty. His nephew Leonetti has neither courage, nor intelligence nor reputation. Pozzo di Borgo is intelligent. Colonna is a soldier only in appearance.

Paoli has not a single officer. Every Corsican with any military, political or administrative knowledge has deserted him. The time to beat him is this month and next, since that is the time of the harvest.

BUONAPARTE

*Captain in the 4th Artillery Regiment*

30

### **To Citizen Bouchotte**

*Minister of War*

Nice

3 July, 1793

Citizen Minister,

We have not yet adopted the custom in the artillery of building reverberating furnaces near the coastal batteries, but content ourselves with a simple grill with forge bellows. But the advantages of reverberating furnaces being generally known, General du Teil requires me to ask you for a model with drawings, so that we shall be in a position to have them constructed on our coasts and so burn the ships of the despots.

With respect, Citizen Minister, your devoted,

BUONAPARTE

*Captain in the 4th Artillery Regiment*

31

### **To the Committee of Public Safety**

H.Q., Ollioules

4 Brumaire, Year II (25 Oct, 1793)

... As soon as we are masters of the Eguillette and Cape Sepet, we will set up batteries there which will force the enemy to evacuate the two harbours and we will direct our attacks against the bastion and frontage of Toulon nearest to the arsenal, which is also the weakest.

But that needs a considerable siege-train: it is artillery that takes fortresses; infantry does no more than help. And it is with extreme sorrow that I see the little trouble that has been taken over this im-

portant matter. Three out of four concern themselves with what is necessary only when they feel the need of it, but then it is too late.

There is no one in charge of the arsenal at Marseilles, and it needs great knowledge to occupy that post. It is a fact that the most difficult operation in the artillery is the formation of a siege-train.

The artillery was not organized at all when I joined this army; now it is beginning to move, thanks to the orders you have given in several matters. I have had to struggle against ignorance and the passions it gives rise to. You must complete the work of giving the artillery in this army the consideration and independence which military law and immemorial custom have accorded to it and without which it cannot usefully serve.

The first step I will propose to you is to send to command the artillery an artillery general who can, if only by his rank, demand respect and deal with a crowd of fools on the staff with whom one has constantly to argue and lay down the law in order to overcome their prejudices and make them take action which theory and practice alike have shown to be axiomatic any trained officer of this corps.

*The Commander of Artillery, Army of the South,*

BUONAPARTE

32

## To Major Gassendi

*H.Q., Ollioules*

*14 Brumaire, Year II (4 Nov, 1793)*

I have not had the letters which we agreed you would send from Avignon. You are by now, I expect, in Grenoble.

One of the things we most need is 8,000 or 10,000 spare muskets. You should be going near Saint-Etienne, so you will easily be able to have these sent to us.

We have two 10-inch mortars among eight we have received and we have been sent nearly a thousand bombs, but nearly all 12-inch. See, then, if you cannot get us some 10-inch bombs without delay. At Marseilles we have six 8-inch mortars and not a single bomb.

I have not been able to procure as many pioneer tools as I had hoped. See if you can have some sent from Grenoble and Valence. What we principally lack is axes and spades.

It would be no bad thing if you were to send some pontoons. I cannot tell you precisely how many, since we shall use them only for crossing a marsh which forms when it rains.

I am not sending you the original order by the Representatives of the People concerning you;\* as I have sent the certified copy to the Minister, I need to keep it myself.

\* Seconding him from the Army of Italy.

You will find many more resources at Lyons than I first thought, especially in the way of wagons.

If you find any signal rockets ready made, have some sent to me. We also need incendiary shells. I am having all these made, but it is slow work. You ought to find some at Lyons.

BUONAPARTE

*The Commander of Artillery, Army besieging Toulon*

33

## To Citizen Bouchotte

*Minister of War*

H.Q. Ollioules

24 Brumaire, Year II (14 Nov, 1793)

Citizen Minister, the plan of attack which I have laid before the Generals and Representatives of the People is, I believe, the only practicable one. If it had been followed from the first with a little more warmth, it is probable that we should now be in Toulon . . .

To drive the enemy from the harbour is the essential preliminary to the siege proper and might even give us Toulon itself. I shall argue on both hypotheses.

To become masters of the harbour we must first become masters of the promontory of the Eguillette. As soon as we control the promontory we must bombard Toulon with eight or ten mortars. We hold the heights of the Arènes which is scarcely 1,800 yards distant and we could easily approach to within 1,600 yards without crossing the river Neuve. At the same time two batteries would be brought into action against Malbousquet fort and another against the Artigues fort. It is quite possible that the enemy, surprised and having already lost possession of the harbour, might decide on retreat through fear of otherwise being immediately overpowered.

You will realize that this is very hypothetical. It would have been certain a month ago, before the enemy received reinforcements. But today it is possible that the garrison might hold on and undergo a siege, even if the fleet were forced to evacuate the roads.

In that case the two batteries established against Malbousquet would be promptly reinforced by a third, and the mortars which had been bombarding Toulon for three days would turn to destroy the defences of Malbousquet. The fort would not hold out forty-eight hours and there is then nothing else to stop us up to the walls of Toulon.

These we attack at the Marais and Arsenal bastions by a sudden assault which at once carries us to the second trench, supported by the batteries at Malbousquet and on the slopes of the Arènes. In this operation we should be impeded by the Artigues fort, but the four mortars and six guns brought to bear on it in the first stages of the attack would remain in position and increase their fire.

It must not be neglected that to undertake this last stage of the siege we have a great many needs, and it is essential that the items requested in the attached inventory should be available in our park.

I owe you an account of the steps I have taken to form the siege-train quickly (see attached Sheet A).

It is more than a month since I told the generals that our existing artillery was adequate to extinguish all fire from the English redoubt on the summit of the promontory of the Eguillette . . .

BUONAPARTE

SHEET A

When the Representatives of the People appointed me to the army before Toulon and gave me command of the artillery there were only a few field guns, two 24-pounders, two 16-pounders and two mortars, with none of the necessary equipment, with no establishment, no artillery park, no organization or unity of command. From the general to the last aide-de-camp everyone directed and changed the disposition of the artillery according to his whim.

I set myself to provide the artillery corps with that consideration and independence in its operations without which it cannot be of useful service.

The weakness of the army, our lack of material, the time necessary to prepare a siege-train, all made me feel the need to put out of mind the idea of besieging Toulon and to limit myself to forming a force that would enable us to clear the enemy out of the roads by placing a battery on the Eguillette.

I soon had fourteen guns, four mortars and enough equipment to set up several batteries. I established a park and entrusted to N.C.O.s the responsibilities that I could not give to non-existent officers. Three days after my arrival the army had an artillery arm.

At that moment the enemy, seeing the inadequacy of their naval artillery, put all to the hazard and disembarked on the Eguillette. They ought to have been crushed during the landing; fate or our ineptitude decided they should succeed. A few days later they had 24-pounders there, a covered road and palissades; shortly afterwards they received considerable reinforcements from Naples and Spain. I realized that the Toulon affair had miscarried and that we must resign ourselves to a siege.

I spared nothing in pushing ahead the preparations for attacking the Eguillette and forming the siege-train.

I called an intelligent officer from the Army of Italy and sent him to Lyons, Briançon and Grenoble to fetch from those places all that might be useful to us. I requested the Army of Italy to furnish me with the guns surplus to the defence of Antibes and Monaco. On the attached sheet 'C' you will see what they can supply. The difficulty was having

them transported, but I sent a hundred horses that I requisitioned in Marseilles . . .

I have established at Ollioules an arsenal where eighty artisans, smiths, wheelwrights and carpenters are working continuously to produce what we need . . .

I have requisitioned horses throughout all departments from Nice to Valence and Montpellier. I have had all the timber that I could find brought from La Seyne and La Ciotat and this is being made into gun and mortar platforms. Five thousand sandbags are being made daily in Marseilles, and I hope soon to have the quantity I need . . .

I have taken steps to repair the Ardennes foundry, which is in our hands, and I hope within a week to have case and round shot and within a fortnight a mortar coming from this foundry. I have an armoury with a staff of ten armourers where muskets are repaired.

You will see some added merit in these operations, Citizen Minister, when you know that I have only myself to control the park, the military operations and the arsenal, that I have not even an engineer N.C.O. and only fifty regular gunners many of whom are recruits . . .

We need an intelligent ordnance officer so that I can entrust to him all the work of the arsenal.

BUONAPARTE

34

## Minutes

### *Council of War*

*H.Q., Ollioules*

*5 Frimaire, Year II (25 Nov, 1793)*

General Dugommier, Commander-in-Chief, General of Artillery du Teil, Major-Generals Lapoye and Mouret, Brigadiers Labarre and Garnier, Majors Buonaparte, Sugny and Brulé and Captains of Engineers Flayelle and La Mothe met in council of war in the presence of the Representatives of the People and, after carefully considering the position, the strength of the enemy and the resources at their disposal, decided:

1. To direct all attacks against the English redoubt, so that batteries can be established in the most favourable positions at the end of the promontory of the Eguillette in order to force the squadron to evacuate the port and even to destroy it, should a contrary wind prevent it from leaving.

2. To bombard fort Malbousquet so as to mislead the enemy as to the point of attack and to prepare for an infantry assault on Malbousquet in case such becomes possible.

3. To place a battery in the most favourable position to fire on the heights of Cape Brun to mislead the enemy as to the front to be attacked.

4. To capture and hold Mount Faron.
5. To make these different attacks simultaneously, the right division being responsible for the feint against Malbousquet and the attack on the redoubt of the Eguillette. The left division will make the feint on Cape Brun and the attack on Mount Faron.
6. To establish in the most suitable position between Malbousquet and the Convention battery a battery of six long-range mortars which will open fire on Toulon at the moment judged most effective with the aim of lowering the morale of the enemy and increasing the distrust between the different nations forming the garrison.
7. To establish a protective redoubt to the left of Convention Hill to prevent the enemy turning and capturing the Convention battery under cover of fire from the Saint-Antoine redoubts.
8. The members of the council approve the batteries that have already been installed.

BUONAPARTE

35

### To Major Gassendi

*H.Q., Ollioules*

*17 Frimaire, Year II (7 Dec, 1793)*

I have received all your letters and am sorry that you should fear persecution. By the next mail I will send you a testimonial from the Representatives of the People and some kind of general recommendation. . . .

Here we are more or less in the same position. The army is thirty thousand strong and we have eleven batteries against the Malbousquet fort and the camp at the Eguillette. A few days ago the enemy tried to capture the Convention battery consisting of seven 24-pounders.

This battery is 2,000 yards from Toulon and fires on Malbousquet from the right. They occupied the battery and spiked our guns, but the reaction was fatal to them. We took 200 of them prisoner, including the English General O'Hara, Commander-in-Chief and Governor of Toulon, a Spanish colonel, an English major and a score of other officers.

More than 400 were killed, almost all English. Our troops attacked as far as the outworks of Malbousquet. The fight lasted seven hours. We had about 50 dead and 150 wounded.

BUONAPARTE

36

### To Citizen Dupin

*Assistant to the Minister of War*

*H.Q., Ollioules*

*4 Nivôse, Year II (24 Dec, 1793)*

I promised you brilliant successes and, as you see, I have kept my word.

Worn out with work and fatigue I could not be the first to let you know. I need only tell you that the English have taken away none of our guns and there is the same artillery in Toulon as there was before they arrived. It is true they have spiked them, but more than half are ready for action again at the time of writing. They have simply increased and improved the fortifications, so that Toulon is now more defensible than ever.

The enemy withdrew in strange haste. A large part of their tents and baggage has fallen to us; they gave themselves no time to fire the ships properly and fifteen are in our hands; they burnt neither the timber nor rope-yards. I have been to the naval arsenal and I can assure you that the damage they have done can easily be repaired.

If the wind had forced them to delay another four hours they would have been lost. One frigate, which was a poor sailer and was late getting out, was still in range when we got our batteries onto the Eguillette. We gave her a salvo of red-hot balls and, to the immense satisfaction of all the Republicans, we burnt her in full view of the squadron . . .

Last night three Spanish 18-gun brigs sailed nicely into the small harbour. Orders were to let everything in, but nothing out, and we took all three, to their great surprise. Tonight we are expecting a Spanish battleship; that too will be caught in our trap unless it gets a warning . . .

We have found only twenty tons of powder in Toulon.

BUONAPARTE

37

**To Citizen Bouchotte**

*Minister of War*

*Marseilles*

*1 Pluviôse, Year II (20 Jan, 1794)*

In each coastal battery there is a requisitioned company of naval gunners. I feel that the good of the navy demands that these sailors be employed afloat. I think, therefore, that a chief gunner should be appointed for each gun with ten labourers requisitioned from the National Guard, without other officers than the chief gunners and the battery commanders. This simple method will not be burdensome to the Republic, and the service will be better carried on.

I am far from satisfied with these companies of coastal gunners; they do not practise and are as ignorant as on the first day. Sailors are of use only at sea, and I think that on all counts they should be returned to it.

Please write me a line as to the course I should follow. I know of no law dealing with the manning of the coastal batteries.

I am occupied in rebuilding most of the batteries, which are absolutely indefensible owing to the incompetence of those who have hitherto been directing them.

I hope within a fortnight to have put the coast from the mouths of the Rhône to the Var upon a respectable footing.

BUONAPARTE

38

### To the Committee of Public Safety

*Marseilles*

*24 Pluviôse, Year II (12 Feb, 1794)*

It is urgently necessary to bring order into the military expenditure on the artillery and the engineers; immense sums are being used for very bad work. It is also essential that infantry generals should not order repairs, since they always make mistakes and, understanding nothing of our work, they listen to busybodies.

Since there are funds for the engineers and artillery, why do the paymasters authorize expenses of this kind on the extraordinary account? In this way the Republic is paying for works which officers of the artillery and engineers have refused to approve. Worse still, the Republic is acquiring useless and dangerous works which must be remade.

I have just come from Bouc, near Martigues; there used to be four bronze 16-pounders there on very good fixed mountings, but these have been converted to marine mountings in the belief that fixed mountings are worthless.

Another matter needing your care and attention is a decree placing the organization of gunners in the coastal batteries on a permanent basis. I have had a provisional ruling adopted by the Representatives of the People, but this is not sufficient; a definite law is needed. Far too many people are being paid and without reference to their services or usefulness.

BUONAPARTE

39

### To the Committee of Public Safety

*Saint-Tropez*

*10 Ventôse, Year II (28 Feb, 1794)*

Since the capture of Toulon I have been occupied in putting our coasts into a respectable state of defence.

I have visited those between the mouth of the Rhône and Saint-Tropez; work is in hand everywhere to improve the old batteries and build new ones at several points where I judge it necessary. . . .

The bay of Saint-Tropez is blockaded by an enemy squadron which intercepts our convoys; they have already taken a few ships laden with provisions. In future these convoys will be protected by two batteries



I am going to have installed, one at Cape Lardier, the other at Cape Taillat; as soon as these batteries are completed I hope that communication between Nice and Marseilles will be free and will be able to operate even in sight of the enemy squadrons.

Apart from the important aim of helping our convoys, I have thought it right to reinforce the batteries on this bay so that, in case of need, they can protect our fleet. The whole of this coast is weak and in need of a great many guns.

From this point of view, the bay of Hyères has particularly occupied my attention; at the moment the Republican and Convention batteries are being installed there, each composed of four 36-pounders, two 18-pounders and two fixed mortars. These two batteries, situated one on the island of Porquerolles and the other on the island of Port-Cros, are independent of the armament of the other forts on these islands. I am setting up 36-pounders at Brégançon, Gapeau and Giens, so that soon the huge roads of Hyères will be as well defended as is possible and able to offer a refuge to our fleet, whatever the strength of the enemy.

I leave today to complete my inspection of the coast as far as Menton. As soon as I have done so I will send you a general report from which you will see the purpose of each battery, its previous condition, the changes that have been made and the state of supplies and of the crews serving it.

Meanwhile I have thought to send you these details, since I know that you are worried about the situation on this coast.

BUONAPARTE

40

### To Captain Berlier

*O.C., Artillery, at Antibes*

*Toulon*

*11 Ventôse, Year II (1 Mar, 1794)*

The fleet, consisting of more than twenty-two sail, put to sea at 3.0 p.m. today. Warn the battery commanders at the Gulf Juan and Saint-Tropez, so that if it appears by day or night, they pay attention to the ships' signals and do not take them for the English fleet.

BUONAPARTE

41

### To Colonel Manceauz

*Director of Artillery, Toulon*

*H.Q., Nice*

*13 Germinal, Year II (2 Apr, 1794)*

We have an urgent need of cartridges; send a million to Nice without delay.

We are going into action tomorrow with 30,000 men; think of the cartridges we shall use.\*

BUONAPARTE

42

### To Citizen Pille

*Committee for the Army & Navy*

*H.Q., Nice*

*28 Prairial, Year II (16 June, 1794)*

. . . I enclose a map of the Gulf Juan showing the batteries; please lay it before the Committee of Public Safety.

Send me four Gomer 12-inch mortars for this gulf. These are essential.

I cannot help telling you that Admiral Thévenard, the admiral at Port-la-Montagne, . . . is interfering with my dispositions and harming the service. 1. He is hoarding too many guns and mortars there at the expense of other parts of the coast. 2. I had decided to place in each sizeable battery of Port-la-Montagne one 18-pounder for every ten 36-pounders, because fire with red-hot balls is easier and much more accurate with small guns; also because it is better to use small guns to fire on small boats. Too many different calibres is certainly an inconvenience to be avoided in large batteries; but the advantages to be gained from smaller calibres should not be lost through too much uniformity. In any case, the effectiveness of artillery is the business of gunners.

I shall be glad if you will write a word to Admiral Thévenard to remind him of military practice. He should order no changes in the coastal artillery without my approval, since I am in command of the artillery of the Army of Italy, quite apart from an order charging me with the defences of the coast between the mouths of the Rhône and Menton.

There is nothing but confusion if people exceed their proper functions.

BUONAPARTE

43

### To Captain Berlier

*O.C., Artillery, at Antibes*

*Antibes*

*7 Messidor, Year II (25 June, 1794)*

I am most dissatisfied with the progress in arming the battery of La Brague. It is still without powder, shot and gunners. That should all have been done within twenty-four hours. Put the commander, Corporal Carli, in prison for absenting himself to fetch wine from Antibes.

\* During the spring offensive of the Army of Italy.

Instruct all battery commanders that in no circumstances are they to leave their posts.

Inform me when the iron 24-pounders have arrived. . . .

BUONAPARTE

## 44

**To Lieutenant Junot**

*Aide-de-Camp to General Buonaparte*

*Antibes*

*Presumed 25 Thermidor/2 Fructidor, Year II (12/19 Aug, 1794)*

The proposal you make to me, my dear Junot, shows clearly enough your friendship for me; you have long known mine for you, and I hope you rely on it.

Men may be unjust to me, my dear Junot, but it is enough that I am innocent; my own conscience is the tribunal before which I bring my conduct.

When I examine it, that conscience is calm; so do nothing, you will only compromise me.

Good-bye, my dear Junot; regards and friendship.

BUONAPARTE

*Under arrest*

## 45

**To Citizens Albitte, Saliceti and Laporte**

*Representatives of the People*

*Antibes*

*27 Thermidor, Year II (14 Aug, 1794)*

Citizens, you will find attached the reply to the four questions you asked me. The information I am sending about the defence of the coasts is not as complete and detailed as I would have wished. I will hand over to whomever in the artillery you entrust with your confidence materials to enable him to provide a more satisfactory answer. I had begun a work on the coastal defences, but I do not feel in a position to complete it. Since I have felt that I have lost the respect of free men my conscience has enabled my spirit to be calm, but the feelings of my heart are overturned, and with a cool head and a hot heart I cannot resign myself to go on living under suspicion.

BUONAPARTE

## 46

**To Citizen Multedo**

*Representative of the People*

*H.Q., Loano*

*29 Fructidor, Year II (15 Sept, 1794)*

I have written to you several times but you have not answered; I cannot believe it is from scorn. I wrote about the trouble that had

befallen me, and I thought that if the opportunity arose to speak on my behalf you would help me with the zeal deserved of a constant friend of liberty and one who has always been attached to you. . . .

BUONAPARTE

P.S. Give my compliments to Arrighi and Casabianca.

47

## To Citizen Multedo

*Representative of the People*

H.Q., Cairo

2 Vendémiaire, Year III (23 Sept, 1794)

I have had no answer to several letters I wrote you a few decades ago.

The Austrians were threatening Savona and thereby the neutrality of Genoa, since they would completely intercept our trade. They had already built great roads, set up camps, brought up artillery. But, while making their plans, they had not thought that the Republicans were there, watching their movements and waiting to catch them red-handed.

You know that the oligarchs of Genoa who rule that Republic hate us and are only awaiting the chance to betray us with impunity. The news from Genoa and the enemy's movements left no doubt of their intentions. The Representatives were convinced that there was but little time in which to meet and nullify their preparations and ordered the Army of Italy to advance against the enemy, fight him and thwart his plans.

On the 2nd Sansculottide we marched with 12,000 men, a division of mountain artillery and 600 dragoons. By well-planned and well-executed marches we forced the enemy to abandon his very favourable entrenched position.

On the morning of the 4th we came face to face with the Austrian army, which was deployed in the plain of Carcare, a Genoese town; it had fortified the high ground and installed good batteries.

We were occupying the heights of Biestro, Pallare and Millesimo. As soon as we saw the situation of the enemy, we decided to open the attack by capturing the old castle of Millesimo and moving from there to the chapel between Carcare and Cairo, so as to attack the enemy in rear of his entrenchment. Thereby we would cut off his retreat, disrupt his battle plan and assure ourselves of complete victory. At 3.0 p.m. we attacked the old castle. The enemy had a good Hungarian battalion there which defended itself long enough to gain a few hours and withdrew when on the point of being surrounded.

When Field-Marshal Colardo saw that we held Millesimo and were ready to march on the chapel, he ordered a retreat which was carried out in good order and with plenty of efficiency on the part of his troops. He was also helped by the night, throughout the whole

of which he continued to march, only halting at Deگو, two leagues beyond Cairo. That same night we entered Carcare, marching the next day to Cairo, a little Piedmontese town, whose inhabitants brought us the keys.

At 2.0 p.m. we saw the enemy from the village of La Rochetta. Both their left and right flanks were against mountains which they thought very strong, and their centre was entrenched behind the Bormida and covered by their artillery. Their uhlands, which were their only cavalry, were manœuvring in the plain, seeking to overawe us.

Had we thought they would wait for us till the next day, we would willingly have postponed the issue; but we were sure they would have fled during the night and at once prepared to attack.

Six battalions and a few mountain guns penetrated the mountains on the right with orders to turn the enemy's left and take up positions on the Deگو to Spigno road, thus preventing his retreat. Two battalions were sent to dislodge the enemy from the position covering his right. The rest of the army, with the cavalry and artillery, was drawn up behind the village of La Rochetta.

It was very late before these movements could be completed. The left attacked and, after four charges, remained in possession of the high ground the enemy had occupied. On the right, where he had large forces, the fire was heavy. We drove him from some of his positions, but a very dark night prevented us from advancing further and reaching Deگو. The centre attacked with great energy; everywhere the enemy gave way and their cavalry, so splendid in its evolutions, thought it wise not to await the shock of ours.

The night separated us. We bivouacked on the battlefield and placed our artillery ready to blast them at first light. But they decided not to wait for us and marched off without halting for twenty-four hours. Their losses are reckoned at 1,000 or 1,200 men. The battlefield, their stores at Deگو and even their wounded were left in our hands.

Thus their plans against Savona are spoilt for a long time.

If we had had three more hours of daylight the fight at Deگو would have overthrown the Emperor in his Lombard States . . .

It only remains for us to rescue Corsica from the tyranny of the English. The season is favourable and there is not a moment to be lost; the Spaniards have returned to port; we have fresh news from Ajaccio, and, far from having increased their means of defence in that important part of Corsica, they have removed part of the military stores from the citadel.

With 8,000 or 10,000 men and twelve warships an expedition to Corsica at this time of year would be just a military parade.

To drive the English from a position giving them command of the Mediterranean, to drive them out of the one department they still

occupy, to punish the villains who have betrayed the Republic and to rescue the many good patriots who still exist in that department: that, my friend, is the expedition which ought to be entirely occupying the Government and, especially, the deputies of that and the neighbouring departments.

BUONAPARTE

48

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Marseilles*

*Semur*

*4 Prairial, Year III (23 May, 1795)*

Yesterday I saw the estate at Ragny belonging to M. de Montigny. If you want to do a good deal you should come and buy it, at a price of 8 millions in assignats. You could put up 60,000 francs of your wife's dowry. That is my wish and my advice. Remember me to your wife, to Désirée and to the family.\*

You will not find France in foreign countries, and to run around the Levant smacks of the adventurer or at least of the man looking for a fortune. If you are sensible, you have only got to enjoy yours. I am sure you can get this place for 80,000 francs in silver; before the Revolution it was worth 250,000. I think it is an unique chance to invest some of your wife's dowry. Assignats are losing value daily.

BUONAPARTE

49

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Marseilles*

*Paris*

*4 Messidor, Year III (22 June, 1795)*

I have received your letter numbered 16 . . . I will do what I can to find a post for Lucien.

I am employed as a brigadier-general in the Army of the West, but not in the artillery. I am unwell, which forces me to take two or three months' leave. When my health is better, I will see what I will do.

Today the Constitution is being read in the Convention. People are expecting happiness and peace from this Constitution; I will send it to you the moment it is printed and can be had.

Jerome writes asking me to find him a school; he has nothing at

\* In 1794 Joseph had married Julie Clary, daughter of a wealthy merchant of Marseilles, and now Napoleon had formed an attachment with her younger sister, Désirée. But this came to nothing, partly through the opposition of her father ('one Corsican in the family is enough'), partly because life in Paris offered new outlets to the general's emotional as well as to his intellectual energies. In 1798 Désirée married Bernadotte.

the moment. Casabianca intends to send his son to Genoa and thence to Corsica; he is keeping him with him doing nothing.

Casabianca should be writing to you about Songis and your brother-in-law; the latest law is favourable to them, and there is no doubt they can return and be struck off the list of emigrants.

BUONAPARTE

50

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Marseilles*

*Paris*

*6 Messidor, Year III (24 June, 1795)*

I will hasten to send what your wife asks for. Désirée has asked for my portrait, so I shall have it done; you must give it to her if she still wants it, otherwise keep it for yourself. Wherever circumstances may lead you, you know that you cannot have a better friend, who holds you more dear or who desires your happiness more sincerely. Life is just a dream that fades away. If you go, and think it may be for some time, send me your portrait. We have lived together for so many years and so closely united that our hearts have fused; you know better than anyone how completely mine is yours. In writing these words I have an emotion such as I have seldom known. I feel we shall not see each other again soon and cannot go on with my letter.

Good-bye, my friend.

BUONAPARTE

51

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Genoa*

*Paris*

*18 Messidor, Year III (6 July, 1795)*

I have had no news of you since you left; evidently one must cross the river Lethe to reach Genoa, for Désirée, too, has not written since she has been there.

The English have made a landing in Brittany with twelve thousand men, mostly emigrants. That has not produced much alarm here; people are so sure of the superiority of our infantry that they laugh at these English threats. The Armies of Italy and the Pyrenees appear to be heavily attacked.

Every day a few articles of the Constitution are passed. All is very quiet. Bread is still scarce; the weather is rather cold and damp for the time of year, which is delaying the harvest. The rate for the louis is 750 francs.

BUONAPARTE

52

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte***At Genoa**Paris**24 Messidor, Year III (12 July, 1795)*

The English will be forced to embark in a few days. Pichegru is preparing to cross the Rhine. The Vendée proper is quiet; the chouans\* begin only north of the Loire. Peace with Spain is said to be imminent. The Dutch seem to be warm friends of their revolution. The Stadthaler will probably not go back; his party is non-existent. The north is in turmoil and Polish hopes are rising. Italy, as ever, does well out of the losses and misfortunes of France . . .

Here luxury, pleasure and the arts are reviving astonishingly. Yesterday *Phèdre* was played at the Opera for the benefit of a retired actress; although the prices were trebled there was an immense crowd by two o'clock. Carriages and dandies are reappearing, or rather remember their eclipse only as a long dream. Libraries and courses of history, chemistry, botany, astronomy, etc., follow one another. Everything that can delight and make life pleasant is piled on. One has no time to think and how could one be gloomy in the midst of so gay a round and such a display of wit. The ladies are everywhere: in the theatre, out driving, in the libraries. You see lovely creatures in the scholar's study. Here, in this one place in all the world, they are worthy to hold the reins; and the men are mad about them, think of nothing else and live only for and through them. A woman needs six months in Paris to know what is her due and her empire.

BUONAPARTE

53

**Note on the Army of Italy***Paris**Early Thermidor, Year III (late July, 1795)*

In the present situation in Europe, great use can be made of the Army of Italy which can strike serious blows against the house of Austria and prove decisive for peace.

It must:

1. Drive the enemy from the positions of Loano and Vado whence they intercept our supply trains and the shipping between Genoa and Marseilles.

2. Use the rest of the campaign to take up positions which it can hold through the winter and both threaten Piedmont and be in a position to protect it against the anger of the Austrians; by this means force the King of Sardinia to accept peace.

\* A name, of uncertain origin, given to the royalist insurgents in the West.



3. Conquer Lombardy, destroy the influence of the house of Austria in Italy and offer the King of Sardinia indemnities there for Nice and Savoy.

4. Once master of Lombardy, seize the gorges of Trent, enter the Tyrol, link up with the Army of the Rhine and force the Emperor, attacked inside his hereditary States, to conclude a peace that answers the hopes of Europe and the sacrifices of all kinds that we have made.

The first and second aims can be carried out before the end of the campaign; the third, during the winter; and the fourth at the first fine weather of the next campaign, if the enemy forces us to do it.

The Army of Italy should be reinforced with the available divisions of the Army of the Pyrenees; it will then be very easy to retake the important position of Vado from the enemy. Once taken, the harbour defences should be repaired, so that a convoy can shelter there from the attack of enemy ships.

The Austrians will retire onto the positions defending the Lombardy road; for preference they will occupy the mountain chain from Priero, upper and lower Montenotte — The Piedmontese will occupy the positions covering the entry into Piedmont, that is to say, the heights of San-Giovanni, la Solta, Biestro and Montezemolo.

By a continuing movement, which does not interrupt that which will give us Vado, and a feint march on Sassello, the enemy should be attacked or forced to evacuate all his positions as far as lower Montenotte and to retire on Acqui or even Alessandria. Then, by way of Cairo and Millesimo, seize the height of Montezemolo which dominates Ceva, while the division held back to defend the Tanaro advances beyond Batiffollo and invests Ceva on the Garessio side, joining the division at Montezemolo as near to Ceva as possible.

Meanwhile, the road from Savona to Altare will be repaired so that the thirty-six siege guns necessary to take Ceva can pass.

While Ceva is being invested one division of the Army of the Alps will join the left of the Army of Italy on Sambuco mountain and, if possible, will invest Demonte by seizing the height of Valloria. Some movements of heavy artillery will be made in the valley of the Stura so as to convince the enemy that Demonte is to be seriously besieged, so forcing him to adopt positions from which he can observe the siege of Ceva as well as that of Demonte, a situation very favourable for the siege of Ceva. The capture of Demonte being by no means necessary to the execution of the plan, the siege will not in fact be attempted unless it seems that there is the necessary time, material and force to take it without in any way weakening the right division of the Army of Italy.

Once Ceva is captured, the fortifications will be repaired and that fortress put in the best possible state of defence. If the enemy squadron

appears in these waters, or if the Austrians are heavily reinforced after the fall of Ceva, one or two good battalions will be put into the fortress of Savona.

It is round Ceva that the army will be assembled, being cantoned in all the nearby towns and villages. Foraging will be carried out well ahead in the plain of Piedmont, and the King of Sardinia will be faced with the prospect of a considerable army ready to invade his States: he will probably conclude peace.

Our armies in Italy have all perished through diseases due to the summer heat. Once established on the plains, the real time to make war there is from February till July. During that season the Alpine passes are snowbound, and one can halve the troops guarding them so as to increase the Army of Italy and march on Turin, if the King of Sardinia has not made peace, and on Milan, if he has.

Controlling Lombardy as far as Mantua, the army would find all that was necessary to re-equip itself and would be able to mount the gorges of Trent, cross the Adige and reach the Tyrol, while the Army of the Rhine passed into Bavaria and also entered the Tyrol.

Few plans of campaign offer more advantageous results, worthy at once of the courage of our soldiers and the destinies of the Republic.

54

### To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte

*At Genoa*

*Paris*

*12 Thermidor, Year III (30 July, 1795)*

Enclosed is the passport you ask for. Tomorrow you will get a letter from the Committee of Foreign Affairs to the minister at Genoa: it asks him to help you in every way necessary. . . .

Lucien has got himself arrested, but a courier leaving tomorrow has an order from the Committee of Public Safety to set him free.

Have patience! I will carry out all your wishes.

The Peace with Spain ensures the success of an offensive war in Piedmont. They are discussing the plan I proposed, which will certainly be adopted. If I go to Nice, we will see each other, and also Désirée. I am only awaiting your answer to buy you a property.

I am going to write to Madame Isoard to give Lucien some money, and I will get him a job in Paris before leaving.

I trust you will let me know in advance when you think of coming back. You will probably get a post as consul in Italy.

Everything is quiet. The peace concluded with Spain and Naples, which we learned of yesterday, fills us with joy. The public funds are improving and assignats rising.

It is not yet hot, but the harvests are as good as possible. This great people is giving itself over to pleasure; dances, theatres, women, and

these are the loveliest in the world, are becoming the rage. Wealth, luxury, good taste, all has come back; the Terror seems only a dream.

The news of the fine victory of Quiberon and of peace with Spain makes all the difference to the state of our affairs.

BUONAPARTE

55

### To Citizen Sucy

*Asst., Q.M.G., Army of Italy*

Paris

30 Thermidor, Year III (17 Aug, 1795)

I send you my compliments on having rejoined the army. You will be useful there and you will have the sweet satisfaction of employing your ability for the good of the country. A man's fortune, position and repute vary and are always in flux; justified pride in having been of use and having merited the respect of those few who can appreciate genius and beauty is as invariable and constant in you as the sentiment of honour.

I have been posted to serve as an infantry general in the army of the Vendée, but I am not accepting; plenty of officers will command a brigade better than I, and few will command artillery with more success. I remain behind, satisfied that the injustice done to the services is well enough known by those who can realize it.

You are in a delicate position, my friend. If active genius and consummate experience are arbitrarily excluded from the army in which you must mix with incapable representatives — rogues, not to say more, they cannot break through and earn a reputation; but, my friend, in this best of all possible worlds the great secret is to do the best one can and let one's own knowledge of it be the reward; then one is never either an impostor or a lackey, not bitter or disappointed or vindictive or criminal.

Nothing new here; only hope remains to honest men: that is the sorry state this empire has come to.

Good health, perseverance and happiness be with you, and never discouragement. If you meet evil and nasty men, remember the good, if farcical maxim of Scapin: *Let us be thankful for all the crimes they don't commit.*

B. P.

56

### To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte

*At Genoa*

Paris

3 Fructidor, Year III (20 Aug, 1795)

At the moment I am attached to the topographical office of the Committee of Public Safety for the direction of the armies, in place of

Carnot. If I ask for it I shall be sent by the Government to Turkey, as a general of artillery with a good salary and flattering ambassadorial title, to organize the artillery of the Grand Turk. I will have you made Consul and Villeneuve engineer to go with me. You told me M. Anthoine was there already. Should this happen, I would come to Genoa within a month and we would go on to Leghorn and leave from there. In that case do you still want to buy a property?

Things are quiet here, but storms may be brewing; the primary assemblies meet in a few days. I shall take five or six officers with me, but I will write in more detail soon.

As the commission of the Committee of Public Safety, which employs me in the direction of the armies and the plans of campaign, loads me with praise, I fear they may not want to let me go to Turkey; we shall see.

I embrace you. Write often, and assume that I shall go.

BUONAPARTE

57

## To the Committee of Public Safety

*Paris*

*13 Fructidor, Year III (30 Aug, 1795)*

At a time when the Empress of Russia has drawn tighter her former links with Austria, it is to the interest of France to do all she can to make the military power of Turkey more formidable. The Turkish armies are large and brave, but very ignorant of the principles of the art of war.

The organization of the artillery service, which in our modern tactics influences so powerfully the winning of battles and almost exclusively so in the capture and defence of fortified positions, is in its infancy in Turkey. The Porte is aware of this and has several times asked for artillery and engineer officers. Indeed, we have a few there at this moment, but they are neither numerous enough nor well enough trained to produce important results.

General Buonaparte, who has gained some reputation in command of the artillery of our armies in various circumstances and notably at the siege of Toulon, offers to proceed to Turkey with a mission from the Government; he will take with him six or seven officers, each of whom has a special knowledge of some branch of the science of war.

If, in this new career, he can make the Turkish armies more formidable and improve the defensive fortifications of that Empire, he will believe that he has rendered a signal service to our country and, on his return, to have deserved well of it.

BUONAPARTE

58

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte***At Genoa**Paris**19 Fructidor, Year III (5 Sept, 1795)*

The Committee has decided that it is impossible for me to leave France while the war lasts. I am to be re-posted in the artillery and shall probably continue to work for the Committee.

The elections and primary assemblies take place here the day after tomorrow. Peace with Hesse-Cassel has been ratified.

Public and emigrant goods are not dear, but private estates are at ridiculous prices.

If I stay here, I might take it into my head to marry. I should like a word from you about that, and it might be a good idea to speak to Désirée's brother; let me know the result and I will decide.

Chauvet goes to Nice in ten days and is bringing the books you asked for.

The famous bishop of Autun [Talleyrand] and General Montesquiou have been given permission to return and are struck off the list of emigrants.

BUONAPARTE

59

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte***At Genoa**Paris**20 Fructidor, Year III (6 Sept, 1795)*

The consulate at Chios is vacant, but you told me you do not want an island; I am hoping for something better in Italy.

Yesterday it was decided that all who supported Toulon during the siege or who held posts under the king should be treated as emigrants. Fréron and Tallien spoke very forcibly. It is today that the primary assemblies of Paris are meeting; there are plenty of placards for and against, but it is hoped that people will be wise. There is no doubt about the Constitution, which will be accepted unanimously; the only doubt is over the decree ordering that two-thirds of the Convention will remain in office. . . .

Whatever happens, you need have no fear for me; I have all the right people as friends, whatever their party or opinion. Mariette is very much on my side and I am on good terms with Dulcette; you know my friends on the other side.

Go on writing to me and tell me what you want to do; try to see that my absence does not prevent what I desire. I am writing to your wife. I am very pleased with Louis; he is realizing my hopes and what I expected of him; he is a good fellow after my own heart: warmth, spirit, health, ability, carefulness, goodness, he combines everything.

You know, my friend, that I live only for the pleasure I can give my family; if my hopes have the good fortune that always attends my doings, I shall be able to carry out your wishes and make you happy. . .

I miss Louis badly; he was a great help to me. . . . Now he is not here, I can attend only to the most important things. Write to him and tell him you are waiting for the first drawing he sends to judge his progress and that you are sure he will keep his promise to write as well as Junot before the end of the month.

Tomorrow I shall have three horses which will enable me to use a carriage and manage all my business.

Good-bye, my good friend; enjoy yourself and be gay; think about my affair, for I badly want to have a household. Since you are not there and want to stay abroad, the question of Désirée must either be settled or broken off. You can stay at Genoa as long as you wish; your excuse is simple; it is to get from Corsica the few pins still remaining to us.

BUONAPARTE

60

### To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte

*At Genoa*

*Paris*

*29 Fructidor, Year III (15 Sept, 1795)*

The majority of the Republic has already accepted the Constitution and the decree of renewal. Some of the Paris sections\* are still in ferment; but the situation seems to have been saved. Our army in the Vendée is very large.

I have just read the following sentence in a printed report by Cambon on events in the south: 'We were in immediate danger when the good and brave General Buonaparte put himself at the head of fifty grenadiers and opened the way for us.'

The government will probably be organized within a month; then things will necessarily be quieter. . . .

BUONAPARTE

61

### To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte

*At Genoa*

*Paris*

*5 Vendémiaire, Year IV (27 Sept, 1795)*

I have your letter of 24 Fructidor.

My journey is more likely than ever; in fact, it would have been decided if there were not such a ferment here. But things are boiling up at the moment and the situation is inflammatory: it will all be over in a few days.

\* The forty-eight local government areas into which Paris was then divided.

I have received the messages from M. de Villeneuve. He cannot hope for more than a captaincy. It is only as a favour that I can include him in the mission in that capacity; but the chief thing is to help and be useful. . . . Lucien is on his way here; if I am still here I will see what I can do for him.

Heads are very hot, and the moment seems critical; but the genius of liberty never abandons its defenders. All our armies triumph.

BUONAPARTE

62

### To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte

At Genoa

Paris

14 Vendémiaire, Year IV (6 Oct, 1795), 2 a.m.

At last, all is over. My first thought is to send you my news.

The Royalists, organized in the sections, were daily getting bolder. The Convention ordered the Lepelletier section to be disarmed, but it drove the troops back. Menou, who was in command, is thought to have been a traitor, and he was dismissed at once. The Convention appointed Barras to command the troops, and the committees nominated me as second-in-command. The enemies attacked us at the Tuileries. We killed a good many of them; they killed thirty of our men and wounded sixty. We have disarmed the sections and all is quiet. As usual, I was not wounded.

BUONAPARTE

Brigadier-General

P.S. Happiness is mine; my respects to Désirée and Julie.

63

### Report

Paris

Presumed 15 Vendémiaire, Year IV (7 Oct, 1795)

At 5.0 a.m. on the 13th Representative of the People Barras was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Interior; General Buonaparte was appointed second-in-command.

Most of the garrison artillery was still at the camp of Les Sablons, guarded by only 150 men; the rest was at Marly with 200 men. The depot of Meudon was without any guard at all. At the Feuillants there were only a few 4-pounders without gunners and only 80,000 cartridges. The ration dumps were scattered over Paris. Several sections were mobilizing and that of the Théâtre-Français had outposts as far as the Pont-Neuf which they had barricaded.

General Barras ordered the artillery to move at once from the camp of Les Sablons to the Tuileries and had gunners found in the battalions

of '89 and the gendarmerie to man them. He sent to Meudon 50 cavalrymen, 2 companies of veterans and 200 men of the police legion drawn from Versailles, ordered the evacuation of all equipment from Marly to Meudon, had cartridges brought up and a workshop to manufacture them established at Meudon, and arranged food supplies for several days for the army and the Convention independently of the dumps that were in the sections.

Meanwhile reports were coming in from every side that the insurgents were coming together under arms and forming their columns. He therefore deployed his troops to defend the Convention and posted his artillery to punish the rebels.

He placed guns at the Feuillants to fire on the Rue Honoré and covered all the exits with 8-pounders, and, to guard against a mishap, he placed guns in reserve to bring a flanking fire to bear on any column which might force a way out. He left two howitzers and two 8-pounders in the Carrousel so as to be able to destroy any houses from which the Convention might be fired on.

At four o'clock the rebel columns emerged from the streets to form up. Even had we had well-disciplined troops, this was the critical moment at which we ought to have crushed them; but it was French blood that would have to be shed, and it was for those wretches, already traitors, to besmirch themselves with the crime of fratricide as well: the honour of striking the first blow must belong to them.

At 4.45 the rebels began to attack from all sides. Everywhere they were routed. French blood flowed, and the crime and shame of that terrible day belonged to the insurgents.

Among the dead were to be seen many emigrants, priests and nobles; most of those taken prisoner were found to be chouans from Charette.

But the rebels did not yet think themselves beaten. They had taken refuge in Saint-Roch church, in the Théâtre de la République and the Palais-Egalité and all around they were to be heard inciting the people to take up arms. To spare the blood that would have been shed next day, they had to be pursued energetically and given no time to reorganize.

The General ordered General Monchoisy, who was in reserve at the Place de la Révolution to send a force with two 12-pounders through the boulevards to turn the Place Vendôme and join up with the picket at headquarters.

General Cartaux sent 200 men of his division and one 4-pounder through the Rue Saint-Thomas-du-Louvre into the Place du Palais-Egalité.

General Brune who had had a horse killed under him moved to Les Feuillants. All these columns advanced. Saint-Roch and the Théâtre de la République were taken and the rebels evacuating them retired to



the upper end of the Rue de la Loi, which they barricaded on every side. Patrols were sent up and several cannon shots were fired with great effect.

At first light the General learnt that a group from the commune of Saint-Germain, with two guns, were marching to the aid of the rebels, and he sent a detachment of dragoons which seized these guns and brought them to the Tuileries.

The rebel remnants were still showing fight. They had barricaded the entrances to the Lepelletier section and placed guns in the principal streets. At nine o'clock General Berruyer drew up his division in the Place Vendôme. He placed two 8-pounders in the Rue des Vieux-Augustins and ranged them on the headquarters of the Lepelletier section. General Vachot, with a force of light infantry, came up on the right, ready to move into the Place Victoire. General Brune occupied the Perron and stationed two howitzers at the end of Rue Vivienne. General Duvignau, with the centre column and two 12-pounders, advanced up the Rue Richelieu and the Rue Montmartre.

But at the fear of seeing their retreat cut off the courage of the insurgents failed. They abandoned the position, thereby, in the opinion of our soldiers, forgetting the military honour of Frenchmen which was theirs to maintain.

The Brutus section still caused some disquiet, and the wife of a representative had been arrested there. General Duvignau was ordered to advance along the boulevard as far as the Rue Poissonnière. General Berruyer stationed himself in the Place Victoire. General Brune occupied the Pont-au-Change. The Brutus section was surrounded, the Ile Saint-Louis searched and the Place de Grève, Place du Théâtre-Français and Place du Panthéon occupied. Everywhere the patriots had regained courage; the spread of civil war ceased; the people were realizing their error and folly.

The next day the two sections of Lepelletier and the Théâtre-Français and the infantry and grenadiers of the National Guard were disarmed.

BUONAPARTE

64

## To Citizeness Clary

*At Marseilles*

*Paris*

*19 Vendémiaire, Year IV (11 Oct, 1795)*

Fréron, who is on a mission to Marseilles, will hand you this letter. I beg you, Madam, to receive him as you would myself. You will find him a good fellow and a man who likes to help people. I have told him of my friendship for your family. Do what you can to make his stay in Marseilles pleasant.

All goes well here. The Royalists have been beaten, but you need not fear that the Terror will return; we like it no more than you.

Had serious work not kept me in Paris, I would gladly have come to Marseilles, but the Convention has appointed me to command the Army of the Interior under the orders of Representative Barras.

Farewell, Madam: homage to Mme Pluvinal, to Mlle Sophia and to your niece. My compliments to Clary. Assure him and all your family that I shall always have their interests at heart.

BUONAPARTE

65

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Genoa*

*Paris*

*10 Brumaire, Year IV (1 Nov, 1795)*

A week ago I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Interior.

The Councils of Five Hundred and of the Ancients have met, and the first has already drawn up its list for the Executive Directory. It seems that the five members will be Sieyès, Rewbel, Barras, Le Tourneur, Cambacérès and La Revellière-Lépaux; one of these six will not be a member.

I am well, though over-worked.

BUONAPARTE

66

**To Citizen Joseph Buonaparte**

*At Genoa*

*Paris*

*26 Brumaire, Year IV (17 Nov, 1795)*

I hear from you very seldom. You must not be hard on me; you know that my work and the constant agitation of my life prevent me from writing regularly; but Fesch should write daily.

The family lacks nothing; I have sent them silver, assignats, etc. I have just received 400,000 francs for you; I have handed it to Fesch, who will account for it.

I may have the family come here. Send me your news in greater detail, and of your wife and Désirée. Good-bye, my good friend, all yours; my only worry is to know you are far away and not to have your company. If your wife were not pregnant, I would get you to come to Paris for a time.

Songis is my colonel aide-de-camp; Junot major; Louis and five others, whom you do not know, captains.

BUONAPARTE

67

**To Major-General Châteauneuf-Randon**

G.O.C., 17th Military District

H.Q., Paris

3 Frimaire, Year IV (24 Nov, 1795)

Citizen General, I have ordered the Commander of Engineers to have stoves and planks installed in the various barrack-rooms in the barracks at Saint-Cloud and Bellevue. Until this order is carried out a ration of brandy will be distributed each morning to those without stoves or fireplaces and they will be given fifteen pounds of straw instead of the ten allowed by law. The Quartermaster-General will give the necessary orders. . . .

*The Commander-in-Chief, Army of the Interior*

BUONAPARTE

68

**To Citizen Faypoult**

Minister of Finance

H.Q., Paris

28 Frimaire, Year IV (19 Dec, 1795)

The Treasury, Citizen Minister, should have paid 25 millions for the forage of the Army on the 25th. But that is three days ago; it is still continuing its system of keeping the Army of the Interior in a state of need. If there is some malicious plan to starve this army, I beg you, Citizen Minister, to press the Treasury agents so hard that they are forced to disclose it.

It is essential that there should be no further delay in making this payment; otherwise we shall be forced to seize from the farms in order to maintain the service. You will appreciate how dangerous that would be.

BUONAPARTE

69

**To Viscountess Josephine de Beauharnais**

Paris

December, 1795

I awake full of you. Your image and the intoxication of last night give my senses no rest.

Sweet, incomparable Josephine, what a strange effect you have on my heart. Are you angry? Do I see you sad? Are you worried? My soul breaks with grief, and there is no rest for your lover; but how much the more when I yield to this passion that rules me and drink a burning flame from your lips and your heart? Oh! this night has shown me that your portrait is not you!

You leave at midday; in three hours I shall see you.

Meanwhile, my sweet love, a thousand kisses; but do not give me any, for they set my blood on fire.

70

## Note on the Army of Italy

*Paris*

*29 Nivôse, Year IV (19 Jan, 1796)*

If the Army of Italy lets February slip by without doing anything as it has let January, the Italian campaign will be entirely fruitless. It must be understood that in Italy success is to be had only in winter.

Assuming that the Army of Italy moves as soon as possible, it can march on Ceva and force the entrenched camp before the Austrians, who are at Acqui, have joined the Piedmontese.

If, in view of the preparations being made by the French, the Austrians, moving beyond the Tanaro, were to join up with the Piedmontese, our army should make a double march on Acqui by going to Cairo and Spigno; we can be sure that then the Austrians would quickly return to defend their communications with the Milanese.

The operation to be carried out is simple. Are the Piedmontese alone? Then march against them through Gressio, Bagnasco, La Solta, Castelnuovo, Montezemolo. Once they are beaten and the camp taken, lay siege to Ceva (an operation preliminary to all others, whatever direction we may wish to take). Do the Austrians have the good sense to join the Piedmontese at Montezemolo? They must be separated, to which end march on Alessandria and, as soon as they separate, gain twenty-four hours to capture the camp of Ceva. Once we have occupied the camp it will need double our forces to make us raise the siege of the fortress.

The siege artillery will disembark at Vado. There need be no fear of lack of wagons, the countryside being rich in means of transport and the siege of Ceva needing no more than from twenty-four to thirty guns.

Ceva captured, not a moment must be lost in advancing the division guarding Tenda, Briga and the heights of Nice county, which should join the main force at Mondovi, in investing Cuneo with the centre division and marching straight for Turin. The King of Sardinia will then propose peace. The general must say that he has no power to make peace and that an envoy must be sent to Paris, and meanwhile the King of Sardinia will be obliged to make proposals which cannot be refused and will perfectly effect the Government's aim. Otherwise Turin will be burned, regardless of the citadel.

Since warfare in Italy depends wholly on the season, each month requires a different plan of campaign. The Government must have

complete confidence in its general and allow him wide latitude, telling him only the end to be achieved. It takes a month to receive a reply to a dispatch from Savona and everything can change in that time.

When Turin is ours it will be pointless to besiege Alessandria and Tortona; we shall enter the Milanese unimpeded, as though it were Champagne.

The Government must order the completion of the pontoon train for the Mincio and Oglio, which I had begun. Everything needed for bridging the Po, Adige, Ticino and Tanaro will be found in Italy.

Wagons, clothing and food will be found for the brave army that seizes the plains of Piedmont and the Milanese.

BUONAPARTE

71

### To Citizen Merlin

Minister of Police

H.Q., Paris

8 Pluviôse, Year IV (27 Jan, 1796)

I am enclosing, Citizen Minister, a declaration by the Justice of the Peace of Saint-Cloud which attests that the troops quartered there are maintaining the most complete discipline. You will see, therefore, that the charges made against them are false and can only be the work of trouble-makers.

BUONAPARTE

72

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Paris

23 Pluviôse, Year IV (12 Feb, 1796)

Insurrection is making noticeable progress in the departments of the Eure, Eure-et-Loir and Loiret.

In the department of the Eure General Huet has seized from the brigands a store of several hundred rations of bread which they had in the forest of Breteuil.

In the department of the Aisne they are posting counter-revolutionary notices urging citizens not to pay the forced loan.

Young men of the first requisition are rejoining on all sides; the department of the Somme alone has produced nearly 3,000.

I must praise the conduct of the departmental administration of the Eure; but in the other departments where there is trouble the municipal authorities behave badly or feebly.

I have organized three companies from among the former gunners of Paris and have sent them to the coast. This step was suggested to me by the need to free Paris of a large number of idle men and to provide for the coastal defence of the Seine-Inférieure.

BUONAPARTE

73

**To Citizen Aubert-Dubayet***Minister of War**H.Q., Paris**10 Ventôse, Year IV (29 Feb, 1796)*

Citizen Minister, the Executive Directory has decreed that part of the troops and equipment in the 9th, 10th and 11th Military Districts should be sent to the Army of Italy. You gave the consequential orders more than a month ago. Yet I am informed that there are still clothing, camp, transport and artillery stores in these three districts which are useless for their present needs. I wish you would write to the generals commanding these districts to send to me without delay, to Nice, returns of all the troops in their districts; to the three artillery commanders to send me returns of the artillery personnel and material, and to the quartermasters of the three districts to send me returns of the stores of the various services, and to let me have those things that I think necessary unless they believe that my demands will compromise their service, and then to report to you at once.\*

BONAPARTE

74

**To Citizen Letourneur***President of the Executive Directory**H.Q., Paris**21 Ventôse, Year IV (11 Mar, 1796)*


I had charged Citizen Barras with informing the Executive Directory of my marriage to Citizeness Tascher Beauharnais. The confidence shown in me at all times by the Directory makes it my duty to inform it of all my actions. This is one more bond linking me to the nation, another pledge of my firm resolution to seek honour only in the Republic.

*The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy*

BUONAPARTE

\* Buonaparte already knew of his appointment to command the Army of Italy, though this was not gazetted until 2 March. He was succeeded as C.-in-C. of the Army of the Interior by Hatry.

*Italy*



**Medals of the Italian Campaign**

*Above: Millesimo-Deigo medal; centre: Mantua medal; below: victory medal (reverse).*

*All actual size.*



**B**ONAPARTE, AS HE NOW BEGAN TO SPELL HIS NAME, REACHED HIS headquarters at the end of March to find the army he was to command in a serious plight. The barrenness of the area, lack of money, the weaknesses of the supply system and the English blockade of the coast had combined to produce desperate shortages of food, clothing and equipment while the troops, their pay in arrears, were undisciplined and mutinous. He at once took such steps as he could to put things right (Nos. 75-86), but little was possible in the existing situation and he knew well enough that victory was the best means both of restoring morale and obtaining supplies. It was also essential to his plans to take the field as soon as possible, and after a few days he began to advance and within a fortnight he was in action. The supply problem remained acute until he entered the Italian plain; the problem of discipline was never properly solved despite his fulminant orders against looting and straggling (Nos. 97, 151), for, although from the first battles the troops became loyal and devoted and always fought splendidly, yet even a year later they were still when off the battlefield a disorderly rabble beside the well-disciplined reinforcements brought by Bernadotte from the Army of the Rhine.

—The Army of Italy had been in action during every year since 1792 and had achieved notable successes. Nice and Savoy had early been siezed from Piedmont, and Bonaparte had himself taken part in the victory at Dego in 1794. In November, 1795, Kellermann's victory at Loano had brought the coast as far as Savona under French control. But through the policy of the government or the timidity of the commanders these successes were not exploited as they might have been and as Bonaparte had suggested they should be. ↗

↗ The army was now opposed by some 30,000 Austrians under Beaulieu and some 20,000 Piedmontese under Colli. ↗ (The fact that Bonaparte when writing to the Directory added the garrison and base troops of the enemy and so almost doubled these figures is typical of the exaggerations he often found it expedient to adopt.) Lombardy (the Duchy of Milan), an Austrian province ruled by the Archduke Ferdinand, and Naples were also at war with France, but apart from a small force of Neapolitan cavalry neither had troops in the field.

↗ Generally speaking the peoples of Italy were either apathetic towards the war or inclined to support the French. The exactions of their alien or clerical rulers and the attractions of the revolutionary principles had in most of the states produced a nucleus of republicanism which French agents had encouraged. Only Piedmont, a well-organized state under a native dynasty, really held the loyalty of its subjects. But the governments were unanimously hostile to regicide and atheist France and the majority, though nominally neutral, openly aided the allies. Genoa alone, like Venice a wealthy but corrupt oligarchy, was accessible to

French influence and was an important source of supplies for the army; but under political pressure from the coalition and the practical threats of the English fleet it had recently been less co-operative.

Relations with Genoa indirectly determined the opening stages of the new campaign. One of Schérer's last acts had been to send forward a brigade under Cervoni to occupy Voltri with the aim of forcing the Genoese to grant a loan. This move displeased Bonaparte (Nos. 75, 85), who feared it would alarm the enemy prematurely, but in the event it was to serve him well. Beaulieu determined to attack this vanguard with his main force while a secondary attack under Argenteau moved from the north against Savona where the bulk of the French were concentrated; the Piedmontese, further to the west round Ceva, took little part in these first moves. This plan involved the dispersal of the allied forces in rugged mountain country where communications were difficult and rapid concentration impossible, a mistake that Bonaparte was to exploit to the full. Leaving Sérurier's division to cover the Piedmontese, he moved the bulk of the army against Argenteau. The victory of Montenotte on 12 April gave him the junction of the Turin and Alessandria roads at Carcare, thus cutting the contact between Colli to the west and Beaulieu to the east. Nos. 87 to 93 are his operation orders preceding the battle, No. 94 his first Order of the Day announcing victory and No. 95 his first victorious dispatch to the Directory.

During the following days this initial advantage was further developed, and after French successes at Millesimo on 13 April and Dego on the 14th and 15th Beaulieu withdrew all his forces on Acqui where he remained more or less inactive while Bonaparte turned rapidly on Colli. Outflanked and forced to abandon their strongly fortified positions at Ceva, the Piedmontese were brought to battle and defeated at Mondovi on the 21st (No. 96). The next day Colli sued for an armistice and in the early hours of the 28th he accepted Bonaparte's terms (Nos. 98, 100, 104). By the armistice of Cherasco the French not only eliminated one of the opposing armies but also opened up far better lines of communication with France.

The Austrians now prepared to hold the line of the Po, and, since Bonaparte gave every indication that he would try to cross at Valenza, their main strength concentrated there with smaller forces on the tributaries to the east. But a strong French formation was moved along the right bank to Piacenza, where a crossing was made on 7 May, the bulk of the army quickly following (Nos. 106, 112). The Austrian positions were thus turned and after some sharp but small-scale actions Beaulieu rather tamely drew off towards Mantua, abandoning the whole of Lombardy apart from a small garrison in the citadel of Milan. The famous battle of Lodi on 10 May had an immense influence in raising Bonaparte's personal self-confidence and the prestige of the Army of

Italy in both its own and the French nation's eyes; but it had little strategic importance. Beaulieu had no intention of standing west of the Mincio, and, as the Order of the Day (No. 116) makes clear, the battle was fought against a rearguard, not the main Austrian army as is suggested by the dispatch (No. 117).

Bonaparte had now to face a crisis in his relations with the government. In granting the armistice of Cherasco he had exceeded the strict letter of his instructions and the Directors did not approve the ambitious schemes he proposed in No. 105. They intended the Army of Italy to discipline the Italian states and to provide no more than a holding diversion against the Austrians while the main attack was launched on the Rhine; they also proposed to divide the army into two separate commands with Kellermann in control against the Austrians while Bonaparte moved south in Italy. His criticism of this foolish plan (Nos. 121, 122) was unanswerable and no more was heard of it. A few days later he was also able to send off the first of many consignments of plunder which 'forged a link of gold between the general and the government' (Nos. 129, 130). Thereafter his relations with the Directory were often strained, but there were few further attempts to control his policy.

Another worry that never left him until Josephine joined him at the beginning of July was her constant refusal on one pretext or another to leave Paris and her failure to write to him in sufficiently loving terms or even for long periods to write at all (Nos. 84, 103, 120, 140).

On 15 May Bonaparte entered Milan and was for the first time faced with problems of political organization, for which he had neither specific instructions nor defined powers. (Cp. No. 126.) With the Austrian army still in the field he at first simply encouraged the friends of France while retaining most of the former administration under military control; to supply the army and satisfy the Directors he also had to impose heavy contributions (Nos. 133, 134). All this produced a sharp reaction and on 25 May there was a serious revolt at Pavia and rioting at Milan which were severely repressed (Nos. 143, 144).

On 22 May he learned that peace with Piedmont had been signed, thus securing his communications. He at once moved against Beaulieu, who was holding the line of the Mincio, and after heavy fighting at Borghetto and elsewhere the Austrians were driven in disorder up the Adige and into the Alps. This uncovered Mantua, which was promptly besieged by the French (No. 147). The fortress was the key to control of north Italy and Austrian efforts to relieve it dominated the strategy of the ensuing months.

But for the moment the enemy was incapable of action, and during the second half of June Bonaparte moved small forces south and west in order to drive the English from Leghorn (No. 162) and to overawe

the Roman and Neapolitan courts (No. 161). He quickly succeeded; Leghorn was occupied and Rome and Naples sued for peace. By the armistice of Foligno on the 23rd the French gained large sums from the Pope in cash and treasure and occupied Ancona and the papal cities of Bologna, Reggio and Ferrara (No. 164). In October these three cities, together with Modena, were to form themselves into the Cispadane Republic, a step approved by Bonaparte; at about the same time the English left Corsica and evacuated the Mediterranean, and he was forced to attend to the government of his native island (No. 189). These things apart, from July to the following February he was concerned to keep the political position stable, for this was a period of repeated and desperate fighting.

By detaching troops from the Rhine front, where the French offensive was delayed, cautious and unsuccessful, the Austrians made four successive efforts to crush the French in Italy and relieve Mantua. Each came very close to success and stretched the resources of the Army of Italy to the uttermost (cp. No. 196). There were many variations of detail, but all four were essentially designed as enveloping movements. This strategy led to complex operations and numerous actions; it often succeeded in bewildering the French command and seriously mauling some of their formations, but it also enabled Bonaparte to fight on interior lines against a divided enemy, and in each case his insight and speed of movement succeeded in crushing the main threat in a decisive battle.

At the end of July Beaulieu's successor, Wurmser, attacked down the Adige while a secondary column under Quosdanovitch overran Sauret's positions west of Lake Garda and captured Brescia. The Austrians were finally stopped at Castiglione on 5 August, but by then Bonaparte had been forced to raise the siege, abandon his siege train and allow Mantua to be revictualled. In mid-September a second offensive by Wurmser was routed at Bassano; he cut his way through to Mantua but was driven into the city and the siege was renewed (Nos. 179, 180). In October Bonaparte called on Wurmser to surrender and on the Emperor to make peace (Nos. 186-7), but neither responded, and shortly afterward the third Austrian blow was struck, Alvinzi advancing from the east through Verona and Davidovitch down the Adige; this threat was defeated at Arcola where Bonaparte himself was nearly killed (Nos. 195-7). The final Austrian effort, led by Alvinzi and Provera, was made in January when their main body was destroyed at Rivoli (No. 208). On 2 February Mantua surrendered (Nos. 212, 214, 216).

Bonaparte now moved south again with Victor's division, denounced the armistice of Foligno and forced the treaty of Tolentino on the Pope (Nos. 191, 209, 211, 218-19). Early in March he was back and, although

to his constant concern the French armies on the Rhine had made no move, he launched his own offensive against the Austrians. By a series of well-planned movements and successful actions he drove the Archduke Charles back in confusion through the gorges of Tyrol and Carinthia as far as Leoben. There, on 18 April, were signed an armistice and preliminaries of peace whose main terms were that France was to gain the Rhine frontier, the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) and control of Italy west of the Oglio, while Austria would be partly compensated through the partition of Venice (Nos. 221-7, 231, 233).

In preparation for this and on the ground of incidents at least some of which were provoked, Bonaparte at once overthrew the Venetian government and occupied its lands (Nos. 229, 236-8, 240, 242-3). The acquisition of the Ionian islands clearly stimulated his ideas of oversea conquest and heralded the next stage in his career (Nos. 244, 254, etc.). In June less forceful intervention was needed to remove the Genoese oligarchy in favour of the democratic Ligurian Republic (Nos. 243, 246), a step, as he thought, on the road to union with France (No. 265). In July the Cisalpine Republic was formed by the union of Lombardy and the Cispadane with a constitution largely modelled on that of France, but with the first authorities appointed by Bonaparte; his moderate appointments and firm repression of both Jacobin and clerical extremes was perhaps the wisest and most fruitful aspect of his whole Italian policy (No. 264). In October the Venetian lands west of the Adige and in November the Swiss territory of the Valtelline were added to the Cisalpine.

➤ Meanwhile the Austrians were dragging out the peace negotiations in hope of a restoration of the monarchy in Paris, where largely royalist chambers were at grips with the regicide executive. The crisis was solved at the *coup d'état* of Fructidor (4 September), when Augereau purged the chambers, drove the moderate Carnot from the Directory and installed staunch Jacobins in power. Publicly Bonaparte held aloof, but in private he abetted this solution; as a presumed agent of the Directors he had come in for his share of attacks to which he had forcefully replied (Nos. 248-9), but it is clear from No. 259 that his political thought was already moving along other lines. The Austrians now perforce agreed to make peace and the treaty of Campo Formio was signed on 17 October (Nos. 261-2).

➤ For the moment the continental war was at an end, and Bonaparte was ordered to prepare for the invasion of England, the sole remaining enemy. On 15 November he handed over command of the army to Berthier and, after spending a few days at Rastadt where he was a French delegate to the congress to settle the affairs of the Holy Roman Empire, he reached Paris on 5 December.

## THE REPUBLICAN ARMIES

When Bonaparte assumed command of the Army of Italy there was in progress the last of a series of reforms which converted the old royal army into a military establishment essentially modern in administration and structure. The chief effect of this last change was to increase the size and decrease the number of units through amalgamations. It finally took effect in the Army of Italy on 26 May, 1796, and in other commands at about the same time, and the military organization which it completed remained unaltered until the end of the continental revolutionary war in 1801. Thereafter, when building the huge armies of the Empire, Napoleon and his lieutenants introduced many reforms; yet the military structure set up by the Republic was not fundamentally changed until after 1815.

For both operational and administrative purposes the basic and permanent infantry unit was the 'demi-brigade'. After the reforms of 1796 the whole French army contained one hundred and ten numbered Demi-brigades of the Line together with thirty Light Infantry Demi-brigades carrying separate serial numbers. A colonel's command, the demi-brigade had a nominal establishment of 3,000 organized in three battalions under majors. Battalions were divided into eight companies under captains, companies into troops under subalterns, troops into sections under n.c.o.'s. Infantry of the line were termed 'fusiliers', light infantrymen 'chasseurs', but the first company in each battalion was an élite unit which marched at the head of the column and was called upon for the more hazardous operations; its members were known as 'grenadiers' in the line units and 'carabiniers' in the light infantry.\*

Most units were usually well below establishment in other ranks, the average strength of demi-brigades in the Army of Italy during Bonaparte's command being less than 2,000; at the same time they also usually carried a number of supernumerary officers who were available as replacements and for special duties. Demi-brigades found their own staff and service personnel, civilians (including women) being carried on the strength as cooks, tailors, laundresses, etc. The chief staff officer of a demi-brigade held the special staff rank of adjutant-major (ranking with captain), that of a battalion of adjutant-captain (ranking with

\* Demi-brigades were first formed in 1793 by the amalgamation of formerly independent battalions, usually on the basis of one of regulars to two of volunteers. The distinction then disappeared, since all were incorporated in a unified French army. To raise the forces needed, the *levée en masse* was decreed at the same time, and this unwieldy general obligation of military service was placed on a more rational and effective basis by Jourdan's conscription law of 1798. (Conscription as it is known today dates from this measure.) Serial numbers for units, in place of the territorial titles of the royal army, were also adopted in 1793, but, like many other changes, this took effect only over a period of years; there were still a few named units in the Army of Italy when Bonaparte reached it.

lieutenant). Each demi-brigade had a depot for training, equipping and forwarding recruits, holding stores and keeping records; depots were mobile but remained in France, forward depots being set up in the rear areas of armies on active service beyond the frontiers.

Grenades were sometimes used against fortified positions, but otherwise the musket and bayonet were the only weapons of the soldiers of the line.\* The light infantry were generally similarly equipped, though in theory and sometimes in practice they held carbines, which were shorter and lighter but rather less efficient than the musket; some carabiniers were equipped with rifles, but, while the far greater range and accuracy of these made them ideal sniping weapons, the extreme difficulty of loading made them almost useless for any other purpose and they were withdrawn during the Empire.

The line units were heavy assault troops designed to fight in close order in pitched battle and to carry the day by the volume of their fire-power and the weight of their bayonet charge; numerous tactical formations—line, column, battalion square, etc.—were used for different purposes. Light infantry, on the other hand, were designed for mobility rather than weight and for open-order skirmishing rather than fighting in mass. Their uses included reconnaissance, sniping, patrolling and the provision of covering forces; in battle their model role was to make first contact with the enemy, harass and disorganize his movement or position, and, as the lines became engaged, to retire onto the flanks where they could make useful diversions and encircling attacks.

The basic cavalry unit was the 'regiment' of 800 men, organized in squadrons and troops, the regimental command and administrative structure being in all essential respects identical with that of the infantry demi-brigade. There were in all some twenty-five Regiments each of (mounted) Chasseurs, Hussars, Dragoons and (heavy) Cavalry or Cuirassiers. The chasseurs and hussars were light cavalry trained for long-range reconnaissance and pursuit; the cuirassiers, who alone were armoured with helmet and breastplate, were primarily intended for the charge in battle; the dragoons were available in either role. All cavalry were armed with sabres and with either pistols or carbines, and, with the exception of the cuirassiers, all were trained to fight on foot as well as on horseback and so to act as mounted infantry.

\* The musket was a muzzle-loading flint-lock of a pattern introduced in 1777, which, slightly modified in 1800, continued in use throughout the Empire. It was of 17.5 mm. calibre and weighed 10½ lbs. It could not be aimed accurately at ranges beyond some sixty yards and its effective killing range was perhaps five times this distance. But musket balls would travel several hundred yards beyond their killing range, and the prevalence of such 'spent balls' on the densely populated battlefields of the time accounts for the large number of superficial wounds reported.

The artillery and engineers were also organized in 'regiments', but this was mainly for administrative purposes in the metropolitan bases, and operational postings normally took place at a lower level. Both were highly trained, specialized arms almost entirely composed of long-service professional soldiers; volunteers and conscripts could serve in them only as labourers, and graduation through the appropriate military schools was essential for commissioned rank. There had been some dilution during the Revolution but the results were not happy, and the rules were strictly enforced again once Bonaparte reached power.

The duties of the engineers included everything to do with the construction and demolition of fortifications, all military building, bridging, road making and cartography. The service necessarily contained a high proportion of officers, but there were specialist companies of sappers, miners, smiths, masons, and pontoon and bridging teams as well as general pioneer battalions.

Artillery regiments contained twelve companies, divided into troops; about a quarter were mounted, the remainder foot companies. All guns, limbers and ammunition wagons were horse-drawn, but the artillery horses were not army property and were supplied by civilian contractors, supplemented in occupied territory (and occasionally in France itself) by requisitioning. Guns of a great many different calibres were in use; from 2-pounders to 12-pounders formed the normal field artillery, with 16- and 24-pounders in the siege-trains; heavier guns were used in static coastal defence positions and permanent fortresses. All guns fired round shot (cannon-balls) and case shot (an anti-personnel weapon consisting of a 'case' of small projectiles, the forerunner of shrapnel). Explosive shell was fired from howitzers, mostly of 6- or 8-inch calibre, and 8-, 10- and 12-inch mortars firing bombs were used in siege work.\* The extreme range of guns firing round shot was about 3,000 yards, but they were inaccurate beyond some 1,200 yards; case shot was considered ineffective beyond 800 yards,

\* The development of the percussion fuse enabled all guns to fire explosive shot, and today a howitzer is simply a short-barrelled, high-angle gun of relatively large calibre and low muzzle-velocity. But in Napoleon's time shell could be fired only from just such a gun; short barrel, since the fuses of shells had to be ignited down the barrel after loading; high angle, since one of the chief uses of shell was plunging fire against fortifications; large calibre, since only low explosives were available and a fairly large projectile was needed to produce much effect; low velocity, owing to the danger of premature bursts with the cast-iron cases generally used. The French word for 'howitzer', *obusier* (*obus*—shell), still suggests the original function of these weapons. Though it was seldom done, shell could in fact be fired from ordinary guns by the use of special methods and devices, and in 1788 Buonaparte was a member of a regimental committee appointed to experiment and report on these; his interesting, but highly technical report still exists and was printed by Masson in *Napoléon Inconnu*.



and the extreme range of howitzers was about 600 yards. Guns were normally used at ranges far less than these maximum figures. Two of the most important military reforms later carried out by Napoleon were the placing of artillery horses on the regular army establishment and the standardization of only a few different calibres throughout the service. There was no separate ordnance service, and the artillery arm was responsible for the arsenals, the manufacture of ammunition, including infantry cartridges, and for the storage and distribution of all military supplies other than those of the engineers.

The whole of the commissariat was in the hands of civilians. At the staff level and responsible for the general supervision of all the supply, transport, financial and medical services was a special body of officials divided into the three ranks of quartermaster-general, quartermaster and war commissary. This contained some able men who made it their career; but many posts were filled by temporary appointments (both Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte served for a time) and as a whole the commissary service was neither efficient nor free from corruption. Much the same may be said of the separate paymaster service which was administratively under its control. Supplies of food, forage and clothing, and transport were provided on a contract basis by commercial companies, whose agents accompanied the armies in the field and were often more concerned to line their own pockets than to serve the troops.

The medical service presented a different picture. Unit surgeons were often only semi-trained, but France possessed several combined military hospitals and medical schools, based on the Invalides and a central directorate, and these produced devoted and skilful doctors who staffed the rear hospitals and the 'flying ambulances', the mobile field dressing stations devised by Larrey in 1793 and, within a few years, attached to every division on active service. This organization, combined with a good deal of inventiveness and a strict regard for cleanliness, gave the French armies of the later Revolution and Empire a far lower rate of loss from sickness and a far higher rate of recovery from wounds than any other army of the time.

At one period in 1793 there were no less than thirteen separate French armies in the field, but this unwieldy number quickly decreased and by 1796 had dropped to seven and by the time of Brumaire to five. Their strength varied from a few thousand to over 100,000 men, the Army of the Rhine, in 1800, at 120,000, being the largest distinct French force before the Grand Army. The Commander-in-Chief of each army had at his disposal a staff headed by a major-general with two or more brigadiers as assistants, about half a dozen adjutants-general and a number of junior officers. (Adjutants-general held the highest of the special staff ranks; they did not rate as generals, but it

is perhaps not surprising that they behaved as if they did, and to prevent the resulting abuses the name of the rank was changed in 1800 to adjutant-commandant.) General staffs were small and often no more than adequately efficient. Staff officers received no special training and mostly were only temporarily so employed between fighting commands; those who regarded staff work as a profession were few, and those who, like Berthier, were notably competent at it fewer still. At the head of the service staff stood the quartermaster-general with three or four assistant quartermasters and a number of war commissaries. The army surgeon-general and paymaster-general were administratively subordinate to the Q.M.G. but personally responsible for the technical aspects of their own services.

Demi-brigades and cavalry regiments normally moved and fought as complete units. They were posted to armies as the need arose and were there brigaded *ad hoc* into divisions, which had no fixed establishment and whose size varied according to circumstances and the decision of the army commander. Infantry divisions might contain anything from two to seven or eight demi-brigades, three or four being the most common number, usually in the proportion of one light infantry to two of the line. They were true divisions containing all arms, since cavalry, artillery and engineer units were attached to them, but the bulk of the cavalry was usually organized in special cavalry divisions and a proportion of the guns and most engineer units were retained in centralized parks. Each army had separate commanders of cavalry, of artillery and of engineers, who had each his own staff and administrative control of all troops of his own arm and often operational command of those not attached to the divisions.

Divisions were commanded by major-generals, with two or more brigadiers under them according to the size of the division. Divisional staffs mirrored the army staff in every respect, but on a smaller scale and at a lower level; they were headed by adjutants-general with war commissaries as the chief commissariat officers.

Brigades were simply fighting commands without distinct staffs, and their organization was very fluid. The army corps had not yet appeared as a field formation, and divisional commanders were directly responsible to the C.-in-C. Towards the end of the Italian campaign Joubert, Masséna and Bernadotte was each at various times placed in control of two or more divisions but retained command of his own, and true, though very sketchily organized, corps were formed during the Marengo and Hohenlinden campaigns; both the term 'army corps' and the title 'lieutenant-general' (it has never in the French army been strictly speaking a rank\*) appeared at that time. This development

\* It had earlier been used occasionally for special appointments; see, for instance, No. 29 where Paoli's appointment as Lieutenant-General of Corsica is referred to.

was finally to be completed in the permanent, fully staffed and numbered corps of the Grand Army. It was only then, too, that the numbering and regular establishment of divisions came into force, though in 1797 Bonaparte introduced numbers into the Army of Italy in place of the unsatisfactory but usual custom of referring to divisions by the names of their commanders. (Cp. No. 210.)

Metropolitan France was divided into twenty-three (ultimately thirty-two) Military Districts commanded by brigadiers or major-generals.\* District commanders were responsible for the defensive garrisons and fortresses and had some supervisory but not necessarily operational control over other military establishments in their areas. But their main duties were to preserve internal order and to act in concert with the civil authorities and as agents of the central government; they had control of the gendarmerie and national guards and of a variable number of regular troops. Their staffs were similar to those of field divisions. Districts occupied by or in the rear areas of the field armies were usually allotted to those armies as supply and communication zones and placed under the control of the army commanders; thus Bonaparte became responsible for the 8th District in 1796 and in 1800 the 18th and 19th Districts were allotted to the Reserve Army.

Administrative control of both field armies and home establishments was centred in the Ministry of War. A strong and knowledgeable minister serving a weak government could sometimes also achieve a good deal of operational control, but grand strategy and operational planning generally remained in the hands of the government, which had, in the Topographical Office, a specialized advisory body independent of the Ministry. As a field commander Bonaparte corresponded with the minister on administrative matters but, whether the minister was an insignificant Petiet or a soldier of the standing of Schérer, on all operational matters he wrote to the Directors.†

Government control over the armies was greatly increased by a Decree of April, 1793. Prompted by the desertion and treachery of so many officers, this laid down that three members of the Convention should be attached to each of the armies as Representatives of the People 'invested with unlimited powers'. The Representatives carried out their duties despotically and ruthlessly, intervening in every aspect of military service and often reducing the army commanders to little

\* See map, p. xxxii.

† It must be remembered that the ministers did not, as they do in a modern parliamentary democracy, themselves form the government. They were important officials and sometimes influential political figures, but they were always subordinated to a superior government whether Convention, Committee of Public Safety, Directors, Consuls or Emperor. American rather than British constitutional arrangements are the closer analogy.



more than technical consultants and subordinates. (It was mainly due to the favourable opinion of the Representatives with whom he served—Barras, Fréron, Saliceti, Robespierre—that Buonaparte received his early opportunities.) With the coming of the Directory the Representatives were replaced by Government Commissioners, who could not be deputies and whose powers were less; these were still almost complete in the political and diplomatic spheres and considerable in the administrative, but operational control was wholly reserved to the soldiers, though the commissioners were still expected to keep an eye on the political loyalty of the military chiefs. In the Army of Italy Bonaparte was quick to repress any intrusion of the commissioners into his own functions, and he quickly reduced them to a position of complete subordination. (Cp. No. 166. Saliceti, at first the sole commissioner, was in any case a friend who did not dispute his supremacy and worked in complete harmony with him.) When he formed the Army of the East the nominal commissioner, Poussielgue, was his own appointee with the real function of heading the civil administration of the conquered territory. The whole system was formally abolished at the beginning of the Consulate.

#### THE ARMY OF ITALY

It is not possible to give a useful Order of Battle of the Army of Italy during 1796-7 since it seldom remained constant for more than a few weeks at a time. When Bonaparte took command the army had a strength of about 45,000 and contained four field divisions of infantry under Masséna, Augereau, Sérurier and Laharpe and one of cavalry under Kilmaine. Other senior officers were: *C. of S.*, Berthier; *Deputy C. of S.*, Vignolle; *Cdr. Cavalry*, Stengel; *Cdr. Artillery*, Dujard; *Cdr. Engineers*, Chasseloup; *Q.M.G.*, Chauvet. Berthier was appointed at the same time as Bonaparte, who also brought as aides-de-camp Murat, Marmont and Junot. Gaultier, the former Chief of Staff, remained in charge of rear H.Q. By the armistice of Leoben the strength had risen to about 85,000 with eight infantry and two cavalry divisions: *1st*, Masséna; *2nd*, Augereau; *3rd*, Bernadotte; *4th*, Sérurier; *5th*, Joubert; *6th*, Baraguey d'Hilliers; *7th*, Delmas; *8th*, Victor; *1st Cav.*, Dugua; *2nd Cav.*, Dumas.

Initially, Saliceti was the only Government Commissioner attached to the army, but in June Garrau and Haller were sent out, the latter in charge of the levying of contributions. In November Clarke arrived as a special Commissioner to negotiate with the Austrians.

At the beginning of May, 1796, Bonaparte withdrew the bulk of the grenadier and carabinier companies from the divisions and brigaded them into a special élite formation commanded by Dallemagne and Lannes. This 'Advance-guard' led the army at the crossing of the Po and the bridge of Lodi. The practice was common in most armies of the time; it gave the commander a powerful and reliable weapon, but by removing their best elements it seriously weakened the fighting potential of the ordinary divisions. Bonaparte seems quickly to have seen this disadvantage, for he maintained the system only for a few weeks and never again resorted to it.




## ITALY


*Above:* in March, 1796.

*Below:* after the Treaty of Campo Formio.


The shading shows the French and Austrian alliance systems.



NORTH ITALY



AREA OF FIRST OPERATIONS, 1796



MANTUA

## To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Nice

8 Germinal, Year IV (28 Mar, 1796)

For several days I have been in the midst of the army and I assumed command yesterday.\*

I must mention three essential matters. 1. The departments of Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rhône, Var and Basses-Alpes. 2. The condition of the army; what I have done and what I hope to do. 3. Our political position with Genoa.

The four departments of the army area have not paid the forced loan or contributions in corn, nor carried out the delivery of forage required by the law of 7 Vendémiaire, nor begun the levy of one horse in thirty. These authorities act very slowly. I have written to them, I have seen them, and they have led me to hope for some energy in these matters so essential to the army.

The administrative position of the army is difficult but not desperate. I am forced to threaten the contractors, who have stolen a great deal, and by finally treating them pleasantly I get much out of them. From now on the army will eat good bread and have meat, and already it has received considerable advances of overdue pay.

The stages on the road from the Rhône to the Var are provisioned and for five days my cavalry, artillery and transport have been on the move. Your instructions will be carried out, Citizen Directors; I shall march shortly. In your name I have informed the army of your satisfaction at its patience and good conduct. This greatly pleased the soldiers and particularly the officers. One battalion has mutinied, on the ground that it had neither boots nor pay. I had all the grenadiers arrested and made the battalion move off and, when it was a league from Nice, I sent it counter orders and sent it to the rear. I intend to disband this unit and incorporate the men in other battalions, since the officers have not shown enough nerve. The battalion is 200 strong and known for its mutinous spirit.

I have been received by the army with signs of pleasure and the

\* Dated 27 March, 1796, there is included in the *Correspondance* (No. 91) a famous 'Proclamation' to the Army of Italy which reads as follows: 'Soldiers, you are naked and starving. The Government owes you much; it can give you nothing. Your patience, the courage you show in the midst of these rocks, are admirable; but they bring you no glory. I will lead you into the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces and great cities will be in your power; there you will find honour, glory and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, will you lack courage and faith?'

This was never placed on the Order of the Day, for it was composed at St. Helena to embellish the *Memoirs*. Yet, since it was in fact written by Napoleon, it cannot simply be ignored as a forgery.



confidence owed to one who was known to have merited your trust.

I have been particularly satisfied with the openness and honesty of General Schérer. His loyal conduct and readiness to give me all information that may be helpful to me have earned my gratitude. His health seems somewhat affected. He combines great facility of speech with moral and political understanding, which may perhaps be of use to you in some important employment.

Our position with Genoa is critical. It has been badly handled, and we have either gone too far or not far enough; but it is to be hoped that no harm will come of it. The Government of Genoa is stronger than is thought. There are only two ways with it: either to seize Genoa by a quick coup de main, which is contrary to your intentions and to international law, or else to live in friendship and not try to take their money from them, for that is the one thing they prize.

In four days I shall move my headquarters to Albenga.

BONAPARTE

76

## Order of the Day

### *Army of Italy*

H.Q., Nice

9 Germinal, Year IV (29 Mar, 1796)

The Commander-in-Chief has reviewed the 100th and 165th Demi-brigades, the 7th Hussars and the artillery. He was satisfied with the bearing of the troops, their devotion to the Republic and the strong will to victory which they showed him. He has passed through the field divisions of the army and everywhere found soldiers accustomed to vanquish and suffer, devoted both to liberty and to discipline, which is the nerve of armies. They will find in him a comrade in arms supported by the confidence of the Government, proud of the regard of patriots and determined to bring to the Army of Italy a destiny worthy of it.

In accordance with the decree of the Executive Directory, dated 12 Ventôse, General Alexander Berthier is appointed Chief of Staff of the Army of Italy. Adjutant-general Vignolle remains Deputy Chief of Staff.

Major-General P. Gaultier remains employed in the headquarters at Nice; for the time being he will be specially in charge of all matters concerning the new organization of the army, with the men joining as a result of the levy and with the exchange of prisoners of war; he will sign all documents relating to this work.

Generals who have less than the number of aides-de-camp authorized by law are ordered to choose them in accordance with its provisions.

Adjutants-general who have no assistants are also ordered to propose at once the officers they consider capable of carrying out this important function. No personal considerations must influence their choice; ability, morality and a pure and enlightened patriotism alone must determine it. . . .

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

77

**To Major-General Berthier**

*Chief of Staff, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Nice*

*10 Germinal, Year IV (30 Mar, 1796)*

Fresh meat will be issued five times per decade; battalions which have drawn salt meat today will have fresh meat tomorrow, and those which have had fresh meat will have salt. . . .

BONAPARTE

78

**To Major-General Berthier**

*Chief of Staff, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Nice*

*11 Germinal, Year IV (31 Mar, 1796)*

The Commander-in-Chief is informed that several war commissaries and officers hold sums proceeding from various sales, from contributions and from revenues of conquered territory. That being contrary to orders, to the good of the service and to the Constitution, he orders that these funds should be deposited without delay in the office of the army paymaster or of his agents so that they may be used, on the orders of the Quartermaster-General, in the interest of the service and to procure for the soldier what is due to him.

BONAPARTE

79

**To Adjutant-general Chabran**

*G.S., Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Nice*

*11 Germinal, Year IV (31 Mar, 1796)*

Adjutant-general Chabran is ordered to leave Nice today, 11 Germinal, and proceed as quickly as possible to Albenga, where he will prepare the establishment of headquarters, which leaves Nice on the 12th and will reach Albenga on the 15th.

For this purpose he will confer with the governor and the consul; he will take all measures required by the law of nations in neutral territory, but will make all necessary dispositions for the lodging of the headquarters.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

80

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of Italy**H.Q., Nice**12 Germinal, Year IV (1 Apr, 1796)*

There will be three coastal districts. The first will extend from the Rhône to Bandol, including the departments of Vaucluse and Bouches-du-Rhône, and will be commanded by General Barbentane. The second will be commanded by General Mouret and will extend from Bandol to the river Argens. The third district will extend from the river Argens to Vintimiglia and will be commanded by General Casabianca.

General Stengel will command the cavalry of the army. General Kilmaine will command one cavalry division.

General Dujard will command the artillery. Colonel Sugny will be chief of staff of that arm.

BONAPARTE

81

**To Citizen Sucy***Asst. Q.M.G., Army of Italy, at Genoa**H.Q., Nice**12 Germinal, Year IV (1 Apr, 1796)*

If, when I arrived a week ago, the Quartermaster-General had sent me a letter like the one I have received from you, my dear Quartermaster, I should have taken steps to ensure the forage service; but all the letters I received from Genoa tended to lull my mind.

The route from the Rhône to the Var is provisioned; Nice is provisioned for one month and Menton equally. . . .

You will receive attached the movement orders for the cavalry. The wagons are moving fast, and tomorrow 2,000 mules will leave; they will be sent to Finale and Vado.

If Citizen Navarre is trustworthy, with the advances he has received in Paris and the 60,000 francs you have given him, you should have no further cause for disquiet. Go to Varaggio and place contracts for 30,000 francs on condition that the forage is delivered to Loano, Finale and Oneglia before the 25th of the month; I will honour your engagements at Albenga.

Corn is assured by the Flosque company. That citizen, who will be going to Genoa, has promised me 20,000 pairs of boots to be paid for in Paris. I shall send 5,000 pairs from here tomorrow; 12,000 pairs will leave from Marseilles. You will deliver the attached letter in which Collot orders his house to send 10,000 pairs and 800 quintals of hay. Hasten the departure of the boots you have bought.

I leave tomorrow for Bordighera. I shall be at Albenga on the 15th and await you there as soon as possible.

Headquarters, including all the agents for the services, have left today. Lambert goes with me.

Farewell, my dear Quartermaster. Energy and courage!

BONAPARTE

82

### To Citizen Faypoult

*French Minister to Genoa*

H.Q., Nice

12 Germinal, Year IV (1 Apr, 1796)

I leave tomorrow for Albenga, where I hope to have news of you. Gavi is a strong position which should hold out several days; it can fall only through treason, and from that moment I would treat as enemies of France the oligarchs who let the *Modeste* be raped and would have handed over Gavi; the ramparts of Genoa would no longer be the ramparts of a neutral people and the government of the Genoese republic would cease to exist. But I do not think that is to be feared, Citizen Minister. Write to me often; let me know your position and ideas and I will take care of the Austrians and Piedmontese. Please send spies into Piedmont who will keep me informed of the strength and movement of the enemy.

Your wife is well, and the little niece is as flirtatious as ever; she is making up to my aide-de-camp; all she likes about me is my fine uniform.

BONAPARTE

83

### Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

H.Q., Menton

14 Germinal, Year IV (3 Apr, 1796)

The Commander-in-Chief repeats his order to the generals commanding divisions to hasten as much as possible the work in connexion with the new organization. Divisional commanders will inspect the troops under their command in order to examine carefully the state of their arms. Unserviceable muskets will be replaced. Generals and adjutants-general must not lose an instant in procuring for the troops such equipment as may be necessary. The Commander-in-Chief learns that forage agents are arbitrarily changing the ration on the excuse of lack of stocks. They are expressly forbidden to issue less than the authorized ration without a written order from a war commissary, who can give it only after ascertaining the state of the stores. Chiefs of staff of divisions will, each decade, send to the chief of staff at Albenga the most exact returns of the positions and state of the troops in their divisions. When executing various troop movements, several generals have forgotten to have detachments recalled. They are ordered to give

more attention to the movements they have to make, so that no detachments remain isolated from formations ordered to march.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

84

## To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

*At Paris*

*Port-Maurice*

*14 Germinal, Year IV (3 Apr, 1796)*

I have received all your letters, but none has made such an impression on me as the last. How, my beloved, can you write to me like that? Don't you think my position is cruel enough, without adding to my sorrows and crushing my spirit? What a style! What feelings you show! They are fire, and they burn my poor heart. My one and only Josephine, apart from you there is no joy; away from you, the world is a desert where I am alone and cannot open my heart. You have taken more than my soul; you are the one thought of my life. When I am tired of the worry of work, when I fear the outcome, when men annoy me, when I am ready to curse being alive, I put my hand on my heart; your portrait hangs there, I look at it, and love brings me perfect happiness, and all is smiling except the time I must spend away from my mistress.

By what art have you captivated all my faculties and concentrated my whole being in you? It is a [*illegible*], sweet friend, that will die only when I do. To live for Josephine, that is the history of my life. I long, I try to come near you. Fool! I do not notice that I am going further away. How many countries separate us! How long before you will read these words, feeble expression of a captive soul where you are queen. Oh, my adorable wife! I don't know what fate has in store for me, but if it keeps me apart from you any longer, it will be unbearable! My courage is not enough for that. Once upon a time I was proud of my courage, and sometimes I would think of the ill's destiny might bring me and consider the most terrible horrors without blinking or feeling shaken. But, today the thought that my Josephine may be in trouble, that she may be ill, above all the cruel, the awful thought that she may love me less blights my soul, stills my blood and makes me sad and depressed, without even the courage of rage and despair. I used often to say men cannot harm one who dies without regret; but, now, to die not loved by you, to die without knowing, would be the torment of hell, the living image of utter desolation. I feel I am suffocating. My one companion, you whom fate has destined to travel the sorry road of life beside me, the day I lose your heart will be the day Nature loses warmth and life for me. I stop, sweet friend; my soul is sad, my body tired, my spirit oppressed. Men bore me. I ought to hate them: they take me away from my heart.

I am at Port-Maurice, near Oneglia; tomorrow I reach Albenga. The two armies are moving, trying to outwit each other. Victory to the cleverer. I am pleased with Beaulieu; he manoeuvres well and is stronger than his predecessor. I will beat him soundly, I hope. Don't be frightened. Love me like your eyes; but that is not enough: like yourself, more than yourself, than your thoughts, your life, all of you. Forgive me, dear love, I am raving; Nature is frail when one feels deeply, when one is loved by you.

BONAPARTE

Sincere friendship to Barras, Sucy, Madame Tallien; respects to Madame Château-Renard; true love to Eugène, to Hortense.

Goodbye, goodbye! I shall go to bed without you, sleep without you. Let me sleep, I beg you. For several nights I have felt you in my arms; a happy dream, but it is not you.

85

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Albenga*

*17 Germinal, Year IV (6 Apr, 1796)*

I have transferred the headquarters of the army to Albenga. The movement that I found begun against Genoa has drawn the enemy out of his winter quarters. He has crossed the Po and pushed outposts to Dego, following the Bormida and Bocchetta and leaving Gavi behind him. Beaulieu has published a manifesto which I am sending you and which I will answer after the battle. I am extremely displeased and annoyed by this movement against Genoa which is the more unfortunate in that it has forced that republic to adopt a hostile attitude and has roused the enemy whom I might have surprised. It will cost us more men.

For his part, the King of Sardinia is very active. He has called young men above fifteen to the colours, has condemned those who do not join to be shot and has in fact had six shot at Turin.

General Colli has sent to Ormea as intermediary an emigrant named Moulin. He was arrested and I am having him brought before a court martial. No function can render a parricide sacred.

At Oneglia I have found some marbles which are thought to be of value. I have ordered this to be estimated and that they be offered at auction on the Genoese riviera; that may bring us a sum of 30,000 to 40,000 francs.

The house of Flachet, which has the contract for corn, and that of Collot, which has the meat, are doing well; they give us very good grain and the soldiers are beginning to have fresh meat. The army is in frightening penury; I still have great obstacles to overcome, but they can be surmounted. Misery has led to indiscipline, and without

discipline there can be no victory. I hope that will be quickly settled; already everything is changing. In a few days we shall be in action. The day before yesterday I had a reconnaissance made towards Cairo; the enemy outposts were all driven in and we took a few prisoners.

The Piedmontese army has a strength of 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. The Austrian has 34,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. I have available but 45,000 men in all; many troops have been held back in the rear and beyond the Rhône.

Chauvet, the Quartermaster-General, has died in Genoa; it is a real loss to the army, for he was active and enterprising. The army has shed a tear in his memory.

BONAPARTE

86

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Albenga  
19 Germinal, Year IV (8 Apr, 1796)

Citizen Directors. . . . The Treasury often sends us letters of exchange which are refused; this has just happened to one for 162,800 francs drawn on Cadiz, which increases our difficulties.

I found this army not only destitute of everything, but without discipline and in a state of perpetual insubordination. Discontent was such that renegades had taken charge; a Dauphin company had been formed and counter-revolutionary songs were sung. I have sent for court-martial two officers alleged to have shouted, 'Long live the King!'

I suppose the mission of M. Moulin as intermediary had something to do with plots of that kind, whose traces I am following energetically. Rest assured that discipline and order will be re-established and that I shall mete out justice to the few counter-revolutionaries who have sprung up.

Everything is getting ready; I have just had the important position of La Solta occupied; when you read this letter, we shall be at grips.

The Treasury has not kept its word; instead of 500,000 francs it has sent us 300,000, and we have heard nothing of a sum of 600,000 francs which was announced. Despite all that, we shall go.

BONAPARTE

87

### To Major-General Augereau

G.O.C., Centre Division, Army of Italy  
H.Q., Albenga  
22 Germinal, Year IV (11 Apr, 1796)

General Augereau will leave today with his two demi-brigades and four picked cavalry squadrons and proceed by the shortest route to

Mallare, which he will reach before midnight. He will take bread or biscuit for the 23rd and 24th and eighty cartridges per man.

The auxiliary companies and cavalry will perform duty services and escort the convoys. At the chapel of San Giacomo General Augereau will collect an artillery reserve of four 8-pounders, four 4-pounders, two 3-pounders and a howitzer which will accompany the division.

He will leave Mallare at 5.0 a.m. tomorrow and proceed to Cairo. He will reconnoitre his left flank and occupy the chapel of Santa Giulia between Carcare and Cairo. If the enemy is there, he will be attacked and driven out.

Once beyond Cairo he will occupy the mountains on the left and will send patrols to Rochetta, half way to Dego, when he will receive further orders. He will communicate with the troops of General Dommartin, which will camp on the heights of Montefreddo. He will ensure that nothing is done to warn the enemy and, above all, that no fires are lit on the hills.

He will attack and destroy the enemy if he meets him on the road, and he will report his arrival to headquarters, which will be at Altare.

BONAPARTE

88

### To Major-General Masséna

G.O.C., *Right Division, Army of Italy*

H.Q., *Albenga*

22 *Germinal, Year IV (11 Apr, 1796)*

General Masséna will order Brigadier-General Menard to stand by to proceed to Altare with the troops which are on the Barracone and at Cadibona and Quiliano. They will carry all the cartridges they have. He will take command of these troops and will try to cut off the enemy between Carcare, Altare and Montenotte.

Brigadier-Generals Joubert and Dommartin will join him during the night. When, as a result of this diversion, the [enemy] troops which have attacked Monte-Legino are no longer on the offensive, headquarters will move to Altare.

General Masséna will inform me of his arrival at Altare and of the enemy's movements. He will give such further orders as he thinks necessary to carry out the dispositions of this order.

BONAPARTE

89

### To Major-General Masséna

G.O.C., *Right Division, Army of Italy*

H.Q., *Albenga*

22 *Germinal, Year IV (11 Apr, 1796)*

You will have General Dommartin leave with two battalions of his demi-brigade so as to reach the heights of Montefreddo before mid-



night. The battalions at Finale will take bread for the 23rd and 24th; those at Melogno will collect bread at the chapel of San Giacomo where there will be supplies before 5.0 p.m. Each man of these battalions will carry eighty cartridges, forty in pouches, forty in the haversack.

He will leave Montefreddo at dawn for Carcare, where he will arrive before 8.0 a.m. He will await further orders on the heights to the right of Carcare. From Montefreddo he will send an aide-de-camp or staff officer with news of his arrival to Altare, where headquarters will be.

General Joubert, with the troops under his orders, will proceed by the shortest route to Altare, which he will reach before 7.0 p.m. He will send news of his arrival by a staff officer. He will take all the cartridges at his disposal; each soldier will carry eighty. He will seize all the mules he can find to transport the two 3-pounders which are at San Giacomo; by leaving some of the ammunition they can be drawn by six mules. If he cannot obtain mules by force or payment he will leave the guns and warn Finale to have them fetched.

He will take the sappers with him and all the bread and brandy possible. He will receive further orders at 9.0 p.m. at Altare.

General Menard will proceed immediately to Altare with all the troops under his command in conformity with the order already given. He will press the enemy, who is at Monte-Legino, by out-flanking him at Montenotte.

BONAPARTE

90

### To Major-General Laharpe

G.O.C., *Advance-Guard, Army of Italy*

H.Q., *Albenga*

22 *Germinal, Year IV (11 Apr, 1796)*

Major-General Laharpe is ordered to leave tomorrow, 23 *Germinal*, so as to arrive one hour before dawn at the position of Monte-Legino, where he will join the troops already there and will attack the enemy in accordance with the plans which I have agreed with him and General Masséna.

He will at once have the troops of the 15th Demi-brigade which are at La Stella withdrawn to Monte-Legino.

He will take care to place a battalion in reserve at La Madonna di Savona so that he can move on the redoubt of Monte-Cucco in case General Masséna's troops are forced to fall back, and can prevent the enemy advancing between Altare and Monte-Legino with the object of turning General Masséna's right. This plan is not likely, but it is wise to prepare against it.

Following the movements observed on his left he will advance and take all steps he may see fit to combine his operations with those of the troops on his left and put the enemy to flight. . . .

As soon as he judges that the enemy can do nothing against the right of General Masséna, he will recall the battalion left in reserve at La Madonna.

He will distribute eighty cartridges per man and carry bread or biscuit for the 23rd and 24th. He will give orders and take all steps to ensure that ammunition, brandy, food and the whole of the ambulance follow the movement of his troops.

BONAPARTE

91

**To Major-General Sérurier**

*G.O.C., Left Division, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Albenga*

*22 Germinal, Year IV (11 Apr, 1796)*

I must inform you, General, that the enemy in superior strength yesterday attacked our outposts at Voltri, which retired on Savona after a most lively and honourable defence. The enemy continued his challenge and appeared at Monte-Legino with even larger forces. There has been fighting since 8.0 a.m., and the brave resistance of our troops has forced him to retreat on Montenotte. I have decided to attack myself. Consequently, General Menard is leaving Cadibona and Quiliano for Montenotte this evening with 4,000 men. Generals Joubert and Dommartin are leaving San Giacomo with 5,000 men to join the troops of General Menard. At the same time General Augereau, with 6,000 men, should move off at midnight to Mallare and thence to Cairo, so as to turn and attack the enemy forces directed against Montenotte and Sassello.

General Laharpe with the advance guard, amounting to about 7,000 men, will march to the heights of Montenotte.

General Rusca must hold La Solta and Monte-Spinarda and defend Bardinetto and Melogno. Apart from the two demi-brigades he already has, he will have under command a battalion of the 84th which is at Melogno. This general is under your orders, and you will give him such reinforcements as you think necessary.

For your part, you should make demonstrations that will alarm the enemy, but without exposing your troops. I will let you know his further movements.

You will pass the above order to General Rusca.

Tomorrow we shall attack the enemy at all points towards the right. The following day we may be at your side.

Be prepared to carry out all movements that may be ordered.

BONAPARTE

92

**To Major-General Laharpe**G.O.C., *Advance-Guard, Army of Italy*H.Q., *Carcare*23 *Germinal, Year IV (12 Apr, 1796)*

I congratulate you, General, on the fine conduct of your troops and on the happy results ever accompanying your talents and bravery.

I have just inspected the battlefield; on all sides I saw nothing but prisoners and many dead. Masséna's division is completely successful; he has beaten General Argenteau outright. You had to do with Beaulieu himself.

Send all prisoners to Savona. Have the 14th Demi-brigade collect bread at La Madonna, where there is some, and, with all your troops, take up positions that appear to threaten the enemy at Sassello; it would be a good thing if before nightfall you send out a patrol to observe his movement and hasten his withdrawal, thus putting the magazines at Sassello at your disposal.

General Masséna is moving to the heights of Cairo; he will send troops into the town to levy a contribution. It is essential that you reconnoitre his position before nightfall so as to be able to communicate easily. Headquarters will be at Carcare. Come yourself this evening or send an aide-de-camp to inform me of your position, of the enemy movements and of all you have done during the day.

Augereau, Dommartin and Joubert, who are in the plain, will move tomorrow towards Montezemolo to fight the Piedmontese, unless your report this evening makes me change my dispositions.

BONAPARTE

93

**To Major-General Masséna**G.O.C., *Right Division, Army of Italy*H.Q., *Carcare*23 *Germinal, Year IV (12 Apr, 1796)*

As soon, General, as you are certain of the enemy's flight, move towards Carcare with your forces. You will send an adjutant-general to reconnoitre the positions threatening those of General Laharpe at Sassello and Dego. You will set up an intermediate post to serve the communications between that general and Carcare. You will send a senior officer to Altare to act as commander there and to send up your food supplies; he must also collect transport to move what you may need and must establish your communications with our rear.

If the enemy is still threatening General Laharpe's division, it is essential that you take up positions to support his left. He left an hour after midnight to climb to the bastion of Monte-Legino with the 70th and 99th Demi-brigades; so you see, he is in strength.

Augereau left at 9.0 p.m. I have sent for news of Joubert and

Dommartin. When I know what to be at with them and am sure of the position of their troops, it is my intention that you should attack the 800 men said to be at the chapel of Santa Giulia; in any case we will meet at Carcare, where I shall return as soon as there is a battalion, either of yours or Joubert's, to cover me there. Beaulieu was in person at the attack on Monte-Legino; he reckoned on capturing Savona.

Everything assures us that today and tomorrow will stand out in history.

BONAPARTE

94

### **Order of the Day**

*Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Carcare*

*23 Germinal, Year IV (12 Apr, 1796)*

Long live the Republic! Today, 23 Germinal, the divisions of Generals Masséna and Laharpe attacked the Austrians, who were occupying the important position of Montenotte to the number of 13,000 men commanded by General Beaulieu in person and Generals Argenteau and Roccavina. The Republicans have completely defeated the Austrians and have killed or wounded some 3,000 of them. General Roccavina is among the wounded. The details of this action will be published to the army as soon as complete information concerning this glorious affair has been collected.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

95

### **To the Executive Directory**

*H.Q., Carcare*

*25 Germinal, Year IV (14 Apr, 1796)*

The Italian campaign has begun. I have to report to you the battle of Montenotte.

After three days of movements intended to mislead us, General Beaulieu had a division of 10,000 men attack the right of the army, which was stationed at Voltri. General Cervoni, who was in command there, withstood the fire with the courage usual in the soldiers of liberty.

I was not misled as to the enemy's real intentions. As soon as I was informed of the attack on the right I ordered General Cervoni to await nightfall and then, hiding his movement from the enemy, to retire by a forced march on to my centre, which was posted on the heights of the Madonna di Savona.

At 4.0 a.m. on the 21st Beaulieu in person with 15,000 men attacked and overran all the positions protecting the centre of the army; at 1.0 p.m. he attacked the redoubt of Monte-Legino, which was our

last entrenchment. Several times they returned to the charge, but owing to the courage of its defenders that redoubt held by 1,500 men was impregnable. At the height of the fire Colonel Rampon made the troops swear that they would all die in the redoubt. The enemy was within pistol range the whole night.

Under cover of darkness General Laharpe with all the troops from the right took up position behind Monte-Legino. One hour after midnight I left with Generals Berthier and Masséna, Commissioner Saliceti and some of the troops from the centre and left and proceeded through Altare on to the flank and rear of the enemy. At dawn on the 22nd Beaulieu, who had received reinforcements, and Laharpe attacked each other with vigour and varying success until General Masséna appeared and sowed death and terror on the flank and rear, where General Argenteau was commanding.

The rout of the enemy is complete. Two of his generals, Roccavina and Argenteau, are gravely wounded. His losses are between 3,000 and 4,000 men, including over 2,000 prisoners. Our loss is less than 400.

When I have received all the reports and am less overwhelmed with work, I will send you a detailed account giving the names of those to whom the nation owes particular gratitude. Generals, officers, soldiers, all upheld the glory of France on this memorable day.

BONAPARTE

96

## Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

H.Q., Lesegno

3 Floréal, Year IV (22 Apr, 1796)

Long live the Republic! The left wing of the army, comprising the divisions of Generals Meynier and Sérurier, and supported by that of General Masséna, has defeated the enemy at Mondovi on 2 Floréal.

General Colli, commanding the Piedmontese army in person, has been forced to retreat. The result of this victory has been the capture of Mondovi, 1,600 prisoners, including a lieutenant-general, ten flags, large stores of food and forage, two howitzers, four 4-pounders, four 8-pounders and 12 limbers.

The army is occupying Dego, Mombarcaro, the entrenched camp of Ceva, Castellino and the positions at Mondovi.

The army is warned that the enemy has scattered bags of cartridges whose balls are made of inflammable material which burns up while leaving the barrel and does no harm even at point blank range. Divisional commanders will ensure that bags of cartridges collected in the camps or trenches occupied by the enemy are examined and are used only if it is certain that the balls are of lead.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

**Order of the Day***Army of Italy**H.Q., Lesegno**3 Floréal, Year IV (22 Apr, 1796)*

The Commander-in-Chief expresses to the army his satisfaction at its bravery and the successes which it daily obtains over the enemy. But it is with horror that he sees the fearful looting indulged in by wicked men who reach their units only when the battle is over in order to commit excesses that utterly dishonour the army and the name of France.

In consequence, he orders:

1. The Chief of Staff will report to him within twenty-four hours on the moral conduct of the adjutants-general and other officers attached to the staff.

2. Divisional commanders will within twenty-four hours send to the Commander-in-Chief a note on the conduct since the opening of the campaign of the senior officers under their command.

3. The Quartermaster-General will make a similar report on the war commissaries.

4. The Commander-in-Chief will decide the action to be taken in the case of senior officers or war commissaries against whom complaints are made.

5. Colonels and battalion commanders will report to their brigadier-general and prepare a note on the officers of each demi-brigade and their conduct since the opening of the campaign. The brigade commander will forward these notes to the divisional commander together with his own observations.

Divisional commanders are authorized to dismiss at once, and even to send under arrest to the castle at Antibes, officers who have, by their example, condoned the horrible looting of the last few days. They are authorized to have shot officers or soldiers who in future encourage others to pillage, thereby destroying discipline, disorganizing the army and compromising its glory and security.

Any officer or n.c.o. who does not follow the colours and is, without legitimate reason, absent at the time of battle will be dismissed and his name sent to his Department, so that he may be branded as a coward in the opinion of his fellow citizens. . . .

Any soldier convicted of not being present in battle will lose his seniority and, if a grenadier or carabinier, will be removed from the company. Any soldier convicted of being twice absent in battle will be degraded at the head of the battalion; he will be stripped of his uniform and sent beyond the Var to work on the roads for the duration of the campaign. . . .

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

**To General Colli***C.-in-C., Piedmontese Army**H.Q., Carrù**4 Floréal, Year IV (23 Apr, 1796)*

Sir, the Executive Directory reserves to itself the right to negotiate for peace: the plenipotentiaries of the King, your master, must, therefore, either proceed to Paris or wait at Genoa for plenipotentiaries to be sent there by the French Government.

The military and moral position of the two armies makes a simple suspension of arms impossible. Although I am myself convinced that the Government will grant reasonable conditions of peace to your king, I cannot halt my march on the basis of vague suppositions. There is, however, one means of attaining your object, in conformity with the true interests of your court, and so preventing further bloodshed that would be useless and therefore contrary to reason and the laws of war: that is to place in my power two of the three fortresses of Cuneo, Alessandria and Tortona, at your choice. We can then, without hostilities, await the negotiations. This proposal is most moderate. The mutual interest of Piedmont and the French Republic make me wish to see your country spared the miseries of all kinds that are threatening it.

BONAPARTE.

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Carrù**5 Floréal, Year IV (24 Apr, 1796)*

. . . You can have no idea of the military and administrative situation of the army. When I arrived it was a prey to every kind of trouble-maker, without food, without discipline, without obedience. I made examples and used all means to improve the supply services, and victory has done the rest. Nevertheless, our lack of wagons, poor horses and greedy administrators mean that we are short of everything. My life here is inconceivable; I come in tired and must spend the whole night in administration and go everywhere to restore order.

The hungry soldiers are committing excesses that make one blush to be human. The capture of Ceva and Mondovi may give us the means to put this right, and I am going to make some terrible examples. I will restore order or I will give up the command of these brigands.

With only 34,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, I have 100,000 men against me. The enemy has strong fortresses and a plentiful and perfectly equipped artillery; the campaign is not yet decided, therefore. The enemy is desperate, numerous and fights well. He knows my state of need and places his hopes in the weather; I place mine in the genius of

the Republic, the courage of the soldiers, the co-operation of the leaders and the confidence shown in me.

In a few days the fate of Piedmont will be decided. But I beg you to send me the artillery officers I asked for: the engineers granted to me but not one of whom has arrived: a quartermaster-general, as I have only Lambert here, which is not enough: 1,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry. Specify clearly my relations with the Army of the Alps, for in a few days I shall be in touch with it. . . .

BONAPARTE

100

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Carrù*

*5 Floréal, Year IV (24 Apr, 1796)*

I send you a request for an armistice that I have received from the Piedmontese general together with my reply.\* I hope this conforms with your intentions.

This proposal of an armistice for one month, during which we remain in control of all that the army has conquered and with two fortresses as guarantee, would be very advantageous to the Republic. During that time I would be able to seize the whole of Austrian Lombardy up to Mantua and to drive Beaulieu from Italy.

I am sending my brother Joseph with these important dispatches so that you can let him know your intentions as to their contents.

BONAPARTE

101

### To Citizen Petiet

*Minister of War*

*H.Q., Carrù*

*5 Floréal, Year IV (24 Apr, 1796)*

I am sending you, Citizen Minister, twenty-one flags taken from the enemy by the Army of Italy.

I cannot hide from you how much my operations are harmed by the counter-order you have given to the light artillery company I had had leave Paris for Nice.

Nothing has arrived of what should have been sent to me by the artillery and engineer section: not one of the artillery or engineer officers I asked for, not one artisan, not one company of horse artillery. The arms of the Republic are being compromised, and I can impute it only to malice on the part of the artillery section. If I had some light artillery I would not have lost the brave General Stengel and I would not find myself held up in the plain by a cavalry more numerous and better mounted than my own.

\* No. 98.



I beg you to send me six companies of light artillery as soon as possible and to keep a hand on your artillery offices where there are trouble-makers seeking to nullify the operations planned by the Government.

BONAPARTE

102

## Order

*H.Q., Carrù*

*5 Floréal, Year IV (24 Apr, 1796)*

All civil and military authorities on the road from Nice to Paris will allow to pass freely Citizen Junot, aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, who carries to Paris twenty-one flags captured from the enemy;

Also Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, entrusted by the Commander-in-Chief with dispatches of the highest importance for the Executive Directory.

Postmasters will furnish them with all the horses they may need to reach their destination promptly; in case of refusal they will be constrained by force, which the said Citizens Junot and Bonaparte will demand from either the military commandants or the municipal authorities who are required to comply immediately with their orders.

BONAPARTE

103

## To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

*At Paris*

*H.Q., Carrù*

*5 Floréal, Year IV (24 Apr, 1796)*

My brother will bring you this letter. I have the greatest love for him and I hope he will gain yours; he deserves it. Nature has given him a sweet and utterly good character; he is full of good qualities. I am writing to Barras to get him appointed consul in some Italian port. He wants to live with his little wife far away from the hurly-burly and political affairs; I commend him to you.

I have your letters of the 16th and 21st. There are many days when you don't write. What do you do, then? No, my darling, I am not jealous, but sometimes worried. Come soon; I warn you, if you delay, you will find me ill. Fatigue and your absence are too much.

Your letters are the joy of my days, and my days of happiness are not many. Junot is bringing twenty-two flags to Paris.

You must come back with him, you understand?—hopeless sorrow, inconsolable misery, sadness without end, if I am so unhappy as to see him return alone. Adorable friend, he will see you, he will breathe in your temple; perhaps you will even grant him the unique and perfect

favour of kissing your cheek, and I shall be alone and far, far away. But you are coming, aren't you? You are going to be here beside me, in my arms, on my breast, on my mouth. Take wing and come, come! But travel gently. The road is long, bad, tiring. Suppose you had an accident, or fell ill; suppose fatigue—come gently, my adorable love, but think of me often.

I have received a letter from Hortense. I will write to her. She is altogether charming. I love her and will soon send her the perfumes she wants.

Read [Ossian's] poem *Carthon* carefully, and sleep well and happily, far from your good friend, but thinking of him.

A kiss on your heart, and one lower down, much lower!

B.

I don't know if you need money; you have never talked about your affairs. If so, you can ask my brother, who has 200 louis of mine.

B.

104

### Conditions of Armistice\*

*Between the French and Piedmontese Armies*

H.Q., Cherasco

8 Floréal, Year IV (27 Apr, 1796)

1. All hostilities between the French army in Italy and the army of the King of Sardinia will cease as from the day on which the following conditions are fulfilled until five days after the completion of the negotiations for a definitive peace between the two powers.

2. The French army will remain in occupation of the territory it has conquered along the Stura, from Demonte to Alessandria.

3. The town and citadel of Cuneo and the town and citadel of Tortona, together with all their artillery, ammunition and stores, will be surrendered to French forces. If the town and citadel of Tortona cannot at once be placed in French hands, those of Alessandria will be so provisionally.

4. The French troops will have the right to cross the Po at Valenza. Until the Austrian troops have vacated his territory, the States of the King of Sardinia will be regarded as neutral, and passage into Lombardy will be accorded to the French army in order to attack the army of the Emperor in such positions as it may occupy.

5. Free passage by the shortest route will be allowed to such special couriers and aides-de-camp as the Commander-in-Chief of the French army may send to Paris, as also for their return.

\* These were Bonaparte's conditions, handed to the Piedmontese intermediary. They were accepted, and the definitive document, where they are set out in somewhat greater detail, was signed the same night by Bonaparte for the French and Lt.-Gen. Baron de la Tour for the Piedmontese.

6. All troops, officers and war material in the pay of the King of Sardinia but forming part of the Austrian army in Italy will be included in the said armistice. The King of Sardinia will hold the Austrians in his army as hostages.

7. The citadel of Ceva will be surrendered or else the army will be free to continue the siege of this fortress.

BONAPARTE

105

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Cherasco*

*9 Floréal, Year IV (28 Apr, 1796)*

You will find attached, Citizen Directors, . . . the terms of armistice agreed during the night between General La Tour and myself. . . .

If you do not come to terms with the King of Sardinia, I shall keep the fortresses and march on Turin. My siege train is proceeding to Cuneo and thence to Cherasco.

Meanwhile, tomorrow I shall march against Beaulieu, force him to cross the Po, cross myself immediately after and seize the whole of Lombardy; within a month I hope to be on the mountains of the Tyrol, in touch with the Army of the Rhine, and to carry the war in concert into Bavaria. Such a plan is worthy of you, of the army and of the destinies of France.

If you do not grant peace to the King of Sardinia, you must warn me in advance, so that, in case I am in Lombardy, I can fall back and carry out my plans.

As to the conditions of peace, you can dictate whatever you see fit, since the principal fortresses are in my power.

Give orders that 15,000 men from the Army of the Alps should come under my command and join me; that would then give me an army of 45,000 men, part of which it would be possible for me to send to Rome.

If you continue to have confidence in me and you approve of these plans, I am sure of success; Italy is yours.

You must not count on a revolution in Piedmont; that will come, but the spirit of this people is not yet ripe for it.

I have justified your confidence and the favourable opinion you have formed of me. I shall constantly seek to give you proofs of my zeal and my firm desire to deserve your respect and that of the nation.

Send me twelve companies of light artillery; I have none; also some cavalry and an able quartermaster-general. I have nothing but pygmies who are letting us die of hunger in the midst of plenty.

BONAPARTE

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Tortona*

*17 Floréal, Year IV (6 May, 1796)*

. . . On the 13th the Austrian army re-crossed the Po, cut the bridges and burnt what boats it could find.

At the present moment General Sérurier's division is camped between Valenza and Alessandria; Masséna's is at Sale; Augereau's at Castellazzo; Laharpe's at Voghera. Brigadier-General Dallemagne is at Casteggio with 3,000 men and 1,500 cavalry. Yesterday there was cannonading with the enemy positions beyond the Po. The river is very wide and difficult to cross. My intention is to cross it as near as possible to Milan, so as to have no further obstacles in reaching that capital. Thereby I shall turn the three defence lines that Beaulieu has prepared along the Agogno, the Terdoppio and the Ticino. Today I am marching on Piàcenza. Pavia is turned and if the enemy persists in defending it I shall be between him and his stores. Everywhere we are building boats and rafts; but you know how long all that takes and how an army prepared for four years for mountain warfare must lack things needed for as active a war in the plains as we are waging. It takes me twenty days to have things brought from Nice; add to that the lack of wagons and you will see what time we would lose if we followed the ordinary rules. I am sure we should not be ready to cross the Po until July were I to wait until we have two boat bridges, so I intend to cross it by rafts and fly-bridges. Be certain we shall do everything that can be done, and I am sure of your confidence. You know better than anyone how to appreciate obstacles that cannot be surmounted at once and you do not listen to armchair soldiers who think you can cross great rivers by swimming. I may be accused of rashness, but not of sloth; even so, one must have reasonable chances on one's side.

When shall we cross the Po? Where shall we cross it? I do not know. If our march on Piàcenza decides Beaulieu to evacuate the Lomelina I shall cross it peacefully at Valenza. If he does not learn of our move to Piàcenza for twenty-four hours and I find boats and material for rafts there, I shall cross during the night. But I still see many difficulties about that. All the boats have been burned by the Austrians and the King of Sardinia has no more.

If I cross the Po I shall have driven the Imperial army from the Sardinian states lying beyond that river, and they will be conquered territory. I have just suggested to the King that he should give me the boats and gear needed to build two bridges, 600 harnessed dragoon horses and 1,400 wagons; on these conditions I am promising to restore his estates beyond the Po as soon as I have conquered them, provided that he puts a garrison of 6,000 men there. This would suit us

well, since if we ever quarrel I shall hold these 6,000 men as hostages; I shall of course keep control of the Po bridges. I will let you know the result of this negotiation.

If I do not cross the Po for a few days, I intend to send 4,000 men from Piacenza to Bologna to hold the roads out of that city, to demand 6 millions from the Duke of Modena and frighten Rome and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. You will have learned of the revolting way he has behaved; he is protecting emigrants and letting our ships be seized under the very guns of Leghorn. . . . These princelings need to be properly handled; they take more notice of a note from the army than from our diplomatists; fear alone makes them honest and respectful, one might almost say fawning.

General Kellermann says he is sending me 10,000 men: with that I can pay a visit to the Pope and at the same time to the Milanese or the King of Sardinia. It is only the Austrian cavalry that is formidable. They have about 6,000.

It would be useful if you were to send me three or four well-known artists to choose what should be seized and sent to Paris.

BONAPARTE

107

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Tortona*

*17 Floréal, Year IV (6 May, 1796)*

I have received the answer to the first dispatch I sent you.\* I beg you to express the gratitude of the army to the Legislative Corps for the honourable decree it has just passed;† it is the sweetest reward that the army can gain from its successes. As for myself, nothing can add to the respect and devotion I shall at all times show towards the Constitution and the Government. I saw it set up in the midst of the most revolting passions, all alike tending towards the destruction of the Republic and the French empire; I was even able to be of some use in the circumstances of its birth. My motto will ever be to die in defence of it.

Since the beginning of the campaign General Berthier, Chief of Staff, has always spent the day at my side in the fight and the night at his desk; no man could show more energy, willingness, courage and resource. I have justly rendered to him one half of the flattering and honourable things you express in your letters.

BONAPARTE

\* No. 95.

† A congratulatory address and the award of the Millesimo-Dego medal illustrated on p. 70.

108

**To Citizen Letourneur***President of the Executive Directory**H.Q., Tortona**17 Floréal, Year IV (6 May, 1796)*

I have received your letter, Citizen Director, and I owe you particular thanks for the signs of esteem you give me. The position of generals is more delicate after battles than before; for then, having been able to follow but one course, they find themselves criticized by all those who would have adopted others. Myself, I have tried to carry out the spirit of the Government's instructions, and if, owing to force of circumstance, the speed of events and my distance from you, I have had to take matters into my own hands, it was only with the greatest repugnance and in complete conviction that that was what you wished to have done. If I was mistaken I shall blame nobody but only the nature of things. In military operations I have consulted no one but myself; in diplomatic operations I have consulted everyone, and we have all been of one mind.

I beg you to continue to show me the friendship merited by the sentiments of attachment and respect with which I am, etc.

BONAPARTE

P.S. I am fortunate in the Government Commissioner, Saliceti; he combines great resourcefulness with great enthusiasm.

109

**To Adjutant-general Lanusse***Commandant of Piàcenza**H.Q., Piàcenza**19 Floréal, Year IV (8 May, 1796)*

I have just inspected the town, Citizen. I did not meet one of the patrols that should be constantly made. I repeat my order that you maintain, at all times, two patrols of a corporal and four dragoons, drawn from the picket at your disposal in the camp area. The patrols will maintain the strictest discipline and will send all soldiers not on duty there out of the town and back to their units. They will follow each other in such a way that when one returns another sets out. I shall hold you personally responsible for the execution of this order.

BONAPARTE

110

**To Citizen Lambert***Q.M.G., Army of Italy**H.Q., Piàcenza**19 Floréal, Year IV (8 May, 1796)*

I am informed, Citizen Commissary, that there are a number of wounded in different parts of Piàcenza who have not yet received any succour owing to the lack of a hospital and of medical officers.

Give orders at once for the immediate establishment of a military hospital large enough and comfortable enough to receive the sick and wounded; have it adequately equipped with medical officers, medicines and all other things needed for the care of our comrades in arms.

BONAPARTE

III

**To the Family of Major-General Stengel**

*H.Q., Piàcenza*

*19 Floréal, Year IV (8 May, 1796)*

I enclose, Citizens, a letter from the Executive Directory which reached me only after the death of the brave General Stengel, whom we all mourn. This letter, dictated by the national gratitude, will prove to you the concern of the Directory at the wounding of this worthy general and will enable you easily to feel what regret it will have been caused by the news of his death. If there is anything that may console you for so great a loss, it will be found in the evidence of the nation's gratitude and in the grief and homage of the army which have accompanied your relative to the grave. I had vowed to him an inviolable friendship and I therefore feel the deepest personal sorrow at the tragedy which afflicts you.

BONAPARTE

III 2

**To the Executive Directory**

*H.Q., Piàcenza*

*20 Floréal, Year IV (9 May, 1796)*

After various marches and other military and diplomatic movements designed to let the enemy think I intended to cross at Valenza, I moved with 5,000 grenadiers and 1,500 cavalry by a forced march to Castel-San-Giovanni. At 11.0 p.m. Major of Artillery Andréosy, Adjutant-general Frontin and 100 cavalymen followed the bank of the Po as far as Piàcenza and stopped five boats laden with rice, officers' baggage, 500 wounded and all the enemy's medical supplies.

At 9.0 a.m. [on the 18th] we reached the Po opposite Piàcenza. On the other side were two squadrons of hussars who showed signs of wishing to dispute the crossing. But we threw ourselves into the boats and raced to the other side, and after a few musket shots the enemy cavalry withdrew. The first ashore was Colonel Lannes, a man as brave as he is intelligent.

As soon as our crossing was established the divisions of the army, which were all in echelon at various distances, hastened their march and crossed during the day.

When he learnt what had happened Beaulieu realized too late that his fortifications on the Ticino and his redoubts at Pavia were useless

and that the French republicans were not so inept as François I. He ordered a force of 6,000 men and 2,000 cavalry to go to meet us and oppose our landing or attack us if we were not formed up; but he miscalculated. At midday I learnt that an enemy force was very close, and we marched. The enemy was entrenched in the village of Fombio with twenty guns. Brigadier-General Dallemagne attacked on the right, Adjutant-general Lanusse along the road and Colonel Lannes on the left. After a lively cannonade and a fairly stubborn resistance the enemy was forced to withdraw. We pursued as far as the Adda; he has lost part of his baggage, 300 horses and 500 dead or prisoners.

The crossing of the Po is one of the most important operations. There were wagers that we would not cross it in two months.

BONAPARTE

113

### To Citizen Carnot

*Member of the Executive Directory*

H.Q., Piacenza

20 Floréal, Year IV (9 May, 1796)

At last we have crossed the Po. The second campaign has begun. Beaulieu is thrown off his balance; he calculates poorly and constantly walks into the traps that are laid for him. Perhaps he will wish to give battle, for he is a man with the courage of madness rather than of genius; but the 6,000 men whom we forced across the Adda and defeated yesterday weaken him badly. One more victory and we are masters of Italy.

I have granted an armistice to the Duke of Parma; the Duke of Modena is sending me plenipotentiaries.

If we had an able quartermaster we would be as well off as can be imagined. We are going to set up big stores of corn and herds of 600 cattle in the rear. As soon as we stop moving we will have the army completely re-clothed; it is still in a frightening condition; but everything is improving; the soldiers eat only the best bread, good meat and plenty of it, good wine, etc. Discipline is returning day by day; but often men have to be shot, for there are some who are incurable and cannot control themselves.

What we have taken from the enemy is beyond counting. We have hospital equipment for 15,000 sick, several stores of corn, flour, etc. The more men you send me, the more easily they can be fed.

I am sending you twenty pictures by the greatest masters, by Correggio and Michelangelo.

I owe you especial thanks for the attention you are paying my wife; I commend her to you; she is a sincere patriot, and I love her madly.

If things go well, I hope to be able to send you some 10 million francs to Paris; that should be useful for the Army of the Rhine.



Send me 4,000 dismounted cavalymen, whom I will arrange to remount here. I cannot hide from you that, since the death of Stengel, I have no senior cavalry officer who knows how to fight. I wish you could send me two or three adjutants-general from the cavalry who have spirit and a firm resolution never to make masterly retreats.

BONAPARTE

## 114

## To the Executive Directory

H.Q., *Piàcenza*

20 *Floréal*, Year IV (9 May, 1796)

The complimentary letters you have written to the generals are producing a great effect; they have not spared themselves since the opening of the campaign, that is for a month. Two major-generals, two brigadier-generals, and several adjutants-general are among our dead.

The brave Stengel has died of his wounds. I have sent your letter to his family.

I am now in what is certainly the pleasantest town of Italy. The administrative gentlemen would have liked headquarters to remain here for a few decades; it is indeed sad that one hour after midnight we must go and live in barns on the other side of the Po.

You will find attached the conditions of armistice that I have accorded to the Duke of Parma. As soon as possible I will send you the most beautiful pictures of Correggio, among others a *Saint-Jerome* that is said to be his masterpiece. I must say, this saint has chosen bad weather to arrive in Paris; I hope you will give him the place of honour in the Museum. I repeat my request for a few known artists to take charge of the choice and transport of the fine things we shall think fit to send to Paris. All arrangements are made for the 10,000 men from the Army of the Alps. There will be no difficulty over their passage.

BONAPARTE

## 115

## Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

H.Q., *Piàcenza*

20, *Floréal*, Year IV (9 May, 1796)

... A disastrous incident darkened yesterday's victory. Having beaten the enemy, the brave General Laharpe took steps for the security of the new positions he had taken up. He had ordered the pickets to be on the alert and had forbidden anyone to leave them; but this order was not carried out. An enemy patrol fell by chance on one of our posts where there were guns. That patrol would have been taken if the guard had done its duty; but it allowed itself to be surprised and

the picket fled. General Laharpe at once proceeded to the abandoned position, seeking to rally troops to attack the enemy. Before leaving he ordered a demi-brigade to advance and, when it did not arrive, he returned in order to hasten its march; it was moving up preceded by its advance-guard which was unfortunately commanded by an officer who allowed it to march in disorder. Seeing the horses of General Laharpe and his staff, some cowards cried: 'There is the enemy cavalry!' At these words the troop opened fire at point-blank range. Struck by several shots, Laharpe fell dead at the feet of those he was trying to lead once again to victory.

This truly republican general, beloved by his comrades in arms, carries with him the true regrets of the nation and the army. May this frightful incident recall officers and n.c.o.s to the most scrupulous control; each one must ensure that troops under his command observe the strictest discipline. . . .

The Commander-in-Chief is informed that soldiers are seizing horses belonging to inhabitants of the conquered territory; he orders the generals to ensure that this abuse ceases. It is for the Commander-in-Chief alone to order the requisitioning of horses; any other order is a violation of the law, and those who commit it will be severely punished. The sole valid prizes are horses captured in battle.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

116

## Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Lodi*

*21 Floréal, Year IV (10 May, 1796)*

General Beaulieu had assembled 14,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry at Lodi. As soon the Commander-in-Chief learnt this, he sent the advance-guard of grenadiers and carabiniers, the divisions of Generals Masséna and Augereau and part of the cavalry to Casale. At midday the attack began. The enemy outposts were overrun and were pursued and driven out of the town of Lodi. Beaulieu's army had crossed the Adda and occupied a formidable position on the left bank with twenty guns covering the bridge.

An artillery duel took place while a column of carabiniers and grenadiers was formed to carry the bridge by storm.

The order was given: at once the impetuous column hurled itself onto the bridge and crossed it at the double despite the fire of the enemy. Once across the river, the republicans carried the batteries, charged the line and completely routed it. The enemy was pursued until dark. He has lost twenty guns and more than 3,000 men. . . . This battle was one of the sharpest of the campaign.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Lodi*

*21 Floréal, Year IV (10 May, 1796)*

I had thought that the crossing of the Po would be the boldest operation of the campaign and that the battle of Millesimo would be the hardest fought; but I have now to inform you of the battle of Lodi.

Headquarters reached Casale at 3.0 a.m. on the 21st. At 9.0 a.m. our advance-guard encountered the enemy who was defending the approaches to Lodi. I at once ordered all the cavalry into the saddle with four pieces of light artillery which had just arrived and were harnessed to carriage horses of the nobles of Piàcenza. General Augereau's division, which was at Borghetto, and General Masséna's, which was at Casale, also moved off at once. Meanwhile, the advance-guard overran all the enemy positions, capturing one gun. We entered Lodi in pursuit of the enemy, who had already crossed the bridge over the Adda. I had the whole of my artillery brought into action, and for several hours there was a very heavy cannonade. As soon as the army came up it was formed into close column, the 2nd battalion of Carabiniers in the van followed by all the grenadier battalions. At the charge and with cries of 'Long live the Republic' they advanced onto the bridge, which is 200 yards long. The enemy's fire was terrible and the column seemed to pause. A moment's hesitation would have been fatal, and Generals Berthier, Masséna, Cervoni and Dallemagne, Colonel Lannes and Major Dupas, realizing this, ran to the front and decided the still doubtful outcome.

That formidable column overthrew everything that opposed it; all the batteries were quickly carried and Beaulieu's line of battle broken; fear, flight and death were sown on all sides; in a flash the enemy army was scattered. As soon as their divisions came up, Generals Rusca, Augereau and Beyrand crossed and completed the victory. The cavalry crossed the Adda by a ford, but, since this was very bad, it was much delayed and was unable to come into action.

To cover the retreat of the infantry, the enemy cavalry tried to charge our troops, but it did not find them easy to frighten. The onset of darkness and the extreme fatigue of the troops, many of whom had covered more than ten leagues in the course of the day, prevented us from maintaining the pursuit. The enemy lost twenty guns and 2,000 to 3,000 killed, wounded and prisoners; we have 150 dead or wounded. Captain Latour, aide-de-camp to General Masséna, received several sabre wounds; I request the rank of major for this brave officer. . . .

If I were required to name all the soldiers who distinguished themselves on this remarkable day, I should be forced to name all the carabiniers and grenadiers of the advance-guard and almost all the

officers of the staff. But I must not omit the intrepid Berthier, who, during the course of the day, was gunner, cavalryman and grenadier. The commander of the artillery, Colonel Sugny, did very well.

Beaulieu is fleeing with the remains of his army; already the whole of Lombardy can be regarded as belonging to the Republic. At the moment he is crossing Venetian territory, where several cities have closed their gates to him. I hope soon to send you the keys of Milan and Pavia.

Although we have had hard battles since the beginning of the campaign, and the army of the Republic has had to put all to the hazard, yet nothing has approached the terrible crossing of the bridge of Lodi. If we have had few losses, we owe it to the speed of the action and the sudden effect produced on the enemy by the mass and fire of our intrepid column. . . . As soon as we are in the same place for two days on end, I will report to you on the men who have most distinguished themselves.

The Government Commissioner was always at my side; the army owes him true gratitude.

BONAPARTE

118

### To Citizen Carnot

*Member of the Executive Directory*

*H.Q., Lodi*

*22 Floréal, Year IV (11 May, 1796)*

The battle of Lodi, my dear Director, gives the whole of Lombardy to the Republic. The enemy has left 2,000 men in the castle of Milan, which I must necessarily invest. You can reckon as if I were at Milan. I am not going there tomorrow, since I want to follow Beaulieu and take advantage of his discomfiture to try to beat him again.

I may soon attack Mantua. If I capture that fortress, there is nothing else to stop me from entering Bavaria; in two decades I could be in the heart of Germany. Could you not co-ordinate my operations with those of our two armies there? I imagine that by now there is fighting on the Rhine; if the armistice were to continue, the Army of Italy would be crushed. If the two armies on the Rhine take the field, please let me know their position and what you hope they will be able to do, so that I can use this as a guide either to enter the Tyrol or remain on the Adige.

It would be worthy of the Republic to sign the treaty of peace with the three armies united in the heart of Bavaria or of an astonished Austria. As for me, I will cross the Tyrol before the Emperor has seriously suspected it, if it is part of your plans that the armies on the Rhine should advance.

If it were possible to have a good quartermaster, the one here would

make a good second; but he has not enough energy or brains to be in charge.

BONAPARTE

119

### To Citizen Faypoult

*French Minister to Genoa*

*H.Q., Lodi*

*24 Floréal, Year IV (13 May, 1796)*

I am much obliged for the drawings you sent me, which will give the army great pleasure. Please send twenty-five louis on my behalf to the young man who did them; get him to draw the amazing crossing of the bridge of Lodi.

Since Montogio is not an imperial fief, it is not included in the order I have made for a contribution from those fiefs.

Yesterday we captured the town of Pizzighettone; we took 300 prisoners and four guns. Beaulieu is running away at full speed.

BONAPARTE

120

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

*At Paris*

*H.Q., Lodi*

*24 Floréal, Year IV (13 May, 1796)*

So it is true that you are pregnant. Murat has written to me; but he tells me it is making you ill and that he thinks it unwise for you to undertake so long a journey. So I must still be deprived of the joy of holding you in my arms! I must still spend several months far from all that I love! Is it possible that I shan't have the pleasure of seeing you with your little belly? That should make you interesting! You write that you have changed. Your letter is short and sad and shakily written. What is it, my adorable? What can be upsetting you? Oh! don't stay in the country; go to town, try to amuse yourself, and remember that there is no truer torment for my soul than to know you unwell and unhappy. I thought I was jealous, but I swear to you that I am not. I think I would rather myself give you a lover than know you to be miserable. So be gay and cheerful, and remember that my happiness depends on yours. If Josephine is unhappy, if she lets herself be sad and discouraged, then she doesn't love me. Soon you are going to bring into the world another being who will love you as much as I—No, that is impossible, but your children and I will always be around you to convince you of our love and care. You won't be horrid, will you? No tantrums!! except as a joke. And then just two or three pouts; nothing is prettier, and a little kiss puts everything right.

The courier has brought your letter of the 18th. How sad it makes me! Can't you be happy, darling Josephine? Is there something you

want? I am waiting impatiently for Murat to know all the details of what you are doing, what you are saying, whom you are seeing, what you are wearing. Everything to do with my adorable is dear to my heart, which only longs to know.

Things are going well here; but my heart is indescribably heavy. You are ill and far away from me. Be gay and take great care of yourself, you who are worth more than all the universe to me. The thought that you are ill makes me very unhappy.

Please, my sweet, tell Fréron that my family does not wish him to marry my sister [Pauline], and that I am determined to take steps to prevent it. Please tell my brother.

B.

121

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Lodi*

*25 Floréal, Year IV (14 May, 1796)*

I have just received the mail which left Paris on the 18th. Your hopes are realized, for at this moment the whole of Lombardy belongs to the Republic. Yesterday, I sent a force to invest the castle of Milan. Beaulieu is at Mantua with his army; he has flooded all the surrounding country. He will succumb there, for it is the unhealthiest part of Italy.

Beaulieu still has a numerous army, having begun the campaign with much superior forces. The Emperor is sending him reinforcements of 10,000 men, who are on the march.

I think it would be most unwise to divide the Army of Italy into two, and it is equally against the interests of the Republic to put two different generals here.

The expedition to Leghorn, Rome and Naples is no great matter; it should be carried out by divisions in echelon, so that we could, by a counter-march, appear in force against the Austrians and threaten to envelop them at the least movement.

That needs not only a single general, but also that nothing shall interfere with his movements and operations. I have carried on this campaign without consulting anyone; I should have done no good had I had to come to terms with the viewpoint of another. Lacking everything, I have got the better of far superior forces because, in the belief that I had your confidence, my movements have been as rapid as my thought.

If you place all kinds of fetters on me; if I must refer each step to the Government Commissioners; if they have the right to change my dispositions, to take away or send me troops, look for no good result. If you weaken your strength by dividing your forces, if you break the unity of military thought in Italy, I must tell you with sorrow that you

will have lost the finest opportunity of bringing Italy under your rule.

In the present situation of the Republic in Italy, it is essential that you have a general in whom you have complete confidence. If it is not I, I shall not complain but shall deport myself with ever more zeal to earn your regard in whatever post you may place me. Each one has his own way of making war. General Kellermann has more experience and will do it better than I; but the two of us together will do it very badly.

I can render important services to our country only if I have your complete and absolute confidence. It needs much courage to write you this letter, for it would be so easy to accuse me of ambition and pride; but I owe you the recital of all my feelings, for I cannot forget that you have always given me evidence of your regard.

The various divisions are occupying Lombardy. When you receive this letter we shall already be on the march, and your reply will probably reach us near Leghorn. Your decision in this affair will be more decisive for the outcome of the campaign than 15,000 reinforcements that the Emperor might send to Beaulieu.

BONAPARTE

122

### To Citizen Carnot

*Member of the Executive Directory*

*H.Q., Lodi*

*25 Floréal, Year IV (14 May, 1796)*

By the time I received the Directory's letter of the 18th your intentions had been carried out; the Milanese is ours. Soon I shall march on Leghorn and Rome to carry out your orders. That will not take long.

I have written to the Directory about the idea of dividing the army. I assure you that therein I have thought only of the public good. In any case, you will find I always take the straight course. I owe it to the Republic to sacrifice all my own ideas. If anyone tries to influence you against me, my answer is in my heart and my conscience.

Since it is possible that this letter to the Directory might be misinterpreted and since you have shown me some friendship, I am taking the course of sending it to you with the request that you will make such use of it as your wisdom and your attachment to me may suggest.

Kellermann will command the army as well as I can, for no one is more convinced than I that victories are due to the courage and boldness of the troops. But I believe that to combine Kellermann and myself in Italy would be to run the risk of losing all. I cannot serve willingly with a man who thinks himself the first general in Europe; and besides, I think it would be better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is like government, a matter of tact.

I can be useful to you only if you have the same confidence in me that you showed in Paris. I care not whether I fight here or elsewhere; to serve the nation, to earn from posterity a page in our history, to give proof of my loyalty and devotion to the Government, that is my sole ambition. But I have it much at heart not to lose in a week the fruit of two months' fatigue, hardship and danger and not to find myself thwarted. I have begun with a little glory and I desire to go on being worthy of you. Rest assured that nothing will tarnish the regard you inspire in those who know you.

BONAPARTE

123

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte**

*At Paris*

*H.Q., Lodi*

*25 Floréal, Year IV (14 May, 1796)*

All goes well. Please arrange matters about Paulette. It is my intention that Fréron should not marry her; tell him so. We are masters of the whole of Lombardy.

Goodbye, my friend; I embrace you. Send me news of my wife; they say she is ill, and that tears my heart.

BONAPARTE

124

**To Lieutenant-Colonel de Lamy**

*Governor of the Citadel of Milan*

*H.Q., Milan*

*27 Floréal, Year IV (16 May, 1796)*

You are surrounded and in no condition to make a prolonged defence; your army has recrossed the Mincio; any resistance you may make would be contrary to the true laws of war. The city of Milan, which should be dear to you for so many reasons, would be compromised were you to hold the fortress longer. The Commander-in-Chief summons you to surrender it to the troops of the Republic; otherwise he holds you responsible for all the ills which may afflict this large and beautiful city and he will allow you no capitulation.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

125

**To the Lombard Communes**

*H.Q., Milan*

*27 Floréal, Year IV (16 May, 1796)*

Within twenty-four hours of the receipt of this order the communes of Lombardy are required to send to headquarters their act of submission and oath of obedience and fidelity to the French Republic.

BONAPARTE



126

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Milan**28 Floréal, Year IV (17 May, 1796)*

The Tricolour flies over Milan, Pavia, Como and all the towns of Lombardy. The castle of Milan is surrounded on all sides. It contains a garrison of 3,000 men. We are forming a siege train at Tortona, and as soon as our artillery arrives the castle will be taken.

The Austrian army is beyond the Mincio. It has already had 6,000 reinforcements and is awaiting a further 10,000 who are on the way. That will serve only to increase the glory of Republican arms.

Milan is very eager for liberty; there is a club of 800 members, all businessmen or lawyers. We are going to leave the existing forms of government in being, only changing the individuals, who cannot enjoy our confidence, since they were appointed by Ferdinand. We will draw 20 millions in contributions from this country; the land is one of the richest in the universe, but exhausted by five years of war. From here will be sent out the journals and other literature which will set all Italy aflame.

If these people ask to set themselves up as a republic, should that be allowed? That is a question which you must decide and as to which it is desirable that you let your intentions be known. It is a far more patriotic country than Piedmont and is closer to liberty.

BONAPARTE

127

**To Citizen Lallement***French Minister to Venice**H.Q., Milan**28 Floréal, Year IV (17 May, 1796)*

I thank you infinitely, Citizen Minister, for the interesting details you give me of the enemy's position. I am sending you 6,000 francs to meet the expenses of the spies you will be sending out. It will be useful if I have news from you daily. Send spies to Trent, to Mantua and to the roads from the Tyrol, and let me know when the boats from Trieste have left for Mantua.

Spare neither money nor trouble; that is what the national interest demands. I will see you are repaid whatever you spend.

Send me an exact and very detailed map of the Venetian states.

There are many people in Milan disposed to make a revolution there.

You should have received a letter from the Government Commissioner from Lodi. Make your letters frequent and informative; I rely on you for news. Establish a rate for the couriers so that when they arrive within a certain time they receive a bonus.

BONAPARTE

128

**Order of the Day***Army of Italy**H.Q., Milan**28 Floréal, Year IV (17 May, 1796)*

The Commander-in-Chief requires divisional and brigade commanders to use the short rest which he is granting to the army to procure to our brothers in arms everything of which they stand in need. In consequence, they will without delay refer to the Chief of Staff of the army and to the Quartermaster-General a detailed return of the requirements of each unit in respect of arms, clothing and equipment. Orders have been issued that the divisions are to be supplied with all they need so as to enable them shortly to renew their operations and carry them out with the speed and keenness which have assured our victories. The Commander relies on the efforts of generals to improve the condition of their troops. He is already convinced that it is their wish to seek new battles; but in the midst of the abundance won by our successes the republican soldier must understand his happy position and refrain from disorders which only tarnish his laurels; he must respect and defend the inhabitants of the land he has conquered. The Commander-in-Chief has too lively a desire to uphold the honour of the army to suffer anyone to exceed the limits of good order.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

129

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Milan**29 Floréal, Year IV (18 May, 1796)*

Tomorrow, Citizen Directors, there leave for Paris twenty superb pictures, chief of which is the famous *Saint Jerome* of Correggio, which I am assured was sold for 20,000 francs. I will have about as many again sent from Milan, including those by Michelangelo.\*

BONAPARTE

130

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Milan**29 Floréal, Year IV (18 May, 1796)*

I have had sent to Tortona at least 2 millions' worth of ingot silver and jewels, the product of various contributions. They will remain there until you give orders for their final destination.

BONAPARTE

\* Presumed of this date is a list of 'works of art and science selected by General Bonaparte to be transported to Paris', which contains pictures, drawn from Milan, Parma and Piàcenza, by Raphael, Rubens, Luini, Giorgioni, Leonardo da Vinci (the *Mona Lisa*), Titian, Correggio and others.

131

**To Lieutenant-Colonel de Lamy***Governor of the Citadel of Milan**H.Q., Milan**29 Floréal, Year IV (18 May, 1796)*

Sir, the Commander-in-Chief of the army requires me to notify you that he accepts the proposal you have made to respect the city of Milan and undertake no military action in that direction. The French, equally, will make no attack from that side.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

132

**To the Municipality of Milan***H.Q., Milan**29 Floréal, Year IV (18 May, 1796)*

I have reported to the Commander-in-Chief on the abuses which have occurred at the national palace of Milan where many citizens have caused meals to be served to them.

The Commander-in-Chief instructs me to inform you that he requires for himself a table for forty persons, served in such a style that the cost does not exceed four francs per head in French money. He wishes that as from today dinner should consist of a single course. All other private tables should henceforward be suppressed. I will inform you should any special circumstances arise. Please give orders in accordance with these instructions and admit no demand unless it is authorized by the Commander-in-Chief or myself.

The Republican character consists in order and economy in the use of public funds, which should be expended in the interests of the army, the Government and the people.

You will inform the Chief of Staff of all abuse which may come to your knowledge; the Commander-in-Chief will give him orders to suppress them.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

133

**To the People of Lombardy***H.Q., Milan**30 Floréal, Year IV (19 May, 1796)*

The French Republic, which has sworn hatred towards tyrants, has also sworn brotherhood towards the peoples. This principle, sanctified in the Republican Constitution, is that of the army.

The despot who has so long held Lombardy enslaved has done great evil to France; but Frenchmen know that the people do not support the cause of kings. The victorious army of an insolent monarch must doubtless spread terror among the nation it has conquered; a republican

army, forced to wage war to the death against the kings, swears friendship to the peoples whom its victories free from Tyranny.

Respect for property and for persons; respect for the religion of the people: these are the sentiments of the Government of the French Republic and of the victorious army in Italy. The clearest proof is the good discipline it has kept since its entry into Lombardy.

If the victorious French seek to treat the people of Lombardy as brothers, these owe them a just return.

The army has to continue its victories; it has to drive the despot who held Lombardy in chains out of the whole of Italy. The independence of Lombardy, which should bring it happiness, depends on the success of the French; it must aid them.

To assure their march the troops need provisions which cannot be drawn from France, which is so far away; they must find them in Lombardy, whither their conquests have led them. The laws of war assure this; friendship should make haste to offer it.

Twenty millions of francs must be contributed by the various provinces of Austrian Lombardy; the needs of the army require them. . . . That is a very small contribution for such fertile lands, above all in view of the advantage which should ensue for them. The assessments might have been carried out by agents of the French Government; that would have been legal. But the French Republic does not so intend; it delegates it to the local authority, the State Congress. It does no more than indicate a basis: this contribution, which must, in the first place, be spread among the provinces in the same proportion as the taxes were levied which Lombardy paid to the Austrian tyrant, should fall upon the rich, the truly well-to-do, and on the ecclesiastical bodies, those who for too long have believed themselves privileged and have succeeded in evading every tax; the indigent classes must be spared. . .

BONAPARTE. SALICETTI

134

## Decree

*H.Q., Milan*

*30 Floréal, Year IV (19 May, 1796)*

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy and the Commissioner of the Executive Directory attached to the Armies of Italy and of the Alps, decree:

### I. SUPPRESSION OF AUTHORITIES

ARTICLE I. The junta established by the Archduke at the moment of his flight on 9 May last, whose function, according to the edict establishing it, was to exercise sovereign government, is suppressed. The President of the Supreme Tribunal, the Presidents of Appeal and of First Instance and the President of the Magistracy, who had been

appointed by the Archduke to compose this junta, are forbidden to continue their functions.

ART. 2. The General Council of the Decurions, restricted to a privileged class and with functions which circumstances have rendered useless, is also suppressed. The same prohibition applies to the sixty nobles and patricians composing it.

ART. 3. The Magistracy known as *Magistrato politico camerale*, whose complicated functions have equally become useless and could only interfere with the smooth working of the administration, is also suppressed.

#### II. REPLACEMENT OF SUPPRESSED AUTHORITIES

ART. 4. The authorities suppressed by the various articles of the preceding section will be provisionally replaced by a military agency of three persons.

#### III. AUTHORITIES RETAINED

ART. 6. The Congress of State of thirteen members charged with the administration of the whole of Lombardy is provisionally confirmed in its functions.

ART. 7. It will carry them out in the name of the French Republic under the supervision and authority of the military agents, to whom it will be required to report.

ART. 8. The municipal administrations are provisionally confirmed in each commune of Lombardy.

ART. 9. The existing municipal council at Milan is also provisionally maintained under the title *Municipality of the City of Milan*.

ART. 10. The commandant of the garrison of Milan will be president of the municipal council; he will be responsible for the police and will exercise all the functions assigned by French laws to commanders of fortresses in a state of siege.

#### IV. GENERAL DISPOSITIONS

ART. 12. The acts and deliberations of all authorities created or retained by the present decree will be headed: 'In the name of the French Republic'.

BONAPARTE. SALICETI

135

To the Army of Italy

H.Q., Milan

1 Prairial, Year IV (20 May, 1796)

Soldiers,

You have rushed like a torrent from the heights of the Apennines; you have overthrown, dispersed and scattered everything that opposed your advance.

Delivered from the Austrian tyranny, Piedmont has returned to its natural love of peace and friendship towards France.

Milan is yours, and the republican flag floats over the whole of Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your generosity.

The army which so proudly threatened you knows no further rampart against your courage. The Po, the Ticino, the Adda could not halt you a single day; the vaunted bulwarks of Italy were useless and you crossed them as quickly as the Apennines.

Such success has brought joy to the heart of our country; your representatives have ordered a festival dedicated to your victories to be celebrated in every commune of the Republic. There, your fathers, your mothers, your wives, your sisters, your sweethearts are rejoicing in your successes and proudly proclaim that they belong to you.

Yes, soldiers, you have done much; but is there not still much to do? Shall it be said of us that we knew how to conquer, but not how to exploit victory? Shall posterity reproach us with finding Capua in Lombardy? But already I see you run to arms; slothful inactivity wearies you, and days lost to glory are lost to your happiness. Well then, let us go! There are still forced marches to be made, enemies to be defeated, laurels to be won, insults to avenge.

Let them tremble who sharpened the daggers of civil war in France, who shamefully murdered our ministers and burned our ships in Toulon; the hour of vengeance has struck.

But let the people have no fear; we are friends to all peoples, and particularly to the descendants of Brutus, of Scipio and the great men whom we have taken for models. To rebuild the Capitol and place in honour there the statues of the famous heroes, to awaken the Roman people benumbed by centuries of slavery, such will be the fruit of your victories. You will have the immortal glory of changing the face of the loveliest part of Europe.

The French people, free and respected throughout the world, will bring to Europe a glorious peace which will repay them for the manifold sacrifices they have made for six years. Then you will return to your homes, and your fellow citizens will point you out and say: 'He was of the Army of Italy!'

BONAPARTE

136

**To Citizen Barthélemy**  
*French Minister to Switzerland*

*H.Q., Milan*

*1 Prairial, Year IV (20 May, 1796)*

We are masters of Lombardy. Though few in number and destitute of everything, the troops of the Republic have surmounted every

obstacle. The enemy has withdrawn to Mantua. Our main body will be here tomorrow. I am anxious to advance and beg you to inform me of the movements of the Army of the Rhine and those of the Imperial army in Bavaria and Swabia.

Can the Emperor weaken his Rhine army to reinforce that in Italy? What troops could he still send into the Tyrol? Please let me know what information you have about this and send agents to all parts so that you can instruct me precisely what forces could be sent into Italy.

I am delighted, Citizen Minister, that this circumstance, etc.

BONAPARTE

137

### To Citizen Ramel

*Minister of Finance*

*H.Q., Milan*

*2 Prairial, Year IV (21 May, 1796)*

The Army of Italy is in the direst need; it is without funds and destitute of the most essential materials; each day sees it reinforced and its requirements grow in proportion.

The Executive Directory, which appointed me to command this army, has ordered offensive operations demanding prompt measures and extraordinary resources.

The pay of two sous in silver for the soldiers and of eight francs for the officers is in arrears, which has angered and discouraged the army. I beg you to look into the matter and to be good enough to inform me whether I can count on the Treasury ensuring that the pay is not lacking. Of all expenditure, that is the most sacred. The Army of Italy is the only one in which the pay is in arrears.

According to the attached memorandum, the Minister of War has on various dates authorized for the account of Pluviôse and part of Ventôse the sum of —, and for the artillery service 10,000 francs in cash and 500,000 in assignats and, on 19 Ventôse, 30,000 in cash and 1,500,000 in assignats.

There are complaints in the army at having received only a small part of this sum. Please note what is still to be sent in accordance with these instructions and let me know what you hope to do to secure the entire payment.

BONAPARTE

138

### To Brigadier-General Dujard

*Cdr., Artillery, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*2 Prairial, Year IV (21 May, 1796)*

The Commander-in-Chief instructs me to inform you that he is displeased with the way in which the artillery is being provisioned and that the orders he has had passed to you have been carried out badly.

Consequently, he orders you to proceed in person to Lodi to ensure the execution of the dispositions you should have made as a result of yesterday's order. It appears that Citizen Faultrier has not done all he should.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

139

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Milan*

*3 Prairial, Year IV (22 May, 1796)*

Citizen Directors, I have just received the mail which left Paris on the 26th. It has brought us the glorious terms of peace which you have concluded with the King of Sardinia. Please receive my congratulations.

Commissioner Saliceti will send you a return of the contributions we have imposed. You can now count on 6 to 8 millions in gold or silver ingots or jewels, which are at your disposal in Genoa. This sum is lodged with one of the leading bankers and is superfluous to the needs of the army. If you wish, I will have a million sent to Basle for the Army of the Rhine. I have sent 10,000 francs in silver to General Kellermann; tomorrow I will send him 200,000.

The troops are satisfied; they receive half their pay in silver. Looting has been stopped, and, with plenty, this glorious army is returning to discipline.

Nine thousand men from the Army of the Alps will arrive in ten days; I shall not await them, for already the troops are moving off towards the gorges of the Tyrol.

The Austrian army is daily receiving reinforcements; but I imagine that our Army of the Rhine will not allow the Emperor to weaken himself too much on that front.

You will find attached some letters of the greatest importance; among others, one referring to the contact between Louis XVIII and several of our positions in the Army of the Rhine. News of these talks is repeated in all the letters from emigrants. I feel it is urgently necessary to take the matter in hand.

The return is attached of what we have captured at Pavia, which is very considerable. We have stores at Tortona, Cuneo, Ceva and Mondovi. The Duke of Parma having no muskets, nor guns, nor fortresses, we have not been able to demand anything of that kind from him.

You will find attached an address to the army.\* Also the armistice I have granted to the Duke of Modena; you will see that that means 10 millions more for the Republic. . . .

BONAPARTE

\* No. 135.



P.S. Among the attached letters from emigrants you will find one from a priest who writes from Paris to Cardinal Zelada. Although it is not signed, it will be easy to find him, since he says he dined with General Dumuy the day before the latter left. As soon as the Minister of Police knows who is this correspondent of the cardinal, it will be easy for him to discover others by having him followed for a few days. You will also find the name of a merchant of Lyons who is passing funds to the emigrants.

140

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

At Paris

Milan

4 Prairial, Year IV (23 May, 1796)

Josephine, no letter from you since the 28th! The mail which left Paris on the 27th has arrived, and I have got no answer, no news of my dear friend! Has she forgotten me, or doesn't she know that there is no greater torment than not to get a letter from *mio dolce amor*? Here they have given a great ball for me, with 500 or 600 pretty and elegant creatures trying to please me; but not one was like you; not one had that sweet, harmonious figure that is so well graven on my heart. I saw only you, thought only of you. That made me quite insupportable; and half an hour after arriving I went off sadly to bed, saying to myself: 'It is empty, the place of my adorable little wife.' Are you coming? How is your pregnancy? Oh, take care of yourself, my darling, be happy, take exercise, don't distress yourself about anything, don't worry at all about your journey; make short stages. I am always imagining seeing you with your little belly; it must be charming; but that wretched heartburn, have you still got it?

Goodbye, lovely friend, and think sometimes of him who is always thinking of you.

B.

141

### To Citizen Oriani

Astronomer, of Milan

Milan

5 Prairial, Year IV (24 May, 1796)

Science, which ennobles the human intelligence, and the arts, which embellish life and transmit great events to posterity, ought to be especially honoured by free governments. All men of genius, all those who have attained a distinguished place in the republic of letters, are Frenchmen, whatever may have been the country of their birth.

In Milan the learned have not enjoyed the consideration due to them. Withdrawn in their laboratories, they have counted themselves happy if the kings and priests have not done them positive harm.

That is not so today; thought in Italy has become free. There is no longer inquisition, or intolerance, or despots. Invite the men of learning to meet and to inform me of their needs and their views on the steps that should be taken to give new life and a new existence to the sciences and the fine arts. All who wish to go to France will be welcomed with honour by the Government. The acquisition of a clever mathematician, a painter of repute, or a distinguished man, whatever his profession, is rated higher by the French people than that of the richest and most populous city.

Be then, Citizen, the bearer of these sentiments to the distinguished men of learning in Milan.

BONAPARTE

142

### To the Municipalities of Milan and Pavia

*Milan*

*5 Prairial, Year IV (24 May, 1796)*

I desire, Gentlemen, that the justly celebrated university of Pavia should resume the course of its studies. Inform the learned professors and the numerous students of this university, therefore, that I invite them to return at once to Pavia and to inform me what measures they think desirable to give a yet more brilliant existence to the university.

BONAPARTE

143

### To the People of Lombardy

*Milan*

*6 Prairial, Year IV (25 May, 1796)*

In several communes a misguided mob with no real means of resistance is committing wild excesses, misunderstanding the Republic and braving an army that has triumphed over kings. Such incredible madness is to be pitied; these poor people are being misled that they may be led to their doom. Faithful to the principles of the French nation, which does not make war on the people, the Commander-in-Chief desires to leave a way open for repentance; but any who, within twenty-four hours, have not laid down their arms and again sworn obedience to the Republic will be treated as rebels; their villages will be burnt. Let the terrible example of Binasco open their eyes! All towns and villages which persist in revolt will share its fate.\*

BONAPARTE

\* The municipal council of Binasco had been shot and the village burnt. The worst outbreak of revolt was at Pavia and Bonaparte ordered the town to be sacked; but the sight so horrified him that after two hours he countermanded the order.

144

**To Brigadier-General Despinoy***Commandant of Milan**Milan**6 Prairial, Year IV (25 May, 1796)*

Brigadier-General Despinoy is ordered to set up immediately a court martial composed of five officers of the garrison to try, within twenty-four hours, the persons arrested carrying arms during the riot which took place at Milan on the 4th, and to have shot those convicted of having taken part, directly or indirectly, in the rising.

The execution will take place the same day in the Ticino suburb.

BONAPARTE

145

**To Captain Bessières***O.C., Company of Guides\***H.Q., Peschiera**13 Prairial, Year IV (1 June, 1796), 9.0 p.m.*

The Company of Guides, at present at headquarters at Peschiera, is ordered to proceed tomorrow, 14th, with arms and baggage to Milan, in order to draw all the clothing, arms and equipment which it lacks. The commander of this company will neglect no steps tending to procure all these objects as promptly as possible. He will be held personally responsible, if, through his negligence, this company is not quickly provided with everything necessary.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

146

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Verona**15 Prairial, Year IV (3 June, 1796)*

I have reached this city, Citizen Directors, only to leave tomorrow.

\* This is the first extant order to the famed and favoured body of men which accompanied Bonaparte in all subsequent campaigns and became successively the Consular and Imperial Guard, growing steadily from a company into an army corps and from a captain's into a marshal's command.

An autobiographical note from St. Helena reads: 'During the battle of Borghetto [30-31 May, 1796] when the army was pursuing the fleeing enemy, Napoleon felt unwell. Returning to headquarters, he put his feet in warm water. A moment later a patrol of Austrian uhlans passed the door, which raised the alarm. He mounted his horse without boots or stockings, within a hair's breadth of being sabred. By such things is history made! That made him feel the need to create for himself a company of Guides, which Captain Bessières organized, and which later became the mounted chasseurs of the Guard. The Duke of Istria [Bessières] was always responsible for guarding him in bivouac, at headquarters, on the march and in battle. Nothing is more necessary to a Commander-in-Chief than a company of two hundred brave and well-mounted dare-devils, men and horses, alike, of the best.'

It is large and beautiful. I am leaving a good garrison so as to remain master of the three bridges which cross the Adige here.

I have not hidden from the inhabitants that had the king of France not evacuated their city before I crossed the Po, I would have set fire to a city so foolhardy as to believe itself the capital of the French empire.

I have just visited the amphitheatre; it is a worthy relic of the Romans. I could not help feeling shame at the meanness of our Champ-de-Mars. Here 100,000 spectators can be seated and easily hear the orator addressing them.

The emigrants are fleeing from Italy; more than 1,500 left before we arrived. They are carrying their troubles and shame off to Germany.

BONAPARTE

147

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Milan*

*20 Prairial, Year IV (8 June, 1796)*

Citizen Directors, after the battle of Borghetto, the passage of the Mincio, the capture of Peschiera and the flight of the enemy into the Tyrol, we invested the city of Mantua.

This fortress, situated in the midst of the lake of the same name, is inaccessible at the moment owing to the flooding of the rivers and the increased water produced by the melting of the snows. Four causeways connect it with the mainland: one, which ends at the San Giorgio suburb, is protected by fortifications and a well laid out bridgehead; another, to the Cerese suburb, is defended by a castellated tower, several batteries and the Cerese entrenchments; the third leads to Pradella and the fourth to the fort of Mantua.

At 5.0 a.m. on the 16th General Dallemagne and Colonel Lannes, with 600 grenadiers, approached the San Giorgio suburb. I myself went to La Favorite, a superb palace of the Duke of Mantua half a league from the fortress. I sent forward one demi-brigade under General Sérurier to support General Dallemagne, who, on seeing the enemy in the San Giorgio entrenchments, had attacked him and occupied the suburb and bridgehead. Despite the case-shot of the fortress, the grenadiers were already advancing in open order on the causeway; they even began to form column as if to storm Mantua and, when the enemy batteries on the ramparts were pointed out, they said: 'There were many more at Lodi.' But the circumstances were not the same, and I had them withdrawn. . . .

General Augereau attacked the suburb of Cerese; he carried the entrenchments and tower and forced the enemy to retire into the body of the fortress. A twelve-year-old drummer, whose name I will

send you, particularly distinguished himself; he climbed to the top of the tower under fire so as to open the gate.

The other two causeways are defended, in one case by a fort, in the other by a very good hornwork; the rise of the Po, which is greater than it has been for twenty years and is flooding a radius of ten leagues, makes any attack impossible for the moment. . . .

I must not keep from you one incident which shows the barbarity still reigning in this country. At San Giorgio there is a convent of nuns, who had fled as it was exposed to the gunfire. Our soldiers entered it to seek cover and take up position. They heard cries and, running to an inner court and breaking into a miserable cell, found a young woman seated on a rough chair, her hands pinioned with iron chains. The wretched creature begged for her life. They broke her chains. From her face she seemed some twenty-two years old and she had been in that state for four years for having wanted, at the age and in the country of love, to escape and follow the dictates of her heart. Our grenadiers took great care of her, and she showed much interest in the French. She has been beautiful and combines the gaiety of the climate with the melancholy of her sufferings. Whenever anyone entered she appeared frightened and it was soon clear that she feared the return of her tyrants. She begged to be allowed to breathe the fresh air and when it was pointed out that shot was raining round the house, she said: 'Oh, to stay here is to die.'

BONAPARTE

148

### To Citizen Petiet

*Minister of War*

*H.Q., Milan*

*20 Prairial, Year IV (8 June, 1796)*

I owe you thanks, Citizen Minister, for the gracious things you have said about me to the Directory. This sign of your regard is most precious to me. I hope to find means of showing you my gratitude.

Here we are very well placed; we lack nothing and the administrative services have everything.

The city of Mantua and the castle of Milan are blockaded.

Beaulieu and his army are in the Tyrol, beyond the Adige.

BONAPARTE

149

### To Major-General Clarke

*Director, Topographical Office, Paris*

*H.Q., Milan*

*20 Prairial, Year IV (8 June, 1796)*

Your young cousin reached me yesterday; he appears to me energetic, though still rather young. I will keep him with me; he will soon be

ready to face danger and distinguish himself. I hope he will be worthy of you, and that I shall have a good report to give you. I am very happy to do something to please you.

Here, all goes well enough; but the dog-days will soon be upon us, and there is no remedy against their dangerous influence. How wretched we humans are, who can only watch nature, not overcome it!

The Italian campaign began two months too late, and we are forced to remain in the most unhealthy part of the country. I see only one way of avoiding being beaten in the autumn; that is to arrange matters so that we are not obliged to march into the south of Italy.

According to all the information reaching us, the Emperor is sending many troops to his Italian army. We wait impatiently for news from the Rhine. If, as I hope, our army is successful the Emperor must be made to pay for his stubbornness.

Meanwhile, I trust you will accept my fraternal respect.

BONAPARTE

150

**To Citizen Lambert**

*Q.M.G., Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*20 Prairial, Year IV (8 June, 1796)*

It is urgent, Citizen Quartermaster, that you take steps to ensure the regular distribution of brandy and vinegar to the field troops of the army. Since the blockade of Mantua forces them to bivouac in marshy and unhealthy country, disease is beginning to attack our soldiers; too many precautions cannot be taken to preserve them from the natural effect on their health of living in areas surrounded by marsh. I urge this matter upon you as essential to the health of the army. Brescia and Verona should provide you with supplies for this distribution; it must not be interrupted.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

151

**Order of the Day**

*Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*20 Prairial, Year IV (8 June, 1796)*

The Commander-in-Chief is informed that many soldiers, instead of staying with their demi-brigades when on the march, wait in the rear in order to indulge in pillage, rejoining their units only long afterwards, and that to excuse their absence they allege that they have been in hospital, where they have in fact been admitted, although not sick, since the majority remain there but one or two days.

He expressly forbids the directors of military hospitals or ambulances, on pain of dismissal, to admit soldiers of whatever rank into their

hospitals unless they are furnished with a certificate of sickness from the unit surgeon, countersigned by the company commander and approved by the battalion commander. . . .

Commanders of garrisons and of military posts on the lines of communication of the army will take care to assemble daily all isolated soldiers passing through their areas; after providing for their subsistence, they will place them under the command of an officer or, failing that, of a n.c.o. and will direct them with a march order to the points where their units are stationed, making them travel in good order in detachments and preventing them from forcing the inhabitants to give them food. Detachments of men the whereabouts of whose units are unknown will be directed to general headquarters. A record will be kept of the officers and n.c.o.s conducting these detachments, and they will be held responsible if disorders are committed by troops under their command.

General officers and garrison commanders are required to arrest any soldier travelling alone without a march order or a certificate of discharge from hospital or a leave pass; they will be assembled and sent under escort to their units to be judged as deserters.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

152

### To General Kellermann

*C.-in-C., Army of the Alps*

*H.Q., Milan*

*21 Prairial, Year IV (9 June, 1796)*

I have inspected the demi-brigades you have sent to me with the greatest pleasure; they are well-found and well disciplined.

I hope I do not abuse your kindness; I am sending you an artillery officer with the funds necessary to provide for the transport of 5,000 muskets, which I beg you to have delivered to us from the magazine at Briançon together with twelve 6-inch howitzers and twelve 8-pounders from the park at Gap.

I am waiting urgently for your reply as to the 1,800 men I asked you to send to Cuneo so that I can withdraw the garrison. . . .

I am, my dear General, with feelings of esteem and regard, etc.

BONAPARTE

153

### To Colonel Chasseloup

*Cdr., Engineers, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*22 Prairial, Year IV (10 June, 1796)*

You will please, Citizen Commander, carry out a reconnaissance at Porto-Legnago on the Adige.

You will report to me on the state of the fortifications and the number of men necessary to defend this position.

The bed of the Adige is higher than the level of the ground round Mantua. That makes it possible to flood a great part of the duchy. Visit the banks of the Adige between Badia and Verona and let me know whether we could use such flooding to make the country between Mantua, the Po and the Adige inaccessible to the enemy.

What effect would this terrible flood have on the fortress of Mantua?

Bring your usual energy and diligence to the solution of these questions, which are of the greatest importance.

BONAPARTE

154

### To Citizen Lambert

*Q.M.G., Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*22 Prairial, Year IV (10 June, 1796)*

I have received your letter of the 20th, Citizen Quartermaster. You must draw as much as you can from Venetian territory, paying for nothing. The intention of the Government is that, in the present situation, so long as the army remains on Venetian territory that country should supply its needs.

BONAPARTE

155

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Milan*

*23 Prairial, Year IV (11 June, 1796)*

General Laharpe was from the canton of Bern, Citizen Directors. The aristocrats of that canton confiscated his goods at the beginning of the revolution. I beg you to concern yourselves with having them restored to his children.

The Swiss have asked us to export to them several thousand quintals of rice; we have allowed it only on condition that the canton of Bern returns his property to young Laharpe. I hope you will approve this.

BONAPARTE

156

### To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

*H.Q., Milan*

*23 Prairial, Year IV (11 June, 1796)*

I am sending you a million francs to be drawn on Basle through Citizen Barthélemy, ambassador of the Republic to Switzerland, to whom I am ordering it to be addressed.

The Army of Italy has asked the permission of the Directory to transfer this money, the product of war indemnities, in order to succour our brothers in arms of the Army of the Rhine.

BONAPARTE



157

**To Citizen Comeyras***French Minister to Graubünden**H.Q., Milan**23 Prairial, Year IV (11 June, 1796)*

I will have 3,000 quintals of corn supplied to Graubünden on condition that they give us horses in payment. At your request I have had the fort of Fuentes destroyed. I will send you all that you ask. You must keep the closest watch on the Valtellina so as to know Beaulieu's movements and warn me in time.

It would be easy to send you a few thousand sporting guns; but would they really be used by our friends, and, if it is true that the chiefs of the Leagues have sold themselves to the house of Austria, would it not be dangerous to increase their means of doing damage?

BONAPARTE

158

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of Italy**H.Q., Tortona**26 Prairial, Year IV (14 June, 1796)*

You will appoint a court martial today to judge the prisoners taken last night by Adjutant-general Leclerc. They are all alleged to have murdered Frenchmen. Their case must be settled before midday tomorrow.

You will have the municipal council of Bosco imprisoned and informed by an adjutant-general that, if they do not immediately name the murderers in their commune and provide a list of at least a dozen persons, I shall have them shot at once.

BONAPARTE

159

**To Citizen Lambert***Q.M.G., Army of Italy**H.Q., Tortona**26 Prairial, Year IV (14 June, 1796)*

Citizen Quartermaster, complaints are reaching the Commander-in-Chief from all sides as to the burdens being placed on the unhappy people of the conquered country by the requisitioning of horses and bullocks by the transport contractor. It is said that simple employees go to the length of imprisoning officials, and the misery of the poorest people around Mantua is such that they are inclined to emigrate with all their beasts.

Find out how far these complaints can be trusted. Put a stop to the cupidity of the employees and agents. Sucey, who has come from Genoa, and many others protest at the number of agents or employees in that town and at the brazenness with which horses requisitioned

for service with the army are being sold there. Join all your means to ours to stop vexations and losses; they seem to be at a peak. . . .

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

160

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Bologna*

*3 Messidor, Year IV (21 June, 1796)*

You will find attached a strength return of the active army; you will see that it is not so strong as you might think.

An intercepted letter from Vienna announces that General Wurmser is coming to command the army in Italy and is replaced in the Rhine army by General Hohenlohe. Already one division of Wurmser's army has occupied the defiles of Graubünden and it is possible that he plans to enter Lombardy from that direction. Beaulieu is daily receiving new forces in the Tyrol: he has already received 10,000 men since the battle of Borghetto. . . .

We have very few sick so far. I continue to be satisfied with the discipline and bearing of the army and of the generals. As for the administrative branch, that scarcely functions at all; there is no order, no method, no energy.

I have no idea how the money coming in from the contributions is distributed. Even the contributions themselves have almost ceased as the method of levying them is constantly changed. The municipal authorities and patriots who support France do not know whom to obey and are pulled in every direction. You can tell what effect that will have in a country where we already have too many enemies.

The great operations we have carried out and have still to carry out and the rich harvest to be gathered on all sides demand speed of movement and as much rapidity of thought as of action. Today the whole of Italy is French, and everything has to be done with a modest army: hold the German armies, besiege fortresses, protect our rear, control Genoa, Venice, Tuscany, Rome, Naples; everywhere we must be in force. There must therefore be unity of military, diplomatic and financial thought. Here we must burn and shoot to establish terror and make a resounding example. There we must pretend not to see what is going on because the time is not ripe. Thus, at the moment, diplomacy in Italy is in truth wholly military.

You will realize that, when each authority and each municipality approaches one of the three commissioners and myself indiscriminately and when each one answers in accordance with his own views, unity of thought and the pursuit of a single plan are impossible, particularly as your agents multiply and are not in agreement.

None of our laws lays down the manner in which conquered

territories are to be governed; the general instructions given to your commissioners, which were permissive, are contradicted by the special instructions you have given them.

I therefore think it essential for the general good that you should regulate the functions of your various commissioners and agents with the Army of Italy, and especially that you define my relations with them and the extent of my authority in diplomatic and financial matters.

BONAPARTE

STRENGTH RETURN OF THE ARMY OF ITALY ON 3 MESSIDOR, YEAR IV

Division of Gen. Masséna	13,660	defending the line of the Adige
Division of Gen. Sauret	4,460	at Salo, between lakes Sero and Garda
Division of Gen. Sérurier	4,700	at the siege of Mantua
Division of Gen. Augereau	4,820	at Bologna and Ferrara
Division of Gen. Vaubois	5,500	in Tuscany
Grenadiers at H.Q.	2,100	at Roverbella
Division of Gen. Despinoy	5,200	at the siege of Milan
Total active army	40,440	men.

161

To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Bologna  
3 Messidor, Year IV (21 June, 1796)

In my preceding letter I spoke to you of our military position; in this I shall discuss our political situation with the Pope and the Senate of Bologna.

The cardinal legate, whom we took prisoner at Bologna, has been given permission to go to Rome on parole. I told him that, if the Pope were promptly to send us proposals which convinced us of his determination to make good the outrage done to the French Republic by the assassination of Basseville and were he at once to pay us a contribution proportionate to the enormous expenses this war has cost us, he might still find in the French Republic a refuge against the laws of war.

I imagine that we shall be receiving a plenipotentiary from His Holiness within two days. M. d'Azara, the Spanish ambassador, who is coming from Milan, will act as mediator. He reckons that we shall be appeased with 4 or 5 millions, but I have refused all discussion until the Pope sends us someone vested with his full powers.

The Republic of Bologna used to enjoy very great privileges which the Popes have progressively invaded. In order to frighten the court of Rome and show it that its influence over the people will have no

effect on us, I have authorized the Senate to treat as null and void all the Roman decrees infringing its liberty. That has given great pleasure in this country, and will thereby be the more effective at Rome. Furthermore it leaves the way open for you to do whatever seems to you proper with this country at the final peace. As long as the armistice lasts we shall have no need to keep troops here, for, from the way I am embroiling them with the court of Rome, they will always fear revenge. . . .

I am today sending an adjutant-general to the Senate to make it swear obedience to the French Republic.

I am most impatient to be done with all these operations, which seriously weaken the army. The heat is excessive, and no time should be lost in recrossing the Po, so as to be able to collect our forces against the Austrians, who are being reinforced to an alarming extent.

I shall be at Leghorn on the 10th, and I assume that by then the armistice with the Pope will be concluded. If not, I shall make a two-day march on Rome through Florence while the division at Bologna marches into the Romagna; that will settle any doubts the court of Rome may have and force it to sign the armistice.

Since this armistice is with the summer rather than with the papal army, I think you should be in no hurry to make peace; then, in September, if our affairs go well in Germany and north Italy, we shall be able to occupy Rome.

BONAPARTE

162

## To the Grand Duke of Tuscany

*H.Q., Pistoia*

*5 Messidor, Year IV (23 June, 1796)*

The flag of the French Republic is being constantly insulted in the port of Leghorn; the property of French merchants is violated; daily there is some outrage against France that is contrary no less to the law of nations than to the interests of the Republic. The Executive Directory has frequently complained to Your Royal Highness's minister at Paris, who has been forced to admit that Your Royal Highness is unable to resist the English and maintain the neutrality of Leghorn.

The Executive Directory thereupon decided that it was its duty to meet force with force in order to protect its trade, and it has ordered me to send a division of the army I command to take possession of Leghorn.

I have the honour to inform Your Royal Highness that a division of the army will enter Leghorn on the 10th of this month. It will behave there in accordance with the principles of neutrality which we are intervening to uphold; the flag, the garrison and the property of

Your Royal Highness and of your subjects will be scrupulously respected.

I am further directed to assure Your Royal Highness of the desire of the French Government to see a continuance of the friendship uniting our two states and of its conviction that, being powerless to remedy the abuses daily committed by English ships, Your Royal Highness will applaud the just and necessary measures taken by the Executive Directory.

BONAPARTE

163

### To Citizen Lallement

*French Minister to Venice*

*H.Q., Bologna*

*5 Messidor, Year IV (23 June, 1796)*

I beg you, Citizen Minister, to be more energetic over your secret correspondence and to arrange to send me each day a report on the strength and movements of the enemy. You should have spies at Trent, Roveredo and Innsbruck and daily reports from these places; that is what Citizen Barthélemy is doing at Basle and thereby rendering important services to the Republic. I have learned from an indirect source that Venice is arming, yet you do not tell me what is the nature and strength of these armaments. You will realize how important it is that I should learn of such matters at once.

BONAPARTE

164

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Pistoia*

*8 Messidor, Year IV (26 June, 1796)*

You will find attached the armistice agreement concluded with the Pope. M. d'Azara, with whom in reality we negotiated, had the impudence to offer us 5 millions in cash and 3 in goods. I held out for 40 millions, of which 10 should be in goods. Seeing that he could not beat me down, he went off to the Government Commissioners with such success that he wrung from them the secret that we were not in a position to go to Rome. After that we could get only 20 millions out of them and that by making a night march on Ravenna. . . . This triangular method of negotiating is most harmful to the interests of the Republic, for a clever man goes around and gains from one what he could not get from the other. These proceedings, in which the Republic has lost 10 millions, have been very unsatisfactory to me since my movement on Bologna has been partly compromised. But I am consoled by the fact that the results still surpass your instructions. We keep the richest lands and, apart from that, shall draw from the Papal States: in cash, 24,500,000; in goods, 10,200,000; total, 34,700,000.

There was no difficulty about all the other conditions. They submitted to everything with fairly good grace, except for the manuscripts, which they did not want to give up; there, too, we had to accept 500 instead of 2,000 or 3,000.

The Legation of Bologna is one of the richest parts of the Papal States. You can have no idea of the hatred this city has for the Pope's rule; the present Pope has withdrawn most of their privileges, to which they seem very attached. As they have seen that their fate depends on the peace treaty, they propose to send deputies to you.

To garrison the citadel of Ancona will not cost us 400 men.

Controlling the port of Ancona we shall have superiority in the Adriatic and, apart from ruining Trieste, we can overawe the Republic of Venice, since eight or ten privateers could destroy their commerce if they break with us. If at any time you think it would be to your interest to keep Ancona permanently, I will undertake to send an engineer there to improve the defences. . . .

BONAPARTE

165

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

At Milan

Marmirolo

29 Messidor, Year IV (17 July, 1796)

I have received your letter, my adorable; it has filled my heart with joy. I am grateful for the trouble you have taken to give me your news. Your health should be better today; I feel sure you have recovered. I urge you to go riding; that can't fail to do you good.

I have been sad ever since I left you. My happiness is to be with you. All the time I am remembering your kisses, your tears, your sweet jealousy, and the incomparable Josephine's charms set a fire burning in my heart and senses. When shall I be free of all work and worry and able to be with you every moment, with nothing to do but love you and savour the pleasure of telling you and proving it to you?

I will send your horse; but I hope you will soon be able to join me. A few days ago I thought I loved you; but since I last saw you I feel I love you a thousand times more. All the time I have known you I adore you more each day; that just shows how wrong was La Bruyère's maxim that *love comes all at once*. Everything in Nature has its own life and different stages of growth. I beg you, let me see some of your faults: be less beautiful, less graceful, less kind, less good; but, above all, never be jealous and never cry; your tears drive me mad and burn my blood. Be sure I can't have a thought except of you or an idea I don't tell you about.

Rest thoroughly and get well. Come and join me; before we die let us at least be able to say: 'We had so many happy days!!'

Millions of kisses, and even some for Fortuné,\* despite his bad manners.

BONAPARTE

166

### To Citizen Garrau

*Government Commissioner*

*H.Q., Castiglione*

*2 Thermidor, Year IV (20 July, 1796)*

The demand which you have addressed to General Vaubois, Citizen Commissioner, is contrary to the instructions given to me by the Government. I beg you henceforward to keep within the limits of the functions prescribed for you by the ruling of the Executive Directory; otherwise I shall be compelled to forbid, through the daily orders of the army, compliance with your instructions. We are all what we are only through the law; whoever wishes to give commands and to usurp functions which it does not grant to him is no republican.

When you were a Representative of the People you had unlimited powers; everyone made it his duty to obey you. Today you are a Government Commissioner and invested with great authority; but your functions are regulated by definite instructions; adhere to them. I know you will suggest that I shall behave like Dumouriez; it seems that a general who has the presumption to command the army entrusted to him by the Government and to issue orders without the approval of the Commissioners can be nothing but a conspirator.

BONAPARTE

167

### To Citizen Miot

*French Minister to Tuscany*

*H.Q., Castiglione*

*2 Thermidor, Year IV (20 July, 1796)*

Citizen Minister, I have received your various letters regarding the English occupation of Porto-Ferraio.

As long as there was hope of persuading the Grand Duke to put that place in a state of defence, you did right to speak strongly to him today, like you, I think threats would be impotent and useless. It will be best to drop the matter and show no sign of resentment, while

\* Josephine's dog. Arnault states in his *Memoirs* that Bonaparte, pointing at Fortuné, once said: 'You see that gentleman; he's my rival. He was in occupation of Madame's bed when I married her. I wanted to throw him out. A hopeless claim! I was told I must agree to share or sleep elsewhere. That made me angry, but it was a case of take it or leave it. I agreed. The favourite was less accommodating; I have the proof on this leg.'

waiting for events and the orders of the Government to enable us to act instead of talking. . . .

BONAPARTE

168

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

*At Milan*

*H.Q., Castiglione*

*4 Thermidor, Year IV (22 July, 1796)*

*10.0 p.m.*

I am sending a courier to Paris. He will pick up your letters in passing. Despinoy has arrived and assures me your health is restored. Although you wrote me so, the details he has added have filled me with joy. So you are quite better, my adorable Josephine; I burn for the pleasure of seeing you. He also tells me that Dubayet and his nice aides-de-camp have reached Milan. You should have received the letter I sent you this morning. I count the days till the 7th. Still three days! In an hour I am off to inspect various posts of my army; and I know well enough who will be first at the rendez-vous on the 7th. Murat is upset. That goddess of the ball, Madame Rugat, has caught him properly. I have sent him to Brescia, and he is furious; he wants to publish his affaire in the papers. Please tell Joseph this and advise him to stick to his Julie; he will be happier and better off that way. Other people on the staff are moaning over Madame Visconti.\* Good God! What women! What morals! I will tell you something frankly and without shrinking: they say young Caulaincourt visited you at eleven in the morning, though you don't get up till one; of course he only wanted to talk about his mother and sister, but you should have chosen a more suitable hour.

The heat is excessive. My very soul is burnt up. I am beginning to believe that to be sane and well one must not feel or give oneself the happiness of knowing the incomparable Josephine. Your letters are cold; your warmth is not for me. Oh, no! I am only the husband. Another must be the lover. You have got to be like everyone else. Woe to anyone who comes into my sight with the title of being loved by you! But stop, there I am being jealous. Good God! I don't know what I am! But I do know that without you there is no more happiness, no more life—Without you, you hear? I mean, completely. If there is a single feeling in your heart that is not for me, if there is a single one that I can't know, my life is poisoned, and stoicism my only refuge. Tell me, love me, and receive a thousand kisses in the imagination and all the assurances of love.

The 7th at Brescia, then?

B.

\* She became Berthier's life-long mistress.



169

**To Citizen Carnot***Member of the Executive Directory**H.Q., Verona**22 Thermidor, Year IV (9 Aug, 1796)*

One of my brothers [Lucien], a war commissary at Marseilles, has gone to Paris without leave. This young man is intelligent but wrong-headed; all his life he has had a passion for meddling in politics. At a moment when it seems to me that a great many people wish to harm me and use every kind of intrigue to spread stupid and damaging rumours, I beg you to do me the important service of ordering him to proceed to one of the armies within twenty-four hours. I should like it to be the Army of the North.

I recommend the one [Joseph], my aide-de-camp, whom I sent to you on the eve of the battle of Lonato. This brave young man will deserve the regard I hope you will show him.

The heat here is excessive, my health not too good. If there is a single pure and honest man in France who can suspect my political intentions or throw doubt on my conduct, I will this very instant renounce the happiness of serving my country. Three or four months of obscurity will calm envy, restore my health and make me the more fit to occupy such posts as the confidence of the Government may wish to confide to me. It is only by leaving Paris in time that I have been able to render the Republic good service. When the moment comes, it will be only by leaving the Army of Italy in time that I shall be enabled to devote the rest of my life to the defence of the Republic.

The great art of government consists in not letting men grow old.

In entering on a public career, I adopted the principle: All for my country.

I beg you to believe the feelings of respect and affection that I have vowed to you.

BONAPARTE

170

**To the Municipality of Milan***H.Q., Verona**22 Thermidor, Year IV (9 Aug, 1796)*

When the army was in retreat and the partisans of Austria and the enemies of liberty believed it lost without hope, at a time when you yourselves could have no suspicion that this retreat was but a ruse, you have shown attachment to France and love of liberty; you have exhibited zeal and character which have won the respect of the army and will bring you the protection of the French Republic.

Each day your people become more worthy of liberty; each day they gain in energy; the day will undoubtedly come when they will

appear with glory upon the stage of the world. Receive this evidence of my satisfaction and of the sincere desire of the French people to see you free and happy.

BONAPARTE

171

### To the Municipality of Brescia

*H.Q., Brescia*

*25 Thermidor, Year IV (12 Aug, 1796)*

Two thousand French and Austrian sick are in the streets of Brescia; humanity demands that they be cared for. I have just ordered 300 of them to be placed in each convent. Please take measures to have them nursed and treated as they should be. The sick in the hospitals of Brescia lack everything. During the course of today you must secure for them all possible help; necessity, humanity and religion command it. In consequence, you will please furnish during the day to the director-general of hospitals three thousand yards of linen for dressings, 30,000 pints of good wine, 10 casks of vinegar, 1,500 pints of brandy, 1 ton of sugar, 3,000 lemons, 6,000 shirts.

These things, like all to be provided by the city of Brescia, will be paid for; but it is essential that they be provided during the day, failing which I shall impose a contribution of 3 millions on the city and shall be forced to have seized what you will not provide.

BONAPARTE

172

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Brescia*

*27 Thermidor, Year IV (14 Aug, 1796)*

Citizen Directors, I feel it may be useful to give you my opinion on the generals employed in this army; you will see that there are very few who can serve me well.

Berthier: a strong character, talented, energetic, brave; everything in his favour.

Augereau: plenty of character, courage, firmness, action; has the feel of war, liked by the soldiers, successful in his operations.

Masséna: active, tireless, bold; has sound judgement and quick decision.

Sérurier: fights like a private; takes no responsibility; severe; has too poor an opinion of his troops; is sick.

Despinois: soft, inactive, timid; unsuited to war, disliked by the soldiers, does not lead in action; otherwise has dignity, intelligence and sound political principles; good in a home command.

Sauret: good, excellent soldier; not bright enough to be a general.

Abbatucci: not fit to command fifty men.

Garnier, Meunier, Casabianca: incapable; not fit to command a battalion in a war as active and serious as this one.

Macquart: a brave man without talent.

Gaultier: good in an office; has no experience of war.

Vaubois and Sahuguet have been in garrison commands; I have just called them to the army and will know how to judge them. They have done very well in everything I have given them so far, but the example of General Despinoy, who was very good at Milan and very bad at the head of his division, leads me to judge men by their actions.

BONAPARTE

173

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Brescia*

*27 Thermidor, Year IV (14 Aug, 1796)*

I have received with gratitude, Citizen Directors, the new evidence of esteem which you have given me by your letter of 13 Thermidor. I do not know what the journalists want of me; they have attacked me at the same time as the Austrians. You have crushed them with the publication of your letter; I have completely beaten the Austrians: thus, so far, these double attempts by our enemies have not been happy.

BONAPARTE

174

### To Major-General Sauret

*G.O.C., Reserve Division*

*Milan*

*8 Fructidor, Year IV (25 Aug, 1796)*

It is only consideration for your health that has made me give you command of the reserve and replace you at the head of your present division. That division is still destined for movements whose speed is incompatible with your present condition; but you will find useful work in the post where I am placing you, which is no less essential, though it is less hard and more suitable for you.

The reserve should meet the enemy, but will reach him by less difficult routes. The services you have rendered should assure you that this change casts no reflection on you; it is utterly foreign to any lessening of my confidence in your courage and patriotism.

BONAPARTE

175

### To the Executive Directory

*Milan*

*9 Fructidor, Year IV (26 Aug, 1796)*

... It has been essential to give the troops a few days' rest, to rally units scattered after so violent a shock and to reorganize the

administrative services, which are in utter confusion; there are some of those gentlemen who retreated in one bound as far as the gulf of Spezia.

War commissary Salva deserted the army. His mind deranged, he saw enemies everywhere; he crossed the Po and passed on his terror to all he met, believing the uhlans at his heels; he travelled in vain for two days and nights, for nothing could reassure him. Crying everywhere, *Sauve qui peut*, he got within two leagues of Genoa, where he died after twenty-four hours of violent fever, during which he believed himself wounded with a hundred sabre thrusts—always from the terrible uhlans. Nothing equals such cowardice but the courage of the soldiers. Many war commissaries were no braver.

Such, Citizen Directors, is the harmful effect of the law requiring that war commissaries should be civilians, whereas they need more courage and military habits even than the officers. Courage is the fruit of familiarity with danger. I have therefore felt how important it is that only men who have served several campaigns in the line and have given proof of courage should be admitted to the post of war commissary. No man who rates life above national glory and the respect of his comrades ought to belong to the French army. It is revolting to hear members of the various services daily admitting and almost glorying in having been afraid.

We have 15,000 sick in the army; only fifteen or twenty die each day. But they say that September is the time when diseases are most dangerous: hitherto they have been only light fevers. I have just visited the hospitals at Milan, with which I was very satisfied; that is in part due to the zeal and energy of Citizen Burisse, the principal agent. . . .

If the 6,000 men of General Châteauneuf-Randon and the 13,000 men long promised me from the Army of the Ocean had arrived, my army would have been nearly doubled and I would have swept up the Austrian army before me. If these reinforcements arrive during the month we shall continue to be in a respectable position, and even in a state to put a stop to the Neapolitan nonsense; but I fear that your orders for these movements are being badly carried out. . . .

We await the first news of General Moreau to advance into the Tyrol; but if that is still delayed for a few days we shall advance provisionally as far as Trent. I am assured that General Wurmser has been recalled and replaced by General Wins.

The King of Sardinia having disbanded his provincial regiments, the Barbets\* have increased. A wagon carrying silver has been pillaged. General Dujard has been killed while on his way to Nice. I have organized a mobile column with a tribunal against the Barbets to bring them to justice. . . .

BONAPARTE

\* Bandits operating in the mountains on the Franco-Piedmontese frontier.

176

**To the Executive Directory***Milan**9 Fructidor, Year IV (26 Aug, 1796)*

I have begun negotiations at Venice. I have asked them for food-stuffs to supply the army. You will find attached a copy of Citizen Lallement's letter. As soon as I have occupied the Tyrol I shall open negotiations in conformity with your instructions; at the moment that would not succeed. Those people have a powerful navy and their capital is sheltered from all attacks. It would probably be difficult to make them seize English and Imperial goods.

I have called Citizen Faypoult to Milan and we have agreed on preparatory measures to be taken in execution of your instructions on Genoa. As soon as we are at Trent and the Army of the Rhine is at Innsbruck I will myself go to Genoa and your order will be carried out exactly.

As to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, we must still dissimulate. I have changed the garrison troops at Leghorn so as to upset calculations as to their number and to make a movement into the interior of Italy which will add force to the rumours I am putting out to restrain the Roman populace and the Neapolitans.

BONAPARTE

177

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Brescia**14 Fructidor, Year IV (31 Aug, 1796)*

The Flachat company, Citizen Directors, is composed of very intelligent and energetic men. The disposal of the merchandise taken from the enemy by the Army of Italy could not have been placed in better hands. But it had not been laid down how the sales should be carried out. It is known that estimated prices are generally faulty. At my request the Government Commissioners have now laid down that the various agents of the Republic in the different commercial centres will be informed of the dates of sales so as to establish a necessary competition. The highest price offered will always replace the estimated price, and by that means the greatest possible benefit will be gained from the merchandise.

The contract this company has obtained from the treasury accords it 5 per cent. on cash sent to Huningue and on ingots sent to Paris. Only the bankers can decide if 5 per cent. is too much for sums furnished in cash; it is certainly excessive for ingots. In fact one million francs in ingots occupies five wagons, which, for the journey to Paris, would not cost 500 louis and would arrive in less than ten days. Five

per cent. on one million is 50,000 and they are required to carry it out only in a month: you will see that this article needs revision.

I am surrounded by thieves, despite the efforts of the Quartermaster-General, with whom I am well pleased. It is no small matter to suppress those fellows. I send a few for court martial, but that is a feeble remedy: it needs two weeks doing nothing but turning the various stores and garrisons inside out. Since I cannot do it myself, I have thought it right to have it done by a commission which I have appointed, composed of honest and generally respected men.

BONAPARTE

178

### To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

*H.Q., Brescia*

*14 Fructidor, Year IV (31 Aug, 1796)*

At last, Citizen General, we are in a position to meet and combine our operations.

On the 16th the Army of Italy marches on Trent, which it will reach on the 18th or 19th.

General Wurmser seems to intend to cover Trieste and consequently he has taken up a position on the Brenta with one division of his army. It is possible that the division at Trent will retire on Brixen and thence along the road to Lienz. That will be the only possible movement for it if you advance in force on Innsbruck. I shall try to estimate your progress from the enemy's manœuvres, but it is essential that I have news from you.

General Berthier is sending your chief of staff a cipher so that we can correspond more safely.

If you occupy Innsbruck in force, it will be easy for us to communicate and concert our subsequent operations.

BONAPARTE

179

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Duè-Castelli*

*30 Fructidor, Year IV (16 Sept, 1796)*

The 32nd Demi-brigade and the 18th Light will leave tomorrow and proceed to Roverbella. General Masséna will review the officers and n.c.o.s and also the arms and clothing. The 4th Light will proceed to Porto-Legnago. The battalion of the 51st which is in that town will move to Governolo. The 51st and 4th of the Line will proceed to Governolo on 2 Vendémiaire.

The 18th of the Line will remain at San Giorgio until it is replaced by the 11th of the Line; then it will go to join the 32nd at Roverbella. You will give orders so that this exchange can be carried out as soon

as possible. The 5th of the Line will take up position at La Favorite, where it will remain until further orders.

General Kilmaine will be in charge of the blockade of Mantua. He will have Major-Generals Sahuguet and Dallemagne under his orders. The former's division will extend from Formigosa to Notre-Dame-des-Grâces; the latter's will comprise the whole of Il Serraglio. Brigadier-Generals Lasalcette and Hazard will be under the orders of the first, Brigadier-Generals Landoz and Lebley of the second. General Landoz will remain provisionally at Governolo with the troops that are under his orders there. General Kilmaine will distribute the troops. He will have in all: the 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th, 19th, 45th and 69th of the Line.

The 12th Light will remain provisionally at the blockade of Mantua; but as soon as we are masters of Il Serraglio you will give it orders to assemble at Roverbella.

General Beaumont will command General Kilmaine's cavalry. He will have under command the 1st and 5th Cavalry, the 8th and 20th Dragoons, the 1st Hussars and the 24th and 25th Chasseurs.

You will order the 5th Dragoons to assemble at Verona. This regiment will form part of General Murat's brigade and will be fully equipped with firearms, as well as the 9th and 15th Dragoons, in preference to any other unit.

You will order the Commander of artillery to appoint an officer to command the artillery of General Kilmaine's division and two majors to be attached to Generals Sahuguet and Dallemagne. There will be the same organization for the engineers. Four pieces of light artillery will be attached to General Beaumont's cavalry, two to General Murat's. . . .

I shall send instructions to General Kilmaine and the Commanders of artillery and engineers on what they have to do concerning the siege.

General Kilmaine will still command the cavalry of the army. . . .

BONAPARTE

180

### To Major-General Kilmaine

*Cdr., Cavalry, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Duè-Castelli*

*30 Fructidor, Year IV (16 Sept, 1796)*

The staff will have informed you, Citizen General, that I have chosen you to command the blockade and siege of Mantua. You will continue to command the army cavalry, which will be divided into two brigades: the first, commanded by Brigadier-General Beaumont, will be employed in the blockade of the city and in covering all the surrounding country; the second, commanded by Brigadier-General Murat, is destined to take part in the active operations of the army. This will receive

orders direct from the general staff of the army, but the general officer commanding will be required to inform you of all his movements.

The troops taking part in the siege of Mantua will be under your command and that of two divisional generals. The staff will forward army orders and all administrative documents direct to these officers, but it will correspond with you regarding movements and operations.

The blockade of Mantua consists in the investment of the citadel and in the occupation of San Giorgio and of the Cerese and Pradella gates.

By tomorrow you must give precise orders to Major-General Sahuguet for the investment of the citadel, for the occupation and defence of San Giorgio and for observation to be maintained along the lake so as to allow no surprise.

The Cerese and Pradella gates can be occupied only after possession has been gained of Il Serraglio. You will also be responsible for this most important operation, which cannot be undertaken for three or four days. It is essential, therefore, that until that time you use cavalry forces to observe the movements of the garrison beyond the Po between the Oglio and the Mincio and to retain control of the Governolo bridge. . . .

A combined attack from Governolo and Marcaria is the sole means of occupying the Cerese and Pradella gates, and a few days are needed to rally the troops before that will be possible. I will send you orders as to the date and plan for that operation. Meanwhile, take your precautions and give orders to carry out the objectives laid down in my letter.

Although the 4th and 51st Demi-brigades and the 5th Light do not form part of the forces intended to be under your command, they will be so provisionally, since they will be responsible for defending the Governolo bridge.

Please inform me of all your dispositions.

The Commanders of artillery and engineers have orders to confer with you respecting all operations to be undertaken that concern their arms.

Set up a strong watch along the lake so that no landing can be made which might take San Giorgio by surprise.

BONAPARTE

### **To the Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs**

*H.Q., Milan*

*5th Complementary Day, Year IV (21 Sept, 1796)*

I am no diplomatist, Sir, I am a soldier; you will pardon my frankness. In different parts of His Majesty's States the French are being



murdered and robbed. By the treaty of peace the King, who is bound to accord us passage across his States, must make this safe for us; it is only to that end that, contrary to the spirit of the treaty, I have taken it upon myself to return to him not only the civil but even the military government of the part of his lands restored to him by the Republic. At Vinadio, at Limone, under the eyes of the garrison of Demonte and the troops commanded by M. Frachar at Borgo-San-Dalmazzo, there are daily outrages which seem to be not only tolerated but even encouraged by the government.

I ask you therefore for a simple answer:

1. Should not the King be obliged to indemnify and make good the losses caused to the French by offences committed on his territory where these occur in broad daylight and by organized bodies of 200 to 300 persons?

2. With 25,000 men under arms, has the King enough force to control the brigands in his states and to ensure respect for the laws of justice, humanity and treaties?

Men, Sir, are judged only by their actions. The King's loyalty is generally known; but one is forced to think that there may be political reasons for encouraging, or at least tolerating such revolting atrocities.

I have written to His Majesty personally and I beg you to give him my letter. The French Government will do nothing either openly or secretly which would tend to destroy or weaken the influence of the King's government with his people, but you must know that that would be easy and certain of success. The day you sincerely determine to destroy the brigands infesting our communications between Cuneo and Barcelonnette, they will no longer exist.

I beg you to believe me, etc.

BONAPARTE

182

## To the Senate of Bologna

*H.Q., Milan*

*5 Vendémiaire, Year V (26 Sept, 1796)*

Citizens, I have received your letter with the printed manifesto enclosed. It has earned your indignation and my contempt. I notice the manifesto is not signed, which leads me to believe that it does not come from the Pope, but from some enemies of religion seeking to make it appear bloodthirsty and therefore odious.

Woe to those who bring down upon themselves the anger of the French army! Woe to Ravenna, Faenza and Rimini, if ever they are misled into disavowing the respect they owe to the victorious army and the friends of popular liberty! The fanatics and dupes would pass like criminals. Parts of Italy shall remain free.

The time has come for Italy to take her place with honour among the nations. Lombardy, Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, perhaps the Romagna, if it shows itself worthy, will one day astonish Europe and re-create the great days of Italy.

Run to arms! The free part of Italy is populous and rich. Strike fear into the enemies of your rights and liberty. I do not forget you. The Republicans will show you the way to victory; they will teach you how to overthrow tyrants. I will direct your battalions, and in part your happiness will be your own work. Above all, tell the madmen who dare to brave the wrath of the French Nation that it protects the people and religion, but is as terrible as the angel of death to the proud and foolhardy.

BONAPARTE

183

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*6 Vendémiaire, Year V (27 Sept, 1796)*

I learn, Citizen General, that as the result of an intrigue several Genoese merchants have left Genoa and taken refuge in Milan, loudly spreading it abroad that they know the French are going to bombard Genoa. Please order them to leave Lombardy at once and return to Genoa, for it is important to prevent trouble-makers from disquieting the good people there, to whom the Army of Italy has important obligations both for the corn they procured for us in times of difficulty and for the friendship they have always shown towards the Republic.

They have a special right to our protection at a moment when they have just closed their port to the English and dismissed the Emperor's minister, who had stirred up the rebellion of the imperial fiefs.

BONAPARTE

184

### To Colonel Chasseloup

*Cdr., Engineers, Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Milan*

*7 Vendémiaire, Year V (28 Sept, 1796)*

You will please, Citizen, have the dikes at Governolo cut, so that when the Po floods it will drive the waters of the Mincio into the city of Mantua, which will do much damage to the besieged. There is not a moment to lose in carrying out this operation, for the Po will soon rise.

Copy of these instructions to General Kilmaine, with orders to ensure their execution.

BONAPARTE

185

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of Italy**H.Q., Milan**9 Vendémiaire, Year V (30 Sept, 1796)*

The latest victories of the army, Citizen General, the capture of San Giorgio, Porta-Ceresse and Porta-Pradella, which absolutely blockades Wurmser in Mantua, and the patriotism spreading daily among the mass of the Lombard people leave no handle to the Austrian intriguers and partisans. The usual wartime custom of taking hostages as a guarantee of public tranquillity is now pointless in the case of the Milanese and the city of Cremona. Give immediate orders to the commanders at Antibes and Nice that the hostages taken there be released.

As for the hostages from the province of Pavia, the commandant of Lombardy will call for a report on those who can be released without danger. As soon as the University of Pavia is opened and public opinion makes some progress in the town, it will be possible to release all the hostages taken there.

BONAPARTE

186

**To H.M. the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia***H.Q., Milan**11 Vendémiaire, Year V (2 Oct, 1796)*

Your Majesty, Europe desires peace. This disastrous war has continued for too long.

I have the honour to inform Your Majesty that, if plenipotentiaries are not sent to Paris to open peace negotiations, the Executive Directory has ordered me to destroy the port of Trieste and seize all Your Majesty's establishments on the Adriatic. I have hitherto refrained from carrying out this plan in the hope of preventing an increase in the number of innocent victims of this war.

I wish Your Majesty to understand the dangers threatening Your Majesty's subjects and to give peace and repose to the world.

I am, with respect, Your Majesty's etc.

BONAPARTE

187

**To Field-Marshal Count Wurmser***C.-in-C., Austrian forces in Mantua**H.Q., Modena**25 Vendémiaire, Year V (16 Oct, 1796)*

The siege of Mantua, Sir, is a greater disaster for humanity than two campaigns. Brave men must face danger, but not the diseases of a swamp. Your valuable cavalry is without forage; your large garrison

is short of food; thousands of sick need clean air, abundance of medicines and a healthy diet. It would, I believe, be in the true spirit of warfare and the interest of both armies to come to an arrangement. Return your person and your cavalry and infantry to the Emperor; surrender Mantua to me: we shall both gain thereby, and humanity more than either.

But, since you may think I have special reasons for making this proposal other than humanity and the true interests of the two armies, I realize that you will wish to know the condition and position of my army of observation. Accordingly I see no difficulty in making arrangements in accordance with custom and the spirit of warfare whereby you can learn the situation of my army in the Tyrol and on the Brenta.

I pray you, Sir, to believe the sentiments of regard and high consideration with which I have the honour to be, etc.

BONAPARTE

188

### To Citizen Garrau

*Government Commissioner*

*H.Q., Modena*

*25 Vendémiaire, Year V (16 Oct, 1796)*

The Flachat company has not yet made any sales, although it has large quantities of silks and other merchandise in Lombardy and at Tortona. The sales taking place at Leghorn are outside its control; it is essential that the consul of the Republic intervenes. Although it has a capital of 14 or 15 millions the company is not meeting its bills on the excuse that it has no money, but in reality so as to have them negotiated by a third party at 15 or 20 per cent. discount. . . .

I request you to keep a strict eye on this company. Everywhere there are complaints against it, and all its agents are so blatantly unpatriotic that I am tempted to believe many of them are enemy spies. Please tell the company that if M. Peragallo, a despicable Frenchman who disavows his nation, comes to Lombardy I shall have him put in prison. I have strong reasons to believe that this man has connexions with the Russian minister at Genoa, and besides I am informed that I am surrounded by spies. Most of its employees at Leghorn are emigrants.

BONAPARTE

189

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Modena*

*26 Vendémiaire, Year V (17 Oct, 1796)*

You will find attached, Citizen Directors, the letter I have just received from General Gentili. From that it seems that the Mediterranean is going to become free. Restored to the Republic, Corsica

will offer resources to our navy and a recruiting ground for our light infantry. Saliceti, the Government Commissioner, is leaving this evening for Leghorn en route for Corsica. I am ordering the 8th District to hold a battalion ready to be embarked at Toulon to garrison the fortresses; I shall also send a battalion from Leghorn, which together with two forces of gendarmerie will be enough to keep order.

General Gentili will provisionally command the 23rd District. I am giving him instructions for the organization of the gendarmerie and authorizing him temporarily to raise several mobile columns to provide the Government Commissioner with forces to occupy the fortresses until the French troops arrive. . . . I am sending an artillery and an engineer officer, but, since the five or six fortresses on the island are weak and useless, I am instructing them to incur no expense but only to draw up plans for the defence of the Gulf of Saint-Florent. This is the one really important point, where it would be well in future to concentrate the whole defence of the island, installing a garrison and permanent fortifications and employing there the sums that would be needed to repair and maintain the useless fortresses of Bastia, Corte, Calvi, Ajaccio and Bonifacio; simple coastal batteries will suffice for these. The English would never have occupied the island if we had had a fortress at Saint-Florent and concentrated our forces there.

But since the establishment at Saint-Florent is still in the air, I think you ought to fix the whole military administration at Ajaccio, which is the most important point on the island until Saint-Florent is developed. . . . The expulsion of the English from the Mediterranean can have a great influence on the success of our military operations in Italy: harder conditions should be demanded from Naples, and that will have a great effect on the mind of the Italians, ensure our communications and make the Neapolitans tremble even in Sicily.

BONAPARTE

190

### To Citizen Cacault

*French Ambassador to Rome*

*H.Q., Modena*

*26 Vendémiaire, Year V (17 Oct, 1796)*

I have just received the news that the English are evacuating the Mediterranean. They have already left Corsica, which has raised the tricolour and sent deputies to me to swear the oath of obedience.

A courier from Toulon informs me that our fleet of eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates is already in the outer harbour and on the point of setting sail with a convoy of sixty sail carrying landing troops. The strange delirium of the country you are in will not last long; a quick remedy will soon be there. That madness will pass like a dream

and what will be left will be the freedom of Rome and the well-being of Italy. I salute you.

BONAPARTE

P.S. A hundred deputies from Bologna, Modena, Reggio and Ferrara have been meeting here for some days. Throughout the whole region there is an enthusiasm such as we had no right to expect. The first Lombard legion is already formed; the first Italian legion is now forming with General Rusca in command. You will understand that I have put in it a number of experienced officers who are used to command and to victory.

Stay in Rome for the time being. The Government's intention is to spare no effort to show those people in the wrong.

191

### To Cardinal Mattei

*Archbishop of Ferrara*

H.Q., Ferrara

*30 Vendémiaire, Year V (21 Oct, 1796)*

The court of Rome has refused the conditions of peace offered to it by the Directory; it has broken the armistice by ceasing to carry out its terms; it is arming and seeking war; it shall have it. But before envisaging in cold blood the ruin and death of the madmen who wish to place obstacles in the way of the republican phalanxes, I owe it to my nation, to humanity and to myself to make a last effort to bring the Pope to the more moderate frame of mind that accords with his true interests, with his sacred position and with reason. You, Sir, know the might of the army I command: to destroy the temporal power of the Pope I have but to say the word. Go to Rome; see the Holy Father, and enlighten him as to his true interests. Snatch him from the intrigues of those who seek his and the court's ruin. The French Government will still allow me to reopen peace negotiations; events can still be forestalled.

War, which is so cruel to the people, brings terrible results to the defeated; save the Pope from great ills. You know how much I personally wish to settle by peace a struggle that to settle by war would bring me neither glory nor danger. I wish you, Sir, the success in your mission that the purity of your motives deserves.

BONAPARTE

192

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Verona

*3 Brumaire, Year V (24 Oct, 1796)*

I am distressed, Citizen Directors, that your letter of 20 Vendémiaire reached me too late. I beg you to recall the situation in which I found

myself: Rome was printing fanatical manifestoes; Neapolitan troops were on the march; the Regency at Modena was showing ill-will and breaking the armistice by secreting supplies into Mantua. The French Republic was flouted and threatened. The vigorous step of denouncing the armistice with Modena restored public opinion and united Bologna, Ferrara, Modena and Reggio. Fanaticism was foiled and the people realized we were still there. The Republic had the right to denounce an armistice that was not being fulfilled; even the Regency itself did not deny sending aid to Mantua.

Meeting in a congress, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara and Bologna have decreed a levy of 2,800 men with the title, *1st Italian Legion*. There is great enthusiasm; the peasants who were carrying food into Mantua themselves came to show us the secret routes they were using. There is perfect harmony between us and the people.

At Bologna, a city of 75,000 souls, enthusiasm is extreme; the lowest class has even been committing excesses. To restore order, I had to pronounce strongly in favour of the Senate, which they did not want to recognize any more.

At Ferrara the cardinal bishop, a Roman prince with 150,000 francs, has given it all to the people and remained in the church. I have sent him to Rome, nominally to negotiate, but in reality to get rid of him: he was pleased with the mission.

The Pope's foolishness is unequalled; but the news from Naples and the Mediterranean will change it. My plan, as soon as I can do so, is to go to Ancona under the terms of the armistice and only then to take up a hostile attitude. . . .

I congratulate you on the treaty signed with Genoa; it is useful on every count. . . .

BONAPARTE

193

### To Citizen Cacault

*French Ambassador to Rome*

*H.Q., Verona*

*3 Brumaire, Year V (24 Oct, 1796)*

You will find attached a letter from the Minister [of Foreign Affairs], Delacroix. The Directory informs me that you are required to continue negotiations with Rome. You will keep me carefully informed of your actions, so that I can pick the best time to carry out the intentions of the Government. You will understand that, in view of the peace with Naples and Genoa, our good relations with the King of Sardinia, the reoccupation of Corsica and our decided superiority in the Mediterranean, I shall only await the most favourable moment to march on Rome and avenge the national honour. The great thing now is to gain time. . . . What is needed is to keep the ball in the air so as to deceive

that old fox. It would be a good thing if you can get them to begin carrying out the armistice terms, but that will be difficult, I think.

Our affairs are looking up now, and victory seems to be returning to our standards.

BONAPARTE

194

### To Citizen Carnot

*Member of the Executive Directory*

*H.Q., Verona*

*4 Brumaire, Year V (25 Oct, 1796)*

I have your letter of 17 Vendémiaire, my dear Director. You will have seen, simply by reading my brother [Lucien's] letter, what a hot-head the young man is. He compromised himself several times in '93, despite the advice I constantly gave him. He wanted to play the Jacobin and would have found himself in the little group of national scoundrels, had his eighteen years not, luckily for him, been some excuse.

For him to be at Marseilles would be dangerous not only to him but to the public good. Intriguers would certainly get hold of him, and his old connexions in the area are very bad. As Corsica is now free, you would greatly oblige me by ordering him to go there, since he is not prepared to stay with the Army of the Rhine. He could be of use to the Republic there.

I must beg your pardon for burdening you with these little domestic troubles. But when I see the different factions passing off as my words or actions whatever suits them; when I see a man who is murdered in Lyons at once accounted one of my agents or relations, though I have never heard of him, I feel I must exercise some supervision over the political behaviour of those near me.

Here we are awaiting the promised reinforcements with some impatience. Peace with Naples and Genoa and the destruction of the Regency at Modena have much improved our position. The weather is terrible. We are now in the rainy season when wise men in Italy keep quiet. But the enemy is beginning to move. That is because Mantua is at its last gasp and on the point of starving; we shall see how things will turn out for them. My plan is to blockade Mantua until 15 December, then beat the Austrian army, bring up my siege artillery and besiege it. Calculations show there is no doubt Mantua will be ours before the end of January. But there is every reason to believe, and the enemy's haste in marching to its help goes to prove it, that if their movements do not succeed Mantua will not withstand the blockade for a month; it is now very tight.

Here everything is beginning to take a favourable turn. The peace with Naples and Genoa is making our enemies despair. Everyone



believes that the destiny of Italy has changed for ever. I think even the disorder in the administrations has diminished.

It is a great pity the island of Elba was not ceded to us under the treaty with Naples. I have given orders at Leghorn that a garrison is to be put onto the island as soon as the English evacuate it. In the secret articles I am required to conclude with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, restoring Leghorn to him, I will, if the Directory approves, obtain Elba against an equivalent indemnity from papal territory. From every point of view Porto-Ferraio is necessary to us.

Please give my respects to your family.

BONAPARTE

195

### To the Army of Italy

H.Q., *San-Massimo*

21 Brumaire, Year V (11 Nov, 1796)

Soldiers!

Mantua is without bread, meat and forage. Wurmser and the debris of the army you shattered on the Bormida, at Bassano, San-Giorgio and Governolo are ready to fall into your power. The freedom of Italy and the welfare of France depend on your courage.

A crowd of fugitives, reinforced with the Emperor's last reserves, once more dares to face you in the hope of snatching from you the fruit of six months of victory.

The generals will do their duty: they will throw everything against the enemy; sometimes they will lead you forward, sometimes they will carry out a feint retreat; they will omit nothing that will make your victory brilliant.

But when the drum sounds for battle and you must march against the enemy with bayonets fixed and in the dread silence that heralds victory, then, soldiers, remember to be worthy of yourselves. I will say only two words; they are enough for Frenchmen: Italy! Mantua! The peace of Europe and the happiness of your families will be the outcome of your courage. Let us do once again what we have done so often, and Europe will not dispute our title as the bravest and most powerful nation on earth.

BONAPARTE

196

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., *Verona*

23 Brumaire, Year V (13 Nov, 1796)

I owe you an account of the operations that have taken place since the 12th; if it is unsatisfactory, do not lay the blame on the army; its

inferiority and the loss of the bravest men fill me with fear. Perhaps we are on the eve of losing Italy. None of the expected help has arrived. The 83rd has not left. All reinforcements coming from the departments are held up at Lyons and, above all, Marseilles. They think that to halt them for eight or ten days does not matter and do not realize that meanwhile the destinies of Italy and Europe are being decided here. The whole of the Empire has been in movement and still is. Only the energy of our Government at the beginning of the war can give an idea of the way they are behaving at Vienna. Not a day passes but 5,000 men arrive, and yet, during the two months it has been clear that we need reinforcements, we have received but one battalion of the 40th, a poor unit unused to fire, while our old soldiers of the Army of Italy rot in idleness in the 8th District.

The army does its duty and I do mine. My soul is in anguish, but my conscience is calm. Help, help! But you must not play at it; it is men present under arms we need, not paper establishments. If you promise 6,000 men, the Minister of War announces 6,000 on paper and 3,000 under arms; when they reach Milan they are reduced to 1,500. . . .

On the 10th I learnt that a corps of 25,000 Austrians was advancing from Carinthia and was already encamped on the Piave. I sent General Masséna with an observation force to Bassano on the Brenta with orders to retire on Vicenza the moment the enemy crossed the Piave. I ordered General Vaubois to attack the enemy posts in the Trentino and, in particular, to drive him from his positions between the Avisio and the Brenta. The attack took place on the 12th against strong resistance. General Guieu carried Saint-Michel and burned the enemy bridges; but they frustrated our attack on Segonzano, and, despite its bravery, the 85th Demi-brigade was badly mauled there. . . .

On the 13th I ordered a renewal of the attack on Segonzano, which we had to have, and, learning at the same time that the enemy had crossed the Piave, I left with the Augereau division, joined the Masséna division at Vicenza and, on the 15th, came upon the enemy who had crossed the Brenta. It had to be a case of descending upon him like thunder and sweeping him away at his first step. The day was fierce and bloody, but the advantage was with us; the enemy recrossed the Brenta and the field remained ours. . . .

On the 13th, however, the enemy had attacked General Vaubois at several points which threatened to turn him and forced him to retire on la Pietra with his right backing on mountains and his left at Mori. On the 16th the enemy did not appear, but on the 17th the fighting was very stubborn. By nightfall we had already taken two guns and 1,300 prisoners when a panic took hold of our troops; the rout became general. On the 18th, by a bridge I had purposely had made, the

division took up position at Rivoli and la Corona. In the retreat we lost six guns and 3,000 men. . . .

The weather continues bad and the whole army is exhausted with fatigue and without boots. I have withdrawn it to Verona.

One enemy column, commanded by Laudon, is advancing on Brescia, another on Chiusa to join the main army. To resist all that I have only Masséna's 6,000 men, Augereau's 5,000 and Vaubois's 7,000: 18,000 in all. The enemy has at least 50,000. . . .

Today the troops are resting; tomorrow we shall act according to the enemy movements. I despair of being able to avoid raising the siege of Mantua, which would have been ours in a week. If that disaster happens and no new troops reach me we shall soon be behind the Adda and beyond.

The wounded are the élite of the army; all our senior officers, all our best generals are out of action; new ones who have arrived are incompetent and do not have the confidence of the troops. Reduced to a handful, the Army of Italy is worn out. The heroes of Lodi, Millesimo, Castiglione and Bassano have died for their country or are in hospital. All the units have left is their reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Chabot, Dupuy, Rampon, Pigon, Chabeau, Saint-Hilaire and Menard are wounded.

We are abandoned in the depths of Italy. . . . I have not lost many men in this war, but they were all of the best and irreplaceable. With such tiny forces amid such continuous hazards the brave men who are left look forward to inevitable death. Perhaps the hour is about to strike for brave Augereau, for intrepid Masséna, for Berthier, for me. Then what will become of their valiant men? That thought is making me careful; I no longer dare face the death that would bring misfortune and discouragement to those in my care.

In a few days we will make a last effort. If fortune smiles, Mantua will be taken and with it Italy. Reinforced by my siege army, there is nothing I could not attempt. If I had received the 83rd Demi-brigade, 3,000 strong and known to the army, I would have answered for everything. Soon, perhaps, 40,000 will not be enough.

BONAPARTE

197

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Verona*

*29 Brumaire, Year V (19 Nov, 1796)*

I am so worn out with fatigue, Citizen Directors, that I cannot inform you of all the military events preceding the battle of Arcola, which has just decided the fate of Italy.

Learning that Field-Marshal Alvinzi was approaching Verona so as to join up with his divisions in the Tyrol, I marched down the Adige

with the Augereau and Masséna divisions. During the night of the 24th to 25th I had a boat bridge built at Ronco, where we crossed. I hoped to reach Villanova in the morning and from there capture the enemy's artillery parks and baggage and attack his army on the flank and rear. General Alvinzi's headquarters were at Caldiero. But the enemy had heard of our movement and had sent a Croat and some Hungarian regiments into the village of Arcola, a very strong position in the midst of marshes and canals. This village held up the advance-guard the whole day. In vain did the generals, knowing the importance of time, rush to the front to force our columns to cross the little bridge: too much courage did only harm; almost all were wounded and Generals Verdier, Bon, Verne and Lannes were put out of action. Seizing a flag, Augereau carried it to the very end of the bridge: 'Cowards,' he cried to his troops, 'are you so afraid of death?' and he stayed there several minutes without producing any effect. Yet we had to cross this bridge or make a detour of several leagues which would have nullified our whole operation; I went up myself and asked the soldiers if they were still the victors of Lodi; my presence had an effect that decided me to attempt the crossing once more.

Already twice wounded, General Lannes returned and received a third and more dangerous wound; General Vignolle was also wounded. We had to give up the idea of taking the village by frontal assault and await the arrival of a column commanded by General Guieu that I had sent by Albaredo. It did not come up until the night, but it occupied the village and took four guns and several hundred prisoners. Meanwhile General Masséna was attacking a division which the enemy had sent from his headquarters onto our left; he drove it back and routed it completely.

During the night we decided to evacuate the village of Arcola, and we prepared to be attacked at dawn by the whole enemy army, which had had time to bring up its artillery and supplies and to fall back to meet us.

At first light the action began everywhere with the greatest violence. Masséna, who was on the left, put the enemy to flight and pursued him to the gates of Caldiero. General Robert, who was on the central causeway with the 75th, overthrew the enemy with the bayonet and covered the battlefield with dead.

I ordered Adjutant-general Vial to move down the Adige with a demi-brigade so as to turn the enemy's left. But the terrain presents insuperable obstacles. The brave adjutant-general plunged into the water up to his neck, but in vain, for only eighty grenadiers were able to follow him and that could not make a sufficient diversion. During the night of the 26th to 27th I had bridges thrown over the canals and marshes, and General Augereau crossed with his division. At

..m. we were in action, General Masséna being on the left, General  
rt in the centre, General Augereau on the right.

the enemy attacked the centre vigorously and forced it to give  
id. I then withdrew the 32nd from the left and placed it in ambush  
ne woods, and at the moment when the enemy by driving back  
entre was on the point of turning our right General Gardanne  
s ambush at the head of the 32nd taking the enemy in the flank  
oing a horrible slaughter. The enemy's left was supported by  
es and was overpowering our right by superior numbers. I  
d Citizen Hercule, an officer of my Guides, to choose twenty-  
en of his company and ride half a league down the Adige and  
the marshes covering the enemy's left flank and then to fall  
him from behind at the gallop sounding several trumpets. This  
uvre succeeded perfectly: the enemy infantry wavered, and  
al Augereau seized the moment. But although retreating, it still  
d until a little force of 800 or 900 men with four guns which I  
nt through Porto-Legnano to take up position behind the enemy  
on his rear and completed the rout. General Masséna, who had  
l to the centre, marched straight on the village of Arcola,  
ed it and pursued the enemy up to the village of San Bonifacio;  
ghtfall prevented us from going further.

fruits of the battle of Arcola are 4,000 to 5,000 prisoners, 4 flags,  
s. The enemy has lost at least 4,000 dead and as many wounded;  
ve had 900 men wounded and about 200 killed. . . .

nwhile General Vaubois was attacked and defeated at Rivoli,  
ortant position covering Mantua. We left Arcola at dawn; I  
e cavalry through Vicenza to pursue the enemy and went myself  
ona where I had left General Kilmaine with 3,000 men.

ve now rallied and reinforced the Vaubois division, which is at  
ovo, 8,000 strong. Augereau is at Verona, Masséna at Villanova.  
row I shall attack the division which beat Vaubois, chase it into  
rol and await the surrender of Mantua, which cannot hold more  
fortnight. If, as things now are, you send me the help you have  
romised, I will promise to force the Emperor to make peace  
six weeks and also go to Rome.

not hide from you that I have not found among the soldiers  
lanxes of Lodi, Millesimo, Castiglione; fatigue and the loss of  
ve have removed that dash with which I could have hoped to  
lvinzi and the greater part of his army. General Vaubois lacks  
er and experience in handling big divisions. . . .

generals and officers of the staff showed unexampled energy  
rage; twelve or fifteen have been killed: it was indeed a fight  
leath. . . .

198

**To Major-General Clarke***Government Commissioner\***H.Q., Verona**29 Brumaire, Year V (19 Nov, 1796)*

Your nephew Elliot was killed on the field of Arcola. The young man had grown accustomed to arms and several times marched at the head of columns; in due course he would have been an admirable officer. He died with glory in face of the enemy; he did not suffer a moment. What sensible man would not envy such a death? Who, amid the changes of life, would not choose thus to leave a world so often detestable? Who among us has not a hundred times regretted not being thus withdrawn from the influence of calumny and envy and all those hateful passions which seem almost alone to guide human conduct?

BONAPARTE

199

**To Citizen Garrau***Government Commissioner**H.Q., Verona**29 Brumaire, Year V (19 Nov, 1796)*

The army is without boots, pay, clothing; the hospitals lack everything; our wounded lie on the floor in the most horrible want. All this arises from lack of money, and that at a moment when we have just acquired 4,000,000 francs at Leghorn and when the goods we have at Tortona and Milan could provide substantial resources! Modena should also have given us 1,800,000 francs and Ferrara large contributions. But there is neither order nor uniformity in the scheme of the contributions, which are your special concern. The evil is so great that a remedy must be found. Please answer within the day whether you can provide what the army lacks. . . . It is the intention of the Government that its commissioners should pay special attention to the needs of the army, and I regret to see that you pay no attention to them but leave that duty to a foreigner whose character and intentions are very suspect. †

Citizen Saliceti decrees one thing, you another, with the result that there is no understanding and no money. The 1,500 men we have at Leghorn are costing us more than an army. Thanks to all these muddles we are on the point of lacking what is essential. Already our soldiers are without things that they should not lack in so rich a country and after the successes they have had.

BONAPARTE

\* Clarke had been appointed special Government Commissioner to negotiate with the Austrian court on 15 November and was now on his way to Italy.

† Haller, special Commissioner for contributions.

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**To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte***At Milan**Verona**3 Frimaire, Year V (23 Nov, 1796)*

I don't love you at all any more; on the contrary, I detest you. You are a vile, mean, beastly slut. You don't write to me at all; you don't love your husband; you know how happy your letters make him, and you don't write him six lines of nonsense.

What, then, Madam, do you do all day? What important affaire stops you writing to your lover? What is this affection that stifles and brushes aside the love, the tender and constant love that you promised him? Who can he be, this hero, this new love who occupies your every moment, who rules your days and stops you from thinking of your husband? Josephine, take care: one fine night and the doors will burst open and I shall be there!

Truly, sweet friend, I am worried at not hearing from you; write me four pages quickly of those nice things that fill my heart with affection and happiness.

Soon, I hope, I will be holding you in my arms; then I will cover you with a million hot kisses, burning like the equator.

BONAPARTE

201

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of Italy**Milan**18 Frimaire, Year V (8 Dec, 1796)*

Please issue orders to the various demi-brigades that they are to send me histories of the actions in which each has taken part since the start of the campaign. They must arrive by the end of the month.

BONAPARTE

202

**To Citizen Ausou***Chief forage agent, Army of Italy (under arrest)**Milan**18 Frimaire, Year V (8 Dec, 1796)*

I have received the two letters you wrote me, Citizen.

If I have not already informed you of the reason for your arrest, that is because I was awaiting the installation of the new courts martial, which, being composed of officers, will give you more intelligent judges and be more ready to hear you.

I complain of you because your service has never been organized or carried out; because Peschiera was never provisioned; because you have never provided your sub-contractors with the necessary funds, and because you allowed the service to fail at a critical moment for the

army. You were never at headquarters when your presence there was necessary, that is to say, when the enemy was on the point of attacking.

It is through your culpable negligence that we have lost several hundred horses, that the service of the artillery has suffered severely and that, forced to forage in the fields and farms, the cavalry has committed excesses likely to alienate the inhabitants. Yet since the start of the campaign your service has received 1,800,000 francs of which you have certainly not spent a third. . . .

BONAPARTE

203

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*At Ajaccio*

*Milan*

*20 Frimaire, Year V (10 Dec, 1796)*

Peace with Parma has been signed. I await every moment the news that you have been appointed there. Come back as soon as possible; do not meddle at all or very little in Corsican politics; put our private affairs in order, especially the house, which, whatever happens, I want to see in good condition and worthy to be lived in; it must be restored as it was before, with Ignazio's room joined on. Do what you can to make the street more inhabitable.

I expect Fesch and Paulette at Milan in a fortnight. Miot is destined for Turin, Cacault for Florence.

BONAPARTE

204

### To Citizens Peragallo, Flachat and Co.

*Milan*

*23 Frimaire, Year V (13 Dec, 1796)*

Gentlemen, you have received the money intended for the maintenance of the army, whose needs are most pressing. The pay is two weeks in arrears; this is the responsibility of the Treasury, with which you have a contract specifically setting aside for that purpose the receipts from all the contributions and merchandise arising from the conquests of the Army of Italy. It is notorious that you have received 5 millions, for which you have accounted to nobody. I wish to believe that you will at once provide the 600,000 francs needed for the pay and I must inform you that bills of exchange for this amount have consequently been drawn on you.

If, with inconceivable bad faith, you have the impudence to refuse payment of these bills you will be responsible for the consequences and for the harm done to the army, and I shall instruct Citizen Faypoult to consider you bankrupt and to treat you as such.

BONAPARTE



205

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of Italy**Verona**30 Frimaire, Year V (20 Dec, 1796)*

You will please, Citizen General, replace the commandant of Casal-Maggiore and order him to proceed to Milan to report the reason why he sold seventeen bullocks belonging to the Republic.

BONAPARTE

206

**To the Executive Directory***Milan**8 Nivôse, Year V (28 Dec, 1796)*

There are three parties in Lombardy at the present time: 1. that which accepts French control; 2. that which desires independence and is even showing some impatience; 3. the party friendly to the Austrians and hostile to the French. I support and encourage the first, I contain the second and I repress the third.

It is not true that I have increased the Lombard contribution by 8 millions, and Laporte, who told you this, would do better to repay the 5 millions he and his partners stole from the army and owe to the Republic than to talk about a country where their company has made itself universally distrusted by the numerous sharp practices it has used.

The Cispadane republics are divided into three parties: 1. the friends of their former government; 2. the partisans of an independent, but rather aristocratic constitution; 3. the partisans of the French constitution or of pure democracy. I repress the first, I support the second and moderate the third. I do so because the second is the party of the rich land-owners and the priests, who in the long run will end by winning the support of the mass of the people which it is essential to rally around the French party. This last is composed of young people, of writers and men who, as in France and everywhere else, love liberty and wish to change the government only to bring about a revolution.

The Germans and the Pope are concerting their influence to bring about a rising in the Apennines; their efforts are fruitless. However, part of the Garfagnana and the little town of Carrara revolted. I have sent a small mobile column to bring those people to reason and make some terrible examples that will teach these mountaineers not to play with us. If a revolt of the Apennines were to happen when we were at grips with the enemy, it would be most embarrassing, for the mountains extend to Tortona and the inhabitants could interfere with our communications. I have my eye on this constantly. . . .

The Cispadane republics are now meeting in a congress at Reggio.

BONAPARTE

207

**To Brigadier-General Lespinasse***Cdr., Artillery, Army of Italy*

Milan

*Presumed 10 Nivôse, Year V (30 Dec, 1796)*

I have just visited the arms magazines in the citadel of Milan. No one could ever understand the returns. They call English what is in fact Spanish, Austrian what comes from Leghorn; things cannot go on like that. You must go to the fort tomorrow, inspect your magazines and put them in better order. Send 20,000 bayonets to Peschiera, from where they will be sent to the divisions, which are in great need of them. Please report to me why the equipment for Bergamo has not yet left; I intended it to leave yesterday. You must accustom your subordinates to make no distinction between night and day; everyone must be ready at every moment. Please show me tomorrow the organization of the artillery in Milan and ensure that the gunners necessary both for the workshops and the pieces are in the castle. The artillery in this area is in great disorder.

BONAPARTE

208

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Roverbella**28 Nivôse, Year V (17 Jan, 1797)*

Since the 23rd there have been operations of such importance and with so many actions that I shall not be able to give you a detailed account before tomorrow. Today I will simply report them.

On 23 Nivôse the enemy attacked General Masséna's division before Verona, which produced the action of San Michele in which we beat him completely, taking 600 prisoners and three guns. The same day he attacked our forward positions on Monte-Baldo which gave rise to the action of la Corona; he was repulsed and lost 110 prisoners.

On the morning of the 24th a very strong enemy column moved through Montagna and Caprino, which forced General Joubert's division to evacuate la Corona and concentrate at Rivoli. I had foreseen this movement and went there during the night. On the 25th and 26th took place the battle of Rivoli, which we won after a most stubborn resistance, taking 13,000 prisoners and several flags and guns. General Alvinzi escaped with difficulty and almost alone.

At midnight on the 24th the enemy division which had been established since the 19th at Bevilacqua, from where it had driven back General Augereau's outposts, suddenly threw a bridge across the Adige a league from Porto-Legnano, opposite Anghiari. On the 25th General Guacu attacked it at Anghiari, trying to destroy it before it had completed the crossing. He did not succeed, but took 300 prisoners.

On the 26th General Augereau attacked in a second action at Anghiari. He took 2,000 prisoners and sixteen guns and burnt all the bridges on the Adige; but nightfall enabled the enemy to slip away towards Mantua. He reached to within cannon range of the fortress and attacked San Giorgio, but could not carry it, for we had fortified it carefully. During the night I arrived with reinforcements and there followed the battle of la Favorite; I am writing from the field. The fruit of that battle is 7,000 prisoners, flags, guns, all the army's baggage, a regiment of hussars and a big convoy of corn and cattle the enemy was hoping to get into Mantua. Wurmser attempted a sortie to attack the left wing of our army, but he was received as usual and forced to return.

In three or four days, therefore, the Emperor's fifth army has been entirely destroyed. We have taken 23,000 prisoners. . . . Their flags were embroidered by the hands of the Empress.

More than three months ago you announced 10,000 men coming from the Ocean. So far only the 64th Demi-brigade, 1,800 strong, has arrived. The Emperor will have organized a new army in Italy before I receive these 10,000 men.

BONAPARTE

209

### To Cardinal Mattei

*Archbishop of Ferrara, at Rome*

*H.Q., Verona*

*3 Pluviôse, Year V (22 Jan, 1797)*

The foreigners who are influencing the court of Rome have tried and are still trying to ruin that lovely land; the words of peace I asked you to carry to the Holy Father have been smothered by these men, who care nothing for the glory of Rome and are quite sold to the courts employing them. The last scene of this ridiculous comedy is opening. You know the value I placed on peace and how much I wished to spare you the horrors of war. The letters I am sending you will convince you of the blindness, the perfidy and the rashness of those who at present control the Roman court. I beg you, Cardinal, to assure His Holiness that whatever may happen he can remain at Rome without fear. As the first minister of religion he will find protection for himself and the Church. At the same time assure all the inhabitants of Rome that in the French army they will meet friends who will welcome victory only in so far as it improves the lot of the people and frees Italy from the domination of foreigners. It will be my personal care to prevent any change being made in the religion of our fathers.

Rest assured, Eminence, that I shall make it my duty in all circumstances to show you the regard and attachment with which I am, etc.

BONAPARTE

210

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of Italy**H.Q., Verona**7 Pluviôse, Year V (26 Jan, 1797)*

We must give numbers to the field divisions of the army, Citizen General. They cannot be numbered according to the order of battle, which changes with every movement; so please obtain from the generals copies of their commissions as major-generals so that you can number the divisions according to the seniority of generals commanding them.

BONAPARTE

211

**Proclamation***H.Q., Bologna**13 Pluviôse, Year V (1 Feb, 1797)*

ARTICLE 1. The Pope has formally refused to carry out articles 8 and 9 of the armistice agreed, with Spanish mediation, at Bologna on 2 Messidor and solemnly ratified at Rome on 27 June, 1796.

ART. 2. The Roman court has not ceased from arming and issuing manifestoes calling the people to a crusade; its troops have approached within ten miles of Bologna and threatened to enter the town.

ART. 3. The Roman court has engaged in negotiations hostile to France with the court of Vienna, as is proved by the letters of Cardinal Busca and the mission to Vienna of the prelate Albani.

ART. 4. The Pope has entrusted the command of his troops to Austrian generals and officers sent by the court of Vienna.

ART. 5. The Pope has refused to answer the official requests to open peace negotiations made to him by Citizen Cacaull, Minister of the French Republic.

ART. 6. The treaty of armistice has therefore been violated and infringed by the Roman court; in consequence, I declare that the armistice concluded on 2 Messidor between the French Republic and the court of Rome is broken.

BONAPARTE

212

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Bologna**13 Pluviôse, Year V (1 Feb, 1797)*

You will find attached, Citizen Directors, the letter Marshal Wurmser has written me. I replied that I could not grant the capitulation he asks, and that so far as he is concerned I will allow him to leave with 500 men of his choice, on condition that they do not serve against the

Republic for three months, but that the rest must become prisoners. I gave my instructions to General Sérurier and left for Bologna.

General Sérurier has just informed me that he has received a new intermediary through whom [Wurmser] offers the fortress on condition that he can leave with his garrison, and he will undertake not to serve against the Republic for a year. I am going to tell General Sérurier that I hold to my first proposal and that if General Wurmser does not accept it before the 15th I shall withdraw and allow him no capitulation other than as a prisoner of war with his garrison.

Today I have had General Victor's division proceed to Imola, the first town in the Papal States. You will find attached my proclamation and other printed pieces for the occasion.

If we go as far as Rome, could we not unite Modena, Ferrara and the Romagna into a republic which would be sufficiently strong? Could we not give Rome to Spain, on condition that she guaranteed the new republic? Then we could restore the Milanese and Mantua to the Emperor and give him the Duchy of Parma, if we had to go so far in order to bring about the peace we need. The Emperor would lose nothing, Spain would gain much and we should gain even more; we would have a natural ally in Italy which would become powerful and by which we could correspond through Massa-Carrara with the Adriatic.

BONAPARTE

213

### To Major-General Macquart

*H.Q., Bologna*

*13 Pluviôse, Year V (1 Feb, 1797)*

I learn with regret, Citizen General, that you are leaving the Army of Italy, which reckoned you among its bravest. When you read of our successes, we shall still be thinking of you. As for me personally, my good wishes will accompany you in your honourable retirement. You will always find me ready to oblige you.

BONAPARTE

214

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Faenza*

*15 Pluviôse, Year V (3 Feb, 1797)*

... I have been at pains to show French generosity towards Wurmser, a seventy-year-old general to whom fortune has been very cruel this campaign, but who has never ceased to show constancy and courage that will be noted by history. Surrounded on all sides at the battle of Bassano, losing his army and part of the Tyrol at one blow,

he yet dared hope to be able to take refuge in Mantua, four or five days' march away; he passed the Adige, overthrew our outposts at Cerea, crossed the Molinella and reached Mantua. Shut up in that town, he made two or three sorties; all were unsuccessful, but he was at the head of each. Apart from the very considerable obstacles presented by our lines of entrenchment, bristling with guns, which he had to surmount, he had to act with soldiers discouraged by so many defeats and weakened by the pestilential sickness of Mantua. All those who always rush to sneer at misfortune will not fail to persecute Wurmser.

General Sérurier and General Wurmser should yesterday have had a conference to fix the date of execution of the capitulation. . . .

BONAPARTE

215

### To the Captain Regent

*Republic of San Marino*

H.Q., Rimini

17 Pluviôse, Year V (5 Feb, 1797)

Sir, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, Bonaparte, has just arrived here; he learns that Monsignor Ceretti, Bishop of Rimini, has withdrawn onto the territory of your Republic after having preached violence and murder against the French, and that by all accounts he has abandoned his sacred role in order to stir up the people against us. The Commander-in-Chief requires and expects, as a result of the good relations which should exist between the French Republic and yours, that as soon as you receive this letter you will have Monsignor Ceretti arrested with all the effects and treasure he has carried off with him.

Tomorrow morning the Commander-in-Chief will send 2,000 men to fetch him, unless you prefer to send him here yourself under a sure escort which will be answerable for him. If he is not at San-Marino, he is at Serravalle. I await your reply during the night, Sir.

Since he is certain of Monsignor Ceretti's whereabouts, General Bonaparte requires you to take all precautions that his arrest be carried out in complete secrecy and that he receive no warning in advance, for the responsibility will necessarily fall on you.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

216

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Ancona

22 Pluviôse, Year V (10 Feb, 1797)

You will find attached the capitulation of Mantua, Citizen Directors. Our troops occupied the citadel on the 15th and today the town is

entirely evacuated by the Austrians. I will send you the inventories of the artillery and engineers and the roll of the garrison as soon as they reach me. It was General Sérurier who besieged Mantua the first time; General Kilmaine, who commanded the second blockade, has rendered great services; it was he who ordered the fortification of San Giorgio, which has since served us so well. The garrison has eaten 5,000 horses, which means that we have found very few. I request the rank of brigadier-general for Citizen Chasseloup, commanding the engineers of the army. He besieged the castle of Milan and the town of Mantua and was already installing the breaching batteries when I ordered the siege to be raised; during the campaign he has fortified Peschiera, Legnano and Pizzeghettone. . . .

BONAPARTE

217

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Tolentino*

*1 Ventôse, Year V (19 Feb, 1797)*

The committee of scholars has reaped a good harvest at Ravenna, Rimini, Pesaro, Ancona, Loretto and Perugia. Joined to what we shall be sending from Rome, that will give us everything of beauty in Italy except for a few things at Turin and Naples.

BONAPARTE

218

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Tolentino*

*1 Ventôse, Year V (19 Feb, 1797)*

You will find attached, Citizen Directors, the treaty of peace which has just been concluded between the French Republic and the Pope. . . . I am sending my aide-de-camp, Marmont, to Rome; he will bring back the Pope's ratification, which I will send to you at once.

My reasons for concluding this treaty were:

1. It is better to have three provinces, the best of the ecclesiastical states, given by the Pope, than to have all his states subject to ratification at the general peace, where we already have so much to settle;
2. Because the King of Naples seemed determined to intervene;
3. Because 30 millions are worth ten times more to us than Rome, where we should not have got 5 millions, everything having been packed up and sent to Terracina;
4. Because my presence with the army is essential;
5. Because it could be a step towards general peace. . . .

In my opinion Rome, once deprived of Bologna, Ferrara and the Romagna and of the 30 millions we are taking, can no longer exist; that archaic machine will break down of its own accord.

I did not mention religion, because it is clear that by persuasion and raising their hopes we can make these people do many things that will really help our internal tranquillity. If you will tell me your intentions, I will work on this and make such approaches to the court of Rome as you think necessary.

Letters from Venice and from the divisional commanders make it clear that the enemy is moving and that Prince Charles has reached Trieste. I leave tonight for Mantua and Bassano. I may begin negotiations with the Venetians, and it will not be long before we cross the Piave and put our plan into operation.

General Clarke, who has just left, is going to Turin to carry out your orders. Our secretary of the embassy at Turin has no standing nor anything to excite consideration. In general, our diplomatic agents neglect appearances and forms too much; they do not know what is going on and are generally little respected.

The Republic has thus acquired without doubt the best part of Italy: Ferrara, Bologna and the Romagna. It is possible that I have been mistaken in what I have done; but I cannot be accused of sacrificing the interest of my country to my glory. . . .

I request the post of minister to Rome or to Florence for Citizen Cacaull and the other of these posts for my brother [Joseph], who has the necessary talents, bearing and dignity and a proved patriotism and honesty. . . .

I will send you immediately the ten flags we have taken from the Pope in various actions.

BONAPARTE

219

## To H.H. Pope Pius VI

*H.Q., Tolentino*

*1 Ventôse, Year V (19 Feb, 1797)*

Most Holy Father, I must thank Your Holiness for the kind things contained in the letter Your Holiness has deigned to write me.

Peace between the French Republic and the court of Rome has just been signed; I am happy to have been able to contribute towards Your Holiness's personal repose.

I beg Your Holiness to beware of those at Rome who are sold to the enemies of France or who let themselves be guided by those hateful passions which inevitably lead to the fall of states.

All Europe knows Your Holiness's pacific inclinations and conciliatory aims. The French Republic will be, I hope, among the truest friends of Rome.

I am sending my aide-de-camp, Colonel [Marmont], to express the respect and complete veneration I have for the person of Your Holiness



and I beg to express my desire on all occasions to give proofs of the respect and veneration with which I have the honour to be Your Holiness's most obedient servant.

BONAPARTE

220

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

*At Bologna*

*H.Q., Tolentino*

*1 Ventôse, Year V (19 Feb, 1797)*

Peace with Rome has just been signed. Bologna, Ferrara and the Romagna are ceded to the Republic. The Pope will shortly be giving us 30 millions and some works of art.

Tomorrow I leave for Ancona and from there for Rimini, Ravenna and Bologna. If you are well enough come to Rimini or Ravenna; but take care of yourself, I beg you.

Not a word from you; good God! What have I done? To think only of you, to love only Josephine, to live for nothing but my wife, to enjoy nothing but the happiness of my beloved, does all that earn me such harsh treatment? My love, please, think of me often and write to me every day. You must be ill, or else you don't love me! Do you think my heart is made of marble? Are you really so uninterested in my worries? You can't know me very well! But I can't believe it! You, whom Nature has given such intelligence, gentleness and beauty, you who alone can rule over my heart, you who know only too well, I'm sure, the utter mastery you have over me!

Write to me, think of me, and love me.

I am all yours, for life.

BONAPARTE

221

### To the Army of Italy

*H.Q., Bassano*

*20 Ventôse, Year V (10 Mar, 1797)*

The capture of Mantua has ended a campaign which has given you titles to the eternal gratitude of the nation.

You have won victory in 70 actions and 14 pitched battles; you have taken more than 100,000 prisoners, 500 field pieces, 2,000 heavy guns, 4 bridging trains.

The contributions levied on the lands you have conquered have fed, paid and maintained the army throughout the campaign; in addition, you have sent 30 millions to the Minister of Finance to assist the public treasury. You have enriched the Museum of Paris with more than 300 masterpieces of ancient and modern Italy which it needed thirty centuries to produce.

You have conquered the finest lands of Europe for the Republic; the Lombard and Cispadane Republics owe their liberty to you; for the first time the French colours fly on the coast of the Adriatic, twenty-four hours' sailing from ancient Macedonia; the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Pope and the Duke of Parma have left the coalition of our enemies and sought our friendship; you have driven the English from Leghorn, Genoa and Corsica.

But you have not yet made an end; one great destiny is reserved to you; in you the nation places its dearest hopes; you will continue to be worthy of them.

Of all the enemies who conspired to crush the Republic at its birth, the Emperor alone remains before us. Degrading himself from the rank of a great power, that prince has placed himself in the pay of the merchants of London; he no longer has any policy or will but that of those perfidious islanders, who smile with pleasure at the ills of the continent while themselves far from the miseries of war.

The Executive Directory has spared nothing to bring peace to Europe; the moderation of its proposals did not reflect the strength of its armies; it did not consult your courage, but humanity and the wish to send you back to your families. It was not hearkened to in Vienna. There is therefore no further hope for peace than by seeking it in the heart of the hereditary states of the House of Austria. You will find there a brave people weighed down by the present war and the war they have fought against the Turks. The inhabitants of Vienna and the Austrian states are aghast at the blindness and irresponsibility of their government; there is not one who is not convinced that English gold has corrupted the Emperor's ministers. You will respect their religion and their customs and protect their property. You will bring liberty to the brave Hungarian nation.

In every war for three centuries the House of Austria has lost part of its power; it outrages its subjects by suppressing their privileges. At the end of this sixth campaign (since it forces us to make it), it will find itself reduced to accepting the peace that we shall grant, and in reality it will descend to the rank of the secondary powers, where it has already placed itself by accepting the bribes and control of England.

BONAPARTE

222

**To Citizen Carnot**

*Member of the Executive Directory*

H.Q., Gorizia

5 Germinal, Year V (25 Mar, 1797)

I am sending you a map of Friuli, my dear Director, since you may not have any at Paris.

As you see, the campaign is being maintained. Tomorrow I shall send the Directory a dispatch with news of the advantages we have gained on the left. Joubert and Baraguey-d'Hilliers have surrounded everything the enemy had on the Avisio. . . . But since the next day should have seen us in Botzen and completed our predominance on that side, I think it wise that you should not spread this news until I inform you of the outcome of all our operations.

Have we crossed the Rhine? It is clear that in four or five days, when my movement is disclosed and the enemy sees what danger he is in, they will more or less abandon the Rhine in order to fall upon me. If Moreau does not then march against the enemy with all speed so as to catch and hold him as soon as possible, I shall be beaten and forced to retire into Italy. You will see from the intercepted letters I am forwarding that the enemy hopes to open the campaign on the Rhine immediately; but as usual they have made their plans without thinking what we can do. If Prince Charles has command of the two armies of the Rhine and of Italy, there must necessarily be unity of command on our side, since we shall be in Germany.

As I foretold, of the 30,000 men you announced, 20,000 at the most have reached me. If I had 20,000 more, I believe I would be in Vienna in a fortnight. In any case, if fortune is not unkind to us and the Rhine is quickly crossed, this campaign holds out great hopes.

My plan is to advance on Klagenfurt where I hope to be in three or four days.

BONAPARTE

223

### To the Mayor of Lienz

*H.Q., Villach*

*8 Germinal, Year V (28 Mar, 1797)*

The Commander-in-Chief Bonaparte, Mayor, is distressed to see the alarm which precedes the French army. Let the inhabitants remain calm and have no fear of any kind. The Commander-in-Chief will protect your religion, your persons, your property and your customs.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

224

### To Field-Marshal the Archduke Charles

*C.-in-C., Austrian Army*

*H.Q., Klagenfurt*

*11 Germinal, Year V (31 Mar, 1797)*

Sir, our brave soldiers make war, yet they long for peace. Has not this situation lasted for six years? Have we not killed enough and done enough harm to humanity? Everywhere it is crying out. Europe,

which took up arms against the French Republic, has laid them down. Your nation alone remains, yet blood will flow more than ever. There are sinister heralds of this sixth campaign, and, whatever the outcome, we shall kill a few thousand more men on either side; but in time we shall have to agree, since everything comes to an end, even the passion of hatred.

The Executive Directory of the French Republic informed H.M. the Emperor of its desire to end the war which is laying waste the two peoples: the intervention of the court of London prevented it. But is there no hope of an understanding, and must we continue to destroy ourselves in the interests of a country which is spared the horrors of war? You, Sir, who by your birth are so close to the throne and above the lesser passions that often guide ministers and governments, will you not decide to earn the title of the true saviour of Germany and benefactor to the whole of humanity? Do not think, Sir, that I mean by that to imply that it is impossible for you to save it by force of arms; but, supposing that the fortunes of war turn in your favour, Germany will be none the less ravaged. As for myself, if this approach that I have the honour to make to you can save the life of a single man, I shall be prouder of the civic crown I would deserve than of the sad glory bestowed by military success.

Please believe, Sir, the feelings of respect and high consideration with which I am, etc.

BONAPARTE

225

### To Field-Marshal the Archduke Charles

*C.-in-C., Austrian Army*

*H.Q., Klagenfurt*

*11 Germinal, Year V (31 Mar, 1797)*

On reaching Klagenfurt the French army found a great many sick and wounded of your army abandoned in the hospitals to French generosity.

It was with pain and surprise that we saw that these unfortunates were without food, while the stocks of flour you had in the town had been burned. General Bonaparte's first care has been to procure for your sick what they need, which must inevitably lay a burden on the inhabitants of the town. This conduct is contrary to the laws of war, for in leaving us your sick you presumably did not intend to deprive them of all means of sustenance.

The Commander-in-Chief, who believes that these stores were burned without your orders, requires me to inform you of it and is convinced that in future you will give orders that in places where you are obliged to leave sick the stocks of flour are not consumed in flames.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

## To the People of Carinthia

H.Q., Klagenfurt

12 Germinal, Year V (1 Apr, 1797)

The French army is not entering your country in order to conquer it or to change your religion, beliefs or customs. It is the friend of all nations and particularly of the brave peoples of Germany.

The Executive Directory of the French Republic has spared no effort to put an end to the calamities desolating the continent. It resolved to take the first step and to send General Clarke to Vienna as a plenipotentiary to open peace negotiations; but the court of Vienna refused to hear him and even declared at Vicenza through M. de Saint-Vincent that it recognized no French Republic. General Clarke asked for a passport to go and speak to the Emperor himself; but the ministers at Vienna feared, with reason, that the moderation of the proposals he was instructed to make would incline the Emperor to peace. Corrupted by English gold, those ministers betray both Germany and their prince and have no other will but that of those perfidious islanders who are the horror of all Europe.

People of Carinthia, I know that you detest as much as we do both the English, who alone gain from the present war, and your ministry, which is sold to them. If we have been at war for six years, it is against the wish of the brave Hungarians, of the enlightened citizens of Vienna and of the good and simple people of Carinthia.

So, despite England and the ministers of the court of Vienna, let us be friends! The French Republic has the rights of conquest over you; but let them disappear before a contract binding us both. You will not meddle in a war you do not support; you will furnish such provisions as we may need. For my part I will protect your religion, customs and property; I will levy no contribution from you. War is horrible enough by itself. Innocent victims of the stupidities of others, are you not already suffering too much? All the taxes you normally paid to the Emperor will serve to compensate you for the damage inseparable from the march of an army and to pay for the provisions you will furnish. . . .

BONAPARTE

## To Generals Bellegarde and Merveldt

Representatives of the Archduke Charles

H.Q., Judenburg

18 Germinal, Year V (7 Apr, 1797)

In view of the military position of the two armies an armistice is quite contrary to the interest of the French army; but if it will be a step towards the peace so much desired and needed by the two peoples, I agree willingly to your request.

The French Republic has often shown its desire to put an end to this cruel struggle. It still has the same feelings, and, after the conference I have had the honour to have with you, I do not doubt that peace will soon be restored between the French Republic and His Majesty.

I beg you to believe the feelings of esteem and high consideration with which, etc.

BONAPARTE

228

### To Citizen Fauvelet de Bourrienne

*H.Q., Judenburg*

*19 Germinal, Year V (8 Apr, 1797)*

Citizen Fauvelet de Bourrienne is ordered to leave Sens and proceed at once by mail-coach to the headquarters of the Army of Italy.\*

BONAPARTE

229

### To the Doge of Venice

*H.Q., Judenburg*

*20 Germinal, Year V (9 Apr, 1797)*

All the mainland of the Most Serene Republic of Venice is in arms. Everywhere the rallying cry of the peasants you have armed is: 'Death to the French!' Several hundred soldiers of the Army of Italy have already fallen victim. It is vain for you to disavow the bands you have organized. Do you believe that because I am in the heart of Germany I am unable to make the first nation on earth respected? Do you believe the legions of Italy will tolerate the massacre you have inspired? The blood of my brothers in arms will be avenged, and there is no French battalion that will not feel its courage doubled and its powers trebled when entrusted with so noble a task. The Venetian Senate has answered the chivalrous treatment we have always accorded it by the blackest perfidy. I am sending you my first aide-de-camp as bearer of this letter. Peace or war. If you do not immediately take steps to disperse the bands, if you do not have arrested and delivered to me the authors of the murders that have been committed, then war is declared. The Turk is not on your frontiers, no enemy threatens you; you have

\* This order, which was accompanied by a friendly letter from Marmont, then the Commander-in-Chief's aide-de-camp, was required to release Bourrienne from the restrictions as to residence legally imposed on him as a returned emigrant. A companion of Bonaparte at Brienne and later in Paris, Bourrienne had according to his own *Memoirs*, first been invited to join him in June, 1796, but had not done so partly through disinclination, partly as a result of legal difficulties. He did so now, reaching H.Q. on 19 April. He was at once appointed to be Bonaparte's private secretary, a post which he held continuously until dismissed for financial chicanery in the autumn of 1802.

deliberately raised pretexts to justify a rising directed against the army; it will be dissolved within twenty-four hours. This is no longer the time of Charles VIII. If, against the clear wish of the French Government, you force me to make war, do not think that the French soldiers will follow the example of those you have armed and ravage the lands of the unfortunate and innocent people of the mainland; I will protect them, and one day they will bless the very crimes that will have driven the French to remove them from your tyrannous government.

BONAPARTE

230

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Leoben

27 Germinal, Year V (16 Apr, 1797)

I am sending you by Adjutant-general Leclerc some very important despatches on the situation of the army and the negotiations we have begun; he will give you verbally all the details I may have forgotten. While crossing Germany he will be able to see the enemy's troop movements and to inform Generals Hoche and Moreau of them when he reaches the Rhine. Please send him back to me at once. All the officers I send to Paris stay there too long; they spend their money and lose themselves in pleasure.

I am sending you a captain of hussars who has seen eighty years of service\* with several flags taken from the enemy.

BONAPARTE

231

### To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Leoben

27 Germinal, Year V (16 Apr, 1797)

General Merveldt came to see me at Leoben at 9.0 a.m. on the 24th. After seeing his full powers to treat for peace we agreed to prolong the armistice until the evening of 20 April. The full powers were for him and the Marquess of Gallo, Neapolitan minister to Vienna. I at first refused to admit M. Gallo as a plenipotentiary of the Emperor, since he is the ambassador of a friendly power, which is incompatible with the other role. On the 25th he himself arrived, and I thought it best not to persist in my opposition since it would have meant much delay and he seems to have the confidence of the Emperor. Also the Austrians and Hungarians are very irritated at seeing foreigners play the principal part in so important an affair, and if we break with them, that will be a powerful means of rousing discontent against the government of Vienna.

\* Captain Jantzon. Eighty was his age; he had been sixty years with the colours.

The first matter raised was a reciprocal promise not to divulge whatever might be said. A clause was drawn up; but as these gentlemen stand on etiquette they wished always to put the Emperor before the Republic, which I flatly refused.

We passed to the article on recognition, and I told them that the French Republic had no wish to be recognized; it is to Europe what the sun is to the sky, and so much the worse for anyone who does not want to look at it and benefit from it.

They told me that, even if negotiations were to be broken off, the Emperor would recognize the French Republic from today, on condition that the Republic adopts the same etiquette towards the Emperor as the former King of France. I replied that since we are quite indifferent to matters of etiquette there would be no quarrel over this article. Thereafter we had an exploratory discussion in all directions.

On the 26th M. Gallo came to me at eight in the morning. He said he wished to neutralize some spot where we could continue our conferences in proper form. A garden with a pavilion was chosen, and we declared it neutral, a farce I was quite willing to go through to satisfy these people's puerile vanity. This so-called neutral spot is surrounded by the French army and in the midst of our bivouacs; it would all have been right and proper had it lain between the two armies. Arrived on neutral territory, we began negotiations; this was the result.

1. The cession of Belgium and recognition of the frontiers of the Republic as laid down by the decree of the Convention; but they demand compensations which they necessarily seek in Italy.

2. They demand the restitution of the Milanese; so that as a result of the first article they wish for the Milanese and some part of the states of Venice or the Legations. If I was prepared to accept this proposal, they had the power to sign at once. The arrangement did not appear to me to be possible. . . . In the end we drew up three alternative projects which they have sent to Vienna; they will have a reply in a few days.

If one of these projects is accepted by Vienna, the preliminaries of peace will be signed by 1 Floréal. If not, since the armies on the Rhine have still made no move, I shall propose a simple armistice for the three armies for three months, during which negotiations can be carried on. Meanwhile we would fortify Klagenfurt and Graz, bring up munitions and organize the army perfectly. You would have time to send 40,000 men from the Army of the Rhine and you would then have a very considerable army here whose presence alone would force the Emperor to even greater sacrifices.

If none of this is accepted, we will fight. If the Army of the Sambre and Meuse is on the march by the 20th it can strike heavy blows and be on the Rednitz during the first days of next month; the best generals and troops are opposite me. If there is the will to take the field, nothing



can stop it, and never in the history of military operations has a river been a real obstacle. If Moreau wants to cross the Rhine, he will cross it. If he had already crossed it without raising difficulties we should now be in a position to dictate conditions of peace imperiously and without any risk; but whoever is afraid of losing his glory is certain to lose it. I crossed the Julian and Noric Alps over three feet of ice; I sent my artillery over tracks where wagons had never been and everyone believed it impossible. Had I cared only for the safety of the army and my own personal interests, I should have stopped beyond the Isonzo; I broke into Germany to relieve our armies on the Rhine and prevent the enemy taking the offensive there; I am at the gates of Vienna, and that proud and insolent court has sent plenipotentiaries to my headquarters. The armies on the Rhine cannot have much blood in their veins. If they do not support me I shall return to Italy and all Europe will judge the different conduct of the two armies; then they will have all the forces of the Emperor on their backs, they will be overcome, and it will be their fault.

BONAPARTE

232

### Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

H.Q., Leoben

28 Germinal, Year V (17 Apr, 1797)

The Commander-in-Chief has ordered that the Divisional Order of 14 and 15 Germinal of General Bernadotte, concerning female camp-followers in his Division, be placed on the General Orders of the Army.

'All women, unless authorized to remain, must leave the divisional area within twenty-four hours: failing which battalion commanders will ensure that they are arrested, smeared with black and exposed in public for a period of two hours. The Commander-in-Chief is informed that the disorders occurring are caused by these detestable women, who encourage the soldiers to pillage.'

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

233

### Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

H.Q., Leoben

30 Germinal, Year V (19 Apr, 1797)

The army is informed that at 3.0 p.m. yesterday, 29 Germinal, preliminaries of peace between the French Republic and the King Emperor were signed at the headquarters at Leoben by Major-General Count von Merveldt and the Marquess of Gallo, the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, and by General Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, for the French Republic.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

234

**To Major-General Delmas**

G.O.C., 7th Division, Army of Italy

H.Q., Leoben

1 Floréal, Year V (20 Apr, 1797)

The Commander-in-Chief has learnt that you have had several soldiers beaten with a cane. As this punishment is quite contrary to our principles and to the methods of discipline in the Army of Italy, you are directed to conform with both.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

235

**Order of the Day**

Army of Italy

H.Q., Palma

5 Floréal, Year V (24 Apr, 1797)

Yesterday the Commander-in-Chief inspected the division commanded by General Sérurier. He records his satisfaction with the keenness and precision of the soldiers in executing manoeuvres; but it is painful to him not to be able to give the same praise to all those who command them. In general, officers do not give the firm, clear orders on which the precision and effectiveness of movements depend. . . . Brigadier-General Charton commanded his brigade with indecision. In consequence the Commander-in-Chief orders that this officer shall remain one month at the rear of the division; he will not take command of the brigade unless he is recognized to have acquired the necessary training. . . .

The army is warned that the Commander-in-Chief will hold frequent inspections and will designate officers indiscriminately to command brigades, battalions and companies.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

236

**To the Executive Directory**

H.Q., Trieste

11 Floréal, Year V (30 Apr, 1797)

The Venetians are behaving worse every day, and in practice war has been declared; the murder of Citizen Laugier, commander of the picket boat *Liberator of Italy*, is the most atrocious event of the century.

Citizen Laugier sailed from Trieste and was met by the Emperor's flotilla of eight or ten sloops; he fought them for part of the day and then sought refuge under the guns of Venice. There he was received with case shot from the fort. He ordered his crew into the hold while he asked with his megaphone why he was being treated as an enemy; but at that moment a bullet threw him to the deck stone dead. A sailor swimming in the water was pursued and killed with oars.

This is but a specimen of what is happening daily on the mainland. By the time you read this letter the mainland will be ours, and I shall make some examples that will be remembered there. As for Venice, I have ordered that all Venetian ships at Trieste and Ancona should be sequestered at once; there are several here chartered for America on which a high value is placed, as well as some fifty others. I cannot believe Lallement will find it within his dignity to remain in Venice, like M. Quirini at Paris.

If French blood is to be respected in Europe, if you do not want it to be treated lightly, the example of Venice must be terrible; we must have blood; the noble Venetian admiral who presided over this assassination must be publicly executed.

M. Quirini will try to intrigue in Paris; but the facts and the infamous treachery of the Venetians, who sought to murder the rear of the army while we were in Germany, are too notorious. I reckon that they have already killed more than 400 of our soldiers. . . .

The Senate sent a deputation to me at Graz; I treated it as it deserved. They asked me what I wanted. I told them to set at liberty all those they have arrested: these are the richest men of the mainland, whom they suspect of being our friends, because they received us well; to disarm all the peasants; to disband part of their Slavonians, since excessive armament is useless; to dismiss the English minister, who has fomented these troubles and is the first to parade the lion of Saint-Mark on his gondola now that they are murdering us . . . to hand over to us all merchandise belonging to the English; to arrest those who have murdered Frenchmen, or at least the principal Venetian nobles. . . .

BONAPARTE

237

### To the Envoys of the Venetian Senate

*H.Q., Trieste*

*11 Floréal, Year V (30 Apr, 1797)*

I have read your letter regarding the murder of Laugier, Gentlemen, only with indignation. You increase the gravity of that outrage, unexampled in the history of modern nations, by the tissue of lies your Government has invented to justify itself.

I cannot receive you, Gentlemen; you and your Senate drip with French blood. When you have placed in my hands the admiral who gave the order to fire, the commander of the tower and the inquisitors who control the Venetian police, I will hear your explanations. You will please leave the soil of Italy without delay.

If, however, the mail that you have just received concerns the Laugier affair, you may attend at my headquarters.

BONAPARTE

238

**To Citizen Lallement***French Minister to Venice**H.Q., Palmanova**11 Floréal, Year V (30 Apr, 1797)*

French blood has flowed in Venice, yet you are still there! Are you waiting to be driven out? Frenchmen can no longer walk in the streets and are insulted and maltreated, and you remain a simple spectator! Since the army has been in Germany more than 400 Frenchmen have been murdered on the mainland, the fortress of Verona was besieged and relieved only after a bloody fight, and, despite all that, you stay in Venice! I myself have refused to hear the deputies from the Senate because they are dripping with the blood of Laugier, and I will never see them unless they first have the admiral and the inquisitors who ordered that massacre arrested and placed in our hands. I well know that they will try to divert the vengeance of the Republic onto a few miserable agents who have carried out their atrocities, but we shall not be deceived.

Write a short note worthy of the greatness of the nation you represent and of the outrages it has suffered; then leave Venice and come and join me at Mantua.

They have done none of the things I demanded. They should have released all the prisoners they have taken since the French army has been in Italy and not simply one, as they have done.

BONAPARTE

239

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Palmanova**12 Floréal, Year V (1 May, 1797)*

I have just received news of the Cispadane Republic. Their choice has been very bad. Priests have influenced all the elections; cardinals and bishops have come from Rome expressly to direct the people's choice; they see well enough that their hopes now rest only on their influence in the Legislative Corps.

Like Lombardy, the Cispadane Republic needs a provisional government for three or four years, during which the influence of the priests can be lessened; otherwise, you will have done nothing by giving it liberty. In the villages they dictate the lists and control all elections. However, in conformity with your orders and the treaties, I shall start by joining Lombardy and the Cispadane under a single provisional government. Thereafter I shall take steps in harmony with their customs to enlighten opinion and lessen the influence of the priests.

BONAPARTE

## To the Executive Directory

Mestre

14 Floréal, Year V (3 May, 1797)

I have just had news from Verona. . . .

As soon as I had passed the Carinthian gorges the Venetians thought I was trapped in Germany and that cowardly government planned a Sicilian vespers. In the city and on the mainland they ran to arms. The Senate encouraged the priests to preach a crusade against us. A horde of Slavonians, many guns and more than 150,000 muskets were sent to the mainland. . . . M. Pesaro was sent to me at Gorizia to try to mislead me about these arms. But I had reason to distrust their atrocious policies, which I had already got to know: I declared that, if these arms were simply to bring order to the towns, they could cease, since I would undertake that, if they would ask for the mediation of the Republic, I would bring the towns to order. . . .

On 30 Germinal considerable Venetian forces cut the communications between Verona and Porto-Legnano. Several of my couriers were murdered and the dispatches taken to Venice. More than 2,000 were arrested on the mainland and thrown into the dungeons of Saint-Mark: all whom the inquisitors suspected of supporting us. . . .

As soon as I got wind of what was afoot, I realized the consequences. I gave General Kilmaine command of all Italy. I ordered General Victor to move his division by forced marches into Venetian territory. . . . I at once sent General Baraguey-d'Hilliers there. . . . I sent my aide-de-camp, Jumot, to Venice and wrote to the Senate the letter of which I have sent you a copy.\*

Meanwhile they had managed to assemble 40,000 armed men at Verona and, at a signal of several strokes of the great bell, they set upon all the French and butchered them. Some were thrown into the Adige; others, wounded and bleeding, escaped into the fortress, which I had long ago taken care to repair and arm.

You will find enclosed General Balland's report; you will see that on this occasion as on so many others the soldiers of the Army of Italy covered themselves with glory. In the end, after six days of siege, they were relieved through the steps taken by General Kilmaine. . . . At the same time, at Venice they were assassinating Laugier. . . . So many outrages and murders will not go unpunished; but it is above all for you and the Legislative Corps to avenge the French name in a resounding way. After such horrible treachery I see no other course than to wipe the name of Venice from the surface of the earth. It will take the blood of all the Venetian nobility to appease the shades of the Frenchmen they have had butchered. . . .

\* No. 239.

As soon as I reach Treviso I will have work started on rafts so that we can force the lagoons and chase those nobles from Venice itself. . . .

During Holy Week and Easter Day the bishop of Verona preached that to kill Frenchmen is meritorious and agreeable to God. If I catch him I will punish him in exemplary fashion.

BONAPARTE

241

### To the Bishop of Como

*Milan*

*17 Floréal, Year V (6 May, 1797)*

Sir, I have received the letter you have taken the trouble to write to me, together with the two broadsheets. I notice with displeasure the device that with misplaced patriotic zeal has been placed at the head of one of these. As you well observe, ministers of religion should never meddle in politics; they should adhere to their true role, which, in accordance with the spirit of the Gospel, must be pacific, tolerant and conciliatory. You can rest assured that, while continuing to hold this view, the French Republic will not permit any disturbance of the practice of religion or of the peace of ministers.

Throw water, never oil, on human passions; dispel prejudice and combat with vigour those false priests who have degraded religion by making it the tool of ambitious men and kings.

The ethic of the Gospel is that of equality and therefore it is favourable to the republican form of government that your country will henceforth have. I beg you, Sir, to believe the sentiments, etc.

BONAPARTE

242

### To the Executive Directory

*Milan*

*19 Floréal, Year V (8 May, 1797)*

I left Palmanova on 12 Floréal and went to Mestre. I have had the divisions of Generals Victor and Baraguey-d'Hilliers occupy all the extremities of the lagoons. I am now not far from Venice and am preparing to enter it in force if matters are not settled. I have driven all Venetians off the mainland which we are now occupying completely. The people are showing great joy at being delivered from the Venetian aristocracy. The Lion of St. Mark is no more.

When I was on the edge of the lagoons three deputies from the Grand Council arrived with full powers to settle all differences; they thought I was still in Germany. I had General Berthier answer them with the attached letter. I have just received a further deputation.

The inquisitors have been arrested; the commander of the Lido

fort, who killed Laugier, has been arrested; the whole Governing Body has been dismissed by the Grand Council, which has announced its intention of renouncing its sovereignty and setting up a form of government to be chosen by me. I intend to set up a democracy and to send 3,000 or 4,000 troops into Venice. I think it is now essential that you dismiss M. Quirini.

Now that I know Hoche and Moreau have crossed the Rhine I am sorry this did not happen a fortnight sooner, or at least that Moreau did not tell me he was in a position to do so.

Our military position is as good as ever. I still occupy Klagenfurt, Gorizia and Trieste. The Venetian peasants are disarmed, and our opponents are everywhere under arrest and our friends in power. The fortifications of Palmanova are being pushed ahead unceasingly.

Please designate Friuli as the area where the Austrians should deliver the French prisoners to us. We shall return their prisoners only as they return ours.

The choice of members of the Directory of the Cisalpine is pretty bad; it was made in my absence and was completely influenced by the priests. But since Modena and Bologna are to form a single republic with Milan, I have suspended the Government and am having prepared here, by four different committees, all the military, civil, financial and administrative laws that must accompany the Constitution. In the first instance I shall myself make all appointments, and I hope that in three weeks the new Italian Republic will be completely organized and able to stand on its own feet.

My first act has been to recall all those who had left for fear of the outcome of the war. I have instructed the administration to be conciliatory and to suppress hatreds. I am cooling the hot-heads and warming the cold. I hope that the inestimable gift of liberty will give this people a new energy and enable it to help the French Republic substantially in such future wars as we may have.

BONAPARTE

243

## To the Executive Directory

*Mombello*

*30 Floréal, Year V (19 May, 1797)*

You will find attached the treaty I have made with Venice, as a result of which 5,000 to 6,000 men under General Baraguey d'Hilliers occupied the town on the 27th. I had several aims in concluding it:

1. To enter the town without difficulty. . . .
2. To put us in a position to turn all the efforts of Venice to our advantage if the treaty of peace with the Emperor is delayed.
4. To curb what might be said in Europe, since it is laid down that

our occupation of Venice is only a momentary operation and a protective measure requested by Venice itself.

The Pope is very sick and is eighty-three years old. . . . What policy should I adopt if he dies?

The Genoese are crying out for democracy; the Senate has sent deputies to sound my intentions. It is quite possible that in ten or twelve days the aristocracy of Genoa will suffer the same fate as that of Venice.

There would then be three democratic republics in Italy, which for the moment could be united only with difficulty in view of the intervening states of Parma and of the Emperor and the inexperience of the Italians. But liberty of the press and future events will not fail to join the three republics in one. . . .

When the definitive peace is made with the Emperor, I will take steps to unite the Cispadane and the Cisalpine. But, meanwhile I must use the period of calm to organize each of them properly, so that if we break with the Emperor we can be sure that our rear will be quiet, and if there is trouble at Rome through the death of the Pope we can use them as a base for any necessary operations.

BONAPARTE

244

## To the Executive Directory

*Mombello*

*7 Prairial, Year V (26 May, 1797)*

The Pope's health, Citizen Directors, continues bad. Please send me new letters of credence to the Conclave, which when the time comes I can send to the French minister at Rome, and indicate the conduct to be followed in these delicate circumstances. We have the right to exclude one cardinal, and this exclusion should fall on Cardinal Albani, if he is in the running.

The Marquess of Gallo very much wants the march of Ancona for Naples. You will see that that is quite clever, but it is the last thing in the world that we should agree to.

In the present situation I think it would be useful were the King of Spain to send 4,000 or 5,000 Spaniards to Parma, so that, at the least sign of trouble in Rome, I could mingle them with our troops. That would prevent our appearing alone in opposition to the King of Naples and might even enable us to join Parma to the new republics and place the Duke of Parma on Roman lands. . . .

Since Spain has, through its navy, a decided superiority over Naples, it is essential to embroil them a little in Italian affairs. The Emperor and the King of Naples clearly have their eyes on the Pope's inheritance.



I think, therefore, if necessary it would be preferable to give Spain 5,000 more men against Portugal and have 5,000 Spaniards at Parma.

I am sending General Gentili with 1,500 men, 500 or 600 Venetians and part of the fleet to occupy Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia. As to Corfu, I think we should retain it irrevocably.

General Vaubois, with 1,500 men, has reached Corsica, where everything now seems perfectly quiet.

The island of Malta is of major interest for us. The Grand Master is dying, and it looks as though his successor will be a German. It would take 500,000 or 600,000 francs to have a Spaniard made Grand Master. Would it not be possible to persuade the Prince of the Peace to take steps to that end, which is most important? Valetta has 37,000 inhabitants who are very well disposed towards the French; there are no longer any English in the Mediterranean; why should not our fleet or the Spanish, before going into the Atlantic, sail to Valetta and occupy it? There are only 500 knights and the regiment of the Order is only 600 strong. If we do not, Malta will fall into the power of the King of Naples. This little island is worth any price to us. . . .

BONAPARTE

245

### To Corporal Moilet

*7th Company, 2nd Artillery Regiment*

*H.Q., Milan*

*19 Prairial, Year V (7 June, 1797)*

The Commander-in-Chief has learned with interest of the courage and skill you displayed at Verona against the fort containing a powder magazine. They were such that at the second shell-burst the explosion of the magazine was so great that the whole was burned down and more than 600 men were killed. Since he wishes to reward bravery and encourage talent, the General requires me to inform you that he has told General Lespinasse, Commander of the Artillery, of your conduct and has ordered him to promote you.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

246

### To the Provisional Government of Genoa

*Mombello*

*28 Prairial, Year V (16 June, 1797)*

I have received your letter, Citizens, through Citizen Balbi.

The first steps of your Government justify the confidence which the Genoese nation has placed in you. Placed in difficult circumstances, provisional governments must consult only public safety and the interests of the nation.

The Republic of Genoa lives by trade; trade depends on confidence. There can be no confidence under a weak government or in a country

split by factions. A government is weak, a state is torn by faction when several hundred citizens organize themselves in an exclusive group, take part in all discussions, court popularity, are always extreme and always seeking but to destroy.

During your provisional government a selected committee must draw up your constitution and the organic laws of your Republic. Your principal duty is to suppress passions and protect the committee from pressures, thereby ensuring that you are not given a prejudiced constitution and laws.

Wisdom and moderation belong to all countries and all epochs, since both are based on our physical nature, but they are essential in small states and commercial cities.

Throughout the whole duration of your provisional government and until you have a stable constitution and laws, act as though you were in a ship in a storm; insist that each citizen carries out his functions and that none attempts to rival the Government. Since you do not know what your constitution will allow or forbid, prevent the citizens from forming any kind of parties for the time being. Your national guard is numerous and loyal.

If, under your Government, the Republic loses any of its trade or happiness, the responsibility will be yours alone.

I beg you to believe the respect and consideration with which, etc.

BONAPARTE

247

### To the Provisional Government of Genoa

*Mombello*

*1 Messidor, Year V (19 June, 1797)*

Citizens, I learn with the greatest displeasure that the statue of Andrea Doria has been pulled down in a moment of passion.

Andrea Doria was a great sailor and statesman; aristocracy was the liberty of his time. The whole of Europe envies your city's precious honour of having given birth to this famous man. I do not doubt that you will make haste to restore his statue. Please inscribe my name as a contributor towards the expense, for I wish to associate myself with those citizens who are most zealous for the glory and happiness of your country. . . .

BONAPARTE

248

### To the Executive Directory

*Mombello*

*Presumed 12 Messidor, Year V (30 June, 1797)*

Citizen Directors, I have just received the motion of Dumolard. . . .

This motion has been printed on the order paper of the Assembly; it is clear that it is directed entirely against me.

After having concluded five treaties of peace and given the last hammer blow to the coalition, I should have had the right, if not to civic triumphs, at least to a quiet life and the protection of the first magistrates of the Republic. Instead, I now find myself denounced, persecuted and in every way decried, although my reputation belongs to the state.

I would have been indifferent to everything, but I cannot be so when it is the first magistrates of the Republic who seek to cover me with this opprobrium.

Having merited a decree that I deserve well of the nation, I ought not to hear myself accused of an action as absurd as it would have been atrocious; I ought not to find a manifesto inspired by an emigrant and payed for by England given more credence in the Council of Five Hundred than the evidence of 80,000 men, or than my own.

What! We have been assassinated by traitors; more than 400 men have died; and the first assembly of the Republic pardons itself for having for a moment believed it!

More than 400 Frenchmen were dragged in the mud outside a great city; they were murdered in sight of the guards in the fort; they were stabbed a thousand times with stiletos like the one I am sending you; and representatives of the French people have it printed 'that, if they believed it an instant, they were to be excused'!

I would not have complained, I would have paid no attention, had it been said by cowards dead to patriotism and glory: I know well enough that there are societies where they say: *Is this blood so pure then!* But I have the right to complain when the first magistrates of the Republic disparage those who, after all, have increased the glory of the French name.

I repeat, Citizen Directors, my request to be allowed to resign. I need to live quietly, if the daggers of Clichy will let me live at all.\*

249

Reply to M. Dunan†

Mombello

*Presumed 13 Messidor, Year V (1 July, 1797)*

So M. Dunan thinks the Army of Italy has not done enough. It should have left the tilting-yard of Italy. The Devil! It looks as if

\* This letter exists only in an unsigned (but autograph) draft and may never have been sent. Clichy was the name of the royalist club in Paris.

† Pseudonym of Duvergne de Presle, a royalist deputy and publicist, who had attacked Bonaparte in the Paris journals. Bonaparte's reply was published as an anonymous pamphlet.

M. Dunan has a pretty small-scale map! He (M. Dunan is speaking of Bonaparte), he should have left the castle of Milan besieged and Mantua blockaded; he should have left behind him the King of Naples, the Pope, the immense country he had just conquered, and have advanced like the arm of a compass to Germany! Let us see, let us reason, M. Dunan; let us first of all try to understand each other.

It was wrong, you say, to concentrate the whole army to besiege Mantua: that is a question of fact; you are misinformed. Not one more man was put to besiege Mantua than was necessary to blockade it. It was besieged with artillery captured in nearby fortresses. The army of observation took up the best line to cover the blockade. A few strong columns were sent to Bologna, Ferrara, Leghorn; they threatened several powers and forced them to make peace and chased the English out of Leghorn and, in the result, out of the Mediterranean. Returning with the speed characteristic of the Army of Italy, they were on the Adige in time to meet Wurmser and his great army.

What do you think would have been better? Should Germany have been invaded? But then that would have been to abandon Italy and expose that beautiful land to insurrection, to a successful sortie from Mantua, to the enemy forces in Friuli. Should one just have crossed the Tyrol and then returned? Yes, no doubt!

The Tyrol which is but three or four inches on your map is an extremely mountainous country, inhabited by warlike people and with forty leagues of difficult defiles across the middle of which passes the continuation of the great Alpine chain.

Moreau was still beyond the Rhine and Jourdan on the Sieg. But it is useless to try to understand you; you do not understand yourself. This article, like the rest of your work, is a mass of wrong and ill-conceived ideas. That is not surprising, since you are speaking of a profession you do not understand. The philosopher who lectured Hannibal, I forget at what town, also thought himself a great soldier.

Do you think that if Caesar, Turenne, Montecuculli, the great Frederick were again to appear on earth they would be your pupils? The perfection of the system of modern warfare, you maintain, consists in throwing one army corps to the right, another to the left, leaving the enemy in the centre, and even to get behind a fringe of fortresses. If these principles were taught to the young they would put military science back four hundred years; and every time they were carried out in face of an active enemy with the slightest knowledge of the tricks of war, he would beat one of your corps and cut the retreat of the other. The retreat of Moreau is so much admired by experts precisely because of the defects in the plan of campaign.

Whether you credit Bonaparte with a little valour and spirit, whether you call him a bandit, a gambler or a schoolboy, his glory is in posterity,

in the admiration of his comrades in arms, of his enemies even, in the great results he has obtained, and lastly in the vision that made him criticize from the start the whole plan of operations for the Rhine and the Irish expedition.

In this campaign the Army of Italy has overthrown the Sardinian army, hardened by four years of war; the army of Beaulieu, so strong that the court of Vienna was sure it would capture the county of Nice. Wurmser's army came down from the Rhine with 20,000 élite troops, and that alone enabled Moreau to re-cross the Rhine and Hoche to advance to the Main: but, though reinforced, Wurmser was no better off and found himself, headquarters and all, closely blockaded in Mantua, victim of a march as bold as it was skilful, which, by itself, would have made this brave army immortal.

Reinforced by all the divisions from Poland, Silesia and Hungary and with another detachment from the Rhine, Alvinczy appeared in his turn. After several days of manœuvring, he fell at Arcola. Our retreat on the Rhine enabled the enemy to send new reinforcements to the Tyrol. Roused by the nobility, the priests and their supporters, Hungary and Vienna willingly sent their recruits to redouble the ranks of our enemies, but the battlefields of Rivoli and La Favorite and the fall, a few days later, of Mantua, Bergamo and Treviso only increased the laurels of the brave soldiers of the Army of Italy.

What is there so ridiculous and improbable that it will not be accepted by the credulous inhabitants of a great city? Rather, what is the interest that leads clever men, with so much evil cunning, to try to denigrate the national glory? Everywhere it has been said and expected that the Army of Italy was lost and that Bonaparte himself was on the way to join the prisoners of Olmütz, if, happily, he had not made peace.

Bonaparte entered Germany on three fronts simultaneously; through the Tyrol, Carinthia and Carniola. He had no fear of being everywhere too weak through so dividing his forces, for that was the position the enemy had taken up. In any case, he was forced to attack in that way so as to keep open a line of retreat and cover his magazines and depots.

But when the fleeing enemy had surrendered to him stores, 24,000 prisoners and 60 guns; once he held Trieste, Gorizia, Klagenfurt and Brixen, he knew that he might in turn be attacked; that the enemy, re-forming far beyond the mountains, could hide his movements and fall upon the separated divisions and beat them individually. He did not march his divisions to Innsbrück, but withdrew them into Carinthia. He also withdrew there the division in Carniola, instead of sending it into Istria as a less able general might have done. In place of all that, he fortified Klagenfurt and put his depots there.

Thus, instead of having three different lines of communication, he had but one; instead of having to contain the naturally warlike and

rebellious people of the Tyrol, he had nothing to fear from them, and, instead of occupying a front of eighty leagues, he collected the army at a single point which threatened Vienna, Hungary and Bavaria at the same time.

General Kerpen, who had gathered his battered division at Innsbrück in the belief that General Joubert intended to march against him, no sooner learned that that general was moving down the Drava into Carinthia than he re-entered the Tyrol. General Quosdanovich, who was defending Hungary, rushed to Trieste once he knew the French army was assembled in Carinthia. Thus, while Bonaparte had reunited the whole of his army at a single spot in the heart of the hereditary states and was able to move in any direction, Prince Charles had the bulk of his army divided between Salzburg and Vienna and weakened by the detachments sent into the Tyrol and Carniola. This was the position when he asked for an armistice.

A few days later the preliminaries of peace were signed. They have saved Vienna, perhaps the very existence of the House of Austria. . . .

It can be said that Prince Charles has constantly walked into the traps set for him by General Bonaparte; from the battle of the Tagliamento up to the behaviour of General Laudon in the Tyrol and General Quosdanovich in Carniola he has made nothing but a series of mistakes and ill-coordinated movements, which played into his enemy's hands. With an inferior army the art of war consists in always having more force than the enemy at the vital point, whether of attack or defence; but that art cannot be learnt from books or by practice; it is an instinctive conduct that can properly be called military genius.

250

## To the Army of Italy

*H.Q., Milan*

*26 Messidor, Year V (14 July, 1797)*

Soldiers, today is the anniversary of the 14 July. You see before you the names of our comrades in arms who died on the field of honour for the liberty of France: they have set you an example. You owe yourselves entirely to the Republic; you owe yourselves entirely to the happiness of 30 million Frenchmen; you owe yourselves entirely to the glory of that name which has received a new lustre as a result of your victories.

Soldiers, I know you are deeply concerned at the evils threatening the nation; but the country is not in real danger. The same men are there who made it triumph over united Europe. Mountains separate us from France; but, were it necessary in order to uphold the Constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the Government and the republicans, then you would cross them with the speed of the eagle.

Soldiers, the Government is watching over the body of laws entrusted to it. If the royalists show themselves they will die in that moment. Have no fear, but let us swear by the shadow of the heroes who have died at our side for liberty, let us swear on our new flags: *Implacable War to the Enemies of the Republic and of the Constitution of the Year III!*

BONAPARTE

251

To Major-General Berthier  
Chief of Staff, Army of Italy

H.Q., Milan  
26 Messidor, Year V (14 July, 1797)

You will please take steps, Citizen General, to prevent the introduction into the army of any gazette tending to spread discouragement, to incite the soldiers to desert or to lessen enthusiasm for the cause of liberty.

BONAPARTE

252

To the Executive Directory

H.Q., Milan  
27 Messidor, Year V (15 July, 1797)

You will find attached a copy of the letter I have received from General Clarke; you will see that they are still playing out time. There can be no doubt that the Emperor wishes to see how matters will turn out in France, and that the foreigner is more involved in all these machinations than it appears.

The army receives a great many of the journals printed in Paris, especially of the worst kind, but that produces an effect quite other than the one intended; indignation is at a peak. The soldiers are demanding to know whether, once they return home, the price of their labours and of six years of war must be to be murdered, as is threatened to all patriots. Matters are getting worse day by day, and I feel, Citizen Directors, that you must at once take them in hand.

I enclose the proclamation I have made to the army; it has produced the best possible effect. There is not a man here but would rather die with arms in his hand than be butchered in a Parisian cul-de-sac.

As for me, I am used to the total subordination of my own interests; but I cannot be indifferent to the outrageous calumnies spread every day by eighty journals, without a single one to nail these lies; nor can I be indifferent to the atrocious perfidy of that motion printed by order of the Council of Five Hundred. I can see that the Clichy club wants to march over my corpse to the destruction of the Republic. Are there then no longer any republicans in France? and must we who have

conquered Europe be reduced to ending our sad days in some remote plot of land?

At a single stroke you could save the Republic and 200,000 heads bound to its fate and, at the same time, conclude peace within twenty-four hours. Have the emigrants arrested; destroy the influence of foreigners. If you need force, call upon the armies. Smash the presses of the papers in English pay, which are more bloodthirsty than ever Marat was.

I myself, Citizen Directors, cannot live in the midst of outrageous factions; if there is no remedy for the ills of the nation, no way of putting a term to assassination and the influence of Louis XVIII, I must ask to resign. . . .

But, in all circumstances, the constant signs you have given me of your unlimited confidence will never be lost from my memory.

BONAPARTE

253

### To Major-General Clarke

*French Plenipotentiary at Leoben*

*H.Q., Milan*

*11 Thermidor, Year V (29 July, 1797)*

You will find attached, Citizen General, two notes that I think it essential to present to H.M. the Emperor: one concerns Ragusa, which the Austrian army has occupied; the other concerns the money owed by the princes of Germany to the Army of the Rhine. . . . If we could at once draw one or two millions, that would be a great gain.

Hoche, not being old enough, cannot be Minister of War; I am assured that Schérer will be appointed. There is serious conflict between the Council of Five Hundred and the Directory.

Lenoir-Laroche, being in poor health, is to be replaced as minister of police. It seems that Hoche is to embark for Ireland.

I imagine you have a cipher to correspond with Perret; do not forget to tell him to gain all possible intelligence of the present military situation of the Emperor, of the value of his levies in Hungary and elsewhere, of the fortifications he may have built at Graz and Klagenfurt, of the Drava and Sava bridgeheads and of the road from Klagenfurt to Brück.

BONAPARTE

254

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Milan*

*29 Thermidor, Year V (16 Aug, 1797)*

The Emperor appears to be moving all his forces towards Italy; the many recruits he is enlisting and now has time to train, combined with



the prisoners who have been returned to him, will enable him to bring a formidable army against me. Perhaps you will think it necessary to increase the cavalry of the Army of Italy and to send us a few artillery companies and demi-brigades of infantry. . . .

I have sent the two battalions of the 79th to the citadel of Corfu; please order General Sahuguet to send us the third, which is at Avignon and which I shall also send to Corfu.

The islands of Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia are more important for us than the whole of Italy. If we were forced to choose, I believe it would be better to restore Italy to the Emperor and keep the four islands, which are a source of wealth and prosperity for our trade. The Turkish empire is crumbling day by day, and the possession of these islands will put us in a position to support it as much as possible or to take advantage of it.

The time is not far distant when we shall feel that, in order truly to destroy England, we must occupy Egypt. The steady death of the vast Ottoman empire obliges us to think in good time of taking steps to preserve our trade in the Levant.

The citadels of Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia are in very good order and well equipped with artillery; I am having the mountings repaired and I have sent a year's supply of stores and ammunition. . . .

BONAPARTE

255

## Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

H.Q., Passariano

11 Fructidor, Year V (28 Aug, 1797)

The Commander-in-Chief, Bonaparte, wishing to give a token of the gratitude of the nation towards those brave soldiers who have distinguished themselves by acts of gallantry during the last two campaigns, orders:

ARTICLE 1. The Chief of Staff will have made ninety grenadier and ten cavalry swords with Damascus blades and with the hilts inlaid with gold and worked by the finest craftsmen of Italy.

ART. 2. On one side of the blade will be inscribed in letters of gold:

ARMY OF ITALY — Division — Demi-brigade.

Given, on behalf of the Executive Directory of the French Republic by  
General Bonaparte

To Citizen — the — year —

On the other side of the blade will be inscribed in letters of gold:

FRENCH REPUBLIC

Liberty

Equality

and thereafter the action for which the sword has been given.

ART. 5. On 1 Vendémiaire, Year VI, the Commander-in-Chief will announce the names of those he believes to have merited a sword.

ART. 6. Each soldier awarded one of these swords will receive double pay.

BONAPARTE

256

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte**

*French Ambassador to Rome*

*H.Q., Passariano*

*16 Fructidor, Year V (2 Sept, 1797)*

You will find attached, Citizen Ambassador, a copy of the note I have handed to the papal envoy at Milan.

I think it essential for the good of France and even of religion itself that the Pope should issue a short instruction to the prelates to obey the laws of the Republic. Since you are not authorized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to make this approach, you should do no more than just follow up what my note has begun.

Please also take unofficial steps to obtain a cardinal's hat for the Archbishop of Milan.

BONAPARTE

257

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte**

*French Ambassador to Rome*

*H.Q., Passariano*

*16 Fructidor, Year V (2 Sept, 1797)*

You will find attached, Citizen Ambassador, a letter written to me by Citizen Monge; I think it important for the dignity of the Republic and the good of humanity that you make the court of Rome feel the need to spare men as universally esteemed as those mentioned in it.

While seeking to maintain good relations between the French Republic and the Roman court, I think it essential for you to try to thwart the desire of several of its ministers to oppress those who have welcomed our artists or served our ambassadors.

Adopt the tone befitting the nation you represent from the outset of your ministry.

BONAPARTE

258

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*H.Q., Passariano*

*27 Fructidor, Year V (13 Sept, 1797)*

You will find attached, Citizen Minister, a copy of the letter I wrote to Citizen Canclaux in reply to the overtures made to him by [Sir John] Acton, which he will certainly have reported to you.

The court of Naples dreams of nothing but expansion and grandeur: on the one hand it wants Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia and Levkas, and, on the other, half the Papal States, and especially Ancona. These pretensions are too comic; in exchange they think of giving us Elba.

I think that from now on the great maxim of the Republic must be never to give up Corfu, Zante, etc. On the contrary, we ought to establish ourselves there firmly. They contain immense commercial resources and will be of great importance to us in the future movements of Europe.

Why should we not occupy the island of Malta? Admiral Brueys could easily anchor there and take it. Four hundred knights and, at the most, a regiment of 500 men are the sole defence of the town of Valetta. The inhabitants, of whom there are more than 100,000, are very well disposed to us and thoroughly disgusted with their knights, who are dying of hunger. I have purposely had all their possessions in Italy confiscated. With the island of Saint-Pierre, which the King of Sardinia has ceded to us, Malta, Corfu, etc., we shall be masters of the whole Mediterranean.

If it happens that when we make peace with England we have to give up the Cape of Good Hope, we must occupy Egypt. That country has never belonged to a European nation. The Venetians alone had a certain, but very precarious preponderance there several centuries ago. We could leave here with 25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten ships of the line or Venetian frigates, and take it. Egypt does not really belong to the Sultan.

I shall be glad, Citizen Minister, if you will enquire in Paris and let me know what reaction our expedition to Egypt would produce on the Porte.

With armies such as ours, for which all religions are alike, Mohammedans, Copts, Arabs, pagans, etc., all that is unimportant; we would respect one as much as another.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

259

To Citizen Talleyrand

Minister of Foreign Affairs

H.Q., Passariano

3rd Complementary day, Year V (19 Sept, 1797)

Citizen Minister, I have received your confidential letter of 22 Fructidor regarding the mission you wish to give Sieyès in Italy. Like you I believe his presence at Milan will be as necessary as it is in Paris and could have been in Holland.

Despite our pride, our thousand and one pamphlets, our endless windy speeches, we are very ignorant in political science. We have not

yet defined what we mean by executive, legislative and judicial power. Montesquieu gave us false definitions, not because that celebrated man was unable to do it, but, as he himself said, his work is only a kind of analysis of what then existed or had existed in the past; it is a summary of notes made on his travels and in reading.

He fixed his eyes on the government of England and defined their executive, legislative and judicial power in general terms.

But why, in practice, should we regard the right to make war and peace and to fix the nature and level of taxes as attributions of the legislative power?

The constitution rightly accords one of these attributions to the House of Commons and in that it does well, because the English constitution is only a charter of privileges; it is a wholly black canvas, but edged in gold.

Since the House of Commons is the only one which, more or less, represents the nation, it alone must have the right to impose taxes; that is the one dyke that could be found to moderate despotism and the insolence of courtiers.

But in a government where all authorities emanate from the nation and where the sovereign is the people, why class as attributes of the legislative power things that are foreign to it?

I can see only one thing that we have properly defined during the past fifty years, and that is the sovereignty of the people; but we have been no happier in fixing what is constitutional than in the attribution of the different powers. Thus the organization of the French people has in truth only begun.

The power of the government, in all the latitude I would give it, ought to be considered as the true representative of the nation, which should govern as a result of the constitutional charter and the organic laws. As it appears to me, it should naturally be divided into two quite distinct magistracies, one of which would supervise but not act, and what we now call the executive power would be obliged to submit to it all large measures, that is, if I may so call it, the legislation of execution. This great magistracy would in truth be the grand council of the nation; it would hold all the administrative and executive functions that our Constitution accords to the legislative power.

By this means the governmental power would consist of two magistracies, one of which would be very numerous and would contain only men who had already carried out some of those functions which give men maturity in political judgement.

The legislative power would first of all make all the organic laws, and would change them, but not, as is now done, in two or three days; for once an organic law is in operation I do not think it should be changed without four or five months of discussion.

This legislative power, having no rank in the Republic, impassive, with neither eyes nor ears for what is going on around it, would be without ambition and would no longer inundate us with thousands of circumstantial laws which simply by reason of their absurdity are inoperative and which turn us into a nation with three hundred books of laws yet without laws.

That, I believe, is a complete political code, which the circumstances we find ourselves in make pardonable. It is a great tragedy for a nation of 30 million inhabitants in the eighteenth century to have to call on bayonets to save the state. Violent remedies indict the legislator, for a constitution given to men should be suitable for men.

If you see Sieyès, please show him this letter; I want him to write telling me my errors. You will give me real pleasure if you can help to send to Italy a man whose abilities I admire and for whom I have a most particular friendship. I will aid him by every means and I hope that by combining our efforts we can give Italy a constitution more in tune with local conditions, with the customs of its people and perhaps even with right principles than the one we have already given it. It was difficult to do otherwise in the midst of war and passion.

Not only do I say to you confidentially that I wish Sieyès to come to Italy, but I also think, and this quite officially, that if we do not give Genoa and the Cisalpine Republic constitutions which suit them France will gain no advantage from them: bought by foreign gold, their legislatures will be entirely at the call of the House of Austria and of Rome. In the final result, it will be like Holland.

Since this letter is neither a piece of tactics nor a plan of campaign, I beg you to keep it for yourself and Sieyès and to use it, if you think that wise, only as to what I have told you of the unsuitability of the constitutions that we have given to Italy.

You will see in this letter, Citizen Minister, both a reply to your own and the entire confidence that I have in you. I salute you.

BONAPARTE

260

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Passariano*

*19 Vendémiaire, Year VI (10 Oct, 1797)*

Citizen Botot\* has handed me your letter of the 1st Complementary Day; in accordance with it he has told me, on your behalf, to revolutionize Italy. I asked him what that meant; whether the Duke of Parma, for example, was included in the order.

I have kept Citizen Botot here a few days, so that he can satisfy himself as to the opinions of my staff and all who surround me. I should be

\* Secretary to Barras.

happy if he would do the same in the various divisions of the army; he would learn what a spirit of patriotism distinguishes these brave soldiers.

My health, which is considerably weakened, and my morale, no less affected, have need of a little rest and make me incapable of carrying through the great things remaining to be done. I have already asked for a successor; if you have not granted my request, I beg you, Citizen Directors, to do so. I am no longer fit to command, but have only a lively interest which will never leave me, in the prosperity of the Republic and the liberty of the nation.

BONAPARTE

261

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Passariano*

*19 Vendémiaire, Year VI (10 Oct, 1797)*

At last the peace negotiations are on the point of ending. The definitive peace will be signed tonight or negotiations broken off.

Here are the principal conditions:

1. We shall have on the Rhine the limits traced on the attached map. . . .
2. Mainz with all its fortifications and in its present state.
3. The islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, etc. and Venetian Albania.
4. The Cisalpine will be composed of Lombardy, Bergamo, Crema, Brescia, Mantua and Peschiera, with all the fortifications up to the right bank of the Adige and the Po, with Modena, Ferrara, Bologna and the Romagna. That makes about 3,500,000 inhabitants.
5. Genoa will have the Imperial Fiefs.
6. The Emperor will have Dalmatia and Istria, the city of Venice and the Venetian states up to the Po and the Adige.
7. In accordance with the secret treaty with Prussia, the Prince of Orange will receive an indemnity. The Duke of Modena will be compensated with the Breisgau; in return, Austria will take Salzburg and part of Bavaria. . . .
8. We shall not evacuate the territory to be occupied by the Emperor until three weeks after the exchange of ratifications and when he has evacuated Mainz, Mannheim, Ingolstadt, Ulm, Ehrenbreitstein and the whole of the Empire.
9. France will have the best of what was held by Venice, Corfu, etc. and the Rhine frontier, apart from 200,000 people whom we can obtain at the peace with the Empire. Thereby she will gain 4,000,000 in population.
10. Since it will hold Mantua, Peschiera and Ferrara, the Cisalpine Republic will have very good military frontiers.

11. Thus the side of liberty gains, in the Cisalpine, 3,500,000 inhabitants and, in the new frontiers of France, 4,000,000: 7,500,000 in all.

12. The House of Austria will gain 1,900,000 inhabitants. It will lose: in Lombardy 1,500,000; at Modena 300,000; in Belgium 2,500,000: 4,300,000 in all. Its loss therefore will still be serious.

I have profited by the powers you have given me and the confidence you have placed in me to conclude this peace. I have been led to do so by:

1. The lateness of the season, which is unsuitable for offensive warfare, especially in this area where we must re-cross the Alps and enter very cold country.

2. The weakness of my army, which has all the forces of the Emperor against it.

3. The death of Hoche, and the bad plan of operations adopted.

4. The distance of the Rhine armies from the hereditary states of the House of Austria.

5. The uselessness of the Italians; I have, at the most, 1,500 with me and they are a rabble from the gutters of the big cities.

6. The new rupture with England.

7. The impossibility of using Sardinian troops, owing to the failure to ratify the treaty of alliance with the King of Sardinia, and the need to increase the garrison of Piedmont and Lombardy by 6,000 French troops.

8. The desire for peace of the whole Republic, a desire showing itself even among the soldiers, who would fight but would far rather see the homes they left so many years ago, and whose absence only tends towards the establishment of military government.

9. The foolishness of risking French blood and definite advantages on behalf of unworthy peoples who have little love for liberty and whose tradition, character and religion cause them to hate us profoundly. It is true that there are 300 patriots in Venice; but their interests will be protected in the treaty and they will be welcomed in the Cisalpine. The wish of a few hundred men is not worth the death of 20,000 Frenchmen.

10. Finally, the war against England will open a larger, more important and splendid field to us. The English are worth more than the Venetians, and their liberation will ensure for ever the liberty and happiness of France; or, if we force that Government to make peace, the advantages throughout the world that we shall gain for our trade will be a great step towards such security.

If I am in error in all these calculations, my heart is pure and my intentions honest; I have stilled the voice of my own glory, vanity and ambition and have regarded only the nation and the Government; I have responded worthily to the unlimited confidence reposed in me for

two years by the Directory. I believe I have done what each member of the Directory would have done in my place.

My services have merited the approval of the Government and the nation, and I have repeatedly received marks of their esteem. It remains for me only to return to the crowd, to return, like Cincinnatus, to the plough and to give an example of respect for the magistrates and of hatred of military rule, which has destroyed so many republics.

Be assured of my devotion and my desire to do anything for the liberty of the nation.

BONAPARTE

262

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Passariano*

*27 Vendémiaire, Year VI (18 Oct, 1797)*

Citizen Directors, General Berthier and Citizen Monge are bringing you the definitive treaty of peace which has just been signed between the Emperor and ourselves.

General Berthier, whose distinguished abilities equal his patriotism and courage, is one of the pillars of the Republic and one of the most fervent defenders of liberty. There has been no victory by the Army of Italy to which he has not contributed. I should have no fear that friendship might make me partial were I to recount here the services this general has rendered to the nation; but history will carry out that task and its first evidence will be the opinion of the whole army.

Citizen Monge, a member of the Commission of Science and the Arts, is celebrated alike for his patriotism and his learning. His conduct in Italy has increased respect for the French, and he has earned a notable place in my friendship. The sciences, which have revealed so many secrets and destroyed so many prejudices, are called upon to render yet greater services. New truths and new discoveries will contribute even more to the happiness of mankind; but it is essential that we should respect the scientists and protect science.

I beg you to welcome with equal distinction the outstanding general and the learned physicist. Each adds to the glory of the nation and the fame of the French name. I cannot send you the treaty of peace by two men more distinguished in their different fields.

BONAPARTE

263

### To the Executive Directory

*Milan*

*15 Brumaire, Year VI (5 Nov, 1797)*

I have sent the courier Moustache to Vienna with the information



for Count Cobenzl that you have ratified the treaty of Campo-Formio. . . .

I think you can leave 25,000 men in Italy, take 36,000 for England and have the rest return to Nice, Chambéry and Corsica. . . .

I am preparing everything for the various troop movements, but they cannot take place until we have occupied Mainz.

To carry out the English expedition with some probability of success will need: 1. Good naval officers; 2. Plenty of well commanded troops, so as to be able to threaten several points and supply the expedition; 3. An intelligent and resolute admiral: I think Truguet the best. Thirty millions of available francs.

General Hoche had very good maps of England, which should be requested from his heirs.

You could not choose an officer more distinguished than General Desaix.

Although I truly need rest, I shall never refuse to pay my tribute to the nation so far as it is in my power.

BONAPARTE

264

## To the Cisalpine People

H.Q., Milan

21 Brumaire, Year VI (11 Nov, 1797)

As from 1 Frimaire your Constitution will be fully in force.

Your Directory, your Legislature, your Court of Appeal and the subordinate administrations will be in being.

You form the first example in history of a people becoming free without faction, revolution and strife. We have given you liberty; see that you preserve it. You are the richest and most populous Republic after France, and your position calls you to play a great role in the affairs of Europe.

To be worthy of your destiny, pass only wise and moderate laws. Have them executed with force and energy. Respect religion and promote the spread of education. Do not form your battalions of feckless men but of citizens who understand the principles of the Republic and are devoted to its prosperity.

In general, you need to steep yourselves in the realization of your strength and of the dignity becoming free men.

Divided and bowed under tyranny for so long, you could not have won your own freedom; left to yourselves for a few years, there will be no power on earth strong enough to take it from you. Until then the great nation will protect you against the attacks of your neighbours. Its political system will be united with yours. Had the Roman people used its power in the same way as the French, the Roman eagles would still

be on the Capitol and eighteen centuries of slavery and tyranny would not have dishonoured the human race.

To consolidate liberty and with the sole aim of your happiness I have carried out a task such as hitherto had been undertaken only from ambition and love of power.

I have made a number of appointments and in so doing I may have overlooked an honest man and preferred an intriguer. But there were serious objections to leaving these first appointments in your hands; you were not yet organized.

In a few days I shall be leaving you. Only the orders of my Government or some imminent danger to the Cisalpine Republic will again bring me among you. But, wherever the service of my country may take me, I shall always have a lively interest in the wellbeing and glory of your Republic.

BONAPARTE

265

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Milan*

*22 Brumaire, Year VI (12 Nov, 1797)*

You will find attached the redistribution of the Army of Italy into armies of England, of Italy and home establishments.

I have made all consequential arrangements and given the necessary orders, so that, the moment the exchange of ratifications takes place and we are in Mainz, our columns can begin to march to the Ocean.

Tomorrow I am sending Colonel Andréossy, of the artillery, to Paris to arrange the casting of cannon of the same calibre as the English field artillery and the building of limbers lighter and more suitable for embarkation than ours. We must have guns of English calibre so that once in the country we can use their shot.

I am working night and day to complete the organization of the Cisalpine Republic, and to arrange Italy and the army so that my absence will not be felt. . . . The Minister of Foreign Affairs will report my recent actions in the Cisalpine and at Genoa.

A large part of the Genoese desire to be French. That is an acquisition which I believe would be useful to us and should not be lost to sight. I do not think that the Constitution they have accepted, although I have improved it somewhat, will prove satisfactory, and, if we help a little, in two or three years they will come on their knees to us to receive them as French citizens.

I have sent Citizen Poussielgue to Malta on the pretext of inspecting our establishments in the Levant, but, in reality, to give the final touches to our plan for that island. . . .

BONAPARTE

266

**To Citizen Poussielgue***First Secretary, Legation to Genoa**H.Q., Milan**22 Brumaire, Year VI (12 Nov, 1797)*

Since the acquisition by the French Republic of the islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephallonia and Cerigo will bring new French political and commercial relations in the Mediterranean and especially in the Levant, and since the Government wishes to establish these on a regular and satisfactory basis as soon as possible, the Commander-in-Chief instructs Citizen Poussielgue, in the name of the French Republic, to proceed at once, with the title of Inspector General of the Levantine posts, to visit the various consuls and agents of the Republic in the Levant and, in general, to inspect all French establishments in that area.

At each place Citizen Poussielgue will study the present position of our trade and relations, will note what changes have occurred since the revolution and will seek the promptest means of restoring the former prosperity of our trade and of increasing it in accordance with the advantages we now have. He will examine the ways in which it is desirable to extend or modify our political relations. Finally, he will seek information as to the surest means of establishing our communications between France and her Adriatic islands either by setting up intermediate points in Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily or Malta, or overland through Italy by way of Ancona.

On his return from this mission, which Citizen Poussielgue will hasten as much as possible, he will report to me on all matters entrusted to him.\*

BONAPARTE

267

**To the Army of Italy***H.Q., Milan**24 Brumaire, Year VI (14 Nov, 1797)*

Soldiers, I leave tomorrow for the Congress of Rastadt.

In leaving the army I shall be consoled by the hope of being soon among you again, fighting against new dangers.

Whatever post the Government may assign to the soldiers of the Army of Italy, they will ever be the worthy supporters of the liberty and glory of the French name.

Soldiers, when talking of the princes you have conquered, of the peoples who owe you their liberty, of the battles you have won, say: 'In two campaigns we would have done still more.'

BONAPARTE

\* The secret instructions given to Poussielgue concerning Malta (cp. No. 265) were no doubt given verbally. If written, they have not survived.

268

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Milan**25 Brumaire, Year VI (15 Nov, 1797)*

General Clarke, who is going to Paris, has been employed in Italy for several months. In all the letters addressed to him which have been intercepted and shown to me I have never seen anything contrary to the principles of the Republic. He has maintained these principles during the negotiations.

General Clarke is upright and a hard worker.

If his relations with Carnot make him suspect in diplomacy, I think he could be useful in the army, especially in the English expedition.

If he is in need of indulgence, I beg you to grant him a little. At bottom, General Clarke is a good man. I kept him at Passariano until 30 Vendémiaire and since then he has been sick.

BONAPARTE

269

**Address to the Executive Directory***Paris**20 Frimaire, Year VI (10 Dec, 1797)*

In order to be free, the French people had to fight the kings. In order to obtain a constitution founded on reason it had to overcome eighteen centuries of prejudice.

You and the Constitution of the Year III have triumphed over all these obstacles.

For 2,000 years religion, feudalism and royalism have successively ruled Europe; but the era of representative government dates from the peace you have just concluded.

You have succeeded in organizing the great nation whose vast territory is circumscribed only because nature herself has imposed limits to it.

You have done more. The two most beautiful parts of Europe, formerly so famous for art and science and the great men they cradled, are now, with the finest hopes, seeing the genius of liberty rise from the tombs of their ancestors. They are two pedestals whereon destiny will place two powerful nations.

I have the honour to lay before you the treaty signed at Campo Formio and ratified by His Majesty the Emperor.

This peace will ensure the liberty, the prosperity and the glory of the Republic.

When the happiness of the French people is founded on the best organic laws, the whole of Europe will become free.

.

*Egypt*

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LIBERTÉ

EGALITÉ

REPUBLIQUE



FRANÇAISE.

*Au quartier-général du KAIRE, le 19 nivôse an 7 de la République française, une et indivisible.*

ORDRE DU JOUR, du 15 nivôse an 7.

Rien de nouveau.

Ordre du jour, du 16 nivôse.

Rien de nouveau.

Ordre du jour, du 17 nivôse.

Rien de nouveau.

Ordre du jour, du 18 nivôse.

Rien de nouveau.

Ordre du jour, du 19 nivôse.

Tout officier de santé qui quitterait le lieu désigné pour l'ambulance, devant l'ennemi, sans ordre, ou qui, dans une maladie contagieuse, se refuse ait à porter aux malades ses secours, sera arrêté, traduit devant le conseil militaire, et traité selon l'article de la loi relative aux soldats et militaires qui ont fui devant l'ennemi. Aucun Français ne doit craindre la mort quel que soit l'état qu'il ait embrassé.

Le citoyen Boyer, chirurgien des blessés à Alexandrie, qui a été assez lâche pour refuser de donner des secours à des blessés qui avaient eu contact avec des malades supposés atteints de maladies contagieuses, est indigne de la qualité de CITOYEN FRANÇAIS. Il sera habillé en femme, pressé sur un âne dans les rues d'Alexandrie, avec un écriteau sur le dos portant : *Indigne d'être CITOYEN FRANÇAIS, il craint de mourir.* Après quoi il sera mis en prison, et renvoyé en France sur le premier bâtiment.

Le commandant d'Alexandrie enverra un exemplaire dudit Ordre du jour au président de son département, avec invitation de le rayer de dessus la liste des Citoyens français.

Signé *ALEXANDRE BERTHIER*, Général de Division, Chef de l'Etat-major général.

Pour copie conforme au registre d'ordres :

*L'Adjudant-Général, sous-chef de l'Etat-major,*

AU KAIRE, DE L'IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE

Order of the Day of the Army of the East

*Reduced; the actual document measures 12 x 8 inches.*

FOR SOME MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS TRIUMPHANT RETURN TO PARIS Bonaparte continued to be involved in the troubled political and military affairs of Italy, and much of his correspondence was devoted to them. But his real new assignment was the invasion of England. It is still far from certain whether he ever seriously intended to carry out this operation; the conquest of England would have been a great triumph, but he was well aware of the risks and for some time he had been suggesting and preparing for an expedition to the Levant (cp. Nos. 254, 258). However, at the beginning of January he began the planning of the invasion, Nos. 272 to 282 being most of the surviving papers he wrote concerning it. From the list of senior officers posted to the new army (No. 273)—a roll-call of half the ablest soldiers of the time—the expedition, whatever its chances, would have been formidable.\* But on 8 February Bonaparte went on a personal reconnaissance of the coast and when he returned he wrote a report (No. 280) in which the slimness of those chances was fully revealed. Whether prompted solely by the facts or also by his own wish for a different theatre the arguments were unanswerable. They were no less so six years later.

On 5 March, at the request of the Directors, he wrote a favourable report (No. 283) on the prospect of occupying Malta and Egypt and this operation was approved the same day. Thereafter he worked hard and in a little over two months everything was ready. The main body sailed from Toulon on 19 May to be met by convoys from Italy and Corsica. The fleet consisted of 13 ships of the line with frigates and smaller craft; the army was carried on some 400 transports. An imaginative feature of the expedition was the inclusion of more than 100 scholars and scientists destined to explore, record and develop the new colony.

Malta surrendered after a token resistance, and the effete sovereignty of the Order of St. John was brought to an end. Within a week Bonaparte had transformed the entire government and life of the island, installed a garrison and sailed on (cp. Nos. 295-308).

Egypt was formally part of the Turkish empire, but effective power there had for long been in the hands of the virtually independent Mameluke beys. The French aim was to exploit this situation by claiming that, far from being a threat to the sovereignty of the Porte, their expedition was designed to support it by ridding Egypt of the Mamelukes. Bonaparte was to claim this consistently in his dealings with the Turks (e.g. Nos. 310, 327, 410), while a special diplomatic mission to Constantinople was to try to ensure the passivity if not the alliance of the Porte; Talleyrand himself was originally intended for this role, but in the end it was Descorches who went.

\* Barely a third of these officers eventually went to Egypt.

The army was successfully landed on 1 July, and the occupation of all Egypt followed quickly, the troops suffering more through heat, thirst and marauding Arabs than from the colourful but one-sided battles against the Mameluke armies. The remnants of these withdrew, some under Murad into Upper Egypt, where they were harried but never quite destroyed by Desaix, others under Ibrahim into Syria.

But in two respects the overall plan miscarried. On 1 August Nelson destroyed Brueys's fleet at the battle of the Nile (Nos. 347-51), thereby ensuring that no further reinforcements or supplies could reach Egypt from France. Isolated and a prey to casualties, accidents and disease, the army's ultimate fate was now sealed, though a prolonged respite from serious fighting might have delayed the end for many years. But the Turks saw through the flimsy French diplomatic pretences and, under English and Russian pressure, declared war.

Nevertheless, Bonaparte set about organizing the new colony with all his accustomed energy. Harassed by revolts and shortages, by private misery (he at last knew certainly of Josephine's infidelity\* and was not much consoled by his own affaire with Mme Fourés) and the seething discontent of the army, he yet succeeded in building an administration, exploring and mapping Egypt, fortifying its frontiers, setting up the Institute, making contact with the surrounding rulers and attempting to do so even with Tippoo Sahib in India.

But by the beginning of 1799 he could no longer ignore the Turks, who were planning simultaneous invasions by land and sea, and to forestall them he was forced to undertake the Syrian campaign. This decisively crushed the immediate overland threat, but the desperate resistance of Acre imposed a terrible cost and unforeseen delay while the return march across the burning, waterless desert with a tired, starved and plague-ridden army, burdened with hundreds of sick and wounded, was probably his worst military experience until the retreat from Moscow.

The seaborne threat was more easily disposed of. At the end of July a Turkish army landed near Alexandria only to be totally destroyed at the battle of Aboukir. Egypt was now secure for another year, but the plight of the army was serious (No. 406), and on learning of the French defeats in Europe Bonaparte both made overtures for peace (No. 410) and prepared to return to France. On 22 August he handed over the command to Kléber and embarked, luck and good navigation enabling his two frigates to avoid Nelson's cruisers and reach Fréjus on 9 October.†

\* There is a reference to this in No. 329, which together with No. 330 are the only two private letters he wrote from Egypt to have survived.

† The 'desertion' has been much criticized. In so far as it was motivated by real fears for France and by realization that if his army was to be saved it could be



The end of the affair may be briefly told. Placed in an intolerable position, Kléber's first aim was to get his army home. To this end he withdrew to the coast and on 27 January, 1800, negotiated with Sir Sidney Smith the convention of El 'Arish by which he was to evacuate Egypt with the honours of war and safe conduct to France. This angered Bonaparte, although he had specifically authorized Kléber to make such terms (Nos. 411, 513, 584); it also angered the British government, which repudiated Smith's signature as to safe conduct. Kléber then reoccupied Egypt, defeating another Turkish army at Heliopolis. But on 14 June he was assassinated and succeeded by Menou, a man of far less ability. Even so, the crumbling French army held out for another year, but was unable seriously to resist Abercromby's English expeditionary force, which landed at Aboukir in March, 1801. It finally surrendered in September and was evacuated to France under the treaty of Amiens.

The Egyptian expedition was far from being a fiasco, but it was undoubtedly a failure from which Bonaparte extricated himself without immediate loss of prestige, but with somewhat tarnished honour. It failed owing to English naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, but Bonaparte can hardly be blamed for not foreseeing this, for when he set out the naval forces were roughly equal and Nelson was not yet accounted the giant he was to become. The expedition was undoubtedly hazardous, but had it not been for the battle of the Nile there is no reason why a successful French imperium could not have been built up in the Levant. As it was, the immediate positive results were negligible (the negative results were probably considerable, for the events of 1798 and 1799 would surely have been different had Bonaparte and his first-rate troops been available in Europe). The long-term results were immense: Bonaparte's experience was widened and his imagination stimulated with lasting effect; the study of Egyptology and the Empire style were born, and the foundations were laid for a century and a half of Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY OF THE EAST  
as at 1 July, 1798 (abridged)

<i>C.-in-C.</i> :	Bonaparte
<i>Government Commissioner</i> :	Poussielgue
<i>C. of S.</i> :	Berthier
<i>Cdr., Cavalry</i> : Dumas	<i>Cdr., Artillery</i> : Dommartin
<i>Insp.-Gen., Cavalry</i> : Dugua	<i>C. of S., Artillery</i> : Sugny

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saved only on European battlefields it was the right decision. But it is hard to avoid the suspicion that he also knew that in Egypt the game was up and that by returning he could both lay the blame for the ultimate debacle on others and serve the cause of his own ambitions.

*C. of S., Cavalry:* Almeras  
*Cdr., Engineers:* Caffarelli  
*Q.M.G.:* Sucey  
*Deputy Q.M.G.:* d'Aure  
*Paymaster-Gen.:* Estève  
*Adjts.-Gen.:* Dumuy, Dupuy, Escale, Grezieu, Lagrange, Zajonchek

*Division:* Kléber

*Brig.-Gens.:* Verdier, Lannes *C. of S.:* Damas  
 2nd Light 25th Line 75th Line

*Division:* Desaix

*Brig.-Gens.:* Belliard, Friant *C. of S.:* Donzelot  
 21st Light 61st Line 88th Line

*Division:* Bon

*Brig.-Gens.:* Marmont, Rampon *C. of S.:* Valentin  
 4th Light 18th Line 32nd Line

*Division:* Menou

*Brig.-Gens.:* Veaux, Vial *C. of S.:* Rambeaud  
 22nd Light 13th Line 69th Line

*Division:* Reynier

*Brig.-Gen.:* Fugière *C. of S.:* Jullien  
 9th Line 85th Line

*Division:* Vaubois (garrison of Malta)

*Brig.-Gens.:* Chanez, Casalta *C. of S.:* Brouard  
 23rd Light 19th Line 45th Line

CAVALRY

*Brigade:* Leclerc

7th Hussars 3rd Dragoons

*Brigade:* Mireur

22nd Chasseurs 20th Dragoons

*Brigade:* Murat

15th Dragoons 14th Dragoons

*Brigade:* Davout

18th Dragoons

THE FLEET

*C.-in-C.:* Brueys

*Rear-Admirals:* Blanquet du Chayla, Villeneuve

*Commodores:* Ganteaume, Perrée

*Flag Captain:* Casabianca


*Ships of the Line:* Orient (120 guns, flag), Franklin, Spartiate, Guerrier, Conquérant, Peuple-Souverain, Heureux, Tonnant, Généreux, Guillaume-Tell, Timoléon, Mercure, Aquilon (all 74's); Cause, Dubois (Venetian 74's)

*Frigates:* Montenotte, Mantoue, Artemise, Justice, Junon, Canonnière, Négresse, Diane, Carrère, Muiron, Leoben, Alceste

COMMISSION OF SCIENCE AND THE ARTS

(Principal members:)

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EGYPT AND SYRIA  
Inset: Malta

**To Citizen Barras***President of the Executive Directory**Paris**3 Nivôse, Year VI (23 Dec, 1797)*

I have the honour to send you, Citizen President, a copy of a letter which I have received from the Bey of Tunis, with the names of eighteen Frenchmen whom he has had set at liberty.

While I was in Italy I took every opportunity of showing our good friends the Turks the friendship that the French Republic has for them.

The provisional Government of the Ligurian Republic has also set free the Turkish slaves in the Genoese galleys and has sent them back to their country.

Since we have been in occupation of the Ionian islands, Ali, Pasha of Janina, the Pasha of Scutari, the Turks of the Morea and even the Divan have not only welcomed us, but have taken every opportunity of showing their regard for the French.

No sooner had our ambassador, Aubert-Dubayet, informed the Porte that our troops were at Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, etc., than considerable cargoes of corn were sent to supply them.

As a result of the new possessions we have acquired, our commerce with the Levant will not only find an assured protection, but it will be treated by all the subjects of the Porte with special favour.

BONAPARTE

**To Major-General Bernadotte***At Milan**Paris**17 Nivôse, Year VI (6 Jan, 1798)*

I thank you, Citizen General, for the reports you sent me on the French establishments in the Ionian sea. You do not waste your time, but spend in study all that peace prevents you from spending on the battlefield.

I would much have liked to have you with me in England; but it appears that the Government thinks your presence necessary to command Italy. That post is so important, that it would ill become me to resist. You will serve the Republic in lighting the way for the new republicans of Italy. Believe that, whatever happens, I will give you proofs of the respect you have inspired in me.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

272

To General Schérer  
Minister of War

Paris

20 Nivôse, Year VI (9 Jan, 1798)

Citizen Minister, I have laid before the Executive Directory various requests concerning the organization of the Army of England. As soon as you send me a copy of the Government's decrees I will forward to you the destination of each unit and each general composing that army, so that you may send them orders to proceed by the shortest route.

But the organization of the artillery being most urgent, since that arm always takes much longer to prepare, I think I should tell you at once of the work needed in this connexion.

Orders must be sent to General Lespinasse and to Citizens Songis and Faultrier to leave the Army of Italy at once and join the Army of England. The artillery in Italy could be commanded by General Sugny and the park directed by Colonel Guériot.

All the various detachments of the 1st Regiment of foot artillery and the 2nd Regiment of horse artillery must be ordered to proceed at once to Douai . . . [*many further movements of troops and officers*].

The train of 120 guns that I have proposed to the Directory for the Army of England must be divided into two parks, of which one should assemble at Douai, the other at Rennes.

Generals Dulauloy and Dommartin must be given the necessary orders and powers to organize immediately at Douai and Rennes parks each composed of fifteen 12-pounders, thirty 8-pounders, fifteen howitzers, ten English guns and a train of thirty pontoons.

Double field stores must be contained in portable boxes and loaded onto extremely light wagons such as will be least difficult to embark. I wish the infantry supplies also to be packed in portable boxes placed on carts.

Each of these trains will need 1,200 artillery horses, which must be of the best. About 1,200 will be coming from the Army of Italy, which can be destined for Rennes, and 1,200 of the best horses in the Army of the Rhine can be chosen for Douai.

The train at Douai must be ready to move off by 1 Ventôse for embarkation at some point on the coast; that at Rennes by the 25th of the same month.

Citizen Andréossy will act as director of the bridging train of the Army of England. I would wish you to give him orders to leave on the 23rd of this month to proceed with Citizen Forfait for Le Havre and thence along the coast to carry out a special mission as to which I will give him separate instructions. . . .

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

**Decree***Paris**23 Nivôse, Year VI (12 Jan, 1798)*

The Executive Directory decrees:

That Major-Generals Berthier (Chief of Staff), Kilmaine (commanding the cavalry), Kléber, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Lefebvre, Championnet, Masséna, Sérurier, Victor, Brune, Dumas, Marescot (commanding the engineers), Baraguey d'Hilliers, Dallemagne, d'Hautpoul, Duhesme, Grenier, Lespinasse (commanding the artillery);

That Brigadier-Generals Lannes, Rampon, Menard, Verdier, Point, Duphot, Lanusse, Chambarlhac, Belliard, Veaux, Monnier, Friant, Pijon, Dessolle, Kellermann, Leclerc, Cervoni, Murat, Mireur, Walther, Dommartin, Dulauloy, Sorbier, Tharreau, Girard the elder, Montrichard, Davout, Decaen, La Boissière, Lecourbe, Oudinot, Gardanne, Vandamme, Mermet, Olivier, Soult, Richepanse, Chasseloup, Caffarelli-Dufalga, Boisgérard, Legrand, Humbert, Klein, Ney, Hardy, Damas, Vial;

That Adjutants-general Argod, Boyer, Escale, Sarrazin, Lorcet, Rivaud, Beulland, Denzelot, Gudin, Heudelet, Jullien, Daultanne, Debilly, Ducheyron, Coulange, Smith\*, Simon, Levasseur, Gilly the younger, Mortier, Charpentier;

That artillery Colonels Gassendi (Director of the park), Lariboisière, Andréossy (bridging train), Songis (Chief of Staff), Latournerie, Faultrier, Salva, Doumic, Allix, Guériot-Saint-Martin, Manscourt, Darencey, Saint-Laurent; . . .

That engineer Colonels Cretin, Poitevin, Sanson, Maubert, will form part of the Army of England.

**To General Schérer***Minister of War**Paris**18 Pluviôse, Year VI (6 Feb, 1798)*

I have received with gratitude, Citizen Minister, the flag and the sword you have sent me.

It is the Army of Italy that the Government thus honours through its general.

Please receive my particular thanks for the handsome letter accompanying your gift.

I salute you.

**BONAPARTE**

275

**To Brigadier-General Lannes***Paris**18 Pluviôse, Year VI (6 Feb, 1798)*

The Legislature, Citizen General, has awarded me a flag in memory of the battle of Arcola.

It has sought to honour the Army of Italy through its general. There was a moment on the field of Arcola when the still uncertain victory demanded boldness from the leaders. With three wounds and covered in blood you left the ambulance, resolved to conquer or die. Throughout that day I saw you constantly in the front rank of the brave. It was you, too, at the head of the infernal column, who were the first to reach Dego, the first across the Po and the Adda. It is for you to be the depository of this honourable flag, which covers in glory the grenadiers you continually commanded. Henceforth you will unfurl it only when all retreat is useless and victory depends on remaining master of the field.

BONAPARTE

276

**To General Schérer***Minister of War**Paris**19 Pluviôse, Year VI (7 Feb, 1798)*

I leave tomorrow to visit the ocean coast, Citizen Minister. I shall be back in twelve days.

General Desaix is going to Brest, General Kléber to Le Havre. We ought to occupy the Saint-Marcouf islands.

I request you to put 30,000 francs at the disposal of General Desaix, [provisional] Commander-in-Chief of the Army of England, for the extraordinary expenses of that army.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

277

**To Brigadier-General Caffarelli***At Dunkirk**Dunkirk**24 Pluviôse, Year VI (12 Feb, 1798)*

General Caffarelli will proceed to Boulogne. He will take steps to improve the port, so that it can hold 50 gunboats, from six to nine divisions each of 50 fishing boats drawing six to seven feet of water, one or two divisions of 50 boats carrying horses, 6 boats of 100 tons for the staff, 6 for the artillery, 6 for the supply services, 6 for the ambulances.

Citizen Forfait will have 15,000 francs sent to the agent for roads and bridges at the port of Boulogne, with which General Caffarelli will at once put work in hand. He will proceed to Etaples and Ambleteuse and will see whether it is possible to put each of these ports into a condition to hold a division of fishing boats. He will inspect the batteries defending Boulogne and have them increased if necessary, so as to enable them to withstand any attack. He will also inspect the port of Calais and have any necessary work carried out to enable it to hold 400 boats.

General Caffarelli will send me a detailed report on these two ports and on the time needed to bring them to the required state. I will have the necessary money sent to him.

He will send privateers with engineer officers on board to reconnoitre the English coast from Folkestone to Rye to find out the true state of this coast and the batteries that must be captured or avoided in order to carry out a landing there.

BONAPARTE

278

## To Citizens Forfait and Andréossy

*Dunkirk*

*24 Pluviôse, Year VI (12 Feb, 1798)*

Citizens Forfait and Andréossy will proceed to the Hague.

They will hand the attached letters to the [Dutch] Executive Directory and to the French Minister and French general at the Hague.

They will themselves indicate the ships we require, after which they will go to Dunkirk where they will receive further orders.

Holland is said to be rich in flat boats which sail well; from 150 to 250 must be procured for us, with as many armed sloops as possible. These various boats must go at once to Dunkirk and be ready to leave there in a month.

If Holland is really interested in this expedition and is in a position to provide what we need, as much as possible must be drawn from there.

Have work on the horse transports started in Holland, at Dunkirk and Le Havre, so that we have space for 4,000 to 5,000 horses.

Have an embargo placed on the fishing boats and others that we can use, to give us enough to embark 50,000 men, with the artillery, supplies, etc. Group all these boats in divisions of fifty.

Have the sloops and gunboats armed at once, so that in fifteen or twenty days all can get under way for the port of assembly.

BONAPARTE



279

**To the Executive Directory***Of the Batavian [Dutch] Republic**Dunkirk**24 Pluviôse, Year VI (12 Feb, 1798)*

Citizen Directors, the Executive Directory has given me command of the army destined to effect a landing in England.

My hope of succeeding in this important mission rests in part on the support which I hope for from your brave nation and in particular from its illustrious rulers.

Apart from your Texel fleet and the transports to embark the troops under your orders, it is indispensable that I should have from 200 to 250 fishing boats, each capable of carrying 80 to 100 men, and 20 or 30 gunboats.

I wish this flotilla to be divided into divisions of fifty boats, each commanded by one of your naval officers and to be at Ostend in twenty or twenty-five days.

I am sending Citizens Forfait and Andréossy, officers of the highest merit who have my entire confidence, to confer with you on the necessary measures and to receive your orders. I am distressed that for the moment I am unable to come myself.

I await your reply with impatience and am confident that the combined Dutch and French flotillas, supported by the fleets from Brest and the Texel, will quickly reconquer the Cape and your other establishments and humble this enemy of our common liberty.

Believe, Citizen Directors, the high consideration with which I am, etc.

BONAPARTE

280

**To the Executive Directory***Paris**5 Ventôse, Year VI (23 Feb, 1798)*

I

Whatever efforts we may make we shall not attain naval supremacy for several years.

To carry out a descent on England without mastery of the sea would be the boldest and most difficult operation ever undertaken.

If possible at all, it will be only by a surprise crossing, either by avoiding the squadron blockading Brest or the Texel, or by arriving in small boats at points in the counties of Kent or Sussex during the night after a crossing of seven or eight hours.

Such an operation needs long nights, therefore winter; nothing can be done after April.

Any operation attempted with sloops during summer calms is impractical since the enemy would offer insurmountable obstacles to the landing and, above all, to the crossing.

Our navy is today as little ready as it was when the Army of England was created, that is to say, four months ago. There are only ten armed battleships at Brest and they are without crews and very far from being ready for sea. The English blockade us there with a few ships. Wherever I have been I have heard sailors' gibes about the lack of energy in our armament. The dockyards are busy building privateers; the workers on the great rivers and canals, who are enlisted into the navy in every emergency, have not even been recorded. Little commerce raiders of thirty or forty tons have crews of from sixty to eighty sailors. All the crews of neutral ships in our ports are one-third and even one-half French. Many sailors are quietly at home.

In the arsenal at Dunkirk there are six superb frigates whose armament is all in store; not one is yet equipped. Some sixty men are at work caulking the first. The others have not been touched, and every day an English frigate or corvette comes within gunshot of our ships.

We have gunboats at Nantes, Brest, Lorient, Cherbourg, where they are not necessary; orders have not yet been given for them to assemble at Le Havre or Dunkirk. In this last port there are twelve sloops or gunboats, disarmed; no one seems ready to start work arming them. During four months not one new sloop has been completed; 120 have just been laid down.

The expedition against England does not, therefore, seem possible before next year, and then difficulties arising on the continent will probably prevent it. The right moment to prepare for this expedition has been lost, perhaps for ever.

## II

Our ports from Le Havre to Antwerp contain the ships necessary to carry 50,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. There are 100 sloops or gunboats between Bordeaux and Ostend. There are 120 under construction, which would be useful but are not absolutely essential, and therefore their completion need not be awaited. All that is needed is:

1. To arm and assemble at Le Havre and Dunkirk all the sloops and gunboats at present between Bayonne and Ostend.
2. To place an embargo on, charter and start work on the ships to be used as horse transports.
3. To place an embargo on and charter the ships between Cherbourg and Antwerp which have been indicated by Citizens Forfait and Andréossy. (The proposals in articles 2 and 3 were carried out by Citizens Forfait and Andréossy: the minister has lifted the embargo.)
4. Urge the Dutch Republic to provide the boats for which I have asked it.

5. Place an embargo on the best privateers of less than 100 tons on the coast between Bordeaux and Antwerp and have them proceed to Le Havre and Dunkirk; since they will be used as transports, only the necessary crews will be left in them.

If all the material mentioned in the above articles were to be assembled at Le Havre, Dunkirk and Ostend during the month of March, which is quite possible, the English expedition would still be feasible. To achieve this object, it is necessary:

1. To appoint a rear-admiral inspector of the coast from Cherbourg to Antwerp.

2. To appoint Citizen Forfait naval commissioner for this same part of the coast.

3. To appoint Citizen Andréossy brigadier-general in charge of the military armament of these ships.

4. To form these three officers into a committee which will receive orders directly from the general commanding the expedition.

5. To instruct the Ministers of Marine and War to provide all the junior officers whom this committee may need for its organization and service.

6. To appropriate 4 million francs, payable at the rate of 800,000 per decade, for the use of this committee; that sum will suffice.

7. There are thirty ships of the line at Brest; within a month twenty-five, with as many frigates, must be ready to leave. That seems to me possible. The step the Government is taking of sending the Minister of Marine there cannot but expedite considerably the work in that port.

8. Take the sailors from all privateers that we shall not be using.

9. Arrest all French and English sailors on neutral ships.

10. Appoint commanders to all the ships and squadrons.

Relieved of the whole expense of the Channel expedition, the Minister of Marine should be able to support the armament of Brest out of his ordinary funds. The chartering of transports and other expenses connected with the invasion cannot, so far as Brest is concerned, amount to more than a million or a million and a half francs.

In addition 300,000 francs per decade must be set aside for the special expenses of the army in addition to the ordinary expenditure of the Ministry of War. (This 300,000 includes the special expenses for the staff, engineers, artillery, the embarkation of the cavalry and the repairs to the ports of Boulogne and Calais.)

It would be essential:

1. To forbid any foreigner, and above all any Anglo-American, to enter the towns of Brest, Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk.

2. To divert the English mail-boats to Gravelines, so that they no longer touch at Calais.

3. Finally, to direct all troops destined for the Army of England

which are now retained in Switzerland or at Lyons or Nîmes to join that army.

If it is not possible to obtain all the money required in this memorandum or if, in view of the present state of our navy, it is not thought possible to secure the speed of action which the circumstances demand, then any expedition against England should in fact be abandoned, though the appearance of it should be kept up, and all attention and resources should be fixed on the Rhine so as to try to seize Hanover and Hamburg from England. It will be realized that, if either of these ends is to be attained, no large army must be maintained at a distance from Germany.

Or else an expedition could be made into the Levant which would threaten the commerce of India.

If none of these three operations is feasible, I see no other way out than to make peace with England. I believe they would now accept the proposals rejected by Malmesbury.

In that case the negotiations at Rastadt would be more favourable to us. Were peace to be concluded with England during the course of the congress, we should naturally be in a position to demand much more from the German Empire.

BONAPARTE

281

### To Brigadier-General Caffarelli

*At Boulogne*

*Paris*

*7 Ventôse, Year VI (25 Feb, 1798)*

On reaching Paris I received the various letters you have sent me, Citizen General. I was not at all surprised at the difficulties you are meeting; but both I and the Government were surprised at the stupidity of this [Naval Commissioner at Dunkirk] M. David.

I have not thought it proper to have the Government make the regulation you suggest. It would be very a bad arrangement for the expedition we are undertaking. The whole of the navy situated in the area of the Army of England must, like the other arms, be entirely in the hands of the general commanding the army.

Citizen Forfait has been appointed naval commissioner; his authority will extend from Antwerp to Cherbourg. Rear-Admiral Lacrosse will also be coming as inspector of this section of the coast. Citizen Andréossy is promoted brigadier-general of artillery and will be in charge of all matters of military armament.

These three officers will form a committee which will receive orders direct from the general commanding the expedition.

The Directory is placing 800,000 francs per decade at the disposal of this committee. A further 300,000 francs per decade will be set aside

for the engineers, artillery and extraordinary expenses of the army. The sums necessary to rehabilitate the ports will be taken from these funds.

Desaix has arrived and will be going to Boulogne in a few days. The troops are on the march.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

282

### To Brigadier-General Caffarelli

*At Boulogne*

*Paris*

*8 Ventôse, Year VI (26 Feb, 1798)*

Citizen General, the result to be obtained from the work at the ports in the Pas-de-Calais is that the greatest possible number of boats can leave on the same tide.

Only Calais, Ambleteuse, Boulogne and Etaples can be counted on, and I should regret having to use Calais, at least for the transport of the first 30,000 men.

It would be pointless to undertake long and costly work at Boulogne to enable it to hold more boats than can leave on one tide. If this number is 100 or 150 boats, no more work should be done than will enable it to hold that number. The same applies to Calais.

Work must be pushed forward at Ambleteuse so that it can hold all the boats that can leave on one tide.

Please let me know what use can be made of Etaples, in the light of both its present condition and its geographical situation.

If the channels at Boulogne and other ports were parallel with the edge of the sea, it is clear that all the ships would receive the water of the tide at the same moment and could leave at once; it is therefore on those parts of the ports nearest the sea that work must be done . . .

Could we not beach all the little boats carrying only forty or fifty men and carry out work on the beaches to facilitate that operation? On the Mediterranean I have often seen boats of forty or fifty tons drawn up twenty-five or thirty yards on the beach and they are refloated in a quarter of an hour.

Since not as many ships as we shall need can leave Boulogne on one tide, we will put the horse transports, supply ships and heavy gunboats there for preference. We will put the gunboats drawing less than three feet of water at Ambleteuse. Three to four hundred boats will be beached in the bay of Saint-Jean; these will not be laden at all since they will be carrying only men and two or three sacks of biscuit.

Please choose the part of the coast between Ambleteuse and Boulogne most suitable for this beaching, and let me know what work can be done to make the operation easier.

As for Calais and Dunkirk, we will use them for the rest of the army, the trains and supplies.

I have been told that by cutting a bridge at Calais a great many boats could be put in the Channel without other work.

You will pay particular attention to the coastal batteries at Boulogne and Ambleteuse and those we must instal in the area where the boats will be beached. You will write to General Dulauloy, at Douai, who will send you 300 or 400 gunners with the mortars and guns you think you need.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

283

## To the Executive Directory

*Paris*

*15 Ventôse, Year VI (5 Mar, 1798)*

To occupy Egypt and Malta would require from 20,000 to 25,000 infantry and from 2,000 to 3,000 dismounted cavalry.

These troops could be found and embarked in France and Italy as follows:

At Civita-Vecchia: the 21st Light, 61st and 88th of the line, with Generals Belliard and Friant, 5,200 men; 20th Dragoons, 7th Hussars, General Mireur, 800.

At Genoa . . . In Corsica . . . At Marseilles . . . At Toulon . . . At Nice and Antibes . . . Total 24,600 infantry, 2,800 cavalry.

The demi-brigades with their companies of gunners;

The cavalry with harness, but without horses, each man armed with a musket;

All units with their [forward] depots;

One hundred cartridges per man;

Water on board for a month; food for two months.

These troops would have to be embarked in the various ports and ready to move at the beginning of Floréal, proceeding to the gulf of Ajaccio and assembled ready to leave there before the end of Floréal.

To these troops must be added: sixty field guns, forty heavy siege guns, two companies of sappers, an artillery battalion, two companies of labourers, a pontoon battalion, which would be embarked in French and Italian ports as follows . . .

At Civita-Vecchia General Masséna can be instructed to charter the largest ships he can find in the port, to embark the troops and artillery and send them at once to the port of Ajaccio, where they would remain till further orders. The expenses of this convoy can be borne out of the Roman contributions; all Papal galleys capable of putting to sea should be used for it.

The general commanding in the Cisalpine can carry out the same order at Genoa, and General Baraguey d'Hilliers can proceed there for this purpose. The necessary money must first be sent.

The Executive Directory of the Cisalpine Republic will be asked for two galleys which will help to transport the troops and escort the convoy.

As for Nice, Antibes and Marseilles, the Minister of Marine must: 1. Charter enough of the largest merchant ships to carry the troops and artillery set out above; 2. Have the necessary provisioning put in hand. The Minister of War must give orders for the troops, with the artillery and other supplies, to proceed there.

At Toulon we have six ships of the line and some frigates and corvettes; six tartans mounting cannon must be added. Together, these ships would be sufficient to carry the troops to be embarked at Toulon.

According to the report of the Minister of Marine, this squadron will be ready to sail in a fortnight, though it lacks sailors. Therefore, it is necessary only to embargo and charter the boats needed to transport the artillery.

To succeed in this expedition an extraordinary expenditure of 5 millions must be envisaged apart from ordinary expenses for supplying, arming and paying the fleet, for the pay, food and clothing of the troops and for the cost of the artillery and engineers, which it is essential to equip effectively; that means in all a sum of from 8 to 9 millions to be borne by the Government between now and 20 Germinal.

BONAPARTE

284

## Decree\*

Paris

15 Ventôse, Year VI (5 Mar, 1798)

The Executive Directory decrees:

ARTICLE 1. Rear-Admiral Blanquet du Chayla is appointed inspector of the Mediterranean coasts and, together with the citizens named below, will form the committee for the armament of the coasts.

ART. 2. Citizen Le Roy, naval commissioner at Le Havre, will carry out the functions of naval commissioner for the Mediterranean coasts.

ART. 3. General Dommartin is appointed inspector of artillery for the Mediterranean coasts.

ART. 4. Quartermaster Sucy is appointed Quartermaster-General and member of the said committee.

ART. 5. The National Treasury will appoint a paymaster to form part of this committee.

\* This Decree and also Nos. 289 and 290 were written by Bonaparte, though signed by the Directors.

ART. 6. All expenses in connexion with the army will be authorized by Q.M.G. Sucey, those in connexion with the navy by Commissioner Le Roy.

ART. 7. The committee will take all steps to secure sailors and will carry out forthwith the instructions it will receive.

ART. 8. All civil, military and naval officers, the Government commissioners attached to local authorities and the officers commanding the various sectors of the coast will carry out the demands made of them by the committee.

ART. 9. The Ministers of War, Marine and Finance are charged, each in so far as he is concerned, with the immediate execution of the present decree, which will not be published.

285

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

24 Ventôse, Year VI (14 Mar, 1798)

I have just learned, Citizen Minister, that the Empire has at last agreed to accept the left bank of the Rhine as the basis of the treaty of Rastadt. Citizens Treilhard and Bonnier will have no difficulty in completing what they have begun so successfully. From now on my intervention would be superfluous, so I beg you to authorize me to have brought back from Rastadt that part of my household that I left there, since my presence at Paris is necessary as a result of various orders and in view of certain expeditions.

BONAPARTE

286

### To Citizen Bénézech

*Minister of the Interior*

Paris

6 Germinal, Year VI (26 Mar, 1798)

Citizen Minister, the director of the Printing Office of the Republic and Citizen Langlès are extremely unco-operative. Please give definite orders that all the arabic characters actually in existence, but not the matrices, be packed at once and that Citizen Langlès should accompany them.

In the first interview I had with him, Citizen Langlès seemed to me very willing to come; in any case, the Republic has the right to demand obedience from him, since it has educated and long supported him.

Please also give orders that the Greek characters be packed; there are some, for at this very moment *Xenophon* is being printed, and it will do no great harm if *Xenophon* is delayed for three months, by which time further characters can be made, since the matrices will remain.



Please also give orders to pack the characters for three French presses. Ordinary type will suffice.

BONAPARTE

287

## To the Executive Directory

*Paris*

*7 Germinal, Year VI (27 Mar, 1798)*

Citizen Directors, the public papers report that you have had several members of the councils of the Cisalpine Republic arrested and that it is now intended to arrest Moscati and Paradisi, two members of the Executive Directory of that Republic.

As a citizen who has had some knowledge of people and events in Italy during the past two years, I feel it my duty to tell you that France and liberty have no truer friends than these two Directors.

Citizen Paradisi, who was a well-known professor at Reggio, is the only Italian who has rendered fighting service to the French army. In the middle of the first campaign, when Mantua was still in the hands of the Austrians, he dared to lead 200 of his compatriots against 200 Austrians who had withdrawn into a castle and took them prisoner. He, his family and the whole town of Reggio were thereafter seriously threatened by the Austrians, who were much angered by this incident.

Citizen Moscati was known as one of the most celebrated of European medical men, with a deep knowledge of moral and political science. He devoted himself entirely to the service of the army, and it is to him and his advice that we owe perhaps 20,000 men who would otherwise have died in our hospitals in Italy.

Disparagement of the Cisalpine Government at the very moment of its birth and the loss of its best citizens would be a real misfortune for France and a triumph for the Emperor and his partisans.

I beg you to see in this letter my desire to place all my knowledge at the service of the nation.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

288

## To Citizen J. B. Say

*Paris*

*8 Germinal, Year VI (28 Mar, 1798)*

I thank you, Citizen, in the name of General Bonaparte, for your kindness in undertaking the purchase and packing of various books intended to form a portable library. I have told your brother the form in which the account should be rendered in order to be chargeable to public funds. Together with this letter he will hand you a

warrant drawn on the paymaster of engineers to pay for the books you have bought and the expenses of packing.

You know that the cases should be solid and convenient, but as simple as possible.\*

CAFFARELLI  
*Aide-de-camp*

289

## Decree

Paris

23 *Germinal*, Year VI (12 Apr, 1798)

The Executive Directory,

Considering that the beys who have seized the government of Egypt have formed most intimate ties with the English and have made themselves wholly dependent on them; that in consequence they have committed open hostilities and the most horrible cruelties towards Frenchmen, whom they daily molest, rob and murder;

Considering that it is its duty to pursue the enemies of the Republic wherever they may be found;

Considering, furthermore, that, the infamous treachery by which England has made itself master of the Cape of Good Hope having rendered access to India by the normal route very difficult for the ships of the Republic, it is necessary to open another route thither for the Republican forces, to combat the satellites of the English Government there and to stop that source of its corrupting wealth,

Decrees:

ARTICLE 1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East will lead the land and sea forces under his command to Egypt and will take possession of that country.

ART. 2. He will drive the English from all their oriental possessions which he can reach, and notably he will destroy their settlements on the Red Sea.

ART. 3. He will cause the isthmus of Suez to be cut through and he will take all necessary measures to ensure to the French Republic the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea.

\* Over a third of this field library of some 300 volumes consisted of history, about equally divided between classical and modern works; among the latter, biographies of great military commanders, Condé, Turenne, Saxe, Marlborough, Frederick, etc., predominated. There was also a number of scientific and military text-books and some works of geography and travel, including Cook's *Voyages*; the heading 'Politics and Morals' covered the Old and New Testaments, the *Koran*, the *Vedas* and Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*. For lighter reading Bonaparte took poetry and plays by La Fontaine, Tasso, Ariosto, Homer, Vergil, Voltaire and his beloved *Ossian*, while forty volumes of unnamed English novels appeared beside Prévost, Lesage, Marmontel and Goethe.

ART. 4. He will improve the lot of the inhabitants of Egypt by all means in his power.

ART. 5. So far as possible he will maintain good relations with the Caliph and his immediate subjects.

ART. 6. The present decree will not be published.

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**Decree***Paris**23 Germinal, Year VI (12 Apr, 1798)*

The Executive Directory,

Considering that the Order of Malta has of its own volition adopted a hostile attitude towards France since the beginning of the present war; that it made an express declaration to this effect in the manifesto of the Grand Master of 10 October, 1794; . . . that, even quite recently, it has brought to the highest pitch its attacks on the Republic by receiving into its midst and admitting to its highest dignities Frenchmen universally known as the most bitter enemies of their country and forever dishonoured through having borne arms against it; that everything indicates its intention immediately to hand over its territory to one of the powers still at war with France and, thereby, to paralyse French navigation in the Mediterranean; . . .

Decrees as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East is instructed to occupy the island of Malta.

ART. 2. To this end he will at once direct against the island of Malta the land and sea forces under his command.

The present decree will not be published.

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**To Vice-Admiral Brueys**

*C.-in-C., Mediterranean Fleet, at Toulon*

*Paris**3 Floréal, Year VI (22 Apr, 1798)*

It is essential, Citizen Admiral, that you organize the fleet at once.

Commodore Ganteaume will carry out the functions of chief of staff of the fleet. Citizen Casabianca will be your flag captain. . . .

Our thirteen ships of the line will be divided into three squadrons. Those of the right and left will each contain four ships, the centre, five. Each squadron will have a frigate and a corvette.

Rear-Admirals Blanquet du Chayla and Villeneuve will each command a squadron.

[Rear-] Admiral Decrès will command the convoy and will have under his orders two first rates . . . three frigates and a number of fast brigs which you will select. With these ships he will lead the movement

and will be ready to command the light squadron which you may decide to form by detaching ships from the fleet.

But, once the enemy is in sight and the line of battle formed, all Admiral Decrès's care, with his frigates, will be for the convoy, to attend to its safety and carry out the orders you may have given him.

Thus, it seems to me that this officer has a splendid role. He sails at the head of the column, verifies the reports of his patrol boats and sends back exact messages to you. This single function is so important that it ought to be, as on land, the commander himself who can be the first to observe the enemy; but at sea the admiral can never leave his fleet because he is never sure of being able to rejoin it once he has left it.

Should you, as soon as the enemy is sighted, judge it proper to support the frigates with two or three ships of the line, then the light squadron will be organized in accordance with established custom and that officer will command it. Finally, if you fight in line, the responsibilities of that admiral will be not less important; whatever the issue of the battle, he will have to shelter from every accident a convoy that is very precious to the Republic and, having done that, he may still with his frigates be of service to the fleet.

What I am laying down is perhaps contrary to normal usage, but the advantages I foresee in it are so great that I am certain we shall profit by it and shall give up the naval custom of putting on the frigates of the advance-guard only some commander when in fact all subsequent events depend on this first observation and the first reports.

I leave tomorrow night and hope to find the squadron prepared on my arrival.

BONAPARTE

292

## To Major-General Desaix

*At Civita-Vecchia*

*H.Q., Toulon*

*29 Floréal, Year VI (18 May, 1798)*

Since the 22nd, my dear General, we have been at anchor and ready to sail; but a very strong east wind has prevented us. Today it is dead calm. So I hope to be able to leave tomorrow morning, unless the wind is again in the east.

Once at sea the winds may carry us very quickly; you must, therefore, still be ready to set sail at six hours' notice.

Four Spanish frigates have just arrived at Toulon.

I recommend you to send a dispatch-boat to us between Elba and Corsica; it will take care to interrogate all ships coming from the Levant or Spain so as to learn of movements in the Mediterranean.

A thousand regards to Monge. I salute you.

BONAPARTE

293

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte***Member of the Council of Five Hundred**On board Orient**4 Prairial, Year VI (23 May, 1798)*

We have joined the convoy from Genoa; we have had good, bad, and calm weather. We are well on our way, moving towards Elba. This evening we shall be opposite Bastia. I have not been sea-sick.

Please send me news. I wrote to you from Toulon what I wish you to do. What concerns you in the arrangement I made with you goes well.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

P.S. My wife will wait a few days at Toulon, until she knows that we have passed Sicily; after that she will go to take the waters.

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**To Vice-Admiral Brueys***C.-in-C., Mediterranean Fleet**On board Orient**8 Prairial, Year VI (27 May, 1798)*

[*Proposal by Admiral Brueys to detach four ships of the line and three frigates to meet the convoy from Civita-Vecchia.*]

If, twenty-four hours after this separation, ten English ships are signalled, I shall have only nine instead of thirteen.

BONAPARTE

295

**To the Grand Master***Order of St.-John-of-Jerusalem**On board Orient, before Malta**22 Prairial, Year VI (10 June, 1798)*

Eminence, having been called upon to carry aboard the flagship the reply of Your Eminence to the request that the squadron be permitted to take on water, the Commander-in-Chief Bonaparte is indignant that permission to water should be accorded only to two ships at a time; what length of time, indeed, would it not take for 500 or 600 sail to procure in this way the water and other things they urgently need? This refusal has surprised General Bonaparte the more, since he is aware of the preference granted to the English and of the proclamation issued by Your Eminence's predecessor.

General Bonaparte is resolved to secure by force what ought to have been accorded to him in the name of hospitality which is the basis of your Order.

I have seen the considerable forces under the orders of General Bonaparte and I foresee the inability of the Order to resist. In so important a matter it was to be wished that Your Eminence, through

love of his Order and his knights and the whole population of Malta, could have proposed some means of accommodation.

The general does not wish me to return to a town which he feels obliged from now on to treat as hostile and whose only hope lies in the generosity of General Bonaparte. He has given the most precise orders that the religion, customs and property of the Maltese should be scrupulously respected.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief  
The French Consul in Malta*

CARUSON

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### **To the Grandmaster**

*Order of St.-John-of-Jerusalem*

*On board Orient, before Malta*

*23 Prairial, Year VI (11 June, 1798)*

In consequence of the request Your Excellency has made for an armistice, the Commander-in-Chief has ordered his aide-de-camp, Colonel [Junot], to visit you and has authorized him to conclude and sign an armistice.

I beg Your Excellency to appreciate my desire to express the esteem in which I hold Your Excellency.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

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### **To Major-General Vaubois**

*G.O.C., Landing Force*

*On board Orient, before Malta*

*23 Prairial, Year VI (11 June, 1798)*

The Commander-in-Chief understands, General, that the Grand Master of the Order of Jerusalem has informed the French military commander that there is an armistice.

There are only parleys, in the town and on board *Orient*.

If the armistice takes place, it will be only for the fortress, unless the other positions of the island are specifically mentioned.

The Commander-in-Chief hopes that during the course of the day you will become master of the Old City and of the whole island in accordance with the orders you received yesterday from the Commander-in-Chief and myself.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

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### **Convention**

*On board Orient, before Malta*

*24 Prairial, Year VI (12 June, 1798)*

Convention agreed between the French Republic, represented by

Citizen Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, of the one part, and the Order of Knights of St-John-of-Jerusalem, represented by . . .

ARTICLE 1. The Knights of the Order of St.-John-of-Jerusalem will deliver the forts of Malta to the French army. They renounce in favour of the French Republic their rights of sovereignty and property over this town and the islands of Malta, Gozo and Cumino.

ART. 2. The French Republic will use its influence at the Congress of Rastadt to secure to the Grand Master, during his lifetime, a principality equivalent to that which he loses hereby, and, meanwhile, it undertakes to pay to him an annual pension of 300,000 francs; in addition he will be given the value of two years' duration of this pension as indemnity for his personal property. So long as he remains at Malta he will retain the military honours which he formerly enjoyed.

ART. 3. The Knights of the Order of St.-John-of-Jerusalem who are French, at present at Malta, and of whom a list will be drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief, may return to their country and their residence in Malta will be counted to them as residence in France.

The French Republic will use its good offices with the Cisalpine, Roman, Ligurian and Helvetic Republics to have the present Article declared applicable to the Knights of these different nations.

ART. 4. The French Republic will pay a pension of 700 francs to the French Knights at present at Malta during their lifetime and will use its good offices with the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Roman and Helvetic Republics that they may grant the same pension to Knights of their nations.

ART. 5. The French Republic will use its good offices with the other powers of Europe to the end that they should preserve to the Knights of their nations the exercise of their rights over the property of the Order situated in their States.

ART. 6. The Knights will retain the personal property which they possess in the islands of Malta and Gozo.

ART. 7. All the civil acts passed under the government of the Order will remain valid and will be executed . . .

BONAPARTE

BOSREDON-RANSIJAT . . .

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## Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

*On board Orient, before Malta*

*24 Prairial, Year VI (12 June, 1798)*

The Army is informed that the enemy has surrendered; the standard of liberty floats on the forts of Malta.

The Commander-in-Chief recalls the Army to the strictest discipline; he wishes persons and property to be respected and the people of Malta to be treated with friendship.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

**Order\****H.Q., Malta**25 Prairial, Year VI (13 June, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, member of the Institute, orders:

ARTICLE I. The islands of Malta and Gozo will be administered by a governing committee, composed of nine persons, to be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief.

ART. 3. A French commissioner will be attached to the governing committee.

ART. 6. The governing committee will at once commence organising civil and criminal courts, following as far as possible the forms at present existing in France. Appointment of members of the courts will require the approval of the general officer commanding in Malta. Until these courts are organized, justice will continue to be administered as in the past.

ART. 11. All the properties of the Order of Malta, of the Grand Master and the different monasteries of the knights belong to the French Republic.

ART. 13. The police will be wholly under the orders of the general officer commanding and the officers under his orders.

ARTICLE I. In consequence of today's order concerning the organization of the government, the following citizens compose the governing committee: Bosredon-Ransijat. . . .

ART. 2. Citizen Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely is the commissioner of the Government attached to the committee.

ARTICLE I. The officers and soldiers who composed the military forces in the service of the Order of Malta . . . will assemble at 2.0 p.m. today and will proceed to Bircarcara at 5.0 a.m. tomorrow. They will be passed in review by Brigadier-General Lannes.

ART. 2. All armorial bearings will be removed within twenty-four hours. It is forbidden to wear livery or any mark or title of nobility.

ART. 3. All knights and inhabitants who are subjects of a power at war with France, such as Russia and Portugal, are required to leave Malta within forty-eight hours.

ART. 4. All knights of less than sixty years of age are required to leave Malta within three days.

ARTICLE I. Knights who were not sworn and who have married at Malta.

ART. 2. Knights who have private professions in Malta.

\* Between 13 and 18 June Bonaparte issued more than twenty orders concerning different aspects of the government of Malta. Extracts from several of these are here given under a single number.



ART. 4. And those included in the attached list, known for the sentiments they have held towards the Republic, will be regarded as citizens of Malta and may remain as long as they wish.\*

ARTICLE I. All effects and merchandise belonging to English, Russian and Portuguese merchants will be placed under seal.

28 Prairal, Year VI (16 June, 1798)

ARTICLE I. Henceforth all inhabitants of Malta have equal rights . . .

ART. 2. Slavery is abolished; the slaves known under the name of *buonavogli* are set at liberty and the contract which they have made and which dishonours the human race is annulled.

ART. 4. All inhabitants of the islands of Malta and Gozo are required to wear the tricolour cockade . . .

ART. 6. The Order of Malta being dissolved, it is expressly forbidden to all to take the titles of bailly, commander or knight.

ART. 8. In every church the arms of the Grand Master will be replaced by those of the French Republic.

ART. 9. Since the island of Malta belongs to the French Republic, the missions of the various minister-plenipotentiaries have ceased.

ART. 12. All those contravening the above articles will be condemned, for the first offence, to a fine of one third of their income; for the second offence, to three months imprisonment . . .

ARTICLE I. All inhabitants of the islands of Malta and Gozo will be disarmed. Arms will be allowed only by permission of the commanding general to men whose patriotism is known.

ART. 2. The organization of volunteer chasseurs will be continued . . .

ART. 3. The signal stations between Gozo point and Malta will be re-established.

ART. 4. The health laws at Malta will be neither more nor less rigorous than those at Marseilles.

ART. 8. The governing committee will nominate sixty youths, aged between nine and fourteen, belonging to the richest families, who will be sent to Paris to be educated in the colleges of the Republic. . . .

ART. 12. Training classes for sailors will be established as in the ports of France. . . .

ARTICLE I. All French troops at Malta will be dressed in cotton.

ART. 2. If blue cotton cannot be found, they may easily be dressed in white, with collars and facings of red and blue, so that they always wear the three colours.

ART. 7. The best hospital, that which was served by the knights, will be reserved exclusively for the French.

\* The list included the names of fifteen French and two Tuscan knights. Against the French list Bonaparte wrote: 'Almost all, six months ago, provided me with useful notes or have made patriotic gifts for the descent on England.'

ARTICLE 1. All priests, monks and nuns, of whatever order, who are not natives of Malta, are required to leave the island within ten days of the publication of the present order. In view of his pastoral qualities, the bishop alone is excepted.

ART. 3. Henceforth religious vows may not be taken before the age of thirty. . . .

ART. 4. There may no longer be in Malta more than one monastery of each order. . . .

*29 Prairial, Year VI (17 June, 1798)*

ARTICLE 1. Latin priests may not officiate in the churches belonging to the Greeks.

ART. 3. Protection will be accorded to the Jews wishing to establish a synagogue.

ART. 4. The commanding general will thank the Greeks established at Malta for their good conduct during the siege.

ART. 6. All Greek ships sailing under the Russian flag, if captured by French ships, will be sunk.

*30 Prairial, Year VI (18 June, 1798)*

ARTICLE 2. The governing committee is responsible for civil, judicial and administrative organization.

ART. 3. It can act only on the request of the commissioner or after having heard his report. . . .

ART. 4. No regulation may be published or take effect unless approved by the commissioner and the commanding general.

ARTICLE 1. The existing taxes will be maintained provisionally.

ART. 2. With the shortest delay, a new system of taxation will be introduced, so that the total product, secured from customs, wine, registration, stamps, tobacco, salt, rents and servants amounts to 720,000 francs.

ART. 6. The streets of the towns and the maintenance of cleanliness and lighting will be paid for by the inhabitants.

ART. 8. Tolls will be imposed for the upkeep of the roads.

ART. 14. The postal service will be organized so that the tax on letters covers the cost.

ARTICLE 1. There will be established in Malta a central school which will replace the university and other faculties.

ART. 2. It will be composed of: a professor of arithmetic and stereometry; a professor of algebra and stereotomy; a professor of geometry and astronomy; a professor of mechanics and physics; a professor of navigation; a professor of chemistry; a professor of oriental languages, and a librarian responsible for the course in geography.

ART. 3. There will be attached to the central school: the library and

collection of antiquities; a museum of natural history; a botanical garden, and the observatory.

ART. 5. The professors will together form a council which will consider how to improve instruction and will propose to the governing committee the administrative measures which it judges necessary.

ART. 8. A course of anatomy, medicine and midwifery will be established at the hospital of the town of Malta.

ARTICLE I. Fifteen primary schools will be set up in the islands of Malta and Gozo.

ART. 2. Instructors in the schools will teach the pupils to read and write in French, arithmetic and pilotage and the principles of morality and of the French Constitution.

ARTICLE I. The bishop will hold no judicial powers except over ecclesiastics. All proceedings relating to marriages fall within the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts.

ART. 2. It is expressly forbidden to the bishop, priests and inhabitants of the island to receive payment for the administration of the sacraments, the duty of their office being to administer them free of charge.

ARTICLE I. Funds of the suppressed monasteries and endowments, sufficient to yield interest of 40,000 francs, will be set aside for the hospital. . . .

ART. 2. 300,000 francs from public property will be set aside for the creditors of the Grand Master.

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## Order

*H.Q., Malta*

*25 Prairial, Year VI (13 June, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, orders:

ARTICLE I. Citizen Berthollet, the auditor of the Army and a clerk of the paymaster will take possession of the gold, silver and precious stones which are in the church of St. John and other dependencies of the Order of Malta, the silverware of the hotels and that of the Grand Master.

ART. 2. During the course of tomorrow they will have all the gold cast into ingots to be transferred to the chest of the army paymaster.

ART. 3. They will make an inventory of all the precious stones which will be placed under seal in the army chest.

ART. 4. They will sell silverware worth 250,000 to 300,000 francs to local merchants for gold and silver money which will also be placed in the army chest.\*

\* Most of this treasure went to the bottom of the sea, for it was still stowed aboard *Orient* when that ship blew up during the battle of the Nile.

ART. 5. The rest of the silverware will be left at the Maltese Mint to be coined, and the money will be transmitted to the divisional paymaster for the upkeep of this division; it will be specified how much this will produce, so that the paymaster can be accountable for it.

ART. 6. They will leave what is necessary for the exercise of the cult both at the Church of St. John and the other churches.

BONAPARTE

302

**To Major-General Berthier**

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Malta*

*25 Prairial, Year VI (13 June, 1798)*

Please, Citizen General, send an officer to visit the different State prisons and set at liberty all who are held in them because of opinions.

BONAPARTE

303

**To General Brune**

*C.-in-C., Army of Italy*

*H.Q., Malta*

*26 Prairial, Year VI (14 June, 1798)*

We are masters of Malta, my dear General; we have found here 1,200 guns, 1,000 tons of powder, 2 ships of the line, 1 frigate, 4 galleys, 40,000 muskets.

Garat, Minister to Naples, will give you more precise details.

I trust you have sent the rest of the 6th and 79th Demi-brigades to Corfu.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

304

**To Major-General Chabot**

*G.O.C., Corfu*

*H.Q., Malta*

*27 Prairial, Year VI (15 June, 1798)*

We entered Malta three days ago, Citizen General. Thereby the Republic has acquired a place as strong as it is favourably situated for commerce. The inhabitants of the three departments forming your command should derive a very special benefit from it; let them know this good news.

I am leaving General Vaubois to command here. You can correspond with him on all matters you need to.

Your division forms part of the army I command. Please send me by the brig an exact return of your troops, your ships and your stores of ammunition and food. Let me know also what is owed to the troops and whether it is possible for you to procure sailors to man the battle-

ship and the frigate which are at Corfu and to send them to me at a point I will indicate to you.

Please send to our minister at Constantinople the news of the occupation of Malta by the French army and of the destruction of the Order of St.-John-of-Jerusalem. Announce this also to Ali Pasha [of Jannina] and to the pashas of Scutari and the Morea.

The *Fortunatus* has orders to rejoin the squadron; have it accompanied by one of your best brigs, which I can send back to you with new orders.

Prepare yourself for attack by the Turks. . . .

BONAPARTE

Give me news of the countries adjoining your command.

305

### To the French Consuls

*At Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers*

*H.Q., Malta*

*27 Prairial, Year VI (15 June, 1798)*

I am informing you, Citizen, that for two days the army of the Republic has been in possession of the town and the two islands of Malta and Gozo; the Tricolour flies on all the forts.

Please, Citizen, make known the destruction of the Order of Malta and the gain of this new possession by the Republic to the bey to whom you are accredited, and let him know that in future he must respect the Maltese as they are now French subjects.

Please ask him, also, to set at liberty the Maltese slaves that he owns; I have ordered the release of over 2,000 Turkish and Berber slaves that the order of St.-John-of-Jerusalem held in their galleys.

Let the bey understand that the power which has taken Malta in three or four days is well able to punish him if he departs for a moment from a correct attitude towards the Republic.

BONAPARTE

306

### To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Malta*

*29 Prairial, Year VI (17 June, 1798)*

You will find attached the original of the treaty which the Order of Malta had just concluded with Russia. It had been ratified only five days, and the courier, who was the man I arrested two years ago at Ancona, had not yet left. Thus His Majesty the Emperor of Russia owes us his thanks, for the occupation of Malta saves his treasury 400,000 roubles. We have understood the interests of his nation better than he himself.

If his aim was to prepare the way to establish himself in the port of Malta, it seems to me that His Majesty should have done things a little more secretly and not made his plans so easily discoverable. But, in any case, we now have in the centre of the Mediterranean the strongest fortress in Europe and it will cost anyone dear to dislodge us.

BONAPARTE

307

### To Brigadier-General Dommartin

*Cdr., Artillery, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Malta*

*29 Prairial, Year VI (17 June, 1798)*

It being the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to send to Paris the Maltese 4-pounder which is worth preserving because of its workmanship and which is at the arsenal, you will have it embarked today aboard the frigate *Sensible*, which should leave tonight.

General Baraguey d'Hilliers is instructed to take it to Paris together with the flags of Malta.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

308

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Malta*

*29 Prairial, Year VI (17 June, 1798)*

You will send orders to Toulon, Citizen General, that all the wives of the army who have remained at the depots should be embarked on ships of the second convoy as far as Malta, where they will receive orders for their further destination.

You will insert this decision in Army Orders tomorrow.

BONAPARTE

309

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

*H.Q., on board Orient*

*10 Messidor, Year VI (28 June, 1798)*

Soldiers!

You are going to undertake a conquest whose effects on civilization and the commerce of the world will be incalculable.

You will strike the surest and most painful stroke possible against England until you can deal her final death-blow.

We shall undergo tiring marches; we shall fight several battles; we shall succeed in all our enterprises; Destiny is with us.

The Mameluke beys, who favour English trade exclusively, who have covered our merchants with insults and tyrannize over the

unfortunate inhabitants of the Nile, will have ceased to exist a few days after our arrival.

The people amongst whom we are going to live are Mohammedans; the first article of their faith is: 'There is no other God but God, and Mahomet is his prophet.'

Do not argue with them; behave towards them as we behaved towards the Jews and the Italians; show respect to their muftis and imams as you have to rabbis and bishops.

Have for the mosques and the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran the same tolerance that you showed for convents and synagogues, for the religion of Moses and of Jesus Christ.

The Roman legions protected all religions. You will find here customs different from those of Europe; you must get used to them.

The people amongst whom we are going treat women differently from us; but, in every country, he who commits rape is a monster.

Pillage enriches but a few; it dishonours us, it destroys our resources, it makes enemies of the people it is to our interest to have as friends.

The first city we are going to meet was built by Alexander. At each step we shall find memories worthy to excite emulation.

BONAPARTE

310

## To the Pasha of Egypt

*On board Orient*

*12 Messidor, Year VI (30 June, 1798)*

The Executive Directory of the French Republic has several times approached the Sublime Porte asking for the punishment of the beys of Egypt who were heaping injuries on French traders.

But the Sublime Porte declared that the capricious and greedy beys did not adhere to the principles of justice, and that not only did it not authorize the outrages against its good and ancient friends, the French, but that it was even withdrawing its protection from the beys.

The French Republic has determined to send a powerful army to put an end to the brigandage of the Egyptian beys, just as it has several times during this century been obliged to do against the beys of Tunis and Algiers.

You, who should be the master of the beys, but whom they hold in Cairo without authority or power, should welcome my arrival.

No doubt you are already informed that I am come to do nothing against the Koran or the Sultan. You know that the French nation is the sole ally of the Sultan in Europe.

Come to meet me, therefore, and curse with me the impious race of the beys.

BONAPARTE

**Proclamation to the People of Egypt***H.Q., Alexandria**14 Messidor, Year VI; 18 Moharram, A.H. 1213 (2 July, 1798)*

The beys who govern Egypt have for long insulted the French nation and injured its merchants: the hour of their punishment has arrived.

For too long this rabble of slaves bought in Georgia and Caucasia have tyrannized over the most beautiful part of the world; but God, from whom all depends, has ordered that their empire shall cease.

Peoples of Egypt, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion; do not believe it! Answer that I have come to restore your rights and punish the usurpers, and that, more than the Mamelukes, I respect God, his Prophet and the Koran.

Say that all men are equal before God; wisdom, talent and virtue alone differentiate between them. But what wisdom, what talents, what virtue have the Mamelukes, that they exclusively have all that makes life desirable and sweet?

Is there a fine estate? It belongs to the Mamelukes. Is there a beautiful slave, a good horse, a pleasant house? They belong to the Mamelukes.

If Egypt is their farm, let them show the lease that God has given them. But God is just and merciful to the people.

The Egyptians will be called upon to hold all offices; the wisest and most learned and most virtuous will govern, and the people will be happy.

Once there were among you great cities, great canals, a great commerce. What has destroyed all this if not the greed, the injustice and the tyranny of the Mamelukes?

Cadis, sheiks, imams, tell the people that we are friends of the true Moslems.

Is it not we who have destroyed the Pope, who called for war against the Moslems? Is it not we who have destroyed the knights of Malta, because those madmen believed God wished them to fight the Moslems? Is it not we who have been through the centuries the friends of the Sultan (may God grant his desires!) and the enemies of his enemies? But, as for the Mamelukes, have they not ever been in revolt against the Sultan's authority, which even now they disown?

Thrice happy those who shall be for us! They will prosper both in fortune and in rank. Happy those who shall be neutral! They will have time to learn to know us, and they will range themselves beside us.

But woe, threefold woe to those who take up arms for the Mamelukes and fight against us! For them there will be no hope: they will perish.

**ARTICLE I.** All villages situated within three leagues of places where



the army passes will send a deputation to inform the general commanding the troops that they are obedient and have flown the flag of the army: blue, white and red.

ART. 2. All villages which take up arms against the army will be burnt.

ART. 3. All villages which submit will fly the flag of the army together with that of the Sultan, our friend.

ART. 4. The sheiks will have placed under seal the goods, houses and property belonging to the Mamelukes and will take care that nothing be embezzled.

ART. 5. The sheiks, cadis and imams will continue to discharge their functions. All inhabitants will remain at home, and prayers will continue as usual. All will thank God for the destruction of the Mamelukes and will cry: 'Glory to the Sultan! Glory to the French army, his friend! Cursed be the Mamelukes, and happiness to the peoples of Egypt!'

BONAPARTE

312

### To Vice-Admiral Brueys

*C.-in-C., The Fleet*

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

I enclose the letter which I have just received from Admiral Ganteaume and which I have shown to the Commander-in-Chief. He instructs me to tell you that he is annoyed that you did not blockade the new port during his attack on Alexandria, with the result that all the local boats called *djermes* escaped, together with four large cargo ships.

The Commander-in-Chief wishes you to take steps, while loading, to have everything belonging to the army disembarked. He is sure you will already have taken soundings. He wishes the squadron to enter the port and he thinks meanwhile that you should set sail and approach as your present anchorage is much too far off for our communications.

Needing an experienced naval officer, the Commander-in-Chief orders Citizen Ganteaume to come here at once.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

313

### To Brigadier-General Caffarelli

*Cdr., Engineers, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

Please, Citizen General, report to me tomorrow on the military advantages which might result and the amount of accommodation to

be gained by the step of having the European consuls lodged elsewhere and taking possession of all these houses.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

314

## Order

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

ARTICLE 1. All inhabitants of Alexandria, of whatever nation, are required, twenty-four hours after publication of the present order, to take their firearms to a spot to be indicated by the commandant of the fortress. Only muftis, imams and sheiks will be permitted to retain and carry their arms.

ART. 2. All inhabitants of Alexandria, of whatever nation, are required to wear the tricolour cockade. The muftis alone will have the right to wear a tricolour shawl. But the Commander-in-Chief reserves the right to grant the same favour to sheiks and imams who are distinguished for their enlightenment, wisdom and virtue.

ART. 3. In consequence of the preceding article, the troops will salute individuals wearing a tricolour shawl, as a mark of military honour. . . .

ART. 4. Foreign agents, of whatever power, are expressly forbidden to fly flags on their terraces. Consuls alone will have the right to inscribe on their doors the title of their employment: 'Consul of —.'

The present order will at once be translated into arabic and communicated without delay to prominent men of the country. The Sherif will have it proclaimed in the city, so that it shall be obeyed.

BONAPARTE

315

## To Divisional Commanders

*Army of the East*

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

The Commander-in-Chief wishes the Turks to carry out their acts of worship in the mosques as in the past; he expressly forbids all Frenchmen, military or otherwise, to enter the mosques or to collect at the door of a mosque.

You will order all commanders of demi-brigades to parade the troops and read this order to them. They will also read again the Commander-in-Chief's order concerning looting and rape. You will have those who disobey it shot. It is of the first importance that the soldiers pay for all that they acquire in the city and that the Turks are

neither robbed nor insulted. We must make friends of them and make war only on the Mamelukes.

Insist that our troops do not straggle on the march and that in no circumstances do they march singly, for otherwise they will be cut down by the Arabs.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

316

## Order

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, orders:

ARTICLE 1. All the Turkish sailors who were slaves in Malta and have been freed and who hail from Syria, the Archipelago, Egypt or Tripoli will be set at liberty at once.

ART. 2. The admiral will have them disembarked tomorrow at Alexandria where the staff will give them passports to return home and, to each one, a proclamation in Arabic.

BONAPARTE

317

## To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

Please give orders, Citizen General, that the English vice-consul be set free. He will be expressly forbidden to hold any kind of correspondence with any individual of his own nation.

You will tell him that he owes his liberty to his position as consul of the Emperor.

BONAPARTE

318

## To Major-General Menou

*G.O.C., Left Division*

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*15 Messidor, Year VI (3 July, 1798)*

Please, Citizen General, give me the names of those who distinguished themselves yesterday and, among others, of that sergeant whom I saw who was wounded. I point him out because, since you were the first to arrive and you advanced as soon as you had a few men, you may well not have noticed him.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

**Decree***H.Q., Alexandria**16 Messidor, Year VI (4 July, 1798)*

ARTICLE I. The names of all the men of the French Army who were killed at the capture of Alexandria will be inscribed on Pompey's column.

ART 2. They will be buried at the foot of the column. Citizens Costaz, Dutertre and — will draw up proposals for the execution of this decree, which will be inserted in Army Orders.

ART. 3. The staff will provide this commission with the names of men killed at the capture of Alexandria

BONAPARTE

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Alexandria**12 Messidor, Year VI (6 July, 1798)*

The Army left Malta on 1 Messidor and arrived before Alexandria at dawn on the 13th. An English squadron, said to be very powerful, had put in there three days earlier and left mails for India. . . .

The wind was strong and there was a heavy swell; however, I thought it right to disembark at once. The day was passed in preparing for the landing. General Menou, at the head of his division, was the first ashore, near the Marabout, a league and a half from Alexandria.

I landed with General Kléber and another part of the troops at 11 p.m. We at once marched towards Alexandria. At first light we could see Pompey's column. A force of Mamelukes and Arabs began to skirmish with our forward troops; but we moved rapidly on to different parts of Alexandria, General Bon's division being on the right, General Kléber's in the centre, General Menou's on the left. The wall of the Arab city was heavily manned.

General Kléber left Pompey's column to scale the wall, while General Bon forced the Rosetta gate and General Menou, blocking the triangular castle with part of his division, with the rest stormed another part of the wall; he was the first to enter the city. He received seven wounds, but happily none of them are dangerous.

While at the foot of the wall showing his grenadiers where to mount, General Kléber received a bullet in the face, which threw him to the ground. His wound, although extremely grave, is not mortal. At that the grenadiers of his division redoubled their courage and broke into the city . . .

Once we were masters of the Arab city the enemy retired into the triangular fort, the lighthouse and the new city. Every house became

a citadel for them. But before the end of the day the city was quiet, the two castles surrendered, and we found ourselves completely masters of the city, the forts and the two harbours of Alexandria.

Meanwhile the Arabs of the desert had ridden up in groups of thirty to fifty horsemen, attacking our rear and falling upon our stragglers. They did not cease harassing us for two days; but yesterday I succeeded in concluding a treaty, not only of friendship, but even of alliance. Thirteen of the principal chiefs came to my quarters. I sat in the midst of them and we had a very long conversation. After agreeing upon terms we assembled round a table and consigned to hell-fire whoever of ours or theirs should break our agreements. These are: on their side, to cease harassing my rear, to give me all help in their power and to provide the men I ask for to march against the Mamelukes; on mine, to restore to them, once I am master of Egypt, the lands which formerly belonged to them.

Prayers are held as usual in the mosques, and my house is always full of imams, orcadis, sherifs, chiefs, muftis or religious leaders . . .

This country is not at all inferior to the picture painted by travellers: it is calm, proud and brave.

The fleet will be at Aboukir today to finish landing our artillery. The old port of Alexandria can contain a fleet of any size. But there is one point in the passage with only five fathoms of water, which makes the sailors think it impossible for 74s to enter. This fact seriously interferes with my plans.

Venetian-built ships can enter, and *Dubois* and *Causse* are already there. I shall need you to send me as soon as possible the three Venetian-built ships which are at Toulon. I will send for the three at Ancona.

General *Desaix's* division has reached Damanhur after crossing fourteen leagues of arid desert which greatly tired it; General *Reynier's* should arrive there this evening. General *Dugua's* is at Rosetta.\*

Commodore *Perrée* commands our light flotilla and will try to send part of his ships up the Nile . . .

I have appointed Citizen *Le Roy* naval commissioner at Alexandria . . .

At the capture of Alexandria we had 30 to 40 men killed and 80 to 100 wounded. . . .

BONAPARTE

321

To Major-General Kléber

Governor of Alexandria

H.Q., Alexandria

19 Messidor, Year VI (7 July, 1798)

Citizen General, you will take command of Alexandria, Aboukir

\* *Dugua* had assumed temporary command of Kléber's division.

and the mobile column commanded by General Dumuy which is intended to remain in rear of the army to facilitate its communications. The staff will inform you of the different individuals composing the staff of the district of Alexandria and of the heads of services. . . .

One of the most essential objects is to provide at once for the establishment of a quarantine station; to follow the various requirements demanded by that with the utmost strictness, and to establish two separate hospitals in Alexandria, one for the wounded, the other for the sick.

Keep on good terms with the Arabs as far as possible. Show the greatest regard for the muftis and principal sheiks of the area. . . .

The fleet is going to anchor at Aboukir. It must try to anchor so as to be protected by the batteries we shall establish there. If this is possible you will see how important it is to push ahead quickly with these works.

It is also essential that General Dumuy should take the field with his mobile column as soon as possible. The first position I wish him to occupy is between Alexandria and Damanhur, at El-Keryun, where there is plenty of water. . . . It is important to tell him to have the wells at El-Beydah cleaned.

It is also necessary that you see that there are always about thirty local boats on the lake of Aboukir for the land communication between Alexandria and Rosetta.

The staff will send you the order I have given for the organization of the country. We must accustom these people to our ways and manner of seeing things step by step, and leave them meanwhile a great latitude in their internal affairs; above all we must not interfere with their justice, which, being founded on divine laws, derives wholly from the Koran.

However, I trust you will give yourself up to these occupations only so far as will not delay your return to health. . . .

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

322

## Order

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*19 Messidor, Year VI (7 July, 1798)*

The Commander-in-Chief orders:

ARTICLE 1. The general staff will leave an officer at Alexandria to have the French, Arabic and Greek printing presses disembarked.

ART. 2. These presses will be set up in the house of the Venetian consul, so that within forty-eight hours everything sent from headquarters can be printed in French or Arabic.

ART. 3. As soon as the Arabic press is established, 4,000 proclamations will be printed.

ART. 4. Rations will be provided for the overseer and workmen of the printing office.

BONAPARTE

323

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

H.Q., Damanhur

21 Messidor, Year VI (9 July, 1798)

The Commander-in-Chief has fixed the prices of goods as follows:

One goose	26 sous	or	35 paras
One chicken	15 <i>id</i>		20 <i>id</i>
A pair of pigeons	18 <i>id</i>		24 <i>id</i>
Mutton	8 <i>id</i>		11 <i>id</i>
Beef	6 <i>id</i>		10 <i>id</i>
3 eggs	3 liards		1 <i>id</i>
A pound of rice	2 sous		3 <i>id</i>
A pound of lentils	3 liards		1 <i>id</i>

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

324

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

H.Q., El-Rahmâniya

24 Messidor, Year VI (12 July, 1798)

In his proclamation the Commander-in-Chief informed the army that he is making war on the Mamelukes, not on the inhabitants of the country, whose friend he is. Since the arrival of the unmounted cavalrymen, some have broken into houses by force. The Commander-in-Chief holds the officers commanding these detachments responsible for any disorder. They will use part of the unmounted cavalry on frequent patrols. General Dumas and General Zajonchek will issue the necessary orders.

In the Order for 21 Messidor the Commander-in-Chief expressly forbade soldiers to fire in the camp for the purpose of emptying their arms, which they must do with discharger rods. This morning, contrary to orders, a fusilade took place on this pretext. The Commander-in-Chief recommends more supervision to generals and unit commanders. . . .

Commanders will recommend the soldiers to eat very little of what are called gourds or water-melons, unless they are cooked; then they are healthy and nourishing.

Generals will take the greatest care to instruct the camp guards as

to the watch to be kept by the sentries. There cannot be too much security, but at the same time alerts must not be given unnecessarily. . . .

The Commander-in-Chief is informed that on the night of the 23rd to 24th several posts had neither the password nor countersign. He invites divisional commanders to take steps that a similar oversight is not repeated. They will also instruct the troops not to fire when out of range and not uselessly to waste ammunition which must be saved for a more effective occasion.

The general of the rounds for the 24th to 25th is Brigadier-General Fugière.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

325

### **To the Sheiks and Notables of Cairo**

*H.Q., Giza*

*4 Thermidor, Year VI (22 July, 1798)*

From the attached proclamation you will see what sentiments inspire me.

Yesterday the Mamelukes were for the most part killed or taken prisoner, and I am in pursuit of the few still remaining.

Send over to this bank the boats on your side; send me a deputation to inform me of your submission.

Have bread, meat, straw and barley prepared for my army, and be without fear, for no one desires more than I to contribute to your happiness.

BONAPARTE

326

### **Proclamation to the People of Cairo**

*H.Q., Giza*

*4 Thermidor, Year VI (22 July, 1798)*

People of Cairo, I am satisfied with your conduct. You have done well not to take sides against me. I have come to destroy the race of Mamelukes and to protect trade and the natives of the country.

Let those who are afraid be calm; those who have fled return to their houses. Let prayers be held today as usual, as I wish them always to be. Fear nothing for your families, your houses, your property, and, above all, for the religion of the Prophet, whom I love.

Since it is important that the peace be not disturbed, there will be a divan of seven persons which will meet at the Mosque of El-Azhar. There will always be two members attached to the commandant of the city and four will be occupied in maintaining public order and supervising the police.

BONAPARTE



327

**To the Pasha of Egypt***H.Q., Giza**4 Thermidor, Year VI (22 July, 1798)*

I am most angry at the violence which Ibrahim has done you in forcing you to leave Cairo and follow him.

If you are able to do so return to Cairo, where you will enjoy the consideration and rank due to the representative of our friend the Sultan.

I wrote you the attached letter\* from Alexandria. . . . I am assured that you have not received it.

By the grace of God, from whom all depends, the Mamelukes have been destroyed. Be assured and assure the Porte that these same arms that we have made victorious will always be at the disposal of the Sultan. May Heaven fulfil his desires against his enemies!

BONAPARTE

328

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Cairo**6 Thermidor, Year VI (24 July, 1798)*

Citizen Directors,

The Army left Alexandria on 19 Messidor; it reached Damanhur on the 20th, suffering much across this desert from the excessive heat and the lack of water.

On the 22nd we met the Nile at El-Rahmâniya and rejoined General Dugua's division, which had come by Rosetta, making several forced marches . . .

## BATTLE OF CHOBRACKHYT

I learnt that Murad-Bey, at the head of his army, composed of a great quantity of cavalry, awaited us at the village of Chobrakhyt with eight or ten gunboats and several batteries on the Nile. On the evening of the 24th we began to march towards them; at dawn on the 25th we were in presence.

We had only 200 cavalry, still lame and worn out by the crossing. The Mamelukes had a magnificent force of horsemen, covered in gold and silver, armed with the best carbines and pistols of London and the best sabres of the East and mounted on perhaps the best horses of the continent.

The army was drawn up, the divisions formed in battalion squares with the baggage in the midst and the artillery in the intervals between the squares. . . . The five divisions of the army were in echelon, covering each other and flanked by two villages which we occupied.

\* No. 310.

Commodore Perrée, with three gunboats, a sloop and a galley' attacked the enemy flotillas. The fighting was extremely stubborn. More than 1,500 rounds were fired. Commodore Perée was wounded in the arm, and by his courage and good dispositions he succeeded in recapturing three gunboats and the galley that the Mamelukes had taken and in setting fire to their flagship . . .

Soon the Mameluke cavalry covered the whole plain, outflanked our wings and sought everywhere, on our flanks and rear, for a weak point to penetrate; but it found that the line was always equally formidable and met it with a cross-fire from front and flank. Several times they attempted to charge, but without pressing home. A few braves advanced to skirmish; they were received by the fire of squads of carabiniers placed ahead of the battalion intervals. Finally, after remaining at half cannon range for part of the day, they effected their retreat and disappeared. Their losses can be reckoned at 300 men killed or wounded.

We marched for eight days, deprived of everything and in one of the most burning climates in the world.

On the morning of 2 Thermidor we saw the Pyramids.

In the evening we were six leagues from Cairo, and I learned that the twenty-three beys, with all their forces, were entrenched at Embabeh, and that they had mounted more than sixty guns on their parapets.

#### BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS

At first light on the 3rd we encountered their advance-guard, which we pushed back from village to village. At 2 p.m. we were face to face with the enemy army and emplacements.

I ordered the divisions of Generals Desaix and Reynier to take up position on the right, between Giza and Embabeh, so as to cut the enemy's communication with Upper Egypt, which was his natural retreat. The army was drawn up in the same manner as at the battle of Chobrakhyt.

As soon as Murad-Bey saw General Desaix's movement, he decided to charge him. He sent one of his bravest beys with a corps d'élite which charged the two divisions with the speed of lightning. It was allowed to approach to within fifty paces and was then welcomed with a hail of case shot and bullets which felled a great many on the field of battle. They threw themselves into the space between the two divisions, where they were met with a double fire which completed their defeat.

I seized that moment and ordered General Bon's division, which was on the Nile, to go in to attack the fortifications, and General Vial, who was commanding General Menou's division, to move between the force which had just charged and the emplacements, so as to complete the threefold aim of preventing that force from entering, cutting off

the retreat of the force within, and, if necessary, of attacking the emplacements from the left . . .

General Bon's attacking columns, commanded by the brave General Rampon, despite heavy artillery fire, threw themselves against the fortifications with their usual impetuosity, when the Mamelukes charged. They left their lines at full gallop; our columns had time to halt, form squares and receive them with fixed bayonets and a hail of bullets. In an instant the field was strewn with them. Our troops were soon carrying the trenches. The fleeing Mamelukes hurled themselves in a mass towards their left; but General Vial was in position there; one battalion of carabinieri, under whose fire they were forced to pass at a range of five paces carried out a fearful butchery; a great many threw themselves in the Nile and were drowned.

More than 400 camels laden with baggage and 50 guns have fallen into our power. I reckon the Mameluke losses at 2,000 of their finest cavalry . . . Ours amount to 20 or 30 killed and 120 wounded. That very night Cairo was evacuated . . . and on the 4th our troops entered the city. During the night the populace had burnt the houses of the beys and committed various excesses. Cairo, which has more than 300,000 inhabitants, has the most wretched populace in the world.

After the great number of engagements and battles which the troops I command have fought against superior forces, I would not think of praising their bearing and calmness on this occasion were it not that this quite new kind of warfare had in truth demanded of them a patience at variance with French impetuosity; had they given way to their ardour they would not have gained the victory, which could be achieved only by great sangfroid and steadiness.

The Mameluke cavalry showed great bravery; they were defending their fortune, and there is not one of them on whom our soldiers have not found 300, 400 or 500 louis of gold.

All the luxury of these people was in their horses and arms; their houses are pitiable. It is hard to imagine a land more fertile and a people more wretched, ignorant and brutish. They prefer one of our soldiers' buttons to a five-franc piece. In the villages they do not even know of a pair of scissors. Their houses are just mud. For furniture they have only a straw mat and two or three earthenware pots. They generally eat and drink very little. They do not use mills, so that we have constantly bivouacked on great heaps of corn unable to have flour. We feed on vegetables and cattle. The little grain that they make into flour they grind with stones, and in a few large villages there are mills turned by bullocks.

We have been continuously harassed by clouds of Arabs, who are the greatest robbers and scoundrels on earth, murdering Turks and French alike, all who fall into their hands.

Brigadier-General Mireur and several other staff officers and aides-de-camp have been assassinated by these wretches. Ambushed behind dikes and in ditches on their excellent little horses, woe to anyone who goes a hundred yards from the columns! . . .

There is very little coin in this country, not enough to pay the army; plenty of corn, rice, vegetables and cattle. The Republic could not have a colony more within reach and with a richer soil. The climate is healthy since the nights are cool.

Despite fifteen days' march, every kind of labour and the complete lack of wine and everything that can relieve fatigue, we have no sick. The soldier has found great comfort in a kind of water-melon, which is very abundant.

We are without any news from France since our departure.

I will shortly send an officer with all information on the economic, moral and political situation of this country. I will also tell you in detail of those who have distinguished themselves and the promotions I have made . . .

I hear nothing of Talleyrand. It is most important that his arrival at Constantinople be not delayed. . . .

I beg you to pay a gratuity of 1,200 francs to the wife of Citizen Larrey, Surgeon-General of the army. His energy and zeal in the midst of the desert have rendered us the greatest service. Of the medical officers whom I know, he is the most fitted to be at the head of the ambulance service of an army.

BONAPARTE

329

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*Member of the Council of Five Hundred*

*Cairo*

*7 Thermidor, Year VI (25 July, 1798)*

You will see in the public papers the result of our battles and the conquest of Egypt, which met enough resistance to add a page to the military glory of this army. Egypt is the richest country on earth in corn, rice, vegetables, meat. It is utterly barbarous. There is no money, not even enough to pay the troops. In two months I may be back in France. Please look after my interests. I have great private unhappiness; the veil has at last quite fallen from my eyes. Your friendship is very dear to me; to lose it and see you betray me is the one thing needed to make me a misanthrope. It is a sad state to be in to have all one's thoughts centred in the heart of one person.

Arrange for me to have a country house when I get back, either near Paris or in Burgundy; I intend to shut myself up there for the winter: I have had enough of human nature. I need solitude and quiet;

grandeur bores me; my emotions are dried up. Glory is stale at twenty-nine; I have used everything up; it only remains to become a real egoist. I shall keep my town house; never will I give that up to anyone. I have only enough to live on. Good-bye, my one friend. I have never wronged you. You owe me that at least, whatever my heart may have desired: you understand? Kiss your wife, and Jerome.

BONAPARTE

330

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*Member of the Council of Five Hundred*

*Cairo*

*Undated*

M. Calmebet holds 100,000 francs on loan in my name; tell him I wish him to reinvest the interest and that the expenses should be as low as possible.

Before deciding what to do, I shall await news from Constantinople and France. If things are not settled at Rastadt and if the Irish have been beaten, it would be best to make peace and to use Egypt to make a brilliant and solid peace. Take care of my wife; see her occasionally. I am asking Louis to give her some good advice. I have had only one letter from you: the one brought by Lesimple. I hope Désirée will be happy if she marries Bernadotte: she deserves it. A thousand kisses to your wife and to Lucien. I am sending a pretty shawl to Julie; she is a good wife: make her happy.

BONAPARTE

331

### To Major-General Menou

*Governor of Rosetta\**

*H.Q., Cairo*

*9 Thermidor, Year VI (27 July, 1798)*

You will find enclosed, Citizen General, a copy of the provisional organization for Egypt.

You will appoint the divan, the aga and the company of sixty men he is to have under him. The comptroller and the French agent will be proceeding to their posts immediately.

You will have an inventory made of all the goods, possessions and houses belonging to the Mamelukes.

You will requisition all horses to remount the cavalry.

Take all steps that may be necessary to maintain peace, order and security in the province of Rosetta.

BONAPARTE

\* Identical instructions to Kléber for the province of Alexandria, Belliard for the province of Giza and Murat for the province of Qalyub.

332

**Order**

H.Q., Cairo

9 Thermidor, Year VI (27 July, 1798)

Bonaparte, member of the National Institute, Commander-in-Chief, orders:

ARTICLE 1. In each province of Egypt there will be a divan of seven members charged with watching over the interests of the province, informing me of all complaints, preventing war between the villages, supervising and punishing criminals with forces provided by the French governor, and instructing the people whenever necessary.

ART. 2. In each province there will be an aga of police, who will always remain with the French governor. He will have a guard of sixty armed native men, with which he will move wherever necessary to maintain order and bring about obedience and tranquillity.

ART. 3. In each province there will be an comptroller responsible for the collection of taxes and of the revenues formerly belonging to the Mamelukes, which today belong to the Republic; he will have the necessary agents under him.

ART. 4. Attached to each comptroller there will be a French agent who will report to the central financial administration and enforce all orders he may receive.

BONAPARTE

333

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

10 Thermidor, Year VI (28 July, 1798)

The undernamed Coptic gentlemen will be recognized as comptrollers of Egypt. You should first give them a proper commission, which must be signed by yourself and the Quartermaster-General, and inform the generals governing the provinces, who must aid them in their extremely important functions. . . .

BONAPARTE

334

**To Colonel Merlin***Aide-de-camp to the C.-in-C.*

H.Q., Cairo

10 Thermidor, Year VI (28 July, 1798)

Citizen Merlin will proceed tomorrow at 4.0 a.m. to the office of the Quartermaster-General. He will require the Surgeon-General or Physician-General and the chief administrator of hospitals to join him and visit the site fixed for the establishment of a hospital in Cairo to discover the reasons which have so far prevented its completion. Thence

he will proceed with the health officer and hospital agent to Giza to inspect in the greatest detail the establishment which has been set up there.

He will present me with a report on these two essential matters.

BONAPARTE

335

## Note

H.Q., Cairo

*Presumed 10 Thermidor, Year VI (28 July, 1798)*

What should be sent:

[*A long autograph list of reinforcements and military supplies of all kinds.*]

Various needs:

1. A company of actors;
2. A company of dancers;
3. At least three or four marionettists for the people;
4. A hundred French women;
5. The wives of all those employed in the country;
6. Twenty surgeons, thirty dispensers, ten physicians;
7. Smelters;
8. Distillers;
9. Fifty gardeners with their families and seeds of all kinds of vegetables.
10. Each convoy must carry 200,000 pints of brandy, a million pints of wine.
11. 300,000 ells of blue and scarlet cloth.
12. Soap, oil.

336

## To Admiral Brueys

*C.-in-C., The Fleet*

H.Q., Cairo

*12 Thermidor, Year VI (30 July, 1798)*

I have just received, all together, your letters from 25 Messidor to 8 Thermidor. What I hear from Alexandria on the success of the soundings leads me to hope that by now you have entered the port. I expect, too, that the *Causse* and *Dubois* are fully armed and capable of forming part of the line if you are attacked; two additional ships are not to be despised.

Rear-Admiral Perrée will be needed for a long time on the Nile, which he is beginning to know. I see no harm in your giving the command of his ships to Citizen ——. Do what is proper about it.

I have sent you copies of all the orders I have given for the provisioning of the squadron. I imagine that the fifty boats laden with foodstuffs have arrived by now. Here we have an immense task; there has never

been such chaos to be disentangled and organized. We have corn, rice and vegetables in abundance. We are seeking money and beginning to find it, but all that involves work, trouble and difficulties.

Enclosed is an order for Damietta. Send it by a picket boat which must ensure that our troops are there before entering; they left three days ago in Nile boats, so they should have arrived when you get this letter. I am going to send a further thirty boat-loads of wheat for your squadron.

The behaviour of the English tends to show that they are inferior in numbers and are confining themselves to blockading Malta.

However, you must either at once enter the port of Alexandria or else provision yourself quickly with the rice and corn I am sending you and proceed to Corfu; it is essential that until matters are decided you should be in a position to threaten the Porte. In the second case, you will take care that the Venetian and French frigates and all ships that can be of use to us remain at Alexandria.

BONAPARTE

337

### Order

*H.Q., Cairo*

*12 Thermidor, Year VI (30 July, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, being dissatisfied with the conduct of the inhabitants of Alexandria, orders:

ARTICLE 1. All the inhabitants, of whatever nation, must take their arms to the military commander.

ART. 2. Those who, forty-eight hours after publication of the present order, have not done so will be beheaded.

ART. 3. The house of the man who murdered the French gunner will be demolished.

ART. 4. Fifty hostages from among the most ill-disposed will be taken on board the fleet, where they will be held until the inhabitants of Alexandria behave better.

BONAPARTE

338

### Order

*H.Q., Cairo*

*12 Thermidor, Year VI (30 July, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, orders that all horses in the city of Alexandria will be handed over to the military commander to remount the cavalry. Those who have not obeyed within forty-eight hours of the publication of the present order will receive 100 strokes of the cane and will be fined 100 talaris.

BONAPARTE



**Order\***

339

*H.Q., Cairo**12 Thermidor, Year VI (30 July, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, considering it essential that the merchants of Rosetta, like those of Cairo, contribute to the upkeep of the army until this can be ensured through the collection of taxes, orders the merchants of Rosetta to pay a contribution of 100,000 francs into the chest of the Paymaster-General.

This contribution must be paid within forty-eight hours.

BONAPARTE

**Order**

340

*H.Q., Cairo**13 Thermidor, Year VI (31 July, 1798)*

The Commander-in-Chief orders:

1. All Egyptian landowners are confirmed in their property.
2. Religious foundations attached to mosques, especially those of Medina and Mecca, are confirmed as in the past.
3. All civil transactions will continue to take place as in the past.
4. Civil justice will be administered as in the past.

BONAPARTE

**Order**

341

*H.Q., Cairo**13 Thermidor, Year VI (31 July, 1798)*

1. Navigation on the Nile and the trade of Cairo, especially with Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta, will continue as in the past.

2. Shipping will be liable only to the ordinary customs dues which were charged previously.

3. The Commander-in-Chief orders the generals and civil and military administrative officers to protect shipping on the Nile and to ensure that it is neither interfered with nor delayed.

BONAPARTE

**To Major-General Menou**

342

*Governor of Rosetta**H.Q., Cairo**13 Thermidor, Year VI (31 July, 1798)*

Citizen General, your presence is still needed at Rosetta for some days for the organization of that province.

\* Similar orders for Alexandria and Damietta.

Only the greatest severity will make the Turks behave; every day I have five or six heads cut off in the streets of Cairo. We have had to treat them gently so far so as to destroy the reputation for brutality which preceded us: but today we must adopt the tone necessary to make these people obey, and, for them, to obey is to fear. . . .

The commission charged with making the inventory of Mameluke goods must send its reports to the Quartermaster.

Send us news of the admiral and the fleet as soon as possible.

Order your artillery commander to send for two or three heavy guns from Alexandria and place them at the mouth of the Nile to prevent English sloops insulting us.

BONAPARTE

343

### Order

*H.Q., Cairo*

*15 Thermidor, Year VI (2 Aug, 1798)*

1. Citizen Beauvoisins, an engineer officer, a member of the divan, the Physician- or Surgeon-General of the army or someone appointed by them will form a health committee charged with maintaining the purity of the air in the city of Cairo, Old Cairo and Bouluq.

2. They will make regulations governing butchers' shops and the burial of the dead, and to cleanse the city of all impurities tending to corrupt the air.

BONAPARTE

344

### To Citizens Berthollet, Monge and Caffarelli

*H.Q., Cairo*

*15 Thermidor, Year VI (2 Aug, 1798)*

Citizens Berthollet and Monge and the Commander of engineers will consult and choose a house in which can be established a French and arabic printing works, a chemistry laboratory, a physics laboratory, a library and, if possible, an observatory. There will be a hall for the Institute. . . . I wish this house to be on Ezbekyeh Square

BONAPARTE

345

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*16 Thermidor, Year VI (3 Aug, 1798)*

Please have measured, in the presence of a staff-officer, how much water a camel carries in ordinary goat skins.\*

BONAPARTE

\* Answer: 24 gallons.

346

**To Brigadier-General Dupuy***Commandant of Cairo**H.Q., Cairo**17 Thermidor, Year VI (4 Aug, 1798)*

I have just written to the divan to make a distribution of corn to the poor of the great mosque. . . .

For the peace of the city great vigilance is more important than a widespread use of troops. A few duty officers patrolling the town, a few orderly sergeants on asses inspecting the most important points, a few French troops penetrating into the markets and the various districts, and a few reserve companies which can be sent wherever there may be trouble are more useful and less tiring than fixed guards on the squares and cross-roads. Apart from the guards on the houses of the Mamelukes, 400 infantry and 50 cavalry should suffice for duty in the city. . . .

BONAPARTE

347

**To Rear-Admiral Ganteaume***At Alexandria**H.Q., Cairo**28 Thermidor, Year VI (15 Aug, 1798)*

The picture of the situation in which you found yourself is horrible, Citizen Admiral. That, under the circumstances, you did not perish is because fate destines you one day to avenge our navy and our friends; accept my congratulations thereon. That is the sole pleasant thought I have had since the day before yesterday, when I received your report, brought to me by General Kléber's aide-de-camp to my advance-guard thirty leagues from Cairo.

I salute and embrace you.

BONAPARTE

348

**To Rear-Admiral Ganteaume***C.-in-C. The Fleet**H.Q., Cairo**28 Thermidor, Year VI (15 Aug, 1798)*

Citizen Admiral, you will take command of all that remains of our navy in Egypt and you will act together with Commissioner Le Roy to arm and provision the frigates *Alceste*, *Junon*, *Carrère* and *Muiron*, the ships *Dubois* and *Causse* and any other frigates, brigs and dispatch boats we still have. You will appoint to all commands.

You will do everything possible to salvage the wrecks remaining in the Aboukir roadstead.

You will at once send to Corfu, and thence to Ancona, a dispatch boat with the letters carried by the courier I sent from Cairo a fortnight

ago, which I am told are still at Rosetta. Send an exact account of the battle to the Minister of Marine.

I much desire to confer with you; but I shall wait a few days before ordering you to come to Cairo, since I intend if possible to go myself to Alexandria.

Send me a return of the officers, sailors and ships remaining to us.

You must know it is essential to warn Malta and Corfu, which Admiral Villeneuve will already have done, but so that they keep on the alert and avoid being surprised.

I imagine that by now the English have drawn off with their wreckage.

I salute and love you.

BONAPARTE

349

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Cairo*

*2 Fructidor, Year VII (19 Aug, 1798)*

Citizen Directors, on 18 Thermidor . . . we marched towards Syria, driving Ibrahim-Bey and his army before us.

Before reaching Bilbeis we rescued part of the Mecca caravan which . . . had been captured by Ibrahim, released and then pillaged by the Arabs. I had it conducted to Cairo under good escort. One merchant assured me he had lost goods worth a million francs. He had all his women with him. I gave them supper and had camels provided for their journey to Cairo. Several appeared to have good figures, but their faces were covered, as is the custom of the country, a custom the army finds it very difficult to get used to.

We reached Sâlhîya, which is the last inhabited place in Egypt and where there is good water; then begins the desert separating Egypt and Syria . . . Ibrahim-Bey is now crossing it; he has been wounded.

I placed General Reynier's division and some engineer officers at Sâlhîya to build a fortress and left on 26 Thermidor for Cairo. I had not gone two leagues when General Kléber's aide-de-camp arrived with news of the battle our fleet had undergone on 14 Thermidor. Communications are so difficult he had taken eleven days to come . . .

I left Alexandria on 18 Messidor. I wrote to the admiral to enter the port within twenty-four hours or, if his fleet could not enter, to unload all the artillery and stores of the land army at once and to go to Corfu.

The admiral did not think he could complete unloading where he was, since he was moored among rocks before the port of Alexandria and several ships had already lost their anchors. He moved to Aboukir which offered a good anchorage. I sent engineer and artillery officers who agreed with the admiral that he could be given no protection

from the land and that, if the English appeared during the two or three days he would have to remain there in order to land our artillery and to sound and mark the passage at Alexandria, he could do nothing but cut his cables and that it was important to stay at Aboukir as short a time as possible. I thus left Alexandria in the firm belief that within three days the fleet would be in the port or would have set sail for Corfu. From 18 Messidor to 9 Thermidor I received no news from either Rosetta or Alexandria. . . . I then received several letters from the admiral from which I saw with astonishment that he was still at Aboukir. I wrote to him immediately to impress upon him that he must not waste an hour in entering Alexandria or proceeding to Corfu.

In a letter of 2 Thermidor the admiral informed me that several English ships were reconnoitring his position and that he was arming at Aboukir to await the enemy. This strange resolve caused me the greatest alarm; but it was already too late, for the letter reached me only on the 12th. I sent my aide-de-camp, Citizen Jullien, with orders not to leave Aboukir till he had seen the fleet set sail. Leaving on the 12th he could never have arrived in time, but he was killed on the way by a group of Arabs who stopped his boat on the Nile and murdered him and his escort.

On 8 Thermidor the admiral wrote that the English had moved off, which he attributed to shortage of food. . . .

On the evening of the 14th the English attacked him. As soon as he saw their fleet he sent an officer to inform me of his dispositions and plans; this officer perished on the way.

It appears to me that Admiral Brueys did not wish to go to Corfu until he was certain he could not enter the port of Alexandria and that the army, of which he had for long had no news, was in a position to have no need for a retreat.

If in the course of these disastrous events he has made mistakes he has expiated them by a glorious death.

On this occasion as on so many others Destiny has shown that, if it gives us great preponderance on the continent, it has given the empire of the seas to our rivals. But, however great this reverse, it cannot be attributed to the perversity of Fortune, which has not yet abandoned us; on the contrary, she has helped us more than ever before throughout this operation. When I arrived off Alexandria and learned that the English had been there in superior force a few days before, I hurled myself ashore despite the furious storm which threatened to wreck us. I remember that while we were preparing to land a warship was signalled in the distance; it was the *Justice*, coming from Malta. 'Fortune,' I cried, 'would you desert me? Give me but five days.' I marched all night; at dawn I attacked Alexandria . . . and in five days I was master of Rosetta, of Damanhur, and established in Egypt. During

those five days the fleet should have found shelter from the English, whatever their number; far from that, it remained exposed throughout the rest of Messidor; at the beginning of Thermidor it received two months' supply of rice from Rosetta; for ten days the English, in superior force, were sighted; on 11 Thermidor it learned of the occupation of all Egypt and of our entry into Cairo; and it is only when she sees that all her favours are useless that Fortune abandons our fleet to its destiny.

Is Talleyrand at Constantinople? . . .

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

350

### To Rear-Admiral Villeneuve

At Malta

H.Q., Cairo

4 Fructidor, Year VII (21 Aug, 1798)

Citizen Admiral, I have received the letter you wrote to me at sea ten leagues from Cape Kelidonia. If you are to be reproached at all it is with not having put to sail immediately after the *Orient* blew up, since the position the admiral had taken up had already for three hours been forced and surrounded by the enemy on every side.

Under the circumstances, you have, as on so many other occasions, rendered a vital service to the Republic by saving part of the fleet.

Rear-Admirals Ganteaume and du Chayla are at Alexandria, together with all the sailors, gunners and soldiers from the fleet, both wounded and fit, all the prisoners having been returned.

The two battleships, *Causse* and *Dubois*, are fitted out, as are the frigates *Alceste*, *Junon*, *Muiron* and *Carrère* and the other Venetian frigates.

At Malta you will find two battleships and one frigate; you will await the arrival of the three Venetian ships and two frigates which should come from Toulon with the convoy. You will make every effort and do all that you think necessary to enable it to reach us.

My plan is to bring together the three new battleships we have at Ancona, the one at Corfu and the two in the port at Alexandria, so that, whatever happens, we can contain the Turkish fleet, and later on to try to join these with the seven ships you will then have under your command and whose principal aim at the moment is to help the passage of the convoys coming to us from France.

I am ordering General Vaubois to provide you with a further one hundred Frenchmen for each of your ships, so that with this reinforcement you can the better control your crews, which you must complete with such Maltese sailors as you can find.

BONAPARTE

351

**To Citizen Najac***Naval Commissioner, at Toulon**H.Q., Cairo**4 Fructidor, Year VI (21 Aug, 1798)*

Admiral Ganteaume has no doubt informed you, Citizen Commissioner, of the event which has overtaken the fleet. Admiral Ville-neuve has gone to Malta with all that he has saved. Commissioner Le Roy will no doubt send you a detailed return of the numbers of dead and wounded and of the crews which are at Alexandria.

You will find enclosed a letter for Mme Brueys; please forward it to her with all possible tact.

The land army is in the most brilliant position; we are masters of all Egypt and once we receive the convoy you should be sending us we shall have nothing left to desire. I am ordering Admiral Villeneuve to assemble under his command at Malta the two Maltese and three Venetian battleships and the frigates which you have at Toulon.

I shall join the three Venetian ships of the line which we have at Ancona and the one at Corfu to the two battleships and six frigates at Alexandria.

There are only very few dead and wounded; the latter are less than 800. The crews captured by the English have almost all been returned and are at Alexandria. The thirty or forty labourers you sent have arrived.

I beg you to be so kind as to inform my wife, wherever she may be, and my mother, in Corsica, that I am well. I am sure that in Europe I have been reported killed a dozen times.

BONAPARTE

352

**To Citizen Sucy***Q.M.G., Army of the East**H.Q., Cairo**5 Fructidor, Year VI (22 Aug, 1798)*

Please order the medical officers and surgeons who were on duty today at No. 1 hospital to be placed under arrest. There is one ward which they had not visited. Please also point out that the bread was not properly baked and the meat is bad.

BONAPARTE

353

**Decree***Cairo**5 Fructidor, Year VI (22 Aug, 1798)*

ARTICLE I. An Egyptian Institute of Arts and Sciences will be established at Cairo.

ART. 2. The principal objects will be: 1. The progress of knowledge and its propagation in Egypt; 2. Research, study and publication of the natural, industrial and historical facts about Egypt; 3. To give advice on the various questions upon which it may be consulted by the Government.

ART. 3. The Institute will be divided into four sections of mathematics, physics, political economy, and literature and the arts. Each section will consist of twelve members.

ART. 7. There will be two sessions each decade, on Primidi and Sextidi. They will open at 7.0 a.m. and last for two hours.

ART. 8. All general officers of the French army may attend all sessions.

ART. 23. The Proceedings of the Institute will be printed every three months. The volume will contain: 1. Papers by members which have been selected by the committee. 2. Papers by strangers whose inclusion has been voted by the assembly. 3. Reports of the various committees on questions presented by the Government.

ART. 24. Every two years two prizes will be offered by the Institute: one for a question concerning the progress of Egyptian civilization, the other for a question concerning the development of industry.\*

BONAPARTE

354

## Minutes of the Institute of Egypt

*First Session*

*Cairo*

*6 Fructidor, Year VI (23 Aug, 1798)*

The Institute of Egypt assembled for the first time on 6 Fructidor. Citizen Bonaparte proposed the following questions:

1. Can the ovens used to bake bread for the army be improved from the point of view of fuel consumption, and how?
2. Does there exist in Egypt anything to replace hops in the brewing of beer?
3. What are the customary methods of purifying and cooling the water of the Nile?
4. In the present circumstances in Cairo is it more suitable to construct wind- or watermills?
5. Are there resources in Egypt for the manufacture of powder, and what are they?

\* Most members of the Institute were drawn, understandably, from the commission of arts and sciences, but several of the more educated and interested generals and administrators also joined; Bonaparte himself played a prominent role. The omitted clauses 9 to 22 set out detailed procedural and administrative regulations.



6. What is the position in Egypt of law and education? What improvements in these matters are possible and desired by the people?

355

**Order***H.Q., Cairo**8 Fructidor, Year VI (25 Aug, 1798)*

The Commander-in-Chief orders:

ARTICLE I. The inhabitants of the village of 'Algâm having murdered the aide-de-camp Jullien and fifteen Frenchmen of his escort, the village will be burnt.

ART. 2. Brigadier-General Lanusse will leave tomorrow evening with 500 men of his division and one gun-boat and proceed to 'Algâm to carry out this order. All cattle and corn found there will be taken on board and confiscated for the benefit of the Republic. If he can manage to arrest the sheiks, he will bring them to Cairo as hostages. He will give the village over to pillage so that no house is left standing.

He will make it known by a proclamation distributed in neighbouring villages that 'Algâm has been burnt for having murdered Frenchmen sailing on the Nile.

BONAPARTE

356

**Order***H.Q., Cairo**9 Fructidor, Year VI (26 Aug, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, orders:

ARTICLE I. 1 Vendémiaire, the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, will be celebrated in all posts of the army by a civic festival.

ART. 2. The garrison of Alexandria will celebrate the festival around Pompey's column. Advantage will be taken of the occasion to carry out the order of 16 Messidor.\* The Tricolour will be flown from the top of the column. Cleopatra's needle will be illuminated.

ART. 3. In Cairo a seven-sided pyramid will be erected in Ezbekeyeh Square, five of the sides bearing the names of the men of the five divisions who have died in the conquest of Egypt. The sixth will be for the navy; the seventh for the staff, cavalry, artillery and engineers.

ART. 4. That part of the army which is in Cairo will parade there at 7.0 a.m., and, after various manœuvres and the singing of patriotic songs, a deputation from each battalion will leave to plant the Tricolour on the summit of the Great Pyramid.

ART. 5. Ezbekeyeh Square will be arranged so that at 4.0 p.m. there can be horse and foot races in which those inhabitants of the country

\* No. 319.

who wish may take part. Prizes will be awarded to the victors. In the evening the pyramid will be illuminated and there will be fireworks.

ART. 6. The troops in Upper Egypt will celebrate the festival at the ruins of Thebes.

ART. 7. The Chief of Staff, the Commanders of artillery and engineers and the Commandant of Cairo will confer to prepare a more detailed programme for the festival.

BONAPARTE

357

## Order

H.Q., Cairo

9 Fructidor, Year VI (26 Aug, 1798)

The Commander-in-Chief orders:

1. Only one kind of bread will be made in the army: all rations, whether for the staff or the administrative offices, will be of regulation bread.

2. A better bread will be made for the hospitals; but administrators and store-keepers are forbidden, under any pretext whatsoever, to give such bread either to the Commander-in-Chief, to any general or to the Quartermaster-General.

3. On the daily visits of the duty officer to the hospitals, the director will state the quantity of hospital bread he has received. He is forbidden, under the severest penalties, to give this bread to anyone else.

BONAPARTE

358

## To Major-General Vaubois\*

G.O.C., Malta

H.Q., Cairo

11 Fructidor, Year VI (28 Aug, 1798)

I have received very few letters from you; I believe that of 12 Messidor is the second. I am grieved to learn there is unrest in the garrison of Malta. Make severe examples of the mutineers, and everyone will remain quiet.

The staff has no doubt sent you the orders of the day and reports of the military events which have taken place here. Everything goes very well. I am writing to France to have money sent to you. This country, although very rich in goods, is not at all so in money.

BONAPARTE

\* This letter, like many others, was intercepted by the British Mediterranean fleet. By the same courier Bonaparte wrote a fairly insignificant letter to Brigadier-General Chanez, Commandant of the fortress at Malta; below the signature, 'Bonaparte,' there is a note: 'Mark the end. Nelson.' This is the only document bearing these two signatures.

359

**To Vice-Admiral Thévenard***In France**H.Q., Cairo**18 Fructidor, Year VI (4 Sept, 1798)*

Your son\* was killed by a cannon ball on his quarter-deck. I carry out a sad duty in informing you, Citizen Admiral; but he died with honour and without pain; that is the only consolation that can ease the sorrow of a father. We are all vowed to death. Are a few more days of life equal to the happiness of dying for our country? Are they worth the horror of dying in bed, surrounded by the egoism of a new generation? Are they worth the indignity and suffering of a long illness? Happy those who die on the field of battle! They live eternally in the memory of posterity. They have never aroused the pity due to frail old age or to the man tormented by a painful disease. You, Citizen Admiral, have grown grey in the career of arms; you will mourn a son worthy of yourself and of the country. In shedding tears for his memory, you will say with us that his glorious death is to be envied.

Know that I share your sorrow, and do not doubt my regard for you.

I salute you.

BONAPARTE

360

**To Major-General Kléber***Governor of Alexandria**H.Q., Cairo**24 Fructidor, Year VI (10 Sept, 1798)*

I have received the suit of armour which you sent me, Citizen General. It is very fine; I suspect it is of English workmanship and destined for some Indian nabob.

BONAPARTE

361

**To Citizen Poussielgue***Financial Administrator of Egypt**H.Q., Cairo**28 Fructidor, Year VI (14 Sept, 1798)*

I wish to have sketches of the various local costumes. When drawing them, Citizen Rigo can at the same time draw the principal men of the country. Thus, to draw an Osmanli, he will draw the amir-al-hadj; for a Copt, he will draw the comptroller-general; for a sheik he can draw the sheik El-Bekry, and so on. I have already spoken to the amir-al-hadj about this; speak to the sheik El-Bekry and the comptroller-general.

BONAPARTE

\* Thévenard, captain of *Aquilon*, killed at the battle of the Nile.

362

**To Citizen Poussielgue***Financial Administrator of Egypt*

H.Q., Cairo

*5th Complementary Day, Year VI (21 Sept, 1798)*

The Damascus merchants owe us 8,300 talari, which they have not paid; the coffee merchants owe 32,000 talari, which they have not paid; the Copts, 1,000; the wife of Murad Bey, 8,000; the wives of the Mamelukes, 20,400. None of that is being paid; but it is essential that they make haste, for our needs are becoming urgent.

BONAPARTE

363

**Order of the Day***Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

*9 Vendémiaire, Year VII (30 Sept, 1798)*

The men Jean-Baptiste Lenati, Benedite and Francois Sala, accused and convicted of having cut bunches of grapes in a Turkish garden, have been condemned, in accordance with Section VI of the Law of 21 Brumaire, Year V, to be paraded under escort in the camp twice in one day in the presence of the guard, carrying the bunches of grapes, their uniforms inside out and with a placard on the chest bearing the word: 'Marauder'.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

364

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

*21 Brumaire, Year VII (11 Nov, 1798)*

The barbarous custom of whipping men suspected of having important secrets to reveal must be abolished. It has always been recognized that this method of interrogation, by putting men to the torture, is useless. The wretches say whatever comes into their heads and whatever they think one wants to believe. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief forbids the use of a method which is contrary to reason and humanity. That does not prevent the agas from inflicting the bastinado, but only as a punishment.

BONAPARTE

365

**To Brigadier-General Caffarelli***Cdr., Engineers, Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

*23 Brumaire, Year VII (13 Nov, 1798)*

Citizen General, I wish you to have five or six games of bowls made and sent to Sâlhîya, to the troops at Bilbeis and to General Desaix.

BONAPARTE

366

**To Major-General Berthier***Chief of Staff, Army of the East**H.Q., Cairo**18 Frimaire, Year VII (8 Dec, 1798)*

Citizen General, please inform the Physician- and Surgeon-General that I am displeased at their readiness to grant certificates to return to Europe to individuals who, through cowardice and lack of the sense of duty, wish to leave the army before the campaign is ended.

Instruct them that they should give certificates only to men who need to go to Europe to recover; in a country as healthy as Egypt that should be limited to a very small number of diseases.

It is not that it is my intention to keep with the army those who do not feel the honour of being our companions in arms; let them go, and I shall be the happier for it: but I do not wish them to hide the real reason for not sharing our fatigues and dangers under feigned illnesses; we risk their sharing in our glory.

BONAPARTE

367

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Cairo**27 Frimaire, Year VII (17 Dec, 1798)*

I am sending you an officer from the army with orders to stay only seven or eight days in Paris and then to return to Cairo . . . Egypt begins to be organized.

A boat arriving at Suez brought an Indian who had a letter for the commander of the French forces in Egypt; but this letter has been lost. It seems that our arrival in Egypt has given a great impression of our power in India and produced effects very unfavourable to the English. There is fighting there.

We are still without news from France; not a single courier since Messidor. That is unparalleled, even in the colonies. My brother,\* Quartermaster Sucy and several couriers I have sent to you should have arrived. Send ships for us to Damietta.

The English have three battleships and two frigates before Alexandria.

General Desaix is in Upper Egypt chasing Murad-Bey, who is fleeing before him with a force of Mamelukes. General Bon is at Suez.

Work is proceeding with the greatest activity on the fortifications of Alexandria, Rosetta, Damietta, Bilbeis, Sâlhiya, Suez and Cairo. The army is in the best possible condition and has few sick. There are a few concentrations of Turkish forces in Syria; I would have been to have an argument with them if seven days of desert did not separate us.

\* Jerome Bonaparte had left Egypt on 1 November.

We have goods in abundance; but money is very scarce and the presence of the English stops all trade.

We await news of France and Europe; that is a great need for our souls, for if the national glory had need of us we should be inconsolable at not being there.

BONAPARTE

368

## Order

*H.Q., Cairo*

*29 Frimaire, Year VII (19 Dec, 1798)*

Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief, wishing to show favour towards the monastery of Mount Sinai: 1. So that it may transmit to future generations the tradition of our conquest; 2. Out of respect for Moses and the Jewish nation, whose cosmogony recounts for us the most distant ages; 3. Because the monastery of Mount Sinai is inhabited by learned and civilized men in the midst of the barbarous deserts where they live, orders:

ARTICLE 1. The bedouin Arabs making war on each other, to whatever side they may belong, may not occupy or seek refuge, food or other objects in the monastery.

ART. 2. Wherever they may reside, the monks will be allowed to carry out their offices, and the Government will protect them from interference in the exercise of their cult.

ART. 4. They will be exempt from all customs dues on the merchandise and other objects which they import and export for the use of the monastery, and in particular on the silks and satins and the products of the religious houses, gardens and farms which they own on the islands of Chios and Cyprus.

ART. 8. The civil and military authorities will ensure that the monks of Sinai are not harmed in the exercise of these privileges.

BONAPARTE

369

## To the Inhabitants of Cairo

*H.Q., Cairo*

*1 Nivôse, Year VII (21 Dec, 1798)*

Perverse men had led some of you astray; they have perished.\* God has commanded me to be forgiving and merciful to the people: I have been forgiving and merciful towards you.

\* A serious revolt broke out in Cairo on 16 October. It was suppressed with comparative ease and considerable severity. This proclamation continues with a series of entirely practical orders for the re-establishment and future procedure of the divan.

I was angry with you because of your revolt. For two months I deprived you of your divan; but today I restore it to you; your good conduct has wiped out the stain of revolt.

Sherifs, Ulemas, orators of the mosques, make it well known to the people that those who lightheartedly declare themselves my enemies will have no refuge either in this world or the next. Is there a man so blind as not to see that Destiny itself directs all my actions? Is there anyone so incredulous as to doubt that everything in this vast universe is subject to Destiny?

Make known to the people that, since the world began, it was written that after destroying the enemies of Islam and casting down the crosses I should come out of the west to fulfil the task allotted to me. Let them see that in more than twenty passages in the sacred book of the Koran what is happening has been foretold and what will happen is laid down.

Let, then, those who are restrained from cursing us only by fear of our arms reform themselves; for in praying to Heaven against us, they seek their own damnation. Let true believers pray for the success of our forces.

I could demand a reckoning from each one of you for the most secret thoughts of his heart, for I know all, even that which you have told to no one; but a day will come when all will see the evidence that I am led by higher powers and that no human efforts can succeed against me. Happy those who in good faith are the first to range themselves beside me! . . .

BONAPARTE

370

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*1 Nivôse, Year VII (21 Dec, 1798)*

. . . At midday daily the bands of the various units will play in the squares outside the hospitals tunes likely to cheer the sick and recall to them the finest moments of the past campaigns. Garrison commanders will issue orders to this effect.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

371

### To the Divan of Cairo

*Bilbeis*

*13 Nivôse, Year VII (2 Jan, 1799)*

I have received your letter and have read it with the pleasure one always feels in thinking of those one respects and on whose attachment one relies. In a few days I shall be in Cairo.

At the moment I am occupied in planning the route by which the water of the Nile may be joined to the Red Sea. This communication existed formerly, for I have found its traces at several points.

I have learned that several groups of Arabs have committed thefts around the city. I wish you to discover what tribe they belong to, for it is my intention to punish them severely. It is time for these brigands at last to stop worrying the poor people, whom they are making wretched.

Believe, I beg you, my desire to do good to you.

BONAPARTE

372

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

19 Nivôse, Year VII (8 Jan, 1799)

Any medical officer who, in the presence of the enemy, leaves the area assigned to the ambulance without orders or who, in a case of contagious illness, refuses to attend the sick will be arrested, brought before a court-martial and treated in accordance with the law relating to soldiers who flee before the enemy. No Frenchman should fear death, whatever work he may have undertaken.

Citizen Boyer, a surgeon at Alexandria, who has been so cowardly as to refuse to tend wounded men who had been in contact with those suffering from supposedly contagious disease, is unworthy of the title of French citizen. He will be dressed as a woman and paraded on an ass in the streets of Alexandria with a placard on his back, reading: 'Unworthy to be a French citizen; he is afraid to die.' After which he will be put in prison and returned to France on the first ship. The commandant of Alexandria will send a copy of this order to the president of his Department with an invitation to erase him from the list of citizens.\*

BONAPARTE

373

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

21 Nivôse, Year VII (10 Jan, 1799)

I am extremely displeased that General Menou has retained the *Revenge*, which had received orders to proceed to Damietta. Please

\* Bubonic plague had recently broken out at Alexandria. At the other end of the scale of medical courage an act by Desgenettes, the Physician-General of the army, is worthy of record. When in March the plague was raging among the troops at Jaffa he deliberately cut himself with an infected scalpel to restore the courage of the terrified soldiers.



write to him once and for all that he is to carry out the orders he receives. By holding the *Revenge* he has upset important plans.

BONAPARTE

374

**To Brigadier-General Caffarelli**

*Cdr., Engineers, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*24 Nivôse, Year VII (13 Jan, 1799)*

You will see by the Order of the Day for tomorrow, Citizen General, that a committee is going with a strong escort to Upper Egypt. On the 26th a convoy is leaving for Suez. Four armed boats are leaving on 1 Pluviôse for Quseir and other ports on the Red Sea. On the 26th General Andréossy is going to the Natrun lakes to visit the monasteries and the waterless river.

Those of the Commission of the Arts who wish to go to these various places are free to do so.

BONAPARTE

375

**Order of the Day**

*Army of the East*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*24 Nivôse, Year VII (13 Jan, 1799)*

Corporal Girardeau and Grenadier Antoine, of the 32nd Demi-brigade, will be shot at midday today for having murdered three women. . . .

BONAPARTE

376

**To Brigadier-General Marmont**

*Governor of Alexandria\**

*H.Q., Cairo*

*25 Nivôse, Year VII (14 Jan, 1799)*

I cannot conceive Citizen General, how the foreign consuls have been able to receive a letter from the English admiral without you being aware of it, and still less how, having received it, they have published it without your permission.

Inquire of the consuls as to who passed them this letter and let them know that, if in future they do not hand over to you the letters they receive, sealed, you will have them shot. . . .

You will place under seal all the effects of the man Jenovitch, Imperial captain, who has reached Alexandria, and send him under good escort to me in Cairo. Take care to have him stripped naked, and his clothes taken and unsewn to make sure there is nothing hidden

\* Kléber had recovered from his wound and resumed command of a field division.

in them. Have him given other clothes. The sending of this man to Alexandria seems to me suspicious. Apart from that, I am glad that he is there, for he will give you news of the continent; but let him speak to no one else.

BONAPARTE

377

### To the Sultan of Mecca\*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*6 Pluviôse, Year VII (25 Jan, 1799)*

I have received and understood your letter. I am sending you the regulations which I have drawn up for the customs at Suez, and I intend to have them carried out exactly. I do not doubt that the merchants of the Hedjaz will see with gratitude that I have lowered the dues to the great benefit of trade, and you can assure them that here they will enjoy complete protection.

Whenever you need anything in Egypt, you have only to let me know, and it will be a pleasure to me to show you signs of my high regard.

BONAPARTE

378

### To the Imam of Muscat

*H.Q., Cairo*

*6 Pluviôse, Year VII (25 Jan, 1799)*

I write you this letter to inform you of what you have no doubt already learnt, the arrival of the French army in Egypt.

As you have always been our friend, you should be convinced of my desire to protect all your nation's ships, and if you will instruct them to come to Suez they will find protection for their trade.

Please also send this letter to Tippoo Sahib by the first means you have to reach India.

BONAPARTE

379

### To Tippoo Sahib

*H.Q., Cairo*

*6 Pluviôse, Year VII (25 Jan, 1799)*

You have already been informed of my arrival on the coasts of the Red Sea with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of England.

\* The form of address used. Cp. No. 406 where the 'Sherif' of Mecca is, correctly, referred to.

I hasten to let you know my desire that you should send me, by way of Muscat and Mocha, news of the political situation in which you are placed. I wish, too, that you would send to Suez or to Cairo some able man in your confidence with whom I can confer.

BONAPARTE

380

### To Brigadier-General Marmont

Governor of Alexandria

H.Q., Cairo

9 Pluviôse, Year VII (28 Jan, 1799)

. . . I cannot understand the obstinacy of war commissary Michaux in staying in his house when there is plague there; why does he not go and camp on a hillock near Pompey's column?

Keep all your battalions at least half a league apart. Keep very few troops in the city and, since it is the most dangerous spot, no corps d'élite . . . As for the unfortunate light infantry demi-brigade, have them strip and take a good sea bath, scrubbing themselves from head to toe; have them wash their clothes well, and see to it that they keep themselves clean. Hold no parades and mount no guards except in each camp. Have a big ditch dug and filled with quick-lime to throw the dead into . . . Order everyone to wash face, hands and feet daily and to keep clean.

If you cannot save the whole of the units where this disease has broken out, at least save the majority of your garrison. It seems to me you have not yet taken steps commensurate with the circumstances. If I did not have stores in Alexandria that I cannot do without I would already have told you to take your garrison and camp three leagues away in the desert. I know you cannot do that, but approach as near to it as possible . . .

BONAPARTE

381

### To Major-General Desaix

G.O.C., Upper Egypt

H.Q., Cairo

15 Pluviôse, Year VII (3 Feb, 1799)

Your last letter, which I received yesterday, Citizen General, is dated 16 Nivôse. I have no news of your subsequent operations. General Davout has written from Asyut on 23 Nivôse announcing his successes against various groups of fellahin who had revolted.

Since 3 Nivôse we have been in Qatiya where we have set up a fort and considerable stores. General Reynier leaves there on the 16th for El 'Arish. A great part of the army is on the march to cross the desert and approach the Syrian frontier. Headquarters is leaving immediately. My aim is to chase Ibrahim-Bey from Egypt, disperse the concentration at Gaza and punish Djezzar for his bad behaviour.

Naval Lieutenant Collot has left Suez with four gunboats carrying a landing party of eighty. He is ordered to cruise off Quseir and even to capture it. As soon as he has landed he will send Arabs to inform you. On your side, send men from Isna to get into touch with him and send him food supplies, which he may need.

Dispose of those wretched Mamelukes by every means and as soon as possible.

BONAPARTE

382

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Cairo*

*22 Pluviôse, Year VII (10 Feb, 1799)*

Citizen Directors, a Ragusan ship entered the port of Alexandria on 7 Pluviôse; on board were Citizens Hamelin and Livron, owners of the cargo, which consisted of wine, vinegar, cloth, brandy, etc. . . . I have myself questioned Citizen Hamelin. His information is pretty contradictory. I have not had news from Europe since 6 July. . . .

I have sent you more than sixty ships of all nationalities and by all routes; thus you should be well-informed of our position here.

We have learned through Suez that six French frigates, which were cruising off the mouth of the Red Sea, had taken more than 20 millions from the English in prizes. I am at this moment having a corvette built at Suez and I have a flotilla of four sloops sailing in the Red Sea.

The English have obtained from the Porte that Djezzar Pasha, in addition to his own pashalic of Acre, should have that of Damascus. Ibrahim, Abdullah and other pashas are at Gaza and threatening to invade Egypt. I am leaving at once to find them. That means nine days of desert with neither grass nor water, but I have collected a considerable number of camels and hope that we shall lack nothing. When you read this letter it is possible that I shall be on the ruins of Solomon's city.

Djazzar Pasha is a fierce old man of seventy with an unreasoned hatred of the French. He has replied with scorn to the friendly overtures I have several times made to him.

I have three aims in the operation I am undertaking.

1. To assure the conquest of Egypt by the establishment of a strong point beyond the desert which will hold armies, of whatever nation, so far from Egypt that they cannot combine with a European army landing on the coast.

2. To force the Porte to take up a position, thereby supporting the negotiations which you have no doubt begun. . . .

3. To prevent the English cruisers from drawing supplies from Syria by using the two months of winter left to me in making the whole of that coast friendly through war and negotiation.

I am being accompanied by the mullah, who is the most revered man in the moslem empire after the mufti of Constantinople, by the shieks of the four principal sects and by the amir-al-haj, or prince of the pilgrims.

Ramadan, which began yesterday, has been celebrated on my part with the greatest pomp; I undertook the functions formerly carried out by the pasha.

General Desaix is near the cataracts, more than 160 leagues from Cairo. He is searching the ruins of Thebes. Each moment I await official details of a battle he has had with the Mamelukes in which Murad-Bey was killed and five or six beys made prisoner.

Adjutant-general Boyer has discovered ruins never before seen by a European in the desert near the Fayum. . . .

By the next courier I will send you the levels of the Suez canal whose remains are perfectly preserved.

It is essential that you have arms sent to us and that your military and diplomatic operations are pursued in such a way that we receive help. Warfare and natural causes bring us losses. A contagious disease broke out in Alexandria two months ago; 200 men have fallen victim. We have taken steps to prevent it spreading; we shall conquer it. We have had many enemies to conquer in this expedition: desert, local inhabitants, Arabs, Mamelukes, Russians, Turks, English.

If during March the report of Citizen Hamelin is confirmed, and France is in arms against the kings, I shall return home.

I will not allow myself any reflections in this letter on the affairs of the Republic, since I have been without news for ten months. We all have complete confidence in the wisdom and vigour of the decisions you will take.

BONAPARTE

383

## To the Sheiks and Ulemas of Gaza

*H.Q., Khân Yûnis*

*6 Ventôse, Year VII (24 Feb, 1799)*

On reaching Khân Yûnis with my army I have learnt that some of the inhabitants of Gaza have taken fright and fled from the city. I am writing you this letter to act as a safe conduct and to inform you that I am a friend of the people and protector of the faithful.

I am coming to Gaza with my army only to drive out Djezzar Pasha and punish him for having invaded Egypt.

Send representatives to meet me, and have no fear for your religion or for your lives, property and women.

BONAPARTE

384

**To Major-General Menou***Governor of Rosetta**H.Q., Gaza**8 Ventôse, Year VII (26 Feb, 1799)*

I have learned with pleasure from your letter of the 27th, Citizen General, that you have said prayers in the mosque.\*

The present weather, which should continue throughout the month of March, reassures me as to the activities of the English. If they come close, our bombs and red-hot shot will deal with them; if they keep far out, their bombardment will produce a few accidents but, in the final result, will do little harm. As soon as your presence is no longer necessary at Rosetta, go to Cairo and send all available foodstuffs and money to Alexandria. Be vigorous and punish any risings by marching against them promptly and secretly. The weather is very bad today, which rather tries us.

I imagine you had the two 12-pounders sent to Damietta; we have great need of them.

BONAPARTE

385

**To Major-General Desaix***G.O.C., Upper Egypt, at Qûs**H.Q., Gaza**9 Ventôse, Year VII (27 Feb, 1799)*

I have had no letters from you for over a month, Citizen General, though I have had indirect news through the commandants of the provinces of Cairo and Beni-Suef. We are now, I suppose, some 300 leagues apart. The staff will have informed you of the military situation here. We have crossed 70 leagues of desert, which was extremely tiring; brackish water, often none at all. We have eaten dogs, asses and camels. For three days there has been a horrible wind and pouring rain; the sky is black; it is Parisian weather. The lemon-trees, the olive forests and the rugged ground are exactly like the countryside of Languedoc; one thinks oneself at Béziers. In the fort of Gaza we found more than fifteen tons of powder and a great quantity of shot of all calibres. We leave tomorrow for Jaffa. The Mamelukes and Ibrahim-Bey have taken refuge in the mountains of Nablus. I await your news impatiently.

BONAPARTE

386

**Order of the Day***Army of the East**H.Q., before Jaffa**14 Ventôse, Year VII (4 Mar, 1799)*

The Commander-in-Chief regrets to see that on leaving camp the

\* Menou had become a Mohammedan.

troops are burning the straw and wood they have procured. Since these materials are very scarce and may be useful to troops following behind the army, he urges unit commanders to prevent all unnecessary destruction.

Several outpost commanders have been negligent, thereby compromising their own safety and that of the army. A soldier of the Bon division was killed by an Arab last night because the picket was asleep. In each division there will be a senior duty officer for each day who must go the rounds at night to ensure that the pickets are in order.

All divisions, detached battalions, the guides and engineers will camp in squares with their baggage and transport animals in the middle.

Generals Bon and Lannes will order the advanced posts blockading the town to arrest any Turk trying to enter or leave and to conduct him to headquarters.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

387

### **To Major-General Berthier**

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

*H.Q., Jaffa*

*19 Ventôse, Year VII (9 Mar, 1799)*

You will send for the colonel of the [Turkish] gunners, Citizen General; you will ask him the names of the twenty principal officers of the gunners, and you will have these twenty officers conducted to the village where the battalion that is to leave for Cairo is stationed. There they will be confined in the fort until further orders. When they have left for the village, you will order the duty adjutant-general to take all the gunners and other Turks captured with arms in their hands at Jaffa to the sea shore and to have them shot, taking precautions that none shall escape.

BONAPARTE

388

### **To Djezzar Pasha**

*At Acre*

*H.Q., Jaffa*

*19 Ventôse, Year VI (9 Mar, 1799)*

Since my entry into Egypt I have several times informed you that it was not my intention to make war on you and that my sole aim was to destroy the Mamelukes: you have not replied to any of the overtures I have made. I have let you know that I wished you to remove Ibrahim-Bey from the frontier of Egypt: far from that, you have sent troops to Gaza, you have set up great stores, you have spread it abroad that you were going to enter Egypt and you have effected your

invasion by putting 2,000 of your troops into the fort of El 'Arîsh, which is ten leagues inside the territory of Egypt. I have therefore had to leave Cairo and bring to you the war that you seemed to be provoking.

The provinces of Gaza, Ramle and Jaffa are in my power. . . . In a few days I shall march on Acre. But what reason should I have for shortening by a few years the life of an old man whom I do not know? What are a few more leagues beside the country I have already conquered? And, since God gives me victory, I wish, like him, to be merciful, not only towards the people but also towards the great.

You have no real reason to be my enemy, since you were the enemy of the Mamelukes. Your pashalic is separated from Egypt by the provinces of Gaza and Ramle and by immense deserts. Become my friend again and enemy of the Mamelukes and the English: I will do you as much good as I can otherwise do you harm. Send me your answer by a man entrusted with full powers who knows your intentions; he will present himself at my outposts with a white flag, and I am ordering my staff to send you a safe conduct, which you will find here attached.

On the 24th of this month I shall be on the march for Acre; I must, therefore, have your reply before that day.

BONAPARTE

389

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Jaffa*

*23 Ventôse, Year VII (13 Mar, 1799)*

On 5 Fructidor, Citizen Directors, I sent an officer to Djezzar, Pasha of Acre; he received him badly and did not reply to me.

On 29 Brumaire I wrote him another letter; he had the messenger's head cut off.

The French at Acre were being arrested and cruelly treated. The provinces of Egypt were inundated with firmans in which Djezzar did not dissimulate his hostile intentions and announced his arrival.

He did more; he invaded the provinces of Jaffa, Ramle and Gaza. His advance-guard took up position at El 'Arîsh, where there are a few good wells and a fort in the desert, ten leagues inside Egyptian territory.

I had no choice, therefore; I was provoked into war and thought that I ought not to delay in myself carrying it to him.

On 16 Pluviôse General Reynier rejoined his advance-guard which was under the orders of the indefatigable General Lagrange at Qatia, three days' journey in the desert, where I had assembled considerable



stores. General Kléber arrived on 18 Pluviôse from Damietta by way of Lake Manzala on which several gunboats had been built; he disembarked at Pelusium and proceeded to Qatia.

On 18 Pluviôse General Reynier left Qatia for El 'Arîsh with his division. It meant marching across the desert for several days without finding water. Difficulties of every kind were surmounted. The enemy was attacked and driven back, the village of El 'Arîsh was carried and the whole enemy advance-guard was blockaded in the fort.

But Djeddar's cavalry, supported by a force of infantry, had taken up position a league in our rear, cutting the besieging army. General Kléber ordered General Reynier to move. At midnight the enemy camp was surrounded, attacked and carried; one of the beys was killed; equipment, arms, baggage, all was captured, but most of the men had time to escape . . .

The trench was opened around the fort. One of our mines caved in and the miners were dislodged. On 28 Pluviôse a breaching battery was set up and two approach batteries. We fired throughout the 29th. At midday on the 30th the breach was passable; I summoned the commander to surrender, and he did so . . .

We left El 'Arîsh on 4 Ventôse. The advance-guard lost itself in the desert and suffered badly from lack of water. We were short of provisions and were forced to eat horses, mules and camels.

On the 5th we were at the columns placed on the border of Asia and Africa. On the 6th we camped in Asia; the following day we were on the march for Gaza; at 10.0 a.m. we found 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry marching against us.

General Murat, commanding the cavalry, crossed several streams in face of the enemy by well-executed movements . . . General Lannes with his light infantry supported the cavalry movements . . . We charged the enemy near the heights opposite Hebron, where Samson carried the gates of Gaza. The enemy withdrew and did not accept the charge . . . The 22nd Light Infantry did very well; it followed the horses at the double, although for several days it had had little to eat or drink.

We entered Gaza and found there eight tons of powder, much ammunition, bombs, tools, more than 200,000 rations of biscuit and six guns.

The weather became terrible, with thunder and heavy rain; it was the first storm we had had since leaving France . . .

On the 11th we camped at Ramle; the enemy had evacuated it so suddenly that he left us 100,000 rations of biscuit, much more barley and 1,500 waterskins which Djeddar had prepared for his crossing of the desert.

The Kléber division first invested Jaffa and then advanced to the El

Auja river to cover the siege. The Bon division invested the right front of the town, the Lannes division the left front . . .

On the 16th two approach batteries, the breaching battery and a mortar battery were ready to fire. The garrison made a sortie, and then one saw a great crowd of men of all colours and a variety of dress rush against the breaching battery . . . They were vigorously repulsed and returned quicker than they wished . . .

At dawn on the 17th I summoned the governor to surrender. He did not reply and beheaded my emissary. At 7.0 a.m. we opened fire; at 1.0 p.m. I judged the breach practicable. General Lannes planned the assault; staff officer Netherwood was the first in with ten carabinieri and was followed by three companies of grenadiers of the 13th and by the 69th Demi-brigade, commanded by Adjutant-general Rambeaud, for whom I request the rank of brigadier-general.

At 5.0 p.m. we were masters of the town and for twenty-four hours it was given up to pillage and all the horrors of war, which have never seemed to me so hideous . . .

During the following days several ships arrived from Acre with munitions and stores, which were captured in the port. They were astonished to see the town in our power, for their opinion was that it would stop us for six months.

Djezzar's general, Abdullah, had the good sense to hide himself among the men from Egypt and to come and throw himself at my feet . . .

At Jaffa we found fifty guns, thirty of them being European models and forming the field train, more than 400,000 rations of biscuit, 2,000 quintals of rice and several stores of soap.

The engineer and artillery corps have distinguished themselves. General Caffarelli, who directed the siege and fortified the Egyptian fortresses, is recommended for his rare energy, courage and ability . . .

Colonel Songis, director of the artillery park had great difficulty in transporting the guns; he commanded the main attack on Jaffa . . .

The army of the Republic is master of the whole of Palestine.

BONAPARTE

390

## **To the Sheiks and Inhabitants of Acre**

*H.Q., Mount Carmel*

*28 Ventôse, Year VII (18 Mar, 1799)*

God is merciful and compassionate!

God gives victory to whom he will; he renders account to no one.  
The peoples must submit to his will!

In coming with my army into the pashalic of Acre, my intention is to punish Djezzar for daring to provoke me into war and to deliver

you from the vexations he places on the people. God, who sooner or later punishes tyrants, has decided that the end of the reign of Djeddar has arrived.

You, good Moslems and inhabitants, must have no fear, for I am a friend to all those who do no ill and live peacefully.

Let each commune therefore send deputies to my camp, so that I can record them and give them safe-conducts, for I cannot otherwise be answerable for what may befall them.

I am terrible against my enemies, but good, just and merciful towards those who declare themselves my friends.

BONAPARTE

391

### To the Emir Beshir

*Emir of the Druses*

*H.Q., before Acre.*

*30 Ventôse, Year VII (20 Mar, 1799)*

After conquering the whole of Egypt, I have crossed the desert and entered Syria. I have captured the forts of El 'Arish, Gaza and Jaffa which the troops of Djeddar Pasha had occupied. I have beaten and destroyed his whole army and have now shut him up in the fortress of Acre, which I have been besieging for two days.

I hasten to inform you of all this news because I know it must please you, since all these victories are destroying the power of a savage man who has done as much harm to the brave Druse nation as to mankind.

It is my intention to make the Druse nation independent, to lower the tribute it pays, and to give it the port of Beirut and other towns which it needs as outlets for its commerce. I wish you to come yourself as soon as possible or send someone to see me here, before Acre, to make the necessary arrangements to free you from our common enemies.

You can proclaim in all the Druse villages that those who wish to bring food and, above all, wine and brandy to the camp will be paid in full.

BONAPARTE

392

### To Commodore Sidney Smith

*H.Q., before Acre*

*3 Germinal, Year VII (23 Mar, 1799)*

General Bonaparte, commanding one of the armies of the French Republic, instructs me to inform you, Sir, that, in conformity with the exchange agreement existing between the two nations, he is sending back to you the English prisoners captured at Haifa.

He has also issued orders in the cities of Egypt and in the island of Mauritius that all English prisoners who may have been taken shall be returned to Alexandria, or to Acre, or to the Indian possessions of the King of England as you may wish.

The Commander-in-Chief of the French army requests you to return the French prisoners, especially those captured on the last ships, to the camp before Acre, upon the condition that they will not serve against the forces of His Britannic Majesty until the complete exchange.

The Commander-in-Chief requires me to thank you on his behalf for the return of one of his messengers. Do not doubt, Sir, my desire to please you, or my eagerness to be of service to the men of your nation who may suffer from the misfortunes of war.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

393

### To the Sheik of Nablus

*H.Q., before Acre*

*28 Germinal, Year VII (17 Apr, 1799)*

Commander-in-Chief Bonaparte requires me to inform you that after the letter he wrote you from Jaffa he believed you would be wise enough to remain quiet and not expose your country to the horrors of war. But you have not done so, preferring to place yourself in the service of Djezzar, a tyrant who is the enemy of God and of men. However, since General Bonaparte is merciful and knows that hitherto you have been enemies of Djezzar, he wishes to be satisfied with the lesson he gave you yesterday and not to carry iron and fire into your villages.

If therefore you behave well and entertain no correspondence with Djezzar, he will grant safety and protection to your country. Otherwise you will run the risk of perishing.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

394

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

*H.Q., before Acre*

*29 Germinal, Year VII (18 Apr, 1799)*

The janissaries of Damascus, united with Djezzar's cavalry, the militia of Nablus, the Mamelukes of Ibrahim-Bey and some Arabs, crossed the Jordan with the intention of raising the siege of Acre. They have been completely defeated in the actions of Nazareth, Safed and Cana and the battle of Mount Tabor. A great many fell on the field of battle; most of their baggage was captured, including that of Ibrahim-Bey and the

Mamelukes, which was carried on 400 camels, and several flags and guns were taken. Part of the fleeing crowd, pursued at the point of the sword, were drowned in the Jordan; the rest were chased onto the Damascus road.

According to the latest news from France received by the Commander-in-Chief, on 1 Ventôse the Republic was master of the whole of the Kingdom of Naples and the whole of Piedmont, and the great powers of the continent, indignant at the arrogant and ridiculous conduct of the court of Naples, had abandoned that king to his unhappy fate.

The bases of peace appear to have been agreed at Rastadt and the treaty was on the point of being signed.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

395

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

*H.Q., before Acre*

*29 Germinal, Year VII (18 Apr, 1799)*

The commander of the English squadron cruising off Acre having had the barbarity to embark the French prisoners on a plague-ridden ship from Constantinople, under pretence of sending them back to Toulon but in fact to get rid of them on the way, and this man being, besides, a kind of madman, you will inform the coastal commanders of my intention that there should be no communication with him. Intermediaries will be turned back before they are within musket range of the coast.

This order will apply only to the present commander of the squadron.

BONAPARTE

396

### To Citizen D'Aure

*Q.M.G., Army of the East\**

*H.Q., before Acre*

*8 Floréal, Year VII (27 Apr, 1799)*

Citizen Quartermaster, you will inform Physician-General Desgenettes and Surgeon-General Larrey that, wishing to give them a mark of my satisfaction for the services they have rendered and are rendering daily to the army, I award each of them a gratuity of 2,000 francs, which they can draw in Paris or Cairo. You will inform me of their intentions.

BONAPARTE

\* D'Aure had succeeded Sucey in December when the latter left for France owing to ill-health.

397

**To Colonel Sanson***Cdr., Engineers, Army of the East\***H.Q., before Acre**13 Floréal, Year VII (2 May, 1799)*

I request you, Citizen Commander, to send the engineer cartographers, Citizens Jacotin and Favier, to map the course of the Jordan and the various gorges running into it as well as the positions of General Kléber. They will proceed to that General's camp today.

BONAPARTE

398

**To the Executive Directory***H.Q., before Acre**21 Floréal, Year VII (10 May, 1799)*

Citizen Directors, . . . you have seen from my last dispatch the speed with which the army crossed the desert, the capture of El 'Arîsh, Gaza, Jaffa, and the dispersal of the enemy army, which has lost its magazines and part of its camels, waterskins and field equipment.

There were still two months before the right season for landings; I resolved to pursue the remnants of the enemy army and to maintain the war for two months in the heart of Syria.

We marched on Acre . . .

At 8.0 p.m. on the 27th we captured Haifa; an English squadron was anchored in the harbour.

Four siege guns that I had had embarked at Alexandria were captured by the English. But several boats laden with bombs and provisions escaped and came into Haifa . . .

We had nothing but our field guns to mount against Acre . . . You will see from the journal of the siege that on 6, 10, 18 and 26 Germinal the enemy made strong sorties which General Vial repulsed with heavy loss; that on the 12th our miners blew up the counterscarp but that the breach was not practicable.

On the 12th General Murat occupied Safed, the old Bethulia; the inhabitants show the spot where Judith killed Holophernes. On the same day General Junot took Nazareth . . . [*Accounts of various actions culminating in the battle of Mount Tabor, 27 Germinal, and the destruction of the Turkish army from Damascus.*]

You will see in the journal of the siege of Acre the works put in hand at various points in order to cross the moat and secure a lodgement in the tower, which was mined and countermined; that when several 24-pounders arrived we set seriously about breaching the town; that on 7, 10 and 13 Floréal the enemy made sorties which were vigorously repulsed; that on 19 Floréal the enemy received reinforcements carried

\* Caffarelli had died of wounds a few days earlier.

on thirty Turkish warships; that on the same day he made four sorties which filled our saps with corpses; that after a most murderous assault we established ourselves in one of the most important points of the fortress.

Today we occupy the principal points of the rampart. The enemy has built a second defence lined based on Djeddar's castle.

It would remain for us to advance into the town. That would mean besieging every house and losing more men than I wish to. Besides, it is too late in the season; what I intended has been done; Egypt calls me.

I am going to set up a battery of 24-pounders to destroy Djeddar's palace and the principal buildings of the town. I shall send in 1,000 bombs, and that should do a lot of damage in so restricted a space. When I have reduced Acre to a heap of rubble, I shall recross the desert and be ready to receive the European or Turkish army which will land in Egypt in Messidor or Thermidor.

I will send you from Cairo an account of the victories of General Desaix in Upper Egypt; he has already several times destroyed groups arriving from Arabia and almost entirely dispersed the Mamelukes.

In all these encounters a number of brave men have died, and at the head of them Generals Caffarelli and Rambeaud; many are wounded, Generals Bon and Lannes among them.

Since I crossed the desert I have had 500 men killed and double that number of wounded. The enemy has lost more than 15,000 men.

I ask the rank of major-general for General Lannes and the rank of brigadier-general for Colonel Songis of the artillery . . .

I have been completely satisfied with the army in all events and in a type of warfare so new to Europeans. It has shown that true courage and warlike talents are surprised at nothing and accept privation of every kind. The result, we hope, will be an advantageous peace and an accession of glory and prosperity for the Republic.

BONAPARTE

399

### To Ahmed Pasha

*Turkish Commander in Acre*

*H.Q., before Acre*

*24 Floréal, Year VII (13 May, 1799)*

The Commander-in-Chief requires me to propose a cease-fire in order to bury the dead who are beyond the trenches.

He also wishes to arrange an exchange of prisoners; he has in his power part of the garrison of Jaffa, General Abdullah, and, in particular, the gunners and bombardiers belonging to the convoy which reached Acre from Constantinople three days ago; he also holds a large number of soldiers from the army which came from Damascus. He knows that there are French prisoners at Constantinople and

Rhodes. He hopes that you will appoint someone to discuss these matters with one of his officers.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

400

### **To Brigadier-General Dommartin**

*Cdr., Artillery, Army of the East*

*H.Q., before Acre*

*26 Floréal, Year VII (15 May, 1799)*

It is essential, Citizen General, that you employ all your available workmen in making stretchers to complete the evacuation; this is of the greatest urgency and I require you to have this work carried out at once and without respite.

If possible please place a certain number of muskets taken from the dead at the disposal of the Quartermaster-General to arm the bakers, butchers and other administrative employees.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief*

401

### **Order of the Day**

*Army of the East*

*H.Q., before Acre*

*28 Floréal, Year VII (17 May, 1799)*

Soldiers, you have crossed the desert dividing Africa from Asia faster than an Arab army.

The army that was marching to invade Egypt has been destroyed; you have captured its general, its field equipment, its waterskins, its camels. You have taken all the forts defending the desert wells.

On the field of Mount Tabor you dispersed that horde of men who had run from every corner of Asia in the hopes of looting Egypt.

The thirty ships you saw arrive before Acre twelve days ago carried the army which was intended to besiege Alexandria; but it was forced to come to the help of Acre and there met its fate. Some of its flags will decorate your entry into Egypt.

Thus, having made war in the heart of Syria for three months, having taken forty field guns, fifty flags and 6,000 prisoners, having razed to the ground the fortifications of Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, and all with a handful of men, we are going back to Egypt. The season for landings calls me there.

In a few days you might have hoped to capture the Pasha himself in his palace; but at this time of year the capture of the castle of Acre is not worth the loss of a few days, and, besides, the brave men I should lose there are now needed for more essential operations.

Soldiers, we have a hard and dangerous road to cross; we have stopped the East from doing anything against us this campaign, but we may have to repel efforts from the West.



That will give you new opportunities for glory; and if in the midst of so many struggles each day brings the death of a brave man, new men must step forward to take their place in the front rank among those few who take the lead in danger and command victory.

BONAPARTE

402

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Jaffa*

*8 Prairial, Year VII (27 May, 1799)*

I informed you, Citizen Directors, in my despatch of 21 Floréal of the glorious events of the last three months in Syria and of my resolution to recross the desert quickly and return to Egypt before June.

As I said, the batteries of mortars and 24-pounders were set up during 23 Floréal so as to destroy the palace of Djezzar and the principal buildings of Acre; they fired for twenty-four hours and produced the effect I intended. The town was on fire throughout.

On 27 Floréal the desperate garrison made a general sortie. The fight lasted three hours; Brigadier-General Verdier was commanding the trench. The rest of the troops which had arrived from Constantinople on the 19th and were European trained fell upon our trenches in close column. We withdrew the posts we were holding on the ramparts, and thereby our field batteries were able to pour case shot on them at 150 yards. Nearly half of them fell on the field.

It seemed a favourable moment to carry the town. But deserters and prisoners and our spies all agreed in their reports that the plague was raging horribly in Acre, more than sixty people dying daily, and that the symptoms were terrible and within thirty-six hours caused the victims to fall into convulsions like those of rabies. It would have been impossible to prevent the soldiers from looting once they were scattered in the town, and at night they would have brought into the camp the germs of that terrible scourge, more to be feared than all the armies of the world.

The army left Acre on 2 Prairial and reached Tantura in the evening.

On the 3rd it camped on the ruins of Caesarea in the midst of the broken marble and granite columns which prove what Josephus said of this city.

We reached Jaffa on the 5th and for two days detachments have been marching off for Egypt. I shall stay here for two more days to blow up the fortifications. I shall go and punish a few places that have behaved badly and in a few days I shall cross the desert, leaving a strong garrison at El 'Arîsh.

My next dispatch will be dated from Cairo.

BONAPARTE

**Order of the Day***Army of the East**H.Q., Cairo**27 Prairial, Year VII (15 June, 1799)*

The Commander-in-Chief expresses his satisfaction to General Dugua at his conduct; it is largely due to the wise measures he took that we owe the peace enjoyed by Egypt during the invasion of Syria.

It was with great pleasure that in the course of his review the Commander-in-Chief saw the battalions of the 61st and 88th and the brave 15th Dragoons; owing to their fatigues and constant victories in Upper Egypt, these units deserve this particular mark of satisfaction.

The Commander-in-Chief is extremely displeased with the war commissaries and store-keepers in charge of the services at Jaffa and Gaza, and he orders the staff to have them placed under arrest and their papers sealed at once, and to have them dealt with according to the full rigour of military law; it was not owing to them that the army did not die of hunger.

The Commander-in-Chief expresses his satisfaction to the Quartermaster-General at the measures taken to feed the army in the desert. War Commissary Sartelon showed energy and zeal in overcoming all the difficulties which presented themselves.

The Commander-in-Chief is displeased with the commandant of Qatia for taking upon himself to send to Damietta an English officer and five men who had been wrecked when escorting a boatload of wounded Frenchmen. He should have kept them at Qatia pending the Commander-in-Chief's orders, treating them with all the consideration due between civilized nations although their country debases itself by its alliance with savages. In unforeseen circumstances of this kind the Commander-in-Chief orders all commanders to take nothing into their own hands but to await his orders.

*By order of the Commander-in-Chief***To the Executive Directory***H.Q., Cairo**1 Messidor, Year VII (19 June, 1799)*

... At the beginning of Floréal the province of Bahyreh was led to revolt by a drama the like of which we had not yet seen. A man from the depths of Africa who had landed at Derna assembled the Arabs and announced himself as the Mahdi angel, foretold in the Koran by the Prophet. A few days later 200 men of the Moghreb arrived, as if by chance, and placed themselves under his orders. The Mahdi should descend from heaven; this impostor claimed to have descended from heaven in the midst of the desert. Although naked, he

lavished gold, which he was clever enough to keep hidden. Every day he dipped his fingers in a bowl of milk, passing them over his lips; that was his only nourishment. Going to Damanhur he surprised and slaughtered 60 men of the naval legion, who had foolishly been left there instead of being placed in the redoubt at El-Rahmâniya. Encouraged by this success, he fired the imagination of his disciples, claiming to be able to stop our powder firing and make our bullets fall down before true believers by throwing a little sand at our guns; a great many attest a hundred such miracles by him daily.

Colonel Lefebvre left Rahmaniya with 400 men to march against the angel. But, seeing the numbers of the enemy increase at every moment, he saw it was impossible to bring so great a number of fanatical men to reason. He formed battalion square and throughout the day killed those madmen who rushed against our guns in their delusion. Only at nightfall, when they counted their dead (there were more than 1,000) and wounded, did the fanatics realize that God does not work miracles.

On 19 Floréal General Lanusse, who was always to be found wherever there were enemies to fight, reached Damanhur and put 1,500 men to the sword; a pile of ashes shows where Damanhur stood. Wounded several times, the Mahdi angel felt his own enthusiasm cooling; he is hiding in the deep desert still surrounded by his partisans. In fanatic heads there are no organs through which reason can enter.

The nature of this revolt helped to hasten my return to Egypt . . .

I reached El 'Arîsh from Syria on 15 Prairial. The heat of the desert sand sent the thermometer up to 44 degrees; the air temperature was 34 degrees.\* We had to cover eleven leagues a day to reach the wells where there was a little warm, brackish water, but we drank it more avidly than a good bottle of Champagne.

I entered Cairo on 26 Prairial, surrounded by an immense crowd, with all the muftis mounted on mules, because the Prophet preferred to ride on those animals. . . .

BONAPARTE

405

**To Citizen D'Aure**

*Q.M.G., Army of the East*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*1 Messidor, Year VII (19 June, 1799)*

There are too many office workers, Citizen Quartermaster; please prepare me a plan to reduce them.

A great many officers and N.C.O.s who have wounds which prevent them from active service could be employed in the administrative

\* On the Réaumur scale; equivalent readings are, approximately, 130° and 110° Fahrenheit.

offices and a great many young men able to carry muskets could leave them to join the units.

Send me proposals on each of these matters.

BONAPARTE

406

## To the Executive Directory

*H.Q., Cairo*

*10 Messidor, Year VII (28 June, 1799)*

. . . Six months ago plague broke out in Alexandria with very pronounced symptoms. At Damietta it was milder, at Gaza and Jaffa, worse. It has not appeared at Cairo or Suez, nor in Upper Egypt.

It is clear from the attached strength return that from its arrival in Egypt until today the French army has lost 5,344 men.

The Syrian campaign had great results: we are masters of the whole desert and we have upset our enemies' plans for this year. We have lost distinguished men. General Bon has died of wounds; Caffarelli is dead; my aide-de-camp, Croizier, is dead; many have been wounded.

Our situation is very reassuring. Alexandria, Rosetta, Damietta, El 'Arîsh, Qatia, El Sâlhiya are being fortified apace; but, if you wish us to hold out, we need 6,000 reinforcements before Pluviôse. If you send 15,000 in addition, we can go anywhere, even to Constantinople.

In that case we should need 2,000 cavalrymen, 500 labourers, masons, armourers, carpenters, miners, sappers; five demi-brigades of 2,000 men each; 20,000 muskets; 40,000 bayonets; 3,000 sabres; 6,000 pairs of pistols; 10,000 pioneer tools.

If it is impossible for you to send us this help, we must make peace, for it must be reckoned that we shall lose a further 6,000 men within a year. Next season we shall be reduced to 15,000 effectives; taking from that 2,000 men in hospital, 500 too old, 500 non-combatant workmen, we shall be left with 12,000 including cavalry, artillery, ~~engineers and staff~~, and we shall be unable to withstand a landing combined with an attack across the desert. . . .

We shall need 18 to 20 physicians and 60 to 80 surgeons; many are dead. The diseases of this country need to be studied. They can all be regarded as unknown; but every year they will become better known and less dangerous. . . .

All our thoughts are for France. If the kings attack her, you will find in our good frontiers, in the warlike spirit of the nation and in your generals the means to punish their audacity. The finest day for us will be when we learn of the formation of the first republic in Germany.

I will send you shortly the levels of the Suez canal, maps of all Egypt, of the canals and of Syria.

We have frequent contact with Mecca and Mocha. I have written several times to India and Mauritius and expect replies soon. It is the Sherif of Mecca who forwards our correspondence.

BONAPARTE

407

### To Major-General Berthier

*Chief of Staff, Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

13 Messidor, Year VII (1 July, 1799)

General Caffarelli having left extremely interesting papers on Egypt, on political economy and military science, the Commander-in-Chief wishes a committee to go through these papers and to retain those which deserve to be published. The committee will consist of Citizens Monge, Fourier and Andréossy.

BONAPARTE

408

### To the Sultan of Morocco

Cairo

28 Thermidor, Year VII (15 Aug, 1799)

There is no other god but God, and Mohammed is his Prophet! In the name of forgiving and merciful God!

To the Sultan of Morocco, servant of the Holy Kasbah, mighty among kings, and faithful observer of the true Prophet's law.

We take advantage of the return of the Moroccan pilgrims to write this letter to you and to inform you that we have given them every assistance in our power, since it is our intention to do what we may, on all occasions, to convince you of our regard for you. We ask you in return to treat the French who are in your dominions well and to allow trade to enter.

BONAPARTE

409

### Order of the Day

*Army of the East*

H.Q., Cairo

29 Thermidor, Year VII (16 Aug, 1799)

Governors of provinces will make known by means of a circular in Arabic, which will be sent to all villages, the pomp with which the feast of the Prophet has been celebrated in Cairo. In living memory there has been none more brilliant.

All troops in Cairo marched by torchlight to visit the Sheik El-Bekry. The Commander-in-Chief dined there, together with Mustafa Pasha and all the principal officers taken prisoner at the battle of Aboukir. The Commander-in-Chief was present at the reading of

Arabic poems in honour of the Prophet, after which, in the midst of the great sheiks, he had prayers said and the genealogy of the Prophet recited. The Pasha and all the Turkish prisoners could not get over their surprise at seeing the respect of the French for Islam and the law of the holiest of prophets.

Wishing to give a proof of his satisfaction to the sheiks Gariany, governor of Alexandria, and El-Messiry, president of the divan of Alexandria, men honourable for their wisdom and piety, the Commander-in-Chief had them each clothed in a cloak of great value.

This order of the day will be translated into Arabic and printed, and thirty copies will be sent to the governor of each province.

BONAPARTE

410

### To the Grand Vizir\*

*H.Q., Cairo*

*30 Thermidor, Year VII (17 Aug, 1799)*

To the Grand Vizir, wise among the wisest, only repository of the confidence of the greatest of sultans.

I have the honour to write to Your Excellency to inform Your Excellency of the true situation in Egypt and to open negotiations between the Sublime Porte and the French Republic to put an end to the present war which brings harm to both states.

By what fate are France and the Porte at war, though friends by habit, friends by the separation of their frontiers, enemies alike of Russia and the Emperor? How can Your Excellency not feel that no Frenchman is killed but there is one less defender of the Porte? How can Your Excellency, so informed as to the politics and interests of states, not know that Russia and the Emperor have plotted the partition of Turkey?

The true enemy of Islam is Russia. Paul made himself Grand Master of Malta; that is to swear war against the Moslems. Is he not head of the Greek church, the most numerous enemies of Islam?

But France has destroyed the knights of Malta, broken the chains of the Turks held in slavery, and believes, as Islam commands, that there is but one God.

Thus the Sublime Porte has declared war on its true friends and allied itself with its real enemies.

The Sublime Porte declared war in January without waiting for the arrival of ambassador Descorches, who had already left Paris for Constantinople, and without asking me for any explanation or replying to my approaches. Yet I hoped to have the declaration withdrawn and to that end I sent Citizen Beauchamp. In reply, he was imprisoned: in

\* This letter has been abridged.

reply, armies were assembled at Gaza and ordered to invade Egypt. At that I found myself obliged to cross the desert, preferring to wage war in Syria rather than have it waged against me in Egypt.

My army is powerful, perfectly disciplined and equipped with everything to make it victorious over armies as numerous as the sands of the sea. Citadels and fortresses bristling with cannon have arisen on the coast and the desert frontiers. Here I am invincible and fear nothing; but I owe it to humanity, to wise policy, to the oldest and truest of allies, the sultan Selim, to make this approach.

What the Sublime Porte will never obtain by force of arms it can obtain by negotiation. I shall answer any proposal with conciliation, and, as soon as the Sublime Porte ceases to make common cause with our enemies, the French Republic will do all in its power to restore good relations and remove all causes of disunity between the two states.

You wish for Egypt, they say; but it has never been the intention of France to take it from you.

Give your Minister in Paris full powers or send someone with full powers to Egypt. Two hours' discussion can arrange everything. It is not against Moslems that the French armies wish to deploy their tactics and courage, but in union with the Moslems against their common enemy.

As for myself, I shall think the happiest day of my life to be that in which I can help to end a war at once pointless and unwise.

BONAPARTE

411

## To Major-General Kléber

*C.-in-C., Army of the East*

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*5 Fructidor, Year VII (22 Aug, 1799)*

You will find enclosed, Citizen General, an order to assume command of the army. Fear that the English squadron may reappear at any moment causes me to hasten my departure by two or three days.

I am taking with me Generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy and Marmont, and citizens Monge and Berthollet.

Enclosed are English and Frankfurt newspapers up to 10 June. You will see from them that we have lost Italy; that Mantua, Turin and Tortona are besieged. I have reason to hope that the first of these fortresses will hold out till the end of November. If fortune smiles on me, I expect to reach Europe by the beginning of October. You will find attached a cipher for correspondence with the Government and another for correspondence with me.

During October, please send off Junot and the belongings which I have left at Cairo and my servants. But I shall not mind if you take any you wish into your own service.

The Government wishes General Desaix to leave for Europe during November, unless serious events occur.

The Commission of the Arts will return to France in November as soon as they have completed their mission, under a safe conduct that you must request under the exchange agreement. At the moment they are finishing their work in visiting Upper Egypt. But you will have no difficulty in retaining any you think may be useful . . .

The arrival of our Brest squadron at Toulon and of the Spanish squadron at Carthage leaves no doubt as to the possibility of transporting to Egypt the muskets, sabres, pistols and shot which you need and of which I have an exact list, together with enough recruits to make good the losses of two campaigns. The Government will then itself let you know its intentions, and I myself, both as public man and as a private individual, will take steps to send you frequent news.

Should unforeseen events render all our efforts fruitless, and you have not received help or news from France by May, and if despite all precaution there is plague in Egypt this year which kills off 1,500 of your men, a serious loss since it would be in addition to what the circumstances of war cause you daily, then I think that in that case you should not risk undertaking the next campaign, and you are authorized to conclude peace with the Ottoman Porte, even if the evacuation of Egypt has to be the principal condition. You must simply, if possible, delay the execution of that condition until the general peace.

You can appreciate as well as any one, Citizen General, how important the possession of Egypt is for France. This Turkish Empire, which threatens to collapse on every side, is today breaking up, and the evacuation of Egypt by France would be the more unfortunate since in our own time we should see this fine province in other European hands. What you hear of the success or reverses of the Republic in Europe must enter strongly into your calculations.

If, before you have received my news from France, the Porte replies to the proposals I made to it for peace, you must state that you have all the powers which I had and begin negotiations, repeating my assertion that it has never been the intention of France to seize Egypt and demanding that the Porte leave the coalition and allow us access to the Black Sea trade and an armistice for six months so that the exchange of ratifications can take place . . .

You know my views on the internal politics of Egypt. Whatever you do, the Christians will always be our friends. You must prevent them from becoming too insolent, so that the Turks do not have the same fanaticism against us as against the Christians, which would make them irreconcilable. Fanaticism must be lulled to sleep until it can be rooted out. By captivating the opinion of the great sheiks of Cairo you gain the support of all Egypt and of all the leaders of the people.



As to fortifications, Alexandria and El 'Arîsh are the two keys of Egypt.

If nothing prevented it I had the intention of trying this winter to introduce a new system of taxation, which would enable us pretty well to do without the Copts. However, I recommend you to reflect carefully before undertaking it; it is better to carry out that operation a little too late than a little too soon. . . .

When the French ships arrive, try to collect 500 or 600 Mamelukes whom you will have arrested in one day in Cairo or the other provinces and have them embarked for France. . . . They will be kept there for one or two years, will see the greatness of the nation, take on our customs and language and, once back in Egypt, will be so many supporters for us.

I have already asked several times for a company of actors and will make a particular point of sending you one. This is of great importance for the army and in order to begin changing the manners of the country.

The important place that you are going to occupy will enable you to use the talents that nature has given you. Interest in what happens here is great, and the effects on trade and civilization will be immense. This is a time from which great revolutions will stem.

Accustomed to see the rewards for the work and hardships of life in the opinion of posterity, I am leaving Egypt with the greatest regret. It is only obedience, the interest and glory of our country and the extraordinary events that have occurred there that have determined me to go into the midst of the enemy squadrons to return to Europe. In heart and mind I shall be with you; your successes will be as dear to me as if they were my own, and I shall regard as wasted all the days of my life in which I do not do something for the army I am leaving to your command and to consolidate the magnificent edifice whose foundations have just been laid.

All the soldiers of the army I confide to you are as my own children; at all times, even in the midst of their greatest hardships, I have had signs of their affection. Treat them with the same feeling; you owe it to the very special regard and friendship that I have for you and to the true affection that I feel for them.

BONAPARTE

412

## To the Army of the East

*H.Q., Alexandria*

*5 Fructidor, Year VII (22 Aug, 1799)*

In view of the news from Europe I have decided to leave for France. I leave General Kléber in command of the army.

The army will soon have news of me; I can say no more. It is hard for me to leave the soldiers to whom I am most attached; but it will be only for a time, and the new Commander-in-Chief has the confidence of the Government and of myself.

BONAPARTE

413

## To the Executive Directory

*Aix-en-Provence*

*18 Vendémiaire, Year VIII (10 Oct, 1799)*

Citizen Directors, since my departure from France I have only once received dispatches from you; they reached me on 5 Germinal, before Acre, and were dated 14 Brumaire and 5 Nivôse. They gave me news of our success against Naples, which made me suspect that there would soon be war on the Continent, and from then on I felt that I ought not to remain long away from France. But, although in my Syrian campaign I had destroyed the armies that had threatened to invade Egypt across the desert, it still remained to see the outcome of the sea-borne expedition which was being actively prepared in the Black Sea. The landing could take place only at Alexandria or Damietta. I confided the defence of the coast at Damietta to General Kléber and held myself ready to march on Alexandria. You will have seen in my last dispatches the result of the battle of Aboukir. Egypt, safe from any invasion, is entirely ours.

At the end of several diplomatic conferences I obtained the English newspapers up to 6 June wherein I learned of the defeats of Jourdan in Germany and Schérer in Italy. I left at once with the frigates *Muiron* and *Carrère*, although they are slow sailers. I thought it right to ignore the dangers, for I had to place myself where my presence could be useful. In this belief I would have wrapped myself in my cloak and left in an open boat if I had not had the frigates.

I have left Egypt well organized and under the orders of General Kléber. It was already under water, and the Nile was more beautiful than it had been for fifty years.

I have passed several English squadrons, and I owe my safe arrival at Fréjus to the energy and sound manœuvres of Rear-Admiral Ganteaume. I should be in Paris almost as soon as this letter; but the dry and cold air here affects and tires me, and that will delay me for thirty or forty hours.

BONAPARTE

*Brumaire*

Liberté.

Egalité.

Paris, le 3 *Messidor* au 6. de la  
République française, une et indivisible.

Bonaparte, Consul de la République,

Au (Moyen) *Lycée* Président de



Paris, le 3 *fructidor* au 7 de la République française.

**Letter-heads of the Consulate**

Above: in use during 1800; below: in use thereafter.

Slightly reduced.

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS COVER THE SEVEN MONTHS FROM the coup d'état of Brumaire to the battle of Marengo. This period has a character of its own. For all the authority given to the First Consul by the new Constitution and overwhelming popular vote and for all the energy and apparent confidence with which he set about using it, for some time after Brumaire the condition of France was chaotic and the tenure of the government insecure. When he returned with the triumph of Marengo behind him his position was impregnable.

He reached Paris from Fréjus on 16 October. Only two or three unimportant papers have survived from the next three weeks, and it is probable that very few were written. He had a terrible quarrel with Josephine, though they were soon reconciled. There was a constant stream of visits and invitations from those who wished to honour the hero, to learn about Egypt, to tell him of the ills afflicting France, to persuade him to their side. He heard the suggestions of all parties and gradually reached agreement with Sieyès and Talleyrand, and with them and a few supporters prepared plans. He was too busy to write, and wise conspirators do not put things on paper.

The essence of the plot was that Bonaparte was to win over the senior generals, in which, with a few notable exceptions, he succeeded, and that at least three of the Directors were to be persuaded to resign, leaving France without a government (the quorum was three). The Ancients were then to appoint Bonaparte to command the 17th District and to remove the legislature to Saint-Cloud, where the recalcitrant majority in the Five Hundred could be overawed and the necessary decisions taken before their Jacobin supporters in Paris got wind of them. The Councils were then to decree the formation of a provisional government of three Consuls and of a committee, drawn from the ranks of the conspirators, to draft a new Constitution. On 9 November the plot was put into effect, and the flood of documents begins again.

Almost all Bonaparte's papers concerning the coup d'état are included; a few call for comment. He made the speech to the Ancients (No. 414) in lieu of taking the oath of fidelity to the Constitution on appointment to a District command. The longer speech to the same body at Saint-Cloud (No. 416) is far from being what the Council heard, though the first part of it may have been prepared beforehand; eye-witness accounts agree that the chamber was in uproar and the general shaken and almost speechless, though such few coherent phrases as were audible were not incompatible with the published version. His report to the nation (No. 417) is packed with falsehoods: the Council of the Ancients was a good deal less enthusiastic than he makes out;

it is doubtful whether there were any weapons in the Five Hundred, certain that none were used against him; it is certain too that, faced with the noisy opposition of the majority, Bonaparte lost his nerve and was carried out in a state of collapse; it was Lucien who saved him, rather than *vice versa*, for Lucien rallied both his brother and the troops and caused them to clear the chamber; finally, the 'majority' that later reassembled was in fact a rump of barely fifty members.

Whether Bonaparte was responsible for the actual wording of any part of the new Constitution (No. 427) is doubtful, but much of it bears the clear imprint of his thought. It was drafted by a small committee meeting in Josephine's drawing-room, but the outcome was the result of a conflict of view between Bonaparte and Sieyès and was almost wholly the work of these two. The starting-point was a draft which Sieyès had long been preparing, and the final electoral system and much of the legislative and legal structures closely followed his proposals. But Sieyès's ideal was a total separation of powers, a careful system of checks and balances within each sector of public life and a head of state with very limited authority. This did not suit the general, who insisted that the executive should be the dominant factor in the State, that the ministers and Council of State should be wholly responsible to the Consuls and that, as between the three Consuls, effective power should unmistakably rest with the First. Despite many later changes, this Constitution underlay the whole subsequent period of Napoleonic rule.

The remaining papers, apart from two or three of personal rather than public interest, show Bonaparte taking his first steps as ruler of France. Much of his work was done verbally in the Council of State and conferences with ministers, but there are more than enough documents to show how he imposed his will on every aspect of French life. He went through the whole army establishment with a tooth-comb, calling for innumerable reports and ordering many changes—the few examples given (Nos. 454, 456, 459, 460) are typical of hundreds of similar papers—and his interventions in other areas of government were scarcely less thorough.

Important as all these matters were, there were three related problems of special urgency facing the French government at the close of 1799: the royalist insurrection in the west, the diplomatic position and, if this did not issue in peace, the military campaign of 1800. Nos. 446, 457, 464, 480, 491 and 507 are a selection from many documents dealing directly with the tragic, complex politico-military situation in the Vendée, though others which show a more liberal attitude towards the Church and the emigrants also have a bearing on it: previous policy had been to destroy the royalists; Bonaparte's was to win them over.

It is often alleged that the First Consul was determined to continue the war, but in fact it is probable that the bid for peace begun in his letters to George III and the Emperor (Nos. 435 and 436) was sincere. He wrote of the possibility of peace to associates with whom he had no need to dissemble (e.g. No. 491), though he probably thought successful negotiations unlikely. He certainly began operational planning for the Marengo campaign at an early date, but the papers dealing with the whole of this are grouped together in the next section.

#### THE LAST DIRECTORS

Gohier (President) Barras Sieyès Moulin Roger Ducos\*

#### LAST MINISTERS OF THE DIRECTORY

*Interior:* Quinette; *Foreign Affairs:* Reinhard; *War:* Dubois-Crancé;  
*Finance:* Lindet; *Police:* Fouché; *Justice:* Cambacérès  
*Marine and Colonies:* Bourdon de Vatry

#### THE PROVISIONAL CONSULS

(11 November–25 December, 1799)

Sieyès Bonaparte Roger Ducos

#### THE CONSULATE

*First Consul:* Bonaparte

*Second Consul:* Cambacérès

*Third Consul:* Lebrun

*Secretary of State:* Maret

#### MINISTERS UNDER THE CONSULATE

*Interior:* Laplace (12 Nov–25 Dec, 1799); Lucien Bonaparte (25 Dec, 1799–6 Nov, 1800); Chaptal (from 6 Nov, 1800)

*Foreign Affairs:* Reinhard (11–22 Nov, 1799); Talleyrand (from 22 Nov, 1799)

*War:* Berthier (11 Nov, 1799–2 Apr, 1800); Carnot (2 Apr–8 Oct, 1800); Berthier (from 8 Oct, 1800)

*Finance:* Gaudin

*Marine and Colonies:* Bourdon (12–22 Nov, 1799); Forfait (22 Nov, 1799–2 Oct, 1801); Decrès (from 2 Oct, 1801)

*Justice:* Cambacérès (11 Nov–25 Dec, 1799); Abrial (25 Dec, 1799–4 Sept, 1802); Regnier (from 4 Sept, 1802)

*Police:* Fouché

*Treasury (created 27 Nov, 1801):* Barbé-Marbois

*War Administration (created 21 Mar, 1802):* Dejean

\* Sieyès and Roger Ducos were privy to the Brumaire plot.

414

**Speech to the Council of the Ancients***Paris**18 Brumaire, Year VIII (9 Nov, 1799)*

Citizen Representatives, the Republic was dying. You knew it, and your decree has saved it. Woe to those who sought to make trouble and disorder. I will arrest them with the aid of General Lefebvre, General Berthier and all my comrades in arms.

Let no one search the past for precedents to impede your progress! Nothing in history resembles the end of the eighteenth century; nothing at the end of the eighteenth century resembles the present moment.

Your wisdom has handed down this decree;\* our arms will ensure its execution.

We want a republic founded on true liberty, on civil liberty, on national representation, and we will have it. I swear it! I swear it in my own name and in the names of my comrades in arms.

415

**Order of the Day***17th Military District**H.Q., Paris**18 Brumaire, Year VIII (9 Nov, 1799)*

Soldiers, the Extraordinary Decree of the Council of the Ancients is in conformity with Articles 102 and 103 of the Constitutional Act. It has given me the command of the city and the army. I have accepted this so as to support the measures to be taken by the Council which are entirely in favour of the people.

For two years the Republic has been mis-governed. You have hoped that my return would put an end to such ills; you have celebrated it with a unity which imposes obligations upon me and these I am fulfilling; you will fulfil yours and will support your general with the energy, steadfastness and confidence that I have always found in you.

Liberty, victory and peace will once more place the French Republic in the rank it used to occupy in Europe and which only ineptitude or treason has enabled it to lose. Long live the Republic!

BONAPARTE

416

**Speech to the Council of the Ancients***Saint-Cloud**19 Brumaire, Year VIII (10 Nov, 1799)*

Citizen Representatives, you find yourselves in no ordinary circumstances; you are on a volcano.

\*Transferring the sessions of the legislature to Saint-Cloud.



Permit me to speak to you with the frankness of a soldier and, to escape the trap which is held ready for you, suspend your judgment until I have finished.

Yesterday I was quietly in Paris when you sent for me to notify me of the decree of transfer and to entrust me with its execution. I at once assembled my comrades and we ran to your help. Well! Today I am overwhelmed with calumnies. They are talking of Caesar, they are talking of Cromwell, they are talking of military government. Had I sought military government, would I have hastened to lend my support to the national representatives?

Citizen Representatives, time presses; it is essential that you take prompt measures. The Republic has no government. Four of the Directors have resigned; I have felt it necessary to place the fifth under surveillance, by virtue of the power you have invested me with. The Council of Five Hundred is divided; there remains only the Council of the Ancients. It is from that body that I hold my powers; let it speak, let it take steps; here am I to execute them. Let us save liberty! Let us save equality!

(*A voice: And the Constitution?*)

The Constitution! You have yourselves destroyed it. You violated it on 18 Fructidor; you violated it on 22 Floréal; you violated it on 30 Prairial. It no longer has the respect of anyone. I will say all. Since my return I have been surrounded by intrigue. Every faction has pressed around me to win me over. And these men who insolently style themselves 'the only patriots' have come to me and said the Constitution must be set aside; and to purify the Councils they proposed to me to exclude men who are sincere friends of the country. So much for their attachment to the Constitution! Then I was afraid for the Republic. I joined with my brothers in arms and we have come to post ourselves around you. There is no time to lose; let the Council of the Ancients pronounce. I am no intriguer; you know me; I believe I have given enough proofs of my devotion to my country. Those who speak to you of the Constitution know full well that, violated every instant, torn on every page, the Constitution no longer exists. The sovereignty of the people, liberty, equality, these sacred roots of the Constitution still remain: they must be saved. If by Constitution is meant these sacred principles, all the rights belonging to the people, all those belonging to each citizen, my comrades and I are ready to shed our blood defending them. But I will not prostitute the name of constitutional act by applying it to purely administrative regulations which offer no guarantees to the citizen. For the rest, I declare that once this is settled I will be nothing in the Republic but the right arm supporting what you have set up.

Citizen Representatives, the Council of Five Hundred is divided and the leaders of faction are the cause. The men of Prairial, who wish to bring back to the soil of liberty the scaffolds and the horrible regime of the Terror, are gathering their accomplices and preparing to carry out their vile projects. Already they are attacking the Council of the Ancients for the measures it has taken and for investing me with its confidence. For my part, I am not disturbed. Should I, whom the coalition could not destroy, tremble before traitors? If I am faithless, may you all play Brutus. And you, my comrades who accompany me, you, brave grenadiers whom I see around this building, may you turn against my heart those bayonets with which we have triumphed together. But also, should any orator in foreign pay dare pronounce against your general the word 'outlaw', let the thunder of war crush him on the instant. Remember that fortune and the god of war march beside me.\*

I withdraw. You will deliberate. Decide, and I will execute.

(*Several voices:* Names! Names!)

Each one had his opinions; each had his plans; each had his clique. Citizen Barras, Citizen Moulin had theirs. They have made proposals to me.

(*Several voices:* The General Committee!)

There is no longer need for the General Committee; the whole of France should know what we wish to tell; we would be the most unworthy of men if we did not at once take those steps that can save liberty and equality.

Since my arrival all the magistrates and all the officials with whom I have spoken have shown me their conviction that the Constitution, so often violated, continually disregarded, is slipping towards disaster; that it offers no protection to the people of France. All the factions are agreed on this; all are ready to profit from the fall of the present government; all have come to me; all have wished me to join them. I have felt it my duty to join only the Council of the Ancients, the first assembly of the Republic. I repeat that it cannot act too promptly, if it wishes to arrest the movement which at any moment may destroy liberty.

Consider, Citizen Representatives; I have just told you truths that each has hitherto told himself, but that someone had at length to have the courage to say out loud. The means of saving our country are in your hands; if you hesitate to use them, if liberty perishes, you will be accountable for it before the universe, before posterity, before France and your families.

\*Referring to this sentence next day Bonaparte said to some friends: 'I got heated and ended with a silly sentence. The French do not like bad taste; no sooner had I said the words than a murmur made me aware of it.'

417

**Proclamation to the French Nation***Paris\***19 Brumaire, Year VIII (10 Nov, 1799) 11 p.m.*

On my return to Paris I found all authority in chaos and agreement only on the one truth that the Constitution was half destroyed and incapable of preserving liberty.

Men of every party came to me, confided their plans, disclosed their secrets and asked for my support: I refused to be a man of party.

The Council of the Ancients called upon me and I responded to its appeal. A plan for general reform has been drawn up by men upon whom the nation is accustomed to look as the defenders of liberty, equality and property. That plan needed calm examination, free from all fear and partisan influence. Therefore, the Council of the Ancients resolved to transfer the legislative body to Saint-Cloud and charged me to deploy the force necessary to ensure its independence. I believed it my duty to my fellow-citizens, to the soldiers laying down their lives in our armies, to the national glory gained at the price of their blood to accept this command.

The Councils reassembled at Saint-Cloud. The troops of the Republic guaranteed their security from without. But assassins created terror within. Several Deputies of the Council of Five Hundred, bearing daggers and fire-arms, uttered threats of death all around them. Discussion of the plans was halted, the majority became disorganized, the most intrepid orators hesitated and the hopelessness of any wise proposal was evident.

I carried my indignation and sorrow to the Council of the Ancients. I urged it to ensure the execution of its liberal designs. I recalled to it the ills of the nation which had led it to conceive them. The Council joined with me in renewed assurance of its steadfast resolve.

I then appeared before the Council of Five Hundred, alone, unarmed, bareheaded, just as the Ancients had received and applauded me. I came to recall the majority to its purpose and assure it of its power.

The daggers which threatened the deputies were immediately raised against their liberator: a score of assassins threw themselves upon me, seeking my breast. The grenadiers of the legislative guard, whom I had left at the door of the chamber, ran up, came between us and bore me out. One of the grenadiers had his coat pierced by a dagger.

\* At the time of his marriage in 1796 Buonaparte acquired a house at No. 6 Rue Chantecaine and this was his and Josephine's Paris home until the time of Brumaire, though after the Italian campaign the street was renamed Rue de la Victoire in his honour. On returning to Paris after Brumaire he at once moved into the Luxembourg, the residence and seat of government of the Directory. On 17 February, 1800, he moved into the former royal palace of the Tuileries which remained his residence in Paris thereafter.

At that moment cries of 'outlaw' were heard against the defender of the law, the savage cry of the assassins against the force destined to crush them. They pressed round the president,\* threatening, arms in their hands, ordering him to declare my outlawry. Told of this, I ordered him to be saved from their fury and six grenadiers rescued him. Immediately afterwards the legislative guard entered at the charge and cleared the chamber.

Intimidated, the seditious dispersed and disappeared. The majority, safe from their threats, returned freely and peacefully to the chamber, heard the proposals made to them for the public good, debated and prepared the salutary resolution which must become the new, provisional law of the Republic.

Frenchmen, you will no doubt recognize in my conduct the zeal of a soldier of liberty and of a devoted citizen of the Republic. Liberal, beneficent and traditional ideas have returned to their rightful place through the dispersal of the odious and despicable factions which sought to overawe the Councils.

BONAPARTE

418

### **Order of the Day** *17th Military District*

*H.Q., Paris*

*20 Brumaire, Year VIII (11 Nov, 1799)*

General Bonaparte is very satisfied with the conduct of the regular troops, of those of the Invalides and of the local national guards, who showed themselves to be true friends of the people during yesterday, a day so happy for the Republic. He expresses his particular satisfaction to the brave grenadiers attached to the national Legislature, who covered themselves with glory in saving the life of their general when he was about to fall beneath the blows of Representatives armed with daggers.

BONAPARTE

419

### **Proclamation to the French Nation**

*Paris*

*21 Brumaire, Year VIII (12 Nov, 1799)*

The Constitution of the Year III was dying. It was incapable of protecting your rights, even of protecting itself. Through repeated assaults it was losing beyond recall the respect of nations. Malignant and selfish factions were despoiling the Republic. France, indeed, was entering the last stage of general disorganization.

But patriots have made themselves heard. All who could harm you

\* Lucien Bonaparte.

have been cast aside. All who can serve you, all those representatives who have remained pure have come together under the banner of liberty.

Frenchmen, the Republic, strengthened and restored to that rank in Europe which should never have been lost, will realize all the hopes of her citizens and will accomplish her glorious destiny.

Swear with us the oath we have taken to be faithful to the Republic, one and indivisible, founded on equality, liberty and the representative system.

*The Consuls of the Republic*  
BONAPARTE. ROGER DUCOS. SIEYÈS

420

### To the Legislative Committee

*The Council of Five Hundred*

Paris

*24 Brumaire, Year VIII (15 Nov, 1799)*

Citizen Representatives, each day should be marked by a step towards the creation of a general financial system. Certain initial measures are essential, among which appear to be:

1. Undertakings by the departmental tax collectors to pay the annual direct contributions, as from 1 Germinal next, in twelve instalments, for each of which they will underwrite bills payable on the first of each month.

2. An advance in cash to be made by the same collectors amounting to one tenth of the land tax for the year VII for each department.

3. A sinking and guarantee fund, outside the national Treasury, into which will be paid the amount of these advances, . . . to reduce the public debt.

In presenting to you a report by the Minister of Finance setting out these various measures, the Consuls of the Republic formally propose them to you in accordance with Article 9 of the Law of 19 Brumaire, Year VIII.

*The Consuls of the Republic*  
BONAPARTE. SIEYÈS. ROGER DUCOS

421

### To Citizen Laplace

*Minister of the Interior*

Paris

*24 Brumaire, Year VIII (15 Nov, 1799)*

The Consuls of the Republic require me, Citizen Minister, to ask that you will at once take steps to assemble a troupe of actors for Egypt. It would be desirable to include a few dancing girls. The Minister of Marine will provide means of transport.

*By order of the Consuls*

422

**Decree***Paris**29 Brumaire, Year VIII (20 Nov, 1799)*

The Consuls of the French Republic, considering that it is essential to enlighten the citizens in all parts of the Republic as to the causes and true objects of the events of the 18th and 19th of this month, decree, in accordance with Articles 4 and 7 of the Law of the 19th of this month:

ARTICLE 1. Delegates of the Consuls will be sent into each military district. They are required to inform the people, by proclamations if they think necessary, of the causes of the events of the 18th and 19th and of the happy results that should follow them. They will ascertain the principles and morality of the public officials and they can suspend and temporarily replace those against whom public opinion complains.

ART. 2. For the execution of the preceding article the delegates will co-operate with the generals commanding military districts and those officials who are attached to republican principles and to the Government. They will correspond with the Minister of the Interior on the important mission confided to them. . . .

*The Consuls of the Republic*

BONAPARTE. ROGER DUCOS. SIEYÈS

423

**To General Jourdan***Paris**3 Frimaire, Year VIII (24 Nov, 1799)*

Citizen General, I have received your letter of 29 Brumaire. You were affronted by the events of the 19th.

Now that the first moments are over I wish for nothing so much as to see the victor of Fleurus take the road that leads to order, true liberty and happiness.

But, however you may be placed, I beg you not to doubt my friendship for you.

BONAPARTE

424

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**8 Frimaire, Year VIII (29 Nov, 1799)*

Bonaparte, Consul of the Republic, sends to the Minister of War a letter from the Government Commissioner attached to the central administration of the commune of Cherbourg and invites him to assemble without delay seven engineer, artillery and general officers, to whom this question will be submitted:

If the English were to land 11,000 to 12,000 men on our coasts situated in the 13th, 14th and 15th Military Districts, what could they do that is to be feared?

BONAPARTE

425

### To Major-General Berthier

Minister of War

Paris

11 Frimaire, Year VIII (2 Dec, 1799)

I beg the Minister to let me know whether he has had made the arms I requested for the generals who distinguished themselves during the affair at Saint-Cloud and particularly for General Macdonald and Colonel Dumoulin.

The Consuls approve that Major-General Murat should command their Guard and that Colonel Bessières should command the Guard cavalry.

The Minister of War will have a fine carbine made at Versailles for General Kléber and will have inscribed on it: *Capture of Alexandria*—*Battle of Mount Tabor*.

BONAPARTE

426

### Decree

Paris

18 Frimaire, Year VIII (9 Dec, 1799)

The Consuls of the Republic, being specially charged with the establishment of internal order, having heard the report of the Minister of Police, and considering:

1. That the emigrants detained in the castle of Ham were wrecked on the coast at Calais;

2. That they are in no way covered by the laws concerning emigrants;

3. That it is contrary to the law of civilised nations to profit by the accident of wreck to deliver even to the just rigour of the laws the unfortunates who have escaped the waves, decree:

ARTICLE I. The French emigrants wrecked at Calais on 23 Brumaire, Year IV, and named in the judgment of the court martial at Calais on 9 Nivose, Year IV, will be deported beyond the territory of the Republic.

ART. 2. The Ministers of Police and of War are charged, each in so far as he is concerned, with the execution of the present decree, which will be printed in the *Bulletin of the Laws*.

*The Consuls of the Republic*

BONAPARTE. SIEYÈS. ROGER DUCOS

427

**Constitution of the French Republic\****Paris**22 Frimaire, Year VIII (13 Dec, 1799)*

## OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP

ARTICLE I. The French Republic is one and indivisible. Its European territory is divided into departments and communes.

2. Every man born and residing in France, who, being twenty-one years of age, has caused his name to be inscribed on the civic register of his commune and who has remained for a period of one year upon the territory of the Republic is a French citizen.

7. The citizens of each commune choose by vote those amongst them whom they believe most suitable to conduct public affairs. There results a list containing a number of names equal to one-tenth of the number of citizens having the right to participate. The public officials of the commune must be selected from this first communal list.

8. The citizens included in the communal lists of a department select one-tenth of their own number. There results a second list, called departmental, from which must be chosen the public officials of the department.

9. The citizens carried on the departmental list also select one tenth of their number; there results a third list which includes citizens of the department eligible for national office.

14. . . . the lists of those eligible will be drawn up for the first time in the course of the year IX. Citizens appointed to the first constituted authorities will belong as of right to the first lists.

## OF THE SENATE

15. The Senate is composed of eighty members of at least forty years of age who hold office for life and are immovable. . . .

16. Senators are appointed by the Senate, which chooses from among three candidates proposed, as to the first by the Legislature; as to the second, by the Tribunate; as to the third by the First Consul. . . .

\* The Constitution was submitted to and approved by the surviving Legislative Committees of the former Councils on 13 December (22 Frimaire). On the 14th a law was passed regulating the method by which it was to be submitted to the popular vote. This process was completed on 7 February, 1800, the result being: Ayes, 3,009,445; Noes, 1,562. Meanwhile, Bonaparte's impatience had already succeeded in bringing the Constitution into force (see No. 431). On 24 December the new Consuls nominated ministers and members of the Council of State, and forty-one Senators were chosen in accordance with Article 24. On the following day the Senate completed itself and nominated the Tribunes and Legislators, while the Legislative Committees passed a law stipulating that the new governing bodies should assume office forthwith. On the 26th, on being notified that these bodies had been constituted, the Committees declared themselves dissolved.



18. A Senator is always ineligible for any other public office.
19. The lists drawn up in the departments under Article 9 are presented to the Senate; they compose the national list.
20. From this list it elects the Legislators, the Tribunes, the Consuls, the Judges of Appeal and the Commissioners of Accounts.
21. It upholds or annuls all acts referred to it as unconstitutional by the Tribunate or the Government. . . .
22. The revenues from specified national domains are set aside for the expenses of the Senate. The annual stipend of each of its members is drawn from these revenues and amounts to one twentieth of that of the First Consul.
23. The sessions of the Senate are not open to the public.
24. Citizens Sieyès and Roger Ducos, retiring Consuls, are appointed to the Senate; they will join with the Second and Third Consuls named in this Constitution. These four citizens will nominate the majority of the Senate, which will then complete itself and proceed to the elections conferred upon it.

#### OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

25. New laws will be promulgated only when a bill has been proposed by the Government, communicated to the Senate and assented to by the Legislature.
27. The Tribunate is composed of one hundred members of at least twenty-five years of age. One fifth of them are renewed annually and they remain indefinitely re-eligible so long as their names remain upon the national list.
28. The Tribunate discusses draft laws; it votes their adoption or rejection. It sends three orators from among its members to explain and defend the motives for the views it has expressed on each of these bills. It refers to the Senate, on grounds of unconstitutionality only, the lists of eligible citizens, the acts of the Legislative Corps and those of the Government.
29. It expresses its views on laws passed and to be passed, on abuses to be remedied, on improvements to be undertaken in every part of the public administration, but never on civil or criminal matters before the courts. . . .
31. The Legislative Corps is composed of three hundred members of at least thirty years of age; one-fifth of them are renewed annually. There must always be at least one citizen from each department of the Republic.
34. The Legislative Corps makes the law by voting, in secret ballot and without previous discussion by its members, on the bills debated before it by the orators of the Tribunate and the Government.
35. Sessions of the Tribunate and the Legislative Corps are public. . . .

36. The annual salary of a Tribune is 15,000 francs; that of a Legislator, 10,000 francs.

37. Every enactment of the Legislative Corps is promulgated by the First Consul on the tenth day after being voted, unless during this period there has been recourse to the Senate on grounds of unconstitutionality. . . .

#### OF THE GOVERNMENT

39. The Government is entrusted to three Consuls, appointed for ten years and indefinitely re-eligible. . . . The Constitution appoints Citizen Bonaparte, formerly provisional Consul, to be First Consul; Citizen Cambacérès, formerly Minister of Justice, to be Second Consul; Citizen Lebrun, formerly member of the Council of the Ancients, to be third Consul. . . .

40. The First Consul has special functions and attributions, in which, when necessary, he is temporarily replaced by one of his colleagues.

41. The First Consul promulgates the laws; he appoints and dismisses at will the members of the Council of State, the ministers, ambassadors, . . . the officers of the armed forces, the members of local administrations, and the Government's attorneys before the courts. He appoints, but cannot dismiss, the criminal and civil judges, except justices of the peace and Judges of Appeal.

42. In the other acts of the Government the Second and Third Consuls have a consultative role: they sign the register of these acts to confirm their presence; if they wish, they may record their opinions; after which the decision of the First Consul suffices.

43. The salary of the First Consul will be 500,000 francs during the Year VIII. The salary of each of the other Consuls equals three-tenths of that of the First.

44. The Government proposes the laws and makes the regulations necessary to ensure their execution.

45. The Government controls the revenue and expenditure of the State in conformity with the annual law determining the amount of each. . . .

46. If the Government is informed of a conspiracy against the State, it may issue warrants of arrest against the persons who are the presumed authors or accomplices; but, if, ten days after their arrest, they have not been either set at liberty or prosecuted according to law, the minister signing the warrant is guilty of arbitrary detention.

47. The Government provides for the internal security and external defence of the State. . . .

49. The Government carries on external political relations, conducts negotiations, . . . signs and concludes all treaties. . . .

50. Declarations of war, treaties of peace, alliance and trade are proposed, discussed, decreed and promulgated as laws. . . .

51. The secret articles of a treaty may not be destructive of the open articles.

52. Under the direction of the Consuls, a Council of State is entrusted with the drafting of bills and regulations for public administration and with resolving the difficulties arising in administrative matters.

54. The ministers procure the execution of the laws and regulations for public administration.

55. No action of the Government is effective unless signed by a minister.

57. Detailed accounts of the expenditure of each minister, signed and certified by him, are made public.

58. The Government may select and retain as Councillors of State and ministers only citizens whose names are inscribed on the national list.

#### OF THE COURTS

60. Each commune has one or more justices of the peace directly elected by the citizens for three years. Their principal function consists in conciliating the parties, whom, conciliation failing, they invite to submit to arbitration.

61. In civil cases there are courts of first instance and courts of appeal. . . .

62. In criminal cases carrying degrading or corporal punishment, a first jury admits or rejects the accusation: if admitted, a second jury determines the facts; the judges impose the sentence. . . .

63. The function of public prosecutor in a criminal court is carried out by the Government attorney.

64. Crimes not carrying degrading or corporal punishment are judged by police courts, subject to appeal to the criminal courts.

65. There is, for the whole Republic, a Court of Appeal, which pronounces in the last instance on the judgments delivered by the courts. . . .

66. The Court of Appeal does not take into account the facts of cases; but it overthrows judgments where the correct form of procedure has been violated or where there is an express contravention of the law; it refers the facts of the case back to the competent court.

68. Judges, other than justices of the peace, retain their functions for life. . . .

#### OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

69. The functions of members of the Senate, the Legislative Corps, the Tribunate, those of the Consuls and Councillors of State give rise to no responsibility.

70. Private crimes committed by members of the Senate, the Tribune, the Legislative Corps or the Council of State are pursued before the ordinary courts, after the body to which the accused belongs has deliberated and authorized this course.

71. Ministers accused of private crimes are considered to be members of the Council of State.

72. Ministers are responsible: 1. for every act of government signed by them and declared unconstitutional by the Senate; 2. for failure to carry out the laws and public administrative regulations; 3. for orders personally given by them, if these are contrary to the Constitution, the laws or the regulations.

73. When the preceding article applies, the Tribune denounces the minister in a bill which the Legislative Corps discusses under the usual procedure, after having heard the accused. A minister placed on trial by a decree of the Legislative Corps is judged by a high court without appeal. The high court is composed of judges and jury. The judges are chosen by the Court of Appeal from among its members; the jury are taken from the national list. . . .

#### GENERAL DISPOSITIONS.

76. The house of every person living on French territory is an inviolable refuge. During the night none may enter except in case of fire or flood, or at the request of those within. During the day it may be entered for a special purpose determined either by a law or by the order of a public authority.

77. Before the warrant ordering the arrest of any person may be executed, it must: 1. expressly state the reason for the arrest and the law under which it has been issued; 2. be signed by an official to whom the law expressly gives this power; 3. be read to the person arrested, who must receive a copy.

80. Access to a detained person may not be refused to his relatives or friends bearing an order from the civil officer, who will always be required to grant it, unless the guardian or jailer holds the order of a judge to hold the person in secret.

82. All violence employed in effecting arrest, detention or the execution of punishments, other than such as is authorized by the law, is a crime.

83. Every person has the right to address individual petitions to any constituted authority, and especially to the Tribune.

86. The French nation declares that pensions will be accorded to all soldiers wounded in the defence of the nation and to the widows and children of soldiers dying on the field of battle or as a result of their wounds.

88. A National Institute is charged with the recording of discoveries and the perfecting of science and art.

89. A Committee of National Accounts regulates and verifies the receipts and expenditure of the Republic. This Committee is composed of seven members chosen by the Senate from the National List.

91. The government of the French colonies is determined by special laws.

92. In the case of armed revolt or of disturbances which threaten the security of the State, the rule of the Constitution may be suspended by law in specified areas and for a specified period. If the Legislative Corps is in recess, such suspension may in like circumstances be declared provisionally by a decree of the Government, provided that by an article of the same decree the Corps is recalled at the earliest moment.

93. The French nation declares that in no case will it permit the return of those Frenchmen who, having abandoned their country since 14 July, 1789, are not included among the exceptions carried in the laws delivered against the emigrants; it forbids any further exception on this point. The property of the emigrants is irrevocably vested in the Republic.

95. The present Constitution will be submitted at once to the approval of the French people.

428

## Proclamation to the French Nation

*Paris*

*24 Frimaire, Year VIII (15 Dec, 1799)*

A Constitution is laid before you.

It ends the uncertainty which the provisional nature of the government was bringing to foreign affairs and to the internal and military situation of the Republic. It appoints to the offices it establishes chief magistrates whose devotion will make it effective.

The Constitution is based on the true principles of representative government and on the sacred rights of property, equality and liberty. The powers which it sets up will be strong and stable, as they must be in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens and the interests of the State.

Citizens, the revolution is established on the principles with which it began. It is complete.

*The Consuls of the Republic*

BONAPARTE. ROGER DUCOS. SIEYÈS

429

## To General Kléber

*C.-in-C., Army of the East*

*Paris*

*27 Frimaire, Year VIII (18 Dec, 1799)*

I have sent you several ships, Citizen General, and I hope they will

have had the skill to reach you and bring you news of France, for which you must be very avid.

I am sending you a staff officer from Paris, who knows the events that have taken place. You will see it was high time I arrived in France. What has happened here should give new encouragement to your soldiers. Let them know that not a day passes but I am occupied with everything that may influence their fate, and that it will be a happy day for me when, as first magistrate of the Republic, I can bestow rewards on men who have so many claims to my affection.

I dare write you nothing, even in cipher, for there are men in Paris and London who can decipher everything; but be sure I do not lose sight of you.

You will see from the dispatches of the Minister of War that the harm done to the depots of the demi-brigades in your army has been made good.

I have had a pension of one-third of the pay of their husbands given to the wives of men who are in Egypt.

The next campaign will, I hope, bring more honour to French arms than the last. Why cannot men like you be in several places at once?

BONAPARTE

430

### **To the Legislative Committee**

*The Council of Five Hundred*

Paris

28 Frimaire, Year VIII (19 Dec, 1799)

Citizen Representatives, by the Law of 19 Frimaire, Year VIII, the Legislature has settled the form of the new metric system. Several provisions seem now to be necessary to hasten the introduction of the new measures and assure the execution of the laws already passed on this subject.

The Consuls of the Republic lay before you a report made to them by the Minister of the Interior and, in accordance with the Law of 19 Brumaire, Year VIII, they submit to you the formal and necessary proposal to make regulations to this effect.

*The Consuls of the Republic*

BONAPARTE. ROGER DUCOS. SIEYÈS

431

### **To the Legislative Committee**

*The Council of Five Hundred*

Paris

1 Nivôse, Year VIII (22 Dec, 1799)

Citizen Representatives, important considerations appear to demand the immediate cessation of the present provisional nature of all governmental powers. The welcome accorded to the new Constitution in

Paris and in the departments leaves no doubt that this new pact of the French is almost unanimously accepted by the citizens. In these circumstances the Consuls of the Republic believe that it would be contrary to the best interests of the country to delay bringing the Constitution into force.

Consequently, the Consuls of the Republic submit to you the formal and necessary proposal to fix the day when the Constitution of the French people will be brought into force;

To determine the places where the Conservative Senate, the Tribunate, the Legislative Corps and the Government shall be established;

To place the present guard of the Legislative Corps at the disposal of the Government;

And to make regulations concerning various credits to be opened or modified as a result of the new order of things, for the service of the Year VIII. A report of the Minister of Finance on this last matter is attached to the present message.

BONAPARTE

432

### To the Legislative Committee

*The Council of Five Hundred*

Paris

2 Nivôse, Year VIII (23 Dec, 1799)

Citizen Representatives, different laws passed at various times have condemned a number of individuals, without previous trial, to deportation or other penalties.

The Consuls lay before you the report on this subject presented to them by the Minister of Police; they submit to you the formal and necessary proposal to pass a law authorizing the Government to pronounce definitively on the petitions made to it by individuals condemned to deportation or other penalty by laws, decrees or acts of the legislative body.

You will no doubt also think it necessary to accord to the Government the power to restore to them the rights of citizenship when it judges that this can be done without danger to the public peace.

BONAPARTE. ROGER DUCOS

433

### To the Legislative Committee

*The Council of Five Hundred*

Paris

3 Nivôse, Year VIII (24 Dec, 1799)

Citizen Representatives, two great moments have occurred during the Revolution: the triumph of liberty on 14 July, and the foundation of the Republic on 1 Vendémiaire; this last day preserves the memory of 10 August.

The citizens' memory of these days is imperishable; they were greeted with unanimous joy by all Frenchmen, and they raise no memory tending to divide the friends of the Republic.

Consequently, the Consuls of the Republic make to you the formal and necessary proposal that you declare that in future 14 July and 1 Vendémiaire shall be the only festivals celebrated in the name of the Republic.\*

*The Consuls of the Republic*  
BONAPARTE. SIEYÈS. ROGER DUCOS

434

### To Citizen Sieyès

*President of the Conservative Senate*

*Paris*

*3 Nivôse, Year VIII (24 Dec, 1799)*

Citizens Abrial, Crétet, Roederer and Regnier do not accept the position of Senator. I wish you to appoint in their place:

Admiral Morard de Galles, distinguished sailor and respected old man;

General Frégeville, at present commanding at Toulouse;

Citizen Jacqueminot, member of the committee of Five Hundred;

General Sauret, distinguished soldier and respected old man.

I think it wise and strictly just that there should be eight or ten soldiers in the Senate.

BONAPARTE

435

### To H.M. the King of Great Britain and Ireland

*Paris*

*4 Nivôse, Year VIII (25 Dec, 1799)*

Called by the wish of the French nation to occupy the first magistracy of the Republic, I deem it proper, on entering office, personally to inform Your Majesty.

Must the war which for eight years has ravaged the four corners of the world be eternal? Is there no way to understanding?

How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, strong and powerful beyond the needs of their security and independence, sacrifice to vain notions of grandeur alike commercial well-being, internal prosperity and family happiness? Why do they not recognize that peace is at once the highest necessity and the highest glory?

\* This proposal was made in a report by Laplace, in which he said that 'for festivals to be of real value some great political or moral idea must have presided over their creation and they must be able to be celebrated with the same enthusiasm at all times and in all places'.



These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of Your Majesty, who rules over a free nation with the sole aim of promoting its happiness.

Your Majesty will see in this approach only my sincere desire for the second time to contribute effectively towards general pacification by a prompt and confidential intervention, free of those formalities which may be necessary to disguise the dependence of weak states but which in the strong reveal only the mutual desire to deceive.

In abusing their powers, to the misery of all, France and England can still for long avoid exhaustion; but I dare to say that the fate of all civilized nations depends upon an end to a war which is setting fire to the whole world.

BONAPARTE

436

### To H.M. the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia

Paris

4 Nivôse, Year VIII (25 Dec, 1799)

On returning to Europe after an absence of eighteen months I find war renewed between the French Republic and Your Majesty.

The French nation has called upon me to occupy the first magistracy.

Being foreign to every sentiment of vain glory, the first of my desires is to prevent the shedding of blood. All goes to show that in the forthcoming campaign powerful and ably led armies will treble the number of victims already caused by the renewal of hostilities.

The known character of Your Majesty leaves me in no doubt as to the wish of Your Majesty's heart. If that alone is hearkened to I foresee the possibility of harmonizing the interests of our two nations.

In all previous correspondence Your Majesty has accorded me some marks of esteem. I pray that in this present approach will be seen both the desire to respond and further evidence of the most particular regard in which I hold Your Majesty.

BONAPARTE

437

### Proclamation to the French Nation

Paris

4 Nivôse, Year VIII (25 Dec, 1799)

To make the Republic beloved by its citizens, respected by foreigners, formidable to its enemies, such are the obligations which we undertook in accepting the first magistracy.

It will be dear to its citizens if the laws and the acts of the authorities are always imbued with the spirit of order, justice and moderation.

Without order administration is but chaos: finance and public credit

are wanting, and personal fortunes collapse with the fortune of the State. Without justice there are only parties, oppressors and victims. Moderation imprints an august quality upon governments as upon nations; it is always the counterpart of force and the guarantee of the survival of social institutions.

The Republic will be impressive to foreigners if it knows how to respect in their independence the title to its own; if its undertakings, wisely prepared and accepted with sincerity, are faithfully kept.

It will be formidable to its enemies if its forces by land and sea are strongly built; if each of its defenders finds a family in the unit to which he belongs and, within this family, a heritage of valour and glory; if the officer, trained by long study, finds through regular advancement the rewards due to his talents and labours.

Upon these principles depend the stability of government, the success of commerce and agriculture, the greatness and prosperity of nations. In setting them out we have set out the rule by which we must be judged. Frenchmen, we have told you our duties; it will be you who will tell us whether we have fulfilled them.

BONAPARTE

438

## Order of the Day

*Army of Italy*

*Paris*

*4 Nivôse, Year VIII (25 Dec, 1799)*

Soldiers! The circumstances which keep me at the head of the Government prevent me from being in your midst.

Your needs are great. All steps have been taken to meet them.

The first qualities of the soldier are constancy and discipline; valour is only the second.

Soldiers! Several units have left their positions; they have been deaf to the voice of their officers. The 17th Light is of this number.

Are they all dead, then, the brave men of Castiglione, of Rivoli, of Neumarkt? They would have perished sooner than desert their flags, and they would have led their young comrades in the path of honour and duty.

Soldiers! Your rations are not issued regularly, you say. What would you have done had you, like the 4th and 22nd Light, the 18th and 32nd of the Line, found yourselves in the middle of the desert, without bread or water, eating horse and mule? 'Victory will give us bread', they said; and you, you desert the Colours!

I shall have rendered to me a daily report on the conduct of all units and especially of the 17th Light and the 63rd of the Line. They shall remember again the confidence I once had in them.

BONAPARTE

439

**Proclamation to the Citizens of Santo Domingo***Paris**4 Nivôse, Year VIII (25 Dec, 1799)*

Citizens, a Constitution which could not be maintained in the face of repeated violations has been replaced by a new pact designed to strengthen freedom.

Article 91 lays down that the French colonies will be governed by special laws.

This disposition derives from the nature of things and the differences of climate. The inhabitants of French colonies situated in America, Asia and Africa cannot be ruled by the same law. Distinctions of tradition, of custom, of interest, the diversity of soil, of culture, of production demand various modifications.

One of the first acts of the new legislature will be to prepare the laws destined to govern you. Far from these being a cause for alarm among you, you will recognize in them the wisdom and depth of view which inspires the legislators of France.

In announcing the new social pact to you, the Consuls of the Republic declare that the sacred principles of the liberty and equality of the black peoples will never undergo any threat or modification among you.

If there are any who maintain relations with the enemy powers, remember, brave blacks, that the French people alone recognize your freedom and the equality of your rights.

BONAPARTE

440

**To Citizen Boulay de la Meurthe***President, Legal Section, Council of State**Paris**5 Nivôse, Year VIII (26 Dec, 1799)*

I wish your section to consider, as soon as possible, the important question of the emigrants.

1. To close the list of emigrants and to substitute for it a law on passports. As to individuals who have emigrated but have not yet been inscribed on the list, to establish a formality that preserves civil liberty, and, above all, to propose a law repealing those dispositions of earlier laws which are contrary to the true purpose for which the law on emigrants was made.

2. To propose a regulation to enable those who have been provisionally struck off the list but not definitively confirmed to be judged as soon as possible. . . .

BONAPARTE

You will find attached different notes furnished by the Ministers:

1. on emigration and its effects; 2. a numerical report of inscriptions on the list; 3. a report on surveillance; 4. notes on the laws on emigrants with observations; 5. accounts of the work of the emigrant section in the Ministry of Police.

441

### To the Conservative Senate

Paris

6 Nivôse, Year VIII (27 Dec, 1799)

Senators, the Consuls of the Republic hasten to inform you that the Government is installed. In all circumstances they will employ every means to decrease faction, to bring about unity and to maintain the Constitution, which represents the hopes of the French people. The Conservative Senate will be animated by the same desires, and through its union with the Consuls the ill-disposed, if such can exist in the first bodies of the State, will be frustrated.

BONAPARTE

442

### To the Conservative Senate

Paris

6 Nivôse, Year VIII (27 Dec, 1799)

Citizen Senators, the Consuls of the Republic have received the report containing the nominations which you have made for the Tribunal and the Legislative Corps.

They desire that all members composing them should come together, remote from all spirit of faction, to work towards the prosperity of the Republic; that they should forget the different hatreds resulting from revolutionary dissensions; and that the declamations made by some of them against the Constitution, which has been accepted with so much acclamation by the French people, should be the last.

BONAPARTE

443

### To Citizen Fouché

*Minister of Police*

Paris

6 Nivôse, Year VIII (27 Dec, 1799)

In conformity with the orders I have received from the First Consul, I have the honour to inform you, Citizen Minister, that as from today *The Monitor* is the sole official journal. Please, in consequence, give the necessary orders so that such correspondence and acts of your administration as should be made public are communicated to it exactly.

*By order of the First Consul*

444

**To Rear-Admiral Ganteaume***President, Naval and Colonial Section, Council of State* *Paris**6 Nivôse, Year VIII (27 Dec, 1799)*

I request you, Citizen, to prepare for me a draft regulation for the provisional government of Santo Domingo, Guadaloupe, Mauritius and Réunion. Let me also know the ideas of the section on measures to be taken to bring the last two to the obedience they owe to the mother country.

BONAPARTE

445

**Decree***Paris**7 Nivôse, Year VIII (28 Dec, 1799)*

The Consuls of the Republic, having seen the recommendation of the Council of State, being instructed that certain local authorities have strained the laws setting up the Republican calendar by ordering that religious buildings shall be open only on Decadi, and considering that no law has empowered these authorities to take such steps, decree:

ARTICLE 1. The said orders are annulled.

ART. 2. The laws concerning the freedom of worship will be executed in the letter and the spirit.

ART. 3. The Ministers of Justice and of Police are charged, each in so far as he is concerned, with the execution of the present decree, which will be inserted in the *Bulletin of the Laws*.

BONAPARTE

446

**Proclamation***Inhabitants of the Western Departments**Paris**7 Nivôse, Year VIII (28 Dec, 1799)*

For the second time a hateful war threatens to set aflame the western departments. It is the duty of the first magistrates of the Republic to halt its progress and extinguish it at the source; but they do not wish to employ force until they have exhausted the resources of persuasion and justice.

The instigators of this trouble are insensate partisans of two men who have honoured neither their rank by virtue nor their misfortunes by deeds, men despised by the foreigner whose hatred they have used without inspiring his sympathy.

There are still traitors sold to the English, tools of their enmity, and brigands who seek only to continue their crimes and hide them under civil strife. To such the Government owes neither concessions nor the explanation of its principles.

But there are also citizens beloved by the nation who have been seduced by their wiles; to these citizens enlightenment and truth are due.

Unjust laws have been passed and executed; arbitrary acts have undermined the security of the citizen and the liberty of conscience; haphazard additions to the lists of emigrants have everywhere struck down citizens who had never abandoned either their country or even their homes; in fact, great principles of social order have been violated.

To repair these errors and injustices a government founded on the sacred principles of liberty, equality, and the representative system has been proclaimed and recognized by the nation. It will be the constant desire of the first magistrates it has appointed, as it will be to their interest and glory, to heal all the wounds of France. Already this desire is witnessed by all their acts.

Thus the disastrous law of the forced loan and the yet more disastrous law of hostages have been repealed; individuals deported without prior trial have been restored to their country and their families. Each day is and will be marked by acts of justice, and the Council of State is working without pause to prepare the reform of bad laws and a happier distribution of public contributions.

The Consuls of the Republic declare once again that freedom of worship is guaranteed by the Constitution; that no magistrate can attack it; that no man can say to another: 'You will follow this creed; you will worship only on such a day.' The law of 11 Prairial, Year III, granting to citizens the use of religious buildings, will be executed. . . .

The Government will pardon; it will show mercy to repentance; indulgence will be complete and absolute. But it will strike down whoever may still dare, after this declaration, to resist the national sovereignty.

Frenchmen living in the departments of the west, rally to a constitution which gives to the magistrates the power and the duty of protecting the citizens and which guarantees them all equally against unjust and oppressive laws.

Let those who seek the glory of France shun those who would still lead them astray to hand them over to the fetters of tyranny or the domination of the foreigner. Let the good inhabitants of the countryside return to their homes and take up again their useful labour; let them spurn the insinuations of those who would lead them back into feudal slavery.

If, despite all the measures taken by the Government, there are still men who dare to provoke civil war, the first magistrates will have only one sad but necessary duty to perform, that of subjugating them by force. . . .

447

**To General Augereau***C.-in-C., French Army in Holland*

Paris

*7 Nivôse, Year VIII (28 Dec, 1799)*

I have appointed you, Citizen General, to the important post of Commander-in-Chief of the French army in Holland.

In all your actions in the exercise of this command show yourself to be above these miserable political divisions whose unhappy effect has been to tear France asunder for ten years.

The glory of the Republic is the fruit of our comrades' blood; we belong to no group other than that of the whole nation.

Be sure that, if circumstances force me to go to war myself, I will not leave you in Holland, and that I will never forget the great day of Castiglione.

BONAPARTE

448

**Note in 'The Monitor'**

Paris

*9 Nivôse, Year VIII (30 Dec, 1799)*

*The Friend of the Laws* (No. 1585) says the First Consul Bonaparte has just ordered a fête which will cost 200,000 francs; this is false. First Consul Bonaparte knows that 200,000 francs is the pay of a brigade for six months.

449

**To the Burgomaster and Senate***Free and Imperial City of Hamburg*

Paris

*9 Nivôse, Year VIII (30 Dec, 1799)*

We have received your letter, Gentlemen; it does not justify you.

States are preserved by courage and virtue; cowardice and vice ruin them. You have violated hospitality. The most barbarous hordes of the desert have not done the like. Our fellow citizens will hold it against you for ever.

The two unfortunates you have surrendered will die illustrious;\* but their blood will do their persecutors more harm than an army.

BONAPARTE

450

**To Citizen Boulay de la Meurthe***President, Legal Section, Council of State*

Paris

*9 Nivôse, Year VIII (30 Dec, 1799)*

The First Consul refers to the legal section of the Council of State

\* Napper Tandy and Blackwell.

the question whether there exists in the law any penalty to punish an individual who has undertaken, on certain conditions, to maintain a depot of flour sufficient to provision a certain town and who has left this depot empty although all conditions of the agreement with him have been fulfilled.

*By order of the First Consul*

451

**To Citizen Fouché**

*Minister of Police*

*Paris*

*9 Nivôse, Year VIII (30 Dec, 1799)*

I have the honour to send you, Citizen Minister, a decision setting at liberty several priests who were deported to the Ile de Ré but at the same time requiring of them the oath of fidelity to the Constitution.

The First Consul instructs me to inform you confidentially that their release should not take place until the oath has been signed.

*By order of the First Consul*

452

**To Major-General Murat**

*G.O.C., Consular Guard*

*Paris*

*9 Nivôse, Year VIII (30 Dec, 1799)*

It will be published tomorrow in the daily orders of the Consular Guard that the Consuls intend that there should be in their Guard only men distinguished by their military services or by outstanding actions.

Consequently, the commander of the Guard will order his colonels and majors to submit to him a return of the men in the units they command; they will take care to add notes of the armies in which they have served, the principal battles in which they have taken part and the special acts of bravery which they have performed.

No man who has not served in several campaigns may, for that reason alone, belong to the Consular Guard.

BONAPARTE

453

**To Major-General Berthier**

*Minister of War*

*Paris*

*10 Nivôse, Year VIII (31 Dec, 1799)*

The Minister of War will have a commission as brigadier-general forwarded to General Boudet and he will be sent to the Army of Italy to be employed in that rank.

Citizen Dubois-Crancé, having been on active service neither as brigadier- nor as major-general, will revert to the rank of adjutant-



general which he held before being appointed a Deputy to the National Convention; he will be employed in this rank in the Army of the Rhine.

Major-General Anselme will be placed on half-pay until his pension is fixed.

BONAPARTE

454

### To Major-General Berthier

*Minister of War*

Paris

13 Nivôse, Year VIII (3 Jan, 1800)

Please send me a report, Citizen Minister: 1. On the present state of our artillery teams; would it be possible and useful to have horses belonging to the Republic? 2. A report on the laws, regulations and customs in force as to the financial accounts of different parts of the service; what changes are desirable? 3. On the laws regulating the pay of the troops, and the systems in force before and at different periods of the Revolution; what action ought to be taken?

BONAPARTE

455

### To Major-General Sainte-Hilaire\*

*G.O.C., 8th Military District*

Paris

14 Nivôse, Year VIII (4 Jan, 1800)

I am satisfied, Citizen General, with your conduct in the 8th District since I appointed you to the command.

Instruct the people and let every citizen know that the time of factions and discords is ended. Use the troops at your disposal and strong pickets from the communal national guards to restore the safety of the roads and to exterminate the brigands who are disturbing the public peace. Heads are hot in the country where you are; let this warmth turn towards the re-establishment of commerce, the glory of our armies and navy, everything that can make the French name respected in the eyes of the universe, and our generation will be dear to the future. All factious meetings should be forbidden even more in the south of France than elsewhere, because there more than anywhere else men tend to exaggeration. Tell the national guards and the citizens that the revolution is over, that the reins of the State are in strong hands. Repeat to them often that moderation is man's greatest virtue.

I have promoted you to the rank of major-general. Let the Government know soon that the bands of criminals infesting the main roads have been dispersed.

BONAPARTE

\* This letter has been abridged.

456

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**14 Nivôse, Year VIII (4 Jan, 1800)*

1. The Minister of War will inform General D'Urtubie that, since it is my unalterable intention not to keep on the active list any officer who has not seen active service during the war of liberty, I think it essential that he should proceed to an army in order to undertake the next campaign; failing that I shall, with regret, be obliged to have him excluded from the active list of generals of artillery.

2. Major-General Dupuch will be appointed to a garrison command (which he may choose) or retire, in which case he will receive the half-pay of his rank until his pension is settled.

3. Brigadier-General Ravel will be appointed to command Briançon. The Minister of War will inform him that this command is being given him as a special mark of confidence.

4. Brigadier-Generals La Salette, Campagnol,\* Valcin and Senneville will be retired and will draw the half-pay of their rank until their pensions are fixed.

5. Major-General Debelle will be employed on active service in his rank.

6. Brigadier-Generals Sorbier, Andréossy and Songis will be promoted to the rank of major-general.

7. Major-General Guériot Saint-Martin will receive orders to report to a field army to be employed in his rank.

**BONAPARTE**

457

**Order of the Day***Army of England**Paris**15 Nivôse, Year VIII (5 Jan, 1800)*

Soldiers, the Government has taken all possible steps to bring to their senses the misguided inhabitants of the western departments. It has heard them before judging. It has done justice to their complaints, for these were reasonable. The great mass of sound inhabitants have laid down their arms. There remain only brigands, emigrants and English hirelings.

Frenchmen in the pay of England! Such can be but vagabonds, without loyalty, without honour. March against them; you will not be called upon to show great valour.

The army contains more than 60,000 brave men; let me know soon that the rebel chiefs have ceased to live. Glory is to be gained only through hardship; if it could be found by keeping headquarters in

\* Bonaparte's former colonel in the 4th Artillery Regiment.

comfortable towns or by staying in good barracks, who would not possess it?

Soldiers, whatever your rank, the thanks of the nation await you. To be worthy of it you must brave the rigours of the season, the ice and snow, the cold nights; you must surprise your enemies at dawn and exterminate these wretches, who dishonour the French name.

Make a short and good campaign. Be inexorable towards the rebels, but maintain the strictest discipline.

BONAPARTE

458

### To Citizen Gaudin

*Minister of Finance*

*Paris*

*18 Nivôse, Year VIII (8 Jan, 1800)*

The 2,500,000 francs accruing from the lottery and the 6,000,000 coming from Holland will be distributed as follows:

To the Ministry of War, destined for a secret expedition,	400,000
To the Army of Italy	1,000,000
For the pay of the Army of Italy (independently of the preceding million); the Minister will inform me when these 2 millions can leave Paris	2,000,000
For the pay of the Army of the Rhine	2,000,000
To the Ministry of Marine, for the expedition ordered	500,000
For the pay of the Atlantic fleet	1,000,000
For the pay of the Mediterranean fleet	500,000
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	300,000
To the Ministry of War for arms manufacture	300,000
For expenses paid in France for the Army of Egypt	100,000
To the Ministry of the Interior, for the expenses of the public workshops of Paris	100,000
To the Ministry of War, for cavalry remounts	300,000

8,500,000

BONAPARTE

459

### To Major-General Berthier

*Minister of War*

*Paris*

*19 Nivôse, Year VIII (9 Jan, 1800)*

The First Consul wishes to have, if possible by the 21st, a service return of all the brigadier-generals on the active list with a note on the abilities and morality of each of them.

*By order of the First Consul*

460

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**20 Nivôse, Year VIII (10 Jan, 1800)*

I wish to know at once, Citizen Minister:

1. What steps you have taken to remount the cavalry.
2. If General Gardanne and the other officers employed in the Army of England have had orders to return to their posts by the 24th of this month.
3. When shall I receive the report on our present legislation relating to the manner of promotion in the different corps?
4. When shall I receive the report on the present situation of the artillery and engineer schools?
5. When shall I receive the report on the present situation as to military law?
6. The report on the present organization of our artillery trains? Would it be possible and useful to have horses owned by the Republic?
7. The report on the laws, regulations and customs governing the accounts of the different parts of the public service?
8. The report on the laws governing the manner in which the troops are paid; what was the custom formerly and during the various periods of the Revolution? What position ought we to adopt in this matter?
9. The report on conscription? . . .

BONAPARTE

461

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**21 Nivôse, Year VIII (11 Jan, 1800)*

I wish to know, Citizen Minister, whether it is true about the letter from General Baraguey d'Hilliers to Prince Charles. . . . Divisional generals must not correspond with enemy generals without the authorization of the commander-in-chief. General Moreau will take measures and issue the strictest orders that no correspondence with the enemy takes place except on his instructions.

BONAPARTE

462

**Minute***Paris**21 Nivôse, Year VIII (11 Jan, 1800)*

[Proposal by the Minister of War to promote Citizen Marchant to the rank of major.]

If this is the man who was consul at Tripoli and who refused in Egypt to march against the enemy, refused.

BONAPARTE

463

## Decree

Paris

22 Nivôse, Year VIII (12 Jan, 1800)

ARTICLE 1. On the first day of each decade there will be held a general council of finance; on the fourth day, an administrative council of war; on the sixth day, an administrative council of the navy.

ART. 2. On the eighth day of each month there will be an administrative council of justice; on the eighteenth, an administrative council of foreign affairs, and on the twenty-eighth an administrative council of the interior and of police.

ART. 3. The Director of the Public Treasury will attend each administrative council of finance; the Minister of Finance will necessarily be present at the financial council: he will attend the administrative councils of the other departments when he considers it desirable.

ART. 4. Ministers will be accompanied at the administrative councils by the chief clerks in charge of their accounts and by the heads of divisions in their departments if they so instruct them.

ART. 5. The Secretary of State will keep the minutes of the general council of finance and the administrative councils on separate registers.

On the day preceding each administrative council he will receive the orders of the Consuls for the summoning of those Councillors of State whom it may be judged necessary to call.

ART. 6. These different councils will be held at the residence of the First Consul at 9.30 p.m.

BONAPARTE

464

## To General Brune

C.-in-C., Army of the West\*

Paris

24 Nivôse, Year VIII (14 Jan, 1800)

. . . The Army of the West contains more than 60,000 men under arms. By pursuing the brigands energetically you will be able to end this war promptly; from now on the peace of Europe depends on its conclusion.

\* Formerly the Army of England. With Brune's appointment as C.-in-C. on this date it was renamed the Army of the West. Hédouville, the previous commander, agreed to serve under Brune and became Chief of Staff.

The man d'Andigné, who has arrived in Paris today, will remain here during the whole of tomorrow. He will not be allowed to leave until twelve hours after yourself.

The Armistice concluded between General Hédouville and the chouans must last only until 1 Pluviôse. Georges,\* who commands the rebels in the Morbihan, is not included in it. . . .

Break up Georges's bands. Seize his guns and his corn stocks (he has a great deal on the coast which he is selling to the English). In fact make the insurgents of the Morbihan feel the weight and horror of war. By the beginning of Pluviôse you should ensure: 1. that the English ships anchored off the coasts of the Morbihan are no longer in communication with Georges; 2. that from the tops of their masts they can see the flags of the Republic dispersing the brigands and dashing their hopes.

Diplomatic reasons of the greatest importance demand that within the first five days of Pluviôse the English should know that considerable forces are in pursuit of Georges so that they send the news to England.

After this first operation move to Nantes, Angers or Rennes as circumstances dictate.

Tomorrow the regulation for the organization of territory where the Constitution is suspended will be signed and sent to you by special messenger.† It will apply to the Departments of Ille-et-Vilaine, Loire-Inférieure, Côtes-du-Nord and Morbihan.

Welcome every individual who submits, but allow no further meeting of leaders; hold no kind of diplomatic parley.

Great tolerance for the priests: severe action against the larger communes to force them to guard themselves and protect the smaller. Do not spare communes which misbehave. Burn a few farmsteads and large villages in the Morbihan and begin to make examples. . . . Only if the war is made terrible for them will the inhabitants realize that their apathy is fatal to them and join against the brigands. . . .

General Hédouville will do very well as your chief of staff or your first lieutenant. He knows the area and the people well but he has neither enough energy nor enough experience in directing military operations to be able to command in chief.

You will have the leaders Châtillon, d'Autichamp, Bourmont, d'Andigné, Frotté informed that if they accede to the proclamations issued by the Government they must let you know together with the place they are retiring to so that their persons and property may be respected. They are required only to submit and to use their influence, even without a public proclamation, to disperse the bands.

As to disarmament, after you have destroyed Georges, dispersed a

\* Cadoudal.

† See Article 92 of the Constitution (No. 427 above).

few bands and made some examples, proceed with it. I know well that this operation, though essential, can only be carried out progressively over a period of time. . . .

Above all you must stir up the generals, who are unaccustomed to being commanded and not active enough. Do not let them stay in their towns; the place of honour is the bivouac and the barns. Those you think too old or unfit for command you can send to Paris; give command of the divisions to active men. . . .

Send me frequent dispatches.

BONAPARTE

465

### To Sergeant Léon Aune

*32nd Demi-brigade of the Line*

Paris

*25 Nivôse, Year VIII (15 Jan, 1800)*

To brave Léon,

I have received your letter,\* my brave comrade; you had no need to tell me of your deeds. Since the death of the brave Benezette you are the bravest grenadier in the army. You hold one of the hundred swords which I distributed. All the soldiers agreed that you were a model for the regiment. I should much like to see you; the Minister of War will send you an order.

I love you as my son.

BONAPARTE

General Murat will give him a commission as 2nd lieutenant in the Consular Guard and will write to him.

BONAPARTE

\* Aune's letter read: 'Citizen Consul, your arrival on the territory of the Republic has encouraged all pure spirits, and especially my own, for I no longer have any hope but in you. I approach you as my tutelary god and beg you to give a place in your memory to Léon, whom you so often honoured on the field of battle. Since I could not embark for Egypt to gather new laurels under your command, I am a sergeant at our demi-brigade depot. Learning from my comrades that you often spoke of me in Egypt, I ask you not to desert me, but to let me know that you remember me. It would be pointless to remind you of the actions where I showed myself to be a republican and earned the approval of my superiors; however, at the battle of Montenotte I saved the life of General Rampon and Colonel Masse, as they themselves informed you; at the battle of Dego I took a flag from the engineer commander of the enemy army; at the battle of Lodi I was the first in the assault and opened the gates to our brothers in arms; at the battle of Borghetto I was the first to cross by pontoon, the bridge being blown; I fell upon the enemy and captured the commander of the position; in hospital, when I was taken prisoner, I killed the enemy commander, and by that act of bravery 400 men, prisoners like myself, were able to rejoin their units. Moreover, I have the scars of five wounds on my body. I dare to place all my hope in you and am quite sure that you will always have a care for the brave men who have served their country so well. I salute you with respect: LÉON AUNE.'

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Paris**26 Nivôse, Year VIII (16 Jan, 1800)*

The note dated 14 Nivôse from the Minister of His Britannic Majesty having been laid before the First Consul, he has noted with surprise that it relies on an opinion as to the origin and consequences of the present war which is not at all correct. Far from France having provoked it, in accordance with the principles of the revolution she had solemnly declared her love of peace and her respect for the independence of all governments; wholly occupied with her internal affairs, it is not to be doubted that she would have remained faithful to her declarations.

But no sooner had the French Revolution broken out than almost the whole of Europe banded together to destroy it. Internal resistance was encouraged, opponents were welcomed, plots were assisted, the French nation was outraged in the person of its agents; and in particular England set the example by dismissing the minister accredited to her. French independence, honour and security were attacked in deed long before war was declared.

Assailed on every side, the Republic had to strike everywhere in her defence. So long as she saw her enemies determined to deny her rights, she relied only on her powers of resistance; but as soon as they were forced to renounce their hopes of invading her, she sought for ways to agreement and showed her wish for peace. If these have not been effective, the blame must be laid above all on the terrible obstinacy with which English resources have been poured out to complete the ruin of France.

But if, as is affirmed, the wishes of His Britannic Majesty are for the re-establishment of peace, why this attempt to justify the war instead of an effort to end it? What obstacle can prevent an agreement whose advantage is mutual, especially when the First Consul has personally given so many proofs of his readiness to put an end to the calamities of war and to uphold the strict observance of treaties?

The First Consul cannot doubt that His Britannic Majesty recognizes the right of nations to choose their form of government, since it is through the exercise of this right that he holds his crown; but he cannot understand how, in face of this fundamental principle, the minister can make insinuations tending to meddle in the internal affairs of the Republic; such are not less injurious to the French nation than would be for England and for His Majesty an encouragement towards the republican regime whose forms England adopted in the middle of the last century or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family which was placed upon it by birth and deposed by revolution.



Everywhere the voice of the people and of humanity pleads for the end of a war that has already brought great disasters. To arrest the course of these calamities the First Consul of the French Republic proposes to bring hostilities to an end forthwith by the signature of an armistice and the immediate nomination by either side of plenipotentiaries who will proceed to Dunkirk or some no less convenient town and will work without delay for the re-establishment of peace and friendship between the French Republic and England.

To this end the First Consul offers to issue the necessary passports.

BONAPARTE

467

### To Citizen Lucien Bonaparte

*Minister of the Interior*

*Paris*

*28 Nivôse, Year VIII (18 Jan, 1800)*

I wish you to send me at 10 p.m. each day, Citizen Minister, a bulletin containing an analysis of your correspondence with the central administrations [of departments], commissioners and other agents of the Government.

For this purpose you will have returns printed in three columns. In the first will appear the names of all the departments and of the central commissioners; in the second, observations resulting from the correspondence relating to supplies and the collection of taxes; in the third, observations relating to the police and to disputes that have arisen between different authorities.

You will send to me on Primidi, Citizen Minister, a draft of the return for which I ask.

BONAPARTE

468

### To Citizen Forfait

*Minister of Marine and Colonies*

*Paris*

*28 Nivôse, Year VIII (18 Jan, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, authorize Rear-Admiral Latouche, commanding the squadron at Brest, to leave with a light squadron of three or four vessels and fall upon the 74-gun ship and the three frigates which have long been anchored in the roads of Quiberon to support the chouans.

You will also authorize Commodore Bedout to leave Lorient with his division to attack the enemy force in the roads of Quiberon whenever he can do so effectively. These two orders will be sent tomorrow by telegraph.\*

BONAPARTE

\* Chappe's semaphore system which achieved very high speeds of transmission.

469

**To the Seven Ministers***Paris**29 Nivôse, Year VIII (19 Jan, 1800)*

The First Consul requires me, Citizen Minister, to invite you to attend in his office on 3 Pluviôse next at 9.0 p.m. Your colleagues are receiving the same invitation. The object of this conference is to draft a regulation fixing definitively the functions of each ministry.

*By order of the First Consul**The Secretary of State*

HUGUES B. MARET

470

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Paris**1 Pluviôse, Year VIII (21 Jan, 1800)*

Please send me a report on the following questions, Citizen Minister.

1. What advantage can we gain from Prussia in order to hasten a general continental peace or a partial peace with one of the belligerent powers?

2. What attention could we pay her so as to engage her more and more on our side; and

3. To decide her to put herself at the head of the Northern League, which would put a curb on the unreasonable ambition of Russia.

BONAPARTE

471

**To Citizen Gaudin***Minister of Finance**Paris**17 Pluviôse, Year VIII (6 Feb, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, the First Consul having received a letter written in the name of the traders of Paris, he invites you to introduce to him this evening at ten o'clock twelve merchants belonging to the twelve principal firms and who can be considered truly to represent the commerce of the capital.

*By order of the First Consul*

472

**To General Brune***C.-in-C., Army of the West**Paris**17 Pluviôse, Year VIII (6 Feb, 1800)*

The merchants of Nantes, Citizen General, must imitate those of Paris, Lyons and Marseilles. They can advance you 400,000 or 500,000 francs, which will enable you to pay the troops under your command and provide for your most pressing needs. I am writing to the Minister

of Finance to authorize someone at Nantes to represent him and make the necessary arrangements for the repayment of this sum. In the meantime whatever you agree to, provided it is in no way onerous, will be exactly fulfilled.

BONAPARTE

473

### Order of the Day

*Consular Guard and all Armies of the Republic*

Paris

18 Pluviôse, Year VIII (7 Feb, 1800)

Washington is dead. This great man fought against tyranny. He established the freedom of his country. His memory will ever be dear to the French people, as to all free men of the two worlds, and especially to the soldiers of France who, like him and like the soldiers of America, fight for equality and liberty.

The First Consul orders that for a period of ten days all flags and colours of the Republic will be draped in black.

BONAPARTE

474

### Decree

Paris

19 Pluviôse, Year VIII (8 Feb, 1800)

The Consuls of the Republic decree:

1. A library of 20,000 volumes will be formed at the Hôtel des Invalides for the use of soldiers residing there.

2. These books will be drawn from stocks of books belonging to the Republic.

3. The Minister of War and of the Interior will consult and arrange for the execution of this decree.

BONAPARTE

475

### To Citizen Abrial

*Minister of Justice*

Paris

22 Pluviôse, Year VIII (11 Feb, 1800)

I am informed, Citizen Minister, that, despite the orders that should have been issued by the Minister of Police and the supervision of the army, corn from the Department of the Ruhr and those adjoining it is reaching the right bank of the Rhine. The customs administration and even the constituted authorities of these departments appear to be involved in the offence and a number of the latter, though accused and convicted of having committed it, have not yet been dismissed by the Department. Remedy this state of affairs promptly.

BONAPARTE

476

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**22 Pluviôse, Year VIII (11 Feb, 1800)*

I am reliably informed, Citizen Minister, that the chests sent to the various armies by the general hospital administration in Paris contain defective instruments and saws which lacerate soldiers who have to have operations. I invite you to put an end to this abuse without delay and to punish those responsible.

BONAPARTE

477

**Minute***Paris**22 Pluviôse, Year VIII (11 Feb, 1800)*

[*Request for employment in the military arsenals by Citizen Robert, ex-gunner in the 4th Artillery Regiment\**]

Referred to General Aboville, who will place this brave man.

BONAPARTE

478

**Minute***Paris**22 Pluviôse, Year VIII (11 Feb, 1800)*

[*Report from the Minister of War on the arrest of General Don.*]

The decision of General Brune is in conformity with the laws of war. General Don cannot be considered either a prisoner of war or an intermediary. Repeat the order that he is not to be allowed to escape.

BONAPARTE

479

**Minute***Paris**23 Pluviôse, Year VIII (12 Feb, 1800)*

[*Proposal by the Minister of War to exempt the department of the Léman from the requisition of horses, as it was but recently reunited with France.*]

Refused. There cannot be two kinds of French citizen.

BONAPARTE

480

**To General Hédouville***Chief of Staff, Army of the West**Paris**24 Pluviôse, Year VIII (13 Feb, 1800)*

Since you are nearer to Paris than the commander-in-chief, Citizen

\* In which Bonaparte had once served.

General, I am taking the step of sending my orders directly to you.

Bourmont is fooling us; he has surrendered neither his guns nor his arms. Give orders to the generals commanding at Le Mans and Laval to combine their forces and proceed against this rebel. General Brune will be sending you 2,000 men from Nantes. General Gardanne has orders to send a column of 1,500 men to Laval; it will be under your orders. Let Bourmont know that he must surrender his guns within twenty-four hours of receiving your summons to do so, and 3,000 muskets three days later. If the response is negative, put yourself at the head of your troops and do not rest until you have destroyed him.

Frotté has asked to submit; my sole reply has been that it must be unconditionally. Brune will pursue Georges vigorously. Thus the war will be pressed ahead in the Morbihan, against Bourmont and against Frotté. It is essential that these three theatres of civil war should be suppressed simultaneously during the first decade of Ventôse; that is the only way to consolidate the pacification of these departments. The English are counting on Bourmont, Frotté and Georges, and our enemies are looking to this chouan war as a diversion at the opening of the coming campaign.

BONAPARTE

481

## To Admiral Mazarredo

*Spanish Ambassador to France*

Paris

27 Pluviôse, Year VIII (16 Feb, 1800)

The First Consul has read the letter you transmitted to him with the greatest attention and interest. Citizen Alquier\* has been instructed to express to His Catholic Majesty and to M. d'Urquijo the sentiments of esteem which the First Consul has towards His Majesty and the Cabinet of Madrid.

On reaching the first magistracy the First Consul saw with some displeasure the relationships which the Spanish Minister entertained with certain individuals in Paris.

If the First Consul has not informed His Catholic Majesty of the request made to the King of England, that is because this was only a first approach with no conditions suggested and because His Catholic Majesty had several times expressed a desire for the opening of negotiations.

But as soon as there might be any question of conditions, even as to preliminaries, the First Consul would make it his duty to do nothing except in concert with His Catholic Majesty and for the common interest of the two nations.

\* French Ambassador to Spain.

The First Consul instructs me to let you know, Admiral, how grateful he is for the special care you have taken to procure two brigs for Egypt, to which he still attaches great importance.

The submission of the West, the departure of the Russians, the return of the Ottoman Porte to its true interests and the improvement in the finances of the Republic will place the First Consul in a position to propose to His Majesty a plan worthy of the two great nations which must contribute to its success.

*By order of the First Consul*

482

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*27 Pluviôse, Year VIII (16 Feb, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, collect the various Irish in Paris who claim to represent the interests of the insurgents, ask them for notes on the present situation in Ireland and hint to them that now that the western departments are pacified, the Government might decide to liberate Ireland.

BONAPARTE

483

**To General Moreau**

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

*Paris*

*27 Pluviôse, Year VIII (16 Feb, 1800)*

A great many people tell me that some of the individuals composing the Swiss Government favour the Austrians. In fact I am informed that for a fortnight they have been considering projects for a separate peace dignified with the name neutrality. This idea is absurd, if not criminal; today there can be no middle way between a free and independent Switzerland aiding us in the war so as to achieve peace and a Switzerland slave to the Austrian princes, its former masters.

Impress on the Government, in daily conversations, the irresponsibility and danger to them of allowing such fancies to circulate.

BONAPARTE

484

**Minute**

*Paris*

*29 Pluviôse, Year VIII (18 Feb, 1800)*

[*Citizen César Berthier\* requests the rank of brigadier-general.*]

At the first battle.

BONAPARTE

\* Younger brother of the Minister of War.

485

**To Citizen Gaudin***Minister of Finance*

Paris

1 Ventôse, Year VIII (20 Feb, 1800)

The Consular Guard has been without pay for a month, Citizen Minister. You will appreciate that this is unsatisfactory.

BONAPARTE

486

**To Admiral Bruix***C.-in-C., the Fleet, at Brest*

Paris

3 Ventôse, Year VIII (22 Feb, 1800)

Admiral Bruix will put to sea as soon as possible with seventeen or eighteen French ships of the line, six frigates and the Spanish squadron.

He will pursue the English squadron blockading Brest, which is believed to be inferior in numbers.

He will then proceed straight to Malta, where he will break the blockade. He will have *Généreux*, *Guillaume-Tell*, *Athénien* and the frigates *Carthaginoise*, *Diane* and *Justice* join him together with any other ships in that port which are of no use for the defence of Malta. He will land in Malta all kinds of provisions which his squadron can do without and the 6,000 quintals of flour and 100,000 pints of brandy which Commissioner Najac is under orders to embark at Brest.

After that he will return with the two squadrons to Toulon. The ships which are at Ferrol and Cadiz will also go there, and the fleet, which will then contain forty-two or forty-three ships of the line, will undertake the expedition against Mahon.

On leaving Malta Admiral Bruix will send a light squadron of the fastest ships to Egypt carrying troops and the munitions of all kinds which the squadron has on board for that magnificent army. He will send a more or less powerful squadron in accordance with the course of events and his information about the enemy.

If, when the level of Cadiz is reached, the Spanish squadron absolutely insists on entering port, Admiral Bruix will not delay his voyage but will proceed to Malta with the French squadron alone, after having made all possible requests, promises and protests to persuade the Spanish admiral to follow him.

Orders have been given for all preparations to be made at Toulon to re-provision the squadron.

BONAPARTE

The First Consul does not enter into details as to the steps Admiral Bruix should take to surprise the English forces blockading Cadiz and Malta and the ships cruising in the seas off Leghorn and Naples. He relies on his talents and his zeal for the glory of the Navy. . . .

487

**To Admiral de Gravina***C.-in-C., Spanish Squadron, at Brest*

Paris

3 Ventôse, Year VIII (22 Feb, 1800)

Sir, it is my strong desire that the two squadrons, commanded by distinguished officers and composed of the finest ships, should cease to be blockaded by a numerically far inferior force.

I am giving orders to Admiral Bruix to put to sea with the united squadrons. I count on the known talents, the love of glory and the courage so natural to the Spanish nation and I am giving instructions to Admiral Bruix in accordance with events and circumstances. I greatly hope they may be such as to enable you to fulfil the intentions of His Catholic Majesty and my own and to realize the desire His Majesty has often shown to see Malta and Mahon seized from our mortal enemies.

Know, Sir, the most particular esteem in which I hold you.

BONAPARTE

488

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

4 Ventôse, Year VIII (23 Feb, 1800)

The First Consul requires me to ask you for a note setting out the principal facts which prove the violation of international law by the English, the occasions when these have occurred, and their immoral conduct towards other Powers, notably during the course of the present war.

He invites you to have this note prepared as soon as possible.

*By order of the First Consul*

489

**To General Brune***C.-in-C., Army of the West*

Paris

6 Ventôse, Year VIII (25 Feb, 1800)

I learn by way of London, Citizen General, that the English are embarking their troops at Jersey and Guernsey. Is it for Ireland? Is it to land their forces in Finisterre? Is it to seize Cherbourg and the former Cotentin peninsula? That cannot be foreseen, for prudence and good sense would not suggest any of these operations to them.

If General Dulauoy is at your headquarters, order him at once to visit the fort of Penthievre; the Minister of War should have given orders for it to be put into an immediate state of defence. He should also have issued the necessary funds for this purpose.



I saw with satisfaction that you were undertaking the provisioning of Belle-Ile. You should now be thinking of hastening disarmament; make sure of the leaders, and see that as many conscripts and deserters as possible rejoin.

I am not yet intending to go to the Army of the Rhine; when I do, you can rest assured I shall keep a place for you there.

It is now quite certain that the Russians, as well as Suvurov, are on the road for their own country and have already reached Poland.

BONAPARTE

490

### To Baron Thugut

*Chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire*

*Paris*

*8 Ventôse, Year VIII (27 Feb, 1800)*

I have laid before the First Consul Your Excellency's letter dated 5 Pluviôse. The position which it adopts has determined the First Consul to enter into a further explanation of his views.

The First Consul has always regarded the Treaty of Campo Formio as capable of reconciling the interests of the two powers; for, at the time when it was concluded, the First Consul, who exercised a direct influence on his Government as to the terms of the treaty, attached more importance to reaching a just peace than to profiting from the larger gains offered by the military events which had placed Italy and part of Germany in his power. Today, having received from the French nation the right and the means to use all its forces, he remains guided by the same principles; he still wishes to work only for an honourable peace which will not undermine the balance of Europe.

I am therefore instructed by the First Consul to propose: 1. that the Treaty of Campo Formio be taken as the basis of negotiation between the French Republic and Austria; 2. that H.M. the Emperor and King should obtain in Italy the equivalent of the indemnity in Germany promised to him by the Treaty of Campo Formio and that the subsequent compensations that may be sought by H.M. the Emperor should also be found in Italy but in such manner as not to damage the stability of the peace or the political equilibrium of Europe; 3. that there should be set up for the small States of Europe a system of guarantee capable of maintaining the full power of international law on which the security and happiness of nations essentially rests.

If these principles are agreeable to His Imperial Majesty, it will remain for him to make known in what manner he wishes the negotiations to be conducted, and no doubt he will be inclined to choose the means most apt to lead to a speedy conclusion. Perhaps the best way of ending all conflict between the two states would be simply to put the Treaty of Campo Formio into force again, while determining

by an additional treaty the modifications to be made to it. In any case, Your Excellency will judge whether it will not be necessary first to agree an armistice between the respective armies, for it is only by arresting the course of hostilities that the hazards of a new campaign, which may further complicate the question of peace, can be avoided.

In informing you of these proposals of the First Consul, Baron, and requesting you to bring them to the knowledge of His Imperial Majesty, it remains for me to tell you that the First Consul has seen with pleasure the assurance of your personal eagerness for the re-establishment of peace, and that I shall consider myself happy to be able to work with you to that end.

*By order of the First Consul*  
*The Minister of Foreign Affairs*  
 CH. M. TALLEYRAND

491

### To General Brune

*C.-in-C., Army of the West*

*Paris*

*14 Ventôse, Year VIII (5 Mar, 1800)*

I have your letter of 11 Ventôse, Citizen General. . . .

I saw Georges this morning; he struck me as a big Breton whom we can perhaps turn to account in the interest of the country. . . .

I have also seen Châtillon, who dined with me today; I was very pleased with him, but I think it is still the best course to disarm as many as possible. I will attend to your request for General Houdetot; he will be placed as he wishes.

Here everything goes from good to better. The Prefects are going to their posts, and I hope that in a month France will at last be an organized State.

Shall we have peace or war? That is still very uncertain. However, the Emperor is treating with us with the greatest politeness; forms are as much in his favour as they were against our friend Georges. . . .

BONAPARTE

492

### Proclamation to the French Nation

*Paris*

*17 Ventôse, Year VIII (8 Mar, 1800)*

Frenchmen, you long for peace. Your Government desires it yet more ardently. Its first wishes, its constant efforts have been to secure it. The English Ministry has betrayed the secret of its horrible policy. To rend France, to destroy its navy and its ports; to wipe it from the map of Europe or reduce it to the rank of the secondary powers; to hold all the nations of the continent divided so as to seize their

commerce and enrich itself by plundering them: it is to achieve this frightful success that England is pouring out gold, proliferating promises and multiplying intrigues.

But neither the gold, nor the promises nor the intrigues of England will sway the continental powers to her view. They have heard the word of France; they know the moderate principles which guide it; they will listen to the voice of humanity and the powerful voice of their own interest. If they waver, the Government, which has not been afraid to offer and to ask for peace, will remember that it is for you to command it.

In order to command it there must be money, iron and soldiers. Let all make haste to pay the tribute they owe to the common defence. Let the young citizens arise. It is no longer for the sake of factions or to choose between tyrants that they will be arming; it is to guarantee what they hold most dear, it is for the honour of France, for the sacred interests of humanity.

Already the armies have regained the spirit that spells victory; do not doubt, Frenchmen, that at the sight of them, at the sight of the whole nation reunited in the same interests and purposes, you will have no further enemies on the continent. And if some power still wishes to try the hazard of war, the First Consul will conquer it at the head of the warriors he has more than once led to victory. With them he will again seek those fields full of the memory of their exploits. But in the midst of battles he will call for peace, and he swears to fight only for the happiness of France and the peace of the world.

BONAPARTE

493

## To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

Paris

17 Ventôse, Year VIII (8 Mar, 1800)

M. de Staël is in the greatest poverty and his wife is giving dinners and balls. If you are still seeing her, would it not be a good idea to persuade this woman to make her husband an allowance of 1,000 or 2,000 francs a month? Or have we already reached the stage where not only morals but even more sacred duties than those between fathers and children can be trodden under foot without honourable people thinking it wrong? By all means let us judge Mme de Staël's morals as though she were a man; but a man who inherited the fortune of M. de Necker, who had long enjoyed the privileges of a distinguished name, and yet who left his wife in misery while he lived in abundance, would that be a man with whom one could keep company?

BONAPARTE

494

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

19 Ventôse, Year VIII (10 Mar, 1800)

Citizen Minister, you will inform citizen Otto, commissioner of the Government at London, that the Government will agree to the exchange of General Don for Napper Tandy and his companions and that, if this does not suit the English Government, the French Government will agree to exchange Generals Hermann, Don and Mack against Generals Colli, Pérignon and Grouchy. In a separate note, five days after the first, Citizen Otto will point out how unworthy of the English nation is the threat to treat the French prisoners in England more harshly. Is it possible that the nation of Newton and Locke can so far forget itself? Prisoners, indeed, neither can nor should be held responsible for the conduct of their government. They depend entirely on the generosity of the capturing power. These being the principles of the French Government, it will never copy the hateful practice of reprisals.

BONAPARTE

495

**To Citizen Lacuée***Councillor of State*

Paris

21 Ventôse, Year VIII (12 Mar, 1800)

I beg Citizen Lacuée to consider carefully the law on the gendarmerie of 28 Germinal, Year VI, and the regulation of the Directory which followed that law and to propose to me a draft regulation to replace it.

Citizen Lacuée will find attached a few observations which struck me in perusing the law of 28 Germinal.

BONAPARTE

1. Article 149 forbids the civil and military authorities to use the gendarmerie to carry their dispatches; but it is to the non-observance of this law that the inactivity of the gendarmerie is largely due.

2. See Chapter III; it seems to me that a commandant of gendarmerie has no right to combine several sections without authorization. This clause must be revised. Gendarmerie officers must have the power to combine sections to escort mail coaches and patrol roads and woods . . .

3. Under the Minister of Police there will be a departmental chief of gendarmerie who, if necessary, can have the rank of adjutant-general or brigadier-general and who will be responsible for corresponding with all heads of divisions and for drawing up every five days a summary of this correspondence and of the bulletins and reports. . . .

6. Establish foot instead of mounted gendarmerie in mountainous country. . . .

496

**To Citizen Forfait***Minister of Marine and Colonies*

Paris

22 Ventôse, Year VIII (13 Mar, 1800)

Why, Citizen Minister, are the English prisoners being given a pound of beef, while the soldiers' ration is only half a pound?

BONAPARTE

497

**Decree**

Paris

23 Ventôse, Year VIII (14 Mar, 1800)

The Consuls of the Republic, considering that prisoners of war are entrusted to the care and humanity of the nations into whose power the fortune of battle has placed them, decree:

ARTICLE I. The Ministers of War and of Marine will use all means in their power to provide food and clothing for the Russian, Austrian and English prisoners. They will ensure that they are treated with every consideration compatible with public safety.

ART. 2. They will also take all necessary measures to speed up the exchange of prisoners.

BONAPARTE

498

**To Colonel Louis Bonaparte***O.C., 5th Dragoons*

Paris

29 Ventôse, Year VIII (20 Mar, 1800)

You will hand over command of your regiment to the senior major and will leave during the night for Brest by way of Rennes. You will hand the attached letter to General Brune, and, at Brest, the attached letters to Admirals Bruix and Gauteaume and to Commissioner Najac.

You will visit all the ships still in the dockyards of Brest and all the forts.

From there you will proceed to Lorient where you will visit all the ships in the dockyard and port and you will return through Nantes.

BONAPARTE

499

**To Admiral Bruix***C.-in-C., the Fleet, at Brest*

Paris

29 Ventôse, Year VIII (20 Mar, 1800)

Citizen Admiral, the Minister of Marine has just told me that he has received the telegraphed news that forty-five English ships are blockading you.

The bad weather which will necessarily appear at the equinox will force this squadron to relax and may disperse part of it; taking advantage of these circumstances to set sail, you will then be the more certain that a superior fleet cannot follow you . . .

Try to bring your squadron up to twenty and more ships.

I imagine that on 1 Germinal I shall receive by special dispatch the details of your position and that of the English squadron. I will reply within the hour.

A short time ago I wrote to Commissioner Najac to fit out ten or twelve of the ships still in the basin at Brest. It appears that biscuit in particular is lacking. Would it not be possible to equip a division of five, six or as many ships as possible with provisions for only four or six decades? This division could accompany you when you leave on a favourable wind and afterwards put into Rochefort or Lorient.

BONAPARTE

500

### To General Brune

*C.-in-C., Army of the West*

*Paris*

*29 Ventôse, Year VIII (20 Mar, 1800)*

I have just learnt, Citizen General, that forty-five warships are blockading Brest.

I wrote to you this morning to send to Brest the 1,800 naval ratings who are at Nantes.

Countermand the order to the 800 ratings who have left Saint-Malo for Cherbourg and direct them to Brest.

Try to procure 500,000 francs from tax receipts for Commissioner Najac.

Have sent to Brest all the corn and flour that is at Nantes or that you can procure there, so as to hasten the fitting out of the twelve ships in the port.

BONAPARTE

501

### To the Conservative Senate

*Paris*

*3 Germinal, Year VIII (24 Mar, 1800)*

Senators, the national budget, as established by the new constitution, covers the same operations as that organized in 1791.

If changes are necessary, it is above all in the regulation of receipts, in the distribution of expenditure and in the strict rules which ought to control them and ensure economy and sound finance.

The Government is fully occupied with these important matters; but the work covers a multitude of interests and if it is to have successful results it must be prepared with prolonged care.

The Consuls therefore invite you to proceed to the nomination of seven members to form the Committee of National Accounts.

BONAPARTE

502

### To the Conservative Senate

Paris

7 Germinal, Year VIII (28 Mar, 1800)

Senators, in conformity with Article 16 of the Constitution, the First Consul proposes Major-General Lefebvre as candidate for the vacant place in the Senate.

Major-General Lefebvre was ever in the front line during the war of liberty. He commanded in Paris on 18 Brumaire. He has shown as much wisdom and attachment to the sacred principles of liberty, equality and the representative system as he showed courage and military ability at Fleurus, at the crossing of the Rhine, at Wetzlar. Several times wounded in former campaigns, he was so gravely so in the last campaign that he can no longer take the field in a manner worthy of himself.

BONAPARTE

503

### To General Brune

*C.-in-C., Army of the West*

Paris

7 Germinal, Year VIII (28 Mar, 1800)

I have received your letters of 4 Germinal, Citizen General. You have taken sound steps to procure the 500,000 francs at Brest; but you have included the departments of the 14th Military District which are not within your command.

Please send me a detailed return of the different demi-brigades and the general and senior officers remaining in the Army of the West, so that necessary changes can be made. You know that before 18 Brumaire the chouans boasted of having agents in the army. It will be as well to take steps to remove from the West all units and individuals who have been there more than three years. But exceptions can be made for individuals whose patriotism and morality are well known. . . .

BONAPARTE

504

### To Admiral Bruix

*C.-in-C., the Fleet, at Brest*

Paris

7 Germinal, Year VIII (28 Mar, 1800)

I have received your letters of 2 Germinal, Citizen Admiral. Here is my opinion of the present position of our fleet.

If several days of bad weather disperse the English squadron and you think it possible to leave with the thirty-two or thirty-three ships, put to sea and carry out your mission.

If the equinoctial season passes without the English squadron dispersing, then, however great our interest in breaking the blockade of Malta and carrying help to Egypt, this must be given up.

I do not approve the proposal of Rear-Admiral Gauteaume to relieve Malta with six or seven ships. It is not that I fear that he would not be able to pass the straits; but I do fear his arrival before Malta where, according to reports, there are constantly from eight to eleven ships.

If the whole of April passes without occasion arising for you to leave with the whole squadron, it is my intention to arm the twelve ships remaining in the port, as the Minister of Marine has already informed the Commissioner, which will bring your squadron to thirty ships of the line, to act, according to the course of the continental war, against Ireland or even to enter the Mediterranean if that should become possible. But in that case I wish to follow up the expedition by having Rear-Admiral Lacrosse leave for the Antilles.

Embark your 3,000 men on board six 74-gun ships and six frigates, which will form Rear-Admiral Lacrosse's squadron. Rear-Admiral Lacrosse will receive orders as to his destination. . . .

BONAPARTE

505

## To Citizen Lucien Bonaparte

*Minister of the Interior*

Paris

15 *Germinal*, Year VIII (5 Apr, 1800)

Citizen Minister, the Consuls of the Republic desire you to make known to the managers of the various theatres in Paris that no play must be presented without being licensed by you. The head of the division of public instruction in your ministry is to be personally responsible for anything contrary to good morals and to the principles of the social pact appearing on the stage. As a result of this ruling the Prefect of Police will allow no play to be announced except on production of the licence granted by you.

Please inform the Prefects of Departments that this rule applies to them also and that they must allow no dramatic work to be announced or shown until they are assured of your permission. The circular which you will send out to this effect will not be published.

The Consuls also request you, Citizen Minister, to report to them during this week on suitable measures to restrict the number of theatres and on the rules to be issued to ensure supervision by the public authorities. You may consider it proper at the same time to



suggest ways of honouring the drama and encouraging those writers who practise it with success.

*By order of the First Consul*

The First Consul would be glad to see suppressed the couplet referring to him in the vaudeville, *Portrait of the Sabines*.

506

## To Citizen Fouché

*Minister of Police*

*Paris*

*15 Germinal, Year VIII (5 Apr, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, it is the intention of the Consuls of the Republic that the journals, *The Well-informed*, *Free Men* and *Defenders of the Country* should no longer appear, unless the proprietors appoint editors whose morality and patriotism is beyond all corruption. You will insist that each number of these journals be signed by the responsible editor.

You will order the Prefect of Police to take the necessary measures:

1. That no bills are stuck on the walls of Paris, and that the news-vendors cry the names of no journals or pamphlets without a permit from the police;

2. That the bookstalls expose for sale nothing contrary to good morals or to the principles of the government.

The Prefect of Police will allow no stage performance to be announced unless the director of the theatre has the permission of the Minister of the Interior.

The Consuls desire you to let them have, during this decade, a report:

1. On the steps to be taken to remove from Paris the large number of Italian refugees and foreigners who are there without means of subsistence.

2. On those you think desirable to remove from the territory of the Republic the emigrants who have returned to the Department of the Seine, whether or not they are under surveillance, unless they had applied to be removed from the list before 4 Nivôse last.

3. On the names and residence of some fifty individuals who, accustomed to living in revolutionary movements, are continually stirring up opinion, and on the means of eliminating these men from Paris, several of them being employed by the foreigner and at the bidding of whoever may be willing to pay them to disturb the public peace.

Finally, you will have Mr. Payne\* informed that the police are aware of his misconduct and that at the first complaint against him he will be returned to America, his homeland.

BONAPARTE

\* Tom Paine.

**Proclamation***To Departments Placed Outside the Constitution*

Paris

1 Floréal, Year VIII (21 Apr, 1800)

Citizens, it was with regret that the Consuls of the Republic saw themselves forced to invoke and execute a law which circumstances had rendered necessary. Those circumstances exist no longer. The foreign agents have fled from your territory; those they led astray have renounced their errors. Henceforward the Government sees among you only Frenchmen subject to the same laws, bound by common interests, united by the same sentiments.

If, to bring about this return, the Government has been obliged to deploy great force, it has confided control to General Brune, who knows how to combine with the necessary rigour that fraternal benevolence which looks only for innocent men and finds only men worthy of pardon or pity.

The Constitution resumes its sway. Henceforth you will live under magistrates who are almost all known to you for their talents and virtues and who, being foreign to civil strife, have neither hatred nor vengeance to exact. Entrust yourselves to their care: they will bring back harmony amongst you; they will enable you to enjoy the benefits of liberty. . . .

BONAPARTE

**To Citizen Forfait***Minister of Marine and Colonies*

Paris

2 Floréal, Year VIII (22 Apr, 1800)

1. On 15 Floréal, weather permitting, the Minister of Marine will cause seven 74-gun warships and five frigates under the orders of Rear-Admiral Lacrosse to set sail from Brest for Santo Domingo.

2. They will carry 4,600 landing troops, an artillery company and six field guns. This force will be commanded by a major-general, who will be appointed commander-in-chief of Santo Domingo.\*

3. Councillor of State Lescallier will leave Paris on the 6th to embark with this squadron.

4. The Minister of Marine will issue instructions to Rear-Admiral Lacrosse, to the commander-in-chief and to Councillor of State Lescallier.

5. General Toussaint-L'Ouverture, General Rigaud and General Michel will be employed in the army of Santo Domingo according to their rank.

BONAPARTE

\* Mathieu was appointed to this command by an order of the same date.

509

**To General Augereau***C.-in-C., French Army in Holland*

Paris

7 Floréal, Year VIII (27 Apr, 1800)

I am informed, Citizen General, that several members of the Dutch Government are behaving with as much insolence as we show of moderation in our conduct. Demand imperiously all that this government owes to us. I have told the Minister of Foreign Affairs to write to Citizen Semonville\* to be more energetic. I have also shown Schimmelpenninck† that I am far from pleased with his Government.

The campaign is about to begin; we shall have successes; that will confound ill-wishers of every kind and particularly the partisans of England who have got into the Dutch Government.

BONAPARTE

510

**To the Presidents of Tribunals***Department of the Seine*

Paris

13 Floréal, Year VIII (3 May, 1800)

When France was divided by factions, justice was badly administered; that was inevitable. That condition has lasted for ten years; you will end it. You will never inquire as to what party belongs any man who asks you for justice, but the rights of each will be weighed with the severest impartiality. It is for the armies to ensure peace with foreign powers: justice is the means of ensuring peace between citizens.

You are appointed for life; no one has the power to dismiss you; you are responsible for your judgements only to your own consciences.

The choice of magistrates for the tribunals in the Department of the Seine has been generally applauded; I hope that in responding to public confidence you will give the Government ever more reason to congratulate itself on having confided to you the administration of justice.

BONAPARTE

511

**To the Consuls of the Republic**

Geneva

20 Floréal, Year VIII (10 May, 1800)

From information I have gained in Geneva, Citizen Consuls, it seems to me that judges have been appointed rather too much from a single party. Citizen Carelli, President of the former criminal court of Léman, who is accepted as a man of great intelligence and probity has not been included. I wish him to be placed in the appeal court at Lyons in place of Citizen Gavard, who has resigned . . .

BONAPARTE

\* French Minister to Holland.

† Dutch Minister to France.

512

**To Citizen Bertin***Naval Commissioner, Toulon**Geneva**21 Floréal, Year VIII (11 May, 1800)*

Please, Citizen, have my messenger for Corsica leave at once.

The Minister of Marine will no doubt have written to you to hasten as much as possible the dispatch of ten separate boats to Malta.

Write to General Vaubois by each vessel. Let him know that France and the whole of Europe are expecting Malta to hold out to the last ounce of bread. Send him a collection of newspapers; tell him of the brilliant victories of the armies of the Republic, which are masters of Suabia.

BONAPARTE

513

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Lausanne**25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, I have received from Toulon a number of letters from generals and, among others, from General Menou. It appears that the capitulation is disapproved by all intelligent people and by many brave men in the army. Since the Quartermaster-General has sent an exact return of the troops composing it, I am sending this to the Consuls to be published in the *Monitor*. When it appears I wish you to have several articles written with the aim of suggesting that had I remained in Egypt that magnificent colony would still be ours, just as, if I had stayed in France, we would not have lost Italy.

In this connexion it will be as well to recall that at Abukir 4,000 Frenchmen beat 20,000 Turks and captured the pasha; that at Damietta General Verdier, with 800 men, beat 4,000 janissaries; that the Grand Vizir certainly had no more than 30,000 men, a rabble of all races, that 8,000 French would have routed; that it is the more unfortunate to evacuate Egypt now when, as a result of the precautions taken, the plague has done no damage this year, and when, with the end of the Vendée war, the Brest squadron, carrying 6,000 men and plenty of munitions would have brought aid to Egypt within a month or two; that the court of London gave the safe conduct to the army only on the recommendation of Mr. Smith who has seen the strength of the French army and the weakness of the Turks: it is such that the Grand Vizir dare not advance from his camp at Bilbeis to Cairo and has gone so far in appeasement as to pay three millions to the French army; and that if the Army of Egypt had known that England would oppose its return to France there is no doubt that it would have beaten the Grand Vizir, forced him to cross the desert and reconquered Egypt.

You will realize that all that must be said, especially to remove any shadow of suspicion that the enemies of the Government might make use of.

BONAPARTE

514

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Lausanne*

*25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)*

I have received your letter of 21 Floréal, Citizen Minister. Advise Citizen Beurnonville\* to be very circumspect. To any question as to which he has no instructions he should always reply: 'I will consult my Government.'

As to Malta, we now have high hopes of retaining it. In the meantime we can use the restoration of the Order as a point upon which England and Russia will never agree. However, he must not commit himself too far.

BONAPARTE

515

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Lausanne*

*26 Floréal, Year VIII (16 May, 1800)*

I am sending you, citizen Minister, a letter addressed to you which I have opened; you will probably find it as stupid as I do. But, while the letter is in truth insignificant, they have learnt their lesson and replied in great haste. The chancellery, which is influenced by England, has felt it could not at this moment reply too soon, so as not to have to write an answer as to which the Emperor might be influenced by the course of the war. However that may be, I hope that the events about to take place in Suabia and in Italy will make them change their tone.

BONAPARTE

516

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Lausanne*

*26 Floréal, Year VIII (16 May, 1800)*

I believe, Citizen Minister, that in order to bring nearer the moment of peace we must press forward war and negotiation side by side. This is what I wish you to do:

Begin your reply to M. de Thugut by deploring the inability of governments to show moderation in success; dwell a little on the miseries this campaign will cause without any real advantage to either side. If anyone can profit from it, it will be solely the English.

\* French Minister at Berlin.

But since one day the Court of Vienna will have to return to its ideas of moderation and peace, inform M. de Thugut that Citizen Lavallette, chargé d'affaires of the Republic at Dresden, has the confidence of the Government; that when he wishes to proceed with the negotiations he can send secretly some agent to Dresden bearing a letter to Citizen Lavallette from M. de Thugut with the information that he is in the confidence of that minister. You will inform Citizen Lavallette of what you have done and what he must do. His principal rôle should be to express a great desire for peace, to listen carefully, to let it be known that we shall have no difficulty in making arrangements for Rome, Sardinia and Switzerland, and to demand the execution of the Treaty of Campo Formio, saying at the same time that, to make this easier, some modifications may be necessary and will be made. Citizen Lavallette must put nothing on paper, agree to little, appear extremely conciliatory and, when he has heard the proposals of the Austrian agent, say that he will forward them to his Government. These methods are only to settle the preliminaries.

BONAPARTE

517

### To the Consuls of the Republic

*Aosta*

*4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

You inform me, Citizen Consuls, that the Minister of the Interior has allowed two ships to import colonial goods into France from England. That seems to me inconceivable. Please call for a full report on the matter. Such a decision could be taken only after long discussion and by a decree of the Government. I even think it necessary that you should give instructions that no new steps are to be taken in this respect until further orders. This matter has diplomatic implications.

BONAPARTE

518

### To Citizen Fouché

*Minister of Police*

*Aosta*

*4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

I have your undated letter, Citizen Minister, brought by the courier of the 29th. The answer to all intrigues, all cabals, all denunciations, will always be this: it is that during the month I have been away Paris has been perfectly quiet. After such services one is above calumny, but so far as I am concerned there was no need for this proof, which can add nothing to my complete confidence in you. I might say to you today what I have said several times: study the people as they are now and the means of setting up a good police system in the Republic; it is

a problem that needs time. It is with pleasure that I see you ever making giant strides towards it. Two or three discoveries like the English committee and you will have a fine and honourable place in the history of the times.

BONAPARTE

519

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Novara*

*12 Prairial, Year VIII (1 June, 1800)*

You will find attached, Citizen Minister, your letter to M. de Thugut, with a few changes. Since it closes the negotiations which opened with my letter to the Emperor, I thought it as well that it should be rather in the style of a peroration.

If the news from Egypt is confirmed, it will be very important to have someone in Russia. The Ottoman Empire cannot exist longer, and if Paul I turns his eye in that direction our interests will be the same. Beurnonville is right in saying that we shall never do anything through Prussia.

BONAPARTE

I am very pleased to learn that you have been able to go out.

520

**To Citizen Fouché**

*Minister of Police*

*Milan*

*15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

Georges, I am assured, is back from England. It is essential to have him arrested, and also the father of Frotté, who is in the Orne. Spare no means to take these two men dead or alive.

BONAPARTE

521

**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Milan*

*15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, I wish you to have printed a pamphlet bearing the title: *Letter from a patriotic German on the Policy of the House of Austria*. The aim would be to suggest that the House of Austria has always aggrandized itself at the expence and to the detriment of the Empire.

It needs someone well acquainted with the events of the last fifty years, those relating to Mainz, etc. It will be well to have this letter printed in German and distributed profusely in Germany.

BONAPARTE

522

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

Inform the prize court, Citizen Minister, that it appears to me essential that no decision be reached concerning Danish ships until M. Dreyer or some other minister of the same rank returns to Paris. The prize council should reply only: 'We will see, we are attending to it.' You will arrange for it to be known that the cause of these delays is the present conduct of the Danish Government.

As to the Dutch ships, I think it would be as well to gain time; for, if the Dutch continue to behave badly, especially in raising difficulties over the troops we are asking them for, there will no longer be any reason to act favourably towards them.

I see no reason why you should not send some dresses to the queen of Spain, and you can spend 1,000 louis for this purpose. But this must be carried out with the decorum necessary to prevent it from appearing ridiculous.

BONAPARTE

523

**Address to the Clergy of Milan\****Milan Cathedral**16 Prairial, Year VIII (5 June, 1800)*

I have wished to see you all assembled here so as to have the satisfaction of myself informing you of the opinions I hold on the subject of the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion. Convinced that this is the only religion which can bring true happiness to a well-ordered society and strengthen the foundations of a good government, I assure you that I shall devote myself to defending it at all times and by every means. I regard you, the ministers of that religion, which is indeed also my own, as my most dear friends. I declare that I shall regard as a disturber of the peace and enemy of the common good whoever commits the least outrage against our common religion or dares offer the slightest insult towards your sacred persons, and that I shall punish such an one in the most signal and rigorous manner, even, if need be, with death.

It is my firm intention that the Christian, Catholic and Roman religion shall be preserved in its entirety, that it shall be publicly performed and that it shall enjoy this public exercise with as full, extensive and inviolable freedom as at the time when I came for the first time into these happy lands. All the changes which then occurred, particularly as to discipline, took place against my wishes and my way of

\* Delivered in Italian.



thought. Being simply the agent of a government which cared not at all for the Catholic religion, I was unable at that time to prevent the disorders deliberately fomented with the aim of overthrowing it. Now that I am furnished with full power I am resolved to put into effect all appropriate means to ensure and protect this religion.

Modern philosophers have striven to persuade the French nation that the Catholic religion is the implacable enemy of every democratic system and republican form of government: hence this cruel persecution launched by the French Republic against the religion and its ministers; hence all the horrors to which this unfortunate people has been delivered. The diversity of opinion on the subject of religion which reigned in France at the time of the Revolution has not been one of the least sources of these disorders. But experience has disillusioned the French and has convinced them that of all religions there is none which adapts itself as does the Catholic to different forms of government and which favours republican democratic government in particular, affirming its rightness and illuminating its principles. I, too, am a philosopher, and I know that no man can pass as virtuous and just in any society unless he knows whence he comes and whither he goes. Reason alone cannot help us there; without religion we move always among shadows; and the Catholic religion is the only one which throws certain and infallible light on the origin and end of man. No society can exist without morality: there is no good morality without religion; it is religion alone, therefore, that gives to the State a firm and durable support. A society without religion is as a ship without a compass; a ship in that state can neither find its route nor hope to enter port. A society without religion, always disturbed, perpetually shaken by the clash of violent passions, experiences all the fury of internecine warfare which casts it into an abyss of evils and sooner or later brings about its inevitable ruin.

France, instructed by misfortune, has at length opened her eyes. She has recognized that the Catholic religion was like an anchor which could hold her fast in the midst of disturbance and save her from the tempest. She has therefore recalled it to her bosom. I cannot deny that I have contributed much to this happy achievement. I assure you that the churches have been reopened in France, that the Catholic religion is resuming its ancient glory there, and that the people observe with respect the holy pastors who are returning, full of zeal, into the midst of their abandoned flocks.

Do not let the manner in which the late Pope was treated inspire any fear in you; Pius VI owed his misfortunes in part to the intrigues of those in whom he had placed his confidence, in part to the cruel policy of the Directory. As soon as I am able to confer with the new Pope, I hope to have the happiness of removing every obstacle which still

hinders complete reconciliation between France and the head of the Church. I am not unaware of what you have suffered, both in your persons and your property. As to your persons, they will in future once more be inviolable and respected by all; as to your property, I shall give orders that it be restored to you at least in part, and I shall take the necessary action to assure to you forever an honourable livelihood.

That is the communication I wished to make to you on the subject of the Christian, Catholic and Roman religion. I desire these words to remain engraved on your minds and I shall approve their printed publication, so that my intentions may be known not only in France and Italy but throughout the whole of Europe.

524

### To the Consuls of the Republic

Milan

18 Prairial, Year VIII (7 June, 1800)

I have received your dispatches of 10, 11 and 12 Prairial, Citizen Consuls. You will see the situation of the army from the attached bulletin: all continues to go well.

I think it would be most desirable to dismiss the municipality of Calais for its lack of surveillance and for having allowed the man Dupeyron, head of the English espionage service, to escape. We must put into Calais men whose patriotism is certain and who are immune to corruption by the English.

The report of the Minister of the Interior on the suppression of *The Friend of the Laws* does not seem to me at all reasonable. I feel it only makes the Institute hateful to suppress a journal because it has loosed off a few gibes against this society, which is so respected throughout Europe as to be above such trifles. I assure you that, as President of the Institute, I do not protest lightly. If they want to, let them say that the sun goes round the earth, that the tides are caused by melting snow and that we are charlatans; there must be the greatest possible liberty.

I see from a return you send me of those detained during the month of Floréal that there are 281 because of desertion. It is perhaps desirable that you appoint a court martial to judge those men and not let them rot in prison.


I have received letters from Corsica from which I learn that many ships have left for Malta; I am sending them to you. It would perhaps be well to publish a small official article to belie the rumours spread about as to the revolt of the departments of Golo and Liamone.

BONAPARTE

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*Marengo*

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**Medals of the Marengo Campaign**

*Above: Marengo medal; below: Desaix memorial medal.*

*Actual size.*

THE WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION, WHICH BROKE OUT EARLY IN 1799, was initially disastrous for the French. Defeated at Stockach in March, Jourdan was driven back to the Rhine. In Italy Schérer, Moreau, Championnet and Macdonald were routed in turn by Austrian and Russian armies and when in August Joubert was crushed at Novi all Bonaparte's conquests were wrested away. The Ionian Islands were lost, Malta blockaded. An Anglo-Russian force under the Duke of York landed in Holland, while the English aided the royalists of Vendée in renewed revolt. Yet, despite administrative chaos and financial bankruptcy, this tide had been stemmed when Bonaparte landed at Fréjus. As Minister of War, Bernadotte worked ably to equip and reinforce the armies; Masséna's heroic defence of Switzerland saved France from invasion, and in September he overwhelmingly defeated Korsakov at Zürich; in November Brune forced York to the surrender of Alkmaar, and an uneasy ascendancy and partial truce were achieved in Vendée. The Coalition, too, began to break up when Russia withdrew from active participation, so that by the time of Brumaire the military position of France, though precarious, was no longer desperate. Only in the south-east, where small, battered forces held the Genoese coast and the passes of Savoy against Melas's well-found army of 70,000 was there a real danger of collapse and invasion.

Bonaparte's plan for the spring campaign of 1800 was for the Army of Italy, now under Masséna, to hold on as best it could and for Moreau, with the Army of the Rhine, to attack and hold Kray, while he himself, with a newly formed Reserve Army, crossed the high Alps into Italy and fell upon Melas from the rear. All his life Napoleon held up the Marengo campaign as one of the finest of his career. Fraught with many risks, it was certainly a bold strategic conception and, despite the unforeseen handicap met at Bard, it was carried through with complete success, though not quite in time to save Masséna from an honourable surrender. Yet the vaunted crossing of the Saint-Bernard, though very difficult, was not more remarkable than Suvurov's opposed passage of the Saint-Gotthard a year earlier or than Macdonald's crossing of the Splügen in the depth of winter six months later. The battle of Marengo itself was very nearly a disaster and the fault lay entirely with the First Consul. There seems no doubt that throughout the battle he remained calm and confident; but the day was saved by others and there is also no doubt that he subsequently took to himself much of the credit that properly belonged to them.

Secrecy and surprise were fully achieved. The enemy were entirely misled as to the strength and purpose of the Reserve Army, considering it no more than a modest reinforcement for Moreau or Masséna; even when it appeared in Italy, Melas seems for some time to have thought that he had to do only with a diversionary force of 7,000 or 8,000 men.

In fact it was nearly 60,000 strong and more than half its effectives were seasoned troops drawn from Brune's Army of the West and Augereau's forces in Holland, which marched to the Lake of Geneva without passing through the spy-infested official assembly area round Dijon. In addition, Moncey's corps of 12,000, detached from the Army of the Rhine, moved straight across the Saint-Gotthard to Milan. Even so, the Reserve Army was weak. It was outnumbered; it was short of cavalry, seriously short of artillery, while the difficult line of march imposed almost intolerable strains on a barely efficient supply system. But Bonaparte inspired it with his own confidence, and it was superbly led: seven of the future marshals were among the higher officers.

Three weeks after his foremost troops crossed the pass, Bonaparte was astride the Austrian communications, had swept up their reserves, stores and hospitals and stormed or blockaded their fortresses. He then moved west to meet Melas's field force; but, whether from over-confidence or fear of a relieving army from the east, he did so, most untypically, with little more than half his available strength. On 13th June he further weakened himself by sending Desaix with Boudet's division to the south-west and Lapoype's division to the north-west to find and hold the enemy, whom he believed to be retreating from Alessandria towards either Genoa or Turin. He had some reason for this in the enemy's recent behaviour and in faulty reconnaissance reports showing the Bormida bridges opposite Alessandria to be blown. In fact they were intact, and when on the next morning the Austrians crossed them in force to the attack, Bonaparte with 22,000 men was faced with an unexpected battle against a far larger army possessing overwhelming superiority in cavalry and artillery on an open plain where that superiority could be fully exploited. By 11.0 a.m. the extent of the danger was clear and orders of recall were sent to Desaix and Lapoype. Lapoype had gone too far and received the message only at 6.30 p.m.; Desaix received it about 1.0 p.m.\* Meanwhile the French were inexorably driven back; their formations disintegrated, their guns were overrun; by 4.0 p.m., when Desaix reached the field, they were streaming away in disorder and the battle seemed lost. The sequel is famous. Marmont's skilful use of Desaix's few guns and the fire of Boudet's intact division shattered the foremost Austrian columns, while the charge of Kellermann's heavy cavalry brigade threw their centre into confusion. The French quickly rallied, and by nightfall the Austrians were being driven back over the Bormida in hopeless rout. A few hours later Melas sued for an armistice. Desaix had been killed at the first impact.

\* It has been widely held that on hearing the gunfire Desaix at once turned back on his own responsibility—a view that has been much used to belabour Grouchy's conduct at Waterloo. There is strong evidence that this was not in fact so.

## DEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH ARMIES During the Marengo Campaign

### ARMY OF THE EAST

*C.-in-C.*: Kléber (assassinated 14th June, 1800, succeeded by Menou). Strength about 30,000. Cooped up in Egypt (with Vaubois's detachment equally blockaded in Malta) this army played no part in continental operations. But the absence of communication with Egypt had caused reinforcements in officers, men and equipment to pile up at the base depots, so that the depots of each of the fourteen demi-brigades of the army stood at approximately battalion strength and those of the seven cavalry regiments at squadron strength. These troops were brigaded to form five *ad hoc* demi-brigades and two regiments and were incorporated in the Reserve Army.

### ARMY OF THE WEST

*C.-in-C.*: Brune (Bernadotte from 1 May, 1800, when Brune was transferred to Dijon to command what later became the 2nd Line, Reserve Army); *C. of S.*: Hédouville. Strength about 60,000. Situated in west and north-west France, the army was engaged in suppressing the continued, sporadic outbreaks of royalist revolt and in forming a covering force against a possible English landing. It played no direct part in the campaign, but two infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades were transferred from it to form the core of the Reserve Army.

### ARMY IN HOLLAND

*C.-in-C.*: Augereau. Strength about 25,000 French plus 15,000 Dutch troops. The main functions of the army were to provide a covering force against an English invasion and to maintain the reality of French control over Dutch policy. One infantry division and one cavalry brigade were contributed to the Reserve Army. In May strong detachments were moved to the south-eastern sector of the army area, and provisional orders were issued for the bulk of the army to move into Germany on the left flank of the Army of the Rhine. In the event, this movement was neither needed nor ordered.

### ARMY OF ITALY

*C.-in-C.*: Masséna; *Deputy C.-in-C.*: Suchet; *C. of S.*: Oudinot. Strength about 30,000, holding the Genoese Riviera and the south-east frontier of France, with small forces guarding the passes up to the Swiss frontier. Its rôle was to receive and hold the Austrian attack, while the Reserve Army came down upon their rear. This attack developed early in April and cut the army in two. Masséna, with about half his strength, became closely blockaded in Genoa, but kept a large Austrian corps at bay until the total exhaustion of his supplies forced him to surrender on 4 June, at the very moment when Hohenzollern was ordered to raise the siege. In the centre Suchet was driven back to the Var, where he withstood heavy attacks until the end of May, when Melas had to withdraw to meet Bonaparte. Turreau's northern division in Savoy came under command of the Reserve Army and attacked the Austrian right flank through Susa.

### ARMY OF THE RHINE

*C.-in-C.*: Moreau; *Deputy C.-in-C.*: Macdonald; *C. of S.*: Dessolle. Strength about 120,000, deployed from Mainz to the Swiss frontier. Moreau had the dual role of providing a corps of 20,000 to 25,000 under Moncey to cross the Saint-Gothard and join the Reserve Army and of attacking and, if possible, defeating, but at least holding the opposed Austrians, so that troops could not be withdrawn to support Melas in Italy. These tasks were fulfilled, but, Moreau being a slow and cautious, if able commander, neither so quickly nor completely as the First Consul intended.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE RESERVE ARMY  
as at 14 June, 1800

*C.-in-C.*: Berthier

<i>C. of S.</i> : Dupont de l'Etang	<i>Deputy C. of S.</i> : Vignolle
<i>Cdr., Cavalry</i> : Murat	<i>C. of S., Cavalry</i> : Berthier (César)
<i>Cdr., Artillery</i> : Marmont	<i>C. of S., Artillery</i> : Sénarmont
<i>O.C., Park</i> : Gassendi	<i>O.C., Siege Train</i> : Saint Michel
<i>Cdr., Engineers</i> : Marescot	<i>C. of S., Engineers</i> : Mutel
<i>Q.M.G.</i> : Dubreton	<i>Asst. Q.M.Gs.</i> : Lambert, Boindot

*Paymaster-Gen.*: Jehannot

*Adjts.-gen., G.S.*: Dampierre, Lacroix, Pannetier, Stabenrath

THE CONSULAR GUARD: Bessières

*Strength*: infantry, 800; cavalry, 360; artillery, 72

ADVANCE GUARD: Lannes

*Adjt.-gen.*: Iazard *Strength*: 5083  
5th Dragoons (Dommanget)

*Brigade*: Mainoni  
28th Line (Valhubert)

*Division*: Watrin

*Brig.-Gens.*: Gency, Malher *C. of S.*: Noguès  
6th Light (Macon), 22nd Line (Schreiber), 40th Line (Legendre)

CORPS: Desaix  
1st Hussars (Juniac)

*Division*: Boudet

*Brig.-Gens.*: Guénand, Musnier *C. of S.*: Dalton *Strength*: 5316  
9th Light (Labasse), 30th Line (Lajeunesse), 59th Line (Bourdois)

*Division*: Monnier

*Brig.-Gens.*: Carra St.-Cyr, Schilt *C. of S.*: Girard *Strength*: 3614  
19th Light (Bourgeois), 70th Line (Rouyer), 72nd Line (Mercier)

CORPS: Victor  
3rd Cavalry (Romagny)

*Division*: Gardanne

*Brig.-Gen.*: Dumoulin *C. of S.*: Dampierre *Strength*: 3691  
44th Line (Saudeur), 101st Line (Cardenau)

*Division*: Chambarlhac

*Brig.-Gens.*: Herbin, Rivaud *C. of S.*: Delort *Strength*: 5287  
24th Light (Ferry), 43rd Line (Bisson), 96th Line (Lepreux)

CORPS: Duhesme  
7th Chasseurs (Michelson)

*Division*: Loison

*Brig.-Gens.*: Broussier, Gobert *C. of S.*: Mériage *Strength*: 5304  
13th Light (Castillon), 58th Line (Colomb), 60th Line (Peyré)

*Division*: Chabran

*Brig.-Gen.*: Sérissiat *C. of S.*: Brenier *Strength*: 3373  
12th Light (1 btn.), 1st *ad hoc* Demi-brigade ex-Army of the East (Taupin),  
2nd *ditto* (Gaspard), 3rd *ditto* (Chavardes)



CORPS: Moncey (ex-Army of the Rhine)

*Division:* Lapoype

*Brig.-Gens.:* Digonnet, Chabert *Strength:* 3462  
1st Light (Gaulois), 29th Line (Paticier), 91st Line (Goury)

*Division:* Lorge

*Brig.-Gen.:* Bonamy *C. of S.:* Foy *Strength:* 4400  
12th Light (1 btn.), 67th Line (Chossat), Italic Legion (Lechi)

*Brigade:* Gilly

*Adj.-Gen.:* Hulin *Strength:* 3300  
12th Light (1 btn.), 1st Line (Berthelot)

*Brigade:* Béthencourt

102nd Line (Goiffon) *Strength:* 1695

*Division:* Turreau (ex-Army of Italy)

*Brig.-Gens.:* Davin, Lavalette *C. of S.:* Liébault *Strength:* 5130  
28th Light (Praefke), 26th Line (Mairesse), elements of 14th & 15th Light and  
21st & 107th Line; 9th Chasseurs (Thullier), 14th Chasseurs (Boudet)

#### CAVALRY

*1st Division:* Murat

*Adj.-Gen.:* Berthier *Strength:* 3688

*Brigade:* Kellermann

2nd Cavalry (Yvendorff), 20th Cav. (Gérard), 21st Cav. (Rouff)

*Brigade:* Champeaux

1st Dragoons (Viallannes), 8th Drag. (Millet), 9th Drag. (Levreault)

*Brigade:* Rivaud

12th Chasseurs (Defrance), 21st Chas. (Duprès), 11th Hussars (Ismert)

*Brigade:* Duvignau\*

6th Dragoons (Romagny), 1st Hussars (Juniac), 12th Hus. (Fournier)

*2nd Division:* Harville

*Brig.-Gens.:* Kister, Dumoulin *Adj.-Gen.:* Requin *Strength:* 2612  
(Unbrigaded) 5th Cavalry (Jacquemin), 15th Cav. (Poinsot), 22nd Cav. (Avice),  
5th Dragoons (Dommaget), 2nd Chasseurs (Croutelle), 7 Chas. (Michelon),  
9th Chas. (Thullier), 14th Chas. (Boudet), 15th Chas. (Teinturier)

#### ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS

Artillery in action at Marengo . . . . .	618
Artillery on siege duties, etc. . . . .	1131
Engineers . . . . .	269

Total troops in action at Marengo . . . . . 28,169

Total troops in garrison, l. of c., etc. . . . . 29,676


Total strength, Reserve Army . . . . . 57,845†

#### PERSONAL STAFF OF THE FIRST CONSUL



*Councillors-of-State:* Dejean, Petiet; *Aides-de-Camp:* Duroc, Lauriston, Merlin,  
Lefebvre; *Secretary:* Bourrienne

\* Duvignau was not present in person at the battle.

† Several contemporary strength returns exist and there are minor discrepancies between them as to the numbers engaged and the exact order of battle.



ROUTE OF THE RESERVE ARMY



THE BATTLE OF MARENGO

Above: about 11.0 a.m. Below: about 4.30 p.m.  
 ----- route of Kellermann's charge

525

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**5 Pluviôse, Year VIII (25 Jan, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, my intention is to organize a Reserve Army, command of which will be reserved to the First Consul. It will be divided into right, centre and left and each of these big corps will be commanded by a lieutenant-general. There will, besides, be a cavalry division, also commanded by a lieutenant-general.

Each corps will contain two divisions, each commanded by a major-general and two brigadiers; each corps will also have a senior artillery officer.

Each lieutenant-general will have a brigadier as his chief-of-staff; each major-general an adjutant-general.

Each corps will comprise from 18,000 to 20,000 men, including two regiments of hussars or chasseurs, and sixteen guns, four mounted, twelve served by foot companies.

The fourteen battalions forming the depots of the Army of the East, the 14th, 30th, 43rd and 96th Demi-brigades in the 17th District, the 9th and 24th Light Infantry in the Army of the West, the 22nd, 40th, 58th, and 52nd, also in that Army, the 11th Light and the 66th will all form part of the Reserve Army.

The 15th, 19th, 21st and 24th Chasseurs, the 5th, 8th, 9th, and 19th Dragoons, the 11th, 12th, and 2nd Hussars, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 18th Cavalry and the seven depot squadrons of the cavalry units of the Army of the East will be the nucleus of the Reserve Army.

The right will be formed at Lyons, the centre at Dijon and the left at Châlons-sur-Marne.

Major-General Saint-Remy will serve as commander of artillery.\* Colonel Gassendi will be director-general of the park. Chief Inspector of Engineers Marescot will command that arm. There will be a quartermaster and four war commissaries in each corps and a quartermaster-general of the Army, who will remain with the Minister of War and carry out the functions of chief of staff.

A staff officer from each corps of the Army must be called to Paris to report on armament, equipment and clothing. They will assemble in Paris on 15 February.

You will issue orders to bring the strength of each battalion up to 1,000 men as quickly as possible.

You will suggest to me officers to form the staff of the Reserve Army.

You will keep the formation of this army extremely secret, even in your own offices.

**BONAPARTE**

\* Owing to the illness of this officer Marmont later replaced him.

526

**To General Moreau***C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

Paris

11 Pluviôse, Year VIII (31 Jan, 1800)

Citizen General, I am sending you my aide-de-camp, Colonel Duroc, so that you can let me know the situation of the army under your command and inform me as to your position.

The following are the sums of money sent to the Army of the Rhine during the month of Nivôse. . . . Please let me know at once if these sums have reached you; reply item by item. I hope that the worst moments are past, and that from now on we shall see the condition of our finances improving daily.

I wish Colonel Duroc to visit the various positions in Switzerland which were attacked and defended during the last campaign, so that I may always have with me someone who knows the nature of that country.

Send me by Citizen Duroc an exact return of the troops composing your army and of their present organization. Give him also for me a detailed note setting out your ideas for the coming campaign.

BONAPARTE

527

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War*

Paris

25 Pluviôse, Year VIII (14 Feb, 1800)

Citizen Minister, I have not received the report of Major-General Gauthier on the depots of the Army of the East, for which I asked you. I wish to receive it without delay. You will order Major-General Chabran to proceed at once to Châlon-sur-Saône to take command of the fourteen depot battalions of the Army of the East. General Chabran will inspect them and attend to their equipment, armament, clothing and recruitment. These battalions will remain in cantonments at Mâcon, Châlon, Leurre and Saint-Jean-de-Losne. They will be exercised in manœuvres twice daily.

The division commanded by General Chabran will be known as the 1st Division of the Reserve Army. There will be attached to it three 8-pounders and one 6-inch howitzer, manned by the light artillery, two 12-pounders, four 8-pounders and two howitzers manned by the foot artillery. General Chabran will have two brigadiers and an adjutant-general under his command. His headquarters will be at Châlon-sur-Saône. He will take orders only from the Minister of War . . .

Colonel Taupin, who is at Toulon, will receive your order to proceed to Châlon to take command of the battalions of the 18th, 32nd and 75th Demi-brigades. Colonel Gaspard will take the battalions of the

13th, 25th and 85th Demi-brigades. The battalions of the 4th, 21st and 22nd Light Infantry will be commanded by a colonel formerly of the Army of Italy who commanded troops through the Italian campaign. The battalions of the 61st, 69th and 88th will be commanded by a colonel promoted from one of these units.

BONAPARTE

528

## Decree

*Paris*

*26 Pluviôse, Year VIII (15 Feb, 1800)*

The Consuls of the Republic decree:

The Minister of Police will notify all journalists that they must refrain from printing anything concerning the movements of the armed forces.

BONAPARTE

529

## To Major-General Berthier

*Minister of War*

*Paris*

*10 Ventôse, Year VIII (1 Mar, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, . . . You will issue orders to have 1,500,000 biscuit rations, 100,000 pints of brandy and 100,000 bushels of oats collected at Geneva as soon as possible. A herd of 1,000 bullocks will be assembled at Bourg by 1 Germinal . . .

You will take steps: 1, to purchase 1,000 pack mules in Dauphiné and the other mountainous regions of France . . . 2, to assemble at Geneva as soon as possible 20 sledges for 8- and 10 for 4-pounders.

You will inform General Moreau that I wish his chief of staff to come with all speed to Paris with the order of battle of his army. On his return this chief of staff will take the plan for the first operations of the campaign, combined with that of the other armies . . .

You will hasten the organization of the Italian legions, so that they can take the field in Germinal. . . .

You will give orders so that by Germinal there are at Geneva two million cartridges and 5,000 rounds of 4 and 8 pound round and case shot and howitzer shells. . . .

You will send Citizen Guériot to command the artillery at Geneva, to organize a powder factory and stores for the depots.

You will send General Sauret to command at Geneva. You will order Generals Bernadotte, Macdonald, Chambarlhac, Lannes, Broussier, Marescot and Saint-Remy to prepare themselves for immediate active service; also Adjutants-general Hulin, Herbin and Nogués.

BONAPARTE

530

**To General Moreau***C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine**Paris**10 Ventôse, Year VIII (1 Mar, 1800)*

The Minister of War will have informed you, Citizen General, of the organization I wish you to give to your army so that it will be in a position to fulfil all the objects I wish to obtain in the next campaign. . . It is not impossible that, if things continue to go well here, I may join you for a few days.

The English are still making preparations on the islands, which force us to have strong forces on that side. . . It is not possible for me to take more than 12,000 or 15,000 men.

I am preparing a good division of demi-brigades which saw no action last year and will be able to hit hard.

I wish Lemarois to go to those places where Duroc did not go, especially to the Saint-Gotthard.

BONAPARTE

531

**To Major-General Lefebvre***G.O.C., 14th 15th, 17th Military Districts**Paris**10 Ventôse, Year VIII (1 Mar, 1800)*

Please, Citizen General, issue the necessary orders to assemble at Paris as quickly as possible all the detachments of the 43rd and 96th Demi-brigades, the 8th and 9th Dragoons and the 12th Hussars. Let me know what these various units lack for the purpose of immediate active service, it being my intention to form them into the 1st Division of the Reserve Army and to have them move off as soon as possible. Embody conscripts in the two infantry demi-brigades so as to bring each to a strength of 3,000.

BONAPARTE

532

**To Major-General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**12 Ventôse, Year VIII (3 Mar, 1800)*

You will find attached, Citizen Minister, a decree for the formation of the Reserve Army. You will keep the whole of this decree secret, but you will warn all those mentioned therein to prepare to leave and will take all necessary steps to collect at Dijon the essential supplies for the provisioning of this army. Headquarters will be at Dijon and the artillery park at Auxonne.

You will no doubt think it necessary to dispatch to Dijon as soon as possible 10,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 uniforms and other clothing.

Assemble the quartermaster-general and the commanders of the different arms, so that each can report to you on the organization of his service. The sledges that I asked should be made at Grenoble can be made at Auxonne.

BONAPARTE

533

## To General Masséna

*C.-in-C., Army of Italy*

*Paris*

*14 Ventôse, Year VIII (5 Mar, 1800)*

I have your letters of the 5th, Citizen General. 800,000 francs are being sent off weekly for your army.

I am assembling a Reserve Army at Dijon, to be commanded by myself. In eight or ten days I will send you one of my aides-de-camp with the plan of all the operations for the coming campaign, by which you will see that you are to have a fine rôle and one not beyond the means at your disposal.

However, if you fear the enemy may open the campaign before we do, I see no harm in your recalling 2,000 of the 6,000 men on the Alps. Dauphiné is under snow and, besides, the army I am going to collect at Dijon will be in a position to go there.

If the enemy masses his forces near La Spezia, so as to attack you from there through Novi and Montenotte, leave only very light forces at the Tenda Pass . . .

In your place I would have four-fifths of my forces at Genoa during Ventôse and Germinal . . . As to Floréal and Prairial, it will be a different matter; we shall have taken the initiative and the instructions I shall send you in ten days' time will show you what to do.

The fort of Savona must be well provisioned, and all your depots should be able to retire there . . .

If the enemy is so stupid as to collect 12,000 men on the Riviera between La Spezia and Genoa, fall upon him with all your forces and massacre him.

I repeat, it seems to me that you are in a good position; make the most of it. Do not be afraid if the enemy appears on your rear. Abandon at once all positions he attacks so as to be on one of his flanks with all your forces . . .

In the positions we occupy, one is never beaten if one has the will to conquer. Remember our great days!

In the usual Austrian manner, the enemy will make three attacks, by Levante, Novi and Montenotte; refuse two of these and meet the third with all your forces.

I imagine the forts of Vintimiglia and San Remo are provisioned and armed so as to be able to hold out against field artillery and light troops.



In any case, I do not think it would be a serious matter if you were to blow up the fort at Vintimiglia.

BONAPARTE

534

### To Major-General Berthier

*Minister of War*

*Paris*

*15 Ventôse, Year VIII (6 March, 1800)*

The 30th Demi-brigade has twelve Piedmontese officers. I have no intention of wronging these brave men who have shown themselves well-disposed towards France; but I wish you to place part of them in the Italic Legion and to distribute the rest, one by one, in the demi-brigades of the Republic.

BONAPARTE

535

### Decree

*Paris*

*17 Ventôse, Year VIII (8 Mar, 1800)*

The Consuls of the Republic decree:

ARTICLE 1. A Reserve Army, 60,000 strong, will be formed.

ART. 2. It will be commanded by the First Consul in person.

ART. 3. The artillery will be commanded by General Saint-Remy; the park by Colonel Gassendi; the engineers by Chief Inspector of Engineers Marescot.

ART. 4. Quartermaster Dubreton will be Quartermaster-General.

ART. 5. The various units and the conscripts which are to compose this Army will proceed at once to Dijon; they will be cantoned in the towns within a radius of twenty leagues.

ART. 6. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the present decree. He will take all measures to assemble at Dijon everything necessary for the armament, clothing and equipment of the Reserve Army.

BONAPARTE

536

### To General Brune

*C.-in-C., Army of the West*

*Paris*

*21 Ventôse, Year VIII (12 Mar, 1800)*

I have your letters of the 19th, Citizen General. Do your best to stop the battalion of the 58th from embarking and have it sent to Dijon.

You know how much words mean to the-soldiers; so let the various demi-brigades know that they form the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the Reserve Army . . .

Send me the route orders of your different troops so that I know where they are camped each day . . .

On the 25th I am inspecting the 24th, 43rd and 96th which form the 1st Division of the Reserve Army, with 3,000 cavalry and eighteen guns. That is 13,000 men, who leave the next day . . .

By 10 Germinal I hope to have 50,000 men at Dijon . . . The Minister of War is issuing an order that General B ethencourt should replace General d'Arnaud, who appears to me much too slow . . .

If we have war, I hope that we shall come out of it brilliantly; if we have peace, the foreign powers will be convinced that we were in a position to force it on them . . .

BONAPARTE

537

### To General Moreau

*C.-in.-C., Army of the Rhine*

Paris

21 Vent ose, Year VIII (12 Mar, 1800)

The Minister of War, Citizen Minister, will have sent you the decree for the creation of the Reserve Army. It will not be only on paper. The 1st Division leaves Paris on the 26th. It is composed of the 24th, 59th, 96th and 43rd, with twelve guns and four regiments of Hussars and Dragoons, making 15,000 men.

The 2nd Division, composed of the 6th Light and the 22nd and 40th of the Line and six guns, should by now have left Nantes. The 3rd Division also leaves Nantes within a week; it contains the 19th Light, the 58th and 60th of the Line and six guns. All these units are at a strength of 2,500 men and will be at 3,000 on arrival at Dijon . . . The 4th Division is forming in Paris and will not be ready before the first week of Germinal.

I imagine that Dessolle\* will arrive tomorrow. Mass ena should have concentrated at Genoa all the forces which were on the Alps. He has 40,000 men and, if he plays his part well and does not give way to groundless fears, he should be able to deal with 60,000. For the enemy to have 60,000 infantry in action against him he must have at least 90,000 in his army, counting the garrisons in his fortresses and the observation corps at Bellinzona and Milan; and 90,000 infantry means 120,000 with the cavalry and artillery . . .

Leave only depots at Mainz and in your fortresses. Collect all your strength between Strasbourg and Constance. With an advance-guard of 30,000 men and a reserve of 50,000 one can talk big.

1,500,000 francs left for your army last week.

I salute you as a friend.

BONAPARTE

\* Chief of Staff, Army of the Rhine.

538

**To General Masséna**

*C.-in-C., Army of Italy*

Paris

21 Ventôse, Year VIII (12 Mar, 1800)

Your aide-de-camp, Reille, has given me your letter of 9 Ventôse, Citizen General. News from Marseilles tells me that several ships full of corn have already left for Genoa; I hope, therefore, that you will find yourself rather better supplied . . .

The campaign will soon be opening on the Rhine. Our blows there will draw the attention of the enemy. Melas, who is opposed to you, is not a very clever man; he has neither your military talents nor your energy. The Russians, whom your troops seem to respect, are now back in their own country . . .

Hold no line, but keep all your troops grouped together round Genoa, with your depots in Savona. Those are true military principles; acting thus you will beat 50,000 men with 30,000 and cover yourself with immortal glory. The Government and the public will know how to appreciate the difficulties you will have had to overcome. . . .

Reille will leave in four or five days with the plan of campaign.

Agents have gone to Languedoc to hasten the export of corn. Much is being sent down the Rhône. I cannot describe to you my indignation with those miserable contractors. I am extremely grieved at the wretched position you are in; but I count on your zeal and ability.

BONAPARTE

539

**To General Moreau**

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

Paris

24 Ventôse, Year VIII (15 Mar, 1800)

I have only today received your letter of the 21st, Citizen General. 1,400,000 francs were decreed for your Army yesterday; I will give orders to have it sent in silver.

Since the weather is still severe and you see difficulties in feeding yourself in the positions I indicated, delay your movement . . .

I think that by 15 Germinal the Reserve will be near enough to you for the whole of your Army to be available.

General Dessolle will leave on the 26th. As a result of conferences I have had with him it is necessary for you to issue immediate orders: 1. To repair the roads from Brunnen to Altorf so that cavalry and infantry can use them. 2. To repair the roads from Stanz to Brunnen and Altorf. 3. To collect at Luzern 10,000 bushels of oats and 500,000 to 600,000 rations of biscuit and brandy . . . 5. To hasten the flotilla on Lake Constance so as to have superiority on the lake if possible. I am sending you two or three naval officers to command your boats.

I am now assured on all sides that the 25,000 Russians who are on Jersey have had orders to return home. If that is true, I shall be able to increase the Reserve by a good division of 8,000 to 10,000 men. . .

A 64-gun English ship has run aground off Brest.

BONAPARTE

540

### To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

*Paris*

*25 Ventôse, Year VIII (16 Mar, 1800)*

Citizen General, General Dessolle will give you my views on the campaign which is about to open. He will tell you that no one takes a greater interest than I in your personal glory and happiness.

The English are embarking in force. What are they up to? Today I am a kind of puppet who has lost liberty and happiness. Grandeur is fine, but in memory and in the imagination. I envy your happy lot: at the head of brave men you are going to do splendid things. I would gladly exchange my consular purple for the epaulettes of a colonel under your command.

I much hope that circumstances will allow me to come and shake your hand. But, in any case, my confidence in you is complete, in all respects.

BONAPARTE

541

### Note in 'The Monitor'

*Paris*

*29 Ventôse, Year VIII (20 Mar, 1800)*

The First Consul receives many letters from young citizens eager to show their attachment to the Republic and their desire to be associated with its efforts to conquer peace. Touched by their devotion, he receives this assurance of it with keen interest; glory awaits them at Dijon. It is when he sees them enrolled under the flags of the Reserve Army that he proposes to thank and reward them for their zeal.

BONAPARTE

542

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*29 Ventôse, Year VIII (20 Mar, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, I wish you to make known to Citizens Serbelloni, Justiniani and to the Neapolitan agents that it appears to me necessary for their Government to issue proclamations and decrees requiring

the Cisalpines, Neapolitans and Romans to rejoin the Italic legions without delay to serve, each as he best may, in the coming campaign.

You will put nothing on paper.

BONAPARTE

543

## To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

*Paris*

*1 Germinal, Year VIII (22 Mar, 1800)*

Citizen General, having considered the position of our troops in Switzerland, on the Rhine, in Italy, and the formation of the Reserve Army at Dijon, the Consuls of the Republic have ordered the following plan of campaign:

1. It is necessary to open the campaign between 20 and 30 Germinal at the latest.

2. The present Army of the Rhine will be divided into an army corps and a reserve corps. The reserve corps, under the orders of General Lecourbe,\* will comprise one quarter of the infantry and artillery of the army and one fifth of the cavalry.

3. Between 20 and 30 Germinal you will cross the Rhine with your army corps, taking advantage of the occupation of Switzerland to turn the Black Forest and nullify any preparations the enemy may have made to defend the gorges.

4. The reserve corps will be specially charged with the defence of Switzerland. Its advance-guard, 5,000 to 6,000 strong, will occupy the Saint-Gothard. It will have six 4-pounders on sledge mountings . . . The first object of your reserve corps during your movements in Suabia will be to protect Switzerland from attacks that the enemy might make through Feldkirch, the Saint-Gothard and the Simplon. It is known to the Government that the enemy has collected considerable stores on the Italian lakes.

5. The aim of your movement in Germany should be to drive back the enemy in Bavaria so as to intercept his direct communication with Milan by way of Lake Constance and Graubünden.

6. As soon as this aim is achieved, and it is certain that the main enemy army cannot in any circumstances, even supposing it forces you to retire, reconquer the ground it will have lost in less than ten or twelve days, it is the instruction of the Consuls to have Switzerland guarded by the rear divisions of the Reserve Army, composed of less experienced troops than the units composing your reserve, and to detach your reserve, with the élite of the Reserve Army, to enter

\* In the event this command fell to Moncey, Lecourbe remaining as a corps commander under Moreau.

Italy by the Saint-Gothard and the Simplon and join with the Army of Italy in the plains of Lombardy.

This last operation will be confided to the Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army assembled at Dijon, who will confer with you and whom the Consuls are about to appoint.

*By order of the First Consul*

544

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army*

*Paris*

*12 Germinal, Year VIII (2 April, 1800)*

The confidence of the Government, Citizen General, and the military talents of which you have given so many proofs call you to the command of an army.\* During the winter you have reorganized the Ministry of War and provided for the needs of our armies so far as circumstances have allowed. During the spring and summer it remains for you to lead our soldiers to victory, the surest means of achieving peace and consolidating the Republic.

Please receive, Citizen General, my assurance of the Government's satisfaction with your conduct at the Ministry.

BONAPARTE

545

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army*

*Paris*

*19 Germinal, Year VIII (9 April, 1800)*

Citizen General, . . . The moment approaches when the columns of the Army of the Rhine go into action, and it is the Reserve Army, under your orders, which must establish the necessary unity between those of the Rhine and of Italy and form the centre of the great line of operations, whose right is at Genoa and whose left on the Danube.

The most perfect co-operation being essential, it is the intention of the Consuls that before going to the Reserve Army you should proceed to the Headquarters of the Army of the Rhine to confer with General Moreau on the series of combined operations.

You have three objects to fulfil: the first is to support the movement

\* The formal command of the Reserve Army was given to Berthier not, as is often said, because the Constitution forbade the First Consul to command troops (the idea arose from his own statement at St. Helena), for there was no such prohibition, but for practical reasons. The army needed a Commander-in-Chief at all times, but Bonaparte intended, and could afford the time, to take control only during the decisive phases; in this way he was able to come and go without disrupting the command structure, yet when he was present Berthier reverted in all but name to his usual rôle of Chief of Staff. The arrangement was not altogether happy, for there was a good deal of confusing duplication of work between Berthier and the nominal Chief of Staff, Dupont.

that the Army of the Rhine will make in Suabia to open the campaign, and to help it if necessary; the second is to penetrate into Italy with the major part of the Reserve Army and the column of General Lecourbe, which will there come under your orders; the third is to leave in Switzerland, after your passage of the Saint-Gothard and the Simplon, a force of troops sufficient to guarantee it against all attack from the direction of Rheineck and Feldkirch. As soon as you enter Italy this force will be attached to the Army of the Rhine.

It is on these various points that you are to consult with General Moreau. Since it is essential that the Government knows precisely what you have agreed, the Consuls require you to forward me a written report, signed by both . . .

*By order of the First Consul*

546

### **To General Masséna**

*C.-in-C., Army of Italy*

*Paris*

*19 Germinal, Year VIII (9 April, 1800)*

Citizen General, the Consuls of the Republic require me to inform you of the plans they have formed for the next campaign.

The operations of the Army of the Rhine, commanded by General Moreau, and of the Reserve Army under the orders of General Berthier will be complementary and will be carried out with the closest co-operation. The Army of the Rhine will take the field first, between the 20th and 30th of this month . . .

It is at the precise moment when the troops directed by General Berthier reach Italy that you must combine your movements with his, so as to draw the attention of the enemy, obliging him to divide his forces, and to effect your junction with the corps which have entered Italy. Until then you will remain on the defensive. The mountains covering you, which render the enemy cavalry and artillery quite inactive, ensure your local superiority, that is to say, the certainty of holding your positions, which must until then be your sole true objective.

An earlier offensive on your part would be dangerous, because as soon as you entered the plains it would bring into action again the enemy forces paralyzed by the mountainous nature of the country you now occupy. It would be impossible to send you directly sufficient supports to give you an effective superiority. It is through Switzerland that this help will reach you, taking the enemy in the rear. Once you have joined forces, this superiority will be established, . . . and, by its own courage, the French Army will emerge from the fearful penury from which we suffer and which we cannot otherwise remedy effectively. . . .

For your advance into Italy you will assemble all the forces you have available in your rear as far as the Var. From those dispersed between the Var and the Mont Cenis you will take as reinforcements all that you judge reasonable and prudent; those remaining between the Mont Cenis and the Valais can form a distinct force which will be put at the disposal of General Berthier to assist his movements.

If you think you can feed the cavalry that is on the Rhône for this short period, move it up to reinforce what you have with you. If this is not the case, let me know so that I can have it assemble at Lyons and approach by the nearest frontier.

Once your operations have reached this point I will forward to you the further instructions given to me by the Consuls for the completion of the campaign.

There is no need for me to impress upon you, Citizen General, the importance of the most complete secrecy in such circumstances. You will make all the demonstrations and movements that you judge expedient in order to mislead the enemy as to the true plan of campaign and to persuade him that he will be first attacked by yourself. Therefore, you will exaggerate the size of your forces and announce huge and imminent reinforcements coming from the interior. . . .

It is the intention of the Consuls that in effecting your junction with General Berthier you should move as far as possible towards your left, even passing on this side of Turin if you think it necessary to avoid compromising the safety of the Army.

*By order of the First Consul*  
*The Minister of War*  
CARNOT

547

### To General Masséna

*C.-in-C., Army of Italy*

*Paris*

*21 Germinal, Year VIII (11 April, 1800)*

Citizen General, Adjutant-general Reille brings you the plan of campaign. The Army of the Rhine is 120,000 strong, the Reserve Army 40,000. I have every reason to hope for brilliant successes which will rescue you from the unhappy position you are in.

You will be informed by General Berthier and directly by the Minister of War of events on the Rhine and in Switzerland, so that you can act in a worthy manner at the favourable moment.

If you can do without Adjutant-general Reille, I should like to have him with me: you know the esteem I have always had for this officer.

BONAPARTE



548

**To General Moreau***C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine**Paris**21 Germinal, Year VIII (11 April, 1800)*

I have just received your letter of 18 Germinal, Citizen General. General Berthier, Commander-in-chief of the Reserve Army, is going to Bâle to confer with you on the execution of the plan of campaign.

The confidence of the Government rests entirely on these two armies and their generals.

The Army of Italy is weak. It is informed of the rôle it has to play. Its position can be assured only by the vigorous movements of the Army of the Rhine and the Reserve Army.

Everything has been done to offer a basis for peace; but moderation has never been one of the qualities of the Austrian when victorious. Let us hope he will change his tune if our operations succeed.

Rest assured that none hold you in higher esteem than I.

BONAPARTE

549

**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Paris**24 Germinal, Year VIII (14 April, 1800)*

Citizen Minister . . . You will inform the general commanding the Reserve Army that the 14th of the Line, which was formerly destined for that Army, will no longer form part of it, as it has been replaced by the 19th Light, which has reached Dijon from the Army of the West.

Thus, the Reserve Army will be composed of fourteen demi-brigades of the Line, apart from the 17th Light and the 39th, which should join it from the Army of Italy and are two shattered units.

Please inspect, on the 28th, the two battalions of the 30th and the squadrons of the 19th Dragoons and 3rd Cavalry, which must leave for the Reserve Army on 1 Floréal, and give orders to have issued to these units whatever they are lacking.

I wish you to take steps so that the remainder of the 19th Dragoons and the 3rd Cavalry can leave for the Reserve Army during Floréal.

BONAPARTE

550

**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Paris**24 Germinal, Year VIII (14 April, 1800)*

The ten sledge-mountings which have been made at Paris have not yet left. But the Reserve Army can make no movement until they

arrive, since they are for the use of its advance guard. I think it necessary to have these sledges mounted on artillery wagons and to have them sent off tomorrow, moving by forced marches and without stopping. Inform the general commanding the Reserve Army of the route taken by these vehicles, so that, in case of urgent need, he can order them to come by extraordinary means.

BONAPARTE

551

### To General Brune

*C.-in-C., Army of the West*

Paris

28 Germinal, Year VIII (18 April, 1800)

I have just received your letter, Citizen General. Your desire to come to Paris is quite natural; of all tasks the one you have been carrying out these last three months is the most distasteful.

In the course of Floréal your presence will become necessary at Dijon. Operations are about to begin on the Rhine. General Berthier will march with part of the Reserve Army and that army will therefore need another commander-in-chief. I destine this post for you. It will be best if you are able to rest for a fortnight in Paris.

However, I believe it necessary to retain a commander-in-chief with the Army of the West throughout the whole campaign and I propose to appoint General Bernadotte; I hope he will follow in your steps and continue your work. . . .

BONAPARTE

552

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

Paris

2 Floréal, Year VIII (22 April, 1800)

Citizen General, I have received your letters of the 26th, from Bâle, and the 29th from Dijon. I have read with pleasure what you have agreed with Moreau, which seems to me reasonable.

If the war on the Rhine does not develop decisively enough for General Moreau to be able to make so strong a detachment as we wish, the operation in Italy may still be possible with a detachment of five demi-brigades and 2,000 cavalry. From reports reaching me from the different departments I imagine your fourteen demi-brigades will be recruited and completed towards the middle of Floréal, which will give you some 40,000 men; if it is true that you have 5,000 Italians, 8,000 men from the depots of the Army of the East, 5,000 cavalry and 2,000 artillerymen, that would bring you up to 60,000 men. What is to stop you acting independently, even if General Moreau is not able to give you big reinforcements?

General Turreau, who is at Briançon, could also take the field with 3,000 or 4,000 men.

In any event, keep your army together and pay no attention to the commandants of Lyons and other towns, who will be asking you for troops. I await a situation report from your army, which will inform me of its position and requirements . . .

Marmont should have arrived.

Let me know how the depot ordered at Geneva and the raising of the 2,000 mules and your herd of 1,000 bullocks are progressing.

Salute and friendship.

BONAPARTE

553

### To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

Paris

2 Floréal, Year VIII (22 April, 1800)

I have received your letter of the 27th, Citizen General. I have seen the reply from M. Kray, which was what I had expected. The season is fine; your troops are numerous and ably led. Our confidence is complete. Send us flags quickly and take many prisoners. We must not hold our hand until we have achieved results which wipe out our losses.

BONAPARTE

554

### To Citizen Carnot

*Minister of War*

Paris

4 Floréal, Year VIII (24 April, 1800)

The Army of Italy is at grips with the Austrian army. Whether it is vanquished or victorious it is essential that the Reserve Army should not waste an hour. If we are the victors, the Austrian army will be considerably weakened and in no condition to resist the Reserve Army. If our Army of Italy is beaten and forced to hold the line of Borghetto or some other in order to defend the Maritime Alps, it is still essential for the Reserve Army to attack Piedmont or the Milanese so as to make a diversion and oblige the Austrian army to return to the defence of Lombardy and its stores.

Please, therefore, order General Berthier:

1. To move the Reserve Army to Geneva with all speed;
2. To have all the munitions and foodstuffs which have been assembled at Geneva sent by the lake to Villeneuve;
3. To move as soon as possible into Piedmont and Lombardy, crossing either the Great Saint-Bernard or the Simplon.

Whatever the result of events in Italy, the Austrian army, which is piled up round Genoa and Savona, is so much the further from the

mountain passes and in a state of disorganization such that it is quite out of the question for it to hold its own against the 40,000 men that General Berthier can easily collect . . .

Before this army has crossed the Saint-Bernard and the Simplon we shall have positive news of the situation of our Army of Italy.

I have learnt today by the telegraph from Bâle and Strasbourg that there is no change. Repeat the order to General Moreau to attack the enemy. Impress upon him that his delay is seriously compromising the safety of the Republic.

Send a special message to General Saint-Hilaire, commanding the 8th Military District, to assemble all forces of infantry, cavalry, etc. which may be in his District, so as to be able to reinforce the Army of Italy. . . .

Write also to General Masséna that we still have no official news of what is happening in Italy; that the Rhine and Reserve Armies are on the march; that we await impatiently the outcome of events, of which we are still only imperfectly aware.

BONAPARTE

555

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

*Paris*

*4 Floréal, Year VIII (24 April, 1800)*

Yesterday, Citizen General, the Minister of War sent you a copy of a letter about the Army of Italy. I still have no official news, but what has come to my knowledge is as follows.

On 16 Germinal General Melas had his headquarters at Cairo; he had some 20,000 men with him; he forced the redoubt of Monte Legino, captured Savona and, on the 17th, San Giacomo.

The French division which was at Montenotte retreated to Genoa after having reinforced the garrison of Savona. The two divisions under Suchet's orders retreated to the Borghetto line.

Meanwhile, on the 17th a division of 15,000 Austrians attacked La Bocchetta. Masséna went there in person, defeated them and took 2,500 prisoners.

A letter from Nice, dated the 23rd, says that General Suchet had just taken 1,200 prisoners. General Masséna's movements are unknown, but it appears that on the 23rd communications had not been re-established.

As soon as Masséna does reopen his communications, we shall necessarily receive a messenger, and, since I have no news today, I am inclined to think he had not succeeded in doing so by the 26th.

What will Masséna do, then? If he fails in his efforts to re-establish his communications, he may remain at Genoa as long as he has rations;

or he may move rapidly to Acqui so as to reach the Alps from there; or else he may go to the Parmesan or some other part of Italy to find food.

In this state of affairs you will see how essential it is for the Reserve Army to make a big effort in Italy whatever the operations of the Army of the Rhine.

For this you have two approaches: the Saint-Bernard and the Simplon. You can reinforce yourself with the troops Moreau has left in the Valais.

By the Saint-Bernard you will be operating much nearer to the lake of Geneva and from there on your supplies will be far more assured. But you must make very sure of the state of the roads from Aosta to the Po. The Italian corps should be able to supply all the necessary information.

By the Simplon you will at once reach far better country.

Nothing in Italy will be able to resist your 40,000 men. Whether the Austrian army emerges victorious or beaten, it will certainly not be able to withstand the shock of a fresh army.

Before your army reaches Geneva and Villeneuve I shall have positive news of the situation of the Army of Italy, which will enable me to give you more precise instructions.

Your biggest task in all this will be to ensure your food supplies . . .

The 30th left three days ago, but there are many conscripts in this demi-brigade. The 72nd, a good and excellent demi-brigade, has left Caen and is proceeding to Dijon by forced marches. You can regard this unit as a kind of reserve.

Leave Vignolle at Dijon and also the depots of all units to reorganize the conscripts as they arrive and send them on to you.

Send back a situation report on your army by my aide-de-camp.

BONAPARTE

As a precaution, you probably ought to send an officer or a war commissary to Chambéry to prepare a commissariat and supplies there to nourish your army in case, after reaching Geneva, the condition of the Army of Italy forces you to cross by the Mont Cenis.

BONAPARTE

556

## To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

Paris

4 Floréal, Year VIII (24 April, 1800)

On the 16th General Melas attacked Montenotte in strength and occupied the town of Savona. Our troops occupy the citadel and the Borghetto line.

L.D.N.—O

On the same day General Masséna was fighting against the right of the Austrian army, also very strong. He has entirely defeated it and taken 2,500 prisoners. He will probably attack General Melas, but he had not done anything by 22 Germinal, and on the morning of the 23rd the Austrians were still at Savona.

The Minister of War is ordering General Berthier to begin moving as soon as possible in order to act in accordance with events taking place in Italy.

I hope you have by now crossed the Rhine. Gain an advantage as quickly as possible so that your diversion helps operations in Italy. Every day of delay will be disastrous for us.

BONAPARTE

557

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

*Paris*

*5 Floréal, Year VIII (25 April, 1800)*

Citizen General. . . . You should have received 1,500,000 francs by Murat. You will see from the attached what I have accorded to the Reserve Army at the last two meetings of the Administrative Council. I will see that what has not yet reached you is sent at once.

Write to Lambert and Boinod to speed up as much as possible the supply of all kinds of provisions and say they will not lack money.

Six guns of the Guard with 500 artillery horses should now have arrived.

I have just received a telegraphic message that the cannonade has been very heavy on the Rhine since this morning: so Moreau is fully engaged. . . .

Have sent to me by special messengers all letters, even private ones, that reach Dijon concerning the Army of Italy.

All goes perfectly here, and the day you think my presence necessary as a result of events either in Italy or on the Rhine I will leave within an hour of receiving your letter.

I am sorry to see that life at Dijon is making you unhappy. Cheer up!\*

BONAPARTE

\* At the end of a long letter, dated from Dijon on 23 April, in which he complained of the lack of news, arms, supplies and money, Berthier had written: 'I am unwell; I am too tired for war. But I will use my remaining strength in the service of my country and in giving you further proofs of my loyalty. If I deserve any reward, I will ask what I have long wanted—rest and oblivion: that is what I would have liked when you saw fit to call me to a ministry I did not seek.' Tired or not, Berthier was to serve Napoleon uninterruptedly for the next fourteen years in the exacting posts of Minister of War and Chief of Staff of the Grand Army.

558

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon**Paris**6 Floréal, Year VIII (26 April, 1800)*

I have your letter of 5 Floréal, Citizen General.

Since the 19th Light will arrive only on 26 Floréal, I think you would do well to put the 13th Light, which arrives on 10 Floréal, into the Loison Division instead. You could put the 19th Light with the 70th and 72nd, which will be able to leave Dijon at the end of Floréal.

This, then, is how I see your Army:

The Loison Division, composed of the 13th Light, 58th and 60th of the Line: 6,000 to 7,000 men.

The Chambarlhac Division, composed of the 24th Light, 43rd and 96th of the Line: 9,000 men.

The Boudet Division, composed of the 9th Light, 30th and 59th of the Line: 7,000 to 8,000 men.

The Watrin Division, composed of the 6th Light, 22nd and 40th of the Line: 6,000 to 7,000 men.

These four divisions available and ready to march on 10 Floréal.

The 5th Division, General Chabran's, composed of nine battalions of the fifteen of the Army of the East, which you will brigade as I suggested: that will give you a division of 6,000 men, which could march after the first four.

The 6th Division, which could leave Dijon between 25 and 30 Floréal, would be composed of the 19th Light, 70th and 72nd of the Line: 6,000 to 7,000 men.

The 7th Division would be composed of the 17th Light and the six remaining battalions of the Army of the East.

Finally, your 4,000 Italians, leaving a depot which can enrol the 3,000 or 4,000 Italians still in different parts of France . . .

General Turreau can support you with 3,000 men. The Army of the Rhine has 3,000 troops in the Valais.

Thus between 20 and 30 Floréal you could reach Aosta and Susa with 44,000 infantry, and you would be followed ten days later by a complete division of 8,000 men and twenty days later, by a further 6,000. This is independent of the detachment from the Army of the Rhine, which could be from 10,000 to 30,000 men according to the circumstances of that Army. But I see you assured of 50,000 to 60,000 infantrymen of your own.

As to cavalry, you have: the 11th and 12th Hussars; the 2nd, 7th, 15th and 21st Chasseurs; the 8th and 9th Dragoons; the 2nd, 3rd and 20th Cavalry: 4,000 men. That is enough cavalry for your first ten or fifteen days of operations.

The 1st Hussars, 1st and 5th Cavalry and 5th Dragoons will leave during the month; they will have six guns with them and amount to 1,800 well-mounted and equipped men . . .

That makes 60,000 men who, after the stupidities of the Austrians in bottling themselves up in the Genoese Riviera, put you in a position to act entirely on your own.

As to artillery, you have forty-eight guns; that means eight for each of your first five divisions and a small park. Decrease the number of your howitzers and increase the 4-pounders, since you have plenty at Auxonne. They will serve you well and be much easier to transport.

General Turreau's column could bring five or six guns from Briançon . . .

As to cartridges, Briançon can provide some; have all available at Grenoble and Besançon sent to Geneva. Have a factory established there. With a little effort and money a city like Geneva should provide enough lead for a million cartridges.

Leave the cadres of the six battalions of the Reserve Army;\* they will be completed with conscripts as they arrive, so that the two demi-brigades formed from them and the 17th Light can provide you with a 7th division in the course of Prairial.

I shall be at Geneva, where I will substitute troops in accordance with events on the Rhine, leaving the Chabran Division on the defensive in Switzerland and sending up the better organized units.

The divisions are strong enough at three demi-brigades. It is necessary for you to have at least five or six divisions in your hands. . . .

Have General Marmont send a senior officer to Briançon and another to Grenoble to have everything possible put on the move . . . It is essential that he has a return of the ammunition and artillery equipment available at Briançon and in the fortresses of Dauphiné.

Send General Marescot to the Saint-Bernard so as to be back at Geneva on 15th Floréal with exact sketches of the route. If he has any pioneers, let him take them with him.

I hope to be at Dijon on the 10th or 11th if nothing prevents it.

All wishes and friendship.

BONAPARTE

559

**To Citizen Lefebvre-Desnoëttes**

*Aide-de-camp to the First Consul*

Paris

7 Floréal, Year VIII (27 April, 1800)

Please go at once with all speed to Châlons-sur-Marne. You will have the 6,000 muskets and six field forges which are there sent to Dijon. You will remain till they have left.

\* Presumably an error for Army of the East.



Thence you will proceed to the capital of each department through which these convoys will pass and see that the Prefects give orders that they travel day and night without stopping. You will remove all obstacles that may be encountered and will await me at Dijon, whither I shall be proceeding shortly.

BONAPARTE

560

### To Citizen Lauriston

*Aide-de-camp to the First Consul*

Paris

7 Floréal, Year VIII (27 April, 1800)

You will proceed to Lyons. You will see Quartermaster Lambert and will assure him that he will not lack for money. Instruct him to expedite the departure of biscuit, brandy and corn to Geneva, which I shall reach on 12 Floréal.

See the commandant of the town and the fortress so that all the cartridges, lead and muskets in store at Lyons are sent by forced marches to Geneva.

Note the number of troops in Lyons and the 19th District.

From there go to Grenoble and have the lead, cartridges and muskets that are there sent by forced marches to Geneva.

From there proceed to the headquarters of the general commanding the left wing of the Army of Italy, who should be at Briançon, and obtain from him a return of all the troops under his orders. You will tell him that on the 14th or 15th I shall be at Geneva, where you will rejoin me and report on the exact strength of all troops in the 7th and 19th Military Districts, infantry, cavalry, artillery, material and harness.

You will pass through Chambéry on your return.

BONAPARTE

561

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

Paris

7 Floréal, Year VIII (27 April, 1800), 4.0 p.m.

Your aide-de-camp has just arrived, Citizen General. I wish you to assemble the whole army at Geneva and to order the transport of biscuit, corn and brandy by the lake to Villeneuve.

Of the two millions which General Murat has brought to you you will see that there are 300,000 francs for Lambert; have them passed to him at once.

Two hundred horses left yesterday with a convoy for Dijon. I have sent aides-de-camp to Châlons-sur-Marne, Tours, etc. to have cartridges sent as promptly as possible to Geneva and Dijon.

My plan is no longer to cross by the Saint-Gotthard. I regard that operation as possible and within the ordinary limits of prudence only if General Moreau has obtained a great advantage over the enemy.

Besides, we may no longer go to Milan; we may be obliged to march rapidly on Tortona in order to extricate Masséna who, if he has been beaten, will be shut up in Genoa where he has rations for thirty days. So I wish the crossing to be by the Saint-Bernard. Once at Aosta, should there be no need to go at once to Genoa, we shall be in a position to move on Lake Maggiore and Milan in a few days and in fruitful country such as we need. Moreover, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard seems to me much more proportionate to your existing means, since (being able to transport your rations by lake to Villeneuve) you will have to feed yourselves only between Villeneuve and Aosta. That is only four days.

You will see that in each of these operations you will have either the passes from Dauphiné on your right flank, or else the Swiss passes occupied by the Army of the Rhine, on your left flank. So you will in any case have an assured line of operation and remain in contact with the Republic.

If you go to Milan everything on the Saint-Gotthard and the Simplon will subsequently join you.

I shall leave here on the 10th for Geneva, by way of Dijon.

BONAPARTE

Have all the biscuit, etc., at Lyons, Chambéry and Grenoble put on the road for Geneva without delay.

562

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

Paris

7 Floréal, Year VIII (27 April, 1800)

. . . . 1. You should have received at Geneva 100,000 lb. of lead from Lyons. 2. 100,000 lb. left Paris yesterday for Dijon. 3. 250,000 lb. have left Tours. 4. You should find enough at Dijon and Geneva to begin manufacture. 5. 200 horses left yesterday drawing several guns. 6. A million francs leaves for your army tomorrow.

8. Five million cartridges will reach here tomorrow and will be sent on to Auxonne.

10. Three pontoon companies will be ordered to leave Constance for Geneva.

12. Until the 10th 200 horses will leave daily bringing artillery ammunition of all kinds; they will reach Auxonne before 20 Floréal.

13. Six guns will leave here on the 9th with a detachment of the Guard.

BONAPARTE

563

**To Brigadier-General Marmont**

*Cdr., Artillery, Reserve Army*

*Paris*

*7 Floréal, Year VIII (27 April, 1800) midnight*

You will see from my letter to General Berthier, Citizen General, the various details I have given him about your artillery.

Look to your harness, shoeing, etc. Set up workshops for all this at Geneva.

I imagine you now have as much lead as you need, and that you have factories at both Auxonne and Geneva.

You should have received ten gun-sledges. Take a wheeled carriage behind each one, so that once over the mountains your field train contains all the guns.

Organize your repair shop at Geneva; arrange that it, as well as the one at Auxonne, can work without using the company of artisans you should have available at your park.

Send me a return of your material, personnel and horses, so that I can see exactly how you are placed.

BONAPARTE

564

**To General Berthier**

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

*Paris*

*8 Floréal, Year VIII (28 April, 1800)*

I have received your letter of the 7th, Citizen General.

The 30th Demi-brigade should by now have arrived, as well as the 13th Light.

What you lack is the artillery horses and munitions. 1. 400 horses have left with Chambarlhac's division; 2. 460 have left with the Guard . . . Total 3,000 horses. Groups numbered 5, 6, 7, 8 are bringing you cartridges, muskets and other war supplies.

Send for a certain Colombini, who is a road contractor at Vienne in Dauphiné and who knows perfectly the Great and Little Saint-Bernard and all their outlets. Send also for Citizen Pavetti, a major in the Italic Legion, who is at the depot and knows all this area well.

Give orders that as the horses arrive at Auxonne they are sent on to reinforce your teams and draw the rest of your provisions.

Set up an artillery repair shop at Geneva and a factory to make artillery harness, which is always needed. Take steps to have a thousand sets of harness and horseshoes in reserve there.

I do not wish to leave Paris until you tell me that everything is ready. From the return you have sent me I see that you will not have a respectable force at Geneva till nearly the 15th of the month.

BONAPARTE

565

**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Paris**9 Floréal, Year VIII (29 Apr, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, give orders to General Gardanne to proceed to Dijon to take command of the 6th Division of the Reserve Army, composed of the 19th, 70th and 72nd Demi-brigades. Before leaving he will hand over command of his district to whichever of his brigadiers he thinks most suitable. This general, who was a prisoner of war, will be exchanged for General Mack. You will inform Citizen Bacher at Frankfurt, so that he declare this to the Austrian commissioner.

General Berthier is beginning to march and will be moving his headquarters to Geneva and then wherever military operations may take him. But the general headquarters of the Reserve Army will remain notionally at Dijon. Thus the muskets, provisions, recruits and officers destined for that army will proceed to Dijon, where General Berthier will send orders as to their destination.

The depot of each demi-brigade of the Reserve Army will remain at Dijon and in the 18th District until further orders. The depots of the units in each division will be in the same town and under the orders of a senior officer from the division. They will correspond with the Deputy Chief of Staff, who will remain at Dijon and will forward the orders of the Chief of Staff for the departure of conscripts destined to join the army.

There will be a quartermaster at Dijon responsible for the food, clothing and quartering of the depots.

BONAPARTE

566

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon**Paris**11 Floréal, Year VIII (1 May, 1800)*

You will find attached a copy of the letter I have just received from Suchet; you will see there, Citizen General, our true situation in Italy.

Order the Loison Division to proceed to Lausanne or Geneva by the shortest route. The Watrin Division should by now have reached Geneva; send it at once to Villeneuve and Saint-Maurice.

The Boudet Division should have reached Geneva and Nyon; have it also proceed to Villeneuve.

Send off from Bourg a detachment of 1,500 Italians and, in general, all who are armed and in condition to fight. Have them go with all speed to Geneva. The rest will await the arrival of arms before marching.

If my memory is right, General Chabran should be at Geneva with 1,500 men of his division. Send him to the Little Saint-Bernard. With this force and the 500 or 600 men he will find there he will draw the attention of the enemy from that side.

Have the battalions of the Army of the East, which are armed and which you count on using, leave Châlon and Mâcon and move by forced marches to the Little Saint-Bernard where they will come under the orders of General Chabran.

My calculation is that on the 17th or 18th General Chabran could be on the Little Saint-Bernard with a division of 5,000 men; this will join at Aosta with General Victor's corps, which equally can be on the Great Saint-Bernard on that day.

I believe the 28th of the Line is intended by General Moreau to defend the Great Saint-Bernard. You can take it to form General Watrin's advance-guard, since it knows the roads better and is more rested. . . .

I shall reach Geneva on the 16th without fail. I shall then have news of General Moreau and we will arrange for the diversion which it is indispensable to make on the Simplon.

Get into touch with the general commanding in Switzerland, so as to learn the state of his forces.

I think your presence at Geneva essential, especially to assemble the stores at Villeneuve, where the troops must draw biscuit for six days. Put as many cattle as you can on the march for Villeneuve.

BONAPARTE

Let the whole of the Consular Guard leave for Geneva. But leave twenty-five cavalymen at Dijon for my quarters.

567

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Dijon*

Paris

12 Floréal, Year VIII (2 May, 1800)

Citizen General, . . . General Vigovich, with whom we had to do in Italy, is charged with the defence of the Simplon, Bellinzona and the Saint-Gotthard with a force of 9,000 men, of which only 3,000 are good troops. His headquarters are at Arona.

I imagine you will establish two weapon repair shops, one at Geneva and one at Auxonne. Re-activate the one at Chambéry, if it still exists, and, if not, have the remains of it sent to Geneva.

You have seven cavalry squadrons of the Army of the East; are they fit for active service?

I have received a letter from Murat from which it appears that the 7th Chasseurs is in a very bad state. If there is one squadron of 120 men fit for active service, attach it to a division, and, if you judge the rest

unfit, send it to Holland. It will be replaced by the 10th Dragoons, which are there. I am having an order sent by special courier to General Augereau to send this regiment to Geneva. It will arrive in time to replace your losses. . . .

General Gardanne will command the 6th Division of your army. He is now on the road for this purpose . . .

With the Austrian army in Italy in its present position, considerably weakened by the terrible struggle it is waging in the Genoese Riviera, 30,000 men and thirty guns make you for the moment master of Italy. But I feel the need to send a great many horses to Auxonne so as to be able to bring up infantry weapons and the 12-pounders, which you need, if not in the first, at least in the second and third acts of the campaign. . . .

I imagine you have as many boats as you wish on the lake to transport your supplies to Villeneuve, where you must at once put in a military commandant and organize a depot.

From all I see of the manoeuvres of General Melas I am fully convinced that he did not have more than 40,000 men on the whole line of the Genoese Riviera. At the present time he has lost 15,000 in prisoners, killed and sick. So now he has not 25,000. I do not include the 6,000 cavalry he may have on the plains of Italy, nor the corps of 8,000 men under the general I spoke of above.

You must try to have your first four divisions at Aosta on the 22nd, as well as General Chabran's division.

From all the information I have been given, I imagine that from Villeneuve to Aosta is only five days. It will need at least two days for these five divisions to cross the Saint-Bernard.

The enemy is not at all expecting the operation that you are carrying out. He thinks it quite possible that a division of 10,000 to 12,000 men may present itself to disengage the Army of Italy, and in that case he does not fear it. I have reliable information that they are laughing at the Reserve Army in Vienna and Italy; they do not believe it will be ready before the month of August, and they regard it as a collection of conscripts to complete the Army of the Rhine.

There must be 400,000 to 500,000 rations at Villeneuve by the 16th and, by the 20th, double the amount of biscuit and at least 150 mules, requisitioned or otherwise, which will carry 30,000 rations to the village of Saint-Pierre . . . You must at once send a transport agent, a war commissary, several troops of your mules, if you have any, and money for this essential transport.

It is necessary thereafter to establish a store at a village between Saint-Pierre and the foot of the Saint-Bernard, where it would also be as well to put a commandant and set up a hospital which will evacuate on the hospitals at Villeneuve and Saint-Maurice.

Thus the troops could draw biscuit for four days at Villeneuve; they would draw for three at Saint-Pierre, or rather the infantry only. The cavalry, the drivers, the staff, all who are mounted would have to draw for eight days, which would take them to Aosta. Meanwhile the depot at Saint-Pierre would continue to be supplied to provide for the crossing and for the retreat, if we are driven to that.

Fortunately, the season makes the feeding of the horses easier; but it is necessary to have a little oats at the foot of the Saint-Bernard and at the convent. I am assured that the monks should have oats and barley, which they would unearth for a little money.

You see that I concern myself much with your details; but in truth the success of the campaign rests upon your operations, and I have no doubt at all that yours will be the glory of reconquering this fine theatre of French valour.

As for the Army of the Rhine, it is quite clear that something will have been decided by the 20th. Then, while you are on the way to Aosta, it can prepare a strong diversion for the Saint-Gotthard and the Simplon, so as to emerge at the moment when you have concentrated all the enemy forces on yourself. I estimate that at the lowest a simple division of 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry by the Saint-Gotthard and 4,000 by the Simplon would be a powerful help to you and would render your operation infallible.

If Masséna does not get too badly mauled, and if he has the wit either to force the line and take up some position in the Genoese Riviera or to let himself be besieged in Genoa, the attack on Genoa will be a great advantage to us. For you could not have made the same diversion without an immense co-operation from the Army of the Rhine had the Austrian army had the good sense to remain cantoned on the Po.

BONAPARTE

568

## To Citizen Carnot

*Minister of War*

*Paris*

*12 Floréal, Year VIII (2 May, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, order Citizen Bual, live-meat contractor for the Reserve Army, to go to Dijon to ensure his service, which is failing.

I see in a note from the Minister of Finance that 200,000 francs have been paid to Citizen Placy de Gayde, forage contractor. But you will see from his letter, which I am sending you, that he does not wish to undertake the service. So this contractor will have received 200,000 francs and there will be no forage service.

BONAPARTE

569

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Châlon**Paris**14 Floréal, Year VIII (4 May, 1800)*

I have just received your letter of 12 Floréal. Here is the latest news from Italy.

On the 3rd Masséna was at the bridge of Cornigliano; so he appears decidedly blockaded in Genoa. It could happen: 1. That Masséna capitulates and evacuates Genoa, without being taken prisoner, rejoins the rest of his army and takes up the Borghetto line or some other. 2. That he is overwhelmed in Genoa.

In either case, you will see that General Melas needs only eight days to move from Genoa to Aosta, and, if he were to arrive before you had crossed with more than 20,000 men, it would give him immense advantages in disputing your entry into Italy.

Try, therefore, to have General Chabran, your first six demi-brigades, their artillery train, the demi-brigade of the Army of the Rhine which is guarding the Saint-Bernard and the Valais and 1,000 cavalry at Aosta on the 20th, with the rest arriving there on the 22nd and 23rd.

I am putting a few more cavalry squadrons on the march, among others the 7th Dragoons, which has been exchanged, and I leave during tomorrow night; I shall be at Geneva on the 18th.

Inform General Moreau of the position of the Army of Italy; impress on him that a few demi-brigades more are nothing to him, but that a few demi-brigades less will compromise not only the Reserve Army but also the county of Nice.

Write to General Moncey to send as many forces as he can onto the Simplon, so that you have 5,000 or 6,000 men there in a position to join you and make a powerful diversion. . . .

BONAPARTE

570

**To Citizen Gaudin***Minister of Finance**Paris**15 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, please have the 500,000 francs, together with a reliable and intelligent paymaster, sent by the post to Geneva where it must without fail arrive by the evening of 10 [May].

This cashier will hold these funds and will use them only on my orders.

I wish you to send me an intelligent paymaster, so that I can use him as a kind of central fund and so that he can account to the director of the Public Treasury for all the measures I may take to have money.



I have instructed Councillor of State Petiet, who is following me, to see you about various other matters.

BONAPARTE

571

## Order

Paris

15 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)

In view of the critical situation of the Army of Italy and the need to prevent encroachment on French territory and to save the southern departments threatened by land and sea, the Consuls of the Republic order:

ARTICLE 1. The detachment into Italy, which, in accordance with Article 2 of the Order of 26 Germinal, the Army of the Rhine is to make when it has driven the enemy back ten days' march, will take place at once.

To this end, in conformity with detailed instructions to be issued by the Minister of War, a column of 25,000 men, including infantry, cavalry and artillery, will cross by the Saint-Gotthard and the Simplon to act under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army.

ART. 2. The Minister of War will leave during the course of today for the headquarters of the Army of the Rhine in order to confer with the Commander-in-Chief concerning this movement, to give all necessary instructions and to inform himself fully as to the situation of the armies.

ART. 3. As soon as he has given these orders, the Minister of War will proceed to Geneva to join the First Consul.

ART. 4. This order will not be published.

BONAPARTE

572

## To General Berthier

C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Geneva

Paris

15 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)

Citizen General, I leave tomorrow morning; I shall reach Dijon on the 17th and Geneva on the evening of the 18th. I hope to stop for one day only in Geneva and then go on to Villeneuve.

The Minister of War is leaving today for the Army of the Rhine with the proposed order and instructions which you will find attached. He will return, to Lausanne or Villeneuve, on the 22nd or 23rd.

The million francs promised in my last letter left only this morning by the post and will reach Geneva on the 25th. You must have means

of transport ready to enable it to follow the army. Make up some of the pay of those unfortunate battalions from the Army of the East . . .

If you have a major-general available, send him at once to take command on the Simplon, to get to know the area and the troops there. Those on the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard will be very useful as they know the country perfectly. They can guide the columns.

All my regards.

BONAPARTE

573

### To Citizen Lacuée

*Councillor of State, Acting Minister of War*

*Paris*

*15 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, order Citizen Yvan, surgeon at the Hotel des Invalides, to leave at once for the headquarters of the Reserve Army at Geneva, where he will be attached to me.\*

BONAPARTE

574

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Geneva*

*Paris*

*12 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)*

I have just learnt by telegraph, Citizen General, that Moreau has had an affair with the enemy at Stockach, has taken 7,000 prisoners, nine guns and considerable stores. . . .

Masséna's aide-de-camp has arrived. He assures me that he has supplies for twenty-five days, reckoned from Floréal. Thus you will see that he must be relieved during the last week of the month.

March with all speed.

BONAPARTE

575

### To General Moreau

*C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine*

*Paris*

*15 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)*

I was leaving for Geneva when the telegraph informed me of your victory over the Austrian army. Glory, threefold glory!

The Minister of War will reach your headquarters a few hours after this letter; from there he will come and join me in Geneva.

\* Thereafter Yvan remained Bonaparte's personal surgeon. He went through all the imperial campaigns, always, on the march and in battle, riding close behind the Emperor.

The position of the Army of Italy is fairly critical. Masséna, shut up in Genoa, has supplies till 5 or 6 Prairial. Melas's army seems pretty considerable, although seriously weakened.

I salute you affectionately.

BONAPARTE

Send me news at Geneva. Is Leclerc\* doing well? A thousand regards to Dessolle.

576

**To Lieutenant-General Suchet**

*Deputy C.-in-C., Army of Italy, at Nice*

*Paris*

*15 Floréal, Year VIII (5 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, . . . On the 24th of the month I shall myself be on the plains of Piedmont with the Reserve Army, 40,000 strong. Keep this secret. Send an intelligent officer to tell General Masséna, but without putting it in writing for fear he may be captured on the way . . .

Tell General Masséna, too, that, whatever happens, I count on him to eke out his rations to last till 15 Prairial. Continue to send what supplies you can to Genoa and Savona. . . .

BONAPARTE

577

**To Citizen Maret**

*Secretary of State*

*Geneva*

*19 Floréal, Year VIII (9 May, 1800)*

I thank you, Citizen, for the bulletin you sent me. I was very pleased with the town of Dijon. It seemed to me that there they were also very pleased with the Reserve Army.

The demi-brigades coming from Paris were a little unruly and gave rise to a few complaints. I wish you to make known their good behaviour. Everywhere I have had reason to be proud of the troops.

BONAPARTE

578

**To Citizen Lacuée**

*Councillor of State, Acting Minister of War*

*Paris*

*20 Floréal, Year VIII (10 May, 1800)*

You will find attached, Citizen Minister, an order that I have made for the prompt organization of the siege artillery of the Reserve Army. General Lacombe Saint-Michel will present various requests to you for personnel and material. You will know how necessary it is to ensure that measures decided on in your offices are promptly executed.

\* Husband of Pauline Bonaparte.

All the steps taken in the artillery offices to form the field train of the Reserve Army were wrongly conceived. At Grenoble alone there was enough to form three field trains of the kind we needed. Send to us at Geneva by the shortest route all the horses you can procure in Paris, harnessed and unmounted.

BONAPARTE

579

### To Lieutenant-General Lannes

G.O.C., *Advance-guard, Reserve Army*

H.Q.,\* Geneva

20 Floréal, Year VIII (10 May, 1800)

Citizen General, in accordance with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, you will proceed on the 23rd to Saint-Maurice with the advance-guard which you command and at Villeneuve you will have biscuit issued to the troops for the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th. During the 24th you will advance six leagues beyond Saint-Maurice and on the 25th you will reach the foot of the Great Saint-Bernard. While passing through Saint-Pierre you will take biscuit for three days, the 27th, 28th and 29th.

General Mainoni is to assemble the three battalions of the 28th Demi-brigade, the Swiss battalion and the Italic battalion at the hospice of Saint-Bernard on the 24th and to have biscuit issued for four days. Give him the necessary orders.

You will take all necessary steps to hasten the transport of your artillery to the Saint-Bernard and you will have the sledge-mountings that have been assigned to you brought up with all speed so that they reach the foot of the mountain before the head of the column.

You will calculate your march with such precision that one hour before dawn on the 26th you will have crossed the Saint-Bernard and have reached the forward posts of the enemy which you will destroy.

You will order the 12th Hussars and the 21st Chasseurs to be at Vevay on the 23rd.

The movement of the Army will follow that of the advance-guard and you will receive further orders.

General Marmont has orders to send an officer to mount on the Saint-Bernard an 8-pounder, a howitzer and the 4-pounders of the Watrin Division. You will give this convoy such escort as you think necessary and will decide where these guns should halt to await the attacking column.

The Chabran Division will cross the Little Saint-Bernard on the

\* Bonaparte held no official position in the Reserve Army and his personal headquarters were theoretically, though not always geographically distinct from those of the army. Only documents which were formally signed by Berthier or members of the staff were issued under army letterheads.

26th, will overthrow any of the enemy who may be occupying that route and join you as soon as possible.

Please report frequently to the Commander-in-Chief as to your position.

I salute you.

*The Chief of Staff, Reserve Army*  
DUPONT

The cavalry units should take oats for four days.

580

### To Citizen Petiet

*Councillor of State*

*Geneva*

*21 Floréal, Year VIII (11 May, 1800)*

You will rejoin me, Citizen, in five or six days with the detachment of the Guard which will be passing through here. Until then organize your war stores.

Report to me daily as to everything passing through Geneva in the way of provisions for the Army and hasten its movement by all possible means.

You will bring with you the paymaster specially attached to me with the 500,000 francs in gold which he will have carried on mules.

Several millions should arrive from Paris which this paymaster will receive and bring with him, apart from what may be judged necessary on the lines of communication. You will have all the money coming from the 18th and 20th Districts deposited at Dijon for the pay of those units of the Reserve Army that are still on the Soâne and for its depots.

BONAPARTE

581

### To General Augereau

*C.-in-C., French Army in Holland*

*Geneva*

*21 Floréal, Year VIII (11 May, 1800)*

A month ago, Citizen General, you received orders to select a camp between Maastricht and Breda. Now I wish you to raise this camp to 8,000 or 9,000 French and 4,000 or 5,000 Dutch, with a proportionate field artillery train, and to be in a position to move to Mainz at the first order. You can easily draw 5,000 or 6,000 men from the 24th, 25th and 26th Districts and particularly from the garrison of Mainz. By this means we should be able to improvise an army corps of 18,000 to 20,000 men, which could march into the heart of Germany and facilitate the main military operations by causing the enemy acute disquiet.

You will realize how secret a plan of this kind must be kept. Let it appear that you intend to move to the coasts and the mouth of the

Escaut. Arrange matters so that you could be on the march for your destination within twenty-four hours of receiving the order. In a fortnight the Reserve Army may be in the heart of Italy, linking the Army of Italy to that of the Rhine. It is then that your rôle would begin.

All this is based on the assumption that we do not expect England to attack Holland for a month or six weeks, and it is especially for this reason that speed and secrecy are essential.

Take all steps to mount the 16th Dragoons.

BONAPARTE

582

### To Major-General Dupont

*Chief of Staff, Reserve Army*

*H.Q., Lausanne*

*22 Floréal, Year VIII (12 May, 1800)*

Give orders for the artillery of the three divisions, Boudet, Loison and Chambarlhac, to leave tomorrow, the 23rd, for Villeneuve where it will park and complete its establishment of supplies, cartridges, etc. and where it will be inspected by General Marmont.

Order the Boudet Division to proceed to Bex, near Saint-Maurice, on the 24th: the Loison Division to proceed to Aigle, two leagues beyond Villeneuve, on the 24th: the Chambarlhac Division to proceed to Villeneuve on the 24th. You will order each of these divisions to draw biscuit for the 25th to 29th inclusive when passing through Villeneuve.

Give orders that all cavalry units except the 12th Hussars, the 21st Chasseurs, the 15th Chasseurs and the two squadrons of the 11th Hussars, which are under orders to rejoin the divisions to which they are attached, should be assembled at Lausanne by the 25th to be inspected by the First Consul; General Harville will consequently proceed to Lausanne, and you will advise General Murat of these dispositions so that he seeks the Commander-in-Chief's orders for this review.

Take care to warn the Quartermaster-General of these movements as well as the lieutenant-generals insofar as they are concerned.

Order all the forward depots of units to be centralized at Geneva whither all conscripts arriving singly or in small detachments will proceed and be armed, etc., before joining their units. In conformity with the arrangements laid down in general orders, the base depots will remain in the localities assigned to them in the 18th District.

Give orders that as from tomorrow all conscripts in all the demi-brigades must fire a few rounds, must be instructed which eye to use in aiming and how to load their muskets.

Instruct a staff officer to proceed to Villeneuve where he will see that all units passing through have fifty rounds and two flints per man.

Instruct the Quartermaster-General that he must order the Paymaster-General to issue funds to the divisional paymasters to cover the pay, as prescribed in general orders. Before moving to Villeneuve the army should receive all pay due up to 1 Prairial, Year VIII. The Paymaster-General will be responsible for the execution of this order. . .

Order H.Q. and all services of the army to be at Villeneuve on the 24th. The staff officers will proceed tomorrow to Vevay.

I shall leave for Vevay tomorrow morning with the First Consul for the review at midday. From there I shall go to Villeneuve to see how things are, returning in the evening to sleep at Lausanne. You are free either to come with me or to remain if you have work to do in Lausanne during tomorrow. In any case, send your horses and some of the staff officers to Villeneuve. On the 24th I shall pick up my horses at Villeneuve and go on to join the advance-guard.

Insert in general orders that thirty sous will be deducted from the pay of any man who has lost a bayonet.

*By order of the First Consul*  
*The Commander-in-Chief, Reserve Army*  
ALEX. BERTHIER

583

### To Lieutenant-General Lannes

G.O.C., *Advance-guard, Reserve Army*

*Vevay*

*23 Floréal, Year VIII (13 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, the Commander-in-Chief has received your letter telling him that the advance-guard will be assembled at Martigny on the evening of the 22nd. He instructs me to impress upon you the precautions demanded by the nature of the country you will be passing through. The local inhabitants and Quartermaster Dalbon, who has long lived there, will give you useful information, of which you cannot have too much in view of the difficulties presented by the crossing of the Saint-Bernard.

General Berthier hopes that you will have crossed the pass by the 26th as arranged. On reaching Aosta you will mass your whole advance-guard for an attack on the castle of Bard. Do not appear before this fortress without all your forces. Once you have captured the heights dominating it, forbid all musketry fire which will only uselessly waste cartridges. Mount your guns on a hill from which they can effectively fire on the fort; put two howitzers on the road and, when these batteries are ready, open a heavy cannonade. As soon as this has had its effect on the protective works over the enemy batteries and there are targets for musketry, allow the fusillade which could then be very effective and hasten the fall of the fort.

General Marescot has orders to join the advance-guard to attend to everything concerning the attack on the fort of Bard. I have also to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief will be at Aosta at the same time as the advance-guard.

*By order of the First Consul*

584

**To Lieutenant-General Desaix**

*At Toulon*

*Lausanne*

*24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

My dear Desaix, I have just received your letter of 15 Floréal. Your first letter told me that you should have left a few days after the ship bringing General Kléber's aide-de-camp, and I was very worried, therefore, to see a month go by without news of you; I feared everything of Punic faith. But now you have arrived; good news for the whole Republic, but especially for me, who have for you all the esteem due to men of your talents together with such friendship as my heart, old now and knowing men too well, holds for no other.

Two months ago I received the capitulation [of El' Arîsh]. I will say nothing thereon, since you have signed it; but how could 16,000 or 18,000 Frenchmen be afraid of 30,000 Turks! You did not need 6,000 men to beat them, take their guns and camels and put them out of action for a year.

When I reached France, I found the Republic lost, the Vendéans at the gates of Paris; the fleet, far from being at Toulon, was at Brest and already disarmed, Brest itself threatened by the English. We have had to destroy the Vendée, find money, rearm the fleet. It was leaving, forty-six ships strong with all kinds of munitions and 6,000 troops, when the news from Constantinople told us of the capitulation.

But let us not speak of it: come and rejoin me wherever I may be as quickly as possible.

I am going down into Italy with 30,000 men to relieve Masséna and chase out Melas. After that I shall return to Paris. At this very moment the advance-guard is crossing the Saint-Bernard. I hope to be at Ivrea when you read this letter.

Moreau is at Biberach; he has routed Kray three times.

BONAPARTE

585

**To Major-General Mortier**

*G.O.C., 17th Military District*

*Lausanne*

*24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

I have received your letter of 19 Floréal, Citizen General. Most of the conscripts sent to the 30th Demi-brigade have deserted with arms and



baggage before reaching Dijon. I fear the same may happen to the 14th. Have searches made to find out what has happened to these conscripts.

Keep Paris quiet. That will enable me to stay away a few more days, which, I hope, will not be without interest to M. de Melas.

I salute you affectionately.

BONAPARTE

Tell Lefebvre to get his arm healed quickly.

586

### To Major-General Dupont

*Chief of Staff, Reserve Army*

*H.Q., Lausanne*

*24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

Give orders that Major-General Monnier is to command the reserve, composed of 19th Light and the 44th and 70th of the Line. The 70th will leave Lausanne on the 26th to rejoin the army. The 19th Light, which reaches Nyon on the 27th will join the 70th as quickly as possible . . . As to the 44th you will see from the following dispositions that General Monnier will find two battalions at Martigny and later the third. Brigadiers [Carra] Saint-Cyr and Schilt and the adjutant-general who is with the 70th will be under his orders.

Tell the Quartermaster-General that he must immediately organize all administrative services, ambulances, etc., for this reserve division. The First Consul will give orders as to the artillery it is to have.

Give orders to General Moncey instructing him that he forms part of the army I command.

Order him to have the two battalions of the 44th Demi-brigade leave at once, my intention being that this whole regiment should join the army on the Saint-Bernard. Consequently, the battalion that General Moncey had to send to the Simplon will be directed as soon as possible to Martigny, where it must arrive on the 30th at the latest to join General Monnier's column; the other two battalions will march there at once. Give definite orders to General Moncey to collect about 1,000 men of the Swiss levies nearest to the Simplon to be sent there and joined to the 400 men of the Swiss battalion already under the orders of General Béthencourt. . . . The 1,400 men who will then be on the Simplon will suffice for the moment, and General Moncey will not send more.

You will order General Béthencourt to send the battalion of the 44th to Martigny as soon as he receives 600 of the 1,000 men that General Moncey has orders to send to the Simplon in place of the 44th.

You will instruct the general commanding the Simplon that after reaching Ivrea the army will probably wheel left and into the Ticino; that he must seek to convince the enemy that he has large forces and to frighten them by attacking their positions, but not rashly. You will

inform him that General Moncey has orders to take large forces over the Saint-Gotthard and that therefore he has nothing to fear.

Warn General Moncey that, in accordance with a decree of the Consuls, General Moreau is detaching from his army the following troops which will come under the command of General Moncey:—one battalion of the 102nd Demi-brigade, two battalions of the 101st, one battalion of the 1st Light: these four battalions, already under General Moncey's orders, make up a force of more than 3,000 men. Two battalions of the 102nd, coming from Vandamme's division; the 91st of the Line, from Laval's division, near Mainz; the 12th Light, from the central reserve of the Army of the Rhine; the 29th of the Line, from Sainte-Suzanne's formation; finally, two demi-brigades, not named, drawn from the divisions of Generals [Gouvion] St-Cyr and Lecourbe.

All these troops will make a force of about 15,000 infantry which will arrive very soon, except for the 91st and the two battalions of the 29th, which are coming from the Mainz area.

He will also receive in cavalry: the 1st Dragoons, the 6th and 14th Cavalry, the 15th, 25th and 12th Chasseurs, making about 2,400 horses.

Order General Moncey to assemble these troops on the Saint-Gotthard as they arrive, except those he may have sent to the Simplon.

Warn him that on the 29th or 30th I shall be at Ivrea with the army; that, once there, I shall march straight for Milan by the shortest route . . . that when I can establish communication with Switzerland and with him by way of the Simplon, I shall have the little force he is to send to the Simplon join me. Inform him that General B ethencourt is in command at that point.

Inform him also that I shall probably be at Romagnano and Arona on 2 or 3 Prairial. Impress upon him that the corps under his command will greatly alarm the enemy. During my movements he must show as many forces as possible and make the enemy believe he has many more than he really has and that he is threatening at any moment to march on Milan.

It is possible that on reaching Ivrea I may have news from General Mass ena obliging me to move straight on Genoa. In that case it is equally necessary for General Moncey to draw the attention of the enemy, so that they keep as many forces as possible in the Milanese. Warn him that should I carry out this movement it will delay my arrival on the Ticino only by five or six days.

It is essential that he should manoeuvre to establish our communications through Bellinzona and Locarno, so that we can act in concert for our different attacks.

Inform General Moncey that there is biscuit, corn and brandy at Z urich and Luzern, with which he can feed his troops; at Luzern there

are 1,500,000 cartridges, which he should move as far forward as possible so as to supply us on the Ticino via the Saint-Gotthard, if the enemy holds me for long in that position.

General Moncey must try to send us 500,000 cartridges through Bern and Fribourg to the foot of the Saint-Bernard; if he can also send us 1,500 rounds each of 8-pound and 4-pound shot and howitzer shells he will be doing us a good service.

Tell him that I think his troops will not all have arrived before 2 Prairial, but that he should begin to move those under his orders to the Saint-Gotthard, and the others as they arrive. Tell him to send officers to meet the columns and hasten their march. But for the situation in Genoa, which forces on our movements, I should have waited a week, but that is not possible.

Order General Moncey to correspond with us frequently by way of the Saint-Bernard until I have advanced far enough to communicate with the Simplon.

The First Consul, who is with this Army, counts on the zeal and talents of General Moncey to overcome the difficulties presented by the speed and character of the movement.

*The Commander-in-Chief, Reserve Army*

ALEX. BERTHIER

587

### **To Major-General Dupont**

*Chief of Staff, Reserve Army*

*H.Q., Lausanne*

*24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

Warn General Turreau that I expect to reach Ivrea with the army on the 28th, crossing by the Great Saint-Bernard.

Inform him that in concentrating their forces the enemy will necessarily weaken themselves on his front; that he must, therefore, move on Susa with all possible forces; that he should have with him the 4th and 9th Chasseurs and the 21st Cavalry and as much artillery and ammunition as possible.

On reaching Susa he will establish communication with the army by way of Lanzo and Ponte. From my side, I will send patrols to these two towns to gain news of him.

Inform General Turreau that my intention is that he should march leftwards and join the army at Ivrea, passing as far as possible from Turin, but by a route where he can take his artillery. I hope that our junction will take place about 1 or 2 Prairial . . .

Tell him that the First Consul and I count upon his zeal and talent to ensure the execution of this important movement. . .

Send these orders by the courier Belin and a duplicate by a staff officer who will rejoin me at Aosta by way of the Little Saint-Bernard

as soon as General Turreau is master of Susa. You will understand that there is no time to be lost in forwarding these orders.

General Turreau will send me an exact return of the troops and artillery he will have with him, and another of what he has left in the positions and strong points he thinks it essential to garrison.

*The Commander-in-Chief, Reserve Army*  
ALEX. BERTHIER

588

**To Citizen Petiet***Councillor of State, at Geneva**Lausanne**24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

Yesterday, Citizen, I visited Villeneuve. You will see that four boats had arrived carrying in all 430,000 rations of biscuit, 300,000 to 400,000 rations of brandy and very little corn. I ask you, first to call for a report on the boats which have left Geneva for Villeneuve apart from the above four and the quantity of rations they carried; secondly, to verify what remains in store at Geneva so as to know, by adding these three amounts together, the total of biscuit on which we can count. It seems to me it can hardly reach the 1,500,000 I was told had been made and for which funds were issued.

No boots had yet arrived at Villeneuve; you know the importance of that article.

The sooner you can join me the better. This army has great need of an administrator.

BONAPARTE

589

**To General Masséna***C.-in-C., Army of Italy**Lausanne**24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

I have been at Lausanne for two days, Citizen General. The army is in full movement. The aide-de-camp you sent me will tell you verbally how things are here.

You are in a difficult position, but what reassures me is that you are in Genoa: it is in cases such as yours that one man is worth 20,000.

I embrace you.

BONAPARTE

590

**To General Moreau***C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine**Lausanne**24 Floréal, Year VIII (14 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, the Minister of War has sent me your letter from

Biberach of 20 Floréal. Your three fine victories have given lustre to French arms and will lower Austrian pride a little.

I have received news dated the 13th from Genoa. Masséna is still defending himself stubbornly, but he is surrounded by considerable forces. The Genoese are showing great devotion to our cause.

The Reserve Army is beginning to cross the Saint-Bernard. It is weak and there will be obstacles to overcome, which has decided me to go myself into Italy.

It is essential that you furnish a good corps of troops to General Moncey. The one you intend is very weak; besides it can never assemble in time. For example, the 29th has two battalions at Mainz; the 91st is also near Mainz: these units will certainly arrive too late. It is essential that you replace them and manoeuvre so as to put 18,000 to 20,000 men, present and under arms, under the orders of General Moncey, so that he can descend by the Saint-Gotthard during the first week of Prairial. Nothing must be spared to save the city of Genoa and the headquarters of our army blockaded there.

The English are continually making small landings on the Provençal coast, and it is beyond doubt that a considerable expedition is at sea . . .

If the diversion ordered by the Government for the Saint-Gotthard is not carried out with all the diligence and zeal that the circumstances demand, it could happen that the 12,000 to 14,000 men we have in Genoa will be taken prisoner together with the headquarters and that the Reserve Army will be beaten. Then you will have to detach 20,000 men to hold the south; you will have to fight against the Austrian army in Italy, and your army might even have to be drawn upon for help in the interior, since successes like that would give a general encouragement to the Vendéans.

You see the circumstances we are in. The success of the campaign can depend on the promptness with which you carry out the required diversion. If it is executed promptly and decisively and you have it at heart, Italy and peace are ours.

Perhaps I am saying too much. Your zeal for the prosperity of the Republic and your friendship for me will speak to you enough.

BONAPARTE

591

## To the Consuls of the Republic

Lausanne

25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)

. . . The advance-guard is now crossing the Saint-Bernard: it is commanded by General Lannes. I have today reviewed the cavalry.

Wait a few days without giving news of the Reserve Army; say only that it is on the march,

It will perhaps be useful to insert in various papers, other than the Official Journal, that I have crossed Switzerland and passed through Basle, so as to put off the scent those who wish to spread false news and alarm good citizens.

We shall have various obstacles to overcome; the transport of the artillery across the Alps is not one of the least; but every kind of means will be used.

I salute you affectionately.

BONAPARTE

592

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Villeneuve*

*Lausanne*

*25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, 600 men of the 60th have arrived. Half their arms are in a bad state; I estimate they need 300. I wish you to let me know whether there are not any at Villeneuve; in that case, they will have to wait there tomorrow to allow time to have some brought from Geneva.

You must give orders to General Sauret to establish his headquarters at Villeneuve or Saint-Maurice. Give him command of the Léman, of all the shores of the lake and the whole of the Valais. Attach a war commissary or quartermaster to him. Order General Sauret to see to it that all conscripts and troops reaching Geneva and Villeneuve are inspected, so that they can be fully equipped with arms, boots and forty cartridges per man.

All units and detachments leaving Geneva should take bread for four days and, on leaving Villeneuve, biscuit for five days . . .

It remains to make arrangements for the cavalry. Much will be passing and, if it is not better fed than it has been so far, the horses will arrive in Italy dead. . . . It will be possible to have oats brought up by the lake, and this is the season when there is no lack of forage.

I urge you to take steps about the cavalry. A large number of artillery horses will be arriving. They will all die on the mountain if they are not fed for eight days.

I have just sent five munition wagons from Lausanne carrying ten sledges made at Auxonne to transport the limbers and 8-pounders. Have the horses changed at Villeneuve and send them with all speed to the Saint-Bernard.

BONAPARTE

General Murat is not organizing his cavalry; there are neither war commissaries nor heads of services with the result that they can barely keep alive.

The best organization seems to be to divide it into four brigades: 1, the 12th Hussars and 21st Chasseurs; 2, 1st Hussars, 2nd and 15th

Chasseurs; 3, 5th, 7th 8th, 9th Dragoons; 4, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 20th Cavalry. Each brigade must have a forage officer, a war commissary and a light artillery squadron with two guns. These can be drawn from the Consular Guard until the army light artillery arrives.

For three decades the quartermaster must arrange to have 2,000 or 3,000 pairs of boots per decade at Lausanne for the units and detachments passing through.

593

**To Citizen Lacuée***Councillor of State, Acting Minister of War**Lausanne**25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)*

General Peyron, who was with the Army of the Pyrenees under General Dugommier, is a bad officer. Therefore I do not approve your proposal to post him to the Reserve Army. It would be much simpler to place him on retired pay. He is good for nothing.

BONAPARTE

594

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Villeneuve**Lausanne**25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)*

Lauriston has just arrived, Citizen General. He tells me that the whole of the artillery of General Lannes's division has crossed. Have the whole of General Duhesme's corps cross at once and advance as quickly as possible on the fort at Bard. If General Chabran has been able to bring the 12-pounders, have them sent there. You know that there is no time to be lost in capturing the castle of Bard.

I imagine that Lannes has occupied Aosta today. I hope you will be master of Bard on the 27th at the latest.

The cavalry will camp tomorrow at Villeneuve; Monnier, with his division, at Vevay. The Italians should have reached you.

Tomorrow evening I shall probably be at Saint-Maurice; my guard and equipment leave in the morning.

I have had news from Paris, where everything goes well . . .

BONAPARTE

595

**To Citizen Petiet***Councillor of State, at Geneva**Lausanne**25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)*

Citizen, order the biscuit to be sent on as soon as it is made. I wish the 1,500,000 rations to be completed and at Villeneuve by 8 Prairial at the latest.

I do not know what steps have been taken by Quartermaster-General Dubreton to organize a clothing depot at Geneva. Enquire from the war commissary and, if insufficient has been done, take steps to meet a consumption of 10,000 boots per decade, half to be sent to Villeneuve and half for the troops passing through Geneva, for a period of three decades. Collect, also for three decades, 1,000 coats, 2,000 breeches, 2,000 haversacks and 4,000 shirts. Geneva should be able at once to provide the materials for making what you require.

Get a report on the steps taken to establish a hospital at Geneva. There may soon be a thousand wounded.

BONAPARTE

Please send an officer through Chambéry to Valence to expedite the departure of the pontoons, which are indispensable to the Army.

596

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

At Paris

Lausanne

25 Floréal, Year VIII (15 May, 1800)

I have been at Lausanne since yesterday and leave tomorrow. I am quite well. This country is very beautiful. I see nothing against your coming to join me in ten or twelve days' time; but you must travel *incognito* and not say where you are going, as I do not want anyone to know what I am going to do. You can say you are going to Plombières. I will send you Moustache, who has just arrived.

A thousand thoughts to Hortense. Eugène is on his way, but will not arrive for a week.

BONAPARTE

597

### To General Berthier

C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Saint-Pierre

Lausanne

26 Floréal, Year VIII (16 May, 1800)

Citizen General, I have just received a letter from General Suchet, sent from Nice on the 21st. The enemy has forced the Tenda Pass and the line of Borghetto. General Suchet had his headquarters at Nice and occupied the Braus Pass and the forts at Vintimiglia and Montalban which he had provisioned. Nice has been evacuated to the last gun; he is going to cross the Var and will resume the offensive with 7,000 to 8,000 men as soon as the enemy is weakened by our movement.

As a result of all that, you must at once order General Lannes to march, even if the rest of the army has not crossed the Saint-Bernard. It is essential to be at Ivrea as soon as possible, even with only half the army. I shall be at Saint-Maurice tonight.

BONAPARTE



598

**To Lieutenant-General Suchet***Deputy C.-in-C., Army of Italy**Lausanne**26 Floréal, Year VIII (16 May, 1800)*

I have just received your letter of the 21st, Citizen General. The artillery of the advance-guard has crossed the Saint-Bernard mountain with ease. General Lannes, who is commanding it, is today at Aosta. The army is at the foot of the Saint-Bernard; during the night it will be in Piedmont. Another strong detachment is preparing to cross the Saint-Gotthard. The enemy will not cross the Var unless they take it into their heads to be buried in Provence. If you cannot hold Nice, defend the bridgehead. Enlist the National Guards. I am arranging to give the generals and prefects of Provence extraordinary authority; I will send you details in an hour by another courier.

I shall be at the foot of the Saint-Bernard tonight; I shall go to Ivrea and then manœuvre in the light of the enemy's later movements.

BONAPARTE

599

**To General Moreau***C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine**Lausanne**26 Floréal, Year VIII (16 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, part of the artillery has already crossed the Saint-Bernard, and I am leaving at once to rejoin the army.

I have had a letter from General Suchet dated the 21st, from Nice. The enemy had forced the line of the Borghetto and the Tenda Pass; Nice was evacuated. The little fort of Vintimiglia, Montalban and the castle of Nice were provisioned for two months. We still held the Braus Pass, which, like Nice, had to be evacuated during the night of the 21st to 22nd, when General Suchet had to recross the Var. The enemy appears to have very considerable forces in Italy; all reports are at one on that point.

I shall be at Aosta tomorrow. I am relying on the diversion from the Saint-Gotthard taking place in conformity with the general plan of campaign and the order which the Minister of War has sent you. All depends on that.

BONAPARTE

600

**To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte***At Paris**Lausanne**26 Floréal, Year VIII (16 May, 1800)*

I am leaving at once to sleep at Saint-Maurice. I have had no letters from you; that is not good. I have written to you by each courier.

Eugène should arrive the day after tomorrow. I have a slight cold, but that will come to nothing.

A thousand tender things to you, my good little Josephine, and to all that belongs to you.

BONAPARTE

601

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Etroubles*

*Martigny*

*27 Floréal, Year VIII (17 May, 1800)*

I have arrived at Martigny, Citizen General. . . . I shall spend the night here to await news of the capture of the fort at Bard, which I hope to receive tomorrow morning.

Two 4-pounders on sledge-mountings could easily be set up on the heights dominating it, without being dismounted and without needing the emplacement required by an ordinary carriage.

General Monnier camps tonight at Saint-Maurice with the 70th.

The cavalry will be here tomorrow.

BONAPARTE

602

### To the Consuls of the Republic

*Martigny*

*28 Floréal, Year VIII (18 May, 1800)*

Citizen Consuls, I thank you for your sympathy at the death of my brother's wife.\* She had long been ill.

We are fighting against ice, snow, gales and avalanches. Astonished at being so rudely attacked, the Saint-Bernard is putting certain obstacles in our way. But a third of our field artillery is already over. General Berthier sent word on the 26th that he had entered Aosta. General Lannes, commanding the advance-guard, has had a minor skirmish with a battalion of Croats, which tried to defend the entrance to Aosta but was driven back.

In three days the whole army will have crossed. Unless it is quite essential, I think it would be wise not to make the news public. It will be better to wait until we are in Italy and serious fighting begins.

BONAPARTE

603

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Aosta*

*Martigny*

*28 Floréal, Year VIII (18 May, 1800)*

I have received simultaneously, Citizen General, your two letters from Etroubles, one of 1.0 p.m. and one of 9.0 p.m. on the 27th.

\* Catherine Boyer, first wife of Lucien Bonaparte.

Today has been fine, which has helped the passage of munitions. All the cavalry is here. I have slowed its movement a little so as not to overwhelm you on the other side until I know that cursed fort of Bard has been captured. The Italians left this morning. . . .

I have written to Geneva that Petiet must send 200,000 cartridges and 200,000 biscuit rations over the Little Saint-Bernard.

The bullocks are moving fast; the front of the herd has reached Lausanne. . . .

BONAPARTE

604

### To Citizen Petiet

*Councillor of State, at Geneva*

*Martigny*

*28 Floréal, Year VIII (18 May, 1800)*

Send the first 200,000 rations of biscuit you have ready either at Chambéry or Geneva to Aosta by way of the Little Saint-Bernard. Since this is of the utmost importance, use all possible means of transport; put a war commissary in charge of the operation. Write to the prefect of Mont-Blanc so that he requisitions the necessary quantity of mules and carts.

200,000 cartridges must also be sent to Aosta by the same route.

Write to Adjutant-general Boyer, commanding in the Mont-Blanc, so that he supports the prefect in arranging the necessary transport.

The line of operations over the Great Saint-Bernard, which draws on the central depot at Villeneuve, is beginning to be adequately provisioned. It is now necessary to send supplies to the army by the other line of operations, which is the Little Saint-Bernard.

Artillery Major Gueriot should have received orders from General Marmont to form an ammunition dump at the foot of the Little Saint-Bernard. If he has not received them inform him of this letter.

BONAPARTE

605

### To Citizen Petiet

*Councillor of State, at Geneva*

*Martigny*

*28 Floréal, Year VIII (18 May, 1800)*

Twelve guns have already crossed the Saint-Bernard, but not without difficulty, less over the guns than over the wretched limbers.

Berthier writes to me that he has entered Aosta. A Croat battalion tried to defend the bridge; twelve men were killed and then the enemy fled. The fort of Bard will be invested tomorrow.

The army is crossing fast.

BONAPARTE

606

**To the Consuls of the Republic***Martigny**29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

Citizen Consuls. . . . At last the weather has become fine, which was very necessary to expedite the passage of our artillery over the Saint-Bernard.

A letter from General Suchet informs me that the enemy attacked the bridgehead on the Var on the 23rd. They were driven off and lost 150 prisoners. General Suchet also tells me that the enemy is beginning to be worried at the movement of the Reserve Army and has sent a detachment against Berthier . . .

I read in the newspapers that I have written a letter to my mother saying I shall be in Milan within a month. That is not my character. Often I do not say what I know, but never do I say what is going to happen. I wish you to have a note to this effect, in humorous tone, inserted in *The Monitor*.

BONAPARTE

607

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Martigny**29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, I am returning to you, signed, the papers you sent me.

At last the Reserve Army is entering the scene. The Saint-Bernard put a few difficulties in our way. Since Charlemagne it has not seen such a large army and, most of all, it hindered the passage of our heavy field pieces. But now half our artillery is at Aosta.

BONAPARTE

608

**To Citizen Reinhard***French Minister to Switzerland**Martigny**29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, please see the Executive Council and ask them to order a battalion of 300 to 400 men to proceed to Saint-Pierre to guard the Saint-Bernard and the line of communication of the Army.

I also hope that the Swiss Executive Council can enlist three battalions of the National Guard, each of 300 men. One should be held at Martigny, the second at Villeneuve, the third at Lausanne. The purpose of these battalions will be to provide escorts for the army convoys and prisoners, to guard our stores and maintain the security of

communications with France. Each national guard will be paid at the rate of ten sous per day from army funds.

BONAPARTE

609

### To Citizen Lacuée

*Councillor of State, acting Minister of War*

*Martigny*

*29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, . . . The army is not yet all across; we still have only half our artillery on the other side.

We shall need a battalion of veterans at Villeneuve to guard our stores and escort prisoners to Geneva. Also a few companies at Geneva . . .

The military police will need reinforcing by 100 men. You should take one man in ten from the most peaceful departments and send them to Villeneuve, whence they will join the army.

BONAPARTE

610

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres*

*Martigny*

*29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

I congratulate you, Citizen General, on this first victory; it is the prelude to greater ones.

At last 500 or 600 requisitioned mules are beginning to arrive here, and I hope that from tomorrow we shall have pretty considerable means for getting our artillery over.

I shall probably leave tomorrow.

According to the news from Nice on the 24th it is physically impossible for Melas to be at Turin, should he go there, before 5 or 6 Prairial.

You must be beyond Ivrea with everything completely ready by the 4th. The cavalry and the Chambarlhac and Monnier divisions will have joined us by then.

BONAPARTE

611

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres*

*Martigny*

*29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, I have just received news from the Var, dated 7.0 a.m. on the 24th. General Suchet informs me that General Melas himself is at Vintimiglia. The corps at Nice appears to be of 15,000 men. On the 23rd the Lattermann Grenadiers attacked the bridge over the

Var; they were vigorously repulsed and pursued as far as the outskirts of Nice. 200 grenadiers were made prisoner.

General Melas has sent a detachment of 5,000 men, commanded by General Bellegarde, into Piedmont by the Tenda Pass. This movement took place when they had news that you had reached Geneva with 15,000 men.

There is not a moment to lose in pressing forward. If the fort of Bard holds out longer than we think, the advance-guard, with four sledge-mounted 4-pounders, which will go anywhere, and the light cavalry brigade, will have to take up a good position between Ivrea and the fort; place the 1st Division in position to support it. But I hope you will have invested this fort today. The weather is superb, which will greatly ease the passage of the artillery. . . . I shall probably cross tomorrow.

BONAPARTE

612

### To Lieutenant-General Moncey

G.O.C., *Saint-Gotthard Corps*

*Martigny*

*29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

I have received your letter, Citizen General, together with the copy of the one you sent to General Berthier, who is far away; I am taking it upon myself to answer for him.

Huningue, Neuf-Brisach or Strasbourg should be able to supply you with gunners. Nothing can replace their knowledge and experience for the transport of artillery on the bad roads you will be passing over.

I am ordering Citizen Petiet to send you 50,000 francs and I am writing to Paris to have 100,000 in gold sent direct to you; you will not lack for money.

If on the 8th you are on the Saint-Gotthard with 12,000 to 15,000 men, all will go well.

The difficulties presented by the crossing of the Saint-Bernard have delayed us a little. The army will not be assembled at Ivrea and in a position to undertake major operations until 5 Prairial. . . . Afterwards it will perhaps take the course of going straight to Milan. It will cross the Sesia as soon as possible, will be joined by the column from the Simplon and will advance to the Ticino. In that case it will reach the Ticino only on the 8th.

On this hypothesis, the Reserve Army will be making a very daring march between 5 and 9 Prairial. The Sesia will be disputed by the force defending the Milanese. It is essential that you find ways of seeming to be ready and in great strength and of keeping the headquarters of the division opposing you constantly on the alert. It will then be less ready to weaken itself so as to oppose the advance of the Reserve Army,

which will be able to manoeuvre as a whole according to circumstances to crush Melas, who will be on its right flank after the 7th or 8th when it arrives on the Ticino.

Then you must proceed to Bellinzona to form the left of the Reserve Army and to Lugano and Varese, which will turn the Ticino.

If, on the other hand, the Army goes straight down to the Genoese Riviera to disengage General Masséna, then you will have five or six days more, during which it is essential that you keep up patrol activity to give the impression that you are going to Milan. The arrival of the Reserve Army in Lombardy will be delayed five or six days, which means that you will be the more ready.

If the enemy determines to pay absolutely no attention to you and thins out considerably so as to march against the Reserve Army, then take count of your strength, carry Bellinzona, march on Lugano and make as great a diversion as you can.

BONAPARTE

613

### To Citizen Boinod

*Asst. Q.M.G., Reserve Army*

*Martigny*

*29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

16,000 rations of biscuit and 10,000 rations of bread are leaving at once for Saint-Branchier. Distributed to the Chambarlhac division, that will give it three days' supply of bread . . .

There is no shortage of foodstuffs at Villeneuve; only transport is lacking, which puts us in danger of dying of hunger in the Aosta valley where there is nothing but hay and wine.

Answer me, please, on this point and let me know who is the quartermaster in charge of transport between Villeneuve and Aosta and therefore responsible for the subsistence of the army.

BONAPARTE

614

### To Lieutenant-General Suchet

*Deputy C.-in-C., Army of Italy*

*Martigny*

*29 Floréal, Year VIII (19 May, 1800)*

I have received your two letters of the 23rd, Citizen General.

The Saint-Bernard mountain is crossed. Half our artillery is at Aosta. I myself am going over tomorrow. When you receive this letter the diversion should be fully made and uncertainty being felt by the enemy at Nice.

The first operation at Nice will be to have the coastal batteries rearmed.

Have those inhabitants who have misbehaved and helped the enemy arrested to be severely punished . . .

The army will be assembled at Ivrea on 4 Prairial.

BONAPARTE

615

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres*

*Etroubles*

*30 Floréal, Year VIII (20 May, 1800), 9.0 p.m.*

I have just received your letter, Citizen General. A war commissary, sent by the Quartermaster-General, is going at once to Saint-Pierre to send up biscuit, of which he will find enough there and which can be delivered at Aosta on the evening of the 2nd.

I am assured here that the sledge-mountings have left. I shall not leave until late tomorrow so as to see for myself the state of the artillery.

I wish you to send me a detailed report on the detour that must be made because of the castle of Bard, the time needed and the state of the route.

Choose good positions on the edge of the plain which the army can take up to cover the siege of Bard and where it can receive the attack of the enemy army. These positions can be selected so that his superiority in cavalry is unimportant and the advantage of his artillery is considerably lessened. That will also ensure our ability to scour the plain and spread out to feed ourselves. Joined to what will reach us by the Little Saint-Bernard and to the million rations of biscuit we have beyond Villeneuve, that will keep us alive.

The movements on the Simplon and the Saint-Gotthard will be strongly felt by the enemy about 5 or 6 Prairial. We have ten sledge-mounted guns which can support the positions taken up by the army. Meanwhile the crossing of the artillery will be completed, the rear corps will arrive and yet the diversion at Genoa will none the less be partly made.

Order a party of sappers and as many peasants as can be collected to start work at once to repair the new road [round Bard], which will become the Army's line of communication; it must be very bad if it is worse than the Saint-Bernard over which we have brought part of our artillery. With time and trouble most obstacles can be surmounted.

Send your adjutants-general and engineer officers to find out the formation of the country between Bard and Ivrea.

Keep on the alert. Lannes will have 7,000 to 8,000 men upon him within three or four days. Melas cannot reach you before the 6th.

To sum up, we must work on the new road and do much reconnaissance. As soon as your artillery is ready start bombarding the fort.

BONAPARTE



**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres**Aosta**1 Prairial, Year VIII (21 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, General Harville and General Chambarlhac have reached Etroubles today; as the latter has brought his artillery, he must have a third of his division still the other side . . . We never hoped to be assembled and ready to meet the enemy in force before 4 or 5 Prairial, so until now the fort of Bard has not delayed you.

The Austrian force opposite the Simplon might go up the Val-Sesia as far as Riva, cross the Valdobbia to Gressoney, and from there fall upon Châtillon by the Ranzola pass and Brusson, or else go by way of Fontana-Mora to Perloz and the heights above Bard.

It is certain that vehicles can go the whole length of the Val-Sesia below Riva. It is even suggested that they could cross to Gressoney and from there to Châtillon and Saint-Martin without very serious difficulty. We must, therefore, as quickly as possible reconnoitre from Châtillon, Saint-Martin and Verres to Gressoney, and establish an observation corps there which will ensure your defence and show us how far we can count on the nature of these roads. I have seen people of the country who have often been from Riva to Châtillon in a day and they reckon even less time from Riva to Saint-Martin.

A few years ago the King of Sardinia established a line from Saint-Martin to Gressoney. I am assured that cannon passed by the route from Arnaz to Perloz, Perloz to Lilliana and Lilliana to Saint-Martin. Those seem to me to be three reconnaissances that must be made. Independently, send spies to Riva as soon as possible. The Italian corps here could be sent to Gressoney; it would occupy the Valdobbia and send patrols into the Val-Sesia, which would facilitate our communication with the Simplon force.

From the other side the enemy could approach Aosta itself through Ceresole. The two or three roads he would have to follow meet on the Cogne Pass; these roads appear to be mountainous, rough and difficult. I think it is equally important to survey and watch the Cogne Pass, from which the castle of Bard can be reached by the Champorcher valley.

If it is true that artillery can use the route from Châtillon to Gressoney, we could avoid Bard, for it seems certain that the road from Gressoney to Saint-Martin is fairly good.

Your artillery is going to increase daily, and, if the Saint-Bernard has not stopped us, a secondary mountain will not put an insurmountable obstacle in our path. . . .

The best-informed people here think that were about thirty shells to fall in the fort with the Albard battery keeping up a brisk fire, Bard

would be carried if we had ladders ready for the assault, especially on the Saint-Martin side.

You must erect a bridge near Donnaz, at least for infantry, so that if the occasion arises we can use the road up the Champorcher valley to the Cogne Pass.

BONAPARTE

617

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres*

*Aosta*

*2 Prairial, Year VIII (22 May, 1800), 11.00 a.m.*

Citizen General, I have received your letter of 3.0 a.m. this morning, with that from General Lannes. I hope that by now I have to congratulate you on the capture of the fort of Bard. Once you hold it, do not let its equipment be dissipated; a garrison must be put in with a good commander. You will understand that, should we change the plan of operations, it will be extremely important to have this little fort to close the valley and ensure our means of renewing the line of communication through Aosta should we so wish. Once the campaign assumes a different character we can then give it up and raze it. . . .

The Italians are going to Châtillon tonight. If you are master of the fort of Bard, you can send them on to Ivrea; otherwise you will do well to send them to Gressoney. . . .

BONAPARTE

Try to send some local men to see if there is news of General Turreau.

618

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres*

*Aosta*

*2 Prairial, Year VIII (22 May, 1800), 10.0 p.m.*

General Chambarlhac informs me, Citizen General, that he will be at Aosta on the evening of the 4th with the whole of his division and all his artillery; so he can be at Ivrea on the 6th.

The Monnier Division and the whole of the cavalry can be there on the 5th. Thus we can reckon that by the 7th the whole of your army will be assembled between Saint-Martin and Ivrea. I hope you will have taken the fort before then. If it is not taken, you could leave the Chabran Division to continue the siege and some of the Italians to occupy the head of the Val di Valla, the cavalry and artillery passing by night along the road between the fort and the village.

If General Lannes can put a good commander with 200 or 300 men in the castle of Ivrea and can bring General Turreau there, you will have a sure line of retreat on the Dora-Baltea enabling you to retire on

Susa. Thereby you will be in a position to act in complete freedom in accordance with the movements of the enemy and the news of General Moncey. . . .

Give orders to General Lechi to occupy Gressoney and to send detachments from Riva into the Val-Sesia and to Biella via Monte-Mosso.

It is important to get as many guns as possible to General Lannes and General Boudet tomorrow. Meanwhile, tell General Lannes to watch closely the movements of the enemy in the Biella and Santhia areas. He must, provisionally, establish himself between Ivrea and Saint-Martin, so as not to be cut off from the Val di Valla. But that must not prevent him from sending detachments to search the plain for news of the enemy and of General Turreau. Above all, see that Generals Lechi and Lannes send spies and troops towards Biella so that we are fully informed of the movements of the enemy on that side.

BONAPARTE

619

## To the Consuls of the Republic

*Aosta*

*4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

Citizen Consuls, . . . A letter that I have received from Nice and the news reaching me from Ivrea inform me that on 29 Floréal Melas was at Nice and suspecting nothing. His confidence was based on the knowledge that there were no troops between Lyons and the Mont Cenis and that the camp at Briançon was very weak. As a precaution he had, however, posted 3,000 cavalry on the approaches from Briançon. I am assured that he reached Turin yesterday in great haste.

BONAPARTE

620

## To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*At Paris*

*Aosta*

*4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

Please give my wife 30,000 francs.

The worst obstacles have been overcome; we are masters of Ivrea and its citadel, where we found ten guns. We have come down like a thunderbolt; the enemy was not expecting it at all and can scarcely believe it.

Great events are coming; I hope the results will be splendid for the happiness and glory of the Republic.

A thousand things to Julie.

BONAPARTE

621

**To Citizen Masc***President, Municipality of Saint-Pierre**Aosta**4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

I have received your letter of 20 May, Citizen. I am very pleased with the zeal shown by all the inhabitants of Saint-Pierre and with the services they have rendered us. Have an estimate prepared of the damage caused by the passage of the army and I will repay the whole. That is no more than justice, and I hope to do something further for the benefit of your commune.

BONAPARTE

622

**To Lieutenant-General Moncey***G.O.C., Saint-Gotthard Corps**Aosta**4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

Yesterday, Citizen General, the advance-guard captured Ivrea and the citadel; 200 prisoners were taken. On the 6th the whole army will occupy all Piedmont between Ivrea and the Sesia. The fort of Bard, closing the valley, is presenting great difficulties to the passage of our artillery. Have all the munitions you can brought via the Saint-Gotthard and collected at Altorf.

Attack on the 7th or 8th; advance to Bellinzona, to Locarno. We may well be on the Ticino on the 8th or 9th.

BONAPARTE

General B ethencourt, with the 24th, will attack from the Simplon and advance to Domodossola. Establish contact with him. A force of chasseurs from the army, now at Gressoney, will be at Riva on the 6th to make contact with General B ethencourt.

623

**To Brigadier-General B ethencourt***G.O.C., Simplon Force**Aosta**4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

If you have 2,000 men under your orders, Citizen General, overrun the enemy outposts on the 7th and advance to Domodossola.

1,500 men now occupy Gressoney. They will reach Riva by the 6th. You can then make contact with this force.

Take 200,000 or 300,000 cartridges with you and two or three 4-pounders.

General Moncey is crossing the Saint-Gotthard on the 8th to occupy Bellinzona, Locarno and Lugano. Get in communication with him.

BONAPARTE

624

**To Major-General Chabran***G.O.C., 5th Division, Reserve Army**Aosta**4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

Citizen General, The First Consul wishes you to leave today with two demi-brigades of your division to proceed to Châtillon and tomorrow to the castle of Bard, to which you will lay siege.

The third demi-brigade of your division will furnish one battalion for the garrison of Aosta, one battalion to guard the gorge of Cogne and one battalion to guard the artillery park at Etroubles.

The First Consul wishes you to carry bread for four days if you can draw supplies here.

*By order of the First Consul*

625

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres**Aosta**4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

. . . General Champeaux's cavalry brigade, which was at Châtillon yesterday, is moving into Piedmont today. The two brigades of dragoons and heavy cavalry are encamped between Bard and Châtillon. Give orders for them to move into Piedmont tomorrow. . . .

The 19th Light will be at Aosta tomorrow and will join General Monnier with all speed. General Monnier is encamped between Verres and Châtillon and tomorrow will take up position between Ivrea and Saint-Martin. General Chambarlhac will camp tonight at Aosta with the whole of his Division, so that, if necessary, he can be at Ivrea on the evening of the 6th. Thus on the 7th the whole of your army will be assembled at Ivrea.

The great difficulty will be the artillery. The people of Bard itself assure me that it should be possible to make a road between Bard and the town, working on it at night: we could also send the artillery past at night.

The artillery is beginning to move, so you should have a good number of pieces of all calibres at Bard.

Could we not fire for three or four hours with a large number of guns and escalate the outer wall, or else escalate it at night with a number of feint attacks?

You must make use of your lieutenant-generals, as they are your best divisional commanders. As things are they are without anything to do. Victor could command Chambarlhac and Monnier, which in reality makes only a big division, and Duhesme, Boudet and Loison.

BONAPARTE

626

**To General Brune***At Dijon**Aosta**2 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

Citizen General. . . . The enemy seems completely astonished by our movement. He still hardly believes it. Judge for yourself. This was the enemy situation on 28 Floréal: 12,000 men at Nice, 6,000 at Savona and the Genoese Riviera, 25,000 in front of Genoa, 8,000 at Susa, Pignerol etc., 3,000 in the Aosta valley, 8,000 opposite the Simplon and Saint-Gotthard; this all infantry. Two regiments of hussars at Genoa and Nice, four regiments near Turin; the rest in cantonments round Acqui and in the interior of Lombardy.

He remained in this position till the moment we reached Ivrea.

The 3,000 men who were in the valley have been beaten and dispersed. The whole force from Susa and Pignerol has moved between Turin and Ivrea. Nice has probably been evacuated by now . . .

I count on having the whole army, about 33,000 men, at Ivrea on the 6th or 7th. I shall be master of the whole country from the Dora-Baltea to the Sesia. The same day Moncey will cross the Saint-Gotthard with 15,000 men. Suchet and Masséna, who are informed of our movements, will follow the enemy when they see him weakening in front of them . . .

If we are successful, it will be only a beginning. You are going to organize a good army corps with which you will have a fine rôle to play at the beginning of July. Work without pause to arm and equip the conscripts reaching you. The army paymaster has just received a million francs from Paris, and I am ordering him to send you 400,000 to make up the pay and provide you with additional arms and clothing, though the Minister of War should already have provided for that.

You will find yourself commanding the Reserve Army as soon as it has secured its junction with the Army of Italy.

BONAPARTE

627

**Bulletin of the Reserve Army\****At Dijon**Rear H.Q., Aosta**4 Prairial, Year VIII (24 May, 1800)*

On 26 Floréal the advance-guard, commanded by General Lannes, crossed the Saint-Bernard and reached Aosta. A Hungarian battalion defending the entrance to the town was driven back and lost a few men killed.

\* This and succeeding bulletins were signed by Berthier as C.-in-C., but they were written in consultation with Bonaparte, and many of the original drafts show manuscript corrections in his hand.

On the 27th General Lannes resumed his march and advanced to Châtillon. The enemy disputed the crossing of a bridge at the end of a very narrow gorge; they were overwhelmed by the grenadiers, who took 300 prisoners and killed about 100 men. Two 3-pounders and four limbers filled with munitions were captured.

The army crossed the Saint-Bernard from the 27th to the 30th. On the 26th General Chabran's division crossed the Little Saint-Bernard. The great difficulty was the carriage of the artillery.\* The Saint-Bernard was snow-bound and the gradient very steep. General Marmont, commanding the artillery, employed two methods.

The first was a simple tree-trunk, hollowed into the shape of a trough, in which 8-pounders and howitzers were laid; 100 men, harnessed to a rope, pulled the gun, taking two days for the crossing.

The second method was sledges on rollers which Colonel Gassendi had had made at Auxonne. The gun-carriages were dismantled and carried piece by piece, except those of the 4-pounders which ten men carried on poles. The limbers had to be emptied and the ammunition put into boxes carried by men or mules . . .

The First Consul descended from the top of the Saint-Bernard by sliding on the snow and water-courses and leaping over precipices.

On the 28th General Berthier surrounded the castle of Bard, seized the heights of Albard which dominate it and summoned the commander to surrender, which he refused. On 2 Prairial he occupied the whole of the lower part of the castle, four companies of grenadiers having broken in during the night and lowered the drawbridges. The enemy retired into the keep and another rampart he had built on the rocks.

On 2 Prairial the advance-guard encountered the enemy, who were defending the outlet from the gorge near Saint-Martin, drove them back and took 50 prisoners. On the same day the Commander-in-Chief having sent forward the Boudet division to support the advance-guard, ordered the capture of Ivrea. The enemy had a garrison in the citadel and seemed to be ready to defend the town; but he had too few men to be able to resist. General Lannes arrived there on the 3rd, ordered an assault and captured both town and citadel, where ten guns were found; he pursued the enemy, who retreated towards Turin, and took 400 prisoners.

\* The difficulty of the operation can be gauged from the fact that each 8-pounder or 6-inch howitzer, excluding its carriage, weighed over one and a half tons; a 4-pounder weighed over a ton. Each carriage, fully assembled, was of about the same weight as its gun. In addition to the guns, carriages and limbers, many thousands of tons of ammunition and other stores were carried on the backs of men and mules over an ill-made, snow-bound path that was often narrow, steep and precipitous.

In these different engagements we have lost but 7 men killed and 25 wounded.

It was reported at the First Consul's headquarters on the 4th that Masséna had recently made a completely successful sortie.

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### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Verres*

*Aosta*

*5 Prairial, Year VIII (25 May, 1800)*

I have your letter of the 4th, Citizen General. I imagine you have sent an artillery company, nominated a commandant and ordered a cartridge factory to be established in the citadel of Ivrea.

General Lannes has probably attacked the enemy this morning and either beaten him or forced him to fall back beyond Chivasso. If he has not done so, order him to do it tomorrow. The enemy cannot have more than 7,000 to 8,000 men. Besides, this is the only way to gain sure news of General Turreau and to mislead the enemy.

Order General Murat to send out reconnaissances to Biella and Santhia; General Monnier to take up position three leagues beyond Ivrea on the main road to Santhia: the Italic Legion to proceed on the 7th by the Valdobbia to Riva and, on the 8th, down the Val Sesia as far as Varallo. Tell the commander to send patrols on the 9th to Crevacuore and Masserano, where they will meet patrols from the army.

BONAPARTE

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### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*Rear H.Q., Aosta*

*6 Prairial, Year VIII (26 May, 1800)*

The First Consul is at Verres. The soldiers are calling for the assault of the fort of Bard, which is still holding out. Tomorrow we expect General Moncey, with his 20,000 men, at the foot of the Saint-Gotthard. All routes into Italy are covered by our cannon and our soldiers, whose devotion is sublime; it must be seen to be believed. The 24th Light has refused the gratuity of 2,400 francs due to it, saying that this debt must be discharged by the Austrians.

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### To the Consuls of the Republic

*Ivrea*

*7 Prairial, Year VIII (27 May, 1800)*

Citizen Consuls, I have received your mails dated 1 Prairial. I arrived at Ivrea yesterday evening. Here we are, at last, in the heart of Italy; in ten days' time a great many things will have been settled. Enclosed



is a short bulletin that you can have inserted without signature in the official journal. The Commander-in-Chief is about to draw up an account of the different events.

Everything goes well. I shall be in Paris before the end of Prairial.

Send me news of Consul Lebrun; I was very worried to hear that he had been ill.

BONAPARTE

631

## Report on the First Operations

*of the Reserve Army*

*H.Q., Chivasso*

*8 Prairial, Year VIII (28 May, 1800)*

The Reserve Army has been only a few days in the field and has already distinguished itself by signs of courage and devotion that will find a place in history.

Arrived at the foot of the Saint-Bernard, the first obstacle to be surmounted was the crossing of the artillery. Nothing could frighten the soldiers: not the prospect of several leagues of road eighteen inches wide, built over precipitous rocks; not those mountains of snow threatening to roar down on their heads; not those chasms which at the least false step might engulf them. They pressed around the guns eager for the honour of dragging them. Various units of the Loison Division, the 19th and 24th Light, the 43rd and 96th of the Line, particularly distinguished themselves in that competition of ardour and devotion. At last, after indescribable labours and unprecedented efforts, the guns arrived beyond the Saint-Bernard.

### THE ACTION OF AOSTA

On 26 Floréal the advance-guard, which had crossed the mountains the day before, marched against the enemy. It met him on the bridge of Aosta, attacked and drove him from the favourable position he was occupying. The senior officer commanding the town of Aosta was mortally wounded in this action.

### THE ACTION OF CHATILLON

On the 28th the advance-guard continued forwards to occupy the heights of Châtillon which were defended by a Croation battalion with four pieces of artillery. While several of our columns turned these heights, the centre column attacked from the front. The enemy was routed and pursued by 100 men of the 12th Hussars who captured three guns and 300 prisoners.

The same day the advance-guard approached within half a league of the castle of Bard. The enemy was occupying the high ground which dominates the village, but by scaling the sheer rocks one of our columns turned their position and forced them to retire within the walls.

I ordered the capture of the town. The sappers and grenadiers lowered the draw-bridges, blew up the gates and the town was taken. Three companies of grenadiers are quartered there and the castle is blockaded at musket-range.

On 5 Prairial I ordered General Loison to invest the castle more closely, so as to ease the passage of our artillery. The grenadiers of the 28th went in with rare courage.

The enemy had regarded the castle of Bard as an insurmountable barrier, closing the entry into Piedmont at a point where the mountains enclosing the valley of Aosta come together leaving a gap of only fifty yards. But 1,500 men ordered to construct a road over the mountain of Albard, were quickly successful. Wherever the slope was too steep, steps were cut; where the path was too narrow and flanked by precipices, walls were built to prevent falling; where there were ravines between the rocks, these were joined by bridges; and now French cavalry has crossed a mountain regarded for centuries as inaccessible even to infantry.

A yet more extraordinary effort astonished the enemy. While work was going on without rest on the Albard road, soldiers carried two 4-pounder guns on their backs over the Col de la Cou and, after scaling fearful rocks for thirty hours, were able to set them up on the heights overlooking the castle.

We were masters of the town of Bard, but the road below the fort was exposed to continuous musketry and artillery fire which stopped all movement. The advance-guard was already in contact with the enemy and had an urgent need of guns. Since the delay involved in passing them over the mountain of Albard presented grave dangers, brave men were ordered to drag the guns through the town by night under fire from the castle. This order was carried out with enthusiasm, and such devotion was crowned with success. One after another all the guns went through, and, despite the hail of bullets that the enemy rained down, we had only a few wounded.

General Marmont, commanding the artillery, was everywhere; his zeal and talent contributed not a little to the success of this important and difficult operation.

#### CAPTURE OF IVREA (4 PRAIRIAL)

General Lannes had been ordered to move with the advance-guard to San Martino and from there to Ivrea. This last town was occupied in force by the enemy. Our troops surrounded it and thrust into the town, every accessible point being attacked. The enemy abandoned both the town and the citadel and we took 500 prisoners and fifteen pieces of artillery. It was high time, for later we should have been involved in a regular siege.

General Watrin, commanding one division of the advance-guard, and Adjutant-general Hullin gave proofs of ability and courage on this occasion. General Malher also distinguished himself. Our losses were but twenty dead or wounded. Major Ferrat, commanding a battalion of the 22nd Demi-brigade, is among the dead.

Supported by General Boudet's division, the advance-guard took up positions beyond Ivrea. Strengthened by reinforcements arriving from Turin and other parts of Piedmont, the enemy had checked his retreat and established himself on the heights of Romano, behind the Chiusella, ready to defend the crossing with 5,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and a number of guns.

#### ACTION OF THE CHIUSELLA (6 PRAIRIAL)

General Lannes, whom I had ordered to drive the enemy from this position, advanced along the Turin road and soon reached the banks of the Chiusella. The 6th Light opened the attack at three points; the centre rushed onto the bridge at the double, while two battalions threw themselves into the river in a hail of bullets and case-shot. The enemy could not resist such dash and valour and already his first line of infantry was in complete confusion. His second line, comprising the Kinski and Banat Regiments, charged the 6th and succeeded in holding it for a time. But the 22nd of the Line, formed into close column by General Gency, hurled itself against the enemy, overthrew him and forced him to seek safety in flight. He was vigorously pursued by the 6th Light, the 22nd of the Line, the 12th Hussars and 21st Chasseurs. The enemy cavalry, 4,000 strong, attacked in turn. The 40th and 22nd of the Line held the charge firmly with their bayonets; never has infantry shown more courage and coolness. Three successive charges were repulsed. The commander of the enemy cavalry, General Palffy, and six other Austrian officers were killed.

The enemy lost more than 500 men and 300 horses, and we took 60 prisoners. We had 250 killed and wounded; among these were Major Sarret of the 6th Light and Major Dumont of the 22nd of the Line.

#### CAPTURE OF SUSA AND LA BRUNETTE (2 PRAIRIAL)

While the advance-guard, under General Lannes, was advancing on the Po and Chivasso, the division under the orders of General Turreau was attacking the enemy at Susa. On the 2nd he attacked the positions at Gravere where the heights were lined with entrenchments and bristling with cannon. Adjutant-general Liébault, commanding the advance-guard, advanced with 800 men of the 28th Light and 150 men of the 15th to take all these works by storm. General Turreau supported the attack with three companies of carabiniers, four of grenadiers, one howitzer and an 8-pounder. It was a stubborn fight, and the outcome was for long uncertain. General Turreau's only reserve was the 26th

Demi-brigade. This received orders to attack the enemy, together with 100 sappers who arrived at the very moment of the action.

One battalion of the 26th managed to turn the Saint-Francis fort; it then occupied it, established itself on the plateau and forced the enemy to evacuate the village of Gravere. Soon the troops rushed forward at the double from all sides. All the positions were forced and La Brunette capitulated at 10 p.m.

After this victory General Turreau advanced beyond Susa.

CAPTURE OF VERCELLI (7 PRAIRIAL)

On his side, General Murat took Vercelli by storm on 7 Prairial. The 2nd and 15th Chasseurs, supported by three companies of grenadiers of the Monnier Division, overthrew 1,000 enemy cavalry on the Sesia; 60 of them were taken together with their horses.

General Lannes is beyond Chivasso.

*By order of the First Consul*  
*The Commander-in-Chief, Reserve Army*  
ALEX. BERTHIER

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**To Citizen Carnot**

*Minister of War*

*Ivrea*

*9 Prairial, Year VIII (29 May, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, we are going to have various places to invest or besiege. Major-General Chasseloup will be needed here, for he is the officer most familiar with the Italian fortresses. Give him orders to join us.

BONAPARTE

633

**To Citizen Carnot**

*Minister of War*

*Ivrea*

*9 Prairial, Year VIII (29 May, 1800)*

You will see from the staff reports, Citizen Minister, what have been the various operations of the army. All goes well here, and the enemy appears completely routed.

The 19th Light, which has just arrived, is only 800 strong; its third battalion and various detachments have been left in France. Order them to rejoin their unit.

The 13th Light is only 1,100 strong; one battalion and its carabinieri are in France. Order them to rejoin their unit.

The 6th, 22nd and 40th and many other demi-brigades have detachments on the Brest squadron. They must be disembarked and sent to their units.

The 9th Dragoons, the 11th Hussars and 15th Chasseurs have not arrived. They seem to have remained on the Saône. Send them orders to join the army.

Have the infantry depots of the army sent to Chambéry.

Appoint a cavalry general to inspect all the cavalry depots on the Saône and to dispatch all available men in detachments of 300.

We have still a great need of artillery horses. We shall need another bridging train unless we can catch one off the enemy.

Our most serious want is artillery labourers; we ought to have 200 and have but 30. Lastly, a battalion of sappers.

BONAPARTE

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### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*Rear H.Q., Ivrea*

*9 Prairial, Year VIII (29 May, 1800)*

After the action of the Chiusella the enemy withdrew on Turin, cutting the bridges and burning all the boats on the Orco. General Lannes occupied Chivasso yesterday. He found a number of laden boats on the Po.

At Chivasso the First Consul reviewed the advance-guard. He made known his satisfaction with this brave division, which has already rendered such great services. He praised the 22nd Demi-brigade for its vigorous crossing of the Chiusella, and the 40th for the courage with which it received the charge of 3,000 cavalry. . . .

General Murat entered Vercelli on the 7th with the cavalry and General Monnier's division. . . .

Two couriers have been intercepted. It is confirmed that General Melas is still at Turin; that he arrived from Nice in haste, cursing the generals who had told him from Turin that there were no more than 6,000 men in the Aosta valley. . . .

The conscripts are behaving well. At the fight on the Chiusella they ducked at the first shells, but the old soldiers controlled them. Next day they were saying to General Watrin: 'General, we must not be called conscripts any more; we know what it is like and are three times the men we were.'

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### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*Rear H.Q., Ivrea*

*9 Prairial, Year VIII (29 May, 1800)*

On 4 Prairial the Cisalpine Legion, 2,000 strong and commanded by the Cisalpine General Lechi, left Aosta and camped at Châtillon. On the 6th it crossed Mount Ranzola and took up position at

Gressoney. On the 7th it crossed the Valdobbia and reached Riva where it crossed the Sesia. On the 8th it advanced to Varallo. The Prince of Rohan, with his legion and one gun, was holding a position in front of this important place, where the valley of the Sesia begins to be practicable for vehicles. The Cisalpine Legion attacked with great bravery and carried the enemy entrenchments, took the gun, three limbers and 350 prisoners and killed 50 men. Their own losses were 2 officers and 4 soldiers killed and 12 wounded.

On the same day the column which is on the Simplon should have moved to Domodossola, thereby turning what troops the enemy still has there.

General Murat crossed the Sesia this morning.

General Moncey should have crossed the Saint Gotthard and have attacked the enemy strongly.

The First Consul and the Commander-in-Chief leave tonight for Vercelli where H.Q. will be established tomorrow.

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## To the Consuls of the Republic

*Vercelli**10 Prairial, Year VIII (30 May, 1800)*

Citizen Consuls, I enclose the bulletin of the army. I am continually on the move. I leave tonight for Novara. Tomorrow I shall be on the banks of the Ticino to see to the means of crossing. It is extremely wide and fast.

BONAPARTE

637

## Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*H.Q., Vercelli**10 Prairial, Year VIII (30 May, 1800)*

The advance-guard remained at Chivasso for the whole of the 9th. Learning that we had collected boats on the Po, the enemy believed we intended to cross it at Chivasso so as to march on Asti and intercept the troops coming up from Nice. He brought all his available infantry from Turin up to the right bank of the Po opposite Chivasso.

Meanwhile, General Murat completed his bridge over the Sesia, crossed over and moved to Novara, taking up positions along the right bank of the Ticino.

The First Consul reached Vercelli this morning. It would be difficult to describe the joy of the Italians at being freed from the Austrian yoke.

All the divisions of the army are on the march and will cross the Sesia tomorrow. Last night General Lannes crossed the Dora-Baltea and is moving on Vercelli by way of Crescentino and Trino.

The Austrians had celebrated the capture of Nice throughout all the cities of Italy; they little knew how disastrous it would be for them. Their consternation is at its height. Today the inhabitants of Milan heard the guns of our forward units.

It is reported that Melas's headquarters is today still at Turin.

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### To Lieutenant-General Lannes

G.O.C., *Advance Guard, at Vercelli*

Novara

12 Prairial, Year VIII (1 June, 1800)

As my courier leaving for Paris carries very important dispatches, please have him escorted as far as Ivrea.

We have crossed the Ticino opposite Galliate. General Monnier has fought a useful action at Turbigo; he took 300 prisoners and killed many enemy cavalry. Troops are crossing all day. General Murat with the advance-guard of 4,000 men and 200 or 300 cavalry is half-way to Milan.

Move to Mortara as soon as possible and push your outposts towards Pavia, whither you will probably be ordered to march.

Let me know when you will arrive at Mortara.

BONAPARTE

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### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

H.Q., Novara

12 Prairial, Year VIII (1 June, 1800)

General Murat entered Novara on the 10th; he at once moved on to the Ticino. The Italic Legion has moved from Romagnano to Sesto.

General Duhesme with the divisions under his orders has taken up positions along the Ticino.

The First Consul reached the Ticino on the morning of the 11th. The enemy had a large number of cavalry and several guns on the left bank. General Murat set up a battery and the cannonade lasted for an hour. The enemy had withdrawn all the boats to the left bank, but the people of Galliate had hidden four or five small boats which they offered to the army. These were used to pass some companies of grenadiers onto an island, which forced the enemy to evacuate the point on the left bank where we wished to cross. In six hours nearly 1,500 men and two guns were put over.

General Monnier took up a position along the Naviglio-Grande. But, seeing the crossing taken, the enemy rallied from all sides at Turbigo. Several enemy generals arrived there in the evening. They attempted a number of unsuccessful cavalry charges. Adjutant-general Girard covered himself with glory.

At 8.0 p.m. General Monnier attacked the village of Turbigo and occupied it after a sharp action, taking 200 prisoners. As the village had been surrounded, all who were inside were massacred. Nearly 300 corpses were counted, almost all cavalrymen.

General Duhesme, having acquired a small boat, sent some companies of grenadiers over to Buffalora. Colonel Duroc fell into the Ticino and was on the point of drowning when happily he was saved.

During the first five days of the decade General Turreau has had some sharp encounters with the enemy and has held in check a considerable quantity of troops. He is continuing to manoeuvre in his position between Turin and Susa.

From the latest letters arriving from Nice it seems that Melas left only on 1 Prairial and that on the 3rd the enemy attacked the bridge of Saint-Laurent-du-Var with considerable forces; he was firmly repulsed.

The Ticino is being crossed in force. General Murat, with the advance-guard, is at Corbetta, three leagues from Milan.

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### To the Consuls of the Republic

*Milan**14 Prairial, Year VIII (3 June, 1800)*

You will find attached, Citizen Consuls, the Bulletin of the Army. I am also sending a copy of a letter from General Suchet. On the 7th and the 8th the enemy still had part of his forces at Nice.

I have received your letters of the 8th. You can announce publicly that I shall be back in Paris on 25 Prairial.

BONAPARTE

641

### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*H.Q., Milan**14 Prairial, Year VIII (3 June, 1800). Morning*

General Murat entered Milan on the 13th. He at once surrounded the citadel. Three hours later the First Consul and the whole of the staff made their entry in the midst of a people showing the greatest enthusiasm. The horrors committed by the Emperor's agents in Milan are unexampled. They have spared neither sex, nor age, nor talents . . .

The details of all that has happened this year will be collected with the greatest care. It is necessary that the French people know the fate that the kings of Europe have in store for them if the counter-revolution succeeds. This thought above all should imbue the nation with gratitude for the courage of the Republican phalanxes which ensure for ever the triumph of equality and of all liberal ideas.



General Moncey has passed the Saint-Gotthard. He should reach Varese tomorrow.

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## Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*H.Q., Milan*

*14 Prairial, Year VIII (3 June, 1800). Evening*

General Lannes's Corps had formed the advance-guard from the Saint-Bernard to Ivrea and advanced as far as Chivasso to make the enemy believe that our plan was to join up with General Turreau, who had entered at Rivoli and Susa. During that time the army was marching in the opposite direction and crossed the Sesia and the Ticino.

When we had advanced far enough, General Lannes recrossed the Dora-Baltea and marched to Crescentino, Trino and Vercelli, where he received orders to move on Pavia, which he entered this morning. He has found there very considerable stores of foodstuffs, 50 tons of powder, 1,000 Austrian sick and wounded, 500 bronze guns with carriages, stores of powder, shot, etc. We expect the full inventory tomorrow.

General Lechi, with the Cisalpine Legion, has gone to Cassano. General Duhesme, with the corps under his orders, is marching on Lodi.

The movement to Milan has been so quick that the people of that city knew that the French were in Italy only twenty-four hours before their entry into Milan. . . .

Two 12-pounders which General Chabran had had placed in a church have breached the walls of the fort at Bard, which forced it to capitulate. Seventeen guns were found there. The garrison, 400 strong, has been taken prisoner and is on the way to France.

The two attached letters, one from Lt.-General Suchet, the other, intercepted at Pavia, from the Prince of Hohenzollern, commanding the blockade of Genoa, show perfectly the present position of the two armies in Italy.

After reading these two letters, one wonders how it was possible that M. Melas did not know on 5 Prairial of the extensive movements taking place in Piedmont, since it was then ten days after the Reserve Army had entered Aosta.

But what is even more surprising is that the Prince of Hohenzollern was unaware of the strength of the Reserve Army, which he calls a detachment. At the time he was writing, this so-called detachment had invaded Piedmont and Lombardy and captured all the stores at Pavia. M. Melas has always held that the Reserve Army had been called to Paris to hold down the people.

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**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

We are at Milan, Citizen Minister. At Pavia we found 300 cannon on their mountings, half field, half siege guns, 100 tons of powder, 10,000 new muskets and a great quantity of war stores of all kinds.

Here is the situation in Italy.

The enemy long thought we were no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men attempting an incursion to make him raise the siege of Genoa and Nice. He persisted in this idea until 8 Prairial. At the fight of the Chiusella their cavalry took seven or eight prisoners, from whom the enemy got information he still refuses to believe. On the 13th General Hohenzollern, who commands the blockade of Genoa, seemed, as you will have seen from the letter I sent to the Consuls, still not to set much store by our forces. General Melas wrote to Pavia, to a woman he has with him: 'I know they are saying in Lombardy that a French army is arriving; fear nothing; I forbid you to leave.' Twelve hours later we were entering Pavia.

We are at Lodi. Moncey's advance-guard is arriving at Como; he is collecting boats for the crossing of the Po.

All the hospitals of Lombardy are in our power; we have found 5,000 to 6,000 sick and wounded in them. Part of the garrison of Savona, who were going back as prisoners, have now joined us.

You will understand that within a few days important events are going to take place which may have a very peculiar effect on the future position of the house of Austria.

As to the second Reserve Army: remount the cavalry and equip it with everything it may need so as to get out of the depots this mass of men who cost much and render no service . . .

Salute and friendship.

BONAPARTE

644

**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

I have your letter of the 9th, Citizen Minister. Have the Italic Legion sent to Milan, where its organization will be completed.

I strongly approve the title Second Line Reserve Army. Appoint Brune Commander-in-Chief. It will be proper to consult him as to the appointment of a chief-of-staff. Appoint the administrative officers independently.

BONAPARTE

645

**To General Bernadotte***C.-in-C., Army of the West**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

I will say nothing, my dear General, except that we are at Milan and have captured the enemy's park, 300 siege and field guns and all his hospitals and stores. Moreau is maintaining himself around Ulm.

Take that wretch Georges dead or alive. Once you have caught him, have him shot within twenty-four hours for having been in England after the capitulation.

I salute and love you.

BONAPARTE

646

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Milan**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, give orders to General Duhesme that, if the enemy has not armed Crema as a fortress, he should push on to Orzinovi and try to capture it, which is possible with the enemy in his present disorder.

If the enemy has got a good garrison and adequate supplies in Orzinovi, then he must arm the castle of Soncino or Crema, whichever is in better condition; let him put in a garrison of 100 men with a good major and four guns from the Loison Division and supplies. Impress on General Duhesme how valuable it would be to have Orzinovi.

Give orders to replace the squad of gunners of the Guard which is manning two 4-pounders before the citadel. These guns will remain, but without horses. The crews will go to Pavia to take over 8-pounders. By these dispositions General Murat will take with him only the howitzers at present held by the Guard; between Pavia and Casale he will be joined by the two guns collected by the horses and gunners now before the citadel.

BONAPARTE

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**To Lieutenant-General Lannes***G.O.C., Advance-guard, at Pavia**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, I have received your letter of the 13th. General Marmont should have reached Pavia with the bridging train. Throw a bridge between the Ticino and Castel-San-Giovanni. Another division will cross at Piacenza where a bridge will also be put across.

BONAPARTE

648

**To Lieutenant-General Moncey**G.O.C., *Saint-Gotthard Corps**Milan**15 Prairial, Year VIII (4 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, I have received your letter of the 13th. Push your cavalry and all your infantry into Lombardy by forced marches, and come yourself to Milan as soon as possible.

The troops are manœuvring to cross the Po at Piacenza and Castel-San-Giovanni and to cut off the Austrian army which was at Nice on 8 Prairial and before Genoa on the 13. You will see, therefore, how essential it is to speed up your movement into Lombardy.

BONAPARTE

649

**To the Cisalpine People***Milan**16 Prairial, Year VIII (5 June, 1800)*

For the second time the French people are breaking your chains.

The birth of states is subject to storms and vicissitudes; the sorrows you have undergone will be useful to you.

You have learned to recognize the traps laid by the enemies of your happiness. They boasted of their respect for property, yet they have despoiled numerous families; of their zeal for religion, yet they have handed Italy over to heretics and even infidels.

Run to arms, Citizens of the Cisalpine; form your national guard and protect your towns from incursions by the enemy's light troops.

Can the pride of forming an independent nation be strange to you? Forget your quarrels, then. Have but one aim: to consolidate a free country. I shall recognize as friends of liberty only those who know how to obey the laws, to suppress hatred and respect unhappiness.

Cisalpine People, as soon as your territory is freed from the enemy, the Republic will be reorganised on the firm bases of religion, liberty, equality and good order. Hasten that moment by your efforts.

*By order of the First Consul*

ALEX. BERTHIER

650

**Bulletin of the Reserve Army***H.Q., Milan**16 Prairial, Year VIII (5 June, 1800)*

With General Duhesme's Corps General Berthier has invested the fortress of Pizzeghettono and occupied Crema. According to informa-

tion from General Suchet, the enemy began his evacuation of the Nice area only on 9 Prairial.

The Commander-in-Chief and the First Consul have attended a concert, which, though improvized, was extremely pleasant. Italian singing has a charm that is ever new.

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### Order of the Day

*Reserve Army*

*H.Q., Milan*

*17 Prairial, Year VIII (6 June, 1800)*

Soldiers, one of our Departments was in the hands of the enemy; all southern France was in consternation.

Most of the territory of the Ligurian people, surest friends of the Republic, was invaded.

Destroyed since the last campaign, the Cisalpine Republic had become the plaything of the grotesque feudal regime.

Soldiers, you are on the march and already the land of France is delivered! Joy and hope are chasing fear and dismay from our country.

You will give back freedom and independence to the people of Genoa; they shall be freed forever from their external foe.

The terrified enemy seeks only to regain his frontiers; you have taken his hospitals, his magazines, his reserve stores from him. The first act of the campaign is over.

But shall the land of France have been violated with impunity? Will you let this army that has carried fear into your families return to its homes? You run to arms! March out to meet it; oppose its retreat; tear from it its laurels, and show the world that the curse of destiny lies on those rash enough to insult the territory of a great people.

The result of all our efforts will be *cloudless glory and secure peace.*

BONAPARTE

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### To Lieutenant-General Lannes

*G.O.C., Advance-guard, at Stradella*

*Milan*

*17 Prairial, Year VIII (6 June, 1800)*

General Berthier, Citizen General, is on his way to Pavia. General Victor and General Monnier with their divisions and the force brought by General Lapoype are all going to Pavia, so as to cross the Po and support you.

General Murat has captured the bridgehead at Piacenza, on this side. He has taken about 100 prisoners from the enemy, who seems to have a great deal of baggage and artillery on the other side. The bridge is

complete except for the last three boats on the Piacenza side which the enemy has had time to cut. You can see how useful it would be if you can make a movement on Piacenza so as to give us possession of the bridge, since we should then have two outlets instead of one, and, with little repair, the Piacenza bridge could be used at once.

I could wish that we had 20,000 rations at Stradella. The enemy army evacuated Nice on 9 Prairial, half by way of Tenda, half by way of Vintimiglia. General Suchet is on their tail and has made 1,900 prisoners in different actions.

BONAPARTE

I do not believe that at the moment the enemy can have more than 10,000 infantry on the Tanaro, or that he can have 20,000 before the 20th or 21st.

653

**To Brigadier-General Lechi**

G.O.C., *Cisalpine Legion*

*Milan*

*17 Prairial, Year VIII (6 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, I am giving orders that cartridges be sent to you at once.

We have crossed the Po and occupy Stradella; thus the enemy army is cut off.

Let me know soon that you have set up the standard of the Republic at Bergamo and Brescia.

BONAPARTE

654

**To General Berthier**

C.-in-C., *Reserve Army, at Pavia*

*Milan*

*18 Prairial, Year VIII (7 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, . . . every moment is precious. Double the means of crossing. It is essential to march against the force at Piacenza so as to join up with General Murat there. Besides, that will be one force cleared from the field of battle.

General Murat's courier has just arrived, having left Noceto at ten o'clock this morning. You will see how much more urgent it has become to march to his help. But if our corps learns on the way that General Murat is master of the bridgehead on the Piacenza side it will be enough to send on a patrol and return to take up position at Stradella.

I am at once sending a courier to General Murat to give him a few instructions in case he has not been able to force the enemy front before Piacenza. I shall await his return.

BONAPARTE

655

**To Major-General Murat***Cdr., Cavalry, Reserve Army, at Piacenza**Milan**18 Prairial, Year VIII (7 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, I have this moment received your letter from Noceto to General Berthier.

General Lannes crossed the Po yesterday morning at Stradella with the whole of his division. He had a pretty warm action with a force, part of which had come from Genoa, part from Piacenza. He killed some, took 200 prisoners and pursued it till 9.0 p.m. and for three leagues towards Piacenza. This force can reach there only during today and it is possible you may by now be master of Piacenza since part of the troops which were there were in this force. You will have learnt the enemy's strength from prisoners. General Lannes is marching on Piacenza to reach your position. Manceuvre so as to join up with him as soon as possible.

BONAPARTE

656

**Bulletin of the Reserve Army***H.Q., Milan**18 Prairial, Year VIII (7 June, 1800)*

General Loison, after crossing the Adda at Lodi and taking Crema, crossed the Oglio during the 16th and took Orzinovi, a fortress between Brescia and the Po with a steep bastioned enceinte and counterscarp. After pursuing the enemy along the highway towards Brescia, General Loison countermarched and fell upon Cremona in order to seize the numerous stores the enemy has there, to cross the Po and link up with General Murat's corps at Piacenza.

General Murat reached Piacenza on the 16th. The enemy defended the bridge with heavy artillery fire. At 11.0 p.m. General Murat occupied the bridgehead and took prisoner a picket of 100 men which had remained to defend the crossing. We now hold the whole of the bridge apart from two or three boats on the Piacenza side which the enemy had time to cut.

At 4.0 a.m. on the 17th General Lannes opened a cannonade at different points on the Po to draw the enemy forces. Meanwhile, he crossed the river at the village of Belgiojoso and immediately occupied the famous strong-point of Stradella. Thereby the sole remaining enemy line of communication has been intercepted. Knowing the importance of Stradella, the enemy grouped his different forces and attacked General Lannes most fiercely. The 28th Demi-brigade covered itself with glory. The enemy was routed, leaving 200 dead, 300 prisoners and as many wounded, and retreated on Piacenza.

General Victor's corps, the cavalry and General Monnier's and General Gardanne's divisions are now crossing the Po. In the course of tomorrow the greater part of the French army will be assembled at Stradella. M. Melas has no recourse but to give battle with no refuge but the fortresses of Alessandria or Tortona.

General Murat crossed the Po at Noceto this morning.

General Moncey has just reached Milan with the advance-guard of his corps.

657

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Pavia*

*Milan*

*19 Prairial, Year VIII (8 June, 1800), 4.0 a.m.*

I have your letter of the 18th, Citizen General. With General Moulin watching the enemy at Casale, you must send spies and a cavalry section to keep him under observation around Valenza so as to know all his movements in good time.

Have a third intermediate pontoon established and send to see if the one at Parpanese cannot be rebuilt. We used to have a bridge beyond the Ticino; have a fifth pontoon put across in that area.

At mid-day yesterday I sent Lauriston to General Murat. I await his return before leaving.

Before sending off General Lannes be sure that the enemy is not in a position to attack General Victor today and that he has not reached Voghera. The whole of General Lannes's division is not needed for the attack on Piacenza. Order him, therefore, to keep his demi-brigades in echelon so as to be able to come quickly to the support of General Victor. At Castel-San-Giovanni he may well hear news of General Murat.

You can be certain that Stradella will be attacked by 20,000 men on the 20th at the latest.

Reconnoitre a strong position near your bridges which could serve as a retreat. It should contain houses, canals and embankments. If there is an island have two or three siege guns put there to give as much protection as possible to your crossing.

BONAPARTE

658

### To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Pavia*

*Milan*

*19 Prairial, Year VIII (8 June, 1800)*

I have received your various letters during the night, Citizen General.



General Murat has sent me the intercepted enemy dispatches. They are now being translated and contain some very interesting details.

A letter from Melas to the Aulic Council, dated 5 June from Turin, shows that Masséna surrendered on the 4th. His army is not taken prisoner, but is marching to join General Suchet. It seems that Masséna himself boarded a frigate so as to reach Nice more quickly.

General Melas also states in his letters that Baron d'Elsnitz has not been able to retreat by the Tenda Pass because one of his brigadiers was defeated on the Braus Pass and that has cut his route. He has retreated through Oneglia and General Melas says he hopes he will arrive at Ormea on 18 Prairial.

M. Elsnitz has with him only 6,000 men of his own division and 3,400 of Morzin's, a total of 9,400 of which he must leave 1,000 men at Cuneo, 1,000 at Savona and 300 at Ceva.

General Hohenzollern will remain at Genoa. General Ott, with 9,000 men, will withdraw through Ovada onto Alessandria.

Thus it appears that the enemy will not be able to group his forces at Alessandria before the 23rd or 24th and that even then he will have only the following troops:

Elsnitz Division	7,000
Ott Division	9,000
Hadik Division, now on the Orco	6,000
Total	22,000

Have our formations press on briskly and crush any troops you encounter. The advance-guard can push as far as Voghera. Send the cavalry and artillery across so that all our divisions are at full strength with their cartridges and everything in order.

BONAPARTE

659

### To General Berthier

C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Pavia

Milan

19 Prairial, Year VIII (8 June, 1800)

Citizen General, Lauriston, who has arrived from Piacenza, tells me that the bridge is quite complete.

My last two letters have shown you the true situation of the enemy. You need have no kind of alarm.

Do not fail to send me exact reports on all prisoners taken so that I can know to what division they belong. It is essential, for instance, to know whether the enemy who appeared at Broni belonged to General Ott's corps, which three days ago was before Genoa, or to that of General Hadik. The essential thing is not to let yourself be surprised; have the advance-guard under arms to reconnoitre the country from first light.

If tomorrow an enemy force advances against Stradella, as is possible, launch an all-out attack on it so as to take 2,000 or 3,000 prisoners; any such force can only be weak.

Let Generals Victor and Lannes know part of the news I have given you. General Lapoype left this morning and should have reached you. General Lorges has arrived.

I do not agree that your troops should cross at Piacenza; it would tire them out and be thoroughly inconvenient. The Po will go down, and in any case with a large ferry you can get a great many men over in twenty-four hours.

What is very good about your position is that whatever happens the forces at Stradella have a natural place of retreat in Piacenza.

I have told Vignolle to send on to Piacenza the 800 Italians who arrived this morning; there they will come under General Murat's orders.

I have no news of General Duhesme. If I hear during the night that he has reached Cremona I will write to him to send 500 men and 500 horses to Parma where they would arrive in time to catch 100 wagons of the enemy's baggage train.

This evening Murat is waiting for two battalions of the Thurn regiment. He took one this morning. If he can capture these two as well, it will be a fine success.

BONAPARTE

660

## To General Berthier

*C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Pavia*

*Milan*

*19 Prairial, Year VIII (8 June, 1800)*

Citizen General, I am sending you translations of the letters from Melas. You will see the situation of his army.

He hopes that General Elsnitz will be at Ormea on the 17th. That means, the 18th at Ceva, the 19th at Salicetto, the 20th, very late and tired out, at Acqui, supposing he takes that route. I assume that General Ott will have left Genoa on the morning of the 17th. He will be at Alessandria or Voghera on the evening of the 20th. General Hadik, supposing he left his position on the Orco before the headquarters, cannot be at Alessandria before the 22nd. These three divisions together, after the losses they have sustained in wounded, killed, prisoners and sick, do not amount to more than 18,000 Hungarians and Austrians and 2,000 Piedmontese. I do not include the cavalry.

General Lannes's corps, which is 8,000 strong, including his cavalry brigade, can move off tomorrow for Voghera.

Victor's corps should support him, as also Monnier's and Gardanne's divisions, all of which will give you 23,000 or 24,000 men.

Generals Murat and Duhesme, who between them have 10,000 men, will equally follow the same movement. Thus you will crush Melas with this whole army.

General Moncey, with the Italians, will have one force beyond the Oglio and one force blocking the citadel of Milan. A third force, for the defence of the Ticino, should march along the left bank of the Po, keeping level with the army, which would facilitate the means of crossing from one bank to the other: then, if the enemy were to cross the Po, this division should retire before him and join up with any troops that may have arrived at Milan to defend the Ticino.

I shall soon be at Pavia; we will plan this movement together.

For tonight, order Generals Lannes and Victor to take up, the first, a good position at Voghera, with the second one-and-a-half leagues in rear. Give General Victor all the cavalry you have. It is essential that they have their cartridges, with reserves at the rear, and their complete supplies.

Generals Monnier and Gardanne have no artillery. They must be given some of that found at Pavia of whatever calibre.

There is no word of General Chabran, of the 72nd, nor of all the artillery from the Saint-Bernard. If the crossing of the Po has delayed you so that you are not ready for these movements, confine yourself to having the advance-guard take up position at Casteggio.

Send orders to General Chabran to march with all his troops to Vercelli and send patrols to gain intelligence at Casale. He will leave strong garrisons in the castle of Bard and the citadel of Ivrea.

BONAPARTE

If troops appear between Voghera and Stradella, they should be attacked without hesitation; they are certainly less than 10,000 men.

661

### To Lieutenant-General Suchet

Deputy C.-in-C., Army of Italy

Milan

19 Prairial, Year VIII (8 June, 1800)

You will find attached, Citizen General, various papers which will show you the situation of the army. We have crossed the Po at Stradella and Piacenza. We are masters of Orzinovi, Crema, Brescia and Cremona. Melas has lost his line of communication. His parks, his magazines, his hospitals, his couriers, all are taken.

From a letter intercepted this morning at Piacenza we learn that Genoa has capitulated. The garrison has not been made prisoner, so it should have rejoined you when you receive this letter.

Elsnitz reached Ormea yesterday. I imagine you are on his tracks. If General Masséna's corps has joined you, you should be strong. I

am going in pursuit of the enemy, who intends to assemble at Alessandria. It may be that when I arrive he will not be ready and will withdraw towards either Turin or the Genoese Riviera.

It is difficult for me to give you definite instructions since I do not know either your strength or what has happened. But your one aim should be this: to hold in check a force equal to your own.

Once your front reaches Ceva you will have indirect news of the army through the local inhabitants, which will show how you should manoeuvre so as to join it.

BONAPARTE

662

### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*Rear H.Q., Milan*

*19 Prairial, Year VIII (8 June, 1800)*

General Loison has moved from Orzinovi to Brescia. General Laudon, who was in that town, had time only to escape by himself. The Cisalpine Legion, commanded by General Lechi, has seized the flotilla that the enemy had on Lake Maggiore, has crossed the Adda at Lecco, occupied Bergamo and taken fifty prisoners and four guns.

General Murat managed to collect five or six boats on the Po, crossed the river at Noceto and took Piacenza by storm. At dawn on the 19th he surrounded and took prisoner an entire force coming up to occupy the citadel.

General Murat found all the army stores at Piacenza and intercepted a courier of M. de Melas with extremely interesting dispatches. He has taken more than 2,000 prisoners.

The dispatches of General Melas to the court of Vienna report that, at the very moment when General Ott received orders to raise the siege, General Masséna sent an intermediary to capitulate. It appears that he has surrendered Genoa, but that his army has not been made prisoner.

General Elsnitz, who has evacuated Nice, has not been able to retreat by the Tenda Pass. Driven from the Braus Pass by General Suchet, he reached the sources of the Tanaro and was at Ormea on the evening of the 17th. From the intercepted letters of General Melas it seems that Alessandria is poorly provisioned. The speed with which the army has crossed the Sesia, the Ticino and the Po has astonished the Italians and even the enemy. The fighting at the Chiusella and the Ticino, at Stradella and Piacenza have convinced them that this is no toy army or one made up of recruits.

The position of General Melas is extraordinary. The French army is astride the Po, occupying Stradella and the Ticino. Some think that if the next events are unfavourable to him General Melas will take refuge in Genoa.

663

**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Milan**20 Prairial, Year VIII (9 June, 1800)*

Citizen Minister, General Moncey has reached Milan. We had counted on his bringing me two thirds of the number of men shown in the situation report which you sent me. He has not one-third, and half of those composed of units on which we can rely but little.

You will have seen from Melas's letters that, forced by an absolute lack of food, Masséna asked to capitulate on the very day that orders reached General Ott to raise the siege. It appears that General Masséna has 10,000 men under arms; General Suchet has 8,000. If, as I think, these two corps have joined up between Oneglia and Savona, they will quickly be able to enter Piedmont by way of the Tanaro and will be very useful, while the enemy will be obliged to leave troops in Genoa.

Most of the army is now at Stradella. We have a bridge at Piacenza and several ferries opposite Pavia. Orzinovi, Brescia, Cremona are ours. I do not yet see how Melas will extricate himself. Either he will come and attack at Stradella, where he will be beaten and lost, and meanwhile Suchet's corps will reach the sources of the Tanaro: or else he will try to cross the Po, the Sesia and the Ticino and will have no happier result. His position is extraordinary, and, if Genoa could have held out another seventy-two hours, very few of his army would have escaped.

As soon as the coming military events have settled things in this country I shall leave for Paris.

BONAPARTE

664

**To General Berthier***C.-in-C., Reserve Army, at Pavia**Milan**20 Prairial, Year VIII (9 June, 1800)*

You will find enclosed, Citizen General, letters from General Suchet. You will see that, between the capture of Braus and the evacuation of the Vintimiglia line, he has taken 1,500 prisoners.

I see no objection to General Murat remaining at Piacenza today.

I have no news of General Duhesme, nor of Loison; order him to move to Piacenza. He will act as a reserve.

There must be no siege work until there has been a battle. Four guns are nothing unless they have 1,000 rounds apiece, and General Marmont cannot send this without disorganizing his field batteries.

The defence of the Ticino, of the Oglio or the Adda and of the bridge at Piacenza must be thought of. Put General Moncey in charge of all these operations.

L.D.N.—Q

General Lorges with Lechi's 2,000 Cisalpines, one battalion of the 12th Light, two battalions of the 67th and 400 cavalry drawn from the first to arrive from the Rhine should form a mobile column to cover Brescia and Cremona. He should take up position between the Chiese and Orzinovi and move according to circumstances. This column will be successively reinforced as General Moncey's tail arrives.

A second force, composed of the 1,600 Cisalpines who left this morning for Piacenza, one battalion of the 12th Light and one of the 1st will blockade Pizzighettone and the castle of Piacenza. A brigadier will command this force and will hold a quarter of it in reserve at Codogno so as to be able to reinforce either Pizzighettone or Piacenza as may be needed.

A third force, composed of one battalion of the 12th, one of the 1st and one of the 27th will blockade the citadel of Milan.

Finally, one battalion with 200 cavalry will remain on watch on the Ticino from Buffalora to Sesto and will establish communication with General Béthencourt.

It will still remain to guard the part of the Ticino between Pavia and Buffalora. One of the small divisions, Lapoype's or Gardanne's, must advance on the left of the Po, always keeping level with the army, so as to be able to fall back if the enemy crosses the Po and hold the Ticino until the rearguard can come up.

It will be necessary, therefore, to have one division a day's march in rear of the Army, in reserve, and a few boats on the Po, following the movement of the army, to establish the quickest possible communication with the division on the other bank . . .

I shall be at Pavia at 2.0 p.m.; please wait for me there . . .

BONAPARTE

665

## Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*Rear H.Q., Milan*

*20 Prairial, Year VIII (9 June, 1800)*

General Duhesme has occupied Cremona, where he found very considerable stores . . .

An intercepted special dispatch rider coming from Mantua to Turin has given us the situation of the artillery and military hospitals.

General Elsnitz has been badly mauled on his retreat from Nice. On the 13th and 14th General Suchet took 1,500 prisoners off him. General Gorrupp was surrounded, lost all his artillery and retired to Cuneo with few troops.

General Suchet should have joined up in the Albenga area with the army corps which was in Genoa; he therefore has very considerable forces.

Continuous rain is greatly tiring the army. The Po has risen very high, which will somewhat delay operations.

666

### To Citizeness Josephine Bonaparte

*At Paris*

*Milan*

*Undated, presumed 9 June, 1800*

I am at Milan with a bad cold. I cannot stand rain, and I have been out in it for several hours; but it is getting better. I will not ask you to come here; I will be back myself in a month. I hope I shall find you well. I am going to Pavia and Stradella. We are masters of Brescia, Cremona and Piacenza.

A thousand tender things. Murat is doing very well.

BONAPARTE

667

### To Citizen Merlin

*Aide-de-camp to the First Consul*

*Stradella*

*21 Prairial, Year VIII (10 June, 1800)*

Citizen Merlin will go to Pavia, where he will see General Marmont. He will inform himself:

1. As to the eighteen pieces of artillery which should have arrived long before; namely, six for the Boudet division, six for the Guard, six for — He will impress upon him how essential it is that we have these guns in the course of tomorrow, because, if we do not have a battle tomorrow, there will certainly be an engagement at dawn the next day.

2. The two guns that were sent for the Gardanne and Monnier divisions have not arrived; stress the importance of this.

3. Five cannon were captured at the battle of Montebello; they need gunners and horses. Take steps that they can be used the day after tomorrow.

4. 100,000 cartridges were ordered for the advance-guard; they have not arrived. A further 400,000 or 500,000 must be sent to Serraville. 2,000 or 3,000 cannon balls are also needed to ensure supplies in the battle.

It was ordered that the ferry between Casatisma and Corti should be established the same day. It has not been. When will it? The ferry from Sommo to Bastida on the Voghera-Pavia road was also to be reopened; can that be done during tomorrow? There are various detachments of infantry and cavalry at Pavia. Find their condition and arrange for them to rejoin their units in the course of tomorrow. They can all cross by the Casatisma ferry; that is the shorter route and better road.

From there Citizen Merlin will go to see General Lapoype and reconnoitre his position. He will inform him that he may tomorrow receive orders to cross by the Casatisma and Sommo ferries. These ferries must therefore be in order . . .

He will bring precise information as to whether there is any change in the situation around Vercelli and Valenza. He will cross by the Casatisma ferry and will ensure that he returns tomorrow.

BONAPARTE

668

### **Bulletin of the Reserve Army**

*H.Q., Stradella*

*21 Prairial, Year VIII (10 June, 1800)*

Yesterday the First Consul left Milan for Pavia. He stayed there but one hour, mounted his horse and crossed the Po to join the advance-guard, which was already at grips with the enemy.

General Ott had reached Voghera from Genoa in three forced marches with a corps of 15,000 men which was covering that town. He had been reinforced by a force of 4,000 to 5,000 men which General Melas had instructed for the defence of the Po. The advance-guard of this army and that of the French army met towards mid-day. The enemy was occupying the heights in front of Casteggio. Fighting continued throughout the day with the greatest stubbornness.

General Victor threw in the Chambarlhac Division most effectively.

The 96th decided the fate of the still uncertain battle with a bayonet charge. The enemy left 3,000 dead or wounded, 6,000 prisoners and five guns. The rout was complete. The 12th Hussars covered themselves with glory. Our losses were 600 killed and wounded.

It appears that General Melas has evacuated Turin and is concentrating all his forces at Alessandria.

The enemy has been pursued beyond Montebello. General Watrin showed talent and an enthusiasm that greatly encouraged the troops.

The battle of Montebello has brought fear and discouragement to the partisans of Austria. They see that future policy is not to hold Italy but to extricate the Austrian army.

One enemy general has been killed, several wounded.

General Masséna should have joined General Suchet and reached Oneglia on the 16th; he too should soon enter Piedmont.

669

### **To Citizen Petiet**

*Councillor of State, at Milan*

*Broni*

*21 Prairial, Year VIII (10 June, 1800)*

Yesterday we had a splendid action. Without exaggeration, the



enemy had 1,500 killed, twice as many wounded; we took 4,000 prisoners and five guns. It was General Ott's corps, come from Genoa by forced marches. He wanted to reopen communication with Piacenza.

Put 50,000 francs at the disposal of Citizen Gassendi, director of the artillery park. We have a great need of infantry cartridges and artillery ammunition of every calibre.

See General Vignolle about having measures taken to prevent the prisoners who are going to Milan from escaping . . .

Have boots made; we are all nearly barefoot.

BONAPARTE

Since I have no time to send a dispatch to Paris, I beg you to pass our news to the Consuls by special courier.

The First Consul left on horseback after dictating this letter and ordered me to sign it.

BOURRIENNE

670

### To Lieutenant-General Lannes

G.O.C., *Advance-guard, Reserve Army*

*Voghera*

*24 Prairial, Year VIII (13 June, 1800), 5.0 a.m.*

We have had no report from you tonight, Citizen General, which makes me think that there is no news beyond what you wrote yesterday to the First Consul. His intention is that you should attack and overthrow whatever is in front of you. General Victor is moving towards San Giuliano. General Desaix's reserve is in front of Pontecurone.

*By order of the First Consul*

671

### To the Consuls of the Republic

*Torre dei Garoffoli*

*26 Prairial, Year VIII (15 June, 1800)*

The news of the army is very good. I shall soon be in Paris. I cannot tell you more; I am in the deepest sorrow at the death of the man I loved and esteemed the most.

BONAPARTE

672

### Bulletin of the Reserve Army

*H.Q., Torre dei Garoffoli*

*26 Prairial, Year VIII (15 June, 1800)*

After the battle of Montebello, the army was put on the march in

order to cross the Scriva. On the 24th the advance-guard, commanded by General Gardanne, encountered the enemy, who was defending the approaches to the Bormida and his three bridges near Alessandria, drove him back and captured two guns and 100 prisoners.

At the same time General Chabran's division advanced along the Po to a point opposite Valenza to prevent the enemy from crossing that river. Thus M. Melas found himself trapped between the Bormida and the Po. His sole line of retreat to Genoa remaining after the battle of Montebello was cut. The enemy appeared to have no plan and to be very uncertain in his movements.

At dawn on the 25th, resolved to break out, he crossed the Bormida in force by his three bridges, surprised our advance-guard and with great ardour began the battle of Marengo, which has finally decided the fate of both Italy and the Austrian army.

Four times during the battle we were in retreat and four times we advanced. At different points and different times more than sixty guns were taken and retaken. There were more than twelve cavalry charges with varying success.

At 3.0 p.m. 10,000 cavalry\* outflanked our right in this superb plain of San Giuliano. They were supported by a line of cavalry and much artillery. The grenadiers of the Guard were placed like a granite redoubt in the midst of this immense plain; nothing could breach it. Cavalry, infantry, artillery, all were hurled at this battalion; but in vain. Then indeed one saw what a handful of brave men can do.

This stubborn resistance held the left wing of the enemy and supported our right until the arrival of General Monnier, who took the village of Castel-Ceriolo at the point of the bayonet.

The enemy cavalry then made a rapid movement against our left, which was already shaken; this attack precipitated its retreat.

The enemy was advancing along the whole line and firing case-shot from over 100 guns. The roads were strewn with fugitives, wounded and debris. The battle appeared lost. The enemy was allowed to advance to within musket range of the village of San Giuliano where General Desaix's division was drawn up in line of battle with eight light guns in front and two flanking battalions in close column on the wings. All the fugitives rallied behind. Already the enemy was making mistakes which foreshadowed catastrophe; he was over-extending his flanks.

The presence of the First Consul revived the morale of the troops. 'My children,' he addressed them, 'remember it is my custom to camp on the field of battle.'

To cries of 'Long live the Republic! Long live the First Consul!' Desaix attacked the centre at the double. In a moment the enemy was

\* As original text; clearly an error for 'infantry'.

thrown back. General Kellerman, whose brigade of heavy cavalry had throughout the day been covering the retreat of our left, made a charge so vigorous and well-judged that 6,000 grenadiers and General Zach, chief of the general staff, were taken prisoner, and several enemy generals killed.

The whole army followed this movement. The right of the enemy became cut off; disorder and fear began to appear in his ranks.

The Austrian cavalry had moved to the centre in order to cover the retreat. Colonel Bessières, at the head of the grenadiers of the guard, charged valiantly and pierced the line of enemy cavalry. This brought about the complete rout of the army.

We have taken fifteen flags, forty guns and six to eight thousand prisoners. More than 6,000 of the enemy were killed.

The 9th Light Infantry have earned the title 'Incomparable'. The heavy cavalry and 8th Dragoons covered themselves in glory. Our losses have also been heavy: we have lost 600 men killed, 1,500 wounded and 900 prisoners. Generals Champeaux, Mainoni and Boudet are wounded.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Berthier, had his clothes riddled with bullets and several of his aides-de-camp were unhorsed. But a loss which is keenly felt by the army and will be so by the whole Republic closes our heart to joy. Desaix was struck by a bullet at the beginning of the charge of his division; he died instantly. He had time only to say to young Lebrun, who was with him: 'Go tell the First Consul that I die regretting not having done enough to live in posterity.'\*

In the course of his life General Desaix had four horses killed under him and received three wounds. He had joined this headquarters only three days earlier. When, in the midst of the hottest fire, the news of his death was brought to the First Consul, there escaped him but this word: 'Why am I not allowed to weep?' His body has been carried to Milan to be embalmed.

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## Armistice Convention

*Alessandria*

*26 Prairial, Year VIII: 15 June, 1800*

ARTICLE 1. There will be an armistice and suspension of hostilities between the army of His Imperial Majesty and that of the French Republic in Italy until the reply from Vienna.

ART. 2. The army of His Imperial Majesty will occupy all the lands between the Mincio, the Fossa-Maestra and the Po, that is to say

\* These famous words are almost certainly apochryphal; Desaix was shot through the heart and died instantly.

Peschiera, Mantua, Borgo-Forte, and thereafter the left bank of the Po and, on the right bank, the town and citadel of Ferrara.

ART. 3. The army of His Imperial Majesty will also occupy Tuscany and Ancona.

ART. 4. The French Army will occupy the lands lying between the Chiese, the Oglio and the Po.

ART. 5. The area between the Chiese and the Mincio will not be occupied by either army. The army of His Imperial Majesty may draw supplies from the parts of this area which formed part of the duchy of Mantua. The French Army will draw supplies from the lands which formed part of the province of Brescia.

ART. 6. The fortresses of Tortona, Alessandria, Milan, Turin, Pizzeghetton, Arona and Piacenza will be restored to the French Army between 16 and 20 June. . .

ART. 9. The artillery of the fortresses will be divided as follows: 1. All artillery of Austrian foundries or calibres will belong to the Austrian Army. 2. All artillery of Italian, Piedmontese and French foundries or calibres will be restored to the French Army. . .

ART. 10. The garrisons will withdraw with military honours, and will proceed to Mantua, with arms and baggage, by the shortest route.

ART. 11. The Austrian Army will retire to Mantua, via Piacenza, in three columns: The first from 16 to 20 June, the second from 20 to 24 June, the third from 24 to 26 June. . .

ART. 13. No person shall be maltreated on account of services rendered to the Austrian Army or of political opinions. The Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Army will release all persons arrested in the Cisalpine Republic for their political opinions and still remaining in the fortresses under his command.

ART. 14. Whatever the reply of the Court of Vienna, neither of the two armies shall attack the other without ten days' advance warning.

ART. 15. During the suspension of hostilities neither army shall send any detachment to Germany.

ALEX. BERTHIER. MELAS.

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## To the Consuls of the Republic

*Torre dei Garoffoli*

*27 Prairial, Year VIII (16 June, 1800)*

Citizen Consuls, on the day following the battle of Marengo, General Melas asked at our outposts to send General Skal to me, and the attached convention was agreed during the day and signed that night by General Berthier and General Melas. I hope the French people will be pleased with their army. I shall be at Milan tonight.

BONAPARTE

675

**To General Moreau***C.-in-C., Army of the Rhine**Milan**28 Prairial, Year VIII (17 June, 1800)*

The fate of Italy, Citizen General, has just been decided by two pretty serious battles, one at Montebello, near Casteggio, the other between Marengo and San-Guiliano. Desaix, who had just arrived, was killed at the second. His family and the Republic have suffered a great loss; but ours is greater still.

After that battle M. Melas found himself surrounded on every side, and he has signed the convention which you will find attached.

Here, as with your army, the weather is bad, which tires us greatly. I have reached Milan and am rather tired.

BONAPARTE

As soon as most of the fortresses are in our hands, I will let it be known to the court of Vienna that the expression *until the reply from Vienna* in the first article can extend to fifteen days only. The army needs this time to organize its artillery.

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**Order***Milan**28 Prairial, Year VIII (17 June, 1800)*

Bonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, orders:-

ARTICLE 1. In consequence of the Convention of 27 Prairial, General Masséna will take all necessary measures to occupy the fortresses of Ceva, Cuneo, Savona and the city of Genoa.

ART. 2. General Turreau will occupy Turin.

ART. 3. General Berthier will undertake the occupation of Milan, Arona, Pizzeghetone, Alessandria and Tortona.

BONAPARTE

677

**Bulletin of the Reserve Army***H.Q., Milan**28 Prairial, Year VIII (17 June, 1800)*

The gunners of the Consular Guard cover themselves with glory in every action. At the battle of Montebello, with the snipers and three guns, they were always within twenty paces of the enemy. 2nd Lieutenant Marin, of that company, distinguished himself outstandingly.

At the battle of Marengo M. Melas had two horses killed under him and his arm was crushed. General Saint-Julien, with four or five other generals was taken prisoner, but they had time to escape while our soldiers were seizing the guns.

Several Hungarian and German grenadier prisoners, who had been taken prisoner in the campaigns of the years IV and V, recognized the First Consul when passing near him. With a kind of satisfaction many of them began to shout: *Long live Bonaparte!*

When he was returning and saw that inevitable aftermath of a great battle, a large number of wounded soldiers in distress and privation, the First Consul said: 'When one sees all these brave fellows suffering one's only regret is not to be wounded too, so as to share their pain.'

The Austrian generals, officers and soldiers are angry with Thugut. They respect the good intentions of their Emperor and seem convinced that we are fighting only to raise the price of English coffee and sugar. A distinguished Austrian general said at headquarters: 'We shall have no peace and happiness on the continent until we all, with one accord, drive out that venal and mercantile nation, which reckons to increase its commerce at the expense of our blood.' They all seem certain that, if we do not have peace, it is the fault of England and its ministry. . . .

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## Bulletin of the Reserve Army

H.Q., Milan

29 Prairial, Year VIII (18 June, 1800)

General Rivaud was wounded at the battle of Marengo while defending that village, where he held out with great courage for several hours.

General Desaix had brought from Egypt two little negroes given him by the king of Darfur and these children are wearing mourning for the death of their master in a most touching way and in the manner of their country.

The First Consul has taken for himself the two aides-de-camp of General Desaix, Savary and Rapp. The general's body has been taken by coach to Milan, where it has been embalmed. It is not yet known whether the First Consul will send it to Paris or will place it in a monument to be erected on the Saint-Bernard to commemorate the crossing of the Reserve Army.

General Desaix is the first European to carry the glory of the French name beyond the Cataracts. He was adored by the people of Upper Egypt, who called him *The Just Sultan*. He had a lively resentment of the ill-treatment he had received from Lord Keith who had loaded him with insults in a way unworthy of a European nation.

General Desaix had left Alexandria on a Ragusan ship. He had passports from the Grand Vizir and from the English commander before Alexandria, who, further to ensure his passage, had placed an English officer on board with him. Contrary to the law of nations he was arrested by Admiral Keith and taken to Leghorn. In vain did he show

his passports, and the English officer protested against such signal bad faith. Once in the harbour of Leghorn, the ship was unrigged, and its rudder removed, putting it in danger of foundering.

General Desaix was put in a kind of prison in the quarantine station. Admiral Keith was so base as to add insult to his violation of the law of nations; he suggested paying twenty sous a day, to him and to each of the French soldier prisoners, adding, with heavy sarcasm, that the equality proclaimed in France demanded that he should be no better treated than they.

Consequently, he was put in the same courtyard as the soldiers, and his every request was refused, even to the newspapers and a few military books. 'I ask nothing of you,' replied Desaix, 'except that you relieve me of your presence. If you will, have straw given to the wounded who are with me. I have dealt with Mamelukes, Turks, Anatolians and the Arabs of the desert, with Ethiopians, Tartars and the blacks of Darfur; all, once they had given their word, kept it, and did not insult men in misfortune.' M. Keith did more: he went so far as to persuade the master of the ship to say that it belonged to General Desaix, promising him 1,000 guineas reward and hoping thereby to set up a prize claim against General Desaix. The good Genoese master objected throughout. 'Very well, Admiral,' wrote Desaix, 'take the ship, take my baggage; we care not for the interest.' This Admiral Keith is the man who so often made a fool of himself before Genoa through drinking too much punch.

The French nation does well to be victorious. If it were to suffer reverses, there is no excess its enemies would not commit. But, thanks to the number and the courage of its soldiers, it will triumph over them all, and opprobrium and the contempt of civilized nations will be the lot of men who behave like Lord Keith. That admiral went through the farce of forging a supposedly intercepted letter from the First Consul to General Masséna, which was full of absurdities and of a piece with the libels of every kind against our chief magistrate being printed by the court of London.

But whatever the court of London may do, there will be no civil war in France. Belgium will form part of the territory of the great nation. Holland and Spain, united by interest as by opinion, will redouble their efforts against the tyrants of the seas . . . Through its arrogance, venality and corruption England will come to be hated and despised by French, Austrians and Russians alike.

This morning the First Consul attended the *Te Deum* sung in the cathedral of Milan in honour of the deliverance of the Republic and the glory of French arms. He was received at the door by all the clergy and conducted into the choir to a specially prepared dais, on which the consuls and first magistrates of the Empire of the West used to be

received. The music of the *Te Deum* was by the best composers of Italy. The ceremony was imposing and superb. This respect for the altar is a memorable event which will have an effect on the peoples of Italy and make more friends for the Republic. . . .

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**Order of the Day***Reserve Army**H.Q., Milan**5 Messidor, Year VIII (24 June, 1800)*

On leaving the army, the First Consul wishes to congratulate it on the victories it has won.

The day of Marengo will be famous in history. Thirteen fortified towns, containing a thousand heavy guns, are in our hands, and we are in a position to conclude a solid peace or, if the blindness of our enemies prevents it, to start a brilliant and decisive campaign for the peace of Europe and the glory of the nation. The First Consul urges generals and unit commanders to lose no time in reorganizing so as to be able to take the field, if necessary, before our enemies.

BONAPARTE

680

**Decree***Presumed Mont-Cenis**8 Messidor, Year VIII (27 June, 1800)*

The Consuls of the Republic decree:

ARTICLE 1. The body of General Desaix will be carried to the convent of the Great Saint-Bernard where a tomb will be erected.

ART. 2. The numbers of the demi-brigades, the regiments of cavalry and artillery and of the generals and colonels will be engraved on a marble tablet opposite the monument.

ART. 3. The Ministers of the Interior and of War, in so far as each is concerned, are charged with the execution of this decree.

BONAPARTE

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**To Citizen Lucien Bonaparte***Minister of the Interior**Lyons**10 Messidor, Year VIII (29 June, 1800)*

I have your letter, Citizen Minister. I shall arrive at Paris unexpectedly. My intention is to have neither triumphal arches nor any kind of ceremony. I have too good an opinion of myself to set much store by such trumpery. I know no triumph other than public esteem.

BONAPARTE



*Lunéville and Amiens*



**'Madame Mère'**

Letizia Bonaparte, from an engraving in the Bibliothèque Nationale  
after the portrait by Gérard.

AS SOON AS HE HAD GRANTED MELAS AN ARMISTICE BONAPARTE again wrote to the Emperor, proposing peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio (No. 682). This approach was undoubtedly sincere, for he was anxious to return to the tasks awaiting him in France; at the same time, he was determined that the settlement should be on his own terms. The upshot was to be nearly two years of hard bargaining, punctuated by military operations and culminating in a short-lived general peace. In the process, Bonaparte was to put out some interesting diplomatic proposals—for agreed disarmament (No. 704) and treaties guaranteeing the small states (No. 682)—which had little immediate effect.

By their treaty with England the Austrians were bound not to make a separate peace before 1 February, 1801, and Thugut, the advocate of war, was still in power in Vienna; yet they were incapable of successful military operations. Five days after the battle of Marengo Moreau defeated Kray at Hochstadt and during the following weeks he besieged Ulm and Ingolstadt, occupied Munich and on 15 July signed the armistice of Parsdorf. In these circumstances the Austrians sought to gain time, and their first step was to send Saint-Julien to Paris for discussions. He had no power to negotiate, but Bonaparte and Talleyrand cajoled him into signing what purported to be preliminaries of peace, and when these were rejected in Vienna they were able to demand harsher armistice terms (Nos. 684-5, 687-9).

Meanwhile Bonaparte was negotiating with Russia, Prussia and, later, Turkey in order both to come to terms with these powers and to isolate England and Austria (Nos. 686, 699). He also supported the formation of the second Armed Neutrality (No. 698), which arose out of Russian and Scandinavian differences with England but was soon disrupted by the murder of Paul I in March and the Battle of Copenhagen in April, 1801.

In October, 1800, discussions between Joseph Bonaparte and Cobenzl began at Lunéville, the Austrians seeking to have England admitted to the Conference, the French refusing this except on condition of an unattainable naval truce. In November Bonaparte lost patience, and denounced the armistice. On 2 December Moreau utterly crushed the Archduke Charles at Hohenlinden and advanced to within sixty miles of Vienna before signing the armistice of Steyr on the 25th (No. 700); in Italy Brune and Macdonald threw Bellegarde back behind the Tagliamento and signed the armistice of Treviso on 15 January. A secondary effect of this campaign resulted from Murat's incursion into Naples, which led in March to the treaty of Florence whereby the French occupied Taranto.

Powerless and nearly free of its obligation to England, the Austrian government now agreed to a separate peace, and after a few days of


negotiation the treaty of Lunéville was signed on 9 February, 1801. It granted Bonaparte all his demands, which had latterly been increased by the substitution of the Adige for the Mincio as the eastern frontier of the Italian Republic (Nos. 702-3).

England alone was now actively at war with France; but even there opinion was tending towards peace. Addington succeeded Pitt at the time of Lunéville, and almost at once the new ministry made approaches through Otto, the French commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. For a time Bonaparte held back, partly because he still hoped to secure his Egyptian colony, partly because he wished by a Franco-Spanish conquest of Portugal to gain a bargaining counter to ensure the return to France and her allies of their overseas possessions (Nos. 705, 707-9). But by May serious negotiations were in train and, after very hard bargaining, preliminaries were signed in London on 1 October. After further protracted negotiations at the conference the treaty of Amiens was signed on 25 March, 1802.


By the terms of the treaty England retained Ceylon and Trinidad, but returned all the other colonies; Egypt was restored to Turkey, Malta to the Order of St. John; the English were to evacuate the island within three months, during which time the French were to evacuate Taranto and the Papal States; the English gave up Elba which, with the neighbouring mainland areas, became French; the independence of the Ionian islands was recognized. Other clauses dealt with the return of prisoners of war, indemnities and various minor points. A significant omission was any reference to trade, with the result that English goods continued to be virtually excluded by France and her allies.

The diplomatic settlement was completed later in the year when France signed treaties with Prussia, Bavaria, Turkey and Russia. Yet none of the great powers was satisfied with the result. Alexander of Russia disliked much of it and was personally jealous of Bonaparte; Austria was humiliated and revengeful; in England, where the preliminaries had been greeted with joy, the final treaty was generally disapproved, and even Addington when speaking to it in the House of Commons plainly looked forward to a renewal of war. Bonaparte, too, though momentarily satisfied, was under no illusions; even setting aside the element of personal ambition, it is clear—and it was clear to him—that the policies he was to pursue would soon bring a rupture.\* It was in fact inherent in its nature that the general peace of 1802 could be no more than a truce.

\* At Ste. Helena he was to maintain that he had really hoped and believed that the peace of 1802 would be permanent. His words at the time were very different: 'I will keep the peace as long as my neighbours keep it; but . . . in the present situation every treaty of peace means no more than a brief armistice; I believe it is my destiny to be fighting almost continuously.'



CENTRAL EUROPE  
In 1792



CENTRAL EUROPE  
After the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens

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**To H.M. the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia***Marengo**27 Prairial, Year VIII (16 June, 1800)*

I have the honour to write informing Your Majesty of the desire of the French people to stop the war which is ravaging our countries.

English cunning prevented my simple and frank approach from having the effect it should naturally have had on Your Majesty's heart.

We have had war. Thousands of Frenchmen and Austrians are no more. Thousands of desolate homes cry out for their fathers, their husbands, their sons. But the evil that has been done cannot be undone; let us at least learn from it and avoid that which would ensue from a continuation of hostilities! This prospect so afflicts my heart that I am not letting the ineffectiveness of my first approach discourage me, but am again taking the step of writing to urge Your Majesty to put an end to the ills of the continent.

It is from the battlefield of Marengo, in the midst of suffering and surrounded by 15,000 corpses, that I implore Your Majesty to listen to the cry of humanity and to spare a whole generation of two brave and powerful nations from massacring each other for interests that are not their own. It is for me to urge Your Majesty, for I am the closer to the theatre of war. My heart is the more affected.

Your Majesty has military glory enough and rules over a great many states. So what arguments have those in Your Majesty's cabinet who want war to continue?

The interests of religion and the Church?

Why do they not advise Your Majesty to make war on the English or the Muscovites? They are further from the Church than we.

The form of government in France, which is elective, not hereditary?

But the government of the Empire is also elective; and besides, Your Majesty knows that the whole world could not change the will of the French people to govern itself as it pleases. Why do they not advise Your Majesty to demand the suppression of Parliament by the King of England or of their Congress by the United States?

The interests of the German States?

But Your Majesty has ceded us Mainz, which several campaigns had not put in our power and which was in a position to withstand several months of siege; and the German States are crying out for peace, which alone can save them from total ruin; most of them, even those of the sole instigator of the war, the King of England, are at peace with the French Republic.

An increase of territory for Your Majesty in Italy?

But the treaty of Campo Formio has given to Your Majesty what has been the constant ambition of Your Majesty's ancestors.

The equilibrium of Europe?

The last campaign shows well enough that the equilibrium of Europe is not threatened by France, while events are proving daily that it is so by England, which has acquired such a stranglehold over world trade and sea power that today she can, alone, resist the combined fleets of the Russians, Danes, Swedes, French, Spanish and Dutch. But Your Majesty, who now has a great trade, is interested in the independence and freedom of the seas.

The destruction of revolutionary principles?

If Your Majesty will consider the effects of war, it will be clear that they are to revolutionize Europe by increasing everywhere the public debt and the discontent of the people.

If the French nation is forced to make war, it will be forced to think only of war and to live only for war, and the French legions are brave and numerous. If Your Majesty desires peace, it is made; let us both carry out the treaty of Campo Formio and, by an addition to it, increase the guarantees for the small states which appear to have been the principal cause of the outbreak of war.

Let us give peace and quiet to the present generation. If future generations are so foolish as to fight, well then, after a few years of war they will learn to be wise and to live in peace.

I could have taken the whole of Your Majesty's army prisoner. I was content with an armistice in the hope that it would be a first step towards the peace of the world, which I have the more at heart since, being reared and nourished by war, I might be thought to know more of the ills it brings with it. But Your Majesty will realize that if the present armistice does not lead to peace, it is pointless and contrary to the interests of my nation.

Thus, I think I should propose to Your Majesty:

1. That the armistice should apply to all the armies.
2. That, secretly or openly, as Your Majesty may please, negotiators be sent by either side to some place between the Mincio and the Chiese to draw up a system of guarantee for the small powers and to interpret those articles of the treaty of Campo Formio which experience has shown to need it.

If Your Majesty refuses these proposals, war will start again; and let me say frankly that in that case Your Majesty would be solely responsible in the eyes of the world.

I beg Your Majesty to read this letter in the same spirit as I have written it, and to believe that after the well-being and interests of the French people nothing interests me so much as the prosperity of that warrior nation whose courage and military virtues I have admired for eight years.

BONAPARTE



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**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Paris**15 Messidor, Year VIII (4 July, 1800)*

The First Consul has only glanced at the *Letters to a Deputy to the German Diet*, but he sees no harm in having them printed as a pamphlet. Care must be taken to use German paper and German type. They will be dated from Frankfurt.

I also wish you to have a caricature drawn showing the Minister Thugut between the Doge of Venice and a Cisalpine Director. The point to be made is that he robs the one under the terms of the treaty of Campo Formio and imprisons the other because he does not recognize that treaty.

BONAPARTE

684

**To H.M. the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia\****Paris**10 Thermidor, Year VIII (29 July, 1800)*

I have received the letter Your Majesty sent to me by Count Saint-Julien. I hope that the preliminaries of peace which he is carrying will soon be followed by the definitive treaty. Our two nations, the most powerful on the continent, are alike tired of war. Their wish will lead them, I hope, to a long repose in the happiness of peace.

It will not be due to me if all difficulties are not promptly smoothed over, all that is reasonable promptly carried out, and all clouds that may arise later promptly dissipated.

As a result of Your Majesty's action in sending Count Saint-Julien to Paris the preliminaries are signed even before Europe suspects that we are talking. Your Majesty will surely think it desirable that the final peace should be signed before Europe knows we have negotiated. . . .

The questions posed by the peace are no longer new, as they were at the negotiations of Campo Formio. Today, the definitive treaty can be drawn up in less time than the preliminaries have taken; and that will save both states a great deal of worry and money.

As for England, with which Your Majesty was led by the circumstances of war to make alliance, as soon as peace is made with Your Majesty, France wishes to make peace with England also. Your Majesty can act towards England as seems fit in view of this declaration.

Citizen Duroc, my aide-de-camp, who brings this letter, will inform Your Majesty verbally of my esteem and most particular consideration.

BONAPARTE

\* This letter was not sent.

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**To Citizen Carnot***Minister of War**Paris**14 Thermidor, Year VIII (2 Aug, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, write to Generals Moreau, Masséna, Augereau and Brune that the Count Saint-Julien has come to assure the French Government of the sincerity of the peaceful intentions of the cabinet at Vienna. He carried proposals. After several conferences agreement seemed to be reached, and we should receive the reply on 15 August. If it is for peace, negotiations to conclude the definitive peace will begin. If it is for war, the generals must be ready to start hostilities at once. Instruct them to keep this information secret.

BONAPARTE

686

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Paris**16 Thermidor, Year VIII (4 Aug, 1800)*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs will write a friendly letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the King of Prussia; it will say:

That the First Consul has been extremely flattered and recognizes the concern of H.M. the King of Prussia for the re-establishment of peace, to which the French people attach great price;

That particular respect for the personal qualities of H.M. the King of Prussia had caused him to wish for his intervention at the beginning of the winter; but that H.M. had thought he should first make peace between the French Republic and the Emperor of Russia;

That, while that negotiation met with unexpected delays, the campaigning season meanwhile intervened, English intrigues were successful at the court of Vienna, and war became the sole means of bringing about peace;

That a general armistice seemed necessary to the two belligerent powers to enable them to reach agreement: the First Consul regards this as a probable herald of peace; and if, in the present situation, the intervention of H.M. the King of Prussia does not become essential for peace with the Emperor, it remains very precious to the First Consul for peace with Russia and the Empire. . . .

That in order to help as much as possible the intervention of H.M. the King of Prussia with the Emperor of Russia the First Consul has informed him by a special messenger of the return of all the Russian prisoners as a mark of respect for these brave troops and of his desire to do something agreeable to His Imperial Majesty;

That the First Consul desires general peace because war is now pointless and barren for France as for the other belligerent powers;

That the known will of a prince who combines so much power with so loyal a character can only speed the result so much desired by the whole of Europe and above all by the belligerent peoples.

BONAPARTE

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### To Citizen Carnot

*Minister of War*

*Paris*

*3 Fructidor, Year VIII (21 Aug, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, dispatch three special couriers before midnight, one for General Moreau, one for General Brune and one for General Augereau, to warn them that hostilities will re-commence during the first decade of September: each of these generals must inform the generals opposing them that, since His Imperial Majesty has not ratified the preliminaries of peace signed in Paris on 9 Thermidor between the French Government and M. de Saint-Julien, hostilities will re-commence between 5 and 10 September. Inform them that you are sending them this message so that they may have as much time as possible to make their preparations.

BONAPARTE

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### To General Bernadotte

*C.-in-C., Army of the West*

*Paris*

*27 Fructidor, Year VIII (14 Sept, 1800)*

The First Consul requires me, Citizen General, to send you several copies of the official journal in which appear the preliminary articles of peace agreed and signed at Paris between the Government and the Count Saint-Julien, representing the Emperor. It is his intention that the whole army should know these articles so that it may see this new proof of the generous moderation of the Government of the French Republic and the proud obstinacy of its enemies, and so that its indignation may give renewed energy to all the efforts which bring its victories, its renown and its courage, and ensure that the evils of war fall upon those who have refused peace.

*By order of the First Consul*

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### To the Prefects of Departments

*Paris*

*1 Vendémiaire, Year IX (23 Sept, 1800)*

The preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris on 9 Thermidor by Citizen Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Count Saint-Julien, and were ratified by the Consuls twenty-four hours later.

Citizen Duroc was instructed to carry them to Vienna. Intrigues by the enemies of peace, who seem still to enjoy some credit there, led the Emperor to refuse to ratify them. The refusal was based on a note from the King of England, who demanded that his envoys should be admitted to the Congress conjointly with those of the Emperor.

Thereupon the Government was forced to break the armistice so as not to lose the rest of the autumn in vain discussions.

General Moreau was ordered to transmit the preliminaries as printed in the official journal to the enemy commander and to inform him that if they were not ratified within twenty-four hours, or, should H.M. the Emperor require further explanations, the three fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt and Philippsburg must be delivered to the French army, otherwise hostilities would re-open.

The Government has also informed the King of England that it sees no objection to the admission of his envoys to the Congress of Lunéville if he will agree to a naval truce offering France the same advantages as a continuation of the continental truce offers to the Emperor.

The Government has just received by telegraph the news that 'H.M. the Emperor has himself joined his army on the Inn and has agreed to deliver the three fortresses, which are now occupied by the troops of the Republic; also that M. von Lehrbach, holding the necessary powers from H.M. the Emperor, is at the headquarters at Alt-Oetting with orders to proceed to Lunéville.'

The difficulties necessarily presented by the drafting of a naval truce will bring some further delay; but should the two Governments fail to agree the conditions of such a truce, then France and the Emperor will negotiate alone for a separate peace on the basis of the preliminaries; and should the English party still succeed in influencing the Viennese ministers, which is not to be expected, then the troops of the Republic will fear neither snow nor the rigour of the season, but will fight to the uttermost during the winter, giving the enemy no time to form new armies.

Thus the principles of the Government are: extreme moderation as to the conditions, but a firm resolution to pacify the continent promptly. The most vigorous steps have been taken to carry out the will of the French people in this important aim. That is the whole secret of the policy of its Government.

BONAPARTE

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**To Citizen Talleyrand**

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*8 Vendémiaire, Year IX (30 Sept., 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, send a special courier to Spain to inform

Citizen Alquier of all the negotiations that have been held with England and of the little hope left of a naval truce. You will tell Citizen Alquier that it is necessary that Spanish troops master Portugal before 15 October. That is the only way to obtain an equivalent for Malta, Mahon and Trinidad. Besides, the danger to Portugal will be felt in England and help bring about a pacific outlook.

BONAPARTE

691

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Lunéville*

*Paris*

*28 Vendémiaire, Year IX (20 Oct, 1800)*

Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate the re-establishment of peace between the French Republic and H.M. the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, should know that it is the intention of the First Consul that, like the negotiations which are about to open, the instructions to be given him will be divided into stages.

Consequently, since the first question is to know whether negotiations are to be general amongst the belligerent powers or whether they will first open privately between France and Austria, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte must be warned that General Clarke has already been instructed to make suggestions on this point to the Austrian minister, Count Cobenzl, and to obtain from him clarifications which he will at once communicate to the plenipotentiary of the Republic.

In his first conversations with M. Cobenzl the French plenipotentiary will, therefore, aim to impress upon him all the advantages of separate negotiations; to this end he will not hesitate to point out how far the intervention of England may complicate and prolong them.

He will try to discover why His Imperial Majesty refused to ratify preliminaries whose moderation is today the surprise of Europe.

He will point out that after this refusal the Emperor should at least explain the reasons for it and put forward, in counter-proposals, his own views on the peace, since he does not accept those of the Republic.

Citizen Joseph Bonaparte will next insist on the ever present necessity of agreeing the heads of negotiation before commencing discussion of the articles of a definitive treaty.

In this respect he will let it be known that the views of the French Government have not ceased to be those put forward during the preliminaries; that consequently it wishes to retain within the Republic the territories defined in that convention, namely maritime Flanders, the Belgian provinces, those situated on the left of the Rhine between the point where it leaves Swiss and enters Dutch territory, and equally Savoy, the county of Nice, the bishopric of Basle and in general all that

has been legislatively united with the territory of France; but that it still recognizes that His Imperial Majesty must obtain in Italy indemnity for the loss sustained through these cessions made to the Republic; also that, while on this matter the Austrian plenipotentiary ought to explain the views of his Government and put them forward for discussion, he can at first confine himself to stipulating, as a basis, what will later be developed as an article of the definitive treaty. . . .

But if Count Cobenzl refuses to enter into preliminary discussions separately from Great Britain, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte will inform the Government and will receive the necessary instructions as to the course he should follow.

In general, he will take care to say nothing, either verbally or in writing, beyond what he has been advised and he will follow the instructions issued to him from time to time, so that the negotiations can never stray from the policy of the Government and the point where it wishes them to lead.

BONAPARTE

692

### To Citizen Cretet

*Councillor of State, Director General of Communications*

*Paris*

*6 Brumaire, Year IX (28 Oct, 1800)*

I regret to see, Citizen Minister, that there is no communication with Lunéville by telegraph. Please send a signaller and everything necessary to set up a telegraph station.

BONAPARTE

693

### To Citizen Lacuée

*Councillor of State, acting Minister of War*

*Paris*

*14 Brumaire, Year IX (5 Nov, 1800)*

Instruct the four Commanders-in-Chief, Citizen Minister, that they are to inform the enemy commanders that hostilities will begin on 1 Frimaire and to prepare accordingly.

At the same time you will tell them, for their personal information, that Count Cobenzl, who is now at Lunéville with the French plenipotentiary, has powers which do not appear to authorize him to sign a separate peace with France, the court of Vienna apparently not having abandoned its plan of having England take part in the negotiations at Lunéville, which would make them interminable. Negotiations are still continuing at Lunéville, but unless there is agreement within a fortnight the French Government will have received proof of the bad faith of Austria and will be able to convince Europe of it.

BONAPARTE

694

**To H.M. the King of Spain***Paris**17 Brumaire, Year IX (8 Nov, 1800)*

The position in Europe being as it is, I have thought it necessary to send my brother, Citizen Lucien Bonaparte, specially to represent to Your Majesty the advantage to be gained by the allies through the conquest of Portugal.

Malta and Mahon have fallen into the power of our enemies. Louisiana is threatened.

The greatest damage we could today inflict on English trade would be to occupy Portugal. That conquest would also recompense Spain for the losses and expenditure she has sustained during the war and would make the reign of Your Majesty forever illustrious. If the assistance of some French engineers and artillery is thought necessary, Your Majesty knows with what speed I will set about providing them.

The intervention of England is the sole obstacle still hindering the peace of the continent. But all the continental peoples are crying out for peace and even the English are constantly showing a desire for peace which in the end will influence His Britannic Majesty. Your Majesty's war with Portugal will increase still further the public discontent in England and will show that ambitious nation that Castilian glory has taken on renewed vigour under Your Majesty's reign and that, if the English attacked Cadiz at a time when that city would have been respected by the fiercest of nations, Your Majesty has not allowed that treacherous and inhuman act to go unpunished.

I beg Your Majesty to believe the consideration, etc.

BONAPARTE

695

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte***Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Lunéville**Paris**21 Brumaire, Year IX (12 Nov, 1800)*

I have received your letter of 18 Brumaire, Citizen. You can correspond with the Minister of Foreign Affairs without restraint.

The Minister has shown me the notes concerning the exchange of powers. Your note does not treat the question well enough; matters of this importance need to be fully developed, and nothing in your presentation of the matter justifies the renewal of hostilities.

Nor do I find the information you give me about the letter from Lord Grenville sufficiently detailed. You must know that confidence is a part of diplomacy and that M. Cobenzl, who took up the career of politics in his youth, only says what he wants one to know.

BONAPARTE

696

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

9 Frimaire, Year IX (30 Nov, 1800)

Reply to the French plenipotentiary:

That the armistice can be made only through the cession of the fortresses and that it would be painful to see us fighting, since according to the note they have already been ceded;

That, if they persist in refusing the armistice, we fear that French troops may be forced to enter Venice, which might alter the basis of the negotiations;

That it is therefore important that the armistice ceding these fortresses should be signed;

That the Government will no longer consent to the Grand Duke of Tuscany obtaining an indemnity on the right bank of the Adige; and, at the same time, that the restitution of his duchy would give him a precarious possession with few advantages; that the Republic wishes indemnities for the Grand Duke to be found in Germany, which will be the better since our arrangements with Russia lead us to use our influence to obtain indemnities in Germany for the Prince of Orange. . . .

That in that case Tuscany would be given to a prince of the house of Parma;

But that the Austrian dispositions have inspired distrust in the Republic, which sees no guarantee other than the whole of the right bank of the Adige and part of the Apennines, so that it can renew the war advantageously if the Emperor or the King of Naples allow themselves to be influenced by the English.

The French Minister Plenipotentiary will demand the release of Moscati and Caprara in execution of the convention of Marengo. He will let it be known, without inserting it in the protocol, that M. Cobenzl should write to Vienna that the King of Naples must set free all Frenchmen imprisoned in Sicily while returning from the Army of Egypt.

BONAPARTE

697

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte***Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Lunéville*

Paris

12 Frimaire, Year IX (3 Dec, 1800)

Lucien has reached Spain. . . .

It will be convenient for the Minister if the official dispatches are addressed to him and handed to him directly by the courier. That does not prevent you from writing me a note whenever that is worth while.

Moreau writes to me that the Austrians have requested passports for



two couriers for Cobenzl; so it is probable that by now they have reached him. I am waiting for their news before deciding to leave.

It would perhaps be useful to say in conversation that once I have left Paris and begun military operations we shall probably not agree to give indemnities in Italy to the house of Austria. You should also say that once I am in Italy negotiations would naturally move to wherever I may be.

As for the English, they have themselves spoiled everything. Therefore we can no longer admit them to Lunéville, since we too have undertakings to fulfil, and we will negotiate only when they have recognized the freedom of the seas.

. . . If I leave, the house of Austria will have reason to remember it. I must know, therefore, when your courier returns, if all hope is lost, as one would think from Pitt's speech in Parliament.

BONAPARTE

698

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*16 Frimaire, Year IX (7 Dec, 1800)*

Please, Citizen Minister, let me have tomorrow a draft note to be communicated to all the ministers here of friendly and allied powers. The note will say:

The French Government has it much at heart to oppose the invasion of the seas and to act with the other neutral powers to make their flags respected; appreciates the truly patriotic zeal of the Emperor of Russia for the common cause of all the continental powers; and will not treat for peace with England until these sacred principles are recognized, the Russian, Danish, Swedish, American, Prussian flags are respected at sea as their arms are on the continent, and England recognizes that the sea belongs to all nations.

BONAPARTE

699

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*25 Frimaire, Year IX (16 Dec, 1800)*

I believe, Citizen Minister, that a letter written to the Sultran and sent by the Ottoman ambassador in Paris would be useful at the present moment. It should inform him, in a suitable manner, of the European situation; that only the English opposed the evacuation of Egypt; that we will evacuate it only when general peace has been signed, and that it is to the interest of the Porte to renew its contacts with France.

BONAPARTE

700

**To the Legislative Corps\****Paris**12 Nivôse, Year IX (2 Jan, 1801)*

Legislators, the Republic triumphs and its enemies beg for mercy.

The victory of Hohenlinden has resounded throughout Europe; history will rate it as one of the finest days of French valour; but our defenders hardly boast of it, for they reckon to have conquered only when the nation has no further enemies.

The Army of the Rhine crossed the Inn; each day was a battle, each battle was a triumph. The Franco-Dutch Army was victorious at Bamberg; the Army of the Grisons crossed the Splügen over ice and snow to turn the formidable lines of the Mincio and the Adige. The Army of Italy crossed the Mincio in strength and is blockading Mantua. Moreau is no more than five days' march from Vienna, master of an immense territory and of all the enemy's magazines.

At that point Prince Charles requested and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine granted the armistice whose terms will be laid before you.

Count Cobenzl, the Emperor's plenipotentiary at Lunéville, in a note dated 31 December, has declared that he is ready to open negotiations for a separate peace. Thus Austria is freed from the influence of the English Government.

Faithful to its principles and to the will of humanity, the Government lays its intentions before you and proclaims them to France and to the whole of Europe.

The frontier of the French Republic will be the left bank of the Rhine; it has no claims on the right bank. It is against the interests of Europe that the Emperor should cross the Adige. The independence of the Swiss and Dutch Republics will be assured and recognized. Our victories add nothing to French claims. Austria must not expect to gain from defeat what she could not have gained from victory.

Such are the unalterable intentions of the Government. The happiness of France will be to restore peace to Germany and Italy; her glory to free the continent from the evil and greedy genius of England. If good faith is again betrayed, we will go to Prague, Vienna, Venice.

The devotion and successes of our armies call for all the thanks of the nation. The Government would like to find new means of commemorating their exploits; but there is one which, by its simplicity, will always be worthy of the thoughts and courage of the French soldier. The Government proposes to you the four attached draft laws.

**BONAPARTE**

\* Similar messages to the Tribune and the Senate. The bills submitted proclaimed that the four armies concerned had deserved well of the nation.

701

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte***Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Lunéville**Paris**1 Pluviôse, Year IX (21 Jan, 1801)*

You should have received the instructions which left Paris on 29 Nivôse, Citizen Minister.

Yesterday a courier arrived from Russia, who had done the journey in fifteen days; he brought me a very friendly letter from the Emperor's own hand. . . . In four or five days I expect a Russian plenipotentiary.

The Russian attitude is very hostile towards England. You will easily see that we must not be over-hasty, for peace with the Emperor is nothing compared with an alliance that would master England and keep Egypt for us.

The armistice in Italy is not yet signed; you must protest at that constantly. If Austria is in good faith in giving up the right bank of the Adige, why does she not make an armistice ceding the fortresses on that bank?

Tuscany is to the right of the Adige; so the House of Austria is presumed to have renounced it.

France must adopt as a first political principle that the Emperor must never cross the Adige. If events demand that the Grand Duke be restored, at least we will not consent while our war with England lasts: for, as long as we are at war with England, we must always distrust Austria and always have a strong army in Italy; the port of Leghorn and the Tuscan coast must be withheld from the English and that can be done only by occupation of the country.

You must never discuss Naples or the Pope. Whenever they are mentioned, you will reply: Do you hold powers from those princes? France will make terms with them.

Whenever they speak of the King of Sardinia, you will simply say that, if it was we who deposed the King of Sardinia, the Emperor should have re-established him in his states, if he was fighting on his behalf; that in any case we will negotiate with the King of Sardinia and will set up in Italy a system such that he cannot cause alarm to neighbouring states.

As to the stipulations Cobenzl may make for the Empire, we must agree to nothing; we will act according to circumstances and the men who rule at Vienna; we have no confidence in Thugut, and can make no agreement with the Emperor so long as that minister is heard in his council. Besides, it is difficult to make terms for Germany except in concert with Paul I. So I repeat:

1. Continue with the protocol, discuss the questions thoroughly, even the terms of the final treaty; but sign nothing for ten days, by which time we shall be in agreement with Paul.

2. Try, meanwhile, to have the Grand Duke of Tuscany placed in Germany.
3. Do not discuss the King of Naples, the Pope or the King of Sardinia. . . .
4. Do not discuss the Cisalpine except to say that it will be organized so as to cause no alarm to neighbouring states.
5. Commit us to nothing in Germany except for the Grand Duke of Tuscany; for the rest, say we will reach agreement at the peace with the Empire.
6. Allow no mention in the treaty of the methods of executing it; that should be in a separate convention.
7. Delay our evacuation of the occupied territory beyond the Inn and the Adige as long as possible and insist on payment of the contributions which have been imposed.
8. Evacuation of the right bank must not take place until the peace with the Empire.
9. You can stipulate independence and neutrality for Switzerland. You must send two couriers each day. . . .

BONAPARTE

702

## To the Senate, the Legislative Corps and the Tribune

*Paris*

*24 Pluviôse, Year IX (13 Feb, 1801)*

Peace on the continent has been signed at Lunéville; it is such as the French people desired. Their first wish was the Rhine frontier; defeats did not shake their purpose, victories have not added to their pretensions.

Having restored the ancient limits of Gaul they had to bring back liberty to the peoples united with them by a common origin, by interest and custom. The freedom of Liguria and the Cisalpine is assured.

After this duty, justice and generosity demanded another. The King of Spain has been faithful to our cause and has suffered for it; neither our reverses nor the treacherous insinuations of our enemies could detach him from us: he will be paid a just return. A prince of his blood will sit on the throne of Tuscany. He will remember that he owes it to the fidelity of Spain and the friendship of France; his ports and bays will be closed to our enemies' ships and trade.

Austria, and it is this that ensures peace, Austria, now separated from France by vast areas, will no longer feel the rivalry and suspicion that for so many centuries have been the torment of these two powers and the calamity of Europe.

The Government owes a mark of its satisfaction to the minister

plenipotentiary who has conducted the negotiations to this happy outcome. There are no interpretations to be feared, no explanations to be sought, none of those equivocal clauses in which the art of diplomacy sows the seeds of future war.

Why could not this be the treaty of general peace? That was the wish of France, the constant aim of the Government; but all its efforts were in vain. Europe knows all that the English ministry has attempted to bring about the failure of the negotiations at Lunéville.

In vain an agent of the Government informed it on 9 October, 1800, that France was ready to enter into separate negotiations with it; that approach was rejected on the pretext that England could not desert her ally. Then, when that ally agreed to treat without England, her Government sought other means of preventing a peace so necessary to the world. It violates conventions consecrated by humanity and makes war on helpless fishermen. It asserts pretensions contrary to the rights and dignity of all nations. All the trade of Asia and of her immense colonies does not satisfy her ambition; the whole ocean must submit to the exclusive sovereignty of England.

She is arming against Russia, Denmark and Sweden because they have protected their sovereignty and the independence of their flags by treaties of guarantee. Unjustly attacked, the northern powers have the right to count on France. Together with them the French Government will avenge an insult to all nations, but will never forget that it must fight only for peace and the happiness of the world.

BONAPARTE

703

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Lunéville*

*Paris*

*24 Pluviôse, Year IX (13 Feb, 1801)*

The treaty of Lunéville was published this morning, Citizen Minister. It completely carries out the aims of the Government.

Citizen Talleyrand is writing to authorize you to come to Paris. I do not wish to write to M. Cobenzl. I cannot treat him differently from an ordinary minister. At the outset of these negotiations he was unworthy of his role. But we shall see him here with pleasure and there is no objection to his coming. In that case it would be neither wise nor proper for you to show him the same intimacy as on the first occasion. Then he was treated as we are now treating M. Kalitchef,\* that is to say as one come to remove all obstacles and make peace, not to gain time and use my special confidence in him to promote the aims of M. Thugut. But there will be no harm in telling him that if he had

\* Russian plenipotentiary in France.

not had the good sense to stay at Lunéville harder conditions would have been imposed on the House of Austria.

I have one more word to say to you: the nation is pleased with the treaty, and I myself am particularly happy about it.

A thousand things to Julie.

BONAPARTE

704

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

28 Ventôse, Year IX (18 Mar, 1801)

When the ratifications are exchanged, Citizen Minister, or immediately after, a convention must be agreed for the evacuation of territory occupied by the French armies.

1. Evacuation will not be deemed to begin until 8 Germinal.
2. Germany will not be evacuated until forty days thereafter.
3. The Austrians will occupy no land beyond the Inn. They will not occupy the Breisgau or the other pockets of territory they may own this side of the Inn.
4. The Austrian and French armies will return to a peace footing; that is to say, regiments will be reduced to peacetime strength.
5. The supply and artillery teams will be sold.
6. The French plenipotentiary will try to lay the foundation for a new kind of treaty, which would regulate the number of men to be kept under arms in time of peace by France, Prussia and Austria in order to relieve their finances.

BONAPARTE

705

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

23 Floréal, Year IX (13 May, 1801)

You will see from the attached letter, Citizen Minister, that M. d'Aranjo\* has reached Lorient. Inform him by special messenger that the French Government has decided to make Madrid the seat of the negotiations and not to depart from the proposals of His Catholic Majesty; that you hasten to declare this to him so that his prince does not deceive himself with vain hopes and does not start a war whose inevitable result will be the destruction of Portugal;

But that, since it is not the custom of the First Consul to refuse to hear the proposals of a power at war, he has given Citizen Decrès, Maritime Prefect at Lorient, the necessary instructions to confer with him.

\* Portuguese plenipotentiary.

You will send Citizen Decrès full powers and instructions:

That negotiations must not last more than five or six days;

That at the first meeting he must inform M. d'Aranjo that the First Consul does not want negotiations to begin in Paris because, at a moment when hostilities are about to begin and large forces are about to enter Portugal, he thinks it would be absurd to have a minister in Paris who would hinder the negotiations at Madrid;

That hitherto Portugal has been an English province;

That the first step towards reconciliation with France must be to place an embargo on all English ships and to forbid their ships to enter Portuguese ports until the general peace;

That, since the English have made large conquests from France and have been aided by the Portuguese fleets, the provinces of Entre-Douro-e-Minho, Tras-os-Montes and Beira must admit part Spanish part French garrisons until the general peace, to serve as equivalents to the conquests seized by the English from the allies;

That I also wish the ships which blockaded Malta and Egypt, together with the English ships, to be delivered to us;

And finally 20 millions for the cost of the war.

Citizen Decrès will be authorized to sign preliminaries based on these articles; once signed he can give M. d'Aranjo passports to proceed to Paris.

BONAPARTE

706

## To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

8 Prairial, Year IX (28 May, 1801)

Citizen Minister, I wish you at once to send a special messenger to Citizen Otto in London to acknowledge receipt of his letter of 6 Prairial.

You will inform Otto that these insinuations of Lord Hawkesbury, *that the most influential people surrounding the First Consul wish for peace*, are to be regarded as mere tittle-tattle; he must tell this Lord Hawkesbury that the cabinet is *one*, that it certainly desires peace, but an honourable peace founded on an equilibrium on the seas and in the various parts of the world;

That it is time the French Government knew precisely what it is to understand by the supposed moderation of the English ministers.

Consequently you will address to Lord Hawkesbury a note pointing out that, despite the proposal of the English Government to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, the French Government is grieved to see that nothing has developed and wishes the negotiations to take on an official character through an exchange of notes assisted by conversations;

That, if the English ministry accepts this, Citizen Otto will request

Lord Hawkesbury to submit in a note the proposals the ministry wishes to make to the French Government and the bases His Britannic Majesty wishes to adopt for the re-establishment of a definitive and general peace;

That it is to misunderstand the spirit of the French nation and the personal character of the First Consul to believe that he will be influenced by any fear whatever; and that it appears that London little knows the intentions of Alexander I and his cabinet, if it is thought that he will ever betray the cause of the continental powers;

That the events occurring in Egypt, whatever their outcome, are acts of war and should in no way delay the general negotiations;

That the French and Spanish armies had already entered Portugal. . . .

That, as for the few assassins instigated by England who may be active in the interior, they are hardly to be feared, and the English Government should not set much store by their help;

That the First Consul will never sign any but an honourable peace;

That it is therefore open to the English ministry to complete the negotiations in a few days and thereby to prove that love for humanity and the peace of the world which so far it has been content to proclaim in speeches.

BONAPARTE

707

## To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*26 Prairial, Year IX (15 June, 1801)*

I send you a copy of the magnificent treaty our ambassador has made for us.\* Please inform him by special messenger that this treaty is contrary to his instructions, contrary to our treaty with Spain, contrary to the interests of the Republic and entirely in favour of England; that he must at once declare to Spain that the treaty is not and cannot be ratified; that if the three provinces are not at once occupied by French and Spanish troops I cannot answer for the return of the Spanish colonies;

That this treaty is an unexpected blow which the First Consul regards as the most resounding defeat he has met during his magistracy. . . .

That General Leclerc should now be at the head of 15,000 men, and that 10,000 more are on the French frontier and will enter at the first request by Spain; that I wish the French troops to be reinforced by 12,000 Spaniards, who will invade Oporto and all the provinces which are to be occupied.

\* Treaty of peace between France and Portugal negotiated in Badajoz by Lucien Bonaparte.



That it is absurd to expect us to guarantee the restitution of the Portuguese colonies; that entirely disgraces the Government, which would suffer less dishonour were I to lose a province than if I signed this treaty;

That my name appears only on things that benefit the nation and honour the French people.

You will show me this draft dispatch tomorrow at midday. Please bring also all your correspondence and our treaty with Spain.

Prepare a draft note which Citizen Otto will present to the court of London. The aim will be:

To inform Lord Hawkesbury that the province of Alentijo has been conquered by the Spaniards;

That the Queen of Portugal sent M. Pinto, who has agreed a kind of treaty with the French Ambassador; that orders have already been sent that this treaty be regarded as void, since the First Consul will never withdraw from the declaration made to M. d'Aranjo at Lorient that he will never make peace with Portugal unless he occupies these provinces which can serve as compensation for the colonies of the allies; that, while ordering the French armies to prepare to renew their attacks against Portugal, the First Consul owes it to the weakness and impotence of the Portuguese Government to suspend hostilities until the court of London has replied to his latest proposals, namely: whether in the negotiations it will accept the *status quo ante bellum* in Portugal as compensation for the *status quo ante bellum* in America;

That the British Government should recognize in the frankness of this approach the desire to deal lightly with a weak power, even one which has played the part of an English province, and to avoid actions which could exacerbate relations between the two nations.

BONAPARTE

708

### To Citizen Lucien Bonaparte

*French Ambassador to Spain*

*Paris*

*28 Prairial, Year IX (17 June, 1801)*

I have your dispatch of 19 Prairial. I have not told you what I thought of your treaty of peace because I do not like saying unpleasant things. Joseph, who was with me when I got it, will tell you the really painful feelings it caused me. You go much too fast in negotiations. In a matter like this a fortnight of discussion is nothing.

Your explanatory letters prove that you should not have done it; for, if England has allowed Portugal to make peace on condition that she gives no compensation, our policy must be thwarted. I have often explained in my letters that Portugal now interests us only as providing sureties for the general peace. . . .

England will not make war on Portugal because that would force us to take Lisbon. She will be very happy if we just occupy a few provinces which she can make us give up by restoring a few islands in America. For a century Portugal has really been nothing but an English province and the port of Lisbon belongs entirely to that power.

An article of your treaty that seems inconceivable is the one stipulating that we will guarantee the Portuguese possessions overseas. That is to turn the question upside down: we want compensations against England, and you give them to that power, which could seize a few Portuguese colonies.

You want us to guarantee the treaty with Spain, yet you do not send us a copy of it.

Portugal once agreed to pay sixteen millions to the Directory; M. d'Aranjo agreed to pay twenty; now these twenty are reduced to sixteen. By having them payable in Madrid you will lose us nearly a million because of the rate of exchange. . . .

In any case the treaty is not in diplomatic form or style. It is contrary to custom to say that hostilities will not cease until ratification. It is contrary to custom to put in a final treaty that if something is decided somewhere else the treaty will be void. In that case the safe course is to wait for news. You must have known that you would know the outcome of M. d'Aranjo's negotiations within three days.

Finally, it is against the practice and importance of diplomatic affairs to sign a final treaty without having sent the text to the government, unless the various clauses have been discussed in the protocols and successively agreed by the government. . . . The drafting is often faulty. I will mention one passage that struck me: you cannot oppose 'the Portuguese monarchy' and 'the French people'; it is customary to say 'between the two nations, between the two States'.

You know that by our treaty with Spain a quarter of Portugal should be in the hands of the two nations to serve as compensation for the American islands and Trinidad.

You can give the following ideas to the Spanish court: negotiations with England are proceeding actively. The English do not seem to wish to give up Malta, Ceylon, the states of Tippoo and Trinidad. I have proposed the *status quo ante bellum* for the Mediterranean and America, with the same condition for Portugal and some compensations in India. Your treaty with Portugal makes all that illusory. . . .

You must say and repeat to the Portuguese plenipotentiary that we are not making war on Portugal, but treating it as an English province. It was an impertinence for M. Pinto to maintain that three Portuguese battleships and two frigates did not blockade Alexandria. We parleyed with them.

All your letters convince me that you are far from understanding the

effort, even obstinacy, that must be shown in negotiation. You can be sure that your treaty, when it reaches London, will show your lack of experience to that court as well as to M. Pinto. That is excusable; but in such a case you should surround yourself with advice and show less haste in concluding. . . .

BONAPARTE

709

### To Citizen Lucien Bonaparte

*French Ambassador to Spain*

*Paris*

*3 Messidor, Year IX (22 June, 1801)*

I have your letter of 24 Prairial. Matters of this importance are not children's games.

The last letters from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and my own will have pointed out to you that the whole of our present system depends on the occupation of two or three Portuguese provinces.

How is it possible that with your intelligence and knowledge of men you could have let yourself be taken in by courtly flattery and could not make Spain understand its own true interests?

In two words, the whole question is this. If we occupy the three provinces, we shall have an honourable peace with England before Vendémiaire; if we were forced to keep to the treaty of Badajoz, we should still have war for several years. It is because everything holds together in a political system that a minister must walk carefully and never decide things precipitately.

How can you have thought that, after the treaty of Lunéville, I would have sent 15,000 men into Portugal in order to make peace on the same, or even worse conditions than those obtained by the Directory six months before the treaty of Campo Formio, when we were still at war with Austria?

I have already informed England that, so far as Portugal is concerned, I will never depart from the ultimatum proposed to M. d'Aranjo, and that the *status quo ante bellum* for Portugal must involve the restitution to Spain of Trinidad, to France of Martinique and Tobago and to Holland of Curaçao. When the note was presented the English minister showed in conversation that he thought this reasonable.

Influence the court where you are placed, but do not let yourself be influenced by it. Make your statement to M. Pinto and to the court of Spain; let the armies do the rest. When there is so small an obstacle in the way of world peace, the Spanish court and the agents of France must overcome it.

As to your personal position, you must stay in Spain. . . .

BONAPARTE

710

**To Citizen Cailland***Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs\***Paris**4 Thermidor, Year IX (23 July, 1801)*

You will find attached, Citizen, the note replying to Lord Hawkesbury. Send it during the day by special messenger.

Inform Citizen Otto that the Government is not disposed to depart from the conditions laid down in the note; that he must insist above all on the terms for Malta and Martinique; that he can let Lord Hawkesbury understand that if hostilities continue Hanover may become an object of compensation;

That the English are not masters of Egypt; we have definite news that Alexandria will hold out for a year, and Lord Hawkesbury is wise enough to know that Alexandria is the key to Egypt; that 100 guns already surround the harbour of Taranto; that that harbour is capable of holding any kind of fleet, and that it would be a great sacrifice to lose that fine position with all it offers;

That to throw their money into Europe to build a new coalition would be in vain; that, even were they to succeed in joining together powers of very diverse interests, the sole result would be a repetition of the history of the grandeur of Rome, and that the result of the turmoil French victories on the continent would produce in London would be as disastrous to them as their defeats would be to their allies;

Finally, that Citizen Otto must never let himself be told that a minister in England can do such and such without clearly asserting that the honour, interest and character of the First Consul will always lead him to prefer war to a peace as disadvantageous as that proposed in this note.

BONAPARTE

711

**Note to be Handed to Lord Hawkesbury***Annexed to No. 710**Paris**4 Thermidor, Year IX (23 July, 1801)*

The undersigned has communicated to his Government Lord Hawkesbury's note dated 20 July. He is instructed to reply as follows:

The French Government wishes to leave undone nothing that may bring about general peace, because that is to the interest both of humanity and of the allies. It is for the King of England to estimate whether it is not also in the interest of his policy, his trade and his nation; if so, then a more or less distant island cannot be sufficient reason to prolong the ills of the world.

\* Talleyrand was unwell.

In his last note the undersigned pointed out how grieved the First Consul had been at the retrograde step taken by the negotiation; but, since Lord Hawkesbury contests this in his note of 20 July, the undersigned will recall the position with the frankness and precision that matters of this importance deserve.

The problem consists in three parts: the Mediterranean; the Indies; America.

Egypt will be restored to the Porte. The Republic of the Seven [Ionian] Islands will be recognized. All ports on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean [coasts of Italy] will be restored to the King of Naples and to the Pope. Mahon will be restored to Spain.

Malta will be restored to the Order, and if, as the preponderant sea power, the King of England judges the destruction of its forts to be necessary to his interests, that clause will be allowed.

In the Indies England will keep Ceylon and thereby become the master of those vast and rich countries. The other establishments, including the Cape of Good Hope, will be restored to the allies.

In America everything will be restored to the former owners. The King of England is already so powerful in that part of the world that to seek for more would be to desire the same mastery of America that he already has of India.

The whole integrity of Portugal will be preserved.

Those are the terms that the French Government is ready to sign.

The British Government would derive immense advantages from them; to demand greater would be to deny a just and mutually honourable peace.

Since Martinique was not conquered by English arms, but was placed by its inhabitants in the hands of England until France had a government, it cannot be accounted an English possession; France will never renounce it.

It is now only for the British cabinet to make known the position it wishes to adopt; if it is not satisfied by these conditions, it will at least have been proved to the world that the First Consul has neglected nothing, but has shown himself ready to make every sacrifice in order to bring peace and to spare humanity the blood and tears that would inevitably result from a new campaign.

712

### Note for the Letter to Citizen Otto

*Annexed to No. 710*

*Paris*

*4 Thermidor, Year IX (23 July, 1801)*

The two points of difficulty are Malta and America.

The First Consul would agree to the restitution of Malta to the Order, or even to the King of Naples, the former suzerain.

If Malta is returned to the Order, the fortifications will be retained. But if England prefers to give it up to the King of Naples, then the First Consul wishes the fortifications to be destroyed; it is easy to show that, unfortified, Malta is no longer of any importance.

As to America, it could be agreed that England should keep Trinidad, but not Tobago.

In that case Citizen Otto would be instructed to sign preliminaries more or less in these terms:

1. There will be peace and friendship between the French Republic and the King of England.

2. Hostilities will cease in Europe as from the date of signature of the preliminaries; in America, forty days later; in India, three months later.

713

### To Citizen Talleyrand

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris

19 Fructidor, Year IX (6 Sept, 1801)

You will find attached, Citizen Minister, a dispatch from Citizen Otto. I wish you at once and before tonight to send him a message informing him quite definitely that the French Government will never agree to the English demand for Essequibo and Demerara.

As for the prisoners, the governments will repay the respective costs, and a clause must be inserted that what France has paid for the prisoners of powers subsidized by England, such as the Russians, Bavarians, the Italian princes, will count for compensation.

In the article about the Pope the words *in conformity with the treaty of Tolentino* must be inserted.

BONAPARTE

714

### To Citizen Talleyrand

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris

30 Fructidor, Year IX (17 Sept, 1801)

You will find attached, Citizen Minister, a letter from Citizen Otto.

Answer him that we will not cede Tobago; that we can adopt no form of words other than *will not oppose*, which was that used by the Emperor when ceding Mainz to us, and by us in ceding Venice; to do otherwise would be dishonourable, since we cannot dispose of what does not belong to us.

It appears we are in agreement over Demerara and Portugal.

Tell Citizen Otto that the English must always have known that we could never cede two islands in America, and that, if they are in

good faith, *will not oppose* seems to me clear enough until we can settle matters in the final treaty;

That if they insist on these two points, then they are not in good faith, and the Government does not intend these rumours of peace to continue longer.

The equinox is coming and each day is precious. In the present position of France the First Consul is in diplomatic relations with every power and has made it a rule never to give a hint of bad faith; in his opinion it would be bad faith to send out fleets from Toulon, Cadix and Brest when their success or failure would change the basis of the situation.

Therefore, either the preliminaries must be signed during the first decade of Vendémiaire or negotiations must be broken off.

You will tell Otto that this is a strict instruction; that it is useless to send messengers; that, if they press us further, I have decided to break, and that I wish it all to be settled before 10 Vendémiaire.

You will easily understand how important this last item is when you think that Menou may not be able to hold out beyond 1 Vendémiaire; that at this period the winds are favourable and ships reach Italy and Trieste very quickly; that therefore it is essential for us to bring matters to a head and have done with them by 10 Vendémiaire. Otto can let it be understood that in view of our weakness at sea and our superiority on land the campaign opens for us during the winter; that therefore I do not wish to remain any longer in this state of stagnation which for six weeks has been leading the operations of the Government into new paths.

Citizen Otto must say that it is not only Tobago that I will not cede, but the smallest island. He must come back to the original idea that, when one has done all that honour allows, to go further means dishonour.

Please, therefore, send off your message before you sleep; time is against us. But since this species of ultimatum may be important, this is how I conceive it:

Citizen, I have laid your letter of 28 Fructidor before the First Consul. I am instructed to tell you expressly that:

Apart from Trinidad, the First Consul refuses to cede not only Tobago, but not even a single rock, if such there be, with a village of a hundred inhabitants; the First Consul's position is that in this treaty he is yielding to England up to the furthest limit that honour will allow, and to go further would bring dishonour upon the French nation.

As to Malta, we cannot name the Emperor of Russia, since we cannot be sure of his consent; we must be content with the first draft, *under the protection of one of the great powers of Europe.*

The First Consul will not agree to accept any words other than *will not oppose*, for it would be absurd for him to pretend to dispose of what does not belong to him, and he would never do so even if the English fleets were anchored before Chaillot; it is by that formula that the Emperor ceded Mainz to France and France ceded Venice to him.

You must therefore, Citizen, maintain this position as long as possible; but if, contrary to all beliefs, it is made a cause of rupture, you may give guarantees in a secret article which could be drafted as follows:

If, at the general peace, the Dutch Republic does not agree to cede to England in full sovereignty the port of Trincomalee; if the King of Spain does not agree to cede to England in full sovereignty the island of Trinidad, then the public articles relating to those powers shall be void.

Should the English minister, in face of all efforts, persist in demanding Tobago or the positive cession by France of Spanish and Dutch possessions, which is not within the power of the Republic, then, Citizen, you are authorized to break, since the First Consul would be justified in thinking that there was some double intrigue going on with Spain or some other reason which he could not explain. But, in the present situation in Europe, he could not reasonably further prolong the rumours of peace, which suspend all military operations, and stop the allies from carrying out necessary movements, and cannot lose part of the campaigning season which for us begins in Vendémiaire.

I must inform you, Citizen, that 6,000 men are embarked on the Rochefort squadron, nearly 20,000 on Admiral Villaret's squadron at Brest, and means of transport for 15,000 are ready in Holland; the Toulon and Cadiz squadrons also have troops on board. The carrying out of the First Consul's plan of campaign requires that by 10 Vendémiaire he should know for certain what the position is and be able to devote himself and all his resources to a renewal of the war, since that is definitely what they will be asking for. By that date, therefore, either the preliminaries must be signed or negotiations broken off.

Before going to Marengo, the First Consul made every offer to the Emperor; he had yielded everything compatible with honour, as he is now doing to England. The Emperor wished for more and in the end owed everything to the generosity and moderation of the victor.

It is now useless for you to ask for new instructions; you must declare this to Lord Hawkesbury and make him understand that what you have said is final; that the First Consul would undergo anything rather than yield further. State this with some pride. Like the Emperor, they risk losing all if they seek for more.



715

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Paris**14 Vendémiaire, Year X (6 Oct, 1801)*

I am sending you, Citizen Minister, the ratifications of the preliminary articles signed at London on 9 Vendémiaire and of the secret article.

I have the honour to inform you that a change has been made in the translation of article 2. In the original document this article is rendered as follows:

‘His Britannic Majesty will restore to the French Republic and to its allies, namely to his Catholic Majesty and to the Dutch Republic, all possessions and colonies occupied or conquered, etc.’ . . .\*

The First Consul wishes you, Citizen Minister, to inform Citizen Otto of the reasons for this change.

*By order of the First Consul*

716

**To the Emperor of Russia***Paris**18 Vendémiaire, Year X (10 Oct, 1801)*

I am sending Colonel Caulaincourt to Your Majesty to express the pleasure I feel at seeing the treaty of peace between our two great nations at last signed and ratified. For the whole of France it has been a cause for joy proportionate to the respect that the French nation has for Your Majesty’s brave and loyal subjects.

The Elector of Bavaria has consulted me over the proposal of the House of Austria that he should alienate part of Bavaria; I believe I was acting in agreement with Your Majesty in advising him not at this time to exchange his hereditary states for others.

In the preliminaries of peace which happily have been signed between France and England it is agreed that Malta shall be restored to the Order under the protection of a great power. I beg Your Majesty to inform me of Your Majesty’s wishes concerning this island and the Order of Malta, of which Your Majesty’s august father was chosen Grandmaster.

The Republic of the Seven Islands is in the cruellest anarchy, and daily there is fighting among its people. In their present condition the Turks are unsuited to enforce a just and equitable government. But Your Majesty must, by religion, be interested in advising in concert some means of enabling these peoples to enjoy the constitution they have been given.

\* The trivial change involved concerned the French word used for ‘namely’ in this article.

The rest of the Russian troops who were in France are being embarked, so as to reach Russia more quickly.

It remains for me to pray Your Majesty to protect our trade; competition cannot fail to benefit the Russian people, and, if we could be granted some preference in respect of timber and other naval needs, Your Majesty would thereby help the restoration of the French navy which must be of advantage to all the maritime powers of the north.

I saw with regret that no French ambassador was present in Moscow at Your Majesty's coronation, but I beg Your Majesty to accept my congratulations and my wishes for the happiness and prosperity of Your Majesty's reign.

BONAPARTE

717

**To Citizen Chaptal**

*Minister of the Interior*

*Paris*

*22 Vendémiaire, Year X (14 Oct, 1801)*

Give immediate orders, Citizen Minister, to start work without delay on the road from Calais to Amiens and Amiens to Paris. Nothing must be spared in putting this road into a state that leaves nothing to be desired.

BONAPARTE

718

**To Citizen Gaudin**

*Minister of Finance*

*Paris*

*22 Vendémiaire, Year X (14 Oct, 1801)*

I wish you, Citizen Minister, to call for a special report on the state of the postal relays from Calais to Amiens and Amiens to Paris, and to take steps at once to ensure that the service between Calais and Paris operates punctually, for traffic on this route is about to become very active.

BONAPARTE

719

**To Citizen Fouché**

*Minister of Police*

*Paris*

*22 Vendémiaire, Year X (14 Oct, 1801)*

Please, Citizen Minister, give orders that any English who land in France can travel freely, provided only that they hold English passports and that they are not emigrants. A report of those landing will be sent to you daily, together with the places to which they are going.

BONAPARTE

720

**To General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**22 Vendémiaire, Year X (14 Oct, 1801)*

Lord Cornwallis [English plenipotentiary at the Conference of Amiens] will land at Calais, Citizen Minister, on his way to Paris. Please give orders that he is to be received in the most distinguished manner. On arrival at Calais he will be saluted with a salvo. There will be a guard of honour and he will be escorted on the road.

BONAPARTE

721

**To Citizen Fouché***Minister of Police**Paris**23 Vendémiaire, Year X (15 Oct, 1801)*

The First Consul has seen the report you addressed to him today, Citizen Minister.

He does not think it proper to prevent English travellers coming to France from landing at the port of their choice. But he does think it reasonable to indicate the ports where they will find authorities with the power to issue passports to them at once. Those ports are Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Cherbourg, Granville, Saint-Malo, Nantes, La Rochelle, Rochefort and Bordeaux.

Foreigners landing at other ports will be obliged to wait for their passports to come from Paris.

*By order of the First Consul*

722

**To General Berthier***Minister of War**Paris**28 Vendémiaire, Year X (20 Oct, 1801)*

You will please order the commander of the 15th Military District to send a battalion of grenadiers to Amiens to act as garrison during the holding of the conference.

BONAPARTE

723

**To Citizen Talleyrand***Minister of Foreign Affairs**Paris**29 Vendémiaire, Year X (21 Oct, 1801)*

Please, Citizen Minister, let Citizen Otto know that I wish him to inform Lord Hawkesbury as soon as possible that the French Government intends at once to send the squadron at Rochefort and part of

that at Brest to carry 10,000 or 12,000 troops to Santo Domingo, to restore order there.

You must also inform the court of Spain that it is essential they send someone with full powers to Amiens, since the English and ourselves are determined to conclude quickly.

Make the same declaration to the Dutch Government.

I wish Citizen Otto to let us know the date negotiations for the definitive treaty are to start. He can make known our desire that it should be during the first decade of Brumaire.

BONAPARTE

724

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*8 Brumaire, Year X (30 Oct, 1801)*

You will send a courier to Citizen Otto, Citizen Minister; you will tell him that he can inform the English cabinet confidentially, in exchange for the communication they have made to us of the dispatch of five ships to Jamaica, that six ships and four frigates of the Rochefort squadron . . . will leave for Santo-Domingo during the last decade of Brumaire; the whole will carry about 20,000 landing troops under the orders of General Leclerc. I wish the British Government to give orders at Jamaica that he is to be supplied with all the foodstuffs he may need, for it is to the interest of civilization to destroy the new Algiers that has been growing up in the middle of America.

BONAPARTE

725

### To H.M. the King of Great Britain and Ireland

*Paris*

*9 Frimaire, Year X (30 Nov, 1801)*

The conclusion of the preliminary articles between the French Republic and Your Majesty having happily brought to an end all hostilities between them, and the loyal frankness displayed by both sides during this first negotiation leaving no doubt that it will at once be followed by the final restoration of peace and good understanding, I believe I shall carry out Your Majesty's personal wish by accrediting Citizen Otto to Your Majesty as Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic. I am convinced that this choice, to which I am impelled by the honourable service Citizen Otto has just rendered, cannot fail to be agreeable to Your Majesty for the same reason. I therefore beg Your Majesty to welcome Citizen Otto and to place entire faith in all he will be instructed to say particularly when he expresses the complete desire of the French Government for the restoration and maintenance of the best intelligence between England and France and the

sincere wishes I have formed for the happiness of Your Majesty and Your Majesty's august family.

BONAPARTE

726

**To Citizen D'Hauterive**

*Director, 2nd Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*5 Nivôse, Year X (26 Dec, 1801)*

Citizen d'Hauterive will see M. Azara to inform him verbally that the negotiations at Amiens are drawing to their close; that it is three months since the preliminaries were signed, and that Spain has delayed the negotiations for six weeks;

That it is no longer possible for England and France to lose another day; peace will therefore be signed shortly, whether or not Spain participates; that the First Consul, who has a most personal sense of benevolence and attachment towards H.M. the King of Spain, will sign on behalf of the King, since he does not wish to place Charles IV in the position of being forced to adhere against his will to what has been done;

That, since the King of Spain is the most intimate ally of the Republic, the First Consul believes he must act in accordance with the domestic circumstances of that court; the illness of the King and the Queen and the extraordinary, not to say mad conduct of the Prince of the Peace, force him to deal with the interests of Spain as with those of France;

That the confidence of H.M. Charles IV will be better placed in the First Consul and that his interests will be better protected by him than by his present ministry;

That M. del Campo would arrive too late: the peace would be signed, and that would serve only to prove to Europe the incompetence of the Spanish ministry;

That the First Consul sees only one method: that M. d'Azara should go to Amiens in virtue of his former powers and then he and Citizen d'Hauterive will draft the necessary papers to authorize him to act; . . .

Or that the First Consul will sign.

BONAPARTE

727

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte**

*Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Amiens*

*Paris*

*13 Pluviôse, Year X (2 Feb, 1802)*

I have received your letter of 12 Pluviôse. It seems that all goes well at Amiens. A week more or less is now unimportant. . . .

I wish you to speak to Lord Cornwallis about the abominable piece of work you will find attached, and to impress upon him how much it is against the dignity of the two states to allow an emigrant to publish such stupidities in London at a time when I am especially occupied in stifling anything that might cause complaint.

You must also tell Lord Cornwallis that he should place little faith in the reports sent him by Mr. Jackson, since he keeps bad company and gets his information from rogues who only want money. Those he has sent so far should go to prove it.

BONAPARTE

728

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*21 Pluviôse, Year X (10 Feb, 1802)*

The petition from the Maltese, Citizen Minister, is not at all in Maltese style; it has not the colour, nor the style, nor the tone of the people of that island, whereas it has the colour, style and tone of a revolutionary Englishman. If you want proof of it, you will find it in the freedom with which English generals and troops are mentioned. Such freedom is not African. The French plenipotentiary must take care to impress this on M. Cornwallis. The author of this petition is an Englishman employed in the customs and health service of the island.

BONAPARTE

729

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Paris*

*30 Pluviôse, Year X (19 Feb, 1802)*

I am sending you, Citizen Minister, three notes regarding the dispatches from Amiens.

In the one concerning the order of Malta you will see a means of settling matters by raising a Swiss battalion. Since this idea arose while I was dictating the notes it is not placed in the most suitable position. You must give instructions to the plenipotentiary to propose it as a means of conciliation and to give the British cabinet time to reject this idea and return to the other.

BONAPARTE

730

### First Note

*Annexed to No. 729*

*Paris*

*30 Pluviôse, Year X (19 Feb, 1802)*

The dispatches of 22 Pluviôse from Amiens, Citizen Minister, deal

first with the question of the Ottoman Porte. The minister of the Republic should have the following note inserted in the protocol:

Preliminaries of peace between France and the Porte have been signed. They have been ratified by the latter, with this single reservation: 'in so far as they do not conflict with the treaty of London'. Since they do not conflict with this treaty, we regard them as ratified.

Meanwhile, a French colonel has reached the Porte and frustrated certain secondary intrigues, and the Sultan, in a letter to the First Consul, has shown a desire to treat directly with France and to convert the preliminary articles into a definitive treaty. The Turkish ambassador in Paris has received the necessary powers and instructions. He has been presented to the First Consul and appeared convinced that the Porte felt France now to be necessary to it; he was prepared to sign the definitive peace, but in honesty and respect he must first inform the English minister. The First Consul agreed that the Turkish minister should at once write to the English minister to inform him of this step. A final peace will definitely be concluded with France. Any peace not made directly between such great powers as the Porte and France might be a truce, but could be only short-lived. In diplomacy there are two kinds of alliance: natural alliance and accidental alliance. The alliance between England and the Porte being only accidental, France had to agree the cessation of hostilities in the preliminaries; but the detailed arrangements must be treated directly; to do otherwise would be to place these two powers among the ranks of secondary powers, whereas both are powers of the first order.

All assurance that the French plenipotentiary can give is: 1. That this treaty will contain no secret article; 2. That it will be entirely based on the preliminaries. Any further demand on the part of His Britannic Majesty would not be reasonable.

BONAPARTE

731

## Second Note

*Annexed to No. 729*

*Paris*

*30 Pluviôse, Year X (19 Feb, 1802)*

The second matter in the dispatch from Amiens is Malta. There is no harm in saying, not only that England and France will not have Languages in the order of Malta, but even that no subject of these two powers can be considered a knight of Malta and all who have the cross will cease to wear it. So it could be said:

The two contracting parties, wishing to render Malta wholly independent of both of them, agree: 1. This Order will no longer contain either an English Language or a French Language; 2. The citizens, subjects, inhabitants and natives of the two states cannot be knights of

Malta or officers employed in the garrison of the island; all those who are now Knights of Malta will cease to be so and can no longer wear the decoration. . . .

Article 12 is inadmissible; we cannot recognize the word *suzerainty*; it is a feudal term that we cannot accept; another word must first be found. . . . But there would be something shocking in an order composed of Spaniards, Austrians, Germans, recognizing the suzerainty of the King of Naples. No doubt when Christendom formed but a single power it was natural that an order of knights hospitaller should recognize the suzerainty of the nearest Christian king; but today this article seems altogether unsuitable. Even if Neapolitan troops are granted, this article must be deleted.

Either the Order can exist or it cannot. If it can, how can it be thought that it needs three years, in place of six months, to organize the 800 men necessary to guard Malta. Together with 400 knights and 600 men who can be raised locally, that is more than enough to put the place in a reasonable condition. If it cannot exist, that is to say, if the powers having the Languages do not support it, three years will not suffice.

We believe therefore either that England should hold the island for six months after the signature of the treaty (of course, for our part, we shall keep Taranto), or that both powers should keep their positions for only three months at the most, and that then England should cede Malta to the knights and to a garrison of 1,000 Neapolitans, who cannot remain beyond 1 January, 1803, or one year from the date of signature of the present treaty. . . .

Another *via media* can be proposed: that would be to raise a battalion of 1,000 Swiss at the expense of the two powers. The officers would be appointed by the present Landsmann from among men who have been in the service of Holland, Spain and the King of Sardinia, but who have left the service at least three years and have not borne arms in the present war. This would appear the wisest course, since it would help the organization of the Order, which badly needs it. As to the choice of men, if English and French commissioners were appointed to help the Landsmann it would be easy to find men incapable of betraying their military duty and who would even be much more reliable than Neapolitans. But, in any event, this subsidy must not continue more than a year after the exchange of ratifications.

The French plenipotentiary will put forward the proposal for the Swiss battalion. But he will declare publicly that we do not intend Malta to pass to the King of Naples, and if the British cabinet does not accept the proposal for the Swiss, the Neapolitan troops cannot remain in the island more than one year; and, in that case, the French Government does not wish to pay anything, as the King of Naples has his



troops already organized and is himself interested in preserving Malta for the Order.

BONAPARTE

732

### Third Note

*Annexed to No. 729*

Paris

30 Pluviôse, Year X (19 Feb, 1802)

The undersigned is ordered by his Government to insist on the proposal recently made regarding the Barbary powers, that the four powers agree to put an end to the brigandage of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli which shames both Europe and the century in which we live. A simple joint notification by the four powers to the Barbary states would bring peace to the trade of the United States, Portugal, the King of Naples, the King of Etruria, Genoa and the northern powers. It might perhaps bring some loss of power to the high contracting parties, but, since owing to their geographical position Mediterranean trade goes to France and Spain, it would be these which would make the greatest sacrifices. In any case, the undersigned certainly has too high an opinion of the honesty of the English ministry and people to believe that they would judge on the basis of interest a question that ought to be judged on the basis of European dignity and public morality; for God has given power to states as to individuals so that they may protect the weak. It would be glorious to see a war that has produced so many calamities end with a hopeful and beneficial action.

This matter is closely linked with the Order of Malta; for if the contracting parties do not take upon themselves the obligation undertaken by the Order since its foundation, the Order cannot cease from being in a state of war with the Barbary powers without risking the loss of all its possessions. The gallant men who founded the fighting orders did so to protect Christians against Barbary piracy, and all the publicists of Europe would be agreed that if the Order of Malta formally refused to carry out its engagements and betrayed the object of its foundation it would have lost its right to hold possessions.

BONAPARTE

733

### To Citizen Talleyrand

*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

30 Pluviôse, Year X (19 Feb, 1802)

It seems to me desirable, Citizen Minister, for the French plenipotentiary to have a note more or less in the following terms inserted in the protocol.

BONAPARTE

The undersigned has informed his Government of the unwillingness of His Britannic Majesty to recognize the King of Etruria, the Italian Republic and the Genoese Republic. Since the recognition of these three powers by His Britannic Majesty is of no advantage to the French Republic, the undersigned will not insist further; but he wishes the following observation to be fully considered by the British cabinet.

The political system of Europe is founded on the existence and recognition of all the powers which share its vast and beautiful territory. If England refuses to recognize three such distinguished powers, it thereby renounces the right to take any interest in the people inhabiting them. But how can it be thought that English merchants can be indifferent to the trade of Genoa, Leghorn, the mouths of the Po and the Italian Republic? And if his trade meets with obstacles in these three states, whom will His Britannic Majesty be able to blame? There could be no reciprocity, since the states of Genoa, Tuscany and the Italian Republic do no kind of trade in England, but are useful and even necessary outlets for English trade. And if these three states, fearful at seeing themselves unrecognized by the great powers, change their organization and seek safety through union with a great continental power, does His Britannic Majesty renounce his right to complain, although he could not witness it with indifference? Complaint is sometimes made of the continental expansion of the French Republic; yet how can it not continue if the great powers place the small states of Italy in a position where they can seek protection in France alone?

Though recognized by the Emperor through the treaty of Campo Formio, the Cisalpine Republic never had its minister received at Vienna; that prince continued to treat it as though the treaty of Campo Formio had never been. At that time, no doubt, the court of Vienna regarded the treaty as only a truce, since there was no general peace. But now that a general peace has been made, if these states do not see their independence recognized, they will fear a renewal of the discredit they have already known and feel the need to draw even closer to the French. . . .

The undersigned begs Lord Cornwallis to place these observations before his cabinet.

734

**To Citizen Talleyrand**  
*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Paris

30 Pluviôse, Year X (19 Feb, 1802)

You will explain to Citizen Otto that military events in Portugal and Egypt can in no way influence the peace negotiations. If, for example, one article of the treaty were to say that the King of Portugal will enjoy the integrity of his states, it is evident that were the French

and Spanish armies occupying two or three of his provinces they would evacuate and restore them.

Similarly, if it is stated that Egypt will be restored to the Sultan, it is clear that it will be restored, whether it is held by the French, by the English or half by each.

Today it is a question of establishing a system convenient to both nations and ignoring what may happen between small armies which do not affect in any important way the main forces of either.

The question therefore remains this: If under the treaty Egypt is to remain French, England must retain a greater part of its possessions. But if Egypt is restored to the Porte, it seems natural that the English should retain less in order to restore the balance as far as possible.

BONAPARTE

735

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Amiens

Paris

17 Ventôse, Year X (8 Mar, 1802)

I have your dispatch of 16 Ventôse. I cannot see that there is now any important difference between the two drafts. The last version of the English draft concerning Malta is not far from ours. It will be easy, too, to find a *via media* over the prisoners. I do not see what can now prevent the conclusion of the treaty. If Lord Cornwallis is in good faith, peace should be signed before the 19th. If he is not, it is clear that the English cabinet must be involved in new combinations, which would be madness in the present state of Europe. In any case, I expect to receive a letter informing me exactly how things stand when my courier returns at midday on the 19th. I have yielded all the English wished. If peace is not agreed at once, I do not fear war. Speak strongly, and let me know on the 19th what to be at: since the English have given orders to arm at Plymouth, it is desirable that I should be able to take precautions for our fleets.

BONAPARTE

As to the Turkish ambassador, we cannot go back on what we have always said. I do not want to make peace with Turkey at Amiens; but that need not impede the article guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

736

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Amiens

Paris

18 Ventôse, Year X (9 Mar, 1802)

I have your letter of 18 Ventôse. I accept, though with regret, the formula: 'The Sublime Porte is invited to accede to the present treaty.'

It is no less my intention to make a treaty with the Porte, for this article does not settle all our differences. Not at the moment having the papers to hand, I do not know if there is an article guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey. That is necessary.

Otherwise I give you all necessary latitude to sign during the night. You will be in conference when you receive this; I do not think it will arrive before 9.0 p.m.

Like you, I think it extremely important not to lose another instant. So do everything possible to conclude, and sign.

Take care to let me know in your reply if the courier arrived before nine, as in that case I promised him 600 francs.

BONAPARTE

737

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte**

*Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Amiens*

*Malmaison*

*20 Ventôse, Year X (11 Mar, 1802)*

It is 5.0 p.m. and I have not yet had the letter you said you would send me after your conference yesterday morning and which I expected at midnight. But Otto's dispatches and all letters from England confirm their big armaments and the sailing of successive squadrons. Lord Hawkesbury told Otto that Cornwallis had received final instructions. But the remaining differences are so slight that they do not seem to justify so much fuss from that minister. A letter from Amiens, I suppose from Mr. Merry, asserting that I did not want peace has alarmed London.

In these circumstances the least delay is truly prejudicial and might have serious consequences for our fleets and naval expeditions.

Please, therefore, report twice a day, in the morning and evening, by special messenger, everything you do and all that is said to you, for it is quite clear to me that if by now peace is not signed or agreed there has been a change of plan in London.

BONAPARTE

Nevertheless, carry on your negotiations, but confine yourself to inserting in the protocol notes making it quite clear that it is the English who do not want peace and are causing delays.

738

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte**

*Minister Plenipotentiary at the Conference of Amiens*

*Malmaison*

*21 Ventôse, Year X (12 Mar, 1802)*

I have your letter of 20 Ventôse, from which I see that, though agreed, you have signed nothing. This delay seems quite extraordinary; it is quite certain that Lord Cornwallis had received final instructions

and had only to sign. Moustache, whom I expect in the afternoon, will no doubt help to clear up the mystery.

I do not want the word *Genoa* substituted for *Liguria* under any pretext whatever; I would rather it were not mentioned. Nor do I wish to evacuate Taranto before the English evacuate Malta; the way out is not to speak of it. It was all right on the hypothesis that they could keep Malta six or eight months; but now that everything is to be evacuated in three months there is no point in mentioning it.

BONAPARTE

739

## To Citizen Talleyrand

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris

21 Ventôse, Year X (12 Mar, 1802)

I wish you, Citizen Minister, at once to send a courier to London to inform Citizen Otto of our situation in Europe and to instruct him to make known officially in conference with Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury:

That M. de Lucchesini, at the express order of the King of Prussia, has informed me of his pleasure at the outcome of the Congress of Lyons;\* on the 17th M. Cobenzl heard from the Emperor, who agrees not only to what was done at Lyons, but also to what we have done in Switzerland and Holland . . . that the reply to the letters sent from Lyons to the Emperor of Russia was even more satisfactory;

That, this being so, I saw clearly that the movement just produced in London was not a political matter but a domestic intrigue designed to overthrow the ministry and gain power;

That the negotiations at Amiens have been languishing for a fortnight through the fault of the English cabinet, and that for a month, since we presented our second draft, the discussion has been of little interest or importance;

That I have begun to resent the threatening air of the English Government, as though I had to be forced to make peace and as if the power of England were really such as to be able to force me;

I signed the preliminaries because it was necessary to put an end to the evils of war, and the immense advantages England gained thereby were the result of negotiations not of force;

That today, as for the past fortnight, the King of England is in a position to conclude, since there is no longer any point in dispute; but that if the King wants war he will be responsible for the consequences; that in any case he is free to make it, but this menace and bluster is an improper tone to adopt towards France.

\* A congress held in January, 1802, and attended by Bonaparte, to draw up the political systems of the new republics in Italy. Lucchesini was Prussian ambassador.

I want Citizen Otto to speak forcefully and to repeat what he says so that it sinks in, even if he is assured that the ministry has given orders to sign; I want it to be well known that threats will never succeed with the French Government.

BONAPARTE

740

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Amiens*

*Malmaison*

*21 Ventôse, Year X (12 Mar, 1802)*

Moustache has just arrived. I have already told you, by the courier who left three hours ago, that I attach no importance to the recognition of Liguria. I attach no more to the secret article about Naples, since it is pointless, and even with the best will I cannot evacuate Taranto with the artillery, etc. in less than three months: these are quite useless articles.

So I see no further obstacle to peace. You must just take care to draft the article on prisoners in a form that does not prevent Portugal paying us what she owes under the secret articles in her own treaty. This is for your guidance, as you must not say a word of it, since England has never mentioned it.

You can tell Lord Cornwallis personally that the King of Prussia has recognized the Italian Republic and had his ambassador congratulate me on the results of the Congress of Lyons. . . .

You will also inform Lord Cornwallis that I am not deceived by the hostile movements in London; that these are no European intrigues, but cabinet intrigues to bring about a change of ministers, and that I shall blame England if such miserable intrigues rekindle war. Add, too, that I am quite convinced that with the situation in Europe as it is, England alone could not reasonably make war against us.

If you think peace will be signed within twenty-four hours, keep Moustache; you will send him to London to inform Otto.

BONAPARTE

741

### To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte

*Minister Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Amiens*

*Malmaison*

*21 Ventôse, Year X (12 Mar, 1802)*

It is midnight. I learn by telegraph from Brest that our fleet reached Santo Domingo on 16 Pluviôse; that our army has landed and the Cape and the whole of the superb plain to the north are occupied by our troops. I hasten to send you this news so you can make such use of it as you see fit.

BONAPARTE

742

**To Citizen Roederer***Councillor of State**Paris**25 Ventôse, Year X (16 Mar, 1802)*

I need a man going to England who is intelligent, can judge men and has his eyes open. Citizen Fiévée seems to me such a man. See if I can count on him for this mission. All he will have to do is move around, see all that he can and send me reports on the movement of public opinion, the administration, in a word all that is happening to the English nation. But since this first mission may lead him to others, it is desirable that his position should be clear; he should have no contact with those who are fomenting troubles in France, but should adhere to the part of one who supports the Government and show it in all his talk.

Let me know if I can count on him.

BONAPARTE

743

**Note***Paris**25 Ventôse, Year X (16 Mar, 1802)*

The article on Malta fixes no term for the stay of the Neapolitan troops. This should be three years, following the English proposal. There should be added at the end of paragraph 12 the words: 'but the troops cannot remain beyond 1805'.

The wording of article 18 is extremely faulty. We cannot say, 'France will procure to the House of Nassau', since we cannot make a positive undertaking as to something that does not belong to us; we are not masters of Germany. It should read: 'The contracting parties will use their influence at the final settlement of the affairs of Germany to procure an indemnity to the Prince of Nassau.'

Article 19 on the Sublime Porte should be the last of all. The words *ally of His Britannic Majesty* must be deleted, for they do not describe the Porte, which is a great enough power to have an existence of its own. I would prefer it to read simply: 'The terms of the present treaty apply to the Sublime Porte.'

BONAPARTE

744

**To Citizen Joseph Bonaparte***Minister Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Amiens**Paris**1 Germinal, Year X (22 Mar, 1802)*

I have been shown your last letter. Your conduct, especially the reserve you have shown, is fitting.

We seem now to be once again in agreement. Otto sends that, on the prisoners, the ministers have agreed that what France has spent on prisoners captured from England's allies shall count for compensation. I think that satisfactory.

As to Malta there would be no harm in declaring that the grand-mastership is vacant, since it is a fact; it is to be understood that as a result of the article stating that neither the English nor the French will have a Language no French native can be appointed Grandmaster. This reservation applies particularly to the Bourbons, since it is said that England plans to have a Bourbon as Grandmaster. It is our intention that the emigrants should play no part in the choice since there is no French Language and the emigrants are still French although proscribed. . . .

It is most important that there is no question of nobility; that conflicts with our forms, and we cannot discuss it. It would be absurd to make us say that one must be noble to enter the Order of Malta. Not to mention it is the sensible *via media*. This is most important.

It is also important to place the article on Turkey at the end and to delete the words *ally of Great Britain*; otherwise it would be necessary to say: *ally of Russia, of the Emperor, former ally of France*. The best thing is to suppress the words *ally of Great Britain*. This is very important, for these words alone would give England a kind of supremacy which we cannot accept.

I have just received letters from Santo Domingo, dated 1 Ventôse; they are very good. Port-Républicain\* has been taken with all its forts and with nothing having been burnt. Toussaint's military chest, containing 2,500,000 francs, has been captured. Port de la Paix and Saint-Dominique are occupied. The Spanish part has submitted, and General Leclerc left on the 29th to attack Toussaint, who was in the field with 7,000 to 8,000 men. I enclose a letter from Jerome.

BONAPARTE

745

### To Citizen Talleyrand

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris

3 Germinal, Year X (24 Mar, 1802)

You will find attached the dispatches I have received from Joseph.

France has always refused the title of Prince of Orange to the Stadtholder; we cannot change this custom.

The third draft of the articles on the Porte is the best.

As for the Barbary states, we must point out, either by inserting it in the protocol or by a note, which is the same thing, how unsuitable it is for the Order of Malta, which was instituted to make war on

\* Port-au-Prince.



them, to admit them to its ports, whence they would ravage even the states of the Pope. How could Portugal, always in a state of war with them, suffer its merchant ships to be captured as they left the harbour of Malta? That would be contrary to all usual ideas and upset the nature of things. It would be best not to mention the Barbary states at all, and if our plenipotentiary is just thinking of Genoa I will force them to respect the Genoese flag whenever I see fit.

Once he has held firm on this and presented the note or insertion in the protocol, the French plenipotentiary is authorized to go ahead and he will not delay signature of the treaty for one hour over this article; it is enough for me to make clear that it was the English who wanted this absurd injustice.

Thus the plenipotentiary is authorized to sign once he has deleted the word *noble* from the article on Malta, the words *Prince of Orange* which we cannot recognize, has adopted the third draft relating to Turkey and presented two notes, one on emigrant knights of Malta, the other on the Barbary states.

BONAPARTE

746

### To Citizen Melzi

*Vice-President of the Italian Republic\**

Paris

5 Germinal, Year X (26 Mar, 1802)

Citizen Melzi, Vice-President of the Italian Republic, you will find attached the final treaty of peace with England.

There is no mention of the King of Etruria, or the Ligurian, Italian and Helvetic Republics; but it will not be long before they are properly recognized. . . .

I see with great pleasure that the Republic begins to be organized and that my plans for its well-being and prosperity will soon be realized.

The news from America is extremely satisfactory.

BONAPARTE

747

### To Rear-Admiral Lacrosse

*C.-in-C., West Indies Squadron*

Paris

22 Germinal, Year X (12 Apr, 1802)

Citizen Rear-Admiral, it is laid down in articles 3 and 12 of the treaty of Peace signed at Amiens on 4 Germinal, Year X, that His Britannic Majesty will restore to the French Republic all possessions and colonies formerly belonging to it which have been occupied or

\* Bonaparte had himself been elected President.

conquered by British forces during the present war, and that, in America, this restitution will take place within three months of ratification of the treaty. I write to tell you that, having chosen you as Commissioner of the Consuls to receive the island of Tobago from His Britannic Majesty in accordance with article 13 of the above treaty, it is my intention that you agree with the commander of the English forces as to the day on which you will take possession of the said island of Tobago in the name of the French Republic in pursuance of the powers I give you by this present.

BONAPARTE

748

### To Rear-Admiral Decrès

*Minister of Marine and Colonies*

Paris

25 Germinal, Year X (15 Apr, 1802)

We must take possession of the Indies, Citizen Minister, within six months of ratification of the treaty at the latest, that is before 1 Brumaire, Year XI. The colonial prefect or some other agent, with a few junior employees and engineer and artillery officers, must be sent straight to Pondicherry by corvette as soon as possible. General Montigny might be sent. This commissioner should arrive before the end of Thermidor, so as to make all arrangements for the resumption of possession and to send us news of the situation in India.

The expedition we shall have to send has two parts: first to take possession of Mauritius; second, to take possession of India. I wish each to consist of at least two battleships.

It seems that to occupy Mauritius will need 2,000 men. I wish them to be ready to leave Toulon before the end of Floréal. I wish the second expedition to be ready a month later.

The first must carry the Captain-General of Mauritius, the second the Captain-General of India. Send me a report on all these matters.

BONAPARTE

749

### Minute

Paris

9 Floréal, Year X (29 Apr, 1802)

[General Napper-Tandy informs the First Consul that, his property being confiscated, his sole resource is the generosity of the French Government.]

The Minister of War will at once have him given a gratuity of 6,000 francs and will send me a report as to what should be done with him.

BONAPARTE

750

**To the Legislative Corps***Paris**16 Floréal, Year X (6 May, 1802)*

Citizen Legislators, the Government lays before you the treaty which puts an end to the last dissensions of Europe and completes the great work of peace.

The Republic fought for its independence; its independence is recognized; the oath of all the powers confirms the rights which it derives from nature and the frontiers which it owes to its victories.

A new republic has been born out of it, has absorbed its principles and adopted at its source the ancient spirit of the Gauls. Attached to France by the memory of a common origin, by common institutions, and above all by the bond of interest, the Italian Republic has taken its place among the powers as among our allies; it will remain there by its courage and achieve distinction by its virtues.

Restored to unity and freed from that divided influence which has bewildered its counsels and led its policy astray, Holland has regained its freedom and finds in the nation that had conquered it the surest guarantee of its existence and its rights. The wisdom of its government will preserve its splendour, and the busy energy of its citizens will restore its prosperity.

The Helvetic Republic, though recognized by others, is still torn within by factions struggling for power. Faithful to its principles, the Government has been unable to bring to bear on an independent nation any influence beyond advice. Hitherto, that advice has been ineffective, but it still hopes that the voice of wisdom and moderation will be heard, and that the powers adjoining Switzerland will not be forced to intervene to suppress troubles whose continuance would endanger their own tranquillity.

The Republic owed it to the fidelity of Spain and to its own undertakings to make every effort to preserve that nation's integrity. It has carried out this duty throughout all the negotiations in every way that the situation allowed. The King of Spain has recognized the loyalty of his allies, and at the peace his generosity has made the sacrifice we had tried to spare him. Thereby he has acquired new rights to the support of France and a sacred title to the gratitude of Europe. Returning trade is already restoring his dominions after the calamities of war and a robust spirit will soon bring new energy and industry to his vast possessions.

Rome, Naples and Etruria have returned to calm and the arts of peace. Lucca has found quiet and independence under a constitution that has united its people and extinguished hatred. Liguria has based

its affairs on the absence of party strife, and trade and wealth once more flow into the port of Genoa.

The Republic of the Seven Islands is still, like Switzerland, a prey to anarchy; but, in agreement with France, the Emperor of Russia is sending the troops he had at Naples to take back to those happy lands the only goods they lack: tranquillity, the rule of law and the absence of hatred and faction.

Thus, from one end of the continent to the other and on the seas Europe sees peace returning and its welfare established on the agreement of the great powers and on respect for treaties.

In America the known principles of the Government have restored complete security to Martinique, Tobago and Santa Lucia. They no longer fear the rule of those foolish laws which would have brought death and devastation to the colonies. They aspire only to rejoin the mother country and, with their trust and devotion, they bring to it no less prosperity than before.

In Santo Domingo great evil has occurred and there is great damage to repair. But each day the revolt is more nearly suppressed. Without fortresses, without money, without an army, Toussaint is no more than a brigand wandering from hill to hill with a few others like himself whom our intrepid patrols are pursuing and will soon have destroyed.

There is peace in Mauritius and India. The first steps of the Government have already carried back to them love for the Republic, confidence in its laws and every hope of prosperity.

Many years will now pass for us without victories, without triumphs, without those great negotiations that decide the destiny of states. But nations, above all the Republic, should be marked by other successes. Everywhere industry is reviving, everywhere trade and the arts are joining to efface the miseries of war. Work of every kind demands the thought of the Government.

The Government will carry out this new task with success for so long as it is supported by the opinion of the French people.

Future years will, it is true, be less illustrious; but the happiness of France will increase through the chances of glory she will have laid aside.

BONAPARTE

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*Bonaparte turning Turk at Cairo for  
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**DEMOCRATIC CONSOLATIONS**

*Bonaparte on his Couch surrounded by the  
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**'Democracy, or a Sketch of the life of Bonaparte'**

Four of a series of eight cartoons by Gillray published in May, 1800

SOURCES ARE INDICATED BY A PREFIX LETTER, OR LETTER AND FIGURE, AND A numeral. The prefix letter shows the source-book referred to, the numeral the number of the document there if the documents are numbered, otherwise the page reference. Volume numbers are not given unless the documents are un-numbered; they are then shown by small roman numerals after the prefix letter. The following are the prefix letters used and the books they represent:

- B1 de Brotonne: *Lettres inédites de Napoléon I*  
 B2 de Brotonne: *Dernières Lettres inédites de Napoléon I*  
 C *Correspondance de Napoléon I*  
 Ce Cerf: *Lettres de Napoléon á Joséphine*  
 Ch Chuquet: *Ordres et Apostilles de Napoléon*  
 D Duguit and Monnier: *Les Constitutions et les principales Lois politiques de la France*  
 J du Casse: *Mémoires de Roi Joseph*  
 L Lecestre: *Lettres inédites de Napoléon I*  
 M Masson: *Napoléon Inconnu*

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