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A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND  
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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SIN.

SIR OLIVER LODGE, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S.,

Principal of the University of Birmingham.

THE following essay is not controversial but explanatory ; it is not to be regarded exactly as the outcome of criticism, but is for the most part an inevitable sequel or supplement to my April article, wherein certain topics were so briefly dealt with as to give rise to misunderstanding and to demand amplification. I do not say that amplification will in every case produce agreement ; all that I can hope from clear statement is the avoidance of misunderstanding.

I find, however, that the most valuable of the criticisms received (by post and otherwise) have fallen chiefly under four heads, and that my present article may be conveniently apportioned under similar headings. They are as follows :—

- I. That an evolutionary treatment of sin minimises unduly the sense of sinfulness.
- II. That I appear to deny the wrath of the Holy One against sin.
- III. That I am heretical in respect of the relation between the humanity and Divinity of Christ.
- IV. That I fail to realise the true significance of the doctrine of a vicarious Atonement.

Before beginning the discussion of these subjects, I will make a few introductory remarks, suggested to some extent by the extremely friendly and yet critical comment with which the Bishop of Rochester has favoured us in the last or July issue of the *Hibbert Journal*. He has in places touched in kindly manner a personal note, and I will clear away these personal references and a few other details before settling down to the business in hand.

The Bishop is good enough to say that in theology I am an amateur. That I am not a professed theologian is certain, but perhaps I *may* aspire to rank as an amateur; for although ignorance is the simplest thing to claim, and although I could make good that claim on a great variety of technical points, it is impossible to imitate the customary attitude of educated men to natural science, and profess total ignorance; since no one can pretend complete ignorance concerning the things which belong unto our peace, however much their inner nature may be hid from his eyes.

It is not, however, on the ground of any incipient or amateurish acquaintance with theology that I have ventured to attempt the discussion of tremendous topics in the *Hibbert Journal*: it is because my studies have lain in other directions, while my interests are somewhat wide; so that occasionally I feel impelled to survey territory not my own, in the hope that the mere fact of a fresh standpoint may enable me to contribute something useful. My sole life-ambition, so far as I know, is the harmless one of hoping to be useful to Higher Powers, by expressing in act and word such thoughts of the age as have fallen to my lot. The Bishop has kindly recognised this, and has given me an ample welcome into his domain.

I confess that I had rather taken a welcome for granted, at least in the case of a privileged publication like this Journal, because if everyone except professionally competent persons refrain from touching a subject, that subject tends to get rather technical and dull. The atmosphere of pro-

fessionalism, in games and in other things, may easily be overdone, and the amateur should not be wholly discouraged. At the same time it must be admitted that an unprofessional outsider who should venture to attack portions of orthodox scientific doctrine, would be unlikely to meet with so polite a reception as that accorded to me.

I do not conceive of myself, however, as attacking theology or theological doctrine: I discern an element of truth in nearly every doctrine, perhaps in quite every doctrine which the human race has been able to believe for a long period; but I am seeking to scrutinise more closely, and if possible display to greater advantage, that side of those doctrines which faces us across the frontier of our scientific territory. This side has been less efficiently attended to by the builders than the façade devoted to edification; and some of our own outworks approach so near to the theological position on its more prosaic side, that an occasional raid, inspired by admiration and conducted with reverence, may be pardoned.

It looks to me as if part of the building were needlessly obscured by coatings and stucco and excrescences, once thought ornamental. Perhaps this extraneous matter had the useful effect of protecting the building through times of ignorance and violence, but some of it is now seen to be little better than disfigurement and crudity, hiding the beautiful structure beneath: it was this extraneous matter alone that I intended to attack in my April article.

But in this legitimate restoration work at the present day a number of operatives are engaged; some doing their occasional best from outside, like myself, others, as regular workmen acting from within, like Dr Talbot. With his scheme of the structure, as seen from his point of view, and stated in the July number of the *Hibbert*, I have extremely little cause to disagree. He is one of the many whom I referred to as having already emancipated themselves from errors of the past to a large extent; and if it still seems to

me that here and there in his statement traces of crudeness remain, who am I that I should suppose myself capable of infallibly detecting and evaluating all forms of crudity?

I see, in a "discussion" on p. 800, that Professor Masterman admits the crudity of ordinary statements of Christian doctrine, but justifies it as necessary to catch the attention of ignorant laymen, who are accustomed to speak in terms of "blood." I think it possible for the clergy to over-estimate the crudity and ignorance of the laity. A professional jargon is apt to be employed which by habit may sound appropriate on Sundays, but does not represent the mental attitude of anyone at other times. I cannot think of anyone who, on suddenly experiencing an unexpected element of good in a man, would be likely to express it by saying that "the blood of Christ had been aroused" in him. Perhaps spirit and character once resided in the blood, as compassion in the bowels and other emotions in other viscera, but few persons imagine that they live there now. I say nothing against the methods of the Salvation Army in its own sphere of activity: these may be justified by their results. I somewhat doubt whether ordinary Church procedure is so justified.

I suggest that it is not wise to assume too invincible an ignorance on the part of habitual worshippers. It may, for instance, be of doubtful wisdom to withdraw documents from common use on this ground alone, and at the same time to suggest that nevertheless they convey essential truth to clerics instructed in refinements of interpretation; it is rather too suggestive of the attitude of the priests in John vii. 49. The really learned in theology are respected by all, but they are infrequently encountered. It would be fairer to admit that some of the documents in use are themselves imperfect and antiquated, that they have been in many respects outgrown, and that truth as now perceived can now be more clearly expressed. But I refrain from entering on ecclesiastical controversy.

Perhaps, however, I may unobtrusively remark that such expressions as righteous vengeance, angry Father, wrathful

Lamb, do not seem satisfactory forms whereby to represent what the Bishop on page 654 well calls "a stately and austere conception of order." Nor is it likely that "the bright front and buoyant tread of early discipleship" (page 653) arose from anything so negative as sin overcome: it was not that which animated the Apostles; and though it certainly contributed to the inspiration of the Magdalene, we should hardly speak of "bright front and buoyant tread" in her case. A brief word, moreover, concerning page 659. Dr Talbot rightly assumes that I raise no objection to the existence of "mystery," wherever it is really unavoidable; but the object of scientific study is to remove it or throw it back into its proper place, which is always the background. If mystery is ever obtrusive, the fact may be taken to indicate that we have failed to understand something that might be intelligible—that the intellect is at fault somewhere. Mystery may be a help to the spirit of worship, but it is certainly not a help to the intelligence; consequently I disagree with his statement on middle of page 659 that the existence of mystery "helps to satisfy the mind" that a certain work is Divine: it has too much the air of the old *credo quia incredibile* type of resolute credulity. I would rather urge that on the intellectual side we should cultivate faith in the intelligibility of the universe, and on the religious side should regard every true work without exception as Divine.

Dr Talbot says that he fails to follow the distinction intended by the sentence "only half man say some, only quarter man say others"; so I will explain that my reference was to the Franciscan doctrine concerning the circumstances connected with the birth of Christ's mother. I used the somewhat flippant adjectives "half" and "quarter" to signify that straightforward manhood might be supposed dichotomised at each supernormal birth.

There is no need for me to enter upon a subject on which the great Doctors of the Church have written much and differed strongly, but I think one must admit that if a Virgin

Birth is necessary for the purpose of cutting off the entail of original sin, it only half accomplishes that purpose, and the Immaculate Conception is a necessary and logical completion of the process. For myself, I am very willing to postulate an immaculate conception, but I see no gain in going two stages back for it. If inheritance of sinfulness could be arbitrarily checked after one generation, why not after another? There is an inherent weakness in embarking on any elephant-and-tortoise-like speculation, since there is no obvious limit to it. The same sort of objection can be felt when arithmetical specification of any kind is introduced into the transcendental region of theology. "Three persons" is doubtless an idea helpful to incipient comprehension, but it should be recognised as a concession to arithmetising humanity. Possibly the idea of "three" in this connexion may be as practically useful as the notion of three dimensions in space, which is a most real and definite human truth; though whether it be a genuine limitation of absolute existence, apart from human limitations, most people who have thought about it strongly doubt. Engineering is governed by space of three dimensions, abstract Mathematics is not. The Christian life may be aided by the idea of a God of triple personality—an infinite Being of triple aspect; but I conceive that even man can be said to have a triple nature, and that the aspects of Deity are not three alone, but are beyond numerical specification.

That is enough by way of introduction, and now we will enter on our appointed task; arranging the subjects in the order already specified on page 1.

I. In the *Hibbert Journal* for April 1904, page 466, the following sentence occurs:—

"As a matter of fact the higher man of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their punishment: his mission, if he is good for anything, is to be up and doing."

When writing these words I was well aware that they laid me open to a retort based upon John ix. 41; nevertheless

the statement seems to me true "as a matter of fact," provided by "higher men" are understood leaders in the world's activity, whether they are working in the public eye or in the study or in the office, or anywhere save in the cloister. Perhaps when so put it will be granted, merely as a matter of fact, if saints are excluded, and if no moral judgment in favour of the thesis is claimed or supposed to be involved in the statement. But it will be contended that more than a matter of fact was implied in my article, that there was an element of judgment also, and that it was one of approbation: that the epithet "higher" signified that a man who was up and doing, instead of introspecting and mourning over his sins, was in the path of progress, and was to be praised rather than blamed. Undoubtedly I did mean that too; and in order implicitly to justify that attitude, without presumption and without tedious contention, I gave two Biblical references—one to Matt. xxiv. 46, where the "servant who is found so doing" is authoritatively "blessed," and the other to the warning contained in Matt. xii. 43, that apologue about the fate of a house which was left unoccupied after having been cleaned and decorated.

It may surely without unorthodoxy be held that there are two ways of overcoming sin and sinful tendencies: one the direct way, of concentrating attention on them with brooding and lamentation; the other the indirect and, as I think, the safer and more efficacious and altogether more profitable way, of putting in so many hours' work per day, and of excluding weeds from the garden by energetic cultivation of healthy plants.

It will be said that brooding and lamentation is not a fit description of the exercises of religion, that a safeguard of a higher order than any terrestrial occupation can be secured by conscious emotional penitence and aspiration. It may be so; but it is not quite certain. The following sonnet may or may not be good poetry, but it would appear to embody, in exaggerated and feminine form, a phase of experience not unfamiliar to the ordinary human soul:—

“A soul of many longings entered late  
 A chapel like a jewel blazing bright,  
 And fell upon the altar steps. All night  
 She held with hopes and agonies debate ;  
 With tears the litanies love-passionate  
 Drenched her ; triumphant colours burned her white ;  
 And, as the incense flamed in silver light,  
 God sealed her to His own novitiate.

“And then, because her eyes were charmed with peace,  
 And blinded by the stars new-born within—  
 The lit sweet lids God’s dreams had loved,—  
 Nine paces from that House of Ecstasies  
 Her feet were taken in the snares of sin ;  
 And, ere the morning quickened, she was dead.”<sup>1</sup>

We must all of us have known what it is to be compelled to say, not always, nor often, it is to be hoped,—it is as stupid to exaggerate in these as in any other matters,—but occasionally in the course of our lives, or even constantly in connection with some minor ingrained habit which we should like to overcome,

“Video meliora, proboque,  
 Deteriora sequor.”

And this doing not what we see to be best, but something inferior which we do not really approve or will to do, is what constitutes one aspect of sin. Plato, indeed, argues in the *Gorgias* that a wicked man is not really obeying his own will, that he is enslaved and acting contrary to his true self ; but whether that be so or not, few of us have the spirit to be wilful sinners. Wilful sin is, as has been often said, rebellion and lawlessness, the misuse and misapplication of natural powers ; it is akin to dirt, to disease, to weeds—*i.e.* to matter and cells and plants out of place, and working harm instead of good. It is like a fire escaped from control and consuming instead of serving. Even so a banked-up lake constructed for the water-supply of a city, if it burst its embankment, may overwhelm villages in flood.

Our business is to restrain and control, to direct and guide,

<sup>1</sup> One of Rachael Annand Taylor’s poems, called “The Vanity of Vows,” quoted in the *Times* Literary Supplement for 15th April 1904.

the forces of nature and our own forces. The man of vigorous sin, rightly trained and directed, may become the man of wholesome energy. There is some valuable material being wasted in our prisons: unreclaimed soil festering for lack of plough and harrow. Good men of small and restrained activity may not constitute the most efficient or the most approved instruments of progress. The ascetic may endeavour to avoid all danger, by never making a mountain lake, by never lighting a fire, by never going to sea, by running no risks and living a poverty-stricken existence; and may succumb after all: as soldiers may be economised in war till they fall victims to some miserably ignominious disease. We are called upon rather for full exercise of all our powers, for full vigour of life, but subject to discipline and reason and restraint. What we call vices and virtues are compounded of very similar vital forces: their character is dependent on the direction we give them. Every activity can be deflected from the vicious into the virtuous direction; and an unsought joy is the reward.

While dealing with these everyday considerations, it is desirable to avoid misconception by explicitly making the admission that doubtless there is a sense in which radical imperfection can be predicated of the whole human race without exception: the sense in which the heavens can be said to be unclean and the angels to be chargeable with folly; the sense in which Job, though able to rebut the charge of hidden wickedness brought by his friends, was willing abundantly to admit vileness when accosted by the Deity.

For devotional purposes this comparison of humanity with infinite perfection and infinite attributes generally may be appropriate and useful, though no finite emendation can be effective against it; one would expect the feeling aroused by contemplation of infinitude to be one of humility and abasement rather than one of contrition and penitence, but I admit that saints have found it otherwise, and that their experience is conclusive.

II. So much for practical and human considerations ; but there is another and more important matter, concerning which I am likewise held to have gone wrong, viz., where I contend that the sacrifice of Christ need not be regarded as expiatory, or as appeasing the righteous anger of a wrathful God, because—

“ He had felt no wrath at the blind efforts, the risings and sinkings, of men struggling in the mire from bestial to human attributes—there was nothing to appease ” (*Hibbert*, April, page 471).

This has been attacked as unscriptural: “ Angry with the wicked every day,” “ The wrath of the Lamb,” and a multitude of familiar texts, can easily be quoted.

Very well, the epithet “ unscriptural ” has no coercive force unless the text appealed to carries with it a conviction of its own inspiration. There is plenty of “ anger ” in the Old Testament undoubtedly, but that is just where one would expect to find it on the survival hypothesis ; and I doubt not the Prophets had plenty to make them angry.<sup>1</sup>

But it is scarcely worth while to waste time in discussing the relative authority of texts : every one must be aware that this is no rosewater world ; the things that have happened in it, and the things that may yet happen in it, are appalling. We must admit the force of experiences which gave birth to

<sup>1</sup> Of the two texts above quoted at random the first is from Psalm vii. 11, and the words “ with the wicked ” seem to be a gratuitous interpolation of the translators, an evident attempt to make intelligible the supposed sentence, “ God judgeth the righteous, and God is angry every day.” The Prayer-book version—more effective as usual—renders it thus, “ God is a righteous Judge, strong and patient, and God is provoked every day ” ; which is doubtless as true as any statement of the kind can be.

“ The wrath of the Lamb ” occurs only in Revelation, so far as I know ; and there also is to be found that hyperbole, intensified from Isaiah and from a common industry of the country, about the vintage of blood flowing “ to the horse-bridles ” from the trodden winepress of the wrath of God. The author’s feelings are evidently overcharged. And if we had lived in times of really efficient persecution we too might have tried, less poetically, to assuage our indignant helplessness in the same sort of way.

ejaculations such as Luke xii. 5, and Hebrews x. 31, whoever may have been their author, and I am glad of the opportunity of enlarging upon this subject of sin and Divine anger somewhat; it was quite too briefly and superficially treated in my former article: indeed it was not really dealt with at all.

It suited the priests to say that God was angry when a budding nation desired to have a king in order to weld it together. It suited them to say that he was angry when prisoners were taken captive instead of being massacred; and again that he was wroth when the first census was contemplated.

So also in rather later times God was represented as angry with idolaters, not ostensibly because some special practices of idol-worship may have been debasing, but because he was "jealous." There are plenty of good reasons against idolatry among intelligent and "chosen" people, but this is not one of them: nor is it to be supposed that the stock of a tree is ever really worshipped, even when prostrated to. An idol, to ignorant and undeveloped people, is a symbol of something which they are really worshipping under a material form and embodiment: the sensuous presentation assists their infantile efforts towards abstract thought, as material sacraments help people in a higher stage of religious development. But some of these helps should be outgrown. An adult mathematician hardly needs a geometrical figure, crudely composed of fragments of chalk or smears of plumbago or ink, to help him to reason; and if he uses such a diagram he is aware that he is not really attending to it, but is reasoning about ideal and unrealisable perfections; he has soared above the symbol, and is away among the cementing laws of the universe.

If an image or a tree-trunk or other symbol helps a savage to meditate on some divine and intractable conception, if it has been so used by thousands of his ancestors, and has acquired a halo of reverence through antiquity and by the accumulation of human emotion lavished upon it,—a missionary

should think twice before he is rude to it, or abuses it or pulls it down. We do not rebuke a child for lavishing a wealth of nascent maternal affection on some grotesque black-Betty of a wooden rag-covered doll; we do not despise, we honour, a regiment content to be decimated so it may save its flag, which materially is almost a nonentity. And so if we send missionaries, we should send competent men, who will gradually educate by implanting useful arts and positive virtues; and we should tell these messengers clearly that negative and iconoclastic teaching may be very cruel.

These things depend upon grade attained. It was very right for Hebrew prophets to feel indignant and to wax sarcastic when they saw the degenerate worship of a moderately enlightened people descending to the level of a grinning idol or the stock of a tree, and they may have rightly felt that to replace such symbols as these by the more advanced symbol of an angry and jealous God would be a spiritual help of the highest kind possible to a nation at such a stage of ethical development. In this manner the texts concerning anger and jealousy can be amply accounted for.

Moreover, like most other symbolism they embody a real truth. Quite irrespective of texts in its favour, we may be willing to recognise Divine wrath as a real and terrible thing; though we must also be ready to admit that the gloom of religions antecedent to Christianity, and its own later struggle amid nascent civilisation, overshadowed the Gospel message unduly; and fear was a powerful weapon in the hands of priests, which they did not fail to employ. But I feel no contradiction between all this and the above quotation from page 471. So far as I can judge, it is *not* likely that a Deity operating through a process of evolution can feel wrath at the blind efforts of his creatures struggling upward in the mire. I judge rather that the human impulse to lend them a pitiful and helpful hand can with difficulty be restrained, can indeed only be restrained by lofty and far-seeing Wisdom, and by perception of "the far-off interest of tears."

Nevertheless, I am sure that what may without irreverence be humanly spoken of as fierce Wrath against sin, and even against a certain class of sinner, is a Divine attribute. But, then, what do we mean by "sin" in this connection? It is a term which, in a different sense from charity, likewise covers a multitude. I do not wish to enter upon a dissertation on the nature of sin in general from the scientific standpoint. For our present purpose we can regard the matter quite simply, as something of which we have all plenty of experience; but I maintain that when we are speaking of the sin against which God's anger blazes, we do not mean the sins of failure, the burden of remorse, the acts which cause contrition and penitence on the part of a saint or a child or a labouring man—a labouring man or woman of any class; we mean something quite other than that. And I assume that therein we are consistent with the doctrines of the Church.

If not a wicked absurdity, it is surely a libel to assert that God is angry with ordinary human failings, and with the dismal lapses from virtue of poor outcasts of civilisation. We are familiar, for instance, with the fierce wrath of Christ, his language was denunciatory in the extreme: but against what sort of people? It was not the publicans and the harlots whom he stigmatised as a generation of vipers, or whom he threatened with the damnation of hell; rather it was some specimens of the unco' guid of that day—people perfectly satisfied with themselves, people ready to forbid deeds of healing on the sabbath, and eager to stifle the holiest if they had the chance<sup>1</sup>—it was with these that he was angry, not with anyone who could be described as helplessly and inefficiently struggling out of the mire towards better things.

There were sins of which he was genuinely ashamed, so that he stooped and wrote upon the ground when they were suddenly obtruded upon his notice by coarse experimenters: shame so acute that even those ruffians had the grace subse-

<sup>1</sup> Mark iii. 5, 6, 29.

quently to slink away; but it was stoning of the Prophets, wilful blindness to the Highest, it was blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, that excited his fiercest reprobation.

Just as it is impossible for the human race at any given time to select that one of their number who will be best remembered a thousand years hence, so it is difficult for us to judge what class of people are rendering themselves most liable to high Displeasure now. I suppose that the respectable and religious world of Judæa was genuinely astonished, and not a little scandalised, at its vigorous denunciation by an itinerant Preacher, long ago; and it is just possible that to-day those self-satisfied people who shut their eyes to truth, and propagate error, are at least as harmful to the general advance as are some individuals whom society for its own safety finds it necessary to keep in seclusion.<sup>1</sup>

A Church which, let us say, excommunicates Tolstoi may possibly be composed of pious individuals whom it does not become us to judge, but I can conceive that in its corporate capacity any Church which opposes reform, which persistently takes the wrong side, which sustains abuses such as the *droits de seigneur* in the past, and perhaps other only less flagrant abuses to-day, may be regarded as deserving of vigorous Denunciation; and if such an institution, in some neighbouring country or elsewhere, should happen to fall upon evil days, it may find itself unsuccessful in its endeavour to fasten the blame upon anything but itself.

There are many grades of sin; and anyone may know the kind of sin which excites the anger of God, by bethinking him of the kind which arouses his own best and most righteous anger. I can imagine that the infernal proceedings of Nero and of the Holy Inquisition were repugnant and

<sup>1</sup> And, incidentally, may it not be also possible that the omission on the part of society to make any serious and satisfactory effort to train and humanise and redeem those whom it thus takes under its providential control (not to mention their subjection to the inhuman device of solitary confinement) is liable to be regarded in High Quarters as deserving of reprobation just as severe as that accorded to any more actively committed crime?

nauseating to the Universe to a degree which was almost unbearable. The fierce indignation that would blaze out if one were maliciously to torture a child or an animal in view of an ordinary man or woman, would surely be a spark of the Divine wrath; and we have been told that a millstone round the neck of a child-abuser is too light a penalty.

Sins of this kind are a boil, an abscess, on the Universe: they must be attacked and cured by human co-operators, they are hardly tractable otherwise;<sup>1</sup> just as in the complex aggregate of cells we call our body the dominant intelligence cannot unaided cope with its own disease, but must depend on the labours of its micro-organisms, the phagocytes, which swarm to any poisoned plague spot, and there actively and painfully struggle with and inflame and attack the evil, till one side or other is overcome: so it is with man as an active ingredient in the universe: we are the white corpuscles of the cosmos: and like the corpuscles we are an essential ingredient of the system, our full potentiality being latent until stimulated into activity by disease.

If it is possible for a man at times to feel a sort of hatred and anger against his own weaker and worser self, so I can imagine a God feeling what may be imperfectly spoken of as disgust and wrath at defects which still exist in his Universe—in Himself, dare we say?—defects for which in a manner he is in some sort responsible, defects which he has either caused, or for ultimate reasons permitted, or has not yet, in the present stage of evolution, been able to cure consistently with full education and adequate scope for free development of personality; defects which surely his conscious creatures will assist him to remove, now that the bare possibility of the existence of these ferocious evils has done its salutary and ultimately beneficent work.

In this sense, therefore, it would be inappropriate to deny any amount of wrath against sin and even against the blatant sinner—the class of people who can only be impressed by the

<sup>1</sup> Psalm cxv. 16.

falling of a stone which shall grind them to powder. But it is not for people in the blatant state that the consolations of religion are available, they are not the bruised reed whom he will not break; and there is no sense in perplexing ordinary struggling, kindly, weak, unhappy humanity, with alleged fearful penalties attaching to even minor disobedience: penalties which must be exacted somehow, no matter much from whom; nor need we spoil people's conception of the Fatherhood of God with distorted legends representing him as a Roman Father who will not scruple to visit their sins and shortcomings upon the innocent body of his own Son, since that is the only condition on which his wrath may be turned away and his hand not stretched out still.

III. There is one sentence in my April article which I should like to explain away.

It is where I appear to suggest that Christ's body was human, his spirit divine; thus making an untenable distinction between the vehicle and the manifestation.

It would have been better to avoid even the appearance of entering on so large a question as the nature of Christ by a mere side-door. My object at the moment was not anything so ambitious, but merely to indicate what would be the effect on mankind of the arrival of a personage, with a human and therefore accessible and mortal body, animated by a spirit of divine perfection. I wished to urge that among the results of the thorough incarnation of a truly Divine Spirit would be the beginnings of a real atonement between man and God; and that the influence exerted would be exerted wholly on man. Further than that I did not then intend to go; nor do I propose to go much further now, though the temptation is considerable. It is easy to recognise that the subjects of the Incarnation and the Resurrection are profoundly difficult, and yet to feel impelled to express surprise at the language which eminent theologians sometimes permit themselves to

employ. I take the following astounding sentence from Canon Moberly's article in *Lux Mundi* :

P. 236. "No one will now dispute that Jesus died upon the Cross. If He did not on the third day rise again from that death to life—*cadit questio*—all Christian dogma, all Christian faith, is at an end."

I suppose it is intended as a paraphrase of St Paul's "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain and your faith is also vain." But the two statements are perfectly different. If Christ be not risen in some sense or other, if his death was the end of him, according to the current but perhaps not quite correct conception of the death of a dog, then indeed is the prospect blank.

But "rise again from death to life on the third day" must mean far more than persistent existence and influence : it seems to mean resuscitation, after the manner of Lazarus. Indeed, the fourth article of the Church definitely asserts that it does mean that and more. But an attempt to link the whole of Christian faith inextricably with an anatomical statement about flesh and bones, is rash.

Again,

p. 237. "No one to-day disputes that He was truly man. Is it true that He was very God? It is either true or false. As to the fact there are only the two alternatives. And between the two the gulf is impassable. If it is not false it is true. If it is not absolutely true it is absolutely false."

Do theologians always know what they mean when they glibly use, in a serious and solemn sense, the awful term God? Have they any notion of the Universe at all? Are they still limited to tribal or planetary conceptions of Deity? They talk, or used to talk, about "dispensations." We ourselves, as a nation, give dispensations to children or savages other than we should give to developed people ; a planetary dispensation is one thing, a planetary God another. These attempted identifications of the Messiah with the Most High, verge on the blasphemous. When Peter was blessed for a burst of bold and enthusiastic affirmation and adequate recognition

of Christ's divine nature, he said no such thing as that. What he said was, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."

As to affirming that Christ was either God or was not God and that there is nothing more to be said: there are few complex propositions of which so simple a positive or negative affirmation can be made. For instance, it is almost proverbially difficult to reply to the childish question whether a given historical character was "good" or was not good.

The word God must have an infinite diversity of meaning, and two uses of the term are prominent. One connotes vaguely the Absolute Sustainer and Comprehender of all existence: the other signifies such detailed conception of Godhead as the human race has been able to frame. This latter has been helped on mightily by the revelation of Jesus, among those who can accept it,—the revelation of genuinely human faculties and feelings, and even something of the unconscious simplicity of childhood,<sup>1</sup> in the Divine Being,—and the further revelation, so enthusiastically glimpsed by the youthful David near the end of Browning's poem "Saul," the perception that Divine as well as human love may be and actually is strong enough to submit to sacrifice and genuine suffering on behalf of the beloved.

This revelation and perception may to some have become so keen and piercing that to no other aspect of Godhead can they pay attention. These are they who say that Christ was very God in the absolute sense; and subjectively they may be right. It is a statement, not of what they conceive of Christ, but of what they mean by God. One cannot define or explain the known in terms of the unknown.

IV. The late Bishop of Southampton, in his article on the Atonement in *Lux Mundi* (pp. 282, 283), says that—

<sup>1</sup> Luke ix. 48.

“It was from the Law that the Jews derived their religious language; their conceptions of sacrifice, of atonement, of the effects of sin, were moulded by the influence of the Mosaic ceremonies. . . . The sacrificial ceremonies and language of the Law throw light upon the apostolic conception of the Sacrifice, the Atonement of Christ.”

I entirely agree. The ceremony of the Scapegoat, and indeed the whole so-called Mosaic system, are clearly responsible for a great deal of the doctrine which penetrated into the New Testament, and has survived even to the present day.

This article of Dr Lyttelton's is full of the word “propitiation.” That word embodies compactly what I regard as an error or a crudity, and serves to focus the issue. The basis of his contention throughout is given succinctly in the following passage (p. 282):—

“Examination of the sacrificial system of the Old Testament is necessary in a discussion of the doctrine of the Atonement, for several reasons.

“The institutions of the Law were, in the first place, ordained by God, and therefore intended to reveal in some degree His purposes, His mind towards man.”

That is where I join issue. I would rather go to the opposite extreme and say that the Gospel was an attempt to break away from sacrificial and priestly tradition; that the “not destroy but fulfil” referred to the major denunciations and other accumulations of race-experience, which were on right lines as far as they went, not to the minor institutions and superstitions which had become an incubus destructive of living personal religion. We may not all in every respect be equally enamoured of the parable of the Prodigal Son—I myself am conscious of a subterranean sympathy with the sentiments expressed by his elder brother—but the whole story is very human, very familiar, and full of manifest inspiration; and without wishing to press it unduly, we must admit that any feeling of wrath against the offender, or even against the offence, is rather conspicuously absent from its scheme. The sense of guilt is there, in pronounced form, but as a one-sided feeling; and its paternal counterpart seems not to have been removed by expiatory sacrifice or by propitiation

of any kind, but simply to be non-existent. There is very little residue of the Mosaic dispensation in that story.

So markedly has this been felt indeed by some preachers that, in dismay at finding themselves adrift from their familiar moorings, a few have actually seized upon the fatted calf and tried to construct some kind of propitiatory sacrifice out of that.

And this brings me to the central feature of the Bishop of Rochester's friendly reply. He urges that the vicarious suffering of the Atonement did somehow redress, cancel, redeem, propitiate,—these words are used in a private letter, while their substance appears in his article,—and he appears to insist that the idea of a Father who is necessarily hard upon us because himself so righteous, is a part of the orthodox view. With great deference I cannot admit the appropriateness of the above verbs to modern insight: they seem to me saturated with the atmosphere of pagan survival and of ante-Isaiah Jewish traditions. No one supposes them to apply to vicious and persistent sins; but if they only apply to negligences and ignorances for which we are heartily sorry and earnestly repent, they are unnecessary, except in a subjective and comforting sense.

But then this is a real sense: there must be some meaning in the perennial experience of relief and renovation at the Cross. Was it not there that Christian's burden fell,—type of many thousands of devout persons? Is there no regenerating agency at work in justification of this mass of real human experience? Far be it from me to doubt it; and it behoves me, who have presumed to emphasise one aspect, to emphasise the other also, in order to make a picture not too obviously incomplete and one-sided.

I am now going to use the word "sin" in its theological and, so to speak, "official" sense, the sense of imperfection, disunion, lack of harmony, the struggle among the members that St Paul for all time expressed; there is usually associated with it a sense of impotence, a recognition of the impossibility

of achieving peace and unity in one's own person, a feeling that aid must be forthcoming from a higher source. It is this feeling which enables the spectacle of any noble self-sacrificing human action to have an elevating effect, it is this which gropes after the possibilities of the highest in human nature, it is a feeling which for large tracts of this planet has found its highest stimulus and completest satisfaction in the life and death of Christ. All religions worthy of the name are based upon some heroic and self-sacrificing life, upon some man with clearer vision than his fellows, one who is in closer touch and sympathy with the Divine.

And not insight and heroism alone: Paul was able to bear the sufferings of this present time with heroism, but Paul was not crucified for us, nor are we baptized in the name of Paul. No, there is evidently something unique about the majesty of Jesus of Nazareth which raises him above the rank of man; and the willingness of such a Being to share our nature, to live the life of a peasant, and to face the horrible certainty of execution by torture, in order personally to help those whom he was pleased to call his brethren, is a race-asset which, however masked and overlaid with foreign growths, yet gleams through every covering and suffuses the details of common life with fragrance.

This conspicuously has been a redeeming, or rather a regenerating agency—I know nothing of “cancelling,” “redressing,” or “propitiating”: those words I repudiate; but it has regenerated,—for by filling the soul with love and adoration and fellow-feeling for the Highest, the old cravings have often been almost hypnotically rendered distasteful and repellent, the bondage of sin has been loosened from many a spirit, the lower entangled self has been helped from the slough of despond and raised to the shores of a larger hope, whence it can gradually attain to harmony and peace.

I have been asked how far I am able to agree with the Hon. Arthur Lyttelton's beautiful essay on the Atonement

in *Lux Mundi*. I reply, with the initial three or four pages and with the concluding three or four pages almost entirely. By dint of working through a maze of rather intractable material, which he treats as well as it is possible for it to be treated, he arrives at what I conceive to be the legitimate conclusion. He discards the infinite-punishment doctrine completely, he brushes lightly aside M'Leod Campbell's infinite-repentance modification of it, and he attempts to justify the view of a perfect sacrifice.

So far as he associates this with vicarious penalty and emphasises the *propitiatory* aspect of the Atonement, he goes, as I consider, wrong; he even argues that in his agony and death the Son must have been engaged in propitiating not only his Father's wrath but his own also; that he was, in fact, taking upon himself, and so both retrospectively and prospectively warding off from others, the wrath of the Lamb. This truly is a logical outcome of the orthodox doctrine, but it should serve as one of the modes of discrediting some of the crudity in that doctrine and reducing it to a kind of absurdity.

But when Dr Lyttelton arrives at page 310 he has emerged from Mosaic mediævalism into an atmosphere of truth: it is *true* that Christ bore his sufferings, as we should learn to bear ours, victoriously and in unbroken union with God. He showed that the highest and the best might have to suffer, so long as the world was imperfect.

In an admirable essay on "Pain" by J. R. Illingworth in *Lux Mundi* this part of the matter is put with great clearness:—

"Once for all the sinless suffering of the Cross has parted sin from suffering with a clearness of distinction never before achieved. . . . The sight of perfect sinlessness combined with perfect suffering has cleared our view for ever. . . . Sin indeed always brings suffering in its train, but the suffering we now see to be of the nature of its antidote. . . . But while sin involves suffering, suffering does not involve sin. . . . We suffer because we sin, but we also sin because we decline to suffer. . . . The pleasures of each generation evaporate in air; it is their pains that increase the spiritual momentum of the world." And so on (p. 123 to the end).

The problem which had puzzled the ages, the problem of the book of Job, of the tower of Siloam, was practically solved.

And Christ showed how the sting might be taken out of all suffering by meeting it with a spirit of undaunted faith. The power of sin lay in the presence of an evil and rebellious disposition. Rid of that, and though pains and sorrows would come as before, they could be faced in a spirit, not of submission only, but of undying love and hope and almost joy.

So the cognate or complementary problem of the Greek Dramatists also—the problem which looms large in the tragedies of Euripides in especial—the dread that man is the sport and plaything of omnipotence—the fear, the paralysing fear, of caprice or even wickedness on the part of higher powers—the dismal uncertainty whether pain is not sometimes mere gratuitous torture, the outcome of divine jealousy or malevolence or anger or some other pagan attribute: all this was somehow removed from mankind by the victory of Christ, and except in a few individual cases has never very seriously troubled it since.

Not only was indifference to suffering and temporal loss the outcome of it, but there was superadded a certain glory in suffering, in emulation of so noble an example: to fill up, as was hyperbolically said, what was behind; this feeling infused such vitality into the Apostles and the early Church as to carry them victoriously through a terrible period of danger and untold misery. It made them staunch; men and emperors found that they simply could not effectively hurt those whom this faith had seized. And in less troublous times the element of suffering and poverty was still felt to be so vital that it was often self-inflicted in order to secure a deeper joy. So is it always in ages of burning faith; comfort and luxury and this present life, with all that they rightly contain of happiness, are cast aside as almost worthless in exchange for a spiritual exaltation.

But it will be said that this violent enthusiasm and contempt for mere individual temporal well-being is not Christian alone,

that it is common to all religions. Granted. I will not contend that Christ was the only channel of this influence, though he has been the channel for most of us; nor do Buddhism, Brahminism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, exhaust the category of religions more or less efficient in this particular. In islands of strange worship, amid savages of unclean life, the same enthusiasm for the spiritual as dominating the material is felt; for it is a part of the truth of God, and is limited to no age or creed. And in countries which by superficial outsiders are said to have no religious faith it is to be found. The Japanese soldier throws away his individual life by the thousand, in order that his nation may take a noble place in the world and begin its destined work of civilising Asia; yet when he is dead what is Asia or his country to him? He *must* be dominated by a living faith, in perhaps he knows not what. He may not be able to express it, but his faith may be none the less efficient for lacking the outward precision of an Athanasian formula.

But whatever be the case with other religions, the sacrifice of Christ has convinced the Western world of sin to a unique degree, of its reality and dire consequence, of its unreasonableness, its aspect as a disease which must be cured—with the knife if need be, but cured; we have learnt that it is foreign to the universe, it is not the will of God, it is not due to his caprice, or amusement, or dictation, or predestination, or pagan example; it is something which gives even Him pain and suffering; it is something to be rid of, and there is no peace or joy to be had until unity of will is secured and past rebellions are forgiven. The sin of the creature involves suffering in the Creator: the whole of existence is so bound together that disease in one part means pain throughout. This is the element of truth in the vicariousness of suffering, and in extension of suffering to the Highest; but it is not vicariously penal, nor is it propitiatory.

The orthodox doctrine of the Atonement implicitly maintains that God cannot forgive sin, unless and until He has

exacted an adequate penalty somewhere. This does embody a kind of truth, for an eddy of conduct, good or ill, can only disappear by expending its energy in producing some definite effect. In one sense, therefore, a penalty must follow every inharmonious action: a penalty not falling on the wrong-doer alone, but involving the innocent likewise, and bringing needless pain into existence. Perception of this may be part of the punishment, for there can hardly be a fiercer feeling than remorse; but the sting will not be fully felt till the spirit has become broken and contrite and open to the healing influences of forgiveness. There is no agony like that of returning animation. Forgiveness removes no penalty: it may even increase pain, though only that of a regenerative kind; it leaves material consequences unaltered, but it may achieve spiritual reform.

Divine forgiveness is undoubtedly mysterious, but it must be real, for we are conscious that we can forgive each other. It should be an axiom that whatever man can do, God *a fortiori* can do also; meaning by "man" not merely any poor individual man, but the whole highest ethos of the race, including saints, apostles, prophets, everybody, and including Christ himself. How does Christ ask God to forgive sins? *As* we forgive others. This does not solely mean, as it is usually taken to mean, *because* we forgive others, nor in so far as, nor on condition that, we forgive our fellows, but it means *after the same fashion* as we forgive or should forgive them. And the reason given is a luminous one; it has nothing to do with propitiation, it makes no reference to sacrifice or vicarious penalty, nor to the merits of any mediator; no, the reason given is a noble and sufficient one, and it is simply this:—"For Thine is the Kingdom, and the Power, and the Glory, for ever." What more can we add but the word "Amen"?

OLIVER LODGE.

# THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN SIR OLIVER LODGE AND THE BISHOP OF ROCHESTER.

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

IT may seem presumptuous in one who is neither a man of science nor a theologian to intrude in the controversy which Sir Oliver Lodge has opened in the *Hibbert Journal*. But watchers are often said to see most of the game, and it has struck me to ask whether the two distinguished men who have taken the chief part in it do not stand, in what they have recently written, for opposite sides of a larger truth which embraces the contentions of both.

It is now many years since Matthew Arnold made us familiar with the distinction between Hebraism and Hellenism as the two great factors in the moral and religious life of modern peoples. More recently the Master of Balliol has pointed out<sup>1</sup> how the distinction here indicated goes even deeper into the nature of religious consciousness than its author supposed; while on the other hand the elements distinguished stand to each other in no such sharp antithesis as he believed, but are already on the way to reconciliation in the higher truth represented by Christianity.

The question of the foundation of religion is far too large a one to be raised here, but among philosophical writers the theory of which the above-quoted work is probably the

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, ii. p. 14.

completest and most eloquent exposition may be said, in one form or another, to hold the field at the present time. Stated shortly, it is that human consciousness, both theoretical and practical, consists in a relation between subject and object, a mind or self, and a world of things or other selves; but that, underneath the consciousness of these two worlds, as different and often sharply antagonised, there is the consciousness of a unity which embraces both and contains the promise of their ultimate harmony. In ordinary life this underlying consciousness shows itself familiarly as belief in the validity of our practical and theoretic ideals; it rises to religion when, in moments of insight or emotion, this belief develops into a lively assurance of the existence of an all-embracing truth and goodness in which our imperfect efforts find their attainment, our knowledge is completed, our will made perfect in a form of being and experience of which our own is only a broken reflection.

While the sense of the Infinite which is implied in all finite consciousness is thus the ground of all religion, it appears in nations and individuals in a variety of forms which fail to express its essential character. To Glaube the imperfection of human apprehension adds Aberglaube, not only in the sense of imaginative accretions, but in the sense of omissions and partialities which substitute a fragment of its essence for the whole. Of these defects two stand out as typical, not only appearing as characteristic of particular ages and peoples in the history of the world, but marking stages in national development, dividing nations into sects, and even occupying the same individual consciousness at different times and dividing it against itself.

1. There is what has been called the objective attitude. There is, of course, a sense in which all religion is objective, in that it carries us beyond ourselves, reaching out to a reality which transcends the merely individual and personal. But if the above account of human consciousness is true, this reality is not something other than ourselves, as seems to be implied in

Matthew Arnold's well-known definition, but the source of all that is truest and most real within us. The attitude here indicated is that of contentment with the world as it exists. The Infinite is sought for in the finite, as that reveals itself on the one hand in the world of objects which lie open to the senses, and on the other in the established system of national life. Not that these objects and relations are accepted simply as they are for the highest realities. Even here there is on the one hand selection: some objects are more divine than others, *e.g.* the human than animal forms—and on the other hand idealisation: the human form, to take the same illustration, is raised to a higher perfection, in order to be a more adequate symbol of the divine. What is characteristic of this stage is that there has as yet risen no deep-going division between the world and the human soul. Man's natural life, with the activities to which it summons him, seems adequate to his needs. As a strong man he rejoices to run his race. There are toils set him by an evil principle in things—perhaps by the gods themselves—but he feels himself sufficient for his day. He even has a surplus of valour wherewith to assist the gods themselves in their combat with evil.

The classical expression of this attitude is to be found in the life of the Greeks; but, as already said, it is one that is constantly reappearing, and at the present time, among those who cherish the modern ideals of purposefulness and efficiency—clear thinking in a world opening up new vistas of conquerable truth—courageous action in a society ready to appreciate and appropriate new ideals is here and there in splendid evidence. How we should ever get on without it is difficult to see, yet history and deeper reflection on human life prove how impossible it is to get on with this alone. For the circumstances of life, both outward and inward, can only momentarily fail, whether in the nation or in the individual, to give rise to deeper problems. Among the Greeks themselves Mr Gilbert Murray has recently brought home to us by his brilliant studies of Euripides how the optimism of the earlier dramatists

had begun in Euripides to give place to a profound scepticism as to any fundamental harmony between man as an individual and the forces of nature and society in which his life is cast.

2. Thus the second or subjective attitude appears as a reaction from the first. All religion, it must again be noted, is subjective in that, while its object goes beyond the individual's experience, it is necessarily interpreted in terms of the latter. Man makes God in his own image. But the form of religious consciousness here indicated is subjective in a special sense, in that it has its source in a sense of the finiteness and nothingness of the natural world which throws it back on its own inward ideals and aspirations as the type of the absolute. In place of the naïve confidence with which the soul goes out, as in the earlier phase, to meet its god in the world of finite things, there is a distrust of all that is external, and a return on the soul itself as the meeting-place of the finite and the infinite. The period that succeeded the break-up of the Greek world is a classical illustration of this attitude of the soul. In the Stoicism which attracted the more earnest minds, and may be said to have been the official philosophy of the succeeding age, we have an example of a religion which, along with despair of the world without, cultivated the certitude of finding God in the soul. But the example which is most familiar to us, and of the deepest interest in the present connexion, is that approved by the later religion of Jews. Partly as a consequence of the strenuous idealism of the Hebrew mind exalting the infinite above the finite in nature and human life—partly as a result of the actual circumstances of Jewish history plunging the nation into ruin and exile—we have in its literature the profoundest expression of man's sense of alienation from the world and God. In the development of this consciousness, as it comes before us in the prophets, three factors stand out. In the first place, God is spiritualised and exalted above the forces of external nature and the narrowness of the natural relations of human life. In thus becoming

detached from the finite and the natural, He becomes the All-Mighty and the All-Holy. In the second place, and as a consequence, man feels himself a very little thing: his life is a vapour, his righteousness is as filthy rags. Yet this sense of alienation can never become absolute in a being whose life is rooted in a sense of ultimate oneness. Hence from the depths of despair comes the hope of some far-off divine event—some sacrificial and healing change that will reunite and reconcile. This Messianic hope is the third element, the prevailing burden of Jewish prophecy. The development of the prophetic consciousness from Job and Ecclesiastes to the later Isaiah, and finally to Christ Himself, is a long progress of growing insight into the true character of the change that has to be brought about in the spirit of man, and of the blessedness that is to be attained by this change.

This second phase is most clearly illustrated from its historical embodiment in a particular religion, but it also is sufficiently familiar as a present-day reality. So far as we share in the spirit of Hebrew Monotheism, and indeed because we have so largely appropriated it, the sense of the alienation of the natural man from the Highest, and the need of atonement and reconciliation, is an integral part of the religious consciousness of the present time. Any attempt to interpret modern religious feeling without reference to this must appear, whether from the point of view of historical development or of individual experience, essentially inadequate and superficial.

These two attitudes of mind receive striking illustration from one side of the two great teachers in whom the religious tendencies of Greece and Judæa culminated. It may seem paradoxical to treat Socrates as an illustration of the objective attitude. He was profoundly dissatisfied with the condition of the Greek world in his time. He came to convince it of the most fatal of all spiritual diseases—ignorance of itself. By turning men's thoughts inwards he contributed, as historians have pointed out, more than any other to the subjective movement that was to follow. Yet with all this discontent,

Socrates cherished a simple and confiding trust in the religion and institutions of his country, seeking in his life and death nothing higher than their establishment on a sure basis of intelligent piety. His last act was an offering to its gods, his choice of death a witness to his filial love of its laws. In a literal sense he came not to destroy, but to fulfil. From one side the teaching of Jesus appears as the precise reverse. It brought not peace, but a sword. His followers were to forsake all that they had. Even the family in which all earthly society has its roots was turned against itself. Heaven was to be sought in an inward condition of purity and simplicity out of all relation to the fashion of this world—its kingdoms and possessions. While thus appearing as representatives of the one-sided attitude for which their national development stood, it would have been strange if the teaching of both had not contained a fuller truth. The teaching of Socrates contained the germs not only of the coming subjective movement, but, as we see in its later developments, of a lofty monotheism involving the reconstruction of society on a more spiritual basis. Not less does the teaching of Christ bear us far beyond anything that can be called subjective, and St Paul was only carrying out what was implicit in it when he saw in his doctrine of the Love of God the promise of regeneration for mankind, and a reorganisation of society founded not upon the worthlessness but upon the essential reasonableness of human ideals, and the forms of society in which they embody themselves.

If there is any truth in the above sketch (and however hasty and inadequate it may be, we may claim for it at least the authority of the most widely accepted theological thought of the present generation), it will be clear that the controversy which has been raised by Sir Oliver Lodge is not one between a right and a wrong in the interpretation of religious consciousness, but between two partial rights—two essential though incomplete phases of religious feeling: on the one hand, belief in

✓ the essential sanity of human nature suffering no shadow of its own inward or outward failures to stain the pure radiance of its faith in the ultimate triumph of the good ; on the other, ✓ the sense of overmastering evil and the need of assistance from some redeeming power beyond ourselves. "Men are thinking of nothing so little as their sins," writes Sir Oliver. "So much the worse for them," is the reply. "It shows only the secularity of their ideals—the shallowness of their sense of the issues that are at stake." Put in this form, the latter, properly interpreted, is undoubtedly the true view, and I think it doubtful whether Sir Oliver would seriously contest it. There can be no deep religious sense in a soul which does not bear about with it the marks of a life-and-death struggle, which has not had its vision of the Holy Grail and been surprised thereby into a sense of the distance between its ordinary level of feeling and achievement and the heights to which it is called. Even in those whom Matthew Arnold describes as gifted with a genius for righteousness—the prophets and saints of religious history, a roll of names far, it is to be hoped, from completion—this sense of alienation makes itself at least momentarily felt. Christ himself asks, "Why callest thou me good?" In most it forms a constantly recurring factor, which is vivid in proportion to the clearness of a man's moral vision and his faith in its reality. So far from being a source of weakness to normal human nature, it is that which drives it periodically to the fountain of all strength, the belief in an at-onement deeper than all division, in forces making for the Kingdom of Heaven, stronger than all the powers that are allied against it.

There can be no question of the reality and significance in human life of the sense of sin. Controversy can only be concerned with the manner of interpreting the relation in which sin places us to the Father of our spirits, and of the nature of the process of reconciliation. Here, I think, Sir Oliver's critics fail to appreciate the drift of his contention, and with it the drift of all modern thought and feeling. A complete discussion of the question would carry

me into the problem of the nature of evil in general and of sin in particular far beyond the limits of this article. Fortunately it is not necessary to enter on so large a subject in order to emphasise a fundamental difference between the Bishop's method of approaching the above questions and that which I agree with Sir Oliver in thinking must be accepted by the Church in the future if it is going to retain its hold upon the deeper religious consciousness of the country. Founding itself upon the Hebraic conception of a God standing outside human life and material nature, the traditional form of doctrine has been fain to represent the process of reconciliation between God and man as brought about by some external act or transaction between two wills. What precisely the transaction is has been the occasion of endless controversy; but through all the forms the doctrine of the Atonement has taken has run the presupposition of two personalities, the human and the divine, standing in an external relation to each other, alienated by actions which the former might have avoided—reconciled by an action which in like manner is conceived of as "free," if not arbitrary, on the part of the latter.

Such a view, we maintain, is in rooted antagonism to the fundamental moral and intellectual convictions of our own time. Whatever respect we may have for this doctrine, whether as a phase of theological thought or as a rhetorical metaphor,<sup>1</sup> the signs of the times are in fatal antagonism to any attempt to fix it permanently as the highest which we can form of the nature of the relation between God and man, or as the ground of an ultimate religious synthesis. The higher thought of the time, as represented not only by science but by poetry and philosophy, has passed beyond it, and is already demanding as the condition of continued allegiance to social religion the abandonment, in the formulæ and ritual of the

<sup>1</sup> Professor Masterman justifies it on the ground of the rhetorical necessity of "surprising by fine excess." But it is just the "excess" that we complain of, and the "finess" which we question.

Church, of the cruder forms of statement that presuppose it. To retain them when the beliefs they represent have no longer any real hold upon the mind is merely to alienate the rising generation and to refuse to the living principle of the Christian religion room within the Church to display itself with all its power.

If the statement of the doctrine of the Atonement in the form required by a more spiritual conception of the nature of God and His relation to the world depended on our own insight, and were something that had to be added from without to Christian doctrine, we might well despair. Fortunately, we are faced by no such difficulty. The true doctrine has, we contend, remained hid with Christianity since its foundation. Stated in its simplicity, it is that, as the sense of sin is the outcome of the development in the human soul of the consciousness of an inward law which is the condemnation of the merely natural man, so the consciousness of reconciliation comes as a further stage in the same process, through the discovery that this law is our life, the entrance to which is through the death and transformation of the life which is merely natural. Whatever it may be that as a matter of history, in the individual or the race, liberates and gives free course to this consciousness, in its essence it is no external and supernatural work accomplished for us by some will outside our own, but the coming to consciousness of the principle on which man's life itself is founded. "As by man came death, by man comes also the resurrection from the dead." Reconciliation is not the result of an external transaction between two separate wills, but of the inner movement of the human will itself whereby its divine and infinite nature is realised.

The deeper spirit of Christianity has from the first refused to regard the Atonement as an event in time, and has pressed towards a view of it *sub specie æternitatis*. On the one hand, the Lamb has been slain from the foundation of the world; on the other, the process which the sacrifice symbolises exists nowhere else than in the souls of the faithful, who are baptised

into a daily death and resurrection. It would of course be false to say that the historical event of the life and death of Christ has not been regarded by the leading exponents of the Christian religion as a fundamental article of faith. But in proportion as they have penetrated to its deeper meaning they have always tended to represent it as symbolic of a process essentially spiritual—an assurance coming from the external world of perception and historical fact that the sense of relief and reconciliation which the surrender of the soul to its highest ideals (which are also its highest reality) brings with it is no illusion, but is bound up with the divine scheme of the world. How far we shall continue to lay stress on these events may be left to the future to decide. In the past they have served a great purpose (not unlike the service that language renders to thought and feeling in general) in enabling mankind to realise for themselves and communicate to others the process whereby the soul rises to its true life. Nor is there any reason why they should not continue to do so in the future with increasing fruitfulness. What is essential to this end is that the transactions they symbolise should be freed from all suggestion of externality. “A religion which is to take hold of the mind of man must supply its deepest want and act along the line of its deepest stream of tendency.” This tendency, we have contended, is in the direction of a conception, on the one hand, of God not as a separate being standing outside the world, but as the principle in which all things find their reality and their unity, and, on the other hand, of human nature as rooted in the consciousness of this unity, and destined through the self-revealing power of this principle to progress towards ever fuller knowledge and realisation of it—all Creation groaning and travailing for the revelation of the Sons of God. In the furtherance of this progress the Church is called to a great task—none other than the interpretation to man of his highest aspirations and proper destiny, the insistence upon the complete self-surrender to the highest within him for which Christianity stands as the condi-

tion of their realisation, and the organisation of social and civic life so as to give completest expression to them in the outer order. That it may continue to perform this task in the future as it has done in the past, the chief condition is a clear understanding of the direction these aspirations are at present taking, the view of its own destiny that science and philosophy are forcing upon mankind. Articles like that of Sir Oliver Lodge, springing, as the Bishop acknowledges, from a spirit *naturaliter Christiana*, are a warning to the present-day exponents of the Christian tradition that they are in danger of forgetting this primary requirement of our time, and in so far as they do so are themselves responsible for the division between science and religion which they deplore.

JOHN H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM.

A CATHOLIC COMMENT ON  
“THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF  
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.”

A CATHOLIC PRIEST.

THE widespread interest which Sir Oliver Lodge's article on the “Re-interpretation of Christian Doctrine” has created, may be taken as an indication that thoughtful minds are keenly alive to the immense importance of the subject, and that it is felt to be a source of satisfaction that a man of his high distinction should come upon theological ground.

The article contains several statements of a general character with which both the Catholic and the Protestant theologian would probably be in cordial agreement.

Sir Oliver Lodge acknowledges, for instance, the existence of that flaw—grit, as he terms it—in the order of the moral universe, the recognition of which lies at the very foundation of true Christian teaching, and the right apprehension of which forms the very corner-stone of its doctrinal system.

The *Catholic* theologian parts company with Sir Oliver when he propounds his views as to the *source* of this “grit,” and when, on the ground of these views, he suggests a reconstruction and a re-interpretation of Christian doctrine. From the Catholic standpoint there can, strictly speaking, be no such reconstruction or re-interpretation, the true explanation and expression of all Christian doctrine having to

be sought for in its authoritative and authentic historic sources, not in the views of any particular period or individual.

But what Sir Oliver quite fails to realise is that, in his attack on Christian doctrine, he is really wholly on Protestant ground, and that he is setting forth as authoritative dogmatic teaching what are merely developments of modern Protestant thought. And this the historical Church, like himself, unceasingly attacks and condemns as unreasonable and contrary to truth.

The Christianity, therefore, which the article condemns, and which it pronounces to be wholly unacceptable to the modern mind, is the Christianity which the Catholic Church too condemns, and against which it has waged war from the very birth of the Protestant heresy. Catholics, indeed, feel themselves much aggrieved that they should be placed in the same category with those whose doctrinal errors and misconceptions they have at all times contended against.

#### ORIGINAL SIN.

It is, in the first place, wholly unjust to say that the doctrine of original sin (in the sense in which Professor Lodge expounds it) is the invention of monks. Monks are Catholics, and Catholics do not hold the absurd notions which he condemns.

The Catholic Church does not teach that original sin affects our moral nature in the sense in which actual sin does; nor does it maintain that we are punished with a positive punishment or held responsible for the sins of our first parents.

Indeed, the word "sin," applied to this taint of our nature, is almost a misnomer. "Stain" or "taint" are the terms used by the Catholic Church. Thus we teach respecting the Blessed Virgin that she was "*sine labe originali concepta.*"

The Catholic conception is briefly this. Our first parents enjoyed a happier and more perfect state of existence than we do now. The grit, which Professor Lodge admits, and which he wishes us to conceive of as "matter out of place" (which is neither an argument nor an explanation), had got in somehow.

They sinned, which, in other words, means they committed an act of disorder. As a consequence, their relations to the superior and inferior universe became disordered, as also did their own parts.

There was a moral recoil, as it were, in a manner quite in conformity with what Sir Oliver Lodge says respecting the action of law and its inevitable sanction.

The spiritual or higher faculties, by rebelling against God, lost their full control over the lower or animal faculties, thus giving rise to that perpetual inner conflict to which the collective experience of mankind bears witness, and which forms the basis of Sir Oliver Lodge's admission as to the presence of "grit."

This inner state of disorder, too, probably goes far to explain some of the so-called modern phenomena of the double-self or of double personality, and certainly of the *divided* self of which St Paul speaks. (When I would do good, evil is present with me.) For by the action of law the human race is, of course, implicated in the fall of our first parents—is drawn down to their own lower condition of struggle and of conflict.

We have this exemplified, to some extent, in the effects of the disorders of the debased lives of parents upon their children. These effects, however, are not necessarily permanent and irremediable. They constitute a tendency only, and just as they do not imply a punishable sin, so neither does original sin imply that those who come into the world with its taint deserve and receive positive punishment. That this is our doctrine is shown from our teaching with regard to infants passing into the other world with this stain still upon them. We do not teach that they suffer any positive punishment. For how can they be punished for what they have never done? We teach that, though their taint does not enable them to enjoy the full perfection of happiness, they nevertheless are happy, being wholly unconscious of their loss, and consequently of what they might have been. And there is manifestly nothing unreasonable or illogical in such teaching.

In the same way the Catholic Church teaches that we are

punished for actual sin only:—that is, for acts of disorder committed with full deliberation and intent; and here, again, Sir Oliver Lodge himself admits the reasonableness of this doctrine by what he says on the action of law, and of the inevitable retribution following upon its transgression.

Original sin, then, in the descendants of our first parents, is a certain moral dislocation brought about by actual and deliberate sin on the part of the parents of the human race, and it alone accounts for the presence of that “grit” in the moral universe of which Sir Oliver Lodge speaks, and which must be admitted to lie at the root of man’s troubles and woes.

It cannot be maintained that the modern doctrine of evolution helps us to solve the intellectual problems which this subject suggests. On the contrary, it introduces difficulties which all fair-minded men must feel to be of a serious and overwhelming character.

Sir Oliver Lodge’s bold statement, that “we have risen as to our bodies from the beasts,” is a wholly arbitrary one, and one which the Catholic theologian cannot allow to pass unchallenged. Is not Sir Oliver aware that there are many high scientific authorities who question the entire theory of animal descent—that, to mention a single instance, so distinguished a savant as the late Professor Virchow, of Berlin, maintained, not many years ago, before an international assembly of scientists, that he had come upon no single fact which could be said to point in that direction? Is it not as easily conceivable that a theory of devolution may hereafter be found to more fitly account for the many organic factors with which physical science has made us acquainted?

Take, for instance, certain obscene habits of monkeys and of the higher apes with which a visit to the Zoological Society’s Gardens is apt to make us familiar.

According to evolutionary principles, such habits should become accentuated as we descend in the scale of animal life, should be more pronounced therefore in, say, the cat or the dog. But, as a matter of fact, these animals have some sense

of decency, while their supposed more highly organised descendants have none.

There are similar flaws and inconsistencies in the theory of evolution when it is examined in detail, and, in the judgment of many, some of them are of such a character as to imperil and invalidate the theory itself.

As regards our anatomical structure, are we not more closely allied to such low forms of life as the frog and the cray-fish? How comes it to pass that it is here, not in the highest forms, that such close similarity is to be found?

The Catholic Church, it is scarcely necessary to point out, rejects the doctrine of Evolution in the form in which it is stated by modern science.

#### SACRIFICE.

A brief exposition of the teaching of the Catholic Church on Sacrifice will serve to elucidate several points touched upon by Sir Oliver in his article.

Man may be considered as an individual and as a member of society. In both capacities he stands in some sort of relation to persons either beneath or above him.

Sacrifice expresses the relation of man as a member of society (religious) to a personality above him.

It is not necessary in this connection to dwell upon those acts of loyalty and obedience which man exhibits towards his fellow-men:—a subject towards his sovereign, a pupil towards his teacher, a servant towards his master. It is the *principle*, expressed in certain outward and public acts, for which we contend.

Man is bound to pay his respect to God

- (1) By an act which is public and social, because God is the Author of Society.
- (2) By an act which is expressive of the peculiar respect and homage which are due to God.

Man bends his knee to the king as an act which is equivalent to saying "I serve thee."

In the same way, an external act or sign of some kind is required in order to express our acknowledgment of the fact that God is the Lord of life and of death, and that it is from Him that we have received all that we possess, and to whom we are alone responsible.

And this peculiar act must include something which is symbolic of God's supreme power and dominion. Now nothing can be more fitly symbolic of this than the offering of a life—a substitute for the life which we possess from Him.

So far there is connected with this idea no notion of wrath appeased, no notion of vicarious punishment. It is a perfectly natural expression of a feeling which lies at the very foundation of Divine Worship, in which the very essence of sacrifice consists, and without which there can be no true religion.

(Protestantism has lost sight of this the chief element in sacrifice, hence the defective character of its exposition of the Atonement of Christ.)

Sacrifice, being a public and social act, was and is everywhere offered by the priest. In ancient religions this functionary was usually the political head of the nation, while in Judaism a special class or family were set apart, as is likewise the case in the Catholic Church, according to the words of St Paul, "Never let any man take this honour upon himself, but such as is called by God, as Aaron."

He represents the people before God, just as the mayor of a city presents and reads an address on behalf of himself and his fellow-citizens when the sovereign enters. As every Catholic child learns from the penny catechism, the sacrifice (of the mass) is offered for four ends.

- (1) To give supreme honour and glory to God.
- (2) To thank Him for all His benefits.

Leaving the other two ends to be dealt with later on, we have here the true and fundamental aspect of sacrifice—of sacrifice which would most certainly have existed had there been no fall of man and no original sin.

(*N.B.*—This aspect is lost sight of by Protestantism in the sacrifice of the cross. Hence its inability to sustain its notion before thinking minds. It dwells entirely upon another aspect with which we are now about to deal.)

Given that man has fallen, and that the justice of God has been outraged, that the equilibrium to which Sir Oliver Lodge refers has been disturbed, certain concomitant elements in the acts of sacrifice can now be likewise and fittingly introduced to express and symbolise man's new conditions and new relations to the Deity.

The pain and suffering necessarily included in the offering of a life, now become the effectual sign of something which man, in his sinful state, felt to be owing to God—a sign and symbol of his grief and his sorrow.

Penance or repentance is defined as a virtue including man's will to hate and detest sin. There need be no overflow into the bodily senses of an act of the will, and tears and stripes are not necessary to the insurance of forgiveness; but conversion is necessary, and conversion means the turning of *the will* from mutable creature to the immutable good (God). It is the well-ordering of the disordered.

Sorrow and pain may, of course, accompany this pure act of the will, for when the will hates and detests that which keeps it from God, and recognises that the sorrow of the trouble lies within itself, sorrow and distress naturally arise.

And, since this act of the will covers the past, the present, and the future, there is a detestation of past sins, a desire to amend in the present, and a firm purpose to avoid evil-doing in the future. And all these three elements are contained in the one act of conversion.

Thus the Catholic doctrine of mortification and of voluntarily-inflicted suffering follows naturally. This doctrine, however, has no resemblance to that popular caricature of it with which Protestant fiction has made us familiar.

For the Catholic mortification is the *forestalling* of possible occasions of sin. "I chastise my body," writes St Paul, and

bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should have become a castaway—not because God is pleased that I torment my flesh. What pleases Him is *the turning of my will* from the creature to Him the Creator, and it is this act of conversion which may indirectly cause the sorrow and pain, an act which in me is so intense that I willingly suffer pain in order that I may achieve my object.

Hence sorrow and pain become most fittingly symbolic of repentance. Repentant man, sacrificing to God, lays stress upon the painful (but not essential) element of sacrifice, *i.e.*, the new element introduced by man's new conditions.

Another element, belonging to the Catholic conception of sacrifice, and originating in man's relation to God, is communion. The repentant sinner partakes of the flesh of the victim which is offered to God, and thus sits at the same table with him, than which there can be no greater sign of reconciliation.

We believe and teach that Christ designed and instituted a perpetual sacrifice which we call the Sacrifice of the Mass. And this sacrifice contains the idea of divine communion and fellowship. Christ, who raised us to the dignity of sons of God by adoption, arranged that we should sit at the same table with God, and feed upon that which is the food of God and of His Angels, *i.e.*, the Divine Substance.

A careful examination of Catholic teaching will show that we believe the Eucharist to have been instituted as a means by which we, in our material and perishable condition, might be supplied with the Divine essence, the very life of God. And there is a chain of logical reasoning which binds these various ideas together, and which forms them into a consistent whole. By an attack on some one aspect of the Catholic doctrine of sacrifice, the sense of the proportion of things is destroyed, and the attack of necessity appears more forcible than the defence.

CATHOLIC PRIEST.

## DANTE.

EDMUND G. GARDNER, M.A.

IN the third quarter of the thirteenth century, a chapter of later mediæval history closes. The struggle between the Empire and the Papacy had lasted for well-nigh two centuries; it had at length been fought to a bloody, though (as it proved) but temporary, finish upon the plain of Grandella, near Benevento, in February, 1266, where the noblest of the Hohenstauffen, the bastard King Manfredi,—“bene genitus,” as Dante somewhat defiantly calls him,—had died a hero’s death. The silver eagle that crowned the imperial helmet of Suabia had fallen before the golden lilies on the royal standard of the champion of the Church and of France. The secular spirit had triumphed in the Papacy, but only to work out a still deeper humiliation for the Roman Pontiffs. The first fervour of the great Franciscan movement had died away. Scholastic philosophy had reached its culmination in the *Summa Theologica* of St Thomas Aquinas, and was henceforth to degenerate into mere intellectual subtleties. A new vernacular poetry had arisen in Italy, a poetry in which Love and Philosophy were inextricably woven together, a poetry in which the adored woman becomes to her lover the very mirror of divine goodness and beauty, to be raised (as it were) above the altars—yet in such wise that the poet would confidently appeal to the Deity himself for approval. *Non fea fallo, s’eo li posi amanza*, writes Guido Guinicelli, addressing

God at the end of his most famous ode, "I did not sin in setting love on her." But this vulgar tongue was not yet regarded as a suitable or adequate medium for the production of a great literary masterpiece, nor accepted, in Mazzini's splendid phrase, as "a form worthy of representing the national idea."

Born of a noble but decadent and impoverished family (too unimportant to be officially regarded as *grandi*, or magnates, by the vigorous democracy that then swayed the destinies of the Florentine Republic) in May, 1265, Dante Alighieri was some eight months old when the Battle of Benevento changed the whole political aspect of Italy, substituting for the theoretically-acknowledged, practically-contested supremacy of the Germanised Holy Roman Empire a more immediately formidable combination — a dubious Franco-Papal alliance.

Tradition tells us much, and extant documents confirm not a little, about the poet's strenuous conduct in early manhood, of his efforts in office and out of office to repress the factions that were devastating Florence, to enforce obedience to the laws from nobles and plebeians alike (not even sparing the man whom he had acclaimed as the first of all his friends), to resist all external interference in the affairs of the Republic on the part of France and Rome. The famous reply he is said to have given to an invitation of his colleagues to undertake an embassy to the Vatican—"If I go, who stays? If I stay, who goes?"—is doubtless a mere rhetorical flourish of Boccaccio's; but in the records of the Florentine Republic is still preserved his brief and emphatic answer to a papal demand for men and money: *Nihil fiat*. Noble and eloquent Latin letters, penned during that long, well-nigh hopeless exile under sentence of death, that lasted from the beginning of 1302 down to his death at Ravenna on September 14th, 1321, show us how he felt the events that shook the Italian world: the Babylonian captivity of the Popes at Avignon; the enterprise of the last hero of the Middle Ages, Henry of

Luxemburg, coming in the name of Julius and Augustus to the Eternal City that sat widowed and alone, crying night and day for her imperial spouse.<sup>1</sup> In them may we read of how the poet's spirit exulted in Henry, as the heavenly-directed regenerator of Christendom, the Lamb of God who had taken away the sins of the world; and of his passionate desire for the reformation of the Church and the restoration of a purified Papacy to Rome. In written word and in recorded action alike is clearly revealed the man whom the zeal of God's house was eating up. The flame of love for his native land, he writes, has already so consumed his flesh and bones that death has put the key to his breast.<sup>2</sup>

But this prophetic fire has not yet touched the *Vita Nuova*, that most wonderful of first books. Much in its earlier chapters is but a glorified repetition of what had been said and done by the troubadours of Provence, much a mere rehandling of what had already become common material in the erotic poetry of the *dolce stil nuovo*, that "sweet new style" in which the lyrists of Bologna and the Tuscan cities made of woman's love a pathway from earth to heaven. But there comes a supreme moment when the poet is revealed; a spiritual crisis mysteriously set forth in the account (which I hold to be entirely allegorical) of the wedding-feast at which Beatrice mocks him. "I set my feet on that part of life beyond which one can go no further with intention of returning." He will write no more about himself: "It behoved me to take up a new matter, and one more noble than the past."<sup>3</sup> It is not new, perhaps, inasmuch as it already existed in germ in the odes and sonnets of Guido Guinicelli; but it is a creed of love as ideal as human nature can well sustain. The lover finds all his beatitude in the words that praise his lady, the splendour of whose soul has reached even to the throne of God. All evil thoughts perish when she passes by; she ennobles all upon whom she

<sup>1</sup> *Purg.*, vi. 112-114.

<sup>2</sup> *Epist.*, vii. 2; *Epist.*, viii.; *Canz.*, xx. 85-87.

<sup>3</sup> *Vita Nuova*, 14, 17.

looks ; she is the mirror of the Divine beauty, "a thing come from heaven to earth to make manifest a miracle." "He seeth perfectly all salvation who seeth my lady." When she passes out of this world, "the delight of her beauty departing itself from our view became great spiritual loveliness, that spreads through heaven a light of love that salutes the angels, and makes even their high and noble intellects wonder." The pilgrim spirit, passing in ecstatic contemplation through the spheres, guided up by the new understanding that Love has infused, is overwhelmed by the sight of her glory in Paradise, where she "gloriously gazeth upon the countenance of Him who is blessed for ever and ever."

Love is thus a continual triumph of the spirit over the flesh, a self-annihilation of the lover at the shrine of the beloved, a suprasensible union, a sacred rose-sweet bond whereby the slightest disloyalty is to be repented of in bitterness of heart, but in which nought save inspiration is asked in return.

The *De Monarchia* is probably some fifteen years later than the *Vita Nuova*,<sup>1</sup> but it presents certain analogies with it, and they have the common characteristic of being the only prose works that Dante completed. In their complete alienation or abstraction from the hard realities of the worlds of sentiment and of action, these two books stand together. In the *De Monarchia*, government becomes as purely spiritual as love ; imperialism for once assumes the garb of ideal beauty.

Amidst the contending claims of the Papacy and the Secular Power for supremacy, when Boniface VIII. had declared but a few years before that the temporal power of kings is subject to the spiritual power of the priesthood, and to be directed by it as the body by the soul, while in Italy

<sup>1</sup> The trend of modern criticism seems inclining to accept Boccaccio's statement that Dante wrote this book on the occasion of the coming of Henry of Luxemburg ; with the exception of the *Vita Nuova*, it is the only one of his prose works in which no allusion is made to his exile.

the Popes had striven to exercise imperial rights, with disastrous results alike to themselves and to the nation, and the papal theory that the imperial dignity was but their gift to Charlemagne and his successors was to find a fresh actuality now that a new Cæsar was hastening to the Roman nuptials, —Dante brings forward this his attempted solution of the question of the relations of Church and State.

The First Book of the *De Monarchia* gives us the essence of the poet's creed of imperialism. He would have, indeed, one single monarch, the Emperor, ruling "over all men in time, or in those things and over those things which are measured by time"; but it is in order that he may establish universal peace, whereby the human race may exercise its proper function, which is constantly to actualise or bring into play the whole capacity of the possible intellect, for contemplation and for action, for speculation and for operation. Under his righteous and universal sway, not only will the individual have the fullest use of free-will, the greatest gift of God to man; but the various kingdoms and nations will have liberty, with their own customs and laws. As other students of his politics have noted, Dante's emperor is a kind of universal arbitrator, invested with the power of enforcing compliance with his decisions. The Second Book, by purely mediæval arguments which have no point of contact with modern thought or belief, endeavours to show that the Roman People rightfully acquired this supreme and universal jurisdiction, and that Christ confirmed it by His birth and His death.<sup>1</sup> In the Third Book, the poet comes directly to the point at issue. The authority of the Emperor, the Temporal Monarch, does not depend upon the Church, but descends upon him "without any mean from the fountain of universal authority." It is in proving this direct dependence of the authority of the State upon God that

<sup>1</sup> Some of these arguments did not fail to excite ridicule even in the poet's own day, and gave a handle to the Dominican friar, Guido Vernani, to assail him in his *De Potestate Summi Pontificis et de reprobatione Monarchiæ compositæ a Dante Aligherio*.

Dante gives us the most explicit statement of his creed, his scheme of dual government. Man is ordained for two ends: blessedness of this life, which consists in the operation of his own powers and is figured in the Earthly Paradise; and blessedness of life eternal, which consists in the fruition of the Divine aspect, to which man's own powers cannot ascend unless aided by Divine light, which is understood by the Celestial Paradise. These ends, with the means whereby to attain to them, are made known by reason and revelation respectively, but would be disregarded by human cupidity, "were not men like horses, wandering in their brutishness, kept in the way by bit and rein." Hence the necessity of a twofold guidance: the Supreme Pontiff, to lead the human race to eternal life according to revelation; the Emperor, to direct it to temporal felicity, in accordance with the teaching of philosophy. And it follows that the chief aim of the latter—*Curator orbis qui dicitur Romanus Princeps*—is to establish liberty and peace throughout the world.

At the end of the *Purgatorio*, where man in the person of Dante has reached this state of temporal blessedness that is represented by the Earthly Paradise, the symbolical figures in the mystical pageant surround "a plant despoiled of flowers and other leaves in each branch." It is the Tree of Knowledge, become now an emblem of Temporal Government. The mystical Gryphon, who represents Christ, binds the Chariot of the Church to the Tree by its pole—the Cross, made from a piece (according to the legend) of the Tree itself, the connecting link between the Church and the Empire—but breaks off nothing of that wood "so sweet to the taste." *Si si conserva il seme d'ogni giusto*—"thus is preserved the seed of all righteousness." All righteousness will be fulfilled by the union of the Church and the Empire, the former usurping none of the rights and dignities of Temporal Sovereignty—that "wood" which the Roman Pontiffs of Dante's day were finding indeed *dolce al gusto*, only to learn to their cost, with

France as the physician, that bitter internal results followed therefrom—*chè mal si torce il ventre quindi*.<sup>1</sup>

Rome, according to Dante, is divinely ordained as the seat of Papacy and Empire alike, and, in one of the most impassioned of his letters, he exhorts the Italian Cardinals to restore the Apostolic See to her after the death of Clement V. But he has no thought of the Pope's return as a temporal sovereign, and certainly would not recognise the papal claim to a civil principedom in the capital of the Empire. And St Catherine of Siena, she who was actually to effect this restoration of the Papacy to Rome a little later, stands with him. She bade the weak, irresolute Gregory XI. choose between the Temporal Power and the salvation of souls. Even with her beloved and passionately-believed-in Urban VI., her "most sweet Christ on earth," enthroned in the Vatican, she treats not him but the representatives of the Roman Republic as the temporal rulers of the Eternal City. ✓

Between the *Vita Nuova* and the *Divina Commedia* there comes a wonderful series of lyrical poems, especially fifteen great canzoni or odes. Connected with them (strictly speaking, with fourteen of them) are the two unfinished prose works of this second period of Dante's life: the *Convivio*, in which he proposed to give an allegorical interpretation of their content (but only accomplished it for the first three); the *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, in which he expounds their metrical form, and strives to establish the ideal Italian language in which they are written.

"I say and affirm," writes the poet, "that the lady of whom I was enamoured after my first love was the most beautiful and most pure daughter of the Emperor of the Universe, to whom Pythagoras gave the name Philosophy."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Purg.*, xxxii. 37-51. It will be seen from what follows that I venture altogether to dissent from Dr Moore's suggestions (*Studies in Dante*, Second Series, p. 18 n.) that Dante's denunciation of the Church's political sovereignty applies only to the papal usurpation of the rights and authority of the Emperor, and that Dante would not necessarily have resented "the modern Papal claim for Temporal Power."

<sup>2</sup> *Conv.*, ii. 16.

That strikes the key-note of the *Convivio*. In the *Vita Nuova*, after the death of Beatrice, Dante had collected his earlier lyrics, furnishing them with prose narrative and commentary; so now, in exile, he intends to put together fourteen odes, and to write a prose commentary upon them to the honour and glory of his mystical lady, his new spiritual mistress, whose body is wisdom and whose soul is love.<sup>1</sup> To weave this poetic crown for his lady, Dante brings together odes irrespective of the primary occasion of their composition: a certain number are entirely allegorical, written throughout with a philosophical intention; two probably originally bore reference to Beatrice; four are obviously inspired by a more earthly passion for another woman. But all are now to be brought into line, to be represented as purely allegorical and expressive of philosophic devotion alone. "By love, in this allegory, is always intended that study which is the application of the enamoured soul to that thing of which it is enamoured."<sup>2</sup>

The supreme expression of the purely allegorical group of lyrics—in which the fundamental idea is that philosophy is an amorous use of wisdom—is found in the ode, *Amor che nella mente mi ragiona*.<sup>3</sup> Love speaks to the poet in his mind of his lady desirously, sweetly uttering to the soul things ineffable, beyond the comprehension of human intellect, beyond the expression of finite speech, "that hath not power to retrace what Love saith." She is the destroyer of vices, the support of faith, giving a foretaste of Paradise in her eyes and upon her lips; the exemplar of beauty and humility, the reflection of the Divine idea. The whole poem is a hymn of exultation in the philosophic liberation of the human soul from the tyranny of the senses—the record of some hour when the clouds suddenly lift, height above height stands revealed, and the path seems clear to aerial battlements of some spiritual fortress that before seemed inaccessible.

<sup>1</sup> *Conv.*, iii. 13–15.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> The second canzone of the *Convivio*.

Another poem stands out conspicuously from the rest, and anticipates the *Divina Commedia*: it begins, *Tre donne intorno al cor mi son venute*—"Three ladies have gathered round my heart."<sup>1</sup> This canzone is Dante's poetical "Apologia pro vita sua." It was composed in one of those times during his twenty years of banishment, when the gloom seems to have been deepest and the clouds gathering darker round his path. He had become utterly disgusted with his associates, and turned in contempt from that "graceless and wicked crew" that had become "all ungrateful, all mad and impious" against him; he had made a party for himself.<sup>2</sup> Leonardo Bruni tells us that he wrote a long letter to the people of Florence that began: *Popule meus, quid feci tibi?* This letter is now lost; it was, so to speak, Dante's open apologia for all the world to see; the canzone of the Three Ladies is his defence of himself and of his life to his own heart.

There is a poetical old legend, told by St Bonaventura, of a wondrous thing that befell the seraphic Father of Assisi on the road from San Quirico to Siena. Three poor women, alike in stature, age and countenance, met him with a new salutation: *Bene veniat, Domina Paupertas*. "And, when he heard this, the true lover of poverty was filled with unspeakable joy, for no salutation from men would he have received so gladly as that which these gave him." But the friars, his companions, considering the strangeness of their coming and their sudden disappearance, "not unreasonably deemed that some mystical thing was betokened concerning the holy man," and recognised these three seemingly poor women as Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience, which "shone forth perfectly in equal form in the man of God, albeit he chose to glory above all in the privilege of Poverty, which he was wont to call now his mother, now his spouse, now his lady."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Canzone xx. in the Oxford edition.

<sup>2</sup> *Par.*, xvii. 61-69.

<sup>3</sup> *S. Bonaventuræ Legenda de Vita S. Francisci Seraphici*, vii. 6. The dependence of the canzone upon this passage in St Bonaventura is, I think, fairly obvious

In like fashion, a mystery is played before the singer of the *Divina Commedia* in this ode. To him, too, in his banishment, three mystical dames appear: Justice takes visible form to greet her preacher, even as Poverty had come to meet her spouse nearly a hundred years before. While anarchy claims the Tuscan cities for her own, while Rome lies desolate, and, away beyond the Alps, Philip the Fair and Pope Clement V. are drinking the blood of the Church, plotting the ruin of the Empire, Justice and her spiritual offspring, Divine Law and Human Law, hunted out from their natural homes, appear to the solitary soul of the exiled Florentine, since all others have forgotten or hate them:—

“Three ladies have gathered round my heart and seat themselves without, for within sits Love who holds the lordship of my life.

“So beauteous are they and of such power, that the mighty Lord—him I say who is in my heart—can scarcely dare to speak of them.

“Each seems grieving and dismayed, like one hunted out and wearied whom all folk fail, and whom neither beauty nor wisdom avails. There was once a time in which, according to their speech, they were beloved; now are they held in wrath and neglect by all. Thus solitary are these come as to the house of a friend; for they know well that within is he of whom I speak.”<sup>1</sup>

Mysterious and full of obscure symbolism are the stanzas that follow. Justice, ungirt, barefooted and in torn raiment, holds converse with the Lord of Dante’s heart, who, at the end, takes his darts, rusted for lack of use, and proclaims the ultimate triumph of Righteousness and Love. “We are of the eternal rock. Even though we be now assailed, we shall endure, and there shall yet return a people who shall make this dart shine bright.” As one of Dante’s earliest commentators, Ser Graziolo de’ Bambaglioli, did not fail to note, this is nothing else than a first hint of the prophecy, to be repeated again and again throughout the *Commedia*, of the Imperial Redeemer who shall be sustained by wisdom and love and power alone, who shall heal the wounds of Italy

<sup>1</sup> *Canz.*, xx. 1–18. In quoting from this canzone, I occasionally adopt the readings of the earlier MSS. in preference to those of the Oxford *Dante*.

and renovate the world. And, then, Dante himself takes up the word:—

“And I who mark, in divine discourse, comfort and dole bestowed upon such lofty exiles, count as my glory the banishment wreaked on me :

“And if judgment and force of destiny will have the world convert white flowers into dark, falling among the good is yet worthy of praise.

“But because the fair signal of my eyes is reft by distance from my sight, which has set me in flame, light should I count that which is heavy unto me. But this flame has already so consumed my bone and flesh that death has put his key unto my breast ; for which if I had fault, many a moon has the sun revolved since it was quenched—if a fault dies because a man repents.”<sup>1</sup>

It is thus, as one who has lost the world and gained his own soul, that Dante, after the complete revulsion of his being in the alternation of impassioned hope, bitter disillusion, temporary despair during the abortive enterprise of Henry of Luxemburg, turns to the completion of the *Divina Commedia*.

The self-annihilation that he found in love, the ideal political creed that he set forth later,—these things make the very life-blood of his work.

St Francis had striven to reform the mediæval world by his example of perfect renunciation ; he had been crucified again with Christ to inflame men’s hearts with the fire of Divine love when the world had grown cold in forgetfulness of the Sacrifice of Calvary. Dante, in his own way, would immolate himself on the altar of wisdom, delivering himself up as an instrument through which the tremendous trump of Divine Justice may blow what blast it will. Not a mere figure of speech is it when he declares that the Sacred Poem, “to which both Heaven and Earth have set hand,” has made him lean for many a year ; nor was it only an idle fancy that made the woman of Verona bid her gossips mark how the heat and smoke of Hell had crisped his beard and darkened his skin. Like all the noblest spirits of his epoch, Dante does not shrink from the most sacred comparisons. He is again the one man who must die for the people that the whole nation perish not. Thus in a sonnet, an allegorical love-poem,

<sup>1</sup> *Canz.*, xx. 73–90 (Mr Wicksteed’s translation).

giving lyrical utterance to his agonising attempts to penetrate the unfathomable depths of philosophic truth:—

“Who shall ever gaze without fear into the eyes of this fair maiden, that have used me so, that I expect nought else save bitter death?”

“See how hard is my lot, that amongst all the rest my life was chosen to give an example to others that man should not yield himself to the peril of gazing on her form.

“Destined to me was this end, because it was meet that one man should be undone, in order that others should be drawn from peril:

“And, therefore, alas, was I so swift in drawing unto me the contrary of life, as a pearl the virtue of the star.”<sup>1</sup>

*Perch' altri fosse di pericol tratto*—“that others might be drawn from peril”! The supreme motive of Dante's life-work is here already as clearly expressed as in the famous letter to Can Grande, many years later, where he tells us that the end of his *Commedia* is to bring man from misery to felicity: “*removere viventes in hac vita de statu miserix, et perducere ad statum felicitatis.*”<sup>2</sup> But there remained one thing still: to combine this with the fulfilment of the promise he had made at the end of the *Vita Nuova*, that he would write more worthily of Beatrice: “So that if it be the pleasure of Him, by whom all things live, that my life endure for some years, I hope to say of her what hath never been said of any woman”—*quello che mai non fu detto d'alcuna*.

Gradually, during those long, weary years of exile, wandering in poverty from city to city throughout Italy, and perchance beyond its confines, showing against his will the wounds that Fortune had dealt him, the poet's own life-story had become merged into that of humanity, and the mightiest of poems—embracing all that the mind of man could reach, penetrating in its height and depth to the supreme Heaven from the bottom of the abyss—had shaped itself.

Before his eyes, as from some celestial watch-tower of contemplation, the world lies outspread—a prey to anarchy and tyranny, abandoned to lust, pride, and greed. Man's two divinely-appointed guides are at strife: “On earth is none

<sup>1</sup> Sonnet xxvi. (Oxford *Dante*).

<sup>2</sup> *Epist.*, x. 15.

to govern; for which the human family goes astray.”<sup>1</sup> The Papacy has quenched the light of the Empire, only to subject itself to the usurping sway of France. A mean-spirited, craven Bavarian sits on the throne of Cæsar; an unworthy, avaricious Cahorsine profanes the chair of Peter. Enough has the Emperor-elect to do with his German affairs to keep him away from the Garden of the Empire, which has become a desert; the Popes remember Italy only as an accumulation of rich and goodly provinces, to be absorbed into the Temporal Dominions of the Holy See. “The Church of Rome, by confounding in itself the two governments, falls into the mire, and defiles itself and its burden.”<sup>2</sup> The Giant of France and the Harlot of Avignon are fornicating together, drunk with the blood of the Church which is the treasury of the poor.

Ah! is not the time come for a mere layman, the least of the sheep of Christ’s pasture, one who has no pastoral authority to abuse, for riches are not with him,<sup>3</sup> to come forward? Shall he not strive, though Roman Prince and Roman Pontiff fall back, to point out to the human race the way to temporal and eternal felicity? And how shall he do it, he who knows that the divine madness of poetry has touched his lips and fired his brain, save in a mighty work of art, a supreme poem in the vernacular that all may understand—in that maligned, sweet mother-tongue that he loves with so fierce and burning a love that all who traduce it and hold it cheap are for him nought but “abominable wretches,” “adulterers with prostituted lips”?<sup>4</sup>

But a very real and tangible fear haunts him. No close and reverent student of the letter to Can Grande can fail to perceive that Dante claims for the *Divina Commedia* an inspiration which is much more than that of a mere poem, however great its theme; he writes as one who, like St Paul, knew a man who “was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.”

<sup>1</sup> *Par.*, xxvii. 140, 141.

<sup>2</sup> *Purg.*, xvi. 127-129.

<sup>3</sup> *Epist.*, viii. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Conv.*, i. 11.

He is a man with a mission, one who has a message to reveal to startle his fellows from their slumber in the *selva oscura* of ignorance and sin. But who is he to do this thing? "Nor I nor others believe me worthy of it." He has been for a while a votary of the world and the flesh—in that epoch when the light of his "new life" grew dim in the hard glare of reality—and men know this. Who now will believe his report? This conviction of personal unworthiness—*peccatum loquentis*—is always with him, a dread lest the message with which he is entrusted for the salvation of his fellow-men may fall to the ground, because of the ill reputation of the man who bears it:—

"But if they bark against the disposition of so great an elevation because of the sin of the speaker, let them read Daniel, where they will find that even Nabuchodonosor by divine inspiration had a vision against sinners, which he forgot. For He who 'maketh His sun to rise on the good and on the evil, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust,' reveals His glory more or less, as He wills, sometimes in mercy for conversion, sometimes in severity for chastisement, to those who live however ill."<sup>1</sup>

He fears, then, because of his own infirmities, of which the confession henceforth will be frank, no longer, even in part, covered up by a veil of allegory; but not at all for any possible consequence to himself by reason of his steadfastly assailing the highest in Church and State. In the Heaven of Fortitude, the fifth sphere in which the souls of warriors of God appear, he asks counsel of his ancestor, the crusader Cacciaguida, and receives the uncompromising answer: *Tutta tua vision fa manifesta*. Let him make manifest all his vision, and it will prove vital nourishment when digested. "This cry of thine will do as the wind that striketh most the loftiest summits." For he is one to whom Truth appeals from its changeless throne. Putting on the breastplate of faith, "in the heat of that coal which one of the Seraphim had taken off the altar and laid on the lips of Isaiah, I will enter on the present contest, and, by the arm of Him who delivered us by His blood from the powers of darkness, drive out from the lists the wicked and the liar in the sight of all the world."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Epist.*, x. 28.

<sup>2</sup> *Par.*, xvii. 124–135; *Mon.*, iii. 1.

The *Divina Commedia* is the last word in literature of the Middle Ages, closing the period which Jerome's *Vulgate* and Augustine's *City of God* may be said to have opened. It is at once a supreme picture of a great epoch in the history of the human race, and an allegory of human life, in the form of a vision of the world beyond the grave. The mediæval dream of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise becomes transformed into a superb work of art, a temple to enshrine all that was noblest in the dark ages that had rolled since the downfall of the Roman Empire, a vehicle to bear a prophecy for the future. The inmost history of the poet's own spiritual life is blended with his conception of the ultimate destinies of all mankind.

Coming to himself in the dark forest of alienation from God and political anarchy—the forest into which he has strayed, as it were, in slumber, when he abandoned the true way—Dante, representative of the human race, is guided by Virgil, who stands for human philosophy and natural reason, through Hell and Purgatory, to the state of temporal felicity prefigured in the Earthly Paradise. There, in the state of innocence regained by the purgatorial pains, a further revelation is given to him of the past, present, and future of the Church and the Empire; thence he is guided by Beatrice herself, the love of his youth, now become the type of the Divine Philosophy that includes the sacred science of Theology, whose ultimate end is the contemplation of primal truth in man's celestial native-land, through the nine moving spheres into the spaceless, timeless Empyrean Heaven of Heavens, where Beatrice resumes her throne in the white and gold Rose of Paradise, and Bernard—type of ecstatic contemplation—commends him to the Blessed Virgin, through whose intercession he obtains a foretaste of the Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence.

This is but the framework, within which the whole society of mediæval Italy is pictured. And mediæval Italy itself, from the poet's height of mystical exaltation, appears as a mere *areola*, a little space of earth, a threshing-floor, in respect

of the vast spiritual horizon that lies open before his eyes. Never was the very essence of vice so revealed as in the *Inferno*, where the poet, as with a scalpel, lays bare the secret motives of remembered and forgotten tragedies, anatomising sinner after sinner to find the "cause in nature that makes these hard hearts." There are few things so wonderful in all literature as Dante's open-air *Purgatorio*, where, beneath the sun and stars, in the glory of sunrise and of sunset, man purges away the dross of the world, setting love in order, until he recovers his primal blessedness in the Garden of Eden. With all its antiquated speculation and scholastic theology, Shelley once for all gave the one adequate summary of the *Paradiso*, when he characterised it as the story of "how all things are transfigured except Love." Love, then, set in order through the purifying ascent of Purgatory, grows more and more perfected from sphere to sphere until the consummation of the vision, when, with all desires set at rest, all wills made one in utter harmony with the will of God, the soul is absorbed in the possession of the absolute Truth and Beauty.

It is obvious that Virgil and Beatrice fill parts in the *Divina Commedia* analogous to those of the ideal Emperor and the ideal Pope of the dual scheme set forth in the *De Monarchia*. The poem is intended to rouse the world from its sinful slumber, to foretell the renovation of the Empire in this ideal aspect, to demand on behalf of Christendom that the Church should return to apostolic purity, simplicity, and poverty, that the Papacy should be cleansed from the mire and the greed of temporalities. These things are insisted upon at intervals throughout, especially at critical points in Dante's ecstatic pilgrimage, from the prophecy at the opening of the *Inferno* of the coming of the "Veltro," the Deliverer, to that (in the last moving sphere) of the roaring of the heavens to usher in the new age. The superb rebuke of the Popes in the Hell of the Simoniacs becomes allegorical pageantry in the Earthly Paradise and the inspired lamentation of a new Jeremiah in the Heaven of the Fixed Stars, where there is an earthquake as at the Crucifixion,

and all Paradise blushes while St Peter denounces the wickedness of those who have usurped his place on the earth.

In his noble epistle to the Italian Cardinals assembled in the conclave at Carpentras, Dante claims to be the Jeremiah of the Church, renewing for Rome the very lamentation of Jeremiah for Jerusalem. He stands on the same spiritual platform as Savonarola. The poet of the *Divina Commedia* and the theological writer of the *Triumphus Crucis* rank together as the prophets of Roman Catholicism. Living each at an epoch of intense corruption, watching Pope after Pope covering the "great mantle" with mire, dragging the Chariot of the Bride daily further away from the track of the Crucified, each made a similar prophecy of the scourge to fall speedily, of the renovation to follow. But Dante represents a purer, a more spiritual ideal of Catholicism than does Savonarola. We could more readily imagine the friar bowing to the authority of Alexander VI. than the poet at the feet of John XXII. Dante's theology would fain be that of a primitive, apostolic Christianity; it is only the inevitable lack of historical perspective that prevents him from rejecting all the accretions that had gathered round what he would have held to be the teaching of the Apostles. And, at the same time, his creed is comprehensive, gathering in truth and beauty from every source. Gregory may smile when he reaches Paradise to behold his own mistake about the Angelic Hierarchies; but Livy "does not err," and Virgil is as safe a guide as Aquinas. But Fra Girolamo already anticipates the intolerant spirit, the rigid dogmatism of the Council of Trent and Post-trentine Catholicity. The Jesuits themselves might well acclaim the *Triumphus Crucis* as a text-book of theological faith.

And, yet, it is clear that at times Savonarola despaired of Rome itself. In his famous vision of the two crosses, the shadow of the black cross of ruin and apostasy still lies over the Eternal City, and there is no hint of its dispersal; it is from Jerusalem that shall arise the golden cross of salvation and renovation, under the arms of which all generations of

men and women shall gather, to rest in temporal and spiritual felicity in the realisation of the age of gold.

Not so with Dante. Popes and Emperors may pass over the stage of history, great states may crumble and great revolutions be effected. The heathen may defile the holy temple, and Peter's place be "vacant in the presence of the Son of God"; Boniface and his successors may make the cemetery of the Apostle a sewer for the blood and the filth whereby the evil spirit who fell from Heaven is appeased in Hell.<sup>1</sup> But the ideal Rome of the poet's dreams is unalterable, undefiled, inviolable; *la gloriosa Roma*, the most noble and holy city, whose birth was contemporaneous with the planting of the race from which sprang "the confidence and the honour of human generation, Mary." Still is he convinced "that the stones that are in her walls are worthy of reverence, and the ground upon which she is placed is worthy beyond all that is preached and proved by men."<sup>2</sup> Neither in the temporal nor the spiritual order is she rejected. In her alone can Cæsar's throne be restored and Peter's seat purified; in her alone can the two suns be rekindled, to shed light upon man's two paths. Still is she the earthly counterpart and representative of the celestial city of God: "*Quella Roma onde Cristo è Romano.*"

Nevertheless, for all the rigid theology of Savonarola and the intense concentration of Dante's idealism upon Rome, there was something of the Joachimist in friar and poet alike. Implicitly, if not expressly, the golden era of their visions was a fresh spiritual epoch for mankind with a new dispensation, and its Church a reborn, renovated Catholicism in succession to that of their own days as it to the old dispensation of Judaism. A dream which will inevitably be dreamed again, under one form or another, in every epoch of the Church's history, when her "unacknowledged legislators" find themselves at war with the official exponents of her laws and doctrines.

But the ultimate note of the *Divina Commedia* is not

<sup>1</sup> *Purg.*, xxxiii. 1-12; *Par.*, xxvii. 22-27.

<sup>2</sup> *Conv.*, iv. 5.

✓ prophecy but fulfilment, not bitterness but sweetness—even as the picture we have left us of the last years of Dante's life shows him one from whose spirit the purging fires have burned away all but the purest essence of humanity. He has laid aside his stern indignation, *la fiera rancura*, as one of his own sonnets puts it, and is already mystically gathered "to the glorious choir of the citizens of the spotless city."<sup>1</sup> ✓  
 Prophecy and prediction can find no place at the consummation of the vision, for he has already passed in ecstatic contemplation from the human to the Divine, from time to the Eternal—where past, present and future are meaningless. But Love is there still, the one thing not transfigured beyond earthly recollection in those suprasensible regions: Love that finds last perfect utterance and final seal, its *ultimo sigillo*, in the poet's lyrical farewell to Beatrice throned above the golden sea of light in which the snow-white Rose of absolute Beauty ever floats; Love so controlling that it can for one ineffable moment draw the beloved from her gaze on the Eternal Fountain to smile upon the lover once more; Love that reveals yet another aspect of its mystery in the *vivace carità*, the burning transcendental yet never impersonal devotion of Bernard at the foot of Mary's throne. No sound or remembrance of the importunate earth may break in upon the mighty trance of the closing canto of the *Paradiso*. Rarified, indeed, is the atmosphere we breathe, from the sublime invocation to the Virgin Mother to the fading away of the vision of the invisible, with desire and will swayed perfectly by "the Love that moves the sun and the stars." The prayers and aspirations of ages of suffering humanity have passed into it, the adoration and yearning of centuries, the ecstatic meditations of generations of rapt mystics have gone to the making of it; but the music to which it is wedded is that of the new poetry of the modern world.

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<sup>1</sup> Sonnet xxxvii.

## THE TRIUMPH OF ERASMUS IN MODERN PROTESTANTISM.

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PROTESTANTISM in the past certainly has not flattered Erasmus. The sanity and catholicity of his conceptions were long obscured in polemic dust. He was always the advocate of moderation and reason, but his gospel of peace fell on deaf ears in an age that demanded passion, intensity, and heroism. The men of his day were also prejudiced against his opinions by their unfavourable estimate of his character.

But there are signs that Erasmus is coming to his own. Protestantism seems to be making amends for its ungracious treatment by offering him now the sincere flattery of imitation. His distinctive principles are dominating Protestant scholarship, and the world, Mr Froude has told us, has come round to the Erasmian way.

The triumph of Erasmus is only too complete, for his popularity is not confined to his virtues. His strength lay in his conceptions; probably no man of his generation had a broader vision of truth. It is the glory of Protestantism that it has "caught his clear accents" and is learning to "speak his great language." He was weak in his convictions. His words were often ambiguous. His attitude toward the great dilemmas of his day was evasive. Dilemmas of all kinds he shrank from instinctively, and partisanship he abhorred. He saw truth on both sides of every actual issue.

He wrote copiously on most of the great questions which then were agitating the minds of men; but his favourite mode of presenting his thoughts was the dialogue, in which it might be uncertain which of the contestants spoke for Erasmus. He yielded to ecclesiastical authority for the sake, he said, of the peace of the Church, but his real motives certainly included his own peace and security. He was unable to sacrifice himself for the sake of truth, but he had enough grace to confess to this inability.

Luther towered above him as the rugged champion of honesty and personal liberty.

To-day the spirit of Protestantism is striving against the letter. The moral rights of the individual thinker are challenging the authority of the Church and the restrictions of the creeds, and Erasmus, as was his wont, is found speaking on both sides of the controversy. On the progressive side, his noble conceptions are inspiring the onward march and point toward the goal of Christian unity and love, which four centuries of Protestantism have failed to reach. On the other hand, we hear the duty of conformity to the Church placed above the rights of the individual, quite in the old Erasmian way. On both sides of the Atlantic, the simple ethical demands of honesty and personal liberty of conscience are being subordinated to the exigencies of institutions and denominations. Ecclesiastical Protestantism is thus restraining the forces which brought it into existence, and which gave it its only reason for existence. These progressive forces are now resisted by the very arguments with which Erasmus, and his kind, opposed Protestantism, as a movement, in its beginning.

Many are looking forward earnestly to a new reformation as the logical, and the heroic, solution of these difficulties. Some seem to think that the proclamation of great, expansive religious truths, such as the Kingdom of God and the Fatherhood of God, is all that is necessary to hasten these days of refreshing. But history gives little encouragement

to this confidence in the power of ideas. Every great upward movement in history was effected by moral forces or convictions far more than by intellectual conceptions. The simple Protestant virtues of frankness, straightforwardness and veracity will be the main inspiration in this reformation of Protestantism, if it ever comes to pass. The demands of these elemental moral instincts must be satisfied somewhere; if not inside Protestantism, then it must be outside. The ideas of Erasmus will point out the path of progress, but the passionate convictions and the outspoken honesty of Luther will be sorely needed before the path is trod.

In the great intellectual or doctrinal points at issue between Erasmus and Luther, the verdict to-day is in favour of Erasmus, or, at least, the tide of opinion is setting in his direction. There were five main questions in regard to which the two men differed fundamentally. These were the attitude toward the Papacy, the proper method of reforming the Church, toleration of opinion, the value of dogma, and the freedom of the human will.

I. *The Attitude toward the Papacy.*—In 1518 Luther promised to obey the voice of Leo as the voice of Christ. In 1519 he was uncertain whether the Pope was the apostle of Christ or antichrist. In the following year he decided the question and adopted the view of Wiclif and Huss. In the *Babylonish Captivity* he declared that “the Papacy is in truth nothing else than the kingdom of Babylon and of very antichrist.” The Pope himself is a “stiff-necked, erring heretic and apostate.” In 1521 he was still surer of his position. The Pope “is more wicked than all devils, for he damned the faith, which no devil had ever done, and he is the greatest murderer that has ever been since the beginning of the world, in that he kills souls as well as bodies.”

Later in life he wrote, “I will curse and gird those wretches (the Papists) till I am in my grave, and they shall not hear another good word from me.” It is probable that he carried out this promise faithfully. The conviction that the Pope

was antichrist fortified him in his difficult and uncompromising position, and was the inspiration of his vehement utterances; but beyond this, it produced in his soul an exultation of assurance. "When I write against the Pope I am not melancholy. I write with joy of heart. Not the Pope and all his shaven crew can make me sad, for I know that they are Christ's enemies; therefore I fight against them with joyful courage."

Erasmus had no sympathy with Luther's determined, belligerent attitude. The fastidious taste of the great Humanist could not abide the coarse bluntness of the Teuton Reformer. The Erasmian prudence and experience rejected the Wittenberg methods as crude and indiscriminating. Early in the controversy he wrote to Luther, advising him to denounce those who abused the Pope's authority, and not to abuse the Pope personally. In 1520 he explained to Campegio his own relation to Luther: "I told Luther that if he would moderate his language, he might be a shining light, and that the Pope, I do not doubt, would be his friend."

The conscience of Erasmus also, as well as his taste and prudence, held him back from sympathy with the Lutheran programme. To Erasmus, Christianity consisted essentially in the spirit of love, wisdom, and goodness. He always opposed war and all controversies, although, by the irony of circumstance, he had to engage in controversy to defend his principles of peace. The main reason why Erasmus, when the crisis came, withheld his open sympathy from Luther, was not, as both Protestant and Romanist historians have sometimes taught, because he was a temporiser and a coward. He may, at times, have acted in a cowardly fashion, although he could speak out bold words in defence of other men. It would be hard to free him from the charge of temporising. But historians have often failed to recognise that his conscience restrained him from indorsing Luther's position. Erasmus could not approve of Luther's attitude toward the Pope or of his views of the Papacy.

Erasmus always considered the Papacy salvable. He

reverenced it, as Dante had done, although, like Dante, he had his own opinion of the character of some individual popes. Still, he believed, or at least said he believed, that Leo X. was a "pious Pope." The successors of Leo, Adrian and Clement, he thought were willing to compromise and find an agreement. "The difficulty," he wrote in his later life, "lay elsewhere." There is little question as to where he was pointing when he said "elsewhere." It was toward the convents of the mendicant monks, who were always his bitterest enemies, while popes and cardinals were his friends and confidential correspondents. Moreover, Erasmus was bound to Leo by strong ties of personal gratitude. He had been rescued twice from the restrictions and intolerance of the monks by the kind personal interposition of the Pope. He knew, also, that Leo had expressed openly his abhorrence of the irregular and immoral practices of the monks. Leo had read with relish his *Encomium of Folly*, in which the sins of monkery were denounced unsparingly, and even the faults of previous popes were ridiculed.

At bottom Erasmus and Leo were fellow-Humanists, though one happened to be wearing the scholar's cap and the other the triple crown. If Erasmus had no reason for considering that Leo X. was antichrist, he had much less reason for taking this dark view of his successor, Adrian VI. The earnestness and sincerity of Adrian is shown in his message to the Nuremberg Diet, in 1522:—

"We are well aware that even in this Holy See, for many years past, much that is abominable has been going on—abuses in things spiritual, transgressions of commands: yea, that all things have been perverted to evil. . . . We have all of us wandered from the right way, and we must therefore humble ourselves before God. As far as it lies with us to do anything in this matter we will use all diligence," etc.

We have all of us wandered from the right way, and we must therefore humble ourselves before God! These are excellent words to read, but they do sound a little incongruous in the lips of antichrist.

Luther massed together the Pope, the papal institution, the

whole Roman hierarchy, and the monastic orders, into one vast system of antichrist. Erasmus, with more genial humanistic tolerance, and with a far more intimate insight into actual conditions in Rome, could not possibly approve of Luther's indiscriminate anathemas. It is safe to say that the average intelligent Protestant of our day has adopted the attitude of Erasmus. The recent "symposia" of opinion, at the time of the death of Leo XIII., show that the Protestant press has come well round to the Erasmian way.

II. *The Proper Method of Reforming the Church.*—Erasmus recognised the existence of evils and the urgent need of reform, as clearly as did Luther. They differed as to the best method to be pursued in the reformation. It was the typical difference which has divided good men in every age as they face the evils in society and in institutions. Shall the reformation be immediate and thorough at the risk of division, or shall it be united and slow with the probability of incompleteness? Erasmus always, consistently, advocated the gradual, catholic, evolutionary method of reform. "Of course the Church needs reform," he wrote in 1521, "but violence is not the way to it. Both parties behaved like maniacs." As the Prince of the Humanists and the leader of Greek New Testament scholarship, he believed that the spread of Biblical learning was the best way to correct the evils of the Church and the age. He even made the strange suggestion that there should be compulsory general education in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. He hoped that by the spread of intelligence and the diffusion of the principles of the Gospel the desired reforms might be accomplished. He believed that strife, antagonism, and schism would be fatal to true progress. The famous Laurinus letter of 1523 shows his position:—

"I cannot help hating dissension and loving peace and harmony. I see how much easier it is to stir up confusion than to allay it. I would that all might strive together for the triumph of Christ and the peace of the Gospel, and that without violence, but in truth and reason, we might take counsel. . . . To those who go about to this end Erasmus shall not be found wanting. But if anyone desires to throw everything into confusion, he shall not have me either for a leader or a companion."

Erasmus differed from Luther also in that he attacked evils rather than individuals and institutions. "I have mocked at open and notorious vice. I have blackened no man's reputation." He possessed, it is true, a neat fund of epithets, and could use them dexterously in debate, especially with Luther himself; but this accomplishment was only part of the necessary equipment of the scholar of the sixteenth century.

"He fought, but not with love of strife."

In the letter to Luther, mentioned before, he said: "I think courtesy to opponents is more effective than violence. Old institutions cannot be rooted up in an instant. Quiet argument may do more than wholesale condemnation." Such words cannot be waved aside as merely the prudent utterances of a time-server. They are Christian words, and when they are viewed in the lurid light of the history of Europe for the following two hundred years, their wisdom is not dimmed.

The Erasmian plan of reform, therefore, was to remove ignorance in the Church by education, to discomfit and shame excesses by ridicule, and to overcome bigotry by emphasising the simple principles of the Gospel. Luther interrupted this programme by challenging and battling against the men and the institutions which represented the evils. His method was abrupt, radical, and revolutionary. "Make an end to all your rotten performances," he ordered the canons of Wittenberg Cathedral; "do away with masses, vigils, and everything that is opposed to the Gospel and to our commands." He adds his ultimatum. "Make up your minds, and let me have a straightforward, immediate answer, yes or no, next Sunday." Wittenberg being Luther's headquarters, the canons find it expedient to answer yes.

This attitude of Luther's is, at least, attractive. It shows rugged honesty and deep conviction. All the world loves a fighter, even more than it loves a lover. Luther set up a straight, clean fight—"I in the Pope's hair and he in mine," as he himself gleefully expressed it. This method may gain

the external object desired, but it is always at the cost of antagonism and division. It is a question how far it aids in the spiritual solution of the difficulties involved. In St Paul's phraseology, it may be as "carnal" as physical force.

Our Protestant historians have generally agreed that Luther's method was necessary. The evils, they say, were too deep-rooted and vice too openly defiant to permit the possibility of an Erasmian solution. It is natural to interpret human actions in the past from the point of view of predestination. This is because we consider the choices of an individual in the light of all the succeeding providential circumstances. We are not so Calvinistic about the actions of men to-day. These are usually ascribed to free-will—and total depravity. The value of the historical imagination lies in its power to view a great personality of the past contemporaneously. His actions may thus be judged by his motives and environment, and not by the long series of subsequent events which may be largely dependent upon his actions. When we endeavour to make this contemporaneous estimate of Luther's attitude and methods, it seems impossible not to regret that the advice of Erasmus was not heeded by Luther. For, judging as we would judge the actions of a man to-day, the method of Erasmus appears saner, wiser, and kinder.

Goethe professed his belief that Europe would have advanced more quickly under the guidance of Erasmus. Mr Huxley, in his last years, expressed a similar conviction. Janssen, the able Roman Catholic historian, says that, if the movement could have been carried on without violent uprooting and destruction, there was no more favourable moment for genuine reform than in Luther's days.

III. *Toleration of Opinion.*—It is said that the views of Erasmus on the subject of toleration were far in advance of his age. They were, however, the general humanistic opinions of his day. Humanism, as a spiritual movement, aided greatly in the progress of European thought, by cultivating a genial and sympathetic intellectual attitude in the midst of a bigoted

and belligerent generation. In many of the Humanists, this tolerance was the result of religious indifferentism or even scepticism; but Erasmus, with all his levity and his classical culture, was a man of deep Christian sentiment. He felt earnestly on the great issues of his day, deploring the bitterness of the controversies and sympathising with neither party in the polemical tactics employed.

The charge of timidity, so often brought against Erasmus, must be modified as we read his frequent and often courageous pleas for toleration of opinion. It is certainly to his credit that this courage was exhibited for the rights of other men, even of those from whom he differed. Here his religious spirit and his Humanism blended to produce one of his finest moral qualities. He defended Reuchlin boldly against the monkish bigots of Cologne. He advised Frederick of Saxony to protect Luther against Rome. To Sadolet he wrote that Luther's books had better be read than burnt. His letter to Campegio, in 1520, shows that Erasmus was no uncertain advocate of free speech. "I perceived that the better a man was, the less he was Luther's enemy. I approved of what seemed good in his works. . . . If we want truth, every man ought to be free to say what he thinks without fear. If the advocates of one side are to be rewarded with mitres and the advocates of the other with rope or stake, truth will not be heard." Such words ring true, and it is a pleasure to find that they are not infrequent. "The defeat of Luther will destroy evangelical truth and Christian liberty," he wrote again. Some years later he wrote, on the other hand, that the triumph of Lutheranism would mean the overthrow of letters; but he seems then to refer to the excesses of fanaticism in the Protestant movement, as seen in the vagaries of the "Heavenly Prophets."

His love of toleration was closely connected with his independent or individualistic attitude. "I am a lover of liberty. I will not and cannot serve a party." Erasmus steadfastly declined every alluring offer to wear the livery of Rome. He

refused the bishop's mitre and the cardinal's hat. As an independent thinker, devoted to the cause of free thought, he pleaded for toleration for Luther, although he had little sympathy with Lutheranism as a movement. One of the main reasons why he had no sympathy was that he detected in the new communion the same intellectual narrowness and intolerance to which he objected in the old Church, and between the two intolerances, he preferred the Roman, as both more ancient and more logical.

In striking contrast with the pliant and courteous tolerance of Erasmus was the strong, uncompromising attitude of Luther, on all matters of religious belief. If Erasmus and the Humanists were essentially modern in their ideas concerning religious toleration, they failed, for that reason, to affect the religious consciousness of their own day as much as did Luther. The great Reformer probably influenced the religious men of his time more effectually, because he shared the popular, limited ideas concerning toleration. Luther and the Pope were quite at one in their views as to toleration of opinion. They differed as to the opinions which should be tolerated, and as to the methods of opposing incorrect dogma. But Luther, although he did not favour oppression or persecution, did not believe in toleration of opinion, in the modern sense, and he certainly did not practise it. Not only did he maintain that the Pope and all his adherents would be damned, but toward fellow-Protestants who disagreed with his doctrines he exhibited the most amazing intolerance. He denounced Henry VIII. with a coarseness and extravagance he tried afterwards to mitigate. Carlstadt, Münzer, and the Anabaptists he anathematised. To the gentle Zwingli he denied the name of Christian, and Erasmus himself was the worst enemy Christ had had for a thousand years. Bullinger said that Luther sends to the devil everyone who does not wholly agree with him.

But hard words break no bones, and much of this extravagance of language need not be taken at its face value.

The narrowness of Luther's intolerance was not confined to theologians who were so unfortunate as to differ from him. It was seen also in his attitude toward the Jews and the peasants. The anti-Semitism of to-day can find solace and support in the utterances of the "entire Luther," and his severe words, at the time of the Peasant war in 1525, show that he had no sympathy with the movement for agrarian reform, except under the control of a political absolutism. He preached, as Calvin did, the duty of unconditional submission to rulers, whether they be good or bad. By the nemesis of circumstance, the movements of the social democracy in Germany are largely out of sympathy with the Protestant Church, for, since the days of Luther, the Church has shown but little sympathy with the cause of democracy.

IV. *The Attitude toward Dogma.*—"Why should we narrow the profession of Christ when He willed that it should be most broad?" This question of Erasmus' is as pertinent to-day as in the Reformation age, and it probes into difficulties in Protestantism as well as in Romanism. The question also indicates the attitude of Erasmus toward all dogmatic questions. The modern tendency in Protestantism toward a "short creed," or simple statement of fundamental beliefs, is quite in the Erasmian way.

His earliest religious work, the *Enchiridion*, was largely a plea for this simplicity of faith. In the Introduction to his Greek New Testament, in 1516, he advocates the Christocentric method of presenting Christian truth. In 1518, he brought out this thought still more clearly. "I would not defile the divine philosophy of Christ with human decrees. Let Christ remain where He is, the centre, with certain circles about Him." He suggests a commission of pious and learned men who should bring together into a compendium, from the purest sources, "the whole philosophy of Christ," with as much simplicity as learning, as much brevity as clearness. "What pertains to the faith should be treated in as few articles as possible."

Erasmus found as little satisfaction in the dogmas of Luther and the Augsburg Confession as in the traditional dogmas of Rome. "I cannot accept his doctrines," he wrote in his old age. Luther, to his mind, was merely opposing one dogma with another. Although Luther was the champion of Protestantism, Erasmus was really maintaining the more logically Protestant position of freedom from the authority of all dogma. "Every definition is a misfortune," he wrote. "A man is not damned because he cannot tell whether the Spirit has one principle or two. Has he the fruits of the Spirit? That is the question. True religion is peace, and we cannot have peace unless we leave the conscience unshackled on obscure points." To the Archbishop of Mainz he wrote: "Reduce the number of dogmas to a minimum. You can do it without injury to Christianity. On other points leave everyone free to believe what he pleases."

Luther's position was characteristically different. "Christians require certainty, definite dogmas, a sure word of God, which they can trust to live and die by. For such certainty Erasmus cares not." Here the moral power of Luther's convictions appeals to us strongly. The problem in Protestantism is to retain Luther's depth of conviction, and at the same time gain the breadth of view of Erasmus. There is no doubt that Luther, with all his spirituality and power, transplanted bodily from Romanism to Protestantism the mediæval conception of dogma. The task of Protestant theology to-day is more than the change in the form of dogma. It is the change in the idea of dogma.

V. *The Freedom of the Will*.—This was the only point of open controversy between these two great leaders of thought, although it was really less significant than any of the four other questions already discussed. The particulars of this debate need not be examined here, for neither of them added anything new or noteworthy to the old, insoluble problem. This question is found in Brahman, Jewish, and Mohammedan theology. It has appeared, in some characteristic phase, at

almost every great era of Christian thought. Neither the earnestness of Luther nor the wit of Erasmus could do more than rehearse the familiar Biblical and psychological arguments.

The Calvinistic Churches of Great Britain and America, while not surrendering their fundamental belief in the divine initiative, are now emphasising the freedom of the human will, in a manner which savours more of the *De Libero Arbitrio* of Erasmus, than of the extreme deterministic position of Luther, from which even Melancthon drew back.

So far we have reason to rejoice in the triumph of Erasmus. His ideas on these disputed points were broader and better than Luther's. They have won their way on their merits, in spite of the prestige of Luther and the unpopularity of Erasmus. But it is an ominous fact that the effort to introduce these ideas into organic Protestantism is accompanied by a revival of the indirect and evasive moral methods of Erasmus. Here we come across the seamy side of his success. His indecision of utterance, his yielding to the prevailing opinion in the Church, his preference for peace rather than for candid expression of his convictions—these are the shadows which are found lurking behind the light of his triumph.

The obstacles in the path of spiritual progress are not always the result of ignorance, indifference, or sin. They may come from the ethical demands made on the Protestant teacher by veracity. How can the claims of veracity impede intellectual and spiritual progress? This is an important question, but it is answered in the following sentences:—

A man who has vowed to maintain a certain set of theological propositions has no moral right to teach what is inconsistent with those propositions.

No man can speak with the authority of truth while in a position where his right to declare his views is questioned by those he desires to influence.

These sentences show the difficulties with which many

sincere men are struggling in the Protestant Churches. They tell the reason why many utterances are inconsistent and halting. They show, in part, why some teachers who hold "advanced" views concerning the Scriptures retain antiquated forms of doctrine based originally upon the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. They show also why good arguments for progressive theology often fail to convince. Plain, honest men doubt the right of a Protestant teacher to question doctrines he agreed to uphold, and their instinctive judgment on this simple moral question will determine their conclusion concerning the theological question involved. They will argue that if a man is teaching what he has no moral right to teach in the Church, there is probably something wrong with his views as well as with his character. It is only fair to Protestant teachers to say that they are as a class quite as sensitive to the ethical requirements of their position as are their critics, and this ethical sensitiveness is restraining the free utterance of many who are labouring and longing for the fuller light.

The younger generation of ministers in the Evangelical Churches find that their theology is strongly influenced by the study of Biblical criticism, the ethnic religions, and the scientific conception of development. The changes in theology which these ideas will ultimately effect are more thorough and fundamental than some of our brisk, popular reconcilers of science and religion seem able or willing to recognise. With all the instinctive desire for evolution rather than revolution, with all loyalty to the great truths contained in the cardinal doctrines of the Church, with all the longing to hold both to history and to freedom, still the fact must be faced that these wider truths of our age are incompatible with the form, the logic, and the method of the old Protestant "systems," which are still demanded of most of our ministry in their ordination vows. The outcome must be, not the amendment or alteration of the old systems, but their recasting or reconstruction.

Just so far as this incompatibility is felt, it is producing indirectness, inconsistency, if not evasion. Crypto-liberalism is

practised in communions which will not permit open expression of liberalism. Progressive men are quietly disseminating their views, preaching them cautiously, but usually keeping them out of print. A frank public expression of liberal views is discouraged by the crypto-liberals as "inexpedient," and opposed by conservatives as erroneous. This crypto-liberalism has adopted the Erasmian morals. It advocates the "policy" of silence, education, and patient waiting for conservative funerals.

There are many good arguments, or at least a good many arguments, advanced for this position—evolution, continuity, the evils of schism, the unity and peace of the Church, love of the brethren who differ, and many other excellent reasons. Against all this array, drawn from history, analogy, and the soul of Erasmus, one simple little question stands in the wavering balance: Is it honest?

Crypto-liberalism will object to this question. Let us ask another, which may not be liked any better: Is it Protestant to be a crypto-liberal?

If anything is clear on the pages of the history of the sixteenth century, it is that crypto-liberalism is not Protestant. Protestantism, as a positive moral movement, sprang from the scorn of compromise, evasion, and duplicity. "Do away with your assertion of your convictions," said Luther, "and you do away with your Christianity." The League of Schmalkald protested against being coerced into professing to believe what they knew they did not believe, under any fear or any temptation. In spite of his intolerance and incomplete conceptions, Luther blazed the way for intellectual and spiritual progress by the moral power of his straightforward sincerity. Nothing can exceed his scorn for the crypto-liberal policy of Erasmus.

That the Erasmian policy in the Church is endangering morals we propose to prove by three witnesses, who agree on this question of the ethical peril, although they might not agree on much else. It will be seen that there is no collusion among these witnesses, when their names are

mentioned as those of Professor Huxley, Professor Sidgwick, and Dr Gore, Bishop of Worcester.

Professor Huxley said: "Theological apologists who insist that morality will vanish if their dogmas are exploded would do well to consider the fact that, in the matter of intellectual veracity, science is already a long way ahead of the Churches; and that, in this particular, it is exerting an educational influence on mankind of which the Churches have shown themselves utterly incapable." This is perhaps an instance of the odiousness of comparisons, and it is capable, and possibly was intended to be capable, of arousing some of the odium theologicum. Nevertheless, it is a strong charge against ecclesiasticism. Coming from one who was a frank critic of ecclesiastical Christianity, its importance will be discounted by many who will listen more attentively to the other two.

Professor Sidgwick, some eight years ago, made what is probably the severest attack on Anglican Erasmianism ever made:—

"The efforts made for more than a generation in England to liberalise the teachings of the English Church, and to open its ministry to men of modern ideas, must find an inexorable moral barrier in the obligations of veracity and good faith. For the minister who recites any one of the creeds, while conscious of not really believing it, can hardly be acquitted of breaking both these rules of duty at once; since he solemnly states that he believes a theological proposition which he has given an express pledge to believe and to teach, and stating this falsely, breaks his pledge."

This is a very solemn and serious charge. Confidence in the ethical standards inculcated in the Church is not assured as we read the able replies made by Dr Hastings Rashdall. Dr Rashdall not only concedes, he very earnestly claims, a very wide divergence between the actual beliefs of the clergy and the doctrines they are required to assent to. "There are few clergymen whose private beliefs correspond with the letter of the formulæ to which they profess adherence." "If anyone supposes that the Articles really express the actual views of the clergy, he must be singularly inobservant of their

pulpit and other utterances." "Among the most numerous section of the clergy . . . nothing can exceed the contempt with which the Thirty-nine Articles are commonly treated." He claims that there is such a general, although not quite universal, agreement on the subject, that "it is legitimate to subscribe to the Articles in a very elastic and unnatural sense."

These expressions do not lack the Protestant merit of frankness. Erasmus certainly could not and would not have written them. Dr Rashdall is deeply in earnest, and he feels the exigencies of a situation which he deploras. If every man were as outspoken as he, the difficulties would vanish. But he is arguing for a position which he himself, by reason of his frankness, does not share. In a second paper, which is a reply to Dr Sanday's criticism of his previous utterance, he claims that there is no unverity in assenting to propositions when both parties recognise that the propositions are not literally meant. He is so infelicitous in his illustrations as to compare the solemn vow to maintain the truths of Christianity to the polite expression, "My dear sir!" or even to the words of an actor on the stage!

The logic of Dr Rashdall's argument hangs on the point that there is a virtual agreement between the parties interested that the vow is to be interpreted indirectly. But Dr Gore and Dr Sanday deny any such general agreement. The Bishop has recently written that clergymen who constantly recite the words of the Creed cannot consistently hold their office unless they personally believe what they recite. There are many who will agree with this statement of Dr Gore's who neither agree with his Christology nor with the letter of the creed he is endeavouring to preserve intact.

If all progressive men were as frank as Dr Rashdall, the moral atmosphere might soon become clarified. If his own suggestive phrase might sometimes be expressly stated, some change might come speedily. If an applicant for Holy Orders could say, "I accept the Articles of the Church on the basis

of a common understanding that these Articles are to be interpreted in a very elastic and unnatural sense," perhaps there would no longer be occasion for the Reviews to discuss the reluctance of able men to take Orders.

Dr Rashdall argues further that it is better that able men should enter the Church, interpreting the moral obligations in the free way suggested, rather than that the ministry should be recruited exclusively from the class of narrow-minded men who really believe the doctrines required by the Church.

Dr Martineau, a generation ago, wrote: "It is no longer an insult to a clergyman's honour, but rather a compliment to his intelligence, to suspect him of saying one thing and believing another." This is asserting ironically the same thing that Dr Rashdall is conceding apologetically.

It seems almost certain that great changes will appear soon on the theological horizon. A sign is seen in the general expressions of dissatisfaction with the old Protestant formulas. A more hopeful sign is the expectation that great modern ideas, such as cosmic development, will prove to be of tremendous power when appropriated religiously.

The coming years are fraught with great issues for Protestantism. The intellectual progress of the world is largely dependent upon the free advance of spiritual Protestantism. The answer to our questions of to-day will not lie in any elaborate formula, or in the invention of any ingenious plan by which one may believe one thing while professing to believe another. The solution will be moral, not intellectual.

Every man who in his secret heart has broken with the old doctrines must, in his own way, win the moral right to speak out the truth that is in him. There cannot be true progress except on the basis of veracity and sincerity.

The moral spirit of Luther, the spirit of the Protestants of Schmalkald, is the true "essence of Protestantism." It is the spirit which abhors insincerity and refuses to offer to God the unclean sacrifice of a lie. If it is true to itself, Protestantism will tear away the tissues and glosses with which the Erasmian

morals have entangled it. Progressive Protestantism will come forth courageously from its bondage to the old Protestant letter. It will defend the noble ideas of Erasmus in the spirit of Luther. It will never speak with power and persuasion until it does.

To do this will cost much, and many men will feel the cost, but there seems to be no other solution of the difficulties. Sincerity, spirituality, self-sacrifice—these virtues are elemental in the character of Jesus Christ. They have given Christianity its power and permanency. They created Protestantism. They are guiding now into the path of promise.

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## DREAMS AND IDEALISM.

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FOR some reason, not easy to analyse completely, but probably connected with the convenient ambiguities of the word, it has become more reputable for philosophers to call themselves "idealists" than "realists." But the verbal agreement which has thus been reached can hardly be said to indicate any real advance either in the cogency of the philosophic case for idealism, or in the amount of popular acceptance it has conquered. Indeed, there seems to be a real and growing danger that, on the one hand, the philosophic arguments for idealism should become more and more slipshod as their technicality increases, and, on the other, that the great mass of human thought should become more and more contentedly ignorant of reasonings grown too unintelligible for their value to be appreciated, or their fallacies to be detected. The blame for both these tendencies would seem to rest mainly on the doctrine which would like to monopolise the name "Idealism," but is more accurately described as idealistic absolutism, and has unfortunately succeeded only in obscuring and rendering unpalatable the truth contained in the idealistic interpretation of our experience.

It may be useful, therefore, to make an attempt to clear away the fallacies and confusions on which idealism is too often based, in order to make room for an argument which is easily within the scope of ordinary minds, and, while it

establishes more simply and conclusively what is really tenable in idealist contentions, may even lead to a reconciliation of Realism and Idealism.

I. We may consider first, therefore, the procedure of idealistic absolutism, which professes to steer a safe and rational course between the Scylla of subjective idealism and the Charybdis of realism. Actually, however, it would seem rather to sacrifice part of its crew to Scylla, and the rest to Charybdis, and finally to founder in an abyss of fallacy.

(1) It sets out from what may stand as the fundamental tenet of all idealism, viz., the assertion that *reality is experience*. But as stated this proposition needs expansion, if it is to account for the facts, and idealistic absolutism also has to develop it. It proceeds therefore to add on the one hand that the experience which is co-extensive with reality is not to be identified with *our* experience—as the subjective idealists falsely suppose—while yet, on the other, the assertion that reality is independent of *our* experience is not to involve a lapse into realism.

It protests, therefore, (2) that subjective idealism is absurd. The subjectivist cannot really suppose that things cease to exist when he is not perceiving them, nor that his fellow-men are but phantoms of his own creation. But does not this concession block the original road to Idealism, and bring us back to Realism?

(3) The absolutist saves his idealism by adding to the assertion that reality is experience—“*yes, but the Absolute's, not ours.*” The Absolute is an infinite experience which includes all our finite experiences, and eternally perceives the system of the universe.

(4) The finite subject is thus put down; but the qualities of the Absolute Experience remain to be determined. And this might be difficult if the finite spirit, of which alone we seem to have direct knowledge, were wholly worthless. But it can be declared an imperfect reflexion of the Absolute, and then observations of finite experience may once more be

appealed to. By their aid the void and formless Absolute gets itself determined as *individual*, *purposive*, and *spiritual*, sometimes even as *conscious* and *personal*, while any doubts as to whether these human qualities will stand the transfer to the Absolute are silently evaded.

It is, I think, apparent that when thus stated in its naked incoherence the absolutist proof of Idealism seems far from satisfactory. Nor would philosophers so extensively have felt bound to accept it, had they not usually come upon it with two settled convictions, the one derived from their studies, that Realism is impossible, and the other from their natural instincts, that subjective idealism is practically absurd.

And yet a little clear thinking would show that if the above argument be the best Idealism can do, then Idealism is untenable; that strict Idealism comes nearer to subjectivism than to absolutism; that the assumption of an absolute experience is self-defeating, and does not account for the "independent" existence of the "real" world; and that nothing is unacceptable to true Idealism that can be proved, or even seriously asserted, by Realism. And thus at the final point of view the true Idealism would become one with the true Realism, and their antithesis would be transcended.

Let us note, therefore, in the first place how inadequate or fallacious are all the stock arguments for Idealism. Thus (1) the mere experiencing of a world is no adequate proof of Idealism, because it would occur equally if Realism were right. For however "independent" the reality might be in itself, it would be real for us only as experienced.

(2) It seems vain to show that without an experiencing subject there can be no object, and that therefore reality is spiritual. For this fails to show that reality is *wholly* spiritual, and the "subject" in this argument is just as much conditioned by the "object" as *vice versa*. Each is implied in the other, and neither can claim the priority. Experience is a process which plays between two poles, *both* of which are necessary to its reality.

(3) The argument that as the world is plainly *not* dependent on “*my*” experience, it must be on the Absolute’s, succumbs to the slightest criticism. It is traceable, of course, to the old Berkeleian doctrine that the *esse* of things is their *percipi*, whence it infers that as there is a permanent world-order, there must also be a continuous divine percipient. In this, however, some serious subreptions have occurred. Thus it has been taken for granted (1) that there is a world-order strictly “common” to a plurality of percipients, and (2) that the alleged permanence of the world as it appears to the postulated non-human mind is available as an explanation of “*my*” intermittent experience, and yields a common ground for individual experiences to meet on. The Absolute, in short, is used as an *asylum ignorantiae*, which hides from view the real difficulties of the metaphysical problem.

The absolutist form of this argument, moreover, is greatly inferior to the Berkeleian. For Berkeley had at least claimed the right to conceive the divine mind in a sufficiently human fashion to render plausible, if not unexceptionable, the analogy between it and the human mind. But all such analogies utterly break down when an impersonal, inhuman Absolute is substituted for God. For then the world is not “*in*” my consciousness *in the same way* as it is in the Absolute’s, nor does it exist “*for*” my mind in the same way as it is supposed to do for the Absolute’s. Indeed, it is only in a different, and quite improper, sense that mind and consciousness can be attributed to the totality of things, the Absolute. Moreover, its experience “includes” other experiences in a way “*mine*” does not. Nor does their inclusion in an absolute “mind” render things any the less extra-mental to me, or alleviate the pressure of an alien reality. From our human point of view, therefore, this absolute idealism is the crassest realism: it has lost also the chief emotional advantage of idealism, the power, to wit, of fostering a feeling of kinship with the universe.

And, finally, it is merely an illusion that the existence of an Absolute at all accounts for the common world of individual percipients. For (1) it is practically useless: it does nothing to alleviate our practical difficulties of understanding one another, of communicating ideas and experiences. (2) It leaves the individual variations just the same. But (3) it renders their existence theoretically incomprehensible. For even when we have hastily taken it to solve the question of the possibility of a common world—by begging it—we find ourselves involved instead in a still more puzzling problem, viz., that of accounting for an indefinite plurality of fragmentary distortions of the absolute world-image. To dismiss these cavalierly as “appearances” is to exhibit temper, not to solve the problem. For, after all, it was these human experiences which the Absolute was invoked to explain. Not only does it refuse to do this, but it leaves us (4) with our difficulty doubled. We had to explain how the many individual perceptions could correspond with one another and coalesce into a common world: we have now to explain in addition how each of them can correspond with an absolute perception as well!

Is it too much, therefore, to conclude that the argument from the human to the “absolute” mind does not hold, because there is no real analogy between them? An Absolute, of course, may still be conceived to “include” us and all things; but there is no reason whatsoever to regard it as “spiritual” or spiritually valuable. The Absolute will help us neither to regard Reality as spiritual, nor to escape from the difficulties of Idealism.

(4) We may consider next the idealistic argument which goes back to Kant, and forms the core of his “transcendental idealism,” namely, the important and indispensable part played by human activity in the constitution of “reality.” To accept from Kant the details of the operations of thought in building up reality is no doubt impossible; but his main principle is sound: reality for us is largely of our making. Indeed, recent

advances in the theory of knowledge have only made this clearer; it has become manifest that selective attention and purposive manipulation are essential and all-pervasive influences in the construction of the "real" world, and even the fundamental axioms, which once seemed "independent" facts, and by Kant were still regarded as facts of mental structure, are now shown to originate in subjective demands.<sup>1</sup> A Humanist philosopher, therefore, is not likely to undervalue whatever testimony to Idealism may be derivable from the moulding of our experience of reality by our activity. But candour compels him to avow that no proof of *complete* Idealism seems attainable in this fashion. For it cannot be proved that reality is *wholly* of subjective manufacture. Kant himself found that the "forms of thought" must be supplied with "matter" from "sensation," to render possible the construction of an "objective" nature; nor is a disavowal of his anti-thesis a solution of his problem. A second factor, therefore, *not* of our making, must be admitted into our "reality." This we may (and must) attenuate into a mere indeterminate potentiality, or disparage by protesting that the true reality of things is never to be sought in what they originally were, but rather in what they have been enabled to become; but there still remains a given material for our constructive manipulation, an objective condition of our activity. However much, therefore, we emphasise the function of our constructive activity in the cognition of reality, we still fall short of a proof that reality is wholly psychical.

(5) Psychology has supplied an interesting argument to the subjectivity of all experiences from the variations of individual perceptions. But this too is insufficient to prove Idealism. For it has already presupposed a "real" world in the very experiments which establish the existence of these subjective differences in perception. Hence, though their proper observation may be scientifically most important, and throw much light on the *de facto* way in

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Personal Idealism*, pp. 47-133.

which the common world of social intercourse is established and extended, the proof that reality is psychical is *ultra vires* for this argument. It can be appealed to only *after* it has been shown that the "real" world it presupposes is already "ideal."

II. Shall we admit, then, that the "proofs" of Idealism one and all break down? Certainly, if what we required was an *a priori* proof independent of experience. Our ultimate assumptions cannot be proved *a priori*; they can only be assumed, and tried. And Idealism also would seem too fundamental to be derivable from anything more ultimate. It can only be assumed, tentatively, and to see how it works. If we are content to prove it in this way, we may claim, and substantiate our claim, that it yields a successful and adequate interpretation of experience. And, moreover, conceiving and assuming it thus, we may find one real, though empirical, argument in its favour, which is ample to confirm our faith.

In attempting such a proof, it will be futile to shrink from the proposition that the fundamental dictum of Idealism must be formulated as being that *Reality is "my" experience*. This dictum has a subjectivist tinge, which has terrified most of the *soi-disant* idealists, and driven them blindly into the nearest refuge for the intellectually destitute. But there is no great harm in it, if we do not allow it to harden into Solipsism, and are careful to conceive a sufficiently intimate and plastic correlation between the world or reality, and the self or experient. And we must avoid the fatal blunder of imagining that when we have pronounced our dictum, we know all about the self and the world, and have nothing more to learn from experience. For we have really still to learn both what we are and what the world is, and what precisely we mean by calling it ours. We may not, therefore, treat our knowledge of the self as primary, and our knowledge of the world as secondary; it would be truer to treat the knowledge of each as defining the other, and to say that the world cannot

be known without knowing the self, nor the self without knowing the world.<sup>1</sup>

The initial statement, therefore, that *reality is "my" experience* must at once be expanded, and subjected to a modification which amounts to a correction. I have to realise that though the reality may be really mine, it has yet been largely "ejected" or extruded from consciousness, and endowed with an "independent" existence or transcendent reality. And the motives for this procedure need analysis.

Looking into this question, we soon perceive that our motives were *volitional*. We were not constrained by any logical compulsion, but impelled by our emotions and desires. We *refused* to accept as *ours* the whole of our experience. And that on merely empirical grounds. Our experience happens to be of such a sort that we will not accept the entire responsibility for it. And so we postulate an external extra-mental reality, to which we can attribute most of its offensive features.<sup>2</sup>

It is, however, quite conceivable that experience might be, or become, such that our objection to owning it would disappear. If, *e.g.*, events invariably took the course we desired, should we not succumb to the temptation of fancying ourselves the omnipotent creators of the cosmic history? Or, again, if pleasure and pain (or even pain alone) were eliminated from our experience, should we retain self-consciousness enough to frame the antithesis of "self" and "world"? And what motive would remain for ascribing any feature in the course of events to an "independent" world?

That there was no logical necessity about the conception of an external world follows also from the possibility of Solipsism.

<sup>1</sup> The sole reason for not asserting a complete mutual interpenetration of self and world lies in the fact that the self is not *exclusively* implicated in our "real" world. It extends, as we shall see, also into the "unreal" worlds of dream-experience, etc., and this gives it a certain primacy.

<sup>2</sup> The primitive instinct is to assign to an external cause even the most clearly subjective disorders. Hence diseases of body and mind are ascribed to possession by demons.

Solipsism is not *logically* untenable; it is only practically uncomfortable. We might, had we willed it, have taken a solipsist view of the situation, if we were willing to take the consequences. Any one madly logical enough might always insist that he was the sole and omnipotent creator of his whole experience. When he fell into a ditch, he might applaud his subtle sense of humour in hoaxing himself. When, touching fire, he was burned, he might still proudly claim the authorship of the fire. And when annoyed at his fatuity, you went up and boxed his ears, he might still ascribe the indignity to the bad regulation of his creative fancy! In short, no logic could refute him, so long as he did not *refuse to own* whatever incidents befel him, and was willing to accept them as characteristic of his nature. It might be demonstrated, of course, that such a nature must be inherently absurd and perverse, self-contradictory and self-tormenting; but if he were blandly willing to admit this—what then? However you maltreated him, you could not force him to admit your “independent” reality.

But, you will say, the solipsist is *mad*, and no sane person can entertain such fancies. Even about this it is not safe to dogmatise. The point whether a being, to which there must be attributed an inherently discordant and conflicting nature, is mad, would have to be settled with the philosophers of the Absolute. For must not their idol, which “includes,” “is,” and “owns” the weltering mass of suffering, struggling, and conflicting experiences that make up our world, have precisely the constitution of our imaginary solipsist?

And further, before we condemn him as an outrageous fool, should we not reflect whether we do not ourselves agree with him? Are we not in the habit of claiming as of our own fabrication large portions of our experience, which are just as absurd and incoherent as that of the poor solipsist? Do we not, that is, regard ourselves as the authors and inventors of our own nightmares? And so, is it not a flagrant inconsistency to adopt a solipsistic interpretation for our

“dreams” and a realist interpretation for our “waking” experiences?

What makes this worse is that it is quite hard at times to know to which portion of life an experience ought to be assigned, and *no fundamental differences in character between the two can be established*. For dream-worlds, like that of waking life, run their course in time and extend themselves in space, and contain persons and things that seem “independent,” and sometimes are pleasing and sometimes not. There is therefore no theoretic reason for the difference in our attitude. The reason is purely practical, and excellent so far as it goes. *Dream-worlds are of inferior value for our purposes, and are therefore judged “unreal.”* What precisely is their philosophic value remains to be elucidated; but they show that the solipsistic interpretation of experience is neither impossible nor theoretically wrong.

The “independent reality,” then, of the world we experience is not an inevitable inference. It is the result of an extrusion, by which we resent the intrusion of unwelcome incidents. It need not, therefore, ever have suggested itself: we might all have lived and died as chaotic solipsists to all eternity. But once the happy thought occurred to anyone, that he might postulate an independent reality to account for the incoherencies in his experience, the foundations of Realism were laid. The procedure was a great and instant success.<sup>1</sup> The notion of an independent external world with independent other persons has indisputably worked, and philosophic arguments are impotent against it. If philosophy disputes it, philosophy incurs contempt. For common sense is always ready to suppose that whatever works is true, and fortunately philosophy is now tending to admit that common sense is, mainly, right.

But though the Realism of ordinary life and science is right so far as it goes, it is not a complete proof of absolute Realism. The “independent reality” which has been postulated is not,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Personal Idealism*, pp. 114-5.

after all, independent of experience, but relative to the experience which it serves to harmonise. It is nothing absolute ; it means "real" *in* and *for* that experience. It may be, therefore, *as real* as that experience, but can never be *more real*. The external world and my fellow-creatures therein are real "independently" of me, because this assumption is essential to my action, and therefore as real as the experience I am thereby trying to control. *Provided always that the situation which evoked the postulate continues.* Thus the "independence" of the real world is limited by the very postulate which constructed it ; it is an independence subject to the one condition that its postulation should not cease. If, therefore, anything should happen in my experience leading me to doubt its ultimateness, the reality of the "independent" external world would be at once affected.

III. Now, curiously enough, it is a fact that our experience is such as to suggest doubts of its own finality. There are in it discontinuities which familiarise us with the notion of different orders of reality ; we do experience abrupt transitions from one plane to another of reality. And in consequence we often find ourselves revising our belief in the independent reality of much that at first was accepted without qualms. Our dream-experiences, of course, are once more what is meant.

This only shows, it may be said, that philosophers are dreamers, and that you are no better than the rest. I can swallow the insult, if I am allowed to exculpate the other philosophers. For really there are few subjects which philosophers have more persistently forborne to work out, not to say neglected, than the philosophic import of dreams. And yet reflection on their existence might have led to corollaries of the greatest value for the proper understanding of experience.

(1) The fact of dream-experience, in principle, involves an immense extension of the possibilities of existence. It supplies a concrete, easy, and indisputable illustration of how to understand the notion of other worlds that are really "other," and the manner of a transition from one world to

another. It shows us that Paradise cannot be found by travelling north, south, east, or west, however far; that it is vain to search the satellites of more resplendent suns for more harmonious conditions of existence. We must pass out of our "real" space altogether, even as we pass out of a dream-space on awakening. In short, we may confidently claim that to pass from a world of lower into one of higher reality would be like waking from an evil dream; to pass from a higher into a lower world would be like lapsing into nightmare.<sup>1</sup>

(2) More than this, dream-experience suggests a definite doubt of the ultimateness of our present waking life, and a definite possibility of worlds of higher reality (heavens) related to our present waking life just as the latter is to dream-life. Thus a thought which Religion long ago divined, dimly and with incrustations of mythopœic fancy, Philosophy expounds to us as a reasoned and reasonable possibility, and urges Science to verify in actual fact.<sup>2</sup> And already this unverified conception may sanction the consoling hope that of the evil and irrationality that oppress us not a little may be due to our not yet having found a way to dissipate the spell of a cosmic nightmare which besets us.

(3) Do not dreams yield the simplest and most cogent of all pleas for Idealism? Do they not afford a brilliant vindication to the idealist's contention that whole worlds of vast complexity may be subjective in their origin, and that their seeming reality is no sufficient warrant for their extramental nature? Do they not triumphantly enforce our warning that the ascription of reality to the contents of experience must not be made more absolute than is necessary? For, while we dream them, our dream-experiences may seem as independent of our wishes and expectations as any incident in our waking life, but that this independence was deceptive, and conditional upon the dream's continuance, we mostly realise on waking up.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Humanism*, p. 282.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Humanism*, p. 283.

We derive, therefore, from the empirical, but incontestable, fact of dreaming a confirmation of the original idealist assertion, viz., that as reality is experience, the psychic factor in it is essential to its existence, and also a proof that *apparent need not be real* "reality." And this is proved not of "dreams" alone, but of "waking" life no less. For the fact of the former enables us to grasp the thought of a fuller reality transcending waking life, as the latter transcends dreams.<sup>1</sup>

Just how far these propositions go to prove Idealism, and to disprove Realism of any kind, may fitly be considered when our doctrine has encountered a few of the objections which are easily suggested and are as easily refuted.

(1) Thus it is clear that our view provides for the fullest recognition of empirical reality. Such recognition is usually just as full in dreams as in waking life. I run away from a dream-crocodile on a dream-river with the same unhesitating alacrity as I should display towards a real crocodile on the banks of the Nile.

(2) "But, it may be objected, do you not in your dreams see through the illusion and detect the unreality? Do you not *know* that you are dreaming?" Sometimes, I reply; but then I sometimes also suspect the reality of my waking life. In fact, that is what I am disputing just now. And in support of my suspicions I am able to quote a whole host of religious, scientific, and philosophic doctrines concerning the true reality of worlds other than that of sense-appearance.

(3) "But is not dream-life merely a parody of real life, a grotesque re-hash of past experiences, containing nothing novel or original? Why question the conventional explanation of science, which assumes the primary reality of waking life and treats all other modes of experiencing as aberrations from it?"

I am, of course, aware that the philosophic claim I am making for dreams is from the standpoint of common science a giant paradox. Nor should I dispute that for the ordinary

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Riddles of the Sphinx*, pp. 284-7.

purposes of practice that standpoint will suffice. But with the wider outlook of philosophy one may observe (1) that the exclusive reality of "waking" experience is not a primary fact, but the outcome of a long process of differentiation and selection, which is not yet quite complete, as is shown by the survival of the belief in the significance of dreams. The process can be traced and practically justified, but it can never subvert the immediate reality of "unreal" experience. (2) It is not quite true that there is no originality in dreams. There do occur in them, though rarely, experiences which cannot *as such* be paralleled from waking life. Do we not fly in dreams, and glide, and fall down precipices without hurt? Yet these are achievements I have never accomplished while awake. Nor can I imagine what justified me once in dreaming that I was a beautiful woman well over eight feet high! I remember that it felt most uncomfortable. (3) Whatever may be the extent and meaning of this originality in dreams, it is not essential to my answer. For the "scientific" objection to dreams is in any case unable to rebut the suggestion that, instead of imitating "waking" life, "real" and dream-life may *both* be imitating a *higher and more real* experience, that this is the source of the similarity between them, and that on awaking from our "waking" life we should discover this.

(4) But is it not an essential difference that "dreams" are short and fleeting, while waking reality abides? No, I reply, the difference in duration does not matter. Our subjective time-estimation is enormously elastic; some dreams, *as experienced*, may teem with the events of a lifetime. That on awakening they should shrivel *ex post facto* into a few moments of "waking" time is irrelevant. And in the time of a more real world a similar condensation and condemnation might be inflicted on the waking life. It is as possible to have a time within a time, and a dream within a dream, as to have a play within a play, and the fact that we criticise a dream-time and a dream-reality within another

of the same kind no more proves its absolute reality than the fact that Hamlet can discourse about the players' play to Ophelia.

(5) "But is it not an important difference that, whereas the breaks in waking life are yet bridged, so that it can continue coherently from day to day, each dream-experience forms a unique and isolated world to which we never can return?" There is a difference here, but too much must not be made of it. For it seems to be merely an empirical accident that we do not usually resume our dreams as we do our waking life. And that the fact has not imposed on our writers is attested, *e.g.*, by the tales of *Peter Ibbetson*, *The Brushwood Boy*, and *The Pilgrims on the Rhine*. Moreover, cases of dreams continued from night to night are on record.<sup>1</sup> The trance-personalities too of many mediums are often best interpreted as continued dreams. As, for instance, the strange trance lives of Mlle. Hélène Smith studied by Prof. Flournoy.<sup>2</sup>

Again, there are on this point assertions implied in all the great religions which should be most embarrassing to the common-sense confidence in the unreality of dreams. "Visions" and "revelations" of more real worlds, and experiences of spiritual ecstasies, are not merely the central reality of all mysticism, but permeate the scriptures and the lives of the founders of religions which count their adherents by the million. Is not every good Mohammedan bound to believe that his Prophet was carried up to "heaven" on the celestial camel Borak, and there copied the sacred text of the eternal Koran? Must not good Jews and good Christians similarly concede the authenticity of the theophanies to Moses and St Paul? And yet from the standpoint of waking life all these experiences were indubitably of the "unreal" order. No doctor, *e.g.*, would hesitate for an instant to ascribe the experiences of Jesus at the Tempta-

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*, i. pp. 353-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Des Indes à la planète Mars*.

tion to hallucinations engendered by the forty days' fast on which they followed. We have learnt, indeed, from Professor James that this "medical materialism" does not dispose of the spiritual value of such "abnormal" experiences.<sup>1</sup> But the fact remains that if the religions are to stand, *they must contend that phenomena which would ordinarily be classified as unreal may, properly, belong to a world of higher reality.* The ordinary man, therefore, must choose between abandoning his religion and admitting that experiences on a different level from that of waking life are in some way real, and that it is not their discrepancy from ordinary life, but their own contents, which decide *in what way.* They are not necessarily discontinuous, incoherent, and unimportant because they diverge from the ordinary level: they may claim, and possess, greater spiritual value and a superior reality.

And so, lastly, it may be pointed out that the unreality we allege against ordinary dreams rests really on their intrinsic shortcomings. If in our sleep we habitually "dreamt" a coherent experience from night to night, such a dream-life would soon become a "real" life, of which account would be taken, and to which, as in Bulwer Lytton's story, waking life might even be sacrificed. We should have to regard ourselves as living in *two* worlds, and which of them was more "real" would depend largely on the interest we took in our several careers.

(6) Leaving such psychological complexities, our objector might take more practical ground. "Dwelling on dreams, he might say, is pernicious. It undermines our faith in the reality of waking life; it impairs the vigour of the action which presupposes such reality." And, of course, if this were true, if our doctrine were calculated to unnerve us and practically paralysing, no more serious objection could be brought against it. But there is no reason to anticipate any such debilitating consequences. *Logically* there is nothing in the

<sup>1</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, ch. i.

thought of a higher reality that should lead us to neglect the highest reality with which we are in contact, or that should lead us to suppose that the right principles of action in our world would be wholly abrogated in a higher. Once more we might appeal to the religious conceptions of "higher" worlds for confirmation. And *psychologically* also it does not seem true that we do not take our dream-worlds seriously while they last, or are more careless about our actions in them; the terrors of a nightmare are surely often among the most real and intense feelings of a lifetime.

(7) Lastly, a still more personal objection may be taken. If waking life may be as unreal as a "dream," may not those for whom we have cared in it turn out to be as unreal as the personages of our dreams? And will not this atrocious, but inevitable, inference rob life of most of its personal interest?

This argument, in the first place, cuts both ways. Not all persons are pleasant, and it might be quite a relief to find that some of the bad characters in our experience were but the monsters of a dream. Secondly, it does not follow that because persons (and things) belong to a dream-life, they do not belong *also* to a world of higher reality. Our dreams, that is, may be *veridical*, and may refer to, or foreshadow, true reality,<sup>1</sup> even as already we may dream of the persons and events of our "waking" lives.

IV. All these objections, then, are capable of being met, and our doctrine cannot be shown to deprive our life of any element of value, while it opens out possibilities of an indefinite enhancement of that value. But we have still to ask how far Idealism has been established, and Realism confuted, beyond doubt.

Taking the latter question first, it would seem that unadulterated Realism, viz., the assertion that existence is quite independent of experience, is still tenable, though only at the cost of a paradox which most realists would shrink from. Inasmuch as it has been shown that a complete parallelism

<sup>1</sup> *Humanism*, p. 284.

exists between "dream"-worlds and "real" worlds, the resolute realist must take the bull by the horns, and boldly allege that *all experiences are cognitions of real worlds, and the dream-worlds are real too!* He might explain further that the co-existence of an indefinite plurality of real worlds, of infinitely various kinds and degrees of completeness, complexity, extent, coherence, pleasantness, rationality, etc., was quite conceivable. Habitually, no doubt, we were confined to *one* of these, but occasionally, as in dreams, we (or our "souls") were enabled, we knew not by what magic, to make fleeting incursions into these other, equally real, worlds, and there to make new acquaintances or to meet old ones, to act and suffer, and finally to return and say (falsely) that "it was all a dream." Such is the sole interpretation of the facts a consistent Realism could come to; and though it has not yet been advocated with full philosophic consciousness, it is not very far removed from some early speculations about dreams which are still entertained by savages.

And, like most consistent views, it would not be easy to refute in metaphysics. Personally, I should probably plead only that a more idealistic view seemed to me more pleasing. Apart from such a prejudice, one could, of course, refer to the general objection to all Realism, viz., the impossibility of proving the entire independence of experience which it alleges on behalf of the Real. For (1) the fact we start from, and must continue to start from, is not a reality which is "independent," but one which is *experienced*. The mutual implication of "experience" and "reality," in other words, forbids their divorce. And (2) the "independent reality" attributed to some of the objects of our experience does not *mean* what the metaphysical realist supposes. It does *not* assert an absolute independence, but is relative to, and rightly understood, *means to be relative to* the experiencing mind which asserts it. The reality we predicate, therefore, is never "extramental"; it has at its heart a reference to the experience which it serves to explain. If, therefore, Realism is taken to

mean a denial that experience and reality *belong* together, it becomes a metaphysical proposition for which there neither is, nor can be, any positive evidence.

But the same considerations also will confute any idealism which asserts existence to be merely mental, and, *a fortiori*, if mental is taken solipsistically. If, as we have seen, "reality" and "experience" are correlated terms, it is false in principle to reduce either to the other. This was why we were so cautious not to assert that reality was *only* "my" experience, or *wholly* psychic. Were this claim implied in the fundamental position of Idealism, Idealism would be false. But really this claim is as little involved in true Idealism as a complete separation between experience and reality is in true Realism.

Moreover, our illustration from dreams did not fail to bring out this point. The appeal to dreams showed the ideal character of the real only by referring to a higher reality, in which the unreality of the dream could be revealed. The notion of reality, therefore, was not abolished, but reaffirmed. For we were led to the thought of a higher reality, which, so far from being subjective appearance, was needed for its detection. Thus nothing could be condemned as a "dream" until we had already reached a something more truly "real."

But at this point apprehension may be felt lest this series of realities embracing dreams should be infinite, so that nothing could be real enough to assure us that it could never turn out to have been a dream. This fear, however, would rest upon a misconception. Our procedure throughout assumes that the reality of every experience is accepted, until grounds for doubting it arise. This, indeed, is why "dreams" at first deceive us. The grounds for doubt, moreover, are in the last resort *intrinsic*; they consist either in some breach with the continuity of the rest of experience, or in some disharmony which shocks us into a denial of its ultimate reality. Perhaps, indeed, the first case is really resolvable into the second; for a breach of continuity as such involves an unpleasant jar. And

if our experience were always wholly pleasant, and its smooth flow never jarred with our ideals, should we not pay scant heed to any incoherencies it might involve? If life were one great glorious pageant, should we dream of questioning its incidents? Should we not accept them all in the spirit of little children watching the gorgeous transformations of a pantomime? Perhaps such a childlike attitude is feasible in Heaven, but on earth it is out of place. For we as yet experience discordant planes of reality, and so can conceive ideals of a more harmonious universe. We can doubt, too, the ultimateness of our present order; but we could not, and should not, doubt the absolute reality of an experience which had become intellectually transparent and emotionally harmonious. For then we should not need to postulate anything beyond our experience to account for it. Our immediate experience would cease to hint that it was the symbol of an unmanifest reality.

Is such a situation better described in the language of Idealism or of Realism? To decide this would not be easy, but is fortunately unimportant. For, in such an experience everything would be absolutely real, and yet "I" should disown no part of it. The question therefore reduces to the verbal one of whether "Heaven" is better defined idealistically as a condition in which whatever is desired is *realized*, or realistically as one in which whatever is *real* is approved of. But perhaps it would be best to conclude that in Perfection the true Idealism coincides with the true Realism, and the antithesis between them is robbed of all its meaning.

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# THE TEN COMMANDMENTS: A STUDY IN PRACTICAL ETHICS.

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MOST of us have a deep-rooted dislike to examining our beliefs; even the man who subjects himself to rigid self-scrutiny with regard to his conduct will shrink from investigating too closely what he believes and why he believes it. This is due no doubt in a great measure to the action of the Churches, which have been as loud in their recommendation of the one kind of self-examination as they have been in their denunciation of the other: and with reason; for when once a man begins that eager search for truth which drives him to examine sanely and unemotionally all that he holds most sacred, he soon finds he has passed beyond the pale of even the broadest Church. Accordingly, the people who do not care to examine their creeds will liken one who does so to the child who digs up its flowers to see how the roots are getting on: and one is bound to admit that the practice is not to be recommended for vegetables, or vegetable minds; though nothing but good can come of it to those in whom the love of truth has cast out all fear. For one who, in the words of Socrates, boldly trusts himself to the argument, allowing it to bear him whither it pleases, will find that, though some of his cherished convictions melt away as he draws near them, others only gain greater beauty and strength, so that he marvels at his own dulness of perception in the past.

It is in this spirit of reverent inquiry that I should like

shortly to examine the Decalogue, that main pillar of the Hebrew religion, adopted verbatim by the early Christian Church, lisped throughout Christendom by infant tongues, and generally accepted as a compendium of morality by the man in the street. Though, of course, originally intended for those who regarded themselves as the chosen people, the Commandments, as given in Exodus, bear so little trace of special or local application that, even apart from the reference made to them by Christ, they were almost certain to be adopted by Christendom out of the general mass of the moral and ceremonial Jewish law. In addition to which, they have for the student an almost unique interest, as being perhaps the only attempt to codify definitely man's moral obligations which can be found in any of the great religions of the world; for the two great commandments given two thousand years later by Christ were, as He said Himself, the foundation of the Law and the Prophets rather than a summary of them.

I. The Ten Commandments fall naturally under three heads: the first four regulating man's attitude towards God, the last five his attitude towards the rest of humanity, while in between them fitly stands the fifth, the parental relation being looked on as midway between divine and human. If it were possible for an educated Englishman to read to-day for the first time the four commandments which detail man's duty towards God, he would probably notice several things which would cause him great astonishment—a feeling no longer possible for us whose ears have grown so accustomed to the familiar words that, while we can grasp the literal meaning of the precepts, we are quite incapable, without a very strong effort, of getting at the ideas behind them, so that they are apt to fall on our ears with all the solemnity of a peal of bells but very little more specific meaning. But if it were possible for us to bring to the investigation of the Decalogue a mind as open and uninformed as that with which we listen to the potential marvels of radium, the first point which would strike us would probably be the enormous strides which Theology has made

since the Ten Commandments were compiled. What an immeasurable difference there is between the jealous God who demands the exclusive homage of His chosen people, and "the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed"! The change is indeed nothing less than from polytheism to monotheism; for from the first commandment it is clear that Jehovah recognises the existence of other gods besides Himself, as a king might recognise the existence of other kings while forbidding his subjects to pay homage to them; this is made even clearer from the Bible version of the commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me"—a precept obviously meaningless if there were no other gods.

II. The change in our point of view is no less noticeable when we come to the second commandment, the one dealing with Image-worship. The attitude of the idolater may be explained in two ways: he either regards the image he has made as in itself a god, or considers it merely as the god's material counterpart; in this latter case he possibly goes a stage farther and believes that the spirit of his god enters into the image, as the devout Catholic believes his God to enter into the consecrated wafer, or the devout Anglican believes his God to be especially present in a consecrated building. The former theory, that he looks on the image as in itself a god, is almost unthinkable. If we try hard enough to enter into the mind of primitive man, we can conceive ourselves at an earlier stage of development as holding most of the crude beliefs that he has held; it only needs a sufficient degree of ignorance to believe that the earth is flat, that the sun revolves round it, that the stars are pin-pricks in "that inverted bowl we call the sky," and their light the glory of another world streaming through, that the earth was re-peopled after the Deluge by Deucalion and Pyrrha throwing stones over their shoulders, that ascension into Heaven is accomplished by moving vertically upwards from the earth's surface, that dead men can only be kept from rising by planting a heavy stone over their bodies: all these are ideas quite natural to a simple mind, quite reasonable to us

if we can only get rid of a certain amount of intelligence. But that it should be in the power of a man, of his own choice and with his own hands, to fashion a god which will thenceforth rule his destinies is flatly unthinkable. For whence could the idol get its divinity? To-day it is a shapeless trunk, to-morrow by a few strokes of the axe and a little paint and feathers it has become invested with life and divinity, both produced out of nothing by the workman! This fantastic idea, which Mr Housman has worked out so delightfully in *Gods and their Makers*, is surely not one which would present itself to the primitive intellect.

If then the idolater cannot imagine himself to be making his god, we can only suppose that he regards his handiwork as an image of his god. When Aaron made the golden calves and told the people that these were the gods which had brought them out of Egypt, he obviously meant that they were the images of the gods, and not the gods themselves: for the calves were not in existence at the time of the Exodus. If the word idolatry means no more than this, the savage who decides to shape his log into a god rather than a bench is in the same position as the painter of a sacred picture or the carver of a crucifix; for both these look on the work of their hands not as an object of devotion but as an aid to worship, enabling the wandering mind to concentrate itself more easily on the Unseen.

It is difficult to see from what motive this should have been prohibited. If the worshipper's prayer becomes more real through such externals—as millions of Catholics can testify that it does—one would have supposed that the enlightened Lawgiver would have encouraged their use. No doubt it will be said that, had he done so, the devotee would in time transfer his worship from the Unseen to the Seen, thus robbing God of the honour due to Him; which is as much as to say that a lover will transfer his affections from his mistress to her photograph—a sufficiently improbable suggestion. But even so, granted such transfer took place, how could man bring

any dishonour on God? The whole conception of worship has changed: whereas now it is looked on as the satisfaction of one of the deepest feelings of the human heart, the primitive Law-giver regarded it as a tribute exacted by God; and entirely unconscious of his own impiety, he dared to depict Him as a jealous God who would be angry if the worship which was due to Him was paid to another. So man made God in his own image, stamping Him with the meanest and most selfish of all human failings.

Jealousy is a feeling which no man can harbour when once he is conscious of his own divinity, or even when once he has attained the far lower height of ordinary self-respect. Such a man knows that in love, as in all else, it is more blessed to give than to receive; if his friend love another better than himself, that is comparatively a little thing; the only real tragedy comes when that friend does something to forfeit his love. If man can reach this level, can say to one he loves, "Be but your best self and help me to be mine; that, and not devotion to myself, is the chief thing I ask of you"; if man can feel that jealousy would be an entire negation of his own greatness, what can we think of those who would depict the Most High as "a jealous God"? Oh, these pitiful attempts to utter the Ineffable!

III. The Third Commandment is generally interpreted as prohibiting any light or hasty use of the divine name. It seems a little strange that this should have been considered one-tenth of the whole duty of man. Ejaculations of all kinds betray a lack of that philosophic calm which, according to Horace, is the only source and sustainer of happiness, but life would become a little uninteresting were they and the emotions behind them all banished; while, as to their sacred character, is there any more profanity in the "Mon Dieu!" of the Frenchman than in the "By Jove!" of the school-boy? In fact, "the custom of vain and rash swearing" denotes a want rather of manners than of religion. Certainly the ordinary man who vents his wrath in strong language has no more intention of offending

the Almighty than the British workman has of appealing to the Virgin when he uses his standing epithet. In any case, whether irreverence be intentional or not, there are so many forms it may take that it seems curious the Legislator should have thought fit to prohibit expletives only, instead of extending his prohibition so as to cover irreverence in general.

IV. The principle underlying the Fourth Commandment is wholly admirable. If there is one imperative law of Nature, it is that her children should have change, change of diet, of air, of clothing, of society—above all, of occupation. There is no surer way of wearing out men, horses, or razors than to work them day after day with no interval for rest. Nature always sets up her protest against monotony, and an inevitable breakdown is the result of disregarding her warning. We need not go so far as the pious but illogical preacher who saw a proof of divine wisdom and goodness in the fact that Sunday came, not in the middle of the week when we are comparatively fresh and vigorous, but at the end when exhausted nature craves for rest. Yet, even if unable to follow this good man's argument, we can all feel that after six days of work a change is welcome.

In its original form the commandment is supposed to have consisted of only the first clause, all that follows being the gloss of a commentator—certainly a necessary one, for the injunction to "keep holy the Sabbath day" requires a little elucidation. Read in the light of what follows, it must be taken to mean resting from toil, if we apply to it the ordinary legal rule that general terms are to be explained by the special terms which follow them. It is from the neglect of this rule that the Sabbatarian movement has attained such astonishing proportions. Disregarding the clear interpretation of the phrase "keep holy," which the commandment itself contains in its later clauses, the Calvinists and the Low Church party generally have read into the words a prohibition of all amusement or recreation, however harmless, and, in fact, of everything except religious observances. If this is what the Legislator

meant, it is strange he did not say so: the idea is one of no complexity, and he had not the excuse which may be pleaded by the modern House of Commons for its proverbial inability to say what it means in an Act of Parliament. It is surely unlikely that, while his prohibition of work is so clear, he should have left his prohibition of amusement to be evolved from a phrase which may mean anything or nothing according to one's definition of the word "holy."

The reasonable view to take of Sunday is that expressed in the old "Golden Maxim" of Sir Matthew Hale:—

"A Sunday well spent brings a week of content  
And health for the toils of the morrow;  
But a Sunday profaned, whatsoe'er may be gained,  
Is a certain forerunner of sorrow."

It is good to see that the Lord's Day Observance Society is prepared to supply the public on cheap terms with any number of copies of this maxim tastefully printed on cardboard, and not disfigured by any dogmatic definition of the word "well," so that each man who wishes to make the best of his life may consult his constitution, mental and physical, and translate the phrase in such a way as to make the six other days of the week better for that which he does on the Sunday. It is no small sign of the wisdom of the Church of England that, by the mouth of one of her most eminent sons, she has quite recently affirmed this view of Sunday observance. Thus one man may spend the day in religious exercises, another may go to lectures or concerts, a third may take strenuous exercise, a fourth may lie in bed, and each of them may feel that he has spent the day well, judged by Sir Matthew Hale's standard, inasmuch as he will do his work better for the rest of the week.

It is strange how obstinately a large section of Christendom have shut their eyes to the plain teaching of Christ on this subject: in vain did He protest that "the Sabbath was made for man"—they still continue to call it "the Lord's day," and to denounce as "Sabbath-breakers" those who are really keeping the Sabbath in the way most adapted to their own

needs. Probably the "unco guid" nowhere assume quite so vitriolic an aspect as over this question; the look of the temperance lecturer as he contemplates the drunkard may be full of a sorrowful wonder, the pure woman may feel a shrinking pity for her fallen sister in the street, but nothing can temper the austere and baleful glare with which the men and women carrying prayer-books regard the passer-by on his bicycle.

V. The Fifth Commandment is one on which great stress has naturally been laid by all who hold a parental or "quasi-parental" relation towards the young, the latter being a convenient phrase under cover of which "governors, teachers, spiritual pastors, and masters" hope to appropriate some of that honour which they possibly might fail to get on any other ground. The Lawgiver seems to have had misgivings as to the adequacy of this command unless accompanied by a bribe, and accordingly he held out a bait which, as many passages in the Old Testament show, was likely to appeal strongly to the heart of the Hebrew; far more so, in fact, than to the man of to-day, who from a variety of motives is neither so fond of life nor so afraid of death as to echo the old pagan prayer, "*Da spatium vitæ, multos da Juppiter annos.*" But whether the Lawgiver was aware of it or not, there can be no doubt that this commandment is the weakest of the Ten. Love and respect are feelings which cannot arise at will; outward observance may of course be demanded, and is often rendered in an exaggerated degree by conscientious young people who are oppressed by their inability to pay that inward honour which the commandment presumably intends; but by no mental hocus-pocus can we honour what we deem dishonourable, or love what seems to us unlovely; and it is a very good thing that we cannot, for the progress of the world is best secured by each man trying to see as clearly as possible the bad as well as the good in all with whom he has to do, that he may imitate what he admires and avoid what he condemns, leaving his respect and affection to find their natural level, regardless of relationship or any such tie.

VI. The Sixth Commandment is one we all read with a cheerful consciousness of our own integrity, even if we do not emulate the Royal Duke whose audible response after each of the Ten was, "Never did that." What we mean, when we thus readily absolve ourselves, probably is that we are neither pickpockets, burglars, nor kleptomaniacs, the subtler forms of theft of course not coming under such a disreputable term as "stealing." "Steal! foh! a fico for the phrase!" No doubt the man who shirks payment of income-tax or the woman who passes the Customs with half a dozen yards of lace concealed about her person would wax indignant if it were suggested that such conduct was a breach of the Sixth Commandment. Most people make a great distinction between private property and public or corporate property; the landowner, who would not under any temptation annex a square yard of his neighbour's land, will think nothing of taking a slice off a common if he can do so undetected; the Civil Servant of exemplary probity will none the less use the Government stationery for his private correspondence; probably it is more the unpleasant consequences of being found out than any moral scruple which deters the majority of people from travelling in a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket. In all such cases the man who regulates his conduct from without instead of from within will always be able to plead, with a good show of reason, that his action makes no difference to his neighbour; it probably never occurs to him to ask whether it does not make a considerable difference to himself by lowering his moral standard.

It is a pity that the word theft has been so generally restricted to material objects, for thereby we are apt to lose sight of the obvious truth that, where another has bought our time or services, we are practically stealing if we deduct any portion of that time from our work. The British workman affords the most obvious example of this form of theft; but it is unfortunately equally common, if not equally apparent, in offices, banks, schools, and other places where payment is

made by time and not by piece. Probably the work of the world might be carried on by one-half the people engaged, if each of them were to take this view of his own responsibilities—a fact which Trades' Unions have had the wisdom to perceive, and accordingly, their object being not to get the work done as well as possible, but to make it support the largest number of hands, they have expressly forbidden the workers to make the full use of their time—with the result not only of diminishing their manual skill, but of lowering their standard of honesty.

VII. The Seventh Commandment was, no doubt, intended to be no more than a special application of the sixth. The Hebrews, like all other Orientals, looked on the wife as little more than a chattel of the husband's; in fact, in a later commandment we find her taking her place in the list of a man's property next after his house and before his servants, presumably as being of intermediate importance. To the Hebrew, adultery meant merely the appropriation of another man's wife against his wishes, an offence which among barbarous peoples has always been held peculiarly injurious to the honour of the husband: it is a quaint conceit, by the way, that a man's honour should depend on the action of any other than himself; it affords another proof of the inability of rudimentary minds to realise their own individuality. The wife whose husband had deserted her for another woman had no redress by Jewish law, the "honour" of a chattel being a negligible quantity. Thus polygamy, denied to women, was permitted to men, the traces of which iniquitous distinction survive to-day in the difference between the penalties, both social and legal, which are inflicted on the two sexes.

The time is not yet ripe for a free discussion of the sex question. Few of us can approach it without a strong personal bias, and by the time they have seen enough of life to know how badly the present system works, most people generally have some private interests—children, property, social or official position—which deter them from entering on the

discussion. For most men are cowards, and horribly at the mercy of their neighbours, knowing well that the unintelligent, whose name is legion, will meet all arguments with offensive personalities, inquiring whether the man who speaks disrespectfully of the holy estate of matrimony has adopted his theories in consequence of his quarrels with his wife, if he has one, and if not, how he dares assail an institution he has never entered. Three-quarters of the educated people in the country will dismiss the whole question as "unsavoury," and of the rest, for one who feels grateful that another has put his own opinions into words, there are ninety-nine who will congratulate themselves on their own wisdom in keeping those opinions to themselves.

It is mainly due to this unhappy reticence that the problem of sex assumes such gigantic importance in the minds of many men and most women to-day, as the stream which is dammed holds far greater possibilities for mischief than if it were allowed to run its natural course. There are so many things in life of infinitely greater importance both to the individual and the state than the relations between men and women, and yet by an astonishing perversion of language the word "morality," as commonly used, is restricted to that one branch of ethics which a comparison of different countries and different ages shows to be the most variable in its standard and to afford the least valuable test of the intrinsic goodness or badness of the individual. So wide, in fact, are the differences in sexual morality between one age and another, between one climate and another, that while it is impossible to conceive a moral code in which lying, theft, murder, and such offences are not prohibited, it is quite conceivable that such a code might contain no reference to what is specifically dubbed "morality" in England to-day. The terms on which two people of opposite sex are to each other ought to be nobody's business but their own, yet there is no subject to which the rest of the world devote so much time, inquisitiveness, and speculation.

That the Lawgiver touched on only one aspect of the sex question will not be wondered at if we realise that to him adultery was merely a form of theft. Of prostitution, with all the terrible evils, mental, moral, and physical, which accompany it—evils which sit so lightly on many pure men and women of to-day—he has nothing to say. Possibly he felt, as did St Augustine at a later day, that any attempt to cope with it would only tend to bring pollution within the family circle. What an overwhelming proof is this that there is something radically wrong with our present system, if love which is bought or love which is stolen forms a necessary part of it!

VIII. The Eighth Commandment has always been read with the gloss “in a private capacity,” and so amended has been cheerfully accepted by headsmen, hangmen, soldiers and sailors, judges, inquisitors, and other functionaries whose duty it is either directly or indirectly to take life. Capital punishment is slowly disappearing before advancing civilisation as man gets a clearer view of his own responsibilities and of the great mystery of Life. It has been abolished in Switzerland; it still prevails in Dahomey and England, though in this latter country men are no longer hanged for picking pockets. The legislator, who has got beyond the rudimentary idea of revenge, has three ends in view when he ordains penalties: the protection of society by the removal of the offender, the object-lesson afforded to others by his punishment, and the reformation of the offender himself; the more enlightened the age, the more stress will be laid on the last, and it is mainly because, in our ignorance of *post-mortem* conditions, we cannot feel confident that any criminal will be reformed by his execution, that capital punishment is tending to disappear. There is, moreover, a growing tendency to regard crime as a disease, and to look for the origin of all anti-social practices in some lesion of the brain or other organ. If this view becomes generally accepted, we shall no more wish to punish, much less to execute, our criminals, than we now punish our sick; all

our efforts will be directed to their cure, and only when this has been proved hopeless shall we relegate them to some home for incurables, where their lives will be made as comfortable as is consistent with restraint.

Of all the wicked absurdities of modern life war stands immeasurably the first. For thousands of years the human race has been slowly evolving, learning little by little to trample out the beast within, only that to-day in Europe ten millions of men should be withdrawn from useful work in the world to spend their lives in idleness, waiting till the word is given by their superior officers to kill—it matters not whom! The war may be just or unjust, to defend the right or to crush it, “Duty” and “Patriotism” combine to blind them to such ethical niceties. And we of the twentieth century profess to look with horror and contempt on the paid assassin of the Middle Ages! O discriminating world! Is the difference between right and wrong merely a matter of scale?

Having, however, duly imbibed the full force of the maxim, “Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just,” the army, supported by the nation at large, will generally succeed in persuading itself that it is engaged in a righteous war, and led by a venal press, whose circulation mainly depends on battle, murder, and sudden death, will pour streams of abuse on the enemy; in which connection the prayer in Time of War from the English Liturgy may be appositely quoted, wherein God—who for the nonce is not addressed as the Prince of Peace—is besought to “abate the pride of our enemies, assuage their malice and confound their devices”—the assumption presumably being that from pride and malice the English are immune, and that their devices are invariably on the side of justice, judgment, and truth.

IX. The Ninth Commandment is not directed against lying generally, but only against one branch of that very rudimentary vice. Most lies are told not about one's neighbour but about oneself, and can generally be traced to moral cowardice; this is almost always the case with children, who, like the young

lady in the play, think "it is better to lie a little than to suffer much"—perfectly naturally from their point of view, for self-respect is a dormant quality in the young, or at best a very tender plant needing the most careful handling. The fault lies with the parents and nurses, who too often try to impose rules from without, instead of teaching the children to evolve them from within, and who have in many cases not got beyond the barbarous idea of punishment, and lack the wits to see that a frank confession is the nearest approach to reparation the infant criminal can make, and should be taken as wiping out all but the inevitable natural consequences of the offence.

Lies told about others fall under a different heading and are far less excusable, as being the outcome, not of a natural rudimentary impulse like cowardice, but of the more potent and dangerous passions of jealousy and malevolence. It is sometimes made an accusation against people that they are too fond of talking about themselves; but if the only alternative is talking about other people, it would be a better world were the fault commoner. One of the worst traits of modern social life is the tendency to criticise people too much behind their backs and too little to their faces; the former can be productive of no good whatsoever, for even if the criticism gets round to the person concerned, it will be in such a garbled form as to be of very little use to him; whereas, if it is delivered point blank at him, there is always a chance that he may be one who is willing "to be taught even by an enemy," in which case he will, certainly afterwards, if not at the time, feel grateful for the lesson he has learnt.

Man is such a complex creature that it needs superhuman intelligence to understand him fully; so that even if we get a fairly clear view of one side of his nature—and that is probably the most we can ever do—we shall be giving an absolutely false idea of his character, if we try to depict him, through our ignorance of his other sides. If, then, we are in that rudimentary state when people and not ideas form the staple of

our conversation, we shall do well to take for our topic the only human being we have had a chance of knowing thoroughly.

X. After the weighty matters which form the subjects of the first nine commandments, the tenth would—but for our long familiarity with it—come somewhat as an anti-climax. It stands apart from the rest as being the only one directed to the regulating of a man's desires. It almost seems as if the Legislator at the close of his task had caught sight of the great truth that the right way to reform a man is to restrain not his conduct but his thoughts. This was one of the cardinal points in the teaching of Christ, though like most of his fundamental ideas it has been generally ignored by the Churches, which have held a man fully responsible for his deeds, but a mere victim of the Devil as regards his thoughts; whereas their Founder clearly taught that the wish to commit a sin was, so far as the man himself was concerned, identical with the actual commission: the Seventh Commandment thus becomes superfluous, as being covered by the Tenth. Not the least of the benefits which the West has derived within the last twenty years from the study of Eastern religions has been the direction of men's minds to the possibility of Thought Control and the development of that power of concentration which is the basis of all successful endeavour.

If the Legislator aimed at inducing men to regulate their thoughts, it seems strange that he should have considered only covetousness as worthy of prohibition. Jealousy and anger he could not very well forbid, as he deemed them Divine attributes; but hatred, pride, envy, malice, and all uncharitableness—how is it none of these are prohibited in what professes to be a compendium of the whole duty of man? Of course if all these feelings had been eliminated, the Book of Psalms would have been considerably reduced in bulk, but probably few people nowadays would deny that thereby it would become more worthy of its place in Holy Writ. Possibly the Lawgiver intended to prohibit that fault to which he considered his

countrymen most prone; but it is more likely that his selection is due to that strong respect for property which is a characteristic of rudimentary minds—their own property, that is to say, for they do not usually hold equally strong views about other people's.

If we try to estimate the force which the Decalogue as a whole would have, we must not fall into the very common error of attributing to an age long past the ideas prevalent in our own. In early societies the commands of a higher power have far more weight than at a later day, when men begin to look through the commands to the principles which lie behind them, and to draw distinctions between *mala quia prohibita* and *mala in se*. Indeed, as man evolves, he tends more and more to draw up rules of conduct for himself, and to stand less in need of external commands as safeguards of morality, so that the philosophical anarchists would seem to be only in advance of their age in asserting the uselessness of all government. But while we are still far enough removed from the Golden Age when legislation shall be superfluous, we must be careful not to estimate the utility of primitive codes by any standard of to-day. It is easy for us, with our wider views of man's destinies and our knowledge of other systems of religion, to detect blemishes and omissions in an early attempt to summarise the whole duty of man, but we must not lose sight of the fact that however inadequate as a guide to the complex life of to-day, the Ten Commandments were by no means ill-adapted for a primitive people, just emerged from centuries of slavery, intolerant of authority, and only held in check by periodic outbursts of divine wrath.

To such a race the only convincing argument, other than physical force or material gain, is supernatural sanction; the good of the community, *esprit de corps*, self-development, self-respect—none of these, however potent they may prove at a later stage, have any weight with a turbulent horde of semi-barbarians. They would make light of commands introduced by anything less than the tremendous formula, "Thus saith

the Lord," so that the Lawgiver, legislating for an age in which there is no boundary-line between religion and morality, has no alternative but to represent his commands as the will of the Deity, and to utter threats of divine vengeance unto the third and fourth generation on all who infringe them.

But if we regard the Decalogue from a modern standpoint, very little consideration will make it evident that a man might have kept all the commandments and yet be "far from the Kingdom of God." To begin with, they are mainly negative, and would be satisfied for the most part by mere quiescence; but the course of human evolution would be pitifully hindered if all mankind adopted this negative attitude, for wisdom comes not by abstinence but by action; there is no salvation in sitting still. Far better is it to act, even under a wrong impulse, than to applaud ourselves for keeping the commandments merely because we have let "I dare not" wait upon "I would." The sinner will at least have learnt, even if it be only that that particular sin was not worth committing—and for what other end are we here?

A thoughtful man who would re-write the Decalogue to-day would almost certainly lay far more stress on the positive duties, with the idea of promoting active benevolence rather than blameless lethargy. The four commandments which deal with man's relation to God would probably be replaced by one simple injunction to obey at all costs the Voice of God within, while the four which treat of his conduct towards his fellows would be combined into one comprehensive prohibition of all interference with the lives of others; but the main aim of the wise Lawgiver who loved his kind would be to promote in each man that fearless pursuit of knowledge and truth, that boundless toleration of all who differ from him, that passionate will to help the world, which become so large a part of the life of those who realise the joy of co-operating with God in the evolution of His mighty scheme.

C. B. WHEELER.

# THE DEGRADING OF THE PRIESTHOOD IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

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“As soon as eminent men grow unwilling to enter any profession, the lustre of that profession will be tarnished: first its reputation will be lessened, then its power will be abridged.”—H. T. BUCKLE, *History of Civilisation in England*.

THERE is no doubt that as soon as one's dignity needs asserting, it is already on the way to become ridiculous. The Church of England has hitherto been charged with too dignified an attitude. The surplice has had too much starch in it. Perhaps, having realised this, she is endeavouring to make amends, and is moving to the other extreme. I do not complain that the amiable foibles of the clergy are considered legitimate amusement for the stalls, or that the mannerisms of the profession are exquisitely imitated by the gentlemen who give musical sketches. As a factor in English society the cleric must be prepared to come under such genial criticism. But the loss of dignity which I lament is that which is caused by the clergy themselves rather than by their critics. And this cheapening of themselves, often effected from a noble motive, is the ignored cause of the obvious and widely lamented decrease in the supply of men for Holy Orders, a decrease which is as obvious as it is lamentable, whether we consider the prestige which attaches to the position, or the inherent nobility of the work of the ministry.

The degrading of the priesthood is unconsciously effected by those very men who most desire to magnify their office, and it proceeds, I submit, from the erroneous conception of the office which is inculcated during the training of the ordinand. After three years of University life, which is probably devoted in the main to athletics and social functions, the candidate for Holy Orders enters for a year or two into a theological college. There his training is predominated by two ideas—first, that he is to be miraculously endowed by virtue of Apostolical Succession with spiritual power; and secondly, that he is about to separate himself from the world, and to become one of a priestly caste. Marriage will be permitted, it is true, but as a concession; it will not be for him the “higher life.” He will be imbued with the idea that intellectual doubt is a sin, and that investigation of theological conclusions is at least dangerous to the welfare of his soul; that dissent is wicked, and that it requires a special act of Divine Mercy to countenance it. With these ideas he goes to the episcopal palace, and for a while breathes an intensely ecclesiastical atmosphere. Then at twenty-three years of age he takes a curacy, and he is under the impression that, having subscribed to the Thirty-nine Articles, he may not, he cannot, in loyalty to his ordination vow, question his theological conclusions: he is imbued with the notion that he stands apart from men, and is commissioned to deal with them as a plenipotentiary from the Court of Heaven; for him the universe is divided into the world and his Church, and that he is to win over the masses from the former and to induce them to obey the latter. In his professional capacity, he is oblivious of the fact that there are outside his Church any Christian people rightly so called, and he imagines that his ordination has endowed him with powers that earnest-minded, thoughtful Christians, old enough to be his grandparents, do not possess. If he find the intellectual level of his parish above his own, he carefully avoids all religious difficulties, depreciates discussion, insists upon the spiritual

power of the Church and its orders, and allows himself the indulgence of cheap pulpit sarcasms about "the so-called higher criticism" and "false new lights." If he find the intellectual level of the parish lower than his own, he devotes himself to numerous philanthropic organisations, and in either case his reading reduces itself to the weekly perusal of the *Church Times*, and the study of some favourite manual of Church doctrine. Instead of leading the thought of his hearers, he assumes an immovable position of defence of "the faith once for all delivered to the saints," and while with a worthy selflessness he throws himself into the life of the people, his work is vitiated, and the confidence of the people is either diminished or destroyed, by their sub-consciousness of the fact that he claims to come to them and to speak to them from an ecclesiastical pedestal of which they are not prepared to admit the validity of the foundations.

The erroneous conception of his office, combined with the cruel economic conditions under which that office has to be held, lead to the adoption of methods which do not tend to add dignity to his position. The prevailing idea of the position of the priesthood, for all but the few who have considerable private means, comes to be one of mendicancy. To maintain every organisation of the Church, from its services to its drum and fife band, the priest has to be perpetually begging. Not only does this divert time and energy from his more proper work, "the reading of Holy Scripture and such studies as help to the knowledge of the same," but it creates the idea that the Church and its officers are to be supported by charity. That is sufficiently degrading. But when, as is often the case, he has to beg for his own stipend, to raise that of his assistant by such invidious methods as bazaars and jumble sales, when his holiday (if he be lucky and in favour with the authorities) comes from a clergy holiday fund, and when his children are clothed by diocesan Dorcas meetings, can we wonder that men are unwilling to enter a profession which is, as a matter of fact, a mendicant order? Clerical

poverty is often attributed to the parson's improvidence. The most glaring instances of improvidence are to be found not among the poor clergy but among the wealthy, who, with the moral and financial assistance of the authorities, build large vicarage houses out of all proportion to the value of the living. But before we endorse the frequent plaint about the improvidence of the clergy, it would be well to consider that the priesthood is the only profession in which a man is expected to do the work of his position, and at the same time to find the means with which the work is to be done; that it is the only calling in which, after a man has worked conscientiously all his life, he has no interest that he can transmit to his children and no pension that he can hold when he becomes past work. If a man have spent his life in the service of the Church, unless he have private means, from the day of his resignation he has nothing to live upon, and from the day of his death his widow has of right nothing, though she may have given her unpaid life-services with no less continuous devotion than marked her husband's work. The position of the clergy needs above everything else to be removed from the sphere of charity, and to be based upon economic justice.

The conditions under which the office is held create in those who hold it a peculiar character for which there is no exact word. It is marked by a laudable desire to advocate the claims of the Institution which they represent, by a justifiable eagerness to secure the approval of the people to whom they minister, by a suppressed sense of an unjust dependence upon others, and by a nervous fear lest they should incur the suspicion of unorthodoxy or of disloyalty to the Church, which prevents them from taking a decided line upon any subject of modern interest. These curiously combined elements which go to produce the average clerical character manifest themselves in certain outward symptoms. The priest wishes to be considered a staunch supporter of his Church, and so you perpetually hear on his lips certain conven-

tional phrases of religious slang, such as Church lines, sound Churchman, Catholic teaching: he wishes to secure the attendance of the people at the Church's meetings and services, and he often tries to win a reputation for "busy-ness," which many good folk think is the same as work, so he reads out a long list of notices during public worship, or prints his engagements in the Parish Magazine, and if you meet him during the week, he has an irritating habit of always telling you what he has been doing or is just going to do—he has just come from the Missionary Congress, or he is just going to the choir practice. No reputable member of any other profession thus advertises himself. Then the cleric labours under a sense of unjust dependence upon others, and consequently his attitude towards the wealthy parishioner, the patron, and the bishop tends to be humiliating. Attendance at almost any social function where county magnates and ecclesiastical dignitaries are present will prove that this statement is not set down in malice, nor is it without foundation in fact. I do not blame the man—he knows that his usefulness and his security of office, and probably his escape from the workhouse, practically all depend upon his being what is euphemistically called acceptable. The curate's egg-story has more truth in it than most of the laity are aware. He is so fearful lest he should incur the suspicion of unsoundness that he acquires the gentle art of sailing a straight course between the Scylla of a Yes and the Charybdis of a No, and never takes a strong line upon any subject. The very acme of perfection in this dubious achievement is reached in the non-committal and indecisive resolutions which are passed at ruri-diaconal meetings, and the fearsome nebulousness of their indecision is matched by the twilight of the clerical mind.

The priesthood will not be magnified and at the same time dignified until the *ethos* of the profession changes, and that will not change until the conditions of the service are so altered that men of another type are drawn to it. If the conditions remain unaltered, the already fast-diminishing

number of the candidates for Holy Orders will fall so low, that in a moment of panic the decision will be arrived at that something must be done; and if that something proves to be, as there are not lacking indications that it may be, the admission of less able and less educated men into the ministry, then the Church of England will lose the little influence which it still has over the thinking section of English society, the gap between the religious and the intellectual life of the people will be widened, and the Christianity of the day will be pushed another step towards becoming a gross superstition. If the priesthood is to regain and to retain the respect of the people, and to be a force in English life, and not an amiably patronised mendicant order, it must attract able and educated men. We may not have always a learned clergy, but we can insist upon having a learning clergy. And such men will enter the ranks of the clergy only if they can be reasonably assured of such intellectual freedom as will enable them as teachers to be utterly sincere and absolutely loyal to truth, such independence as will free them from the need of being "acceptable" to patrons, and such remuneration, adequate and secure, as will relieve them from undue and unmerited anxiety, from the necessity of begging, and from the haunting vision of the ægis of the Poor Law.

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## M. ALFRED LOISY'S TYPE OF CATHOLICISM.

PROFESSOR PERCY GARDNER.

FEW ecclesiastical personalities of our day are more interesting than M. Alfred Loisy; and few situations could be more striking than that created by the Papal condemnation of his views. But as usually happens when men's feelings are strongly excited, it is not easy to find in print a clear and dispassionate account of his work. On the one side he is represented as an insidious introducer of rationalism into the Church, on the other as a sort of St Michael, victoriously trampling on the reptile heresies of Protestant theologians. Yet, if one wants to see clearly what fire lies beneath the smoke, it is remarkably easy to do so. For the Abbé's works, especially *L'Évangile et l'Église* and *Autour d'un petit livre*, are written in the clearest of styles, and with a simplicity and directness which are above praise.

The main point, which is obvious to every reader of those books, is that M. Loisy supposes himself to have discovered a way of reconciling intellectual faithfulness to the principles of historic science and Biblical criticism with dutiful submission to the authorities of the Roman Church wherever religious and moral teaching comes in. His mode of reconciliation consists in pushing to a length to which it has never before been pushed the distinction between what is matter of history, to be decided on principles of historic investigation, and what is matter of doctrine, to be regulated by that Church which he regards

as the visible representative of Christ. The reconciliation between *la science* and *la foi* is produced by so rigidly defining the field of each, and erecting such mighty barriers between them, that collision is impossible.

The relations between history and doctrine are at present in all branches of the Christian Church a burning question. The growth of historic criticism is a matter which neither Bishop nor Moderator, nor even the Pope, can venture to overlook. And it is clear from the first that the Church of Rome is in an exceptionally good position for making concessions to historic science, since she has never built her system of belief, as, most unfortunately for us, the Reformers of the sixteenth century did, on the text of the Old and New Testaments. She may yet read to Anglicans and Presbyterians a lesson in liberality in the tolerance of historic doubt. But it is not surprising that the Roman authorities find M. Loisy somewhat too advanced for them.

And, indeed, a little reflection will convince most people that so rigid a line as is drawn by the Abbé between fact and doctrine is not a possible line. The human mind resolutely refuses to be divided into watertight compartments. Some circulation must be possible through the whole field. But it is impossible to construct any scheme of Christian doctrine in entire independence of history. And, in fact, if we consider the views of M. Loisy closely, we shall find that he has not been able by pushing principles to the furthest extreme to free himself from inconsistency.

He allows, for example, that it is a matter of faith that Jesus Christ died on the cross. But according to his own principles this, as a fact of history, is the concern of science, not of faith. Without a certain historic foundation, a fabric of doctrine could not be constructed, though M. Loisy is quite right in maintaining that a small historic foundation may bear up a great superstructure of doctrine.

M. Loisy set out to refute the great liberal theologians of Germany, and in spite of his complete change of mental attitude

he has adhered to his purpose. His work, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, is in form a criticism of Harnack's *Wesen des Christenthums*. His friends are fond of representing him as the victorious champion of the Church against rationalism. This is an odd misrepresentation. The fact is that he entirely adopts the methods of the works he attacks, though he of course sometimes disputes results. His persistent opposition to "Protestantism"<sup>1</sup> and "Protestant" theologians surprises an English reader. His notions on the subject would have been impossible had he known more. Over and over again he makes absurd statements in regard to them. He identifies Protestantism with pure individualism in belief, which is much the same as saying that if you have not an absolute monarchy you must have an unlimited democracy. Again, "Qui dit protestantisme affirme implicitement la suffisance et l'immutabilité absolues de la révélation évangélique" (p. 206). Some such attitude towards the Gospels was no doubt taken up by the great Reformers. But it would not be easy to find, say in the Anglican Church, which is of course included in M. Loisy's *Protestantisme*, any leader of thought who took this view literally. The leaders accept various compromises, not perhaps always logical, but of practical value. M. Loisy's prejudice against Protestantism makes him very unfair also to the writings of Professor Harnack, attributing to him a narrowness and rigidity which are altogether foreign to his temper. But of this matter I have written elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

The one half of M. Loisy's mind, that which deals with evangelic history, is frankly critical. It moves lightly and freely in the New Testament, because the writer is convinced that historic views are separable from doctrine. But the other half of his mind, which is applied to doctrine, moves with slower and more cautious steps. He does not regard the form

<sup>1</sup> The word Protestant, as applied to the Reformed Churches, is surely out of date. If Rome tried to persecute us, we should *protest* readily enough, but the attitude of watchful jealousy which the name implies is scarcely a Christian attitude.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, i. p. 602.

in which doctrines have been set forth by the Church as above criticism. We have, indeed (at pp. 152-6), a lucid and eloquent argument for a restatement of the Creeds in more modern terms, since the language of Greek philosophy, in which they are still couched, is not merely not intelligible to ordinary Christians, but is not on the lines of modern scientific thought at all. But the substance of the doctrines M. Loisy is willing to accept on the authority of the Church. What the rulers of that Church, which is, from M. Loisy's point of view, the Church of Rome, have decided to be true in matters of doctrine, or right in practice, he accepts dutifully, only observing that his allegiance is to the essential doctrines of the Church, not to the temporary form in which they are from time to time expressed. In his work, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, M. Loisy showed that he was prepared to vindicate in principle the veneration of relics, the granting of indulgences, and any other aberration from a nobler faith which Rome has sanctioned. Each of these practices has met a need of human nature; and it does not occur to M. Loisy to inquire whether that need was a craving of man's higher spiritual nature, or a recrudescence of a barbarous superstition. In every case he accepts the appeal to Rome, and, however pathetic the circumstances may be, he only reaps as he has sown when Rome in its infallibility utterly rejects his manner of treating the New Testament. "Hast thou appealed unto Cæsar? Unto Cæsar shalt thou go."

I ought perhaps to set forth more in detail some characteristic pieces of New Testament criticism of M. Loisy. None is more striking, or more illustrative of the paradox of his position, than his attitude in regard to the Lord's Supper. First, the critical half of M. Loisy points out with admirable clearness and perfect frankness the historic difficulties which surround the ordinary view, that it was established as a sacrament by the Founder of Christianity just before His departure. He dwells on the fact that St Paul is our most complete authority for the events of the Last Supper, and that "Saint

Paul est le théologien de la croix, de la mort redemptrice, et il interprète visiblement, d'après sa théorie de l'expiation universelle, la cène commémorative de la mort. Je crois et j'ai dit que la rédaction de Paul avait influencé celle du second Évangile, et, par l'intermédiaire de Marc, celle du premier."<sup>1</sup> M. Loisy thinks that the original and most historic narrative of the Supper must have run to this effect: "And while they were eating, taking bread, He blessed it and brake, giving it them and saying, 'This is my body.' And taking the cup, He gave thanks, and gave it them, and they all drank. And He said to them, 'In truth I tell you that I shall no more drink the fruit of the vine until the day when I shall drink it new in the Kingdom of God.'" According to M. Loisy, then, it appears that the historic Jesus did not institute the Supper at all. And yet he accepts the doctrine of transubstantiation, on the authority of the Council of Trent, though he gently rallies the Bishops on their exact knowledge of metaphysical truth. But the doctrine of transubstantiation asserts a stupendous fact, a continual miracle. Surely we must judge of that fact, as of the facts of history, by evidence! Or if we may take an everyday event as a matter of faith, why cannot we accept as a matter of faith an event which took place two thousand years ago? "Il est inconcevable que la critique puisse suivre à l'égard de l'Écriture une méthode différente de celle qu'elle applique aux autres documents de l'antiquité." Well and good. On the same principle, the history of the Church after it was regularly organised must be placed on the same level as other history, and the doctrines proclaimed by the Church must be criticised like other statements in regard to things visible and invisible. We cannot introduce *la foi* as a source of knowledge in some parts of the field of science, and rigorously exclude it from other parts. The doctrine of transubstantiation, according to M. Loisy, is an expression of "le témoignage que le Christ vivant se rend à lui même dans l'Église, qui vit par lui." If it involved that only, would the

<sup>1</sup> *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 237.

pious Christian Reformers of the sixteenth century have been burned rather than accept it?

Another very characteristic criticism of M. Loisy relates to the passages in which Jesus speaks of the Second Advent as close at hand. These passages have caused much heart-burning to many commentators. Is it possible that our Lord can have been mistaken as to such a vital matter? Some modern critical writers consider, in my opinion quite justifiably, that all the discourses on the Second Advent in the Gospels are so mingled with the current Jewish eschatology, and so transformed by the expectations of the first generation of Christians, that it is impossible to tell with any high degree of probability what were the Master's views on the subject. Not so M. Loisy.<sup>1</sup> "Otez de l'Évangile l'idée du grand avènement et celle du Christ-Roi, je vous défie de prouver l'existence historique du Sauveur; car vous aurez enlevé toute leur signification historique à sa vie et à sa mort." This is an astonishing exaggeration, the root of which is that M. Loisy does not distinguish between the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven, of which our Lord does constantly speak, and the coming of the Messiah in the clouds of heaven, of which He only speaks in doubtful passages. It can clearly be made out that, in the great majority of the passages in which the Kingdom of Heaven is mentioned, something invisible and spiritual is intended, a kingdom which comes not with observation, but spreads like leaven through the hearts of men. The vulgar externalisation of it, according to the regular Jewish notions of the time, must be attributed not to the Master, but to the disciples. No one has shown this more clearly than Dr Charles in his admirable Jowett Lectures on Jewish eschatology.

M. Loisy observes that, if the Kingdom of Heaven proclaimed by Jesus were merely spiritual, He would not have been condemned to death. "S'il n'avait prédit que le règne de la charité, Pilate n'y aurait pas trouvé grand inconvénient." Precisely; and if our accounts are at all to be trusted, this was

<sup>1</sup> *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 70.

exactly the view of Pilate, when he said, "Why, what evil hath he done?" "I am innocent of the blood of this just man." Had M. Loisy quite forgotten the attitude of Pilate? or does he regard it as unhistoric? That he should so completely contradict such sayings as "My kingdom is not of this world" shows a *parti pris*, which very seldom appears in M. Loisy's works, except when he is attacking a "Protestant."

Yet he insists earnestly upon his interpretation, which is that Jesus was in fact entirely mistaken as to the Second Coming, which He expected to follow shortly after His death. Of course this view has been held by several advanced critics; in a Roman Catholic theologian it surprises us, until we learn, not only from M. Loisy's writings, but those of other theologians of his class, that this interpretation is in a certain school almost "de foi," because it makes the whole Gospel narrative lead up to and culminate in a visible church.<sup>1</sup> "Le royaume n'est pas arrivé aussi prochainement que Jésus l'attendait, dans sa forme solennelle; mais il est arrivé sous une autre forme, qui n'est pas moins vraie ni moins belle." "Le Royaume de Dieu est arrivé sous une autre forme, et il continue d'arriver toujours. L'Église n'est elle pas le Royaume en son principe, en sa manifestation initiale, progressive?"

Most Christians would be ready to allow that the Church as a whole has been the visible manifestation of the Kingdom of Heaven in the hearts of men. Let us accept M. Loisy's own definition of the Church<sup>2</sup> as "la conscience collective et permanente du Christianisme vivant." If we do this it will not appear, either what support M. Loisy's criticism gives to the Roman Church in particular, or what help is gained from an assumption of our Lord's ignorance, which is from the critical point of view quite unnecessary.

It is not very easy to understand whereon, in the view of M. Loisy, rest the exclusive claims of the Roman Church.

<sup>1</sup> "Lettres Romaines," iv., in the *Annales de Philosophie chrétienne*, Jan. 7, 1904.

<sup>2</sup> *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 59.

He expressly deprecates attaching evidential value to such passages of the Gospels as the "Tu es Petrus" or the last verses of Matthew. He is surely too keen a historian to accept the apostolic succession of bishops as sober truth. But he speaks with conviction of the Church as inspired by the spirit of Christ, and carrying on His work. Yet this line of defence, though quite legitimate, could tend only to prove that the Roman Church was part of the true Church of Christ. It could not be the foundation of any exclusive claims, since the Greek and the Reformed Churches make the same claim, and with the same conviction. In this matter it is easier to understand how M. Loisy came to take up his attitude than to defend it in any reasonable way.

I do not wish it to be supposed that I criticise M. Loisy's views in any hostile or grudging spirit. In almost every page of his writings there is bright thought in clear expression. His liberality is past praise, except where "Protestants" are concerned, and his courage admirable. One finds again and again suggestions of the greatest value towards Biblical exegesis and Christian philosophy. With three-fourths of his *Autour d'un petit livre* I find myself in complete harmony. It is all the more necessary, if one finds his general standpoint not maintainable, to say so frankly. And I venture to think that I can lay my hand on the precise misconceptions which vitiate that point of view. I will try to lay these clearly before the reader.

In the early Church there was great spiritual illumination, whereof the source was the Founder Himself. In His lifetime, nothing was crystallised; everything was in flux. After His death, the light and life remained, but they needed a corporeal embodiment, and they had to be embodied in terms of the Founder. This embodiment could proceed in various ways; but in the first century two ways had precedence. The first was the way of idealised history. Out of various materials—the remembrances of the Apostles, passages of the Old Testament regarded as prophetic, the early experiences of the

Christian Church, and the like—some unknown Evangelists in the course of half a century put together an idealised life of the Master. Considering all the circumstances, the Synoptic narrative is accurate and faithful; yet there run through it many strands which are not historic. The second way was that of doctrine. Great theologians of the Church, above all St Paul, set forth the new illumination in the language of the current philosophy or science of the time, making a theory of the person of Christ which should embody the new inspiration. The writer of the Fourth Gospel works on both lines alike, producing a result which is quite invaluable to the Christian, but which to the critic of history presents a tangle which will probably never be unwound.<sup>1</sup>

Now in the construction of history and in the construction of doctrine the spirit of the Church proceeded in just the same way. Her representative writers, whose works she adopted, did not, in either case, move on scientific lines, for the obvious reason that such did not exist. In composing history they worked according to the style of the age, thinking far more of ideas than of facts, and caring more for the edification of their readers than for their instruction. In building up doctrine they did not proceed in true psychological method, but on the lines of the later forms of Platonic philosophy. If we want to reach historic truth, we must deduct from the Gospels both purpose of edification and habits of style, and pass every fact through the meshes of a critical sieve. If we want in doctrine to reach philosophic or psychologic accuracy, we must begin with a sharp criticism of the philosophy of the period, and try to work back to the realities with which that philosophy deals.

If this be the case, we cannot reject the history accepted by the early Church and accept her doctrines on her authority. But can we, as M. Loisy suggests, accept the substance of the doctrines while criticising the forms? If the doctrines

<sup>1</sup> In view of the many striking works on John recently published by such writers as Réville, Drummond, Loisy, and others, one feels more confident than ever of the truth of this saying.

were the direct outcome of the spiritual life of the Church, and the expression of them imperfect only because of the prevalence of Greek philosophy, we might perhaps take this line. But everyone who has given attention to Church history knows how much of inferior motive, of hatred and jealousy, of imperial and local politics, was mingled in the production of doctrines. While we may be willing to assert that on the whole the Church carried on the obedience of Christ, yet we must allow that at times she was sadly soiled with the world, that unworthy purposes and motives came in to degrade the higher life, and to lower the tone of Christianity.

Thus it is quite impossible to maintain that early Christian history must be handed over to historic science, but that early Christian doctrine must be received on faith. The one and the other were constructed at the same time, on similar lines. Both alike received the sanction of the Church. If the Church was infallible, her infallibility covers both the historic and doctrinal books of the New Testament. If she was without inspiration, history and doctrine are alike almost worthless. If, as I should prefer to hold, she was neither infallible nor uninspired, we must find some way of applying tests so as to keep the good and put aside the bad. As regards the test to be applied to the evangelic narratives, we must in the main agree with M. Loisy, though, of course, we shall not necessarily reach his results. But we must also apply tests to doctrine. First we must translate them from the unintelligible language of Greek philosophy into phrases which have a meaning for the modern mind. So far again we go with M. Loisy. But we cannot stop at that point. We must bring them, even when translated afresh, to a further test, the test of the Christian life. If the inspiration of the Church is entirely a thing of the past, then we must accept her ancient dicta; but if it is continued into the present, then the present also has a right to judge, to determine what is the best expression of the Christian life, to try to rise to a higher

level than was reached in these matters in the early ages of Christianity.

Theologians of the school of M. Loisy will shrink back from the acceptance of the really free position; they will call it "Protestant," individual. They will fear that it will give to every man licence to think what he pleases, and to make a church for himself. But there are two sufficient answers. The first answer is that one must follow either authority, or else fact, inspiration, reason. One cannot first accept an authority, and then carefully prescribe the limits within which it is infallible. If one makes a vow to obey a particular Christian organisation, one must obey it even when one thinks it wrong; otherwise one has all the disadvantages of individualism in addition to those of authority. When one surrenders, one can only make such terms as the victor chooses to allow, and trust to his clemency to carry them out.

The second answer is still more satisfactory. Every move in the questioning of authority is no doubt a move towards anarchy. If in civil affairs one limits the power of the king, one runs some risk of falling into nihilism. But there is such a thing as constitutional government; and there are such things as representative institutions. In England we are taught from the cradle that a moderate and defined liberty is the best kind of freedom. Why should there not be moderate liberty and representative institutions in the Church as well as in the State? We read a great deal in the Acts and in the Pauline Epistles about Christian liberty, about the sending of representatives, about government essentially democratic. Of course, when the barbarians overran the Roman Empire, and even earlier, in the centralising days of Diocletian and Constantine, this liberty could not persist. But it made a hard struggle for existence. The earlier councils of the Church were filled with bishops nominated by the popular voice; their decisions were in the main the decisions of democracy, until the Emperors took to interfering, and the episcopal system hardened and lost touch with the laity.

M. Loisy has made an eloquent appeal in favour of greater liberty in his Church. For us the ancient liberty revived in the sixteenth century with the Teutonic revolt against Rome. Apparently M. Loisy thinks that that revolt, brought on by the sale of indulgences and other foul abuses, was quite unjustified, and he seems to think that the Church of Rome, after all liberty and progress had been forced out of it, after many of its most valuable constituents had been driven into an attitude of opposition, remained just as representative as before of the life of Christianity in Europe. We of course think, on the contrary, that of the various strands which had made up the Church, some went on in connection with Rome, others went on in connection with the Anglican, the Presbyterian, the Reformed Churches.

And in northern Europe and in America, since the Reformation, religious life has developed freely on parallel lines to civic life. We see in England and America a great deal of the evils of religious democracy. But they are not more prominent than the evils of civic democracy. And it is not clear that absolute government, either in State or Church, is better than liberty, even if liberty be abused. Both in Church and State we want, not to go back to absolute government, but to go on to constitutional government by those who know and are really best fitted to lead. And though at present events are moving but slowly in this direction, there are many reasons for thinking that the necessity of expediting the coming of enlightened control in both Church and State will before long become clear to such of us as survive.

It is not for me, at the end of an article on M. Loisy's position, to try to sketch a reasonable system of Church government. I will only point to what is going on in England under our eyes. In our "Protestant" country, according to M. Loisy and his friends, we ought every year to be drifting further towards anarchy. On the contrary, we have seen in recent years the Church of Ireland organise itself in a very efficient way. The convocation of the Church of England

shows many signs of increasing vitality. In Scotland several of the great religious bodies, the Free Church, the United Presbyterians, and others, have actually come to terms and amalgamated. The so-called Free Churches of England, Independents, Baptists, and the like, are approaching one another, and eager to enter into a closer alliance. Socialism in religion is growing, like socialism in the State. All this does not greatly help us towards a solution of such difficult speculative questions as those which concern the relations between history and doctrine. These at present only perplex the thoughtful minority. But it does show that the life of Christ is working in many branches of the Church towards greater unity. It is pathetic to find that M. Loisy and his friends see the only hope of saving Christendom in the advent of a liberal and reforming Pope. He even makes the strange suggestion that the proclamation of Papal infallibility is a mile-post on the road to reform, "que le Pape ne peut avoir été revêtu d'un si grand pouvoir que pour permettre à l'Église unifiée de réaliser avec plus de promptitude et de facilité toutes les réformes et tous les progrès exigés par le temps." This is striking; but it is not thus that in past history the divine power has worked in the Church: with all his clearness of thought and sincerity, M. Loisy is in some respects a visionary.

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# THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO THE HEBREWS.

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THIS mysterious work—the mere wreckage of which is all that has been washed up on the shores of our late times—hovers before the imagination of New Testament scholars like a phantom ship, intangible, indeterminate. Periodically the ghostly book reappears in criticism only to be discredited as again it glides away into obscurity. In the discussion of its merits the tables are turned—heresy believes and orthodoxy doubts. A sceptical orthodoxy brings a charge of unwarrantable license in championing its claims on credulous heresy. At the dawn of the scientific method in criticism, its founder, Lessing, approaching the subject from the standpoint of general literature, propounded the idea that the Gospel according to the Hebrews was the primary source of our Synoptics (A.D. 1778). Stimulated by that great writer's exciting suggestion, Eichhorn, a specialist in the subject, early in the nineteenth century worked out in detail the conception that some Syro-Chaldaic work was the original composition at the root of our first three gospels, and then the discussion drifted into wider fields, and the identity of the hypothetical source with the traditional Gospel according to the Hebrews was variously regarded. Discussing the subject in the year 1866, Hilgenfeld declared triumphantly, "At length the Gospel according to the Hebrews offers those of us who are investigating the

origin of the gospels the *punctum Archimedis* which so many learned men have vainly sought in the Gospel according to Mark.”<sup>1</sup> Pfeleiderer is more cautious; but he finds one of the sources of Matthew in a strongly Jewish work of primitive Christianity, adding “that this source was the Gospel according to the Hebrews, which is also often cited elsewhere, is probable (*wahrscheinlich*), though nothing can be affirmed of it with certainty.”<sup>2</sup> More recently Harnack has assigned the origin of the Hebrews’ gospel to the period 65 (70) to 100 A.D., holding that it probably belongs to the beginning of this period.<sup>3</sup> Inasmuch as he gives 70 to 75 as the probable date of Matthew, and 78 to 93 as the probable date of Luke and Acts, evidently he is inclined to set the Hebrews’ gospel earlier than both these Synoptics, and of course much earlier than John, while it may be no later than Mark, the first written canonical gospel, which he assigns to 65 to 70 A.D. And now we have the latest critical life of Christ, written by Oscar Holtzmann, an elaborate work of great learning, acuteness of observation, and freshness of thought, which challenges the attention of students as one of the most important contributions to the subject, claiming the Gospel according to the Hebrews as a primary authority—as far as its fragments go—parallel in historical worth to the Synoptics, and even in some respects to be preferred to them, while our Fourth Gospel is almost wholly relegated to the realm of legend.<sup>4</sup> Among English writers the tendency has been to discredit the work as a late product, a secondary gospel, based on one or more of our New Testament gospels—Matthew in particular—the view, for example, maintained by Lightfoot, Westcott, and Salmon. But in the year 1879 Mr Nicholson, Principal Librarian and Superintendent of the London Institution, published an

<sup>1</sup> *Novum Testamentum extra Canonem Receptum*, fasciculus iv. p. 13. Apud Nicholson, *The Gospel according to the Hebrews*, p. ix.

<sup>2</sup> *Urchristenthum*, p. 540.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Chronologie*, pp. 625 ff.

<sup>4</sup> D. Oscar Holtzmann, *Leben Jesu*, pp. 35 to 39 (1901 A.D.).

exhaustive study of the subject,<sup>1</sup> in which he endeavoured to vindicate the antiquity and independence of the Gospel according to the Hebrews.

The high historical value recently set on this Gospel by scholars and critics brings it again into the light, and demands a searching examination of its claims. I do not profess to offer here any such complete treatment of the subject. But some of the most significant points may be indicated within reasonable limits of space.

First, let us summarise the principal known facts concerning the gospel. Our fullest information comes from Jerome. He writes of "the Gospel belonging to (*juxta*) the Hebrews which the Nazarenes use to this day; according to (*secundum*) the Apostles, or as most (*plerique*—perhaps meaning "many") assert belonging to (*juxta*) Matthew."<sup>2</sup> This gospel, then, was existing in the days of Jerome as a scriptural document, read in the churches of Jewish Christians known as Nazarenes. Jerome suggests that his own opinion was that it should be ascribed to the Apostles, though he admits, as an alternative adopted by many, if not by the majority of his contemporaries, that it should be assigned to Matthew. Jerome has many references to this gospel, and seven times he tells us that it was largely attributed to Matthew, especially by Jewish Christians. In one very important passage he informs us that he himself had seen the book and copied it. His statement is as follows:—

"Matthew, who also is Levi, and who from a tax-gatherer came to be an Apostle, first of all the Evangelists composed a gospel of Christ in Judæa in the Hebrew language and characters, for the benefit of those of the circumcision who had believed: who translated it into Greek is not sufficiently ascertained. Furthermore, the Hebrew itself is preserved to this day in the library at Cæsarea which the martyr Pamphilus so diligently collected. I also was allowed by the Nazarenes who use this volume in the Syrian city of Beræa to copy it," etc.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel according to the Hebrews*: Its Fragments translated and annotated, with a Critical Analysis of the External and Internal Evidence relating to it. I am indebted to this work for valuable materials, which I thankfully acknowledge here once for all, without cumbering the pages with repeated references.

<sup>2</sup> *Adv. Pelag.*, iii. 2. We must not attach any importance to the change of preposition from *juxta* to *secundum*, as elsewhere Jerome has *secundum Hebræos* (Com. on Micah vii. 6 and Matt. vi. 11).

<sup>3</sup> *De Viris ill.*, 2.

In another place Jerome writes of "the Gospel which is called according to the Hebrews (*secundum Hebræos*), and was lately translated by me into the Greek language and the Latin, which also Origen (*Adamantius*, the church name of Origen) often uses."<sup>1</sup>

Again, he says it was written in the "Chaldee and Syriac (*i.e.* Aramaic)" language, but in Hebrew letters.<sup>2</sup> Here, then, we have an exact, unmistakable description of the literary form of the work. It was in the Aramaic dialect, but written in Hebrew characters. In this form Jerome found it at Cæsarea, and again at Berœa, when he was allowed to copy it. Subsequently he translated it into Greek and Latin. Much discussion has arisen on the subject of Jerome's translation. But two points seem to be clear, in spite of all the uncertainty that surrounds the whole question. First, this Aramaic work could not have been the original of our Greek Matthew, for in that case Jerome would not have had occasion to translate it, since our Matthew in Greek was familiar to him as part of his New Testament. Second, in spite of the fact that Jerome made his translation, it seems to be demonstrated by Harnack that the Gospel according to the Hebrews had been translated into Greek long before this—as early as the latter part of the second century A.D. The references to it in Eusebius, Origen, and Clement of Alexandria prove this.<sup>3</sup> The only explanation of Jerome's action is that he had not met with the translation which perhaps was chiefly used in Egypt, while his researches were carried out in Palestine and Syria, where the original Aramaic text was in use among the Jewish churches.

Tracing the references to the gospel further back we have an important witness in Eusebius, the most learned and fair-minded Christian scholar at the beginning of the fourth century. After giving his list of New Testament books, the Father of Church History adds, "Some moreover have also counted in this class" (*i.e.* the class of universally acknowledged

<sup>1</sup> *De Viris ill.*, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Contra Pelag.*, iii. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See Harnack, *Chronologie*, pp. 635-641.

books)<sup>1</sup> “the Gospel according to the Hebrews, in which especially those Hebrews who have received the Christ rejoice. Now all these” (*i.e.* some books just mentioned and also our Gospel according to the Hebrews) “will belong to the disputed books.”<sup>2</sup> These are books in Eusebius’ second list, accepted by some, rejected by others. Here he would place the Hebrew Gospel, but only after stating in his candid way that some would go further, and reckon it to be of undoubted canonicity. A little later, referring to those Ebionites who did not reject the divinity of Christ, he says, “using that gospel alone which is called the Gospel according to the Hebrews, they took small account of the rest.”<sup>3</sup> We have already seen how Jerome stated that Origen used the Gospel according to the Hebrews. One or two of his references to this work have been preserved. Thus before quoting the most difficult passage of the gospel that has come down to us—which we shall have to discuss a little later—he writes, “But if anyone admits the Gospel according to the Hebrews, where the Saviour Himself says,” etc.<sup>4</sup> Here the use of the indicative ‘*admits*’<sup>5</sup> shows that Origen knew of people who accepted this gospel as authoritative. In another place, where we only have the Latin version of Origen’s work, we read, “It is written in a certain gospel which is called ‘according to the Hebrews,’<sup>6</sup> where the technical phrase it is written”<sup>7</sup> points to a citation from recognised scripture. But Origen (in this Latin version) adds, “If, however, anyone is pleased to take that as now authoritative,” etc., showing that there were doubts on the position to be assigned to the gospel. Going a step further back to Origen’s predecessor, Clement of Alexandria, we come upon a quotation from this gospel in Greek, introduced by the technical formula for scripture:<sup>8</sup> “Just as in the Gospel according to the Hebrews it is written,” etc.<sup>9</sup> This is

<sup>1</sup> ὁμολογούμενα.

<sup>2</sup> ἀντιλεγόμενα, *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 27. See also Eusebius, *Theophan.*, iv. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Comm. in John* ii. 63.

<sup>5</sup> προσίεται.

<sup>6</sup> *Com. in Matt.* (Nuzries edition, vol. iii. 1284).

<sup>7</sup> *scriptum est.*

<sup>8</sup> γέγραπται.

<sup>9</sup> *Strom.*, ii. 9.

the earliest known citation from the Gospel according to the Hebrews by name. But we have several earlier references to the book, and one probable citation from it, though there the book is not mentioned. Irenæus tells us in two places<sup>1</sup> that the Ebionites only used the Gospel according to Matthew. It is generally assumed that Irenæus here means our Matthew, and indeed, since we know he used that book, and attached a unique value to the four gospels of which it is the first, it is difficult to come to any other conclusion on the subject. Nevertheless we have seen from what Jerome, our chief authority, said, that the book used by the Jewish Christians of his day was not our Matthew, but the Gospel according to the Hebrews in Aramaic, which they, in common with many others, ascribed to Matthew. Now the Ebionites of whom Irenæus wrote were the Jewish Christians of his day. It is not to be supposed that after using the Greek canonical Matthew in the second century these people had discarded it in favour of an Aramaic book by the end of the third century. The tendency would rather be the other way. Nor can we get any assistance from the fact that, while Irenæus called the Jewish Christians Ebionites, Jerome called them Nazarenes, for if these are not two names for the same people, the Ebionites must be regarded as the more heretical, rejecting the divinity of Christ, while the Nazarenes, accepting that fundamental doctrine of orthodoxy, were nearer to the Catholic Church. It cannot be supposed that the heretical Ebionites accepted our Matthew in Greek, but the more orthodox Nazarenes used a different and more Jewish gospel. Accordingly, Mr Nicholson concludes that Irenæus was referring to the Gospel according to the Hebrews when he wrote of the gospel used by the Ebionites, and consequently held this to be Matthew's work.<sup>2</sup> But since he accepted our Matthew as the genuine apostolic gospel, that would only be possible on condition that he held the Gospel according to the

<sup>1</sup> *Adv. Hær.*, i. 26. 2; iii. 11. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *The Gospel according to the Hebrews*, pp. 2, 3.

Hebrews to have been the Hebrew or Aramaic original of our Matthew. This, we see, even Jerome seemed to allow. The simpler explanation of the case is that Irenæus had never seen the Gospel according to the Hebrews. There is no evidence that it had reached Western Europe when Irenæus lived. All our references to it are found in the East—Palestine, Syria, Egypt. Hearing that the Ebionites used a gospel that they ascribed to Matthew, but not seeing their gospel, Irenæus would naturally conclude that this was the Matthew gospel which he knew, while in point of fact it was another gospel which the Jewish Christians ascribed to the publican Apostle. A comparison with Hippolytus shows us that Irenæus is capable of much greater errors than this in his often hearsay descriptions of heretics. The conclusion we come to therefore is, that Irenæus is no authority for ascribing the Gospel according to the Hebrews to Matthew, but that he does give us evidence for believing that in his day Jewish Christians used a gospel which they ascribed to Matthew; and then, combining this information with that afforded two centuries later by Jerome, for concluding that gospel to have been no other than the Gospel according to the Hebrews.

Eusebius gives us two earlier references to this Gospel of an indirect character, but still unmistakable. The first is in Hegesippus, a Jewish Christian writer, but of the Catholic Church, not an Ebionite, whom Harnack dates at A.D. 150. "He also," says Eusebius, "adduces something out of the Gospel according to the Hebrews and the Syriac, and particularly out of the Hebrew language."<sup>1</sup> The passage is confused; probably the text is corrupt. But whatever may have been its original phrasing, plainly it asserts that Hegesippus quoted this gospel in a Syriac or Hebrew form—possibly meaning, what Jerome also told us, that it was in the Syriac language, but in Hebrew letters. Now I am induced to think that the author of *Supernatural Religion* is correct when he argues that we have no evidence showing that

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. Eccl.*, iv. 22.

Hegesippus used any other gospel.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, seeing that we have but a very few fragments of Hegesippus, Dr Lightfoot was also plainly right in his triumphant refutation of the two assumptions, built on this fact by the author of *Supernatural Religion*, first that Hegesippus never quoted any of our gospels, and second, that he did not even know of their existence. For our present purpose, however, that controversy is beside the mark. What we have to take note of here is, that so early a writer as Hegesippus made use of the Gospel according to the Hebrews as an authoritative document.

The other indirect early reference to this gospel preserved by Eusebius is a statement concerning Papias, who cannot be dated later than A.D. 160, and perhaps wrote much earlier. The Church historian, after mentioning various things recorded by Papias, adds, "and he has published also another relation of a woman accused of many sins before the Lord, which the Gospel according to the Hebrews contains."<sup>2</sup> We cannot be certain, on the ground of this remark, that Papias used the Hebrew gospel. All that Eusebius tells us is, that he gives a story that is contained in it. He may have obtained this story by tradition from the elders, whose information he elsewhere informs us he valued very highly. Still there is some degree of probability that he used the book, and there we must be content to let the matter rest.

There is yet one earlier possible indication of the use of the Gospel according to the Hebrews in the church of the second century. In the Epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnæans we read, "For I know and believe that He was in the flesh even after the resurrection; and when He came to Peter and his company, He said to them, *Lay hold and handle me, and see that I am not an incorporeal dæmon.*"<sup>3</sup>

Now, Jerome quotes the expression *incorporeal dæmon*,<sup>4</sup> and ascribes it to the gospel used by the Nazarenes, saying,

<sup>1</sup> *Supernatural Religion*, new and revised edition, 1902, pp. 268-276.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 39.

<sup>3</sup> δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον, *Ad. Smyrn.*, iii. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *incorporale dæmonium.*

“For when the Apostles thought Him a spirit, or, according to the gospel which the Nazarenes of the Hebrews use, a *dæmon* without a body,” etc.<sup>1</sup>

Then we have the fuller expression in Origen, who, while discussing the term ‘incorporeal,’<sup>2</sup> writes, “And if anyone should quote it to us out of the little treatise entitled *The Teaching of Peter*, in which the Saviour seems to say to His disciples ‘I am not an incorporeal *dæmon*,’ I have to reply, in the first place, that that work is not included among Ecclesiastical Books.”<sup>3</sup> These references leave with us the suggestion that the curious expression was to be found in “*The Teaching of Peter*” as well as in the Gospel according to the Hebrews, possibly taken by the one work from the other. There must be some doubt, therefore, as to the question in which book Ignatius found the saying, if indeed he derived it from either of them. Farther back than this we cannot find any traces of the gospel. But neither do the early patristic writings contain certain references to any of the canonical gospels before the time of Ignatius; the possible allusions to one or more of them in the apostolic fathers<sup>4</sup> are too indefinite to be cited as evidence. Accordingly, it may be admitted that the external evidence for the Gospel according to the Hebrews is nearly if not quite as ancient as that for the New Testament Synoptics, though very much less abundant.

But our assurance concerning the genuineness and reliability of the Synoptic gospels is by no means confined to the results of patristic inquiries. It rests much more on the self-evidencing character of the books themselves. If, therefore, the Gospel according to the Hebrews is to be brought into line with those gospels, as some contend—not to speak of the idea of giving it priority of authority—it must stand this test. Here we have to discriminate between two questions that are not at all conterminous—the question of antiquity and the question of authority. It would be quite possible to allow

<sup>1</sup> *Com. in Isa.* xviii., præf.

<sup>2</sup> ἀσώματον.

<sup>3</sup> *De Prin.*, i., Proem, 8.

<sup>4</sup> See Charteris, *Canonicity*, pp. 102 to 108.

greater antiquity for the Gospel according to the Hebrews, and yet to judge it to be less reliable than the gospels, which, on this hypothesis, came later. St Luke, in his preface, treats his predecessors with scant courtesy. Suppose we grant the first contention of its champions, that the Gospel according to the Hebrews was among these predecessors, we may still be justified in giving it an inferior historical value if it affords evidence of being based on uncertain information, inaccurately reported, received with indiscriminating credulity, or warped by prejudice. How do the fragments that we possess help us in settling this point? Let us examine the more suggestive of them in order to see whether they furnish materials for an answer to the question.

Taking these fragments in the order of the gospel history, and passing over two which are almost identical with our Matthew, we come upon this remarkable extract preserved by Jerome:—

“Behold the mother of the Lord and his brothers said to Him, John the Baptist is baptizing for the remission of sins: let us go and be baptized by him. But He said to them: What have I sinned that I should go and be baptized by him? unless perhaps just this that I said is ignorance.”<sup>1</sup>

Now, Oscar Holtzmann maintains that such a saying would never have been admitted into a gospel if it had not proceeded from the lips of Jesus Himself, since in all subsequent times it was reckoned a sin to doubt the sinlessness of Jesus.<sup>2</sup> He attributes the idea of the sinlessness of Christ to the Apostle Paul,<sup>3</sup> and he thinks he finds a different opinion expressed by our Lord Himself in two passages (Mark x. 18 and xiv. 36). This is not the place to discuss the great subject of the sinlessness of Jesus. Still it may be remarked that to base a theory on questionable inferences derived from the two passages given, to the neglect of all the gospel testimony to the contrary, is not scientific, especially since an examination of those passages shows that the interpretation of them assumed by Holtzmann is far from being warranted. The first admits of

<sup>1</sup> Jerome, *Contra Pelag.*, iii. 2, in Erdwin Preuschen, *Anti-legomasa*, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Oscar Holtzmann, *Leben Jesu*, p. 36 text, and also footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> He refers to 2 Cor. v. 21, comparing John viii. 46; 1 Pet. ii. 2.

various interpretations ; the second is not usually regarded as indicative of more than the limitation and weakness natural to human life. To take our Lord's prayer in Gethsemane as a sign that He confessed Himself to be not sinless is to read a strange meaning into it. This passage from the Gospel according to the Hebrews stands absolutely alone in containing a definite confession of conceivable faultiness assigned to Jesus Christ. It is possible to accept it as historical without contradicting the idea of the perfect sinlessness of Jesus which runs through the whole of the New Testament, if we suppose the word 'sin' to be used here for a technical breach of the letter of the law, apart from moral evil, as it might well be understood in a strict Jewish household. Indeed, it would seem to be this that was intended by the word 'ignorance.' We can hardly imagine how even an absolutely innocent child could have been brought up without ever transgressing unknown rules. This impossibility was recognised by the rabbis when they fixed the age of thirteen as the period of life at which a boy was to be required to keep the Torah. It may be allowed that, spoken in this sense, the saying might have fallen from the lips of Jesus. It is not safe to say that is certainly not genuine. All the same, the whole conversation has the legendary air of the apocryphal gospels, with their love of personal details. Though of most doubtful origin, it is probably very ancient ; we cannot well imagine such a tradition creeping into a gospel in the later period, when anything even apparently derogatory to our Lord would have been resented as much by the Jewish Christian as by the Catholic Church.

The next fragment refers to occurrences at our Lord's baptism. For this, too, we are indebted to Jerome. It is as follows :—

"It came to pass when the Lord had come up from the water, the whole fountain of the Holy Spirit descended and rested on Him, and said to Him : My Son, in all the prophets I waited for Thee, that I might come and rest on Thee ; for Thou art my rest, Thou art my firstborn Son who reignest for ever."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jerome, in *Is. Comment.*, iv. 11, 12 (Preusschen, p. 4).

This passage contains several peculiarities: (1) Jesus is called "the Lord" (*dominus*), a characteristic of the later usage. (2) The simpler conception of the Holy Spirit which we meet with in the canonical gospels is enlarged to "the whole fountain of the Holy Spirit." (3) Jesus is addressed by the Holy Spirit as "Son." (4) The reference to the prophets suggests the age of reflection, when prophecy was recognised as fulfilled in Christ. (5) The description of Jesus as God's 'firstborn' is not met with in any of the four gospels; in the New Testament it does not appear till late in the development of apostolic teaching.<sup>1</sup> All these five points indicate a later age than the Synoptics.

But the most remarkable quotation from the Gospel according to the Hebrews which we possess is that which refers to the temptation. It is found twice in Origen,<sup>2</sup> in the first place directly ascribed to this gospel, and the first part of it three times in Jerome. In this passage Jesus is represented as saying, "My mother the Holy Ghost lately took me by one of my hairs and carried me to the great mountain Tabor." Oscar Holtzmann thinks that this remarkable saying is probably genuine, and represents an older account of the temptation than anything we have on the subject in the gospels. His reasons for coming to this extraordinary conclusion are, that here the incident is given in words ascribed to Jesus Himself, and since it must have first been narrated by Him, this fact points to priority; and further that Mount Tabor, being visible from Nazareth or its vicinity, the idea of the temptation being connected with that place points to our Lord's residence at Nazareth. The temptation is approached from Nazareth. Even the strange reference to the mode of carrying, he points out, might be suggested by Old Testament precedents. But surely the whole passage is obviously apocryphal. There is nothing at all approaching it in any other of our Lord's recorded sayings. It would be difficult to compress more improbabilities into a single sentence. (1) Jesus nowhere else

<sup>1</sup> Heb. i. 6; cf. Col. i. 15, 18; Rev. i. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Comment. in John* ii, 12, and *Hom. in Jerem.* xv. 4.

speaks of the Holy Spirit as His mother. In the light of this passage we must understand the passage just previously discussed concerning the baptism to mean that there also the Holy Spirit as Christ's mother addressed Him as her firstborn son! The idea is accounted for by the fact that the Aramaic word for spirit is feminine, but such a grammatical inference is more in the style of the later times when gnostic fancies were afloat, than the simple matter-of-fact manner of the primitive gospels, or our Lord's way of speaking about Himself. (2) The fantastic description of the manner in which Jesus is here supposed to speak of the Holy Ghost conveying Him to the scene of the temptation is scarcely less incongruous. It is not to be denied that Jesus commonly talked in figurative language, spoke of a fig-tree, or the Mount of Olives, or Mount Hermon, being transported to the sea by faith, promised His disciples immunity if they trod on snakes and scorpions, declared that they should forthwith see angels ascending and descending on Him. But in all such cases the metaphorical character of His utterance is apparent. Here however the way in which Mount Tabor is introduced excludes the idea of anything but a physical transportation through the air. It may be urged that in the second temptation a very similar situation is created when we are told that the devil set Him on a pinnacle of the temple, as well as on a high mountain. But these things are stated in the course of the temptation, and they have not the most peculiar feature of the narrative in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Oscar Holtzmann thinks that Jesus may be using figurative language, based on Apocryphal and Old Testament analogies. It is much more likely that those analogies gave rise to the myth in Jewish Christian circles. Ezekiel says that the hand of the Lord God fell upon him, and adds, "and he put forth the form of a hand, and took me by a lock of mine head; and the spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the visions of God to Jerusalem," etc.<sup>1</sup> Here not only

<sup>1</sup> Ezek. viii. 1, 3.

is the same curious mode of carrying described, but it is also assigned to "the spirit." In *Bel and the Dragon* we read concerning Habbakuk, "Then the angel of the Lord took him by the crown, and lifted him up by the hair of his head, and with the blast of his breath set him in Babylon over the den."<sup>1</sup> It seems plain that our gospel fragment must have been inspired by one or other, or perhaps both, of these earlier passages. The prophet, it should be observed, unlike the Hebrew evangelist, is careful to indicate the fact that he is writing figuratively by inserting the saving clause "in the visions of God," before mentioning so realistic a destination of his aerial voyage as the city of Jerusalem. (3) Mount Tabor would have been an absolutely unsuitable site for the scene of the temptation, because there was a Roman fortress with a garrison of soldiers there in the time of Christ. For the same reason, as well as on other grounds, the tradition that fixed on this conspicuous round hill in the plain of Jezreel as the Mount of the Transfiguration is equally erroneous. But the twofold selection of the same hill is not without significance, for it shows that the fancy of early Christian times was readily attracted to it, perhaps simply on account of its peculiar situation. For this reason it was singled out in the Old Testament for special notice, as by the Psalmist who wrote,

"The north and the south, thou hast created them :  
Tabor and Hermon rejoice in thy name."<sup>2</sup>

and again by Jeremiah, where he writes, "As I live, saith the King, whose name is the Lord of Hosts, surely like Tabor among the mountains, and like Carmel by the sea, so shall he come."<sup>3</sup> In other words, the appearance of Tabor in the Gospel according to the Hebrews is literary, not historical; it is due to reminiscences of Scripture, not to observation of contemporary conditions; therefore it is just not such a reference to the mountain as would be made by a resident at Nazareth in sight of the fortress—as Oscar Holtzmann supposes—but, on the contrary, the kind of reference that would

<sup>1</sup> *Bel and the Dragon*, 36.

<sup>2</sup> Psalm lxxxix. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Jer. xlvi. 18.

come to a writer at a distance, to whom Tabor was merely a Bible mountain, known to him by the Scripture passages concerning it.

When we put all these considerations together, can we suppose that this grotesque statement in the Gospel according to the Hebrews is to be accepted as of even higher historical value than the account of the temptation in the Synoptic gospels? Surely the more we look into it, the more shall we find the obvious impression of its legendary character confirmed.

Proceeding further, we have Jerome pointing out that in its version of the Lord's prayer this gospel has the Hebrew word *Machar*,<sup>1</sup> meaning "of the morrow," where we read "daily" in the phrase "our daily bread," a rendering now widely accepted as a translation of the Greek of our gospels, so that the concurrence of the Hebrew gospel here is of peculiar interest. Whatever may be its historical value, at all events it affords a most ancient comment on a difficult passage, and very likely it gives us the very word used by our Lord.

This gospel also adds an interesting bit of information about the man with the withered hand, stating that he said, "I am a mason, seeking my living with my hands; I pray thee, Jesus, to restore my health, lest I shamefully beg my food."<sup>2</sup> The passage has been described as obviously a late gloss. Can we be sure of this? There is nothing inherently improbable in it, and the simple appellation "Jesus" speaks for its antiquity and genuineness. A late writer, not adhering to a true tradition, would certainly have written "Lord" or "Teacher," in the usual style of the gospels.

Here is an interesting version of our Lord's teaching about forgiveness, taken from the Gospel according to the Hebrews: "If thy brother sin in word and make satisfaction to you, seven times a day accept him. Simon, his disciple, said to him, 'Seven times a day!' The Lord answered and said to him, 'Yea, I tell thee, up to seven times seven; for in the

<sup>1</sup> מחר representing the Greek ἐπιούσιον, Matt. vi. 11; Luke xi. 3

<sup>2</sup> Jerome, *Comm. in Matt.* xii. 13.

prophets also, after they have been anointed by the Holy Spirit, the word of sin is found.'"<sup>1</sup>

This has affinities both with Matthew and with Luke. It is Matthew only who gives us the "seventy times seven,"<sup>2</sup> but Luke only mentions the "day."<sup>3</sup> The final clause about the prophets is not in either of those gospels, but there is not anything extravagant or unlikely in it. It may be the comment of some later teacher, or of the writer of the gospel. But there is nothing to forbid us to accept it as a genuine saying of our Lord.

Origen has preserved a longer extract from the Gospel according to the Hebrews, containing the incident of the rich young ruler, which varies considerably from all the Synoptic accounts. We have this in the old Latin version only. It is as follows:—

"Another of the rich men said to him, Master, what good thing shall I do that I may live? He said to him, Man do the law and the prophets. He answered him, I have done it. He said to him, Go sell all thou possessest and divide it among the poor, and come follow me. But the rich man began to scratch his head, and it did not please him. And the Master said to him: How do you say, I have done the law and the prophets? since it is written in the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; and behold many of thy brothers, sons of Abraham, are covered with filth, dying of hunger, and your house is full of many good things, and nothing at all goes out of it to them. And turning to Simon he said, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to go into the kingdom of heaven."<sup>4</sup>

The crudity of this passage has often been pointed to as a sign of its late and untrustworthy character. But is this just? Does it not rather suggest the primitive nature of the narrative? If the Gospel according to the Hebrews contained much writing of this sort we can understand how the main body of the Church refused to use the book even if it were as old as the Synoptics, since the latter works are better in tone and style. Still there are features of the paragraph that point to a possible derivation in part from our gospels, rather than priority to them and absolute independence. The description

<sup>1</sup> Jerome, *Contra Pelag.*, iii. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Luke xvii. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xviii. 21, 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Comm. in Matt.* xv. 14.

of the poor and the rich man's neglect of them reads like an echo of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus in Luke; but the question, "What good thing shall I do?" and the expression "the kingdom of heaven" with which the extract closes point to Matthew, the only New Testament book in which either occurs. It might appear, therefore, that we have here a conflation of Matthew's account of the young man who came to Christ with the parable in Luke. But even if that be allowed, we have also a good deal that is found in none of our gospels. This may be set down to later imagination working over the story. But there is nothing to prevent us from attributing it to genuine tradition.

Jerome has an extract from the Gospel according to the Hebrews, describing what happened at the temple when Jesus died, where we read that "the lintel of the temple, of infinite size, was broken and divided";<sup>1</sup> and again, Jerome says that we read in this gospel, not that "the veil of the temple was torn," but that "the lintel of the temple, of wonderful size, fell down."<sup>2</sup> This variation cannot be traced to anything in the gospels, unless it might be regarded as a legendary modification of the Synoptic narrative based on Mark xiii. 2. It may be thought that the typical significance of the rending of the veil of the temple, opening up the secluded inner sanctuary to public view, would lead to the tradition in our Synoptics being made more welcome in the Gentile churches, while the alternative tradition in the Gospel according to the Hebrews, not containing the same significant suggestion, would be more acceptable to Jewish Christians.

Jerome has preserved a remarkable extract from this gospel about an appearance of the risen Christ to James the brother of the Lord, which has become well known to all students of early Christian times. It is as follows:—

"But when the Lord had given his shroud to the priest's servant, he went to James and appeared to him; for James had sworn that he would not eat bread from that hour when

<sup>1</sup> *Comm. in Matt.* xxvii. 51.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep.*, 120.

he had drunk the Lord's cup until he should see him risen from the sleeping ones." Jerome says that a little later the gospel has, "Bring, says the Lord, a table and bread," and immediately after it adds, "He took bread and blessed it and gave to James the just and said to him, My brother, eat your bread because the Son of man has risen from the sleeping ones."<sup>1</sup>

This passage cannot be traced to anything in the Synoptics, although perhaps the latter part of it might be regarded as founded on Luke xxiv. 41-43. But the resemblance is very slight. In our third gospel, it is broiled fish that is brought. Jesus eats it Himself, and His reason for doing so is to demonstrate that He is not merely a spirit. In the Hebrew Gospel the case is entirely different. Bread is brought; James, not Jesus, is to eat; and the reason for doing so is his release from his oath. The story, since it concerns James, may be said to be a legendary gloss on St Paul's bare, brief assertion, "Then he appeared to James."<sup>2</sup> Still, as the story stands, it must be understood to be independent of the New Testament. Can we regard it as an ancient and reliable tradition? In attempting to answer this question the following points should be noted:—

1. The prominence given to James, the head of the Jewish Church, in a gospel written for Hebrew Christians, may be regarded as a set-off against the prominence of Peter in the other gospels. They contain the Petrine tradition (Mark being the interpreter of Peter). The Gospel according to the Hebrews may contain the Jacobean tradition, and each perhaps may be historically valid. Still we cannot but suspect a 'tendency,' a certain bias, in this prominence of James.

2. It would seem from this extract that Jesus made His first appearance to James. But our earliest and best authenticated account of the appearances of the risen Christ, given by St Paul, puts the appearance to Cephas first, and that to James in the fourth place.

<sup>1</sup> *De Viris ill.*, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Cor.* xv. 7.

3. The reference to the shroud looks apocryphal.

4. So does the reference to the priest's servant. Is this suggested by Mark xiv. 47? Or may we suppose that the incident in the garden actually led the high-priest's servant to become a follower of Jesus Christ? It is significant that in John (xviii. 10) the man's name is given. Why is this, except that he was of some interest to the church in later times?

5. James' presence at the Lord's Supper does not agree with any of our four gospel accounts. It implies that he was a close follower of Christ, if not an apostle. This is rather like a reflection from his later importance in the church. But there is some question as to what drinking the cup of the Lord may mean here. May it be an allusion to that cup of which Jesus spoke to James and his brother John on an earlier occasion, the cup of Christ's sufferings?<sup>1</sup> If so, in the passage before us the idea must be that the agony James suffered when Jesus was crucified was his drinking of the Lord's bitter cup.

6. For the same reason, his oath, which represents his having more faith in the resurrection and more self-abandoning devotion to Christ than any of the Twelve, strikes us as apocryphal.

7. The description of Jesus as the Lord indicates here, as elsewhere in this gospel, a later time than Mark; on the other hand, the expression "the Son of man," occurring at the end of the same passage, is quite in the primitive gospel style.

Origen supports Jerome in another extract, where Jesus after His resurrection appears saying, "I am not an incorporeal spirit."<sup>2</sup> The extract in Jerome is larger, running as follows: "Behold, touch me and see, for I am not an incorporeal spirit. And immediately they touched him and believed." This reads very like an echo of Luke xxiv. 36-43, where, however, there is no reference to touching; the latter

<sup>1</sup> Mark x. 38, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Jerome, *De Viris ill.*, 16; Origen, *De Princ.*, i., Proem, 8.

idea suggests the incidents of the Magdalen and Thomas in John (xx. 17, 25, 27).

There is a fine statement of the Gospel according to the Hebrews preserved by Jerome, according to which this gospel put among the greatest offenders the man "who saddened his brother's spirit."<sup>1</sup> Similar is another saying from the same gospel, ascribed to our Lord, "Never be glad except when you look on your brother with charity."<sup>2</sup> This beautiful utterance almost guarantees its own accuracy; it is so completely characteristic of our Lord, and so foreign to the common temper of the Church in later times.

And now what conclusion are we to draw from these data as to the independence and authoritativeness of the gospel?

Surely at least a measure of independence must be conceded. Several of the fragments we have examined are not capable of being traced back to any of the canonical gospels.<sup>3</sup> Some of these fragments bear on the face of them an inherent probability, while others are manifestly apocryphal. Taking them as a whole, we must confess that they contain a disproportionate amount of difficult statements when compared with our more sober canonical gospels. Therefore, even if we granted complete independence to this mysterious work, we should be compelled to relegate it to the secondary position of those various attempts at writing the life of Christ, of which St Luke refers somewhat disparagingly in the preface to his gospel. Not only is it not always written in the best taste, but it displays dangerous credulity in accepting improbable legends. Then some of the less reliable fragments, as we have seen, appear to point to a date later than our Synoptics. The resemblance to the Synoptics—Matthew and Luke in particular

<sup>1</sup> *Comm. in Ez.* xviii. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Comm. in Epiph.* v. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Nicholson reckons that ten of the fragments are independent of the canonical narratives, yet that these have parallels to expressions and thoughts especially of Matthew and Luke. He finds no evidence of matter peculiar to John nor of any peculiar to Mark, except in Ebionite interpolations. See *The Gos. according to the Hebs.*, p. 98.

—finds its solution most easily in the conclusion that those works were known to its author. It would seem then, as a result of analysis, that the sources of the work are of three kinds: (1) genuine traditions, not preserved in any of the canonical gospels; (2) unreliable legends, also not found in those gospels; (3) passages from two or more of those gospels which have been worked over by the author of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, in the light of his own independent materials. If these are just conclusions, we cannot allow the gospel that position of authority by the side of the Synoptics, sometimes in preference to them, and always in preference to the fourth gospel, claimed for it by Oscar Holtzmann. On the other hand, we must conclude that the almost scornful treatment of it by Dr Salmon and other conservative scholars is not just. The book must be very ancient, almost contemporary with the Synoptics, and it contains some fragments of historical tradition and teachings of Jesus, the neglect of which is unwarrantable. Still more unjust is it to treat this gospel as a heretical work, wilfully perverting the true tradition of Christian origins. Assuredly it is honestly written; and there is no reason to doubt the good faith of its author.

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# DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

## THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1904, p. 766.)

### I.

Does not Mr St George Stock, in his essay on the Problem of Evil, create for himself much of the difficulty which he subsequently admits that he is unable to resolve? Having ruled out, on the authority of Lactantius, whom he seems to consider final from the Christian point of view, any theory of dualism, he finds that "this doctrine leaves no loophole for ascribing evil to anything but the will of the divine creator." Later on we are told that the two propositions, "God is all" and "God is good," bring us inevitably to the proposition, "There is no evil," which is contrary to experience. But it is just because God is all, in other words, each one of us is a sharer in the Divine Nature, and therefore in right of this possesses free-will, that evil has been brought into the world, because both human and angelic intelligences, being free because Godlike, have chosen evil rather than good. God in creating other personalities has necessarily limited what we must call His Divine Personality, but not His essential Being, in which His creation shares. Anyone who believes in the Divine Nature in humanity, as Mr Stock does believe, judging by his concluding pages, must logically admit that it involves a freedom of the will inconsistent with our being mere puppets of God. Our task is to rise from a mere unity of being to a personal union with God.

This double sense in which we naturally think of God as Person and as Substance, and of our rise from one form of union to the other, becomes an insoluble difficulty to Mr Stock; first, because he rejects the Christian doctrine of free-will, thus making a personal union with God impossible, and secondly, because he rejects the general Christian belief in the existence of Lucifer or Satan, the "Prince of this world," whose fall gives the reason for the something out of joint which we all feel in the world of nature. We feel that God is the Substance, and yet that Nature

as we know it does not adequately express Him. The problem of Evil returns in another shape, and is not to be entirely explained by human free-will. Differing from the belief of Lactantius as to the creation, Mr Stock considers this belief in the existence of Satan as obsolete, but on what grounds he has formed this opinion he does not tell us. It supplies at any rate an answer to his difficulties as to the cruelty in Nature. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now," and would not this result naturally happen if the great Angel set over this world had in pride declared himself independent of any higher power, and thus cut himself off *in his consciousness* from God, thus becoming Mephistopheles, the "spirit that ever denies," because he cannot believe in God and the soul? "I saw Satan like lightning fall from heaven," said our Lord, not referring to the fact that His messengers had had power over evil spirits, but to this fall of Satan from the inner communion with God to outer darkness, from the spiritual plane to the infernal. In his fall, the earth, his kingdom, was involved, so that God could no longer look upon it and see that it was "very good." In some way which we can only dimly apprehend it is out of harmony with the inner realities, and this constitutes evil. But in the exercise of our free-will we can individually pass from the kingdom of Lucifer to that Kingdom of Christ which He set up on earth; and we hope for the restitution of all things, when God's will shall be done on earth as it is in heaven.

This, I submit, is a truer presentation of the Christian belief than that given by Mr Stock, and I fail to see anything in his arguments which can subvert it. His easy supposition that no one any longer believes in the personality of "the devil" is part of a point of view which is a little out of date, and of this he seems to have some suspicion himself when he later on asks whether, after all, we are sure that the spirit of God in its turn is a mere abstraction. We are beginning to realise that the key to the understanding of the world is to be found in Personality rather than in abstractions; that, just as the justification for the pain and struggle of the evolutionary process is to be found in the development of personality, so it is a far truer view of God to think of Him as the great Personality, personal (*i.e.*, full of relations) in a fuller sense than we can conceive. So, too, with Lucifer; the instinct to personify, like all our deepest instincts, is justified by results as well as by the nature of man. The belief in the angelic hierarchy, because it was not at first held in its fulness by the Jews, is not on that account necessarily mistaken. The Spirit of God gives divers revelations at divers times, and this growing belief in Personality may be the form which that revelation is to take in this age. Such beliefs cannot be proved; they must be judged by the extent to which they help us to "see life steadily and see it whole."

SYBELLA GURNEY.

BROCKENHURST.

## II.

MR STOCK's able and interesting article fails to be convincing because it omits all consideration of what many would deem the most essential factor in the Problem of Evil, viz., the free-will of man.

Mr Stock contends that theology will have to give up the position that "all things are the work of a perfect and all-powerful Creator," because all things are not good. This argument has an attractive simplicity, but it does not really touch the kernel of the question.

The theological position, as I understand it, may be thus summarised:—

It was the intention of a perfect and all-powerful Creator that man should develop to the highest point possible within the necessary limitations of his finite nature. Man must therefore be a moral being. If moral, he must be endowed with a free will. But the possession of a free will involves of necessity the power of choice between good and evil.

And since the higher morality can only be evolved (as theology holds) "through suffering"—and suffering is *per se* an evil—and, since, moreover, among the myriads of beings endowed (*ex hypothesi*) with free-will there is a practical certainty that some would choose the evil which is easy, rather than the good which is hard, it follows that evil must needs enter such a world.

Mr Stock further maintains (if I understand him aright) that Nature, being "non-moral," cannot be the work of a moral Creator. Why not? A clock or a steam-engine is "non-moral," but that fact does not preclude the possibility that the men who made it are moral. A steam-engine may be the occasion of suffering; so may the forces of Nature: and this suffering may be a part of a scheme whereby mankind may be made (within their limits) perfect.

Mr Stock gives us a syllogism—

God is all, God is good, ∴ all is good.

I would venture to amend it thus—

God is over all, God is good, ∴ all tends to good.

In such a theory, most imperfectly sketched in the above paragraphs, I at least can see nothing inconsistent with the truths of science, the principles of logic, or the doctrines of theology.

That there has been a great evolution of religious ideas about God since the epoch of the early Hebrews hardly requires detailed demonstration in the twentieth century.

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## III.

MR STOCK appears to have overlooked a double interpretation of which the proposition "God is All" is susceptible. It may mean that God is all in the pantheistic sense; so that if we take up a stick or a stone, or

even think of an immoral act, we must say "This is God." Or it may mean "All is *from* God," that is, "everything derives its being from God, and is maintained in being by Him." This latter interpretation is, I take it, the specifically Christian version of the statement as against the pantheistic. If the words are not susceptible of this meaning, the proposition "God is all" is not accepted by the great majority of Christians.

It is true that this interpretation does not at once relieve us from the difficulty which Mr Stock states. For it may be said, "If God is not Himself the direct cause of evil, He must have so created things as to be susceptible of evil, and being, as Creator, all-powerful and under no conditions, He cannot but be held responsible for the evils that ensued from conditions which He created." True, if God in creating is *subject to no conditions*. The argument is good against those who maintain that God can do whatever He pleases by a mere *fiat*—that is, without means; that He could, for instance, if He chose, instantly transform every wicked man into a good man, and every evil spirit into an angel. It has often been assumed that the Divine power is of this absolute and unlimited character. If it were so, I agree that we could not rationally think of God as perfectly good. For we must think of God by means of data furnished by our own experience. His goodness must be like ours, however infinitely it may transcend it. And, unquestionably, one who *can* do a good action and omits it, cannot be regarded as wholly good. "To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin." (James iv. 17.)

We are, therefore, thrown back on the question, "Are there limitations to the Divine power, and if so, of what kind?" Mr Schiller, in the "Riddles of the Sphinx," maintains that there are, and that the idea of an Infinite God must be abandoned. Mr Stock maintains that there are, and that the limitations are to be found in "A God of Nature," who may be "feared or admired," but who is unworthy of worship or love; who is "not moral, nor yet immoral, but simply non-moral"!

If we assume, as all Christians do, at least theoretically, that the Infinity of God is an Infinity of Love and Wisdom, it is obvious that this Infinite must in its action be in several very real respects limited. Such a God cannot do anything that is unloving or unwise. He is *self-limited*. This is a limitation which has its counterpart in human experience. So far as a man's love and wisdom become exalted and stable, so far does moral evil become impossible to him. In either case, the Divine or the human, it is a limitation which is necessary for perfection.

But further, if we assume an immanent God, that is, a God who not only created the universe, but sustains it from moment to moment by an act as truly creative as that which first brought it into existence; and that He created and creates it not "out of nothing," as Lactantius said, but "out of Himself," as Swedenborg taught, we shall easily see that He must be limited by His own creative acts. Having created anything, God

must thereafter act towards that thing according to the nature He has given it, and not otherwise. For creation being the expression, in orders of being beneath the Divine, of qualities which constitute the nature of God Himself, to act upon created things otherwise than according to the nature He has given them would imply action against Himself, would indicate a lack of harmony between Himself and His creation, a lack of harmony, indeed, in His own nature. This limitation, also, we must style "self-limitation," and necessary to perfect creation.

I might follow the same line of thought further, and show that we must so think of the infinity of God as to make it compatible with change in Him. For if we push the idea of absolute infinity to the extreme, we arrive at the idea of a dead God; for all willing and acting imply change; and to will and act is to live. If there must be in a right idea of God that which is eternal and unchangeable, there must also be that which is mutable. We must even reconcile it with the conception of process in Him; for processes which we see in nature must be remote reflections of processes which take place in Him. There must be in Him infinite becoming as well as infinite being. In a word, we are compelled by our assumptions to think of God under many of the categories which are applicable to finite being; with a specific difference, however, as they are conceived to apply to Him.

The problem stated by Mr Stock is not solved by these considerations, but it becomes capable of being stated in another form. Is it conceivable that a God of infinite love and wisdom would create a world in which evil was *possible*? or,—to confine ourselves to man, in whom alone of created beings moral evil (which is the graver problem) is found,—would create man with some element in his nature which, although not in itself evil, was capable of *becoming evil*? "No one," says Mr Stock, "who allows evil is good." Surely he must be conscious of the ambiguity lurking in the word "allows." It may mean either "allows as *approving*" or "permits though *disapproving*." Many a good father and mother have permitted, and in this sense "allowed," a headstrong boy to take a course they disapproved, because they felt that further opposition from them would do harm rather than good, and that their boy must learn wisdom, if at all, from experience, and not from their teaching. Can there be anything answering to this "disapproving permission" in God?

An answer to this question is given by Swedenborg, discursively throughout his theological works. I do not attempt to discuss its validity, though I regard it as the only rational interpretation of the facts of life which is consistent with the belief that the whole universe has been created and is maintained in being by an infinitely loving and wise God. I merely wish to show that the terms of the problem stated by Mr Stock are interpretable in a sense which abolishes his dilemma.

The chief assumptions involved in this explanation are the following:—

The end or motive of creation is a vast and ever-increasing heavenly society composed of human beings.

Heaven consists in the presence of God in the whole and every member of it, as the spring of every activity; this intimate government and control being wholly in accordance with the affections of those who are subject to it.

The possibility of any individual becoming a member of this society depends upon an organic spiritual fitness. Psychologically it depends on his possession of some degree of the love of goodness or usefulness for its own sake.

This disinterested love of goodness is acquired, and acquired only, by a man's choice between good and evil, as they present themselves to him, during his life on earth. As to man's bodily nature, he is an animal like other animals. He is *man* because he has, added to this animal nature, a higher nature which brings him into contact with a whole world of spiritual facts which never present themselves to a merely animal mind.

If man is really to have the power of choosing the better, he must be able to choose the worse. If he had not this power, he would be a mere automaton, mechanically obedient to the impulses that played upon him; destitute alike of virtue as of vice. Of such beings a heaven of willing obedience could not be formed.

I hold that on the basis of these assumptions it is perfectly conceivable that a God of infinite love and wisdom should create man with a power of self-determination, out of which evil could arise, not by the act of God, but by the act of man through a power which God conferred upon him. To this extent God must be responsible for the existence of evil; responsible, that is, not as originating, nor as approving it, but as having created the conditions out of which evil could arise as well as good; because without these conditions the highest order of created beings—the likeliest God, self-limited by good like Him, through Him and under Him—would have been impossible. All that we could justly expect would be that whatever the choice might be, for good or evil, the best results possible under the given conditions would be educed for the individual and the race. If the choice of evil be final and irrevocable, we must still be able to regard Hell itself as a provision of the Divine mercy for those whose states are such as to preclude any method of government less sternly punitive.

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### THE GLADNESS OF THE PURITANS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1904, p. 848. Review of *The Cambridge History*, by H. S. Perris.)

THE very title of the book would make one hesitate to rank *Grace Abounding* among the literary expressions of "the religion of the Law and not of the Gospel," or to find in it little but "a message of fear and not of gladness."

And its contents justify this hesitation. The expenditure of a few pence and a few minutes will convince most readers that for almost every passage of mental torment and morbid introspection in this Puritan classic, you can light upon another which is aglow with the bliss and peace of genuine religion. The rhythm is as strongly marked in the one direction as in the other.

The fact is—to say nothing of the rather heterogeneous character of the witnesses summoned by Mr Perris—although the indifference displayed by many Protestants of the school in question to the lighter and brighter aspects of existence is too palpable to be ignored and too exaggerated to be defended, it is only just to inquire how much was due to the exigencies of the historical situation, which forced religion into unwarrantable extremes and temporary phases of conflict. The martial temper does not make for intellectual impartiality, any more than for the softer graces of existence. But there is a time for war, among the times of the world, as Simon Memmi saw and showed at Florence. The Puritans and Covenanters, like their Protestant progenitors, conceived that stern work was the order of their day, and it cannot be alleged that impartial historical investigation has altogether disproved the accuracy of their estimate. The inference is perhaps too well-worn to need repetition. It is this, that the gun and axe of the pioneer must come into play, before flowers can be trained outside the log-cabin. A sentinel may be excused for indifference to horticulture. Were it only as a grave remedy for a grave disease, as a necessary reaction against the secularisation of piety, Puritanism might in this way be justified to some degree, even in its more sombre and unsympathetic phases. “Puritanism,” says Mr Meredith, “I won’t attempt to paint—it would barely be decent; but compare it with the spectacle of English frivolity, and you’ll admit it to be the best show you make.” Besides, when one discounts the constitutional idiosyncrasies of men like Bunyan and Cowper, looking narrowly into the private lives of the ordinary Puritans, a very different state of matters is presented from the picture dear to novelists, or to those who paint merely or mainly from *Hudibras* and a prosaic, literal interpretation of the more extreme or striking statements of some Puritan theologians. The idea of the ordinary, average Puritan as a sour, fanatical Intransigentist, gloomily nodding over existence, breaks like a bubble at the touch of the evidence furnished by the social mirth and pleasures of men like Cromwell himself, or—to take one Northern case out of many—Guthrie of Fénwick. As Kingsley was once at pains to prove, the Puritans were not strangers wholly to the House Beautiful of poetry and human joy; when worked out in practice, the movement in England and Scotland cannot be fairly described as having been necessarily antagonistic at all points to the innocent charities and courtesies and charms of man’s existence. The Jesuit bogey has vanished before historical research. Surely it is time that the Puritan bogey were laid also and for ever.

Furthermore, when gladness is taken in its definitely religious sense, Puritanism held within its core the true corrective to any exaggerations of

melancholia, as is written plainly all over the works of men like Bunyan and Richard Baxter (whose *Reliquiæ*, by the way, is a more valuable clue to Puritanism than most other works). Certain people who had the misfortune to be born before either Augustinianism or the "softening influences of the Catholic cult," are said on good authority to have *received the word in much affliction, with joy of the Holy Ghost*, and it was this genuinely Catholic conception and experience of joy, not any Renesque sentimentalism, which Puritans sought to recover; their very sense of sin, acute and piercing as it was, reached down to a bubbling source of religious fervour under the hard soil of internal and external affliction. Dr Dale, if I remember aright, has somewhere traced the comparative absence of joy in a well-known Anglican's religion to his peculiar conception of God's saving work; "in parting with the Lutheran truth about justification he parted with the springs of gladness." Now it was the very tenacity and intensity with which the Puritan developed his doctrine of sin and grace that opened out into an experience of religious freedom and heart's ease which he would have counted well-won even at the expense of any *livsglaede*, Catholic or pagan; while often, as I have indicated, its sombre, austere exterior was built without serious detriment to a radiant, adorned interior of domestic and social enjoyment.

The subsequent and companion generalisation about Scotland and its liberal ideas invites a similar process of questioning. The kailyard is all right in its place, but I hope Mr Perris does not imagine it is the best standpoint for surveying the trend of modern theology in Scotland. If he does, it would suggest, as a recent legal decision has also suggested, that the judgments of Englishmen upon Scots' religion might profitably be added to the four things which a Semitic sage pronounced too wonderful to understand. On this, however, I must not linger. Only, I should like to quote one item of a proof which might be led against the rather sweeping statement upon the Protestant leaders and their tragic mistake of stamping religion as correct opinion. Intellectualism was rather the atmosphere of that controversial age, when dogma was being defined, than a spirit peculiar to one party. And even though the tendency was strong in Protestantism, it was not unresisted. The *Racovian Catechism*, for example, did represent the visible Church as a school rather than as a fellowship; but this Catechism was a Socinian manifesto, and, as Ritschl has argued, the Reformers maintained that the Church was essentially a fellowship of believing people, of whom the *pura doctrina evangelii* was indeed a mark, but only a mark. As a matter of fact, the publication of this very Catechism in England was strenuously opposed in 1652 by the Puritan leaders, including, as I have elsewhere pointed out, Dr John Owen, then Vice-Chancellor of Oxford.

JAMES MOFFATT.

DUNDONALD, AYRSHIRE.

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## THE EARLY USE OF THE GOSPELS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904, pp. 607-612, and July 1904, pp. 803-807.)

DR STANTON objects to my ascribing to him "apologetical bias." I hasten to choose instead of this a purely objective expression and to say that his positions are well fitted to serve as the basis of apologetical efforts, and that in my opinion they are very difficult to reconcile with the facts.

The same character belongs to two arguments with which he tries to oppose me. I had said on p. 611, "What in reality was investigated before a writing could be incorporated in the Canon, was rather, whether the contents of such writing corresponded to the views of the Catholic Church." Dr Stanton replies (p. 806), "The words of the *Muratorian Fragment* refer, like similar words of Irenæus, to the harmony of the Gospels among themselves, not to their agreement with the Church's creed." In reality they refer to the harmony of the Gospels only so far as the Church creed is concerned: cum uno ac principali spiritu declarata sint in omnibus omnia de nativitate, de passione, de resurrectione, de conversatione cum discipulis (*N.B.*: after the Resurrection!) ac de gemino ejus adventu. This, as one can see, concerns hardly more than five of the twenty-eight chapters of Matthew.

Dr Stanton's second objection against the above words of mine runs: "Serapion, when he permitted the little Church of Rhossus to continue their practice of publicly reading the *Gospel of Peter*, certainly did not imagine himself to be settling the Canon of Scripture. He shows no disposition to adopt *Peter* at Antioch; and, indeed, it would have been thought ludicrous for the practice of Rhossus to be taken as a guide in a matter which concerned the Church at large." In reality, no question arises as to whether Serapion wished to adopt the *Gospel of Peter* in Antioch; for no one has desired this. Dr Stanton omits to add, what I have expressly adduced from Eusebius (*H.E.*, vi. 12), viz., that Serapion had allowed the use of the *Gospel of Peter* in public worship in Rhossus before he was acquainted with it, and that, after he had learnt its contents and found heretical views therein, he would not suffer it even in Rhossus. If Dr Stanton declines to admit that Serapion intended to establish the Canon when he permitted *Peter*, so much the more certain is it that he had this intention when he prohibited its use, for he says expressly, "Peter and the other Apostles, we accept (as well) as Christ, but the writings falsely handed down under their name we refuse." The important point, however, is just this; that he did not regard the *Gospel of Peter* as a pseudograph until the time when he became acquainted with its heretical contents.

Dr Stanton's remarks on the force of cumulative evidence and on

partial anticipation of the formula *γέγραπται* ("it is written") are of so fundamental a nature that I must refrain from discussing them here. I therefore only mention that he not only passes by many objections of mine in silence, but expressly acknowledges one instance: he has not subjected to examination the possibility "that characteristic expressions and phrases might well have been the common property of the language of the Church, and have been adopted in two writings, independently of each other." He says on this point, p. 806, "It did not fall within the scope of the volume I have published to do this." Why? The scope of the volume is to say which ecclesiastical writers betray acquaintance with the Gospels. Should there, then, be no inquiry whether their agreements with the Gospels have come into existence through reading of these Gospels, or independently?

One misunderstanding I may, in addition, clear up. I did not say, p. 609, as Dr Stanton renders my meaning, p. 805, "that the author of *Barnabas*, though he knew the saying to be a portion of oral tradition, yet used in regard to it the formula 'it is written.'" This indeed would be, as he says, "an extraordinary suggestion, which seems to ignore altogether the natural force of words." In reality, from my parallel statement that the author had erroneously taken the saying in Matthew (xxii. 14) as a quotation from a book actually recognised as Scripture, it clearly follows that my meaning was the following:—he was *not* aware that he knew the saying only from oral tradition, but believed, erroneously but quite firmly, that it stood in a book recognised as Holy Writ.

Lastly, a footnote of Dr Stanton's, p. 805, shows with what right I have contested his method in direct reference to the chief contents of his book. He says: "Dr Schmiedel credits Polycarp with indifference to the natural force of words, when he says that in *Ad. Phil.*, vii. 1, his source might equally well have been 2 John 7 as 1 John iv. 2, 3. There is a difference of tense between these two which makes unquestionably some, and probably a very considerable, difference in the meaning, and Polycarp agrees with 1 John iv. 2, 3." Certainly Polycarp agrees with 1 John more nearly than with 2 John. But how, if at the time when he wrote, 1 John did not yet exist, but only 2 John? This was the question I brought forward. What has to be asked in face of this is not whether Polycarp better agrees with 1 John or 2 John, but only whether 2 John is sufficient to serve as the basis of the saying of Polycarp. So soon as this is granted—and I know not how it can be denied—the proof that 1 John was known to Polycarp miscarries. When Dr Stanton notwithstanding asserts this, he assumes, as so often, what he must first prove.

PAUL W. SCHMIEDEL.

ZÜRICH.

PRESENT ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.<sup>1</sup>

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1904, p. 722.)

THE conclusions arrived at in this paper are not very definitely, and certainly not dogmatically, stated, but the general impression is that the writer is distinctly in favour of the view that a future state is probable. Are there not many facts which point in the opposite direction?

Taking for a moment the scientific aspect of consciousness, we may assume, whether we choose to call consciousness a product or a function of the brain, that consciousness, as we know it, does not exist apart from the brain. Destroy the brain and we destroy consciousness, and destroy a portion of the brain and we destroy a portion of the consciousness. Following the gradual growth and development of the brain in the human body, we find a growing and developing consciousness. Now, in death we find a total and absolute destruction of the brain substance. Can we, under these circumstances, hope to find any continuity of consciousness?

Before proceeding further, it is well to state definitely what consciousness in a future state we should be willing to accept as a satisfactory solution of the problem of immortality. May we not fairly ask that the consciousness of the future state should comprise and comprehend the consciousness of the former state? For my part, a consciousness which does not comprehend the former state is not the same consciousness, or at most is a very incomplete consciousness.

Taking the states of consciousness on this earth, every normal human being is satisfied that on waking from sleep he is the same being, who has only suffered a temporary state of unconsciousness, and on passing through the great sleep of death the interruption of consciousness should surely be no greater than that experienced in sleep during the life on earth. Are we justified in believing that consciousness can awaken in a future state apart from the continued functioning of the brain substance? I cannot help feeling that there can be very few who have given much thought to the physiological aspect of the question, who can believe that continuity of consciousness can exist apart from continuity of brain substance.

Of the desire to live in a future state surely too much is made. We must own, perhaps, that in the normal and healthy condition of mind and body, the majority of persons desire a future state, that is, provided that the future state is at least not less happy than that of the majority in the present state. Can, however, this desire be used as any valid argument for the probability of a future state? For my own part, at the present moment, I have an ardent desire for a future state, in spite of which,

<sup>1</sup> Dr Mellone wishes to correct the statement in his article to the effect that a *questionnaire* regarding human sentiment as to a future life was issued by *both* the English and American branches of the Society for Psychical Research. The statement should apply to the American branch only.—Ed.

my reason tells me that as far as I can see such a state is not in store for me.

Again, if a future state is in store for man, can it be denied that at least the higher forms of animal life have an almost equal claim to a future state? Can those who claim a future state for man and annihilation for the higher apes have fully grasped the lessons of evolution? It seems incredible that anyone who has studied comparative anatomy closely should say that between the lowest forms of human life and the highest forms of animal life there is a clear and definite line drawn, on one side of which all are mortal, and on the other all are immortal.

If, on the other hand, the higher apes are immortal, it is a still more difficult question where to draw the line.

On the argument from the inequalities of life too much stress should not be laid. For my part, I feel that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, on the average the sum total of happiness, in various lives, is approximately equal. Those who have never suffered from lack of food, do not experience the keen pleasure which is found by those who have known the pangs of hunger, when their hunger is satisfied. Again, to the chronic invalid, a day of cessation of pain gives a keener sense of pleasure than is experienced by a year of health, in one who is normally healthy, and the same argument applies to all the other ills of mankind.

May we not also argue from the known to the unknown, *i.e.* from the known past to the unknown future? For my own part, I am satisfied that my consciousness did not exist in a previous state, and it was only with the gradual development of my material brain that my consciousness has developed, so that I reluctantly acquiesce in the belief that with the destruction of my material brain destruction of consciousness must also follow.

On the work of the spiritualists I will only touch. That there is a great and worthy field for research on these lines is not to be denied. The conclusion of most persons at the present moment would be that we cannot do more than suspend our judgment. In every case which has been investigated there is at least, of course, one material and living brain with its consciousness, often in an abnormal and ill-balanced condition, and to a brain in this state all types of conscious and unconscious self-deception are possible, and the verdict drawn from this and other sources at the present moment must, I feel, be given as "not proven."

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## REVIEWS

*The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers.* The Gifford Lectures, delivered in the University of Glasgow in Sessions 1900-1 and 1901-2.—By Edward Caird, LL.D., D.C.L.—2 vols. Pp. 382, 377. Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons.

THERE are many opinions about the Gifford Lectures, and in Scotland one hears a great deal about their uselessness. The grumblers, however, so far as my experience goes, are usually people who have little interest in the prescribed subject, or who are so ignorant of it that they expect to find, in ten or a dozen lectures, a handy, final and popular solution of problems which by their very nature are perennial. It was inevitable that some of the lecturers should make no great contribution to natural theology, and that others should be irrelevant in their discourse; but no one who is capable of appreciating the lectures of such men as Ward, Wallace, Pfeleiderer, Fraser, Royce, James, and the Cairds (not to speak of those who have dealt mainly with comparative religion), can fail to be grateful for the solid and suggestive thinking and the aid to a spiritual view of the universe which we owe to the Gifford foundation. And no one of the lecturers has given us works of more permanent value than the two books of the Master of Balliol, *The Evolution of Religion* and *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*.

In the lectures on *The Evolution of Religion*, delivered at St Andrews in 1891 and 1892, Dr Caird inquired into the nature of the principle which makes man a religious being, "a being who in all ages has been conscious of himself as standing in vital relation to a supreme object of reverence and worship whom he calls God." He showed with great clearness the fallacy of seeking for this principle in what is merely common to all religions, maintaining that the "consciousness of God finds an adequate expression only in the highest forms of religious thought and experience," although "we can detect the beginnings of it, under very crude and elementary forms, even in the superstitions of savages." And he endeavoured to trace three great stages in the religious life of man: the stages of objective, subjective and universal religion. In the present set of lectures he passes from the evolution of religion to the evolution of

theology. "Theology is not religion; it is at best the philosophy of religion, the reflective reproduction and explanation of it"; or, as he puts it elsewhere, "theology is religion brought to self-consciousness, and endeavouring reflectively to criticise and interpret its own unconscious processes."

In the history or evolution of theology Dr Caird recognises three main periods, namely, "the period of Greek and Roman antiquity, the Christian era down to the Reformation, and the modern period." The characteristic of the first of these periods is the almost complete freedom of philosophy, which "at once breaks away from the tutelage of faith and asserts its independence, nay, claims to provide the only true basis on which the moral and spiritual life can be supported." The mythology from which it sprang and from which it too easily won its freedom is accounted of no value. "And one consequence of the facility with which criticism disposed of the primitive faiths of the ancient world was, that the purely intellectual life, the life of philosophical reflection, tended too much to withdraw upon itself and to disconnect itself from the life of feeling and impulse; to break away, in short, from the unconscious basis out of which the life of consciousness arises." The theology or philosophy of this period thus "tended in the end to an exclusive intellectualism, in which the form of thought was opposed to the matter, and the actual world was not idealised or spiritualised, but rather condemned as unideal and unspiritual." In the second period "the conceptions and methods of Greek philosophy were used to formulate and interpret" Christian ideas as to the nature of God and man and their relations to one another. The attitude of theology is the reverse of that which it took in the first period. Philosophy is no longer supreme and free, but is "in a strictly subordinate position." There is a real evolution of doctrine during this period; but theologians did not recognise it, believing "that they were simply maintaining an immovable truth," and that any alterations which were made in its expression were merely of a formal kind. Religion and philosophy were externally combined, and as a result there was artificially produced a system of fossilised dogma. "It was inevitable in the long run that the reflective power, called forth by this imperfect attempt to work out the consequences of the new view of life, should turn against its own products." Thus the first characteristic of the modern period, beginning with the Renaissance and the Reformation, is the reassertion of the ancient freedom of Greek speculation. "Modern philosophy, and the theology or view of 'the highest things,' in which it culminates, is, like Greek philosophy, free speculation. It deals with religion as it deals with the other experiences of life, which it tries with perfect impartiality and disinterestedness to interpret. And when any attempt has been made to limit its freedom, it has asserted itself in a sceptical and even a revolutionary spirit against all dogma whatsoever, and even against Christianity itself, so far as it was identified with dogma." But the theology of the modern period could not long remain negative or indifferent to popular

religion. "It was committed to the hard task of idealising a world which in its first aspect seems to know nothing of the ideal, of taking away the commonness of life by the power of a more comprehensive vision, and finding the key to its discords in a harmony which realises itself through them." The necessity of its own development has "obliged it to consider whether in its own way and by its own methods it can reinterpret and justify the thoroughgoing and fearless idealism and optimism of the founder of Christianity, while bringing it in relation to the whole results of modern life and science."

Dr Caird devotes these lectures entirely to the first period in this great evolution. It is by no means the least important period or the least worthy of study. For by giving man "courage to define and to measure, to distinguish and to relate, all the forms of his inward and outward life," by making him "ask distinct questions of experience and teaching him the methods by which he could hope to answer them," by attempting "to name and to determine the categories," and by seeking "to grasp and verify that idea of the ultimate unity of all things, which lies at the basis of all religion," Greek philosophy "laid down the indispensable presuppositions of all later theological thought, and developed that flexible language of reflection in which alone its ideal relations could be expressed." Dr Caird's position, in short, is fundamentally antagonistic to the Ritschlian view of theology, according to which Greek philosophy, with all that has flowed from it, is an evil influence that has fouled Christianity at its source, and the one way of advance is to go "back to the Gospels" and rebuild Christian doctrine without allowing philosophy to govern the process. Dr Caird would agree with the Ritschlians in holding that, in order to understand Christian theology as it has hitherto developed, we must go back to its sources in Greek thought, but in opposition to them he would maintain that its development has not been a huge mistake but a rational evolution, and that sure progress can only be made on the lines and in the light of the master works of European speculation.

In tracing the development of Greek thought as it affects theology, Dr Caird confines himself "mainly to the most important writers, to Plato and Aristotle, to the chief representatives of the Stoic philosophy, and to Philo and Plotinus among the Neo-Platonists." In connection with Plotinus he also discusses the Gnostics by way of contrast, and in the concluding lecture he indicates the influence of Greek philosophy upon Christian theology. Plato he regards as the father of our theology, "the first systematic theologian, the first philosopher who distinctly grasped the idea that lies at the root of all religion, and used it as the key to all the other problems of philosophy." "Plato is the source of two great streams of theological thought which have flowed through all the subsequent literature of religion down to the present time," the stream of mysticism, seeking "to merge the particular in the universal, the temporal in the eternal, and ultimately to lose the intelligible world

and the intelligence in an absolute divine unity"; and the stream of idealism, "which is the best corrective of mysticism," and which seeks "not to escape from immediate experience into an ideal world, in comparison with which it is a shadow and a dream, but to find the ideal in the world of experience itself, underlying it and giving a new meaning to all its phenomena." The mystical or abstractly idealist element in Plato is that which, until recent times, has been traditionally regarded as the distinctive feature of his philosophy. It is the side of Plato's thinking which was most characteristic of the Platonic schools, and which Aristotle most vigorously opposed. And there are still not a few students of Greek philosophy who maintain that it expresses Plato's fundamental thought. There can be no doubt of its great influence on the actual course of Christian theology, and, as it appears in such a dialogue as the *Phædo*, it seems to have much in common with some characteristic doctrines of St Paul. But the general trend of recent investigation is to treat it as a stage in the development of Plato's philosophy, which he ultimately to some extent overcame, and recent scholars are inclined to lay stress on the indications, in what they regard as later dialogues of Plato, of a more concrete idealism and an approximation to the position of Aristotle. The question remains unsettled, and Dr Caird takes the reasonable view that the "two tendencies conflict in Plato, as in subsequent philosophy and theology, and if we cannot say that in his writings their conflict comes to a definite issue or results in the final victory of the more comprehensive view, yet the very statement of the alternative was of immense importance in the history of religious thought, and makes the study of Plato essential to anyone who would understand its development." As one might expect, however, from Dr Caird's other books, his own tendency is to give Plato the benefit of the doubt and to emphasise the higher, more positive, and comprehensive elements in his thinking rather than those which lend themselves more easily to criticism. Thus, while he shows that in the *Phædo*, as compared with the *Symposium*, the negative relation of the ideas to sense and opinion is specially dwelt upon, he does full justice to those passages in the *Phædo* in which a less abstract theory is indicated; and in a note on Plato's relation to Anaxagoras he maintains that in the *Phædo* "the Ideas are to be taken as constitutive principles of reality within particular spheres of being," and that Plato's argument "points to" (though it does not work out) "a hierarchical distribution of Ideas, in which the highest Idea is conceived as the ultimate ground of all the others." We have here, however, only the germ of the more concrete idealism, and Dr Caird advances, by the consideration of later dialogues, to the positions that "an Idea, in the Platonic sense, is a principle which transcends the distinction of subject and object, of thought and reality, and which manifests itself in both"; that "an Idea must be conceived as a self-determining or active principle, since only that which is self-determined can be said . . . to maintain its unity in difference and its permanence in change"; and finally, that "Ideas,

merely as such, are deposed from the highest place as principles of thought and reality, and the place is taken by souls or minds." This, however, implies that all inorganic objects either are mere appearances or are somehow living and organic; and as Plato cannot accept the second alternative, his idealism passes into a dualism, which he never succeeds in fully transcending. "All we can say is that the ambiguous nature of the phenomenal world makes Plato at one time exalt it almost to the ideal, and at another time set it in almost absolute opposition thereto; and that, in his final utterances, we find him dwelling more on the positive than on the negative aspect of the relation."

While the fundamental doctrine of Plato is that "the universal is the real," the contention of Aristotle is that "the individual is the real." Whether or not these doctrines are irreconcilable depends upon the question whether or not the universal and the individual are conceived as abstract, *i.e.* whether or not the universal is merely "a common element found in the particulars as these are given in ordinary experience," and the individual merely the immediate object of sense-perception, a unique "this." In this abstract sense, "universality and individuality are direct opposites of each other." And Dr Caird's view of the relation between Plato and Aristotle is that they "seem respectively to begin with the abstract universal and the abstract individual, but that in their most developed doctrine they substitute for these what we may call the concrete universal and the concrete individual." Nevertheless Aristotle, like Plato, is unable to escape from dualism. In spite of the tendency (in which he makes a distinct advance upon Plato) to an organic view of the universe, according to which "matter, as opposed to form, would become a relative conception, and the phenomenal world would simply be the real world imperfectly understood," he is unable entirely to get rid of an ultimate mutual independence of matter and form, and he draws "a deep line of division between the intuitive and the discursive intelligence, between the pure reason and the passions and interests of mortal life." Ultimately, then, Aristotle's dualism is more definite than that of Plato, and he "comes to a view of reason, and of God as the unmoved mover, which carries us far in the direction of the mysticism of Plotinus." As thus briefly and baldly stated, Dr Caird's account of Aristotle may seem to differ little from the view that is taken by most modern scholars; but he develops his position by an exposition and discussion of Aristotle's conception of form and matter, his view of reason in its practical and its theoretical use, and his theory of the relation between God and the world, which is thorough, fresh, and full of suggestion. In particular, he gives in the twelfth lecture a most interesting and luminous interpretation of the fundamental difficulty regarding the relation between the "active" and the "passive" reason. It is impossible to summarise this in a review; but I know of no abler or more suggestive treatment of the problem. The thirteenth lecture also, in which Aristotle's exaltation of theory is contrasted with Kant's view of the primacy of the practical reason, and both

are found inadequate, inasmuch as they imply discontinuity between theoretical and practical consciousness, is an admirable discussion of the principles that underlie certain current controversies, especially those which have to do with the relation between mechanism and teleology. "A teleology," says Dr Caird, "that takes no account of mechanism is as imperfect as a mechanical philosophy that takes no account of teleology. The latter, indeed, is less of an illusion; for a science that deals with efficient, and not with formal or final causes, is a true science so far as it goes. . . . It lays the true foundation for a systematic view of things, even though it may not be able to give to that view the highest kind of unity. . . . On the other hand, as the work of the Scholastics often showed, the attempt to deal directly and immediately with formal and final causes is apt to lead to a philosophy of foregone conclusions, which stereotypes our first notions of things, and attempts, by merely analysing these notions, to add to our knowledge of objects."

The efforts of Plato and Aristotle to attain a comprehensive systematic unity having ended in failure to overcome the initial dualism of form and matter, the post-Aristotelian schools sought to realise the unity of the universe, not by comprehension but by abstraction, "by isolating one of its elements, treating it alone as absolutely real, and explaining away everything that is different from or opposed to it." "Post-Aristotelian philosophy presents the spectacle of two opposite dogmatisms dividing the field of thought, though each of them really has its *raison d'être* in the other, and would lose all its meaning if it were successful in destroying its opponent." But, in Dr Caird's opinion, it does not follow that post-Aristotelian thinking, although it was inferior to that of Plato and Aristotle in speculative power, indicates a retrograde movement. "There may be a dialectical value in the absence of dialectic; and a narrowing outlook upon the whole sphere of knowledge may be the necessary condition of a growing clearness of perception in one direction." Stoicism is especially valuable because of its treatment of the practical side of philosophy, because it "lifted moral and religious ideas out of the national or racial setting to which they had hitherto been confined," and because, by combining the assertion of the absolute unity of the universe with a thoroughgoing individualism, it sharply defined the problem of the relation between the individual man and God. Dr Caird devotes four or five lectures to the Stoics, of whose position he gives us the most illuminating statement and discussion that we have in English. He has read and assimilated the best work of foreign scholars, and with the addition of his own learning, insight and philosophic grasp, he has made a most valuable contribution to the study of Stoicism.

The individualism of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies is inevitably followed by the subjectivity of scepticism, and this leads directly to Neo-Platonic mysticism. "Philosophy in Greece, as elsewhere, begins with the objective, the not-self, then it turns from the outward world to the self; finally, it ends with the effort to grasp the principle of unity

which is beyond this and all other oppositions. Unfortunately in Greece the movement from one idea to the other was mainly by a process of abstraction, in which thought as it advanced altogether set aside its previous points of view. The result, therefore, was a theology which vindicates the reality of the Divine Being at the expense of all his creatures, and represents the Absolute and Infinite as excluding rather than as including all that is relative and finite." Dr Caird finds in the philosophy of Plotinus "a kind of summary or concentrated expression of the whole movement of Greek philosophy. Plotinus represents the universe as distributed into a series of stages or degrees of reality, reaching up from matter to God; and in these different stages we have, as it were in an abbreviated form, the different stages in the development of Greek thought." To those who have been accustomed to regard Neo-Platonism as the running to seed of Greek thinking, as a retrograde and decadent movement, this striking and original interpretation will come as a revelation, giving a new significance to the work of Plotinus and discovering the secret of his influence on Christian theology. Dr Caird devotes no fewer than five lectures to a critical exposition of the philosophy of Plotinus, evidently based on a first-hand mastery of his writings. One gathers from the sympathy and eloquence with which this part of the book is written that Dr Caird has been deeply impressed with the greatness of Plotinus and the importance of his work. He gives us an admirable view of mysticism in its relation to Pantheism, he develops analogies and contrasts between Plotinus and such modern writers as Spinoza and Hegel, Goethe and Tennyson; and, in a lecture on the controversy between Plotinus and the Gnostics, he writes wisely and with insight on the problem of evil. Dr Caird's view of the value of Plotinus's work as a whole may be summed up in his statement that "the philosophy of Plotinus is the condemnation of the Greek dualism, just because it is he who carries it to its utmost point. It is proof that we cannot so emphasise the *transcendence* of God in relation to his universe as to deny his *immanence* therein, without ultimately being led to the absolute denial that He is *its God* at all. Or, to put the same truth in its particular application, we cannot deny that God is essentially related to man, without also denying that man is essentially related to God."

The fundamental conception of Christianity, held at first only in germ, is the idea of the essential unity of God and man, in spite of the actual division of men from God and from one another. In the last lecture, the influence of Neo-Platonism on the development of this conception and of the whole theology which proceeded from it is expounded in outline. The political and religious circumstances in which the Church arose tended to the re-appearance in a new form of the dualism of human and divine, which Christ seemed to have come to terminate, and the influence of Neo-Platonism acted in the same direction, tending to emphasise the negative and to weaken the positive elements of the Christian faith. "Christianity could

not give up its central idea of the unity of the human with the divine, nor could it give up the faith that men in some sense are capable of being participators in the divine nature. But, under the influence of Neo-Platonic modes of thought, the gulf between Christ and other men tended to widen." Yet Neo-Platonism "discharged a very useful office. In the region of spirit a victory won too easily is of little value. An optimism established without any difficulty becomes worse than any pessimism: an idealism that has not entered into all the differences and antagonisms of the real is futile." In the modern period from the time of the Renaissance the tendency of thought has been "to emphasise the positive rather than the negative aspect of ethics and religion," and the consequence has been a disposition towards a "facile monism," to the exaltation of self-development apart from self-sacrifice, and to a search for the Divine in nature rather than beyond it. "Hence there is much still to be learnt from a philosophy that keeps before us the depth of the antagonism between the natural and the spiritual, between the real and the ideal, between man and God."

In such a book as this of Dr Caird, which is not a reasoned statement of positive doctrine, but a critical exposition on idealist grounds, there is not much room for discussion except regarding matters of detail, and I have therefore thought it best in this review to let the book speak for itself. It will well repay the study of all who are interested either in philosophical or in theological thought, and what I have said about it gives only a slight indication of its wealth of ideas and the originality of its outlook. One cannot give it higher praise than to say that it is one of the best pieces of work Dr Caird has done.

R. LATTA.

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*Essais de Philosophie Religieuse.*—Par le Père L. Laberthonnière, de l'Oratoire.—Paris : Lethielleux, 1903.

*Le Réalisme Chrétien et L'Idéalisme Grec.*—Par l'Abbé L. Laberthonnière.—Paris : Lethielleux, 1904.

PÈRE LABERTHONNIÈRE of the Oratory (a congregation dissolved in France by decree of the present Government, as the change of title in his latest volume reminds us) is the principal disciple of M. Maurice Blondel, whose philosophy of action has so profoundly modified the method of Catholic Apologetics in France and Italy. But if M. Blondel was first in the field with his Sorbonne thesis of ten years ago, published under the title of "L'Action," M. Laberthonnière has the merit of a clearer style and a more popular method of exposition. In these two volumes he has delivered a challenge to every form of Rationalist dogmatism which it will be difficult for its various exponents to evade.

In a brief essay which serves as introduction to the volume which M. Laberthonnière published last year, he has sounded the keynote of this challenge. Philosophy, he contends, is an art before it can be a science, and is always an art even more than a science. By this he means that philosophy as an exposition of the meaning of life depends for its value upon the intensity and the quality of the individual life which has sought to render an account of itself, or rather of life as the whole of which it has realised itself as an integral factor. A metaphysic is primarily an "état d'âme." It is "a moral life elaborating itself, acquiring full consciousness of itself, fixing itself in determinate concepts. It constitutes quite really a kind of poem, not a poem relating imaginary adventures, but a poem acted by the man who writes it, expressing his heart and soul, the human reality which he is, with his efforts and hopes as well as with his failures and despairs." In other words—elementary as it may be to insist on the fact it is yet necessary to insist on it—a philosophy is not a mere abstract juggling with ideas, but an attempt, necessarily imperfect and needing to be continually renewed, to establish the concrete facts of life in their living relation with life as a whole, with that universal reality which, though for the intellect it must ever remain an inadequate abstraction, is itself concrete and in continuous living relation with us. And just because our lives are a living part of this reality, it can not only be vitally apprehended by all, but, in proportion to our living effort to enter more and more fully into the secret of its operation in ourselves and in all its other manifestations, it can also be intellectually apprehended with increasing certainty. The apprehension of life's meaning is vital and concrete before it can become abstract and intellectual. It must be felt before it can be known. It must exist for the will and conscience before it can exist for the intellect. And yet the intellectual process of analysis of moral experience is a real gain for moral experience itself. It is even in itself, M. Laberthonnière finely insists, a form of moral effort. "The mere fact of returning into one's self in order to formulate distinctly a conception of self, in order to compose the poem of one's own life, is already an act of courage, a step towards the light and the moral ideal." "What intensity of life has there not been in a Plato, a Descartes, a Leibnitz, a Kant, a life concentrated, strong, master of itself, entirely absorbed in a ceaselessly renewed effort to reach the truth."

Philosophy, then, is justified in so far as it remembers that it is a science of life which must always remain relative to the art of living. But it has not always remembered this. It has forgotten it when it has either denied the existence of any ultimate reality or denied its knowableness or affirmed it of ideas, of things in themselves considered as objects of complete intellectual apprehension by us. Scepticism, agnosticism, idealism erected into an intellectual dogmatism, all these are denials of a true philosophy. The true reality is subject, is something vitally experienced, and known only in and through experience. It is the

living concrete truth in which the manifold of life is rooted and by seeking to give living expression to which it too in its degree can attain reality. The life of man is itself a growth out of reality towards reality. The one reality is its principle. It can make that reality its conscious end. Not otherwise, at least, than by moral effort can man lay hold upon the ultimately real. To know it he must by the concrete purpose of his moral life have made it his own. The dogmatic affirmation of reality is reserved, therefore, for the moral will. This is the method of knowledge to which M. Laberthonnière has given the name of moral dogmatism.

There may seem something paradoxical in the association of the terms, dogmatism and method of knowledge. Yet they are neither of them out of place in exposing M. Laberthonnière's thought. For him philosophy is primarily a question of method. The fruitful quest of reality depends upon the place in which it is sought. To seek it in the knowledge of phenomena, however accurate, is to land one's self in illusion. For the knowledge of phenomena is itself only possible through some living correspondence, some identity of principle, between that which knows and that which is known. The reality which is reached through phenomena is always subject and not merely object. It is something with which we get into felt relation; and only in so far as we feel with phenomenal objects, and can act not merely upon them but in them, can we be said to know whatever reality they contain. It is, then, that living energy which brings us into most immediate and assured contact with the common vital principle in other things that holds the key to the knowledge of reality. Now this energy is moral effort. It is through moral effort, therefore, that reality can be known. Our thought, in so far as the purpose of thought is to know what is real, will be worth just what we are worth. The value of philosophy is in the last resort a psychological question. It is the effort to know, even more than the actual result, that counts. The result will be always relative and imperfect. The effort is itself an essential part of the living activity of the soul, and is, therefore, so far a concrete affirmation of reality. The effort to know is an essential part of man's effort to become what he might be and ought to be. The method of knowledge is one with the method of moral action, as knowledge itself is but a single form of that action.

But this method leads inevitably to a dogmatic affirmation of reality. By the fact that man is conscious of an internal life, that he is conscious of inward growth or of becoming something which is continuous with what was given to him, he is led to affirm reality of himself, to feel himself one and permanent amid the shows of things which change and pass in him and around him. The same instinct of action leads him to assert reality of the principle out of which it grows and which originally constituted him a separate being. This principle, indeed, which was originally given in him, he cannot know so long as he merely passively endures it. But the moment he consciously makes it his end, he affirms it as the ultimate term of reality, which in one sense he will never reach because he cannot entirely

escape from the phenomenal, because he must always be reaching towards it through the phenomenal which in some measure he himself remains. But in another sense in making it his end, he has already made himself one with it through whatever change he may have to strive and attain. Besides, instead of merely passively and unconsciously enduring it as the principle of his life, he has consciously and deliberately accepted it as such. Thus man by the mere fact of moral action affirms God as the ultimate reality. And in the same way he recognises other men as sharing in this reality, as being not merely external objects, but subject-centres of a force similar to his own. This recognition, again, is not matter of mere sense-perception, of any kind of external observation, but of spiritual action. It is in so far as we can live in others, share their inner life and act upon it, accept their help in constituting ourselves realities, and impart to them something of the same power, that we can affirm reality of them also. And if in the non-human forms of life we can recognise no consciousness of moral aim, we at least know them as alive, as sharing to some degree in reality, only in so far as we feel in them the same constitutive vital principle as in ourselves. The vital principle which we freely make an end of moral effort and attainment they passively endure.

This is the conception of the knowledge of reality, its method and its content, which M. Laberthonnière draws into the service of Christian Apologetics. For him Christianity is the supreme concrete revelation of this moral dogmatism, of what the life of man ought to be, of the method and the nature of the knowledge involved in that life. It is no series of abstract propositions, no abstract scheme of knowledge whatever. Its dogmatic statements are revealed in no other sense than as they are the most satisfactory expression possible of the postulates of this life, and may be the most efficient incentives to its further development. As the life is in process of development, so its intellectual expressions are imperfect and incomplete. But as the life is continuous, is always growing out of its past self, so there is an unchanging vital element in dogma, a spirit which vivifies and illuminates all its changing forms. It is to this abiding spirit that the conception of dogma as changeless can alone be applied. And this spirit is the assertion of faith, that moral energy of man which can alone affirm reality. As we have seen, this faith is in the highest sense rational. The immediate affirmation of reality is an affirmation which involves the reason. But the logical explication of its contents must always depend upon the fact that we apprehend reality through phenomena. Therefore Christian dogma on its intellectual side is provisional and relative. Every term which it uses is capable of profound modification, has, in fact, been so modified, and will be exposed to continual modification in the future. The Christian tradition is concrete and alive, a living force to be absorbed and turned to vital account, not a changeless intellectual abstraction enslaving thought, and so far necessarily enslaving the moral life also. And the Christian tradition is briefly what M. Laberthonnière calls the truth of Christ—*i.e.*, the redemptive power of God operating in

Jesus of Nazareth, and in humanity organising itself in His Spirit, in the Church of Christ. This truth is not now, and never has been in the past, capable of being recognised or established by facts of history, though, of course, like every concrete truth, it was given in facts of history. The Truth of Jesus Christ was certainly given in phenomena. His life was a real life, a life happening in the world of phenomena and a part of that world. But His Truth could not be phenomenally perceived. It was and remains the supreme affirmation of reality by living men, who find in it the answer to their own highest needs, the means and the guarantee of reality in themselves. The Truth of Christ is an affirmation of that rational faith which is the necessary expression of man's spirit in the fulness of its activity. The phenomenal events through which it was revealed lie entirely within the purview of historical criticism.

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*Problems and Persons.* By Wilfrid Ward.—Longmans, 1903.

"THE essential *semper eadem* of Catholic dogma . . . has ever been compatible with the assimilation of contemporary culture." "And this assimilative principle . . . may well be now applied to the more rapid and conscious developments in theology which the age of science demands." (Preface, p. xiv. l. 20 *et seq.*)

"Rest assured, venerable brethren, that we will use the greatest diligence to prevent the members of the clergy from being drawn to the snares of a certain new and fallacious science which savoureth not of Christ, but with masked and cunning arguments strives to open the door to the errors of Rationalism and semi-Rationalism." (The Encyclical "*Supremi Apostolatus*," January 1904.)

Early in this same year the books of the Abbé Loisy were placed on the Index, and his opinions and conclusions condemned.

And yet one feels quite sure that Mr Wilfrid Ward is, after all, right—and that the order of things is as he sees it, ultimately. Mr Ward has collected together in this book several essays published at different dates, and dealing with a wide range of persons and subjects, and yet all held together by the one idea with which he is himself concerned,—the one problem with which he seeks, or seems to care, to grapple. There are many persons, and yet but one problem,—for Mr Ward. And these persons all, from the Prime Minister disclosing the foundations of belief, to M. Renan devastating the fields of faith, are interesting to Mr Ward just in so far as their intellectual and spiritual experience and utterances can be made to minister, negatively or positively, to the solution of the problem which he has in view. Indeed, he admits himself that these essays deal "primarily with problems rather than with persons," and these "problems" of which he speaks all arise out of the one problem with which he is really concerned—viz., the problem which the

schism of the Catholic Church in the West, and in these islands in particular, does persistently present to the devout-minded Catholic, on whichever side of the dispute he may find himself ranged.

No catholic-minded man can be content—can be anything but most unhappy—when he contemplates the strife, misunderstanding, bitterness, and consequent loss of power and efficiency which result directly from the present state of affairs since the time of the Reformation until now; nor can he rest from ceaseless endeavour of prayer and thought to grapple with the problem which the state of the Church presents. On one side and on the other men's minds are restlessly seeking how order may be brought out of chaos, concord out of discord—in a word, they are feeling after the possibility of reunion between those who claim, in its historic sense, the name of "Catholic." This is Mr Ward's problem, viewed from the Roman side, and approached in the spirit of a cautious liberal Catholicism. The thing that he feels he must do is to try to deal sympathetically with some of the misconceptions and prejudices which have grown and hardened in the mind of the average Englishman in respect to the theology, and the attitude of the Roman theologian, towards the achievements of science and "the accepted conclusions of the time-spirit." And at the same time he essays to sustain the hope of a more liberal attitude on the part of Rome towards the demands of contemporary learning and culture, by justifying and explaining her rigid and formal conservatism in the immediate past, and by demonstrating the fact of the slow assimilation into her theology before and during the Middle Ages of the ascertained and accepted results of human endeavour in the field of philosophy and scientific research. He uses again and again such phrases as that which stands at the head of this review. It is difficult not to be carried away by the enthusiasm of his optimism; and he sustains his expectations and hopes by arguments sound and logically developed. One cannot but feel that he has rendered a great service to the cause which he has so near to his heart, and that his optimism, which must wait many a long decade for its final justification, will yet find some measure of satisfaction in the natural effect of his reasoning on any open mind, by the removal of misconceptions and by the raising of a legitimate hope of the possibility of a better understanding on both sides. At the same time, it must be evident that the attitude of the present Pope and of the Holy Office is hardly such as to encourage the hopes even of the most moderate of liberal Catholics. The quotation from the Encyclical of the Holy Father which stands at the head of this article is distinctly reactionary in tone; and the treatment which has been accorded to the Abbé Loisy seems to indicate, as might easily have been surmised, that there exists in high quarters a clear animus against the work of that band of young and brilliant scholars who in France, Germany, England, and America alone are doing something in the direction in which the argument of Mr Ward moves.

It is interesting and noteworthy, although Mr Ward's argument

moves on very much the lines which M. Loisy adopts, that there is not apparently any direct recognition in these essays of the immeasurably valuable contribution which this learned priest has made to contemporary criticism of the New Testament; and yet it is impossible to believe that Mr Ward is not conversant with his work, or is unconscious of the close analogy which exists between his own line of thought and that of the author of *Autour d'un Petit Livre*. He notices Sabatier's *Esquisse*, Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*; he quotes Professor Caird and *Lux Mundi*; and in each he finds some endorsement of the view which he adopts. But of M. Loisy there is no word,—and one apprehends here an intelligent anticipation of events, which results in the preservation on Mr Ward's part of that silence which charity and a due sense of self-preservation enjoin, in respect of the Damned.

Mr Ward's argument is admirably set forth in an elaborate, scholarly, and lucid line of argument in the four principal essays of the book. And I think it may fairly be said of the others, brilliant and interesting as they are both in their subjects and treatment, that they are entirely subsidiary to the one idea which is elaborated in the first four. These—"The Time-Spirit of the Nineteenth Century," "The Rigidity of Rome," "Unchanging Dogma and Changeful Man," and the "Foundations of Belief"—together with the essays on "Two Mottoes of Cardinal Newman" and "Newman and Renan," form the *pièces de résistance* of the volume, and in them the main thesis is admirably set forth and maintained.

Briefly, the argument runs thus:—

The evolutionary view of the world and of society is the "new framework" in which the spirit of the nineteenth century has taught us to place the phenomena of the universe and the facts of life.

We view the universe statically no longer, but dynamically. Regarding mankind as a developing social organism, which "to live must change," we have begun to realise that the same thing is necessarily true of the growth and development of human knowledge, in all departments of inquiry, and moreover that, in the general advance of knowledge, all ascertained truth in any one department of science must ultimately have its effect in modifying or endorsing conclusions provisionally accepted in all or any other departments of human knowledge and inquiry. From this general law theology cannot be excepted, and the recognition of it has incidentally thrown theology into some degree of confusion in many directions. For the stereotyped definitions of the theology of a former age contain incidentally, along with the truth which each enshrines, implications, characterised by a less advanced stage of human knowledge, which the common consent of the present-day mind has outgrown and is compelled to reject. This has in effect produced a degree of confusion in men's minds which rises to the point, in some cases, of sheer disbelief, engendered by bewilderment and doubt.

The argument of these essays sets itself to meet this difficulty first of all by pointing out that, though the recognition of the evolutionary

process in the development of human knowledge is but of yesterday, yet the process itself is coeval with the history of the mind of man. Therefore, this generalisation of the evolutionary process reveals the fact that the theology of no age can have been unalterable or final in its terms; that, if a work of discrimination seems to be required to-day, in the face of the wide advance of scientific and critical knowledge, a similar work of discrimination has been necessary in each successive age in the past; and that, in theological as well as in all other development of knowledge, the law of advance is that of gradual displacement, and of the substitution of new for old. Yet as the thinking subject remains constantly the same under all the external changes of form and expression which the law of life demands, so the underlying supernatural Truth remains, *semper eadem*, unchangeable, and yet in the ever-changing formulæ of its expression approximating more and more to the Absolute Truth, which these formulæ are ever striving to reveal to the mind, and preserve for the happiness and welfare of man. The "Depositum Fidei," however slender in its expression at the outset, implicitly contains all Truth, and in the living body of the Church is expanded and developed, as the Reality of which successive theological definitions are in turn the part-expression. Now, the evolutionary view brings its own compensation. The formula of to-day approximates more nearly to the Absolute than the formula of yesterday, but is no more final than was that. "The old idea of fixity which did not look beyond the tangible *formulæ* with their supposed unchangeable analysis is parted with. But another principle of persistency is disclosed . . . the persistency of certain central religious ideas, reappearing in a more and more purified form under the influence alike of an exacter knowledge of the world of fact, and of the criticisms of the intellect and the moral sense: and the persistency of the law of development."

Thus on a basis of sound philosophical argument does Mr Ward preach patience to those whose faith seems to be threatened, and whose doubts are aroused by the discrepancy between the implications of traditional theology and the accepted conclusions of the time-spirit. And to those who urge the impossibility and hopelessness of the expectation that Catholic theology can ever bring itself into sympathetic and receptive relation with the progress of human thought and knowledge, who are dashed by such utterances as those of Pius X. in the Encyclical above quoted, and by such facts as those accomplished in the case of M. Loisy, he replies, first, by pointing out that the Catholic Church in union with the Apostolic See has preserved the ideal of the Church, as a growing, living organism, with a definiteness and consistency not to be found elsewhere.

And, secondly, to the charge of rigidity and narrowness as formulated by her enemies, he replies by pointing out that for three centuries and a half the Roman communion has been practically in a state of siege. Surrounded by Protestant, agnostic, and infidel armies,—the horrid brood of the Reformation and of the "licentious revel" of the human reason that

ensued upon it,—she has been driven to a reactionary conservatism, a narrow exclusiveness of all that savours of novelty, and a rigid tenacity of her traditional definitions, not from choice or in time of peace, but from necessity and in a time of war. The Catholic Church has assimilated ideas and customs from every civilisation with which she has been in contact in the past; and this normal power of assimilation and adaptivity may be expected to reassert itself as the habits of suspicion and the attitude of hostility engendered by the state of war gradually give way under the influences of peace. Thus he excuses and commends to the average Englishman the Catholic attitude, taking immense pains to do so, and arguing with a conspicuous ability that should ensure a certain measure of success. The tradition of three hundred years of hostility and misrepresentation cannot be cancelled in a generation or two; and Mr Ward rightly enough deprecates the possibility of anything like corporate reunion in England at the present hour. He admits that Romans have not, as yet, mastered accurately the Anglican position and its heritage of doubt and misconception. He points out that much of the ablest Anglican argument from Church history must necessarily be beside the mark, if the evolutionary principle is to be applied to theological as to other domains of science. And in support of this he quotes St Vincent of Lerins' famous dictum that the doctrine of yesterday may be to the doctrine of to-day as the fœtus to the fully developed man; and the argument of Abbé Duchesne to the effect that the principle of regarding the explicit definitions of early Christianity as final expressions of dogmatic truth, which is applied in arguments against the Papal Supremacy and the dogma of the Infallibility, would commit the Church to Arianism, or similar heterodoxy, if applied to the doctrine, *e.g.*, of the Trinity. On the other hand, he allows that it is not as yet possible so to unravel the tangled skeins of history as to understand how men like Tunstall believed that to remain within the English Church after the breach with Rome did not necessarily involve a separation from the communion of the Church Catholic. Taking all these and similar difficulties into account, he is at once optimistic, and yet content to await the gradual issue of the event, confident that in the long run the strong current of Catholic devotion and feeling will surely carry men on towards the only visible centre of Catholic unity; and that as the movement grows from more to more, and a better understanding arises through the pursuit on both sides of a policy of *rapprochement*, the ideal of corporate reunion will gradually emerge into the light and range of practical politics.

And this is the only sound and statesmanlike view of the present *impasse*. Individual secessions from one side or the other only serve to accentuate differences, intensify bitternesses, and obscure the real aim and goal of all patriotic Catholics. The pervert might conceivably act as an interpreter for one side to the other; in fact, he becomes usually (*ipsis Hibernis Hibernior*) a new obstacle to the possibility of a better understanding. The one thing worth working and praying for is corporate reunion, and of this fact Mr Ward is evidently inclined to be convinced.

The concluding passages of the essay on "The Rigidity of Rome" are instinct with just and noble feeling, and constitute in themselves an eirenicon which may be read and pondered with profit by Anglican and Catholic alike. They do honour to Mr Ward in their exhibition of a wise judgment and a temperate and sober charity, and cannot fail to carry a measure of conviction wherever they are read, and "prepare and make ready the Way of the Lord."

The space at my disposal does not allow me to say more than just a word of the excellence of the other essays. The essay on "Two Mottoes of Cardinal Newman," the clever comparison of that prelate with M. Renan, and the delicately sympathetic article on the work of Mrs Augustus Craven—these alone would suffice to commend the book to all lovers of fine and distinctive characterisation.

But, as I have said above, all these in their measure are made to subserve the main idea of the book, and each in one way or another is made to lend something of enchantment and attraction to the Church that holds Mr Wilfrid Ward's enthusiastic love and loyalty; and each by contrast or direct commendation helps to present her in the most favourable light.

Mr Ward does his work throughout with great literary skill and admirable judgment. His optimistic devotion and high hopes for the future glory of the Catholic Faith are never allowed to carry him away. He is always courteous to an opponent—reasonable and temperate, as well as learned and skilful in argument; and through all there shines a charity—so much better a thing than mere tact—that not merely disarms, but charms, and goes far to convert an opponent into a friend, even where the argument may fail to convince.

ARNOLD PINCHARD.

ST JUDE, BIRMINGHAM.

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*An Introduction to the New Testament.*—By Adolf Jülicher, Professor of Theology at the University of Marburg. Translated by Janet Penrose Ward, with Prefatory Note by Mrs Humphry Ward.—London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1904.—Pp. xxii. + 635.

APART from the various prolegomena and the index, this important work is in three parts: I. "A History of each of the New Testament Writings," pp. 32-458; II. "A History of the New Testament Canon," pp. 459-566; III. "A History of the New Testament Text," pp. 567-628. We could have wished that the first part had been published separately at a moderate price—not because the other two are less satisfactory, but because they appeal to a different class; they are more technical than the first part, and, for the average reader, less easily intelligible and, we fear, less interesting. The first part—the History of the Writings—is a marvellous combination of accurate scholarship with attractive popular exposition; it represents somewhat advanced modern views, just as Dr Salmon's *Introduction to the*

*New Testament* stands for traditional criticism. Both books are moderate, sober, and interesting, and alike deserve to be widely read.

Professor Jülicher gives a very modest account of his book: "The idea of competing with a work like Holtzmann's *Introduction* has naturally never occurred to me. As before, his book will remain indispensable for exhaustive studies in this branch of science. All I have desired has been to furnish an introduction to Holtzmann and to Weizsäcker, and to stimulate the interest of students towards yet further study" (p. vi.). Our author thus releases himself from the technical etiquette of introduction as to exhaustive statement, method, and form, and at the same time relieves his reviewers of the duty of criticising him on these points. He leaves himself at liberty to choose and arrange his materials to suit the needs of less advanced students, and he has done this with marked success; indeed, the book may be used with pleasure and profit by any ordinarily well-informed reader who takes a serious interest in the New Testament. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose that this *Introduction* is a mere popularisation of other scholars' methods and results; it is the original work of a writer who has full knowledge of his subject and great critical gifts. There are many of his positions we should not endorse; but, on the whole, his account of the New Testament fairly represents the views held by critics who are not controlled by dogmatic presuppositions. On the other hand, Professor Jülicher is not the victim of an anti-dogmatic reaction; he does not belong to the school of van Manen and Schmiedel. As Mrs Humphry Ward says in her Prefatory Note, "Dr Jülicher employs a method of perfect freedom, but his freedom is no mere cloak for critical license, and his eagerness as critic or historian does not rob him of common sense."

As regards the dates of the New Testament books, Professor Jülicher gives the following "Retrospective Survey": "The latest of its documents are separated from the earliest by a full century; the years between 50 and 70 may have witnessed the appearance of the ten Pauline Epistles, as well as of the "We-document," the Logia of Matthew, and the original source of the Apocalypse; those between 70 and 100 that of the three Synoptics, Hebrews, the Apocalypse, and probably, also, though only by a narrow margin, Acts and 1 Peter. Then in the beginning of the second century come the Gospel and the three Epistles of John, Jude a little later, the Pastoral Epistles probably after 125, and James and 2 Peter last of all" (pp. 456, 457). It will be obvious from this passage that our author rejects the Apostolic authorship of Hebrews, the Pastoral Epistles, and the General Epistles, and also the Lucan authorship of Acts. On the Pauline Epistles he writes: "Four of the Epistles of Paul have not been disputed even by the Tübingen school, and only those who lack all critical power have attempted to shake them. They are those to the Romans, the Corinthians, and the Galatians. The three Pastoral Epistles are now generally regarded as spurious, but the majority of those who hold this view are in favour of the genuineness of 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon; 2 Thessalonians and Ephesians are almost universally given

up, as well as large parts of Colossians. I do not, however, hold that the objections even to these last three are insuperable" (p. 54). Mark is held to have been the author of the Second Gospel, and Matthew of a collection of Logia; and these two works are regarded as the main sources of the First and Third Gospels—a theory very widely accepted. On the other hand, Matthew did not write our First Gospel (p. 309), and Luke did not write either the Third Gospel or the Acts (pp. 435, 445); but he was probably the author of the "We-document" (p. 447). We see, therefore, that Professor Jülicher finds a measure of truth in the traditional view as to the First Gospel and the Acts; but he does not admit the presence of any Johannine basis in the Fourth Gospel or the Epistles of John, or of any Pauline basis in the Pastoral Epistles. Further, the Apocalypse was written by a teacher of Asia Minor, whose name was John; but if we understand our author rightly, he was neither John the Apostle nor John the Presbyter; but on this latter point some reserve is maintained (p. 282). This John in many places inserted "older Apocalyptic fragments, more or less adequately harmonised with the context" (p. 290).

We have said that this work is representative of the dominant school of liberal criticism; it may be interesting to consider how far the lay reader who is willing to accept the decisions of free criticism, as distinguished from the dogmas of tradition, may safely commit himself to Professor Jülicher's guidance. We should suppose that the general position he assumes as to the date and authorship of Matthew, Mark, the ten Pauline Epistles, Hebrews, and 2 Peter is fairly established, in spite of van Manen and his friends. We must admit that substantially his views on the Third and Fourth Gospels, Acts, the Pastoral, and the remaining General Epistles are held by an increasing majority of liberal critics, except in so far as many would concede a Johannine basis to the Gospel, and would admit Pauline fragments in the Pastoral Epistles. Nevertheless, we can hardly feel that judgment has been finally entered against the Lucan authorship of the Third Gospel and Acts; some consideration is due to the recent apologetic of such scholars as Professor Ramsay and Professor Bartlet. Again, the denial of any real connection between John the Apostle and the Fourth Gospel is, we believe, against the drift of present criticism; nor can we ignore the fact that the defenders of actual Johannine authorship have been reinforced by so liberal a critic as Principal Drummond. Similarly, there is a widespread inclination to discern actual Pauline fragments in the Pastoral Epistles, and in England especially many critics of different schools still cling to the Pauline authorship. Even Professor Jülicher is impressed by the Pauline tone and spirit of these letters, though he explains them by the sympathetic skill of a disciple who had made a long study of St Paul's writings. The problem of the Pastoral Epistles is exceedingly complex, and the available evidence is painfully conflicting: one is sometimes tempted to hope that they may be retained for the Apostle by assuming a very free use of secretarial assistance, and a considerable amount of textual corruption; but it is very

doubtful whether such hopes are well founded. In the case, also, of the General Epistles—other than 2 Peter—the difficulties are serious, though of a different character. For instance, 1, 2, 3 John stand or fall with the Gospel, and yet have obvious connections with the other General Epistles. Again, we do not really know who are meant by “James” and “Jude,” and the presence of these names constitutes a tradition so vague and ambiguous that it hardly seems worth considering; we might as well treat the letters as anonymous. We must confess that, as far as 1 Peter is concerned, the denial of the Petrine authorship is attractive, because it annihilates a host of difficulties at a single blow; and yet, is our knowledge of Peter and his times sufficient to warrant us in categorically rejecting Zahn’s theory that the letter was written by Silvanus under Peter’s authority? Professor Jülicher naturally dates the Epistles according to his theory of the development of Christian doctrine; but at present this method is precarious, seeing that our views of the development of doctrine depend on the dates we assign to the literature. At first sight, indeed, it might seem that there was no escape from reasoning in a circle; but there are fixed points both for literature and doctrine; nevertheless, there is a real danger of arguing at one time that a book is late because of its doctrine, and at another that the doctrine is late because it is not found in early literature. Moreover, we need to remind ourselves continually how little we know of Peter and John, or of the numerous persons named “James” or “Jude,” or, indeed, of the Church of the first two centuries. We feel, for instance, that Professor Jülicher’s arguments for a date between 125 and 130 for James are interesting and weighty; but many of them seem to rest on doubtful interpretations of ambiguous and inadequate evidence, which might assume a different complexion in the light of fuller knowledge. Professor Jülicher argues against the early date of James on the ground, *inter alia*, that its foolish misunderstanding of the Pauline thesis of faith is inconceivable in the Apostolic Age, or at least in Jerusalem, among the leading spirits. We may waive the question whether the passage in James is such a misunderstanding; but, assuming it to be so, experience shows that no misunderstanding of the teaching of one party leader by his opponent is so gross as to be inconceivable.

It is only fair, however, to Professor Jülicher to quote a qualifying principle which he lays down at the outset: “There is scarcely a single branch of science in which the inclination to know everything for certain, and to have an answer ready for every question, is so universal as it is in the introduction to the New Testament; scarcely any in which that inclination is so little justified. The more decidedly, then, must we emphasise from the very outset the fact that our judgments can only be absolutely trustworthy on the negative side, while our positive assertions can seldom rise above the level of probabilities” (p. 8). We fear that in history this canon has a wide application; as regards ancient literature, certain characteristics of a book may exclude the possibility of its having been written in a given period or by a given person; but it is seldom that we can obtain

conclusive proof of date or authorship. In numberless instances the current views are only accepted by an otiose assent; and even where there has been critical investigation, a margin of uncertainty usually remains. For instance, we are much more certain that Matthew did not write the First Gospel than we are that Mark did write the Second. Nevertheless, the extreme form in which the canon is stated suggests a fallacy by which Professor Jülicher has been unconsciously influenced. "Our judgments," he writes, "can only be absolutely trustworthy on the negative side"; and then contradicts himself by inserting "seldom" into the next clause: "Our positive assertions can seldom rise above the level of probabilities," implying that they do sometimes rise above that level, and therefore become "absolutely trustworthy." Yet the impression remains that an undue confidence is felt in negative judgments, and that consequently the early date and Apostolic authorship of some of the books have been denied with an assurance that is not warranted by the evidence; the range of possibilities is larger than our author has been willing to admit.

So far we have purposely ignored the criticism of the history of events as distinguished from the history of literature; however closely connected, they both gain by separate treatment, and we are not sure that it is desirable to include the discussion of the historicity of narratives in an introduction to a collection of literature. Professor Jülicher, however, does so, and decides for a large element of genuine history in the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts, supplemented by legendary additions, *e.g.*, the birth-stories. The Fourth Gospel is only historical so far as it borrows from the Synoptics. We believe that Mrs Humphry Ward pointed out some time since that the question of miracles is one of dogma and not of historical evidence, and we cannot but feel that our author's naturalistic attitude as to physical miracles is not purely critical, but to some extent dogmatic.

With regard to the sections on the Text and the Canon, we can only say that they are admirable statements of the information at present available, and of the probable conclusions deducible therefrom.

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LONDON.

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*Das Evangelium Marci*, übersetzt und erklärt. Von Julius Wellhausen.—  
Berlin: G. Reimer, 1903.

LIKE the author whose work he edits, Wellhausen plunges at once into the heart of his subject, and without preface or introduction the reader is ushered into a vivid translation of the Gospel, broken up into ninety successive paragraphs, each of which is furnished with some crisp, curt notes, betraying often a rare insight and sympathy, upon the textual question (where repeated honour is paid to D and Syr. Sin.), the literary problems involved in any passage, or the historical meaning and value of the particular section. The division of the Gospel is as follows: (1) Introduction, i. 1-15; (2) Jesus in Capernaum, i. 16-vi. 13; (3) the

wanderings of Jesus, vi. 14–viii. 26; (4) Jesus on the way to Jerusalem, viii. 27–x. 52; and (5) the Passion, xi. 1–xiv. 8. With (4) we have the beginning of the gospel as it was preached by the apostles (p. 65); but in view of ii. 19 f., iii. 28 f. (in Mark's sense), and iii. 35, it is impossible to distinguish so sharply as Wellhausen does between the general character of the preceding teaching of Jesus and his subsequent concentration on his own person. Besides, he still (*cf.* viii. 34, x. 1) addresses the people now and then. As for the close of the Gospel, when one recollects the *milieu* of belief in the exalted Christ in which it was composed, it is incredible that xvi. 8 should represent its original ending; but at the other end Wellhausen is right, I think, in taking i. 2–3 as an interpolation, while his omission of *υἱοῦ θεοῦ* knocks Schultz's strained interpretation on the head (*cf.* his remarks on Wrede, pp. 70 f.). Verse 1, however, looks more like a title than anything else. Further interpolations or editorial additions are found, *e.g.*, in iv. 11–12, 35, vi. 53–56, viii. 11–12, ix. 35 (introduced to form a bridge between 33–34 and 36–37), xv. 35–36*b*, together with *λέγετε* in vii. 11, etc. In ch. xiii. he detects, of course, an incorporated (Jewish) apocalypse, assigning to it 7–8, 12, 14–22, 24–27; verses 28–37 form a Christian appendix, later than the redaction of 5–27, and dating from a period subsequent to the fall of Jerusalem.

The literary structure of the Gospel, Wellhausen still holds, rests on an Aramaic basis, and one feature of the book is the application of this hypothesis, with more or less success, to the language (*e.g.* iv. 22, ix. 8, xv. 13) and sense (*e.g.* viii. 34) of various passages. Even in its Greek form, the Gospel is of course prior to Matthew and Luke (pp. 37, 49, 64, 95, 100), whose use of it is presupposed and illustrated. Regarded historically, its contents are substantially trustworthy, even vi. 34–44 (apart from the exaggeration of the numbers in popular tradition), xiv. 68, etc. Thus on xv. 1 f. he writes: "I have no doubt that Jesus was executed as Messiah" (though xv. 2 is a *hysteron proteron*), and nothing could be finer than his incidental statements on the parables (pp. 30–31), the relation of Jesus to the Old Testament (pp. 102–104), and the sacrament (pp. 118 f.). Mark is not, to Wellhausen, a theological pamphlet in historical disguise, or a Gospel in which tendency has overpowered the element of historicity at three points out of four. His general attitude towards the mythical school may be summed up, perhaps, in his sane words upon iv. 35–41: "This story is not an echo of the story of Jonah. In general it is seldom correct to hold that the evangelic narratives owe their origin to Old Testament types. Taken as a whole, such a theory throws the real facts of the case topsy-turvy. What was known of Jesus, and what was preserved in tradition, did not agree at all with the O.T. view of the Messiah or with the Jewish messianic expectations, and it was only with difficulty that one could prove that the contradiction between the two disappeared for enlightened eyes."

On the other hand, he is alive to one feature in Mark, *viz.*, the frequent superiority of the sayings which the evangelist preserves to the unhistorical

and artificial setting provided for them (*e.g.* iv. 21–22, ix. 50, xi. 23 f., xiii. 3–4), and the narrative of the Transfiguration (pp. 76–77) is tentatively regarded as representing originally the earliest account of the Resurrection—in which case its fortunes would be exactly the reverse of those which are sometimes ascribed to the story of John xxi. 1 f.

But, in view of his own sensible remark on p. 21, it would have been more satisfactory to have had some more adequate handling of other dubiously historical passages, such as v. 1–20, vi. 7–13 (vi. 2 is bluntly but arbitrarily pronounced unreliable), xi. 12 f. (which Klein refers to Jer. viii., *cf.* ver. 13; see Schwartz in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift*, v. 80 f.), all the more so, as even the reasons occasionally adduced elsewhere (*e.g.* pp. 50–51, 79) do not carry conviction with them. It is unduly sceptical to throw doubts on the Lord's Prayer (p. 98), or on x. 7, xii. 12, xiv. 20–21, 62, much more on the *ἐνεγκαλισάμενος* of x. 16 (for which he prefers to substitute the *προσκαλεσάμενος* of D and Syr. Sin.), or to object to xiv. 12–16 and to xiv. 38 in its present setting. The conjecture י"צ (Saidan = Bethsaida) for the Sidon of vii. 31 has more in its favour than the deletion of *γραμματεῖς* in ix. 14. In x. 6 he makes the interesting suggestion that ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς κτίσεως is = בראשית, a reference to Genesis in the well-known Jewish manner of quotation, and x. 39 is taken to imply John's early, tragic death. But it is arbitrary to dismiss x. 45*b* as a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* (see the recent examination of it in Dr Denney's *Death of Christ*, pp. 38 f.). Here as elsewhere the limitations of Wellhausen's method, which aims at exhibiting results rather than processes, serve perhaps to lend an unduly oracular and cavalier tone to his pages, just as the absence of any introduction, summing up his views on the authorship and date and object of the Gospel, obliges one to fit together incidentally scattered hints if one wishes to get any coherent idea of the principles upon which his synoptic criticism proceeds. This latter difficulty will be eased, of course, as later volumes of his commentary appear. And for this reason I shall defer any notice of the author's comments on the "Son of Man" problem (pp. 66 f.) and the chronology of the Passion week (p. 114), till I come to notice the companion volume on Matthew which has just been issued.

Meantime it is enough to describe this small book as an almost indispensable handbook to the study of the Gospels, so fascinating is its robust, incisive manner. It neither supersedes, nor will it be superseded by, other commentaries upon a larger scale, for Wellhausen goes on his own road and looks at things with his own eyes. His rare allusions to any fellow-workers will add only to the gaiety, if not to the profit, of theologians, though one is sorry to find two pages (95, 141) disfigured by unworthy gibes at Weiss. On the contrast between Mark x. 13–16 and 17–31, he aptly cites *Richard II.* (Act V., Scene 3). It is a pity that his Shakspearean studies did not extend to Isabella's quiet rebuke of Angelo for the abuse of a giant's strength.

JAMES MOFFATT.

*Christianity in Talmud and Midrash.*—By R. Travers Herford, B.A.—  
London: Williams & Norgate, 1903.

THE early Christian writings, especially the New Testament, are full of references to the Jews and Judaism; so that nothing would be more natural than to suppose that the Jewish writings of the same period would have a great deal to tell us of Christians and Christianity. But it is notorious that any such expectation is disappointed. There are not half a dozen passages in these writings that contain unequivocal references to Jesus and his apostles; and there are but few unambiguous notices of the Christians. Yet the rabbis of the first three centuries, in every part of the world, must have been acquainted with Christianity, and we need not wonder that scholars should still ransack their utterances to see what they will yield.

This is what Mr Travers Herford has done. He has collected no fewer than a hundred and thirty-nine passages from Talmud and Midrash, transcribing, translating, and commenting; to say nothing of others which he quotes and makes use of. It is not his fault that the result is meagre, or that he often leaves us after all with a question whether this or that passage has any connection with Christianity at all, and if so, where we are to discover the trait in Christianity with which it deals. He attacks his problem cautiously enough. No one, whether agreeing with his conclusions or not, will accuse him of "having begged the question that he set out to answer" (p. 361). Where he is uncertain he suspends his judgment, and finds consolation for the poverty of his results in the thought that at any rate he has gathered more abundant materials for judgment than can be found elsewhere. Some future investigator, he hopes, will profit by them, and will penetrate further into the matter, should it really be possible. All honour to the man who works in this spirit, and gives us the results of his labours, long and far from light, with so much modesty!

Yet I cannot withhold certain considerations—weighty, as I think,—that may be urged against his book. He lays his basis analytically, collecting successively all the passages which he thinks are to the purpose, first those "referring to Jesus and his apostles," of which there are five-and-twenty, and then the far more numerous ones "relating to his followers," that is to say, the Christians of the early centuries. These latter are arranged under several heads, and the whole series is numbered, the original texts being given in an appendix.

The analysis is followed by a synthesis (pp. 342–397), which contains, first, a summary of all that Talmud and Midrash teach as to Jesus; and, second, an attempt to show that by the *Minim* we are to understand Christians, and specifically Jewish Christians. Some twenty years ago, when myself dealing with substantially the same subject on which Mr Travers Herford is now occupied,<sup>1</sup> I had no hesitation in assuming in like

<sup>1</sup> "Joden en Christenen in Palestina op het eind der eerste eeuw," *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, xvii. (1883), pp. 509–576. Let me warn any reader who may care to consult this essay that in the index of passages from Talmud and Midrash with which it closes

manner that the Minîm were Jewish Christians who still frequented the synagogues, but were gradually expelled from them. So far as I know, this was the view generally accepted at the time. But I had thought that since then Friedländer had demonstrated once for all that this was a mistake. Mr Travers Herford knows his writings, and with perfect justice condemns their extravagance and slovenliness. He is right, moreover, in rejecting Friedländer's own opinion that the Minîm are Gnostics. But in refuting him he has been all too prone to lapse into the old view. He admits that "the name may occasionally denote other heretics" (p. 380); but as a rule he takes the Minîm to be Christians; and this, I think, is a mistake.

Following what I take to be the most probable view, he regards מין simply as the ordinary Hebrew word for "sort," and therefore as bearing a general signification; but at the next step I think he goes wrong. He argues: The Aramaic word for "sort" or "species" is נין, and this suggested הנה, which means "to fornicate." Now "fornication," according to the well-known symbolism of the Old Testament, means unfaithfulness towards the covenant relation with the God of Israel.

Mr Herford is too well acquainted with the rabbinical caprices of etymology to lay much stress on such an argument; but after all it is of little consequence how מין came to signify "heretic." The word is constantly interchanged in manuscripts, editions, and parallel passages with Sadducee, Samaritan, Epicurean, and other terms of reproach. It is true that this substitution of some other word for Minîm is often due to the censors, in whose time probably it was understood to refer to the Christians. But this explanation is far from covering the whole ground. Mr Herford himself refers to passages in which he supposes Sadducees or heathen to be referred to under the designation of Minîm; see, for example, pages 249, 277, 313, 332. And if the snake of Genesis iii. and Moses are called Minîm (p. 199), it is clear that the rabbis used the word for no defined class of persons, but for heretics in general. If the word acquired any more specific meaning, the fact must be established, in the absence of any express evidence, from the applicability of all that is said of the Minîm to the Christians. But no such applicability can be shown. Only a few of the numerous passages collected by Mr Herford contain any distinct reference to the Christians. He repeats again and again (*e.g.* pp. 78, 285, 316, 327, 332) in different words what he says on p. 178: "The reference must be to heretics, possibly, though not necessarily, Jewish Christians; but I do not know of any heretical practice such as that described." And on the other hand a Christian usage or opinion is sometimes very distinctly referred to without the name מין appearing. This is the case with the references to Sunday as the day of the "Nazarines" (Nos. 58 and 59); nor are the Minîm mentioned in the proof that God has no father, son, or brother (No. 120); or in No. 10, which clearly refers to Jesus. Moreover, Mr Herford more than once finds a reference to some Christian doctrine when an error runs through all the page references, to which 112 must be added in every instance.

it is not really there. For instance, in No. 94 there is an elaborate proof that the one only God made the world without the help of any other. Mr Herford discovers a doctrine of "two powers" in the heresies here refuted, and explains it by the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews; but the passage itself does not specify *two* powers. Mr Herford speaks of "the doctrine of the two powers" as though some clearly defined heresy were indicated by the phrase. But this is not so. If, for instance, we consult the passage Mechilta 66 b. (on Exod. xx. 2), to which Mr Herford refers, we shall indeed find a mention of "the Minîm, who teach that there are two powers," but a few lines higher the very same words שהי רשיות הן are placed on the lips of "the peoples of the world," *i.e.* the heathen. There is another passage on p. 301. Nothing was more natural than that the Jews should constantly come into contact with people who directly or indirectly seemed to impugn the doctrine that God is one and alone, and that we frequently encounter defences of the same. We find one such in Ber. R. on I. i., for instance, which might just as well be directed against a Jew of philosophical culture, a disciple of Philo, who assumed various λόγοι by the side of God, as against a Christian who supposed God created the world through Christ. Cosmological discussions between Jews and others, or between Jews among themselves, were in the order of the day.

Mr Herford is too prone, I think, to assume that every name corresponds to a sharply defined conception, and that the several designations reflect a carefully co-ordinated set of ideas. Thus he argues, on p. 366, that in T. Sanh. xiii. 4, 5, four classes of men are sharply rebuked, Minîm, apostates, traitors, and Epicureans, and *therefore* Minîm cannot be a general designation of all unfaithful Jews. "The construction of the sentence forbids us to assume that Minîm is the *genus* of which the other three are *species*." Certainly the three last classes are not grammatically subordinated to the first; but does it follow that Minîm are not traitors, nor apostate Epicureans? Read on a little further. These four sets—the Minîm and the rest—are not the only ones condemned to Gehenna. The same fate befalls "those who lied concerning the Tora, and those who depart from the ways of the congregation, and those who have lied concerning the resurrection of the dead," etc. Are we to suppose that none of these could be described as Minîm, apostates, and so forth, because they are enumerated co-ordinately with them?

Mr Herford's identification of the Minîm with the Jewish Christians seems to rest on a misapprehension of the religious conditions of the first and second centuries. He writes as if, at that period, a set of well-defined religions stood over against each other, which is not the case. In that age of awakened religious life all manner of Western and Eastern religions surged together, and were often merged in the most weird combinations. Judaism itself was anything but united. The rabbinical, the philosophical, and the apocalyptic schools were widely severed on certain points, and the rabbis themselves had often such fierce disputes that they set each other under the ban, thus proclaiming each other heretics; nay, more than

once fell to blows, and supported their injunctions by the sword. Meanwhile the Gospel of Jesus, sometimes with the constant use of his name, sometimes with very sparing reference to it, was making its influence felt; and communities were being formed amongst all kinds of heathen and all kinds of Jews, mostly amongst Greek-speaking populations, some of whom had come under Philo's influence. The distinction between Pagan Christians and Jewish Christians is far too crude; and no man can say who were heretics in the eyes of *the rabbis* or of *the Jews*.

Here is an example. On p. 199 Mr Herford discusses a passage<sup>1</sup> in which certain not very comprehensible specimens of Minuth are mentioned. It is asserted, for instance, that whoever sets the *tephillim* upon his forehead or his palms is in the way of the Minim. It is not easy to see what this can have to do with Christianity. Further on (p. 202), Mr Herford devotes a passing notice (though without transcribing the text) to another portion of the same passage which enumerates other reprehensible practices, which, though not expressly called Minuth, are evidently equally to be rejected. Thus, if a man says, "Thy love extends to the nest of the bird," silence is to be enjoined upon him. It is easy to see what is disapproved of here, viz. the implicit symbolical interpretation of Deuteronomy xxii. 6; for anyone who adopts this interpretation implies that, literally understood, the command has little or no importance, and that its significance lay in its teaching that God's love extends to everyone and everything. Now this was exactly the view, not indeed of Philo himself, but of many of his followers; and it was likewise the view of the writer of 1 Cor. ix. 8, who taught that Deuteronomy xxv. 4 did not mean that God concerned himself about men, but that the ministers of the Gospel should receive their hire. Well, then, the man who, for taking this view, was to be silenced in the synagogue, might be a Christian, it is true, but he might equally well be a Jew who had never so much as heard of Christianity. In one case no less than in the other he might be called a *מין*, for he did not interpret the law according to the halacha, any more than did he who applied the tephillim in an unusual way.

Minim are heretics in general. Some of them, no doubt, may have been Christians, as were those referred to in the passage from Jerome which Mr Herford (p. 378) triumphantly cites as an unimpeachable witness for his view. It is doubtless true that the Palestinian Jews about the year 400 were acquainted with but few Minim who were not Christians, or inclined to Christianity; but this proves nothing as to the use of words three centuries earlier.

On p. 332 *sq.* Mr Herford cites, "without comment, some few passages which merely allude to Minim, but contain nothing of importance for the study of them." This does the passages in question scant justice. Some of them are important enough. Is it of no interest, for example, to read in B. Bathra 28a that a certain rabbi would not turn to the east in prayer "because the Minim teach concerning it"? These men are surely

<sup>1</sup> Meg. iv. 8, 9 (Ber. v. 3).

not Christians (whatever "Rashi" thinks), but we learn from the passage that there were still Jews who turned to the east in prayer, as to which Succah v. 4 says that it was the practice of the fathers. And these Jews are called Minîm.

Had space allowed it, I should have had a word to say on the supposed references to the apostles, and the supposed source of the knowledge of Jesus possessed by the rabbis; but I must conclude by a few criticisms of detail.

P. 62, בו לַתְּהוֹת is translated "people will laugh at him." How is this justified? We should read בו לַתְּהוֹת with Levy, *Neu-Heb. Wörterbuch*, s.v. אָרַם, and translate "If any man says, 'I am the Son of Man,' he will come to repent it."

P. 64, Num. xxiii. 19 is taken wrong. The rabbi understands וַיִּבֹּז לֹא אִישׁ אֵל, "No man is God; and he lies."

P. 68, line 4, read *per coitum ferventem*. The passage is cited because it speaks of Balaam and Jesus side by side, and in order to show that "Balaam serves frequently as a type of Jesus," but the opposite inference would seem more just.

P. 104. There are two mistakes in the translation from Abhodah zarah 27<sup>b</sup>. לְהֵי שַׁעָה does not mean "an hour of life," but "the temporal life"; and the two last lines signify, "It is different in regard to Minuth which seduces and which comes to seduce." What this means, in the context, I confess I do not see. Does the foregoing story refer to a Minuth that did not seduce, and merely served to rescue the temporal life by incantations?

P. 126, line 3, בְּרַכַּת הַמִּינִים should not be translated "a benediction of the Minîm," but "the Minîm-benediction," *i.e.* the benediction in which the Minîm are mentioned. Nor does תִּקַּן mean "to compose," which would suggest that the prayer had to be made by the rabbi himself. It means "formulate according to the tradition." In line 7 for "from the pulpit" read "to the pulpit."

P. 156, lines 6-14 also occur in Bammidbar R. on ii. 9 (ed. Warschau, p. 31a).

P. 161 *sqq.*, Be Abidan and Be Notzaphi. Joël, *Blicke in die Religions-geschichte zu Anfang des zweiten Chr. Jahrh.*, ii. 91 *sqq.*, conjectures that the former is an intentional corruption of Be Ebjonim (as the latter of Be Notzarim), in which case *both* would refer to Christian houses of prayer.

P. 237, line 3 of No. 87, "Sing, because," etc. There is an interrogation: "Why does it say רָנִי, when?" etc.

P. 243, line 15 from below, the reading מְבֹרָךְ מְבֹרָךְ occurs, which is correct, and appears in the editions of the Talmud; but it departs from the text as given on p. 423. Whence did Mr Herford draw the false reading?

I may add a passage of some interest to Mr Herford's rich collection, *viz.* Shabb. 152a (also Koh. Rabba on x. 7): "A eunuch asked Joshua ben Korcha [Korcha means *baldness*], How far is it to Bald-town? He

answered, As far as to Eunuch-town. The min said," etc. The reading and translation of the dialogue that follows are very doubtful. Three different explanations may be found in Levy's *Neu-Heb. Wörterbuch*, under אִיקָא, עִקָא, and מְצוּיִנָא. The min ends by running his head against a wall! The point of interest is that a min eunuch makes game of a rabbi. We need not suppose he was a *εὐνοῦχος διὰ τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*. Mention may also be made of the passage in *Abhodah zarah* iii. 4, where Rabban Gamaliel is hard put to it by Proclus, the son of "a philosopher."

The following errata and suggestions refer to the texts. No. 27, line 8 from below, for חוור read חוור; line 5 from below, for הקק read הקק. No. 35, line 2, for והירנן read והא אינן (as conjectured by G. Dalman, *Gr. d. Jüd. pal. Aram.* 89); line 3 from below, for נסב read נסב. No. 36, line 5, for ועשיחם read ועסותם; line 7, for מדרכי read מדרכו. No. 49, last line, for המאבדון read המאבון (as in *Babli*). No. 65, line 9, for חרייהו read חרייהו; line 4 from bottom of page, for הניה read הניה. No. 70, line 1, for התורו read תתורו. No. 85, last line, for מרחשת read מרחשן. No. 88, line 3 from below, for שוה ישוה read שוה. No. 94, line 13, for וחורן read וחורו. No. 100, line 3 from below, for מדר read מדר. No. 106, line 4, for הכי הכי read הכי. No. 108, line 3, for אסחידו read אסחידו. No. 112, line 1, for אומר אומר read אומר. No. 115, line 1, for שכפרו read שכפרו; line 2, insert ו before בעשרת. No. 130, line 3, לרדר stands in *Zuckermandel's* text as here; in the parallel passage in *Talmud* we find לרדות; but the true reading is that of the usual edition of *Tosephtah*, viz. לרדוף.

I cannot close this notice by a list of errata, but must offer my hearty thanks to Mr Herford for all that he has done. It is, indeed, no trifling achievement to have dredged up and examined such a mass of specimens from that sea of *Talmud* and *Midrash*, which few Christian scholars venture to approach. And Mr Herford never puts us off with second-hand erudition, but is always in contact with the original sources.

H. OORT.

LEIDEN.

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*The Book of the Covenant of Moab: A Critical Inquiry into the Original Form of Deuteronomy.*—By John Cullen, M.A., D.Sc. Edinburgh.—Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, Publishers to the University, 1903.

THIS is a very able and scholarlike contribution to the study of *Deuteronomy*, and one, moreover, which is original and interesting in a high degree. If Dr Cullen has proved his thesis, then the opinion on the composition of *Deuteronomy* which has long passed almost unquestioned must be absolutely reversed, while the familiar picture of the great reform under *Josiah* will need serious modification. Dr Cullen has stated his case in a singularly lucid, modest, and attractive style: his reasoning is close and methodical; and whatever our final view of his conclusions may be, we cannot fail to learn much from his careful and competent examination of the *Deuteronomic* vocabulary and style. The present writer does not see his way to

adopt the somewhat revolutionary theory which Dr Cullen propounds. On that account he is all the more anxious to accentuate his sincere respect for Dr Cullen's treatise, and his sense of the serious attention which it thoroughly deserves. It is of course impossible within the limits of a short review to exhibit all or nearly all the learned author's arguments: such of them as are linguistic have to be passed over altogether. An attempt, however, will be made to explain the position which Dr Cullen occupies, and the chief arguments by which he has endeavoured to fortify it.

There are indeed certain points held in common by Dr Cullen and the great mass of critics. He, like them, believes that the reform which Josiah inaugurated in the eighteenth year of his reign, a reform which deeply affected Judaism ever after, and prepared the way for the absolute and final revelation of God in His Son, was based on the book which Hilkiah the priest found in the temple. He, like them, holds that this discovery prompted and shaped the solemn covenant by which king and people bound themselves to their God. Dr Cullen does not doubt that the book which Hilkiah discovered is contained in the text of Deuteronomy as we have it, while, in accordance with the general opinion, he likewise is convinced that the book of Deuteronomy, in its present form, consists of diverse strata, due to various persons at various times, and partly exilic. So far we are on sure ground, away from the sound of battle. The difficulty arises when we ask another question, which is this: Where are we to find the kernel of Deuteronomy, the primary section which furnished Josiah with the programme of his reform? Various answers have been given; yet even here a considerable measure of argument has prevailed. It has always been supposed that the earliest portion of Deuteronomy is to be found in the law properly so called, *i.e.* in xii.-xxvi. Even here allowance must be made for the probability of more recent addition, and for the fusion into one of two revisions of the same text. But all this does not disturb the superior claims of the central chapters xii.-xxvi., as compared with the historical and hortatory introductions which precede and the expanded promises and threats which follow them. Two poetical pieces—the "Song" and the "Blessing of Moses"—may be older in time of actual composition than the law. Nevertheless they have been appended to the law at a later date, and are so far secondary and subsidiary. Nor is the case essentially altered if we look on v.-xi. as an introduction penned by the author of the law himself, designed to assert clearly and emphatically the Mosaic authorship of the code, as well as to prepare the people for the enthusiastic reception of its precepts. The preliminary exhortation may have been published simultaneously with the code, but it has been always assumed that it never existed as a separate work, and was never meant to be more than a preface to the law. Dr Cullen, however, has reversed the order which up till now has been universally admitted. In his view v.-xi., which he calls "the commandment," or the "Book of the Covenant in Moab," is the primitive layer of Deuteronomy: it was written at or near the beginning of Josiah's reign. On the other hand, the "law-code," *i.e.* xii.-xxvi., was an after-thought,

devised and published subsequently to the first great reform in Josiah's reign. The following are the chief arguments which he urges in favour of this novel and startling hypothesis.

Chapters v.-xi., he says, cannot have been written as an introduction to the code of law, because the purpose of the two documents is essentially different. The legislator in xii.-xxvi. lays the main stress on the one place of worship. Sacrifice is to be offered at one place only, and that the place "which Jehovah thy God shall choose out of all thy tribes." Thither oblations of every kind are to be brought: there the Israelite is to rejoice before the Lord his God. This injunction to sacrifice at one place only has been called "the soul of Deuteronomy"; and assuredly it is the soul of the code in xii.-xxvi.; yet in the supposed introduction nothing is said about unity of place. It is the object of worship which occupies the writer's mind. He asks not "where shall we worship," but "whom shall we worship?" and he replies with reiterated emphasis: "Worship Jehovah and Him alone, destroying utterly heathen shrines, and purging the ritual of all the heathen elements which have been intermingled with it." The Hebrews are to renounce once and for ever the use of images in the service of Jehovah, and for this prohibition a definite reason is given: viz., that when God spoke to His people on Horeb, no likeness or form was to be seen. Here, then, Dr Cullen pleads, we have two distinct plans of reform, and we are obliged to ask which of the two is the elder. He decides for the priority of v.-xi., and no one who accepts his presentation of the facts, no one, in other words, who sees in v.-xi. an independent plan of reform, will be at all likely to disagree with him. The obligation of worshipping Jehovah alone had long been a favourite theme of the prophets, and the rejection of images, even if they professed to be images of Jehovah, is at least as old as Hosea. On the other hand, till Hezekiah's time no attempt, so far as we know, was made to forbid sacrifice except in the temple at Jerusalem, let alone the doubtful value of the document in which Hezekiah's proceedings are recorded. Starting then from this premise, Dr Cullen is impelled to take a further step and criticise the narration of Josiah's reform in 2 Kings xxii., xxiii. There, as he thinks, events which followed each other at a considerable interval have been treated as if they had been simultaneous. First of all, the young king became acquainted with the "Book of Covenant," *i.e.* Deut. v.-xi., and in obedience to its behest did away with the worship of the false gods, and the use of images, sacred pillars and Asherahs in the service of Jehovah. After some time had elapsed, the high places were abolished, and sacrifice was restricted to the temple in the capital. At this later date a code was constructed, still preserved in Deut. xii.-xxvi., to regulate anew the religious and civil life of Judah. Now then, as Dr Cullen argues, we have hit upon the natural order of evolution, since a formal law does not go before but follow a great religious change. It is not the cause but the result of a new religious order.

We have seen that Dr Cullen has had to correct the statements of 2 Kings xxii., xxiii., and this in a manner which appears to be somewhat

arbitrary. Even v.-xi., his so-called "Book of the Covenant," will not serve his purpose without radical alteration. He cuts out the decalogue from ch. v. He expunges such expressions as "these are the statutes and the judgments," etc., since in their natural sense they point forward to the specific precepts of the code in xii.-xxvi., though that code, if Dr Cullen is right, had not come into being when the "Book of the Covenant" was first written. Nor is this all or nearly all, for Dr Cullen finds fragments of his primary document outside of Deut. v.-xxvi., nay, outside of Deuteronomy altogether. His "Book of the Covenant" consists of the following passages arranged thus. Deut. xxviii. 69: xxix. 1-5; 7<sup>a</sup>; 8-14: v. 2: iv. 10<sup>b</sup>-16<sup>a</sup>; 19-26: v. 29, 30: vi. 1-25: vii. 1-viii. 18: xxvi. 1, 2<sup>a</sup>; 3\*-5<sup>a</sup>; 6-15; 17, 19\*; 18, 19\*: viii. 19, 20: ix. 1-6: x. 12-21: xxvii. 1<sup>b</sup>; 3<sup>b</sup>; 4<sup>a</sup>; 5-7: xi. 8-28: xxviii. 1\*; 2<sup>a</sup>; 7-15; 20-25<sup>a</sup>; 43-45: xxx. 11-20: Exod. xxiv. 4-8: Deut. xxxii. 45, 46. This scheme, elaborate though it is, by no means represents the intricate nature of Dr Cullen's results. He also attempts to set the "Law Code," *i.e.* xii.-xxvi., once more in its original framework, as well as to distinguish the parts of Deuteronomy which were at first intended to serve as prologue and epilogue for the first combined edition, containing both the "Book of the Covenant in Moab" and the "Law-Code."

We admitted at the outset that Dr Cullen's work is much too complicated for detailed criticism here. A review which did him justice would have to be as long as his own book. So much will scarcely be disputed by anyone who has followed us thus far. It is possible, however, to state in a general way why it is that the present writer remains unconvinced by Dr Cullen's plausible and learned reasoning.

In the first place, the so-called "Book of the Covenant in Moab" is far too vague and hortatory to have produced the effect attributed to it. What was there in long exhortations to serve Jehovah alone and pull down heathen altars that could startle the sovereign and populace of Judah and strike terror into them when they recalled their past neglect, their failure to apprehend the infinite difference between Jehovah and the idols? They had heard all this in far more pointed language over and over again. Jehovah, as the prophets assured them, had been, *de jure* at least, the sole national God ever since He had led them by a mighty deliverance from Egypt, and it is hard to see why the clear statement that this command and covenant had been given to Moses should avail of itself to quicken the prophetic exhortation with new force. The insistence on loyalty to Jehovah must have lost rather than gained in force by the added warnings against intermarriage with the Canaanites and the assurance that there was no occasion to be afraid of them. Such rhetoric as this, though it belongs to the Mosaic setting, had no more than a historical interest for those who lived when the Canaanites had faded into a dim and confused memory. How different when we turn to the "law-code" of xii.-xxvi.! It places on its fore-front the command to serve Jehovah and none but Him, and instantly adds that Jehovah is to be worshipped at one place

only, the place which He by His own will has chosen to set His name there for ever. The precept was new, and yet God had been preparing the way for it. Jerusalem had gained in prestige by the fall of the Northern kingdom, and the Assyrian, the rod of the divine anger, had swept away many a time-honoured sanctuary in the land of the ten tribes. We may well accept Dr Cullen's contention that a code of law is the result rather than the starting-point of a religious reform. The code in xii.-xxvi. is the precipitate of prophetic teaching maintained for centuries together; only it sums up the teaching with legal precision and drives it home by connecting it with a definite enactment on the one place of sacrifice, an enactment of an external and material kind, which gave, as it were, a body to the prophetic teaching, and could be understood by those to whom purely spiritual lessons appealed in vain. This limitation of sacrifice, moreover, placed the ritual under the immediate supervision of the prophetic party at Jerusalem, and saved religion from the syncretism sure to come so long as Jehovah was worshipped at many shrines, once the seats of worship paid to the Canaanite Baals. The temple at Jerusalem was free, so far as its origin went, from such dangerous associations, for it had been built by Solomon, the son of Israel's darling hero, the famous captain of Jehovah's hosts. Once let us suppose that the law in xii.-xxvi. had been written, and the introductory exhortation in v.-xiv. is intelligible and appropriate. Why should the writer dwell on the one place of sacrifice? He is not promulgating a law, but preparing the people for the acceptance of a law by awakening within the right moral and religious predispositions. It is to be observed, moreover, that the "Book of the Covenant in Moab," even when corrected and reconstructed by Dr Cullen, still does in all probability contain a striking reference to the central shrine which is henceforth to absorb the sacrificial worship of Israel. The people are reminded that Jehovah their God is not one God but one "Jehovah." The warning was seasonable, for the existence of altars up and down the country would foster the belief that the Jehovah, say of Beersheba, was a different being from the Jehovah of Bethel. Even in the Christian Church such perverse superstition has not been quite unknown. Ignorant Romanists, as readers of Quentin Durward may remember, came to regard our Lady of Chartres and our Lady of Monserrat as rival, not identical, objects of worship.

Finally, we cannot help doubting whether, if the real history of the Deuteronomic text was as perplexing as Dr Cullen believes it to be, the wit of man would ever find the clue by which to thread its way through such a labyrinth. We confess to a suspicion that he has undertaken an impossible task and yielded to that hypercriticism which mars a good deal of recent work by biblical and classical scholars. But we gratefully acknowledge the stimulus he has given to the study of a book which must always hold a foremost place in the religious literature of mankind.

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- L *Harper (W. R.)* The Structure of the Book of Amos. 38p. 4to. Univ. of Chicago Press, 1904. ["An effort has been made in this paper to present the text of Amos with special reference to (1) its strophic structure; (2) the separation of later additions; (3) such modifications of the text as a conservative criticism would suggest."]
- 5k *Moulton (J. H.)* Characteristics of New Testament Greek. V. and VI. Expos., June and Aug. 1904.
- t *Nestle (Prof. E.)* A New Greek Testament Text, with Critical Apparatus. 668p. B. and F. Bible Soc., 1904.
- y *Whittaker (Thomas)* The Origins of Christianity, with an Outline of Van Manen's Analysis of the Pauline Literature. 232p. Watts, 1904. [The Gospel story is not merely legendary but mythical. Before the Fall of the Temple we must assume nothing at all corresponding to Christianity save an obscure cult and an indeterminate Messianic movement. The quasi-historical life and death of Jesus, around which a new sect or sects came to cohere, did not take form till after the year 70. The period of oral myth-making lasted till end of first century and then began the production of N.T. literature.]
- 6 *Bacon (B. W.)* The "Coming One" of John the Baptist. Expos., July 1904. [Supposes the Baptist's conception of the "Coming One" to have been vague and indeterminate, and not necessarily referring to the Messiah.]
- Klein (G.)* Zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrasch. Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1904. [Parallels are given to a few of the Gospel incidents.]
- Loisy (A.)* Review of Wellhausen's *Das Evangelium Marci* and *Das Evangelium Matthaei*. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May-June 1904.
- b *Bennett (W. H.)* The Life of Christ according to St Mark xxvii. Expos., July 1904.
- N *Cairns (D. S.)* The "Self Assertion" of Jesus, i. Cont. R., Sept. 1904. [Deals largely with Dr Martineau's view that Jesus did not claim to be the Messiah.]
- r *Lytelton (E.)* The teaching of Christ about Divorce. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- Ross (D. M.)* Teaching of Jesus. 212p. *Handbooks for Bible Classes*. T. & T. Clark, 1904.
- y *Anon.* The Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels. III. Ch. Quar. R., July 1904. [Dealing apologetically with the narratives of the Infancy and the Resurrection.]
- Burton (E. de Witt)* A short introduction to the Gospels. 150p. Univ. of Chicago Press, 1904.
- C *Bernard (J. H.)* The Death of Judas. Expos., June 1904. [A consideration of the differences in the accounts given in Matthew and Acts.]
- Milne (T.)* S. Matthew's Parallel Narratives. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- D *Burkitt (F. C.)* St Mark and Divorce. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- S *Moffatt (J.)* Loisy upon the Sermon on the Mount. Expos., Aug. 1904.
- 7M *Clemen (Carl)* Paulus, sein Leben und Wirken. Th. i. Untersuchung. Th. ii. Darstellung. Ricker, 1904.
- Milligan (G.)* The Authenticity of the 2nd Epistle to the Thessalonians. Expos., June 1904. [A defence.]
- S *Eagar (A. R.)* The Authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Expos., July and Aug. 1904. [To prove Luke's authorship of the Epistle.]
- U *Kirn (Dr)* Noch einmal Jakobus, iv. 5. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1904. [Further discussion of the author's proposed emendation: *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* for *πρὸς ἠδέρων*.]
- Cullen (E. H.)* Teaching of James: Studies in Ethics of Epistle of James. 256p. Stockwell, 1904.
- Matthews (J. H. D.)* Spiritual Healing. Expos., Aug. 1904. [Exegesis of James v. 14 and 15.]
- Y *Chapman (J.)* The Historical Setting of the Second and Third Epistles of St John. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- Findlay (G. G.)* Studies in the First Epistle of John, iii. and iv. Expos., July and Aug. 1904.
- Z *Cladder (H. J.)* Strophical Structure in St Jude's Epistle. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- Mayor (J. B.)* Notes on the Text of the Epistle of Jude. Expos., June 1904.
- 8 *Ramsay (W. M.)* The Letter to the Church in Pergamum. Expos., June 1904.
- Ramsay (W. M.)* The Letter to the Church in Thyatira. Expos., July 1904.
- Ramsay (W. M.)* The Letter to the Church in Sardis. Expos., Aug. 1904.
- 9 *Schmidt (Carl), ed.* Acta Pauli aus der Heidelberger Koptischen Papyrus, Handschrift No. 1 herausgegeben. Uebersetzung, Untersuchungen und Koptischer Text. Vol. i., 328p. Vol. ii., Tafelband, 80 Photographic Plates. Hinrichs, 1904. [An important and long-expected work. The fragments, beautifully reproduced in vol. ii., were originally purchased from a dealer in Coptic antiquities in Achmin, and have already thrown much new light on the nature of this ancient work.]
- See *J. H. Wilkinson* in Crit. R., July 1904; and *F. Bacchus* in Dub. R., July 1904.
- Grenfell (B. P.)* and *Hunt (A. S.), ed.* New Sayings of Jesus and Fragment of a Lost Gospel. (Egypt Exploration Fund.) With Translation and Commentary. 45p. Frowde, 1904.
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- Anon.* The New Sayings of Jesus. Ch. Quar. R., July 1904.
- Büchler (A.)* Eine eigenthümliche Einzelheit des Astartendienstes in den Psalmen Salomos. 24p. Vierteljahrsschrift für Bibelkunde, May 1904. [In the passage viii. 8-13.]
- Macler (F.)* L'Apocalypse arabe de Daniel. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May-June 1904. [Introduction, Arabic text, and translation. The writer thinks it is a Christian work.]

- Waitz (H.)* Simon Magus in der altchristlichen Literatur. Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1904.
- C CHURCH** 14 \* *Social Problems*, 20 \* *Polity*, 42 \* *Liturgical*, 50 \* *Sacraments*, 60 *Missions*.
- 14 *Percival (J.)* The Church and National Life—Union and Progress. A Charge delivered to the Clergy and Churchwardens of the Diocese of Hereford. 91p. Rivingtons, 1904.
- Hunt (W. H.), ed.* Sermons on Social Subjects. 252p. Skeffington, 1904. [By various authors and preached at St Paul's Church, Covent Garden, under the auspices of the Christian Social Union.]
- 20 *Louvie (W.)* The Church and its Organization in Primitive Catholic Times. An Interpretation of Rudolph Sohm's "Kirchenrecht." The Primitive Age. 402p. Longmans, 1904.
- 26 *Hayman (the late Rev. H.)* The Position of the Laity in the Church. J. of Th. St., July 1904. [A criticism of the Report of the Joint Committee of the Convocation of Canterbury on the Position of the Laity. Scripture and Church History testify to the elective rights of the clergy and laity, but give no support to the idea of real lay partnership in government.]
- 30 *Macfayden (D.)* Humanity measured by Jesus Christ. Cont. R., Aug. 1904.
- 40 *Scott (Hugh M.)* The Place of *oikodomē* in New Testament Worship. Princeton Th. R., July 1904.
- 41 *Codrington (H. W.)* The Syrian Liturgies of the Presanctified. III. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- 42 *Freisen (J.)* Manuale Lincopense, Breviarum Scarense, Manuale Aboense. Katholische Ritualbücher Schwedens und Finnlands im Mittelalter. 260p. Paderborn, Junfermannsche.
- Turton (Z. H.), ed.* The Vedast Missal, or Missale Parvum Vedastinum. A 13th Cent. MS., probably Flemish, but containing the germ of the subsequent English uses. 112p. Baker, 1904.
- 43 *Stales (Vernon), ed.* Essays on Ceremonial. By Various Authors. 322p. (*Library of Liturgiology and Ecclesiology for English Readers.*) DelaMore Press, 1904.
- 53 *Holtzmann (O.)* Das Abendmahl im Urchristentum. Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1904.
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- 60 *Delagneau (S.)* L'Évangélisation apostolique et l'évangélisation actuelle en pays catholique. Rev. chrétienne, June 1904. [A rather pessimistic account, from the Protestant side, of Protestant evangelising work in Roman Catholic Canada.]
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- D DOCTRINE** 10 \* *God*, 22 \* *Christ*, 60 \* *Eschatology*, 70 \* *Faith*, 90 *Apologetics*.
- 11 *Mann (C. N.)* The Divine Fatherhood. 140p. Hodgson, 1904.
- 12 *Masterman (J. H. B.)* Was Jesus Christ Divine? Enquiry into Credibility of the Incarnation. 120p. Gardner, Darton, 1904.
- 15 *Watkins (O. D.)* Divine Providence. 192p. Rivingtons, 1904.
- 20 *Clark (H. W.)* The Christ from Without and Within. A Study of the Gospel by St John. 232p. Melrose, 1904.
- Walker (W. H.)* The Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the New Testament. Amer. J. of Th., July 1904.
- 22 *Butler (Slade)* The Virgin Birth. 19th Cent., July 1904.
- 26 *Tymms (T. V.)* Christian Idea of Atonement. Lectures delivered at Regent's Park College, London, in 1903. 488p. Macmillan, 1904.
- 33 *Mason (A. J.)* A Modern Theory of the Fall. J. of Th. St., July 1904. [A criticism of Tennant's *Origin and Propagation of Sin and The Fall and Original Sin.*]
- 42 *Scheel (O.)* Zu Augustins Anschauung von der Erlösung durch Christus. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1904.
- 58 *Hamilton (Jos.)* Our Own and other Worlds; intr. by W. H. Withrow. New York, Eaton & Mains, 1904. [An argument in favour of the theory that the other worlds are inhabited.]
- 62 *Proctor (F. B.)* Lost Article of the Creed; New Testament Teaching on Condition of the Dead. 286p. Simpkin, 1904.
- 63 *Raniles (M.)* After Death, is there a Post-mortem Probation? 278p. Kelly, 1904.
- 80 *Churchman (P. H.)* An Appeal to the New School of Theology. I. Biblio. Sacra, July 1904.
- Temple (Henry)* Trinity in Unity. Four Lectures. 46p. Longmans, 1904. [Lectures preached in York Minster urging the importance of preserving the *status* of the Anglican Communion in its relation to the Church Catholic.]
- Welldon (Bishop)* A Practical View of the Athanasian Creed. 19th Cent., July 1604.
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- 1 *Chandler (A.)* Greater Catechism at Work in a Large Town Parish. 136p. Mowbray, 1904.
- 7 *Inge (W. R.)* Light, Life and Love. Selections from the German Mystics of the Middle Ages. 224p. Methuen, 1904.
- Lyman (E. W.)* Faith and Mysticism. Amer. J. of Th., July 1904.
- 10 *Gibson (W. E. Boyce)* A Philosophical Introduction to Ethics. 223p. Sonnenschein, 1904. [An advocacy of the spiritual principle in Ethics from the point of view of Personal Idealism. Author advances to his position through a critical examination of the views of Taylor, Green, Bradley and others.]

*Bergemann (P.)* Ethik als Kulturphilosophie. 640p. Hoffmann 1904.

*Giddings (F. H.)* The Heart of Mr Spencer's Ethics. Inter. J. Eth., July 1904. [The most direct avenue to Spencer's philosophy of life lies through his ideas upon the subject of militarism.]

*Kutna (G.)* Egoismus und Altruismus als Grundlage des Sittlichen. 108p. Mayer und Müller, 1903.

*Gusti (Demetrius)* Egoismus und Altruismus, ii. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxviii. 2, 1904.

[The individual is from a psychological and ethical point of view neither egoistic nor altruistic. The individual will as such is in consequence of its psychical structure dependent on others. Out of the interaction of individual wills arises the collective will; the terms egoism and altruism only applicable in cases of conflict between the individual and the collective will.]

*Westermarck (E.)* Remarks on the Subjects of Moral Judgments.

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904. [Moral judgments may be passed on the motives of acts as well as upon the acts themselves simply in virtue of their volitional character.]

*Jones (E. E. C.)* Professor Sidgwick's Ethics. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904. [Defends Sidgwick as against the criticisms of J. Seth and Moore.]

*Ingram (John K.)* Practical Morals: A Treatise on Universal Education. 177p. Black, 1904.

[Written from the standpoint of Positivism. A study of the entire life of the individual in its relations to the larger life of the race.]

*Parodi (D.)* Morale et Biologie. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1904. [Deals particularly with the views of Metchnikoff.]

20 *Berolzheimier (F.)* System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie. Bd. i. Kritik des Erkenntnisinhalte. 328p. Beck, 1904.

*Adler (M.)* und *Hilferding (R.)* Marx-Studien. 433p. Brand, 1904.

*Fournière (E.)* Les théories socialistes au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. 446p. Alean, 1904.

*Lanson (G.)* L'histoire littéraire et la sociologie.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1904. [Subject matter of literary history in great part sociological. Great literary personalities are at least in some measure representatives of the collective life.]

*Taylor (J. L.)* Aspects of Social Evolution. 1st Series, Temperaments. 330p. Smith, E., 1904.

*Goldscheid (Rudolf)* Jahresbericht über Erscheinungen der Soziologie in den Jahren 1899-1904, I. Ar. f. system. Phil., x. 3, 1904. [Discusses *inter alia* Simmell's *Philosophie des Geldes*, which has hitherto been far from estimated at its proper value.]

*Kropotkin (Prince)* The Ethical Need of the Present Day. 19th Cent., Aug. 1904.

23 *Russell (Hon. R.)* First Conditions of Human Prosperity. 156p. Longmans, 1904.

*Kinley (D.)* Money. A Study of the Medium of Exchange. (The Citizen's Library.) 433p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Seager (H. R.)* Introduction to Economics. Bell, 1904.

*Rist (Ch.)* Économie optimiste et économie scientifique.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1904.

*Oppenheimer (F.)* Ein neues Bevölkerungsgesetz.

Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxviii. 2, 1904. [Defends his theory that the produced and producible means of subsistence, in consequence of the unceasing progress in agriculture, constantly increases with the increase of population, as against those who maintain the law of decreasing returns.]

*Unwin (G.)* Industrial Organisation in 16th and 17th Centuries. 286p. Frowde, 1904.

*Lichtenberger (M.)* L'assistance par la terre. Colonies agricoles et jardins ouvriers.

Rev. du christianisme social, May 1904. [An account of schemes tried in various countries to provide work on the land for the unemployed.]

24 *Comte (L.)* Placement à la campagne des ouvriers sans travail.

Rev. du christianisme social, May 1904.

*Harrison (A.)* Women's Industries in Liverpool. 64p. Williams & Norgate, 1904.

*Higgs (Mary)* How to deal with the Unemployed. 202p. Brown, Langham, 1904.

27 *Barnes (Earl)* Student Honor: A Study in Cheating. Inter. J. Eth., July 1904.

*Beroliet (J. J. Van)* L'éducation de la mémoire à l'école. Rev. Phil., June 1904. [Account of an attempt made in a primary school to institute a rational course of training of the memory.]

*Lewis (W.)* General View of History and Organisation of Public Education in the German Empire. Tr. Asher, 1904.

*Wylie (R. C.)* Our Training Schools for Citizenship. Biblio. Sacra, July 1904.

*Thompson (H. M.)* Moral Education in Schools, i. Inter. J. Eth., July 1904.

[Whether in combination with religious instruction or not, direct moral instruction is the logical outcome of the demand of the parents that the tone of a school shall be good. Sketch of a course of moral instruction actually applicable to children.]

*Holcombe (Hon. Chester)* The Moral Training of the Young in China.

Inter. J. Eth., July 1904.

28 *Tolstoy (Leo)* "Bethink yourselves!" Trans. by U. Tchertkoff and I. F. M. 64p. Free Age Press, 1904.

[Reprint of the Author's Letter to the Times on the Russo-Japanese War.]

30 *Craigie (Mrs)* The Science of Life. 60p. Burns & Oates, 1904.

31 *Howard (G. E.)* A History of Matrimonial Institutions chiefly in England and the United States; with an introductory analysis of the literature and the theories of primitive marriage and the family. 3 vols. 1579p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1904. [Contains a bibliography and index of cases.]

34 *Chapple (W. A.)* The Fertility of the Unfit. Pref. by Rutherford Waddell. 142p. Whitcombe & Tombs, 1904.

41 *Barnicoat (C. A.)* The Government Prison Settlement at Waitapu, New Zealand.

Inter. J. Eth., July 1904.

[An experiment in the utilisation of prison labour.]

50 *Brown (H.)* The impending peril, or, Methodism and Amusements. 304p. Cincinnati, Jennings & Graham, 1904.

- 84 *Fehlandt (A. F.)* A Century of Drink Reform in the United States. 410p. Cincinnati, Jennings & Graham, 1904.

#### F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons

*Briggs (C. A.)* A Plea for the Higher Study of Theology.

Amer. J. of Th., July 1904.

[Urges a higher standard of theological education for the ministry; otherwise the decline in intellectual respect for Church and Ministry must go on.]

- 1 *Weldon (J. E. C.)* Difficulty of Preaching Sermons. 19th Cent., Sept. 1904.  
*Pierson (A. T.)* Making of a Sermon. 400p. Marshall, 1904.  
*Richardson (E. C.)* Voragine as a Preacher. Princeton Th. R., July 1904.  
*Butler (W. J.)* Butler's Sermons for Working Men. (The Oxford Sermon Library, Vol. ii.) 298p. Mowbray, 1904.  
 [Preached to agricultural labourers by the late Dean of Lincoln, when he was incumbent of Wareside, and first published in 1847.]  
*Hancock (Thos.)* The Pulpit and the Press, and other Sermons. 298p. Brown, Langham, 1904.  
*Meyer (F. B.)* In the Beginning God! 214p. (World's Pulpit Series.) S. C. Brown, 1904.  
*Smith (Martin R.)* The Divine Presence. 203p. Longmans, 1904.

#### G BIOGRAPHY 2 English

*Anon.* Christian Sanctity.

Ch. Quar. R., July 1904.

[Brief sketches of the lives of S. Teresa, S. Francis de Sales and S. Vincent de Paul.]

*Gregory the Great: a Life of Pope St. Gregory the Great* written by a monk of the Monastery of Whitby (probably about A.D. 713). Now for the first time fully printed from MS. Gallen, 567, by Francis Aidan Gasquet.

*Hocedez (E.)* Nicolai de Fara Prafatio in Vitam S. Johannis a Capistrano.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 2 and 3.

[Text and introduction.]

*Manitius (M.)* Collationes ad SS. Augustinum Leonem Caesarium Baronti visionem.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 2 and 3.

*Moren (Dom)* La plus ancienne vie de S. Ursmer.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 2 and 3.

[Latin Text of an acrostic poem which the writer thinks is due to S. Ermin, Ursmer's immediate successor.]

*Poncellet (A.)* Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum latinorum bibliothecæ publicæ Rotomagensis.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 2 and 3.

[Besides the enumeration and description of the codices, the text of ten fragments is given.]

*Poupardin (R.)* Vie de S. Romain du Mans attribuée à Grégoire de Tours.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 2 and 3.

[Text is given. Gregory's authorship is denied.]

- 1 *Kawerau (G.)* Luther und Luthertum. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1904.  
 [A sharp attack on Père Denife's *Luther u. Luthertum*, and *Luther in rationalistischer und christlicher Beleuchtung*.]

- 2 *Dyke (Paul Van)* Thomas Cromwell. Part II. Princeton Th. R., July 1904.  
*Lawless (Hon. E.)* Maria Edgeworth. (English Men of Letters.) 219p.

Macmillan, 1904.

*Lennox (Cuthbert)* Henry Drummond. A Biographical Sketch (with Bibliography). 5th ed. 278p. Melrose, 1904.

*Walker (T. H.)* Clerical Cameos. A Series of Pen Portraits of typical Scottish Ministers. 118p. Glasgow, Ker & Co., 1904.

- T *Carlyle (H.)* Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell. With elucidations. Ed. with Notes, Supplement, and enl. Index, by S. C. Lomas. Intro. by C. H. Firth. 3 vols. 1774p. Methuen, 1904.

V *(An Old Boy)* Early Days at Uppingham under Edward Thring. 163p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Douglas (G., Sir)* Life of Major-Gen. Wauchope. 3 Ports. in Photogravure. 438p. Hodder & S., 1904.

*Green (T. B.)* Life and Work of Samuel Smiles. Pref. by Mrs A. Tweedie. 68p.

Betterment of London Printing and Publishing Co., 1904.

- 4 *Aeschimann (J.)* Une grande figure de prêtre social.

Rev. chrétienne, June, July 1904.

[Biographical account of the Abbé Rambaud.]

*Dartique (H.)* Profil d'universitaire.

Rev. chrétienne, June 1904.

[Biographical sketch of M. Octave Gréard, "the first teacher in France."]

*Ilbert (Sir C.)* Montesquieu. The Romanes Lecture, 1904. 46p.

Clarendon Press, 1904.

- 7 *Steiner (E. A.)* Tolstoy the Man. Macmillan, 1904.

73 *G. R.* John Alexander Dowie. Rev. chrétienne, June 1904.

#### H HISTORY x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

*Lécrivain (Ch.)* Études sur l'Histoire Auguste. 452p. Nutt, 1904.

*Newberry (P. E.)* and *Garstang (J.)* A Short History of Ancient Egypt. 111p.

Constable, 1904.

- x *Delehaye (H.)* Passio sanctorum sexaginta martyrum.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 2 and 3.

[The story of sixty soldiers martyred in Palestine at the time of the Arab conquest. "The document is important as giving the key to a series of hitherto obscure literary and hagiographical problems."]

C Lausiac History, Readings seemingly complete in the MSS. of the, by E. C. Butler. J. of Th. St., July 1904.

Lausiac History of Palladius. II. By Dom Cuthbert Butler. (Texts and Studies.) 8vo. 382p. Clay, 1904.

R Cambridge Modern History (The). Planned by the late Lord Acton. Vol. VIII. The French Revolution. 904p.

C. J. Clay, 1904.

*Anon.* The Cambridge Modern History. Edin. R., July 1904.

[Deals with Vol. II. on the Reformation.]

- 1 *Gasquet (Abbot)* English Monastic Life. Illus. 346p. Methuen, May 1904.
- 2 *Anon.* Truth in History. Ch. Quar. R., July 1904.  
[An indictment of the method of Carlyle and other historians, as illustrated in their treatment of Cromwell.]  
*Tacemlow (J. A.), Prep.* Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland. Papal Letters, Vol. vi., A.D. 1404-1415. 663p. Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1904.
- V *Amos (A.), Hough (W. W.)* Cambridge Mission to South London. A 20 years' survey. Macmillan, 1904.
- 6 *Hull (Eleanor)* Pagan Ireland. Epochs of Irish History. I. 228p. Nat., 1904.
- 4 *Armstrong (E.)* French Wars of Religion: Their Political Aspects. Expansion of three lectures delivered before Oxford University Extension Summer Meeting of August 1902. *Corr. edit.* 140p. Simpkin, 1904.  
*Reuss (R.)* Vieilles paperasses et vieilles gens. (Souvenirs d'une famille alsacienne au temps de la Révolution.)  
Rev. chrétienne, June and July 1904.
- 73 *Anon.* Religious Liberty in America. Ch. Quar. R., July 1904.  
[Short account of American Church History.]

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R. C. Church* 3 *Anglican.*

- Crum (W. E.)* Inscriptions from Shenonté's Monastery. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- A *Bigg (C.)* Notes on the Didache. J. of Th. St., July 1904.
- C *Anon.* Clement of Alexandria. Ch. Quar. R., July 1904.  
*Cramer (J. A.)* Die Erste Apologie Justins. *Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss.*, Heft 2, 1904.  
[First article. Writer thinks the Apologies are composite, partly the work of Justin, and partly that of an Alexandrian Jewish Christian. This is an attempt to recover the original form.]  
*Brooks (E. W.), ed.* and *trans.* The Sixth Book of the Select Letters of Serverus of Antioch. In the Syriac Version of Athanasius of Nisibis. Vol. ii. (Translation). Part II. 232-480p. Williams & Norgate, 1904.  
*Chrystal (J.)* Authoritative Christianity: the Six Synods of the Undivided Church. Vol. 2, Council of Ephesus, Acts ii.-vi. 491p. Jersey City, Chrystal, 1904.  
*Jones (A. S. D.)* A Homily of St Ephrem. J. of Th. St., July 1904.  
[Text and translation.]
- 2 *Casartelli (L. C.)* The Dutch Pope. Dub. R., July 1904.  
[Pope Adrian VI.]  
*Benedict XIV. (Pope).* Opera inedita primam publicavit Franciscus Heiner. 478p. St Louis, B. Herder, 1904.  
*Corneloup (Abbé)* Story of my Conversion. Trans. from French by H. E. W. and M. M. 126p.  
*Griseille (Eugène)* Fénelon Méta-physicien. (Œuvres inédites) fin. Rev. de Phil., July 1904.

- Lilly (W. S.)* Cardinal Newman and the New Generation. Fort. R., Aug. 1904.  
*Passy (P.)* The Religious Situation in France. Cont. R., July 1904.  
*Massie (J.)* Concession, Compromise and Concordat. Cont. R., Aug. 1904.
- 3 *Comper (J.)* Church Principles; or, Scriptural Teaching of British Churches. Pref. by Richard Meux Benson. Memoir by James Wiseman. 232p. Stock, 1904.
- 4 *Luther (Martin)* Works. Standard ed., tr. and ed. J. N. Lenker, in 13 v., v. 3. Epistles of St Peter and St Jude explained. 383p. Minneapolis, Lee.  
*Hastie (W.)* The Theology of the Reformed Church in its Fundamental Principles. Ed. by W. Fulton. 282p. Clark, 1904.

[The Croall Lectures for 1892.]

*Lods (Arnaud)* Les Associations décalrées pour l'exercice du culte.

Rev. chrétienne, June 1904.

[Gives account of a project now before the French Chamber for the separation of Church and State. The associations referred to are Lutheran, and their object is to prevent the separation, and, failing that, to help the disendowed churches (Lutheran).]

*Knappert (L.)* De theologie van Petrus Bloccius. Th. Tijd., July 1904.  
[A Dutch reformer of 16th century.]

5 *Foster (F. H.)* Prof. Park's Theological System. Biblio. Sacra, July 1904.  
[Conclusion. Deals with Park's views on Regeneration, Sanctification, and Eschatology.]

*Brown (J.)* From the Restoration of 1660 to the Revolution of 1688. 148p. (*Eras of Nonconformity.*) T. Law, 1904.

*Fothergill (G.)* List of Emigrant Ministers to America, 1690-1811. E. Stock, 1904.

*Birrell (Augustine)* The Case of the Free Church. Indep. R., Sept. 1904.

See also *Balfour (Frances)* in Nat. R., Sept. 1904.

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- Lee (Vernon)* The Nature of Literature, i. Cont. R., Sept. 1904.
- Elton (Oliver)* The Meaning of Literary History. Quar. R., July 1904.  
[Deals mainly with Courthope's *History of English Poetry* and Saintsbury's *History of English Literature.*]
- H *Ker (W. P.)* The Dark Ages. (Periods of European Literature.) 360p. Blackwood, 1904.  
[A survey of European Literature from the 6th century to the end of the 11th.]
- 2 *Gwynn (Stephen)* The Masters of English Literature. 424p. Macmillan, 1904.  
*Anon.* English Poetry from Shakespeare to Dryden. Church Quar. R., July 1904.  
[Review of Courthope's *History of English Poetry.*]
- Lilly (W. S.)* Shakespeare's Protestantism. Fort. R., June 1904.
- Gregory (A. E.)* The Hymn-Book of the Modern Church. Brief Studies of Hymns and Hymn Writers. 350p. Kelly, 1904.
- Waller (A. R.), ed.* Poems by Richard Crashaw. (Camb. English Classics.) 402p. Camb. U. Press, 1904.

- V *Butler (Samuel)* Essays on Life, Art and Science. Edited by R. A. Streetfield. 340p. Richards, 1904.
- Anon.* Matthew Arnold and Insularity. Edin. R., July 1904.  
[Arnold's message is one for individuals, and not, as he insisted, for communities.]
- Hayllar (Florence)* Legend of Saint Frideswide and other Poems. Constable, 1904.
- Yeats (W. B.)* Tables of the Law and Adoration of the Magi. (Vigo Cabinet Series.) Mathews, 1904.
- W *Welsford (Enid)* The Seagulls, and other Poems. 84p. Putnam, 1904.  
[These poems, many of them simple and pretty, and all free from precocity, were written by a little girl between the ages of six and ten years. Introduction by Mr Bosworth Smith.]
- Swinburne (C. A.)* A Channel Passage, and other Poems. Chatto & Windus, 1904.
- 4 *Ker (W. P.)* A Great French Scholar, Gaston Paris. Quar. R., July 1904.
- Tollemache (Beatrice L.)* select. and trans. Diderot's Thoughts on Art and Style. 274p. Rivingtons (Second Edition).
- Courtney (W. L.)* The Development of Maurice Maeterlinck, and other Essays. 174p. Grant Richards, 1904.
- 17 *Stange (C.)* Das Problem Tolstois. 34p. Dieterich, 1904.

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- Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*
- Frobenius (L.)* Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes. Reimer, 1904.
- 5 *Anon.* Buddhist India. Ch. Quar. R., July 1904.
- 6 *Smith (H. G.)* Persian Dualism. Amer. J. of Th., July 1904.
- 7 *Adler (M. N.)* The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela (continued). Jewish Q. R., July 1904.  
[Text with translation.]
- Ginzberg (L.)* Genizah Studies. I. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.  
[Text of British Museum fragment (13th century), giving three answers from a collection of Geonic Responsa.]
- Gottheil (R. J. H.)* Some Spanish Documents. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.  
[I. Early Spanish Shetarot. II. A Marrano pedigree.]
- Henriques (H. S. Q.)* The Jews and the English Law. VI. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.  
[The writer declares that all Cromwell did for the Jews was to connive at the presence of some half-dozen families in England. This article is mainly a review of the general religious conditions in Charles II.'s reign.]
- Hirschfeld (H.)* The Arabic Portion of the Genizah at Cambridge. VI. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.
- Margoliouth (G.)* Spanish Service-Books in the British Museum. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.  
[Description of MSS. of Spanish synagogal liturgies.]
- Poznański (S.)* Ibn Hazm über jüdische Secten. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.
- Schechter (S.)* The Mechilta to Deuteronomy. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.  
[Text and notes.]

*Wünsche (A.)* Gedanken über Bild und Vergleichung im Hebräischen und Arabischen nach Wesen und Bedeutung.

Vierteljahr für Bibelkunde, May 1904.  
*Steinschneider (M.)* Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters. Jewish Q. R., July 1904.

*Lévy (Louis-Germain)* Une Religion rationnelle et laïque. 2nd ed. 77p.

Barbier-Marillier, 1904.  
[An attempt to show that Judaism is a religion in accord with modern science and philosophy.]

*Scott (H. Macdonald)* The Modern Jew: his whence and whither.

- Biblio. Sacra, July 1904.
- 8 The Awakening of the Soul. A philosophical Romance. Rendered from the Arabic, with an Introduction by Dr Paul Brönnle. Orient Press, 1904.
- Tisdall (W. St Clair)* Manual of Leading Muhammadan Objections to Christianity. 240p. S. P. C. K., 1904.
- 9 *Thompson (R. C.)* The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia. Vol. ii. "Fever Sickness" and "Headache," etc. (Semitic Text and Translation Series.) 179p. Luzac, 1904.
- Anon.* The History of Magic during the Christian Era. Edin. R., July 1904.
- 12 *Crawford (C. H.)* Natural laws governing the mortal and immortal worlds. 223p. Chicago, Homewood Pub. Co., 1904.
- Drake (Mrs M. E. B. L.)* Psychic light the continuity of law and life. 605p. St Louis, L. C. Parker, 1904.
- 31 *Anon.* Recent Lights on Ancient Egypt. Quar. R., July 1904.  
[Main requirement of Egyptology seems now more than ever to be accuracy of observation and of interpretation, which also means distinguishing clearly between fact and conjecture.]
- 52 *Revon (M.)* Le Shintoïsme (3<sup>e</sup> article). 2. Le Monde des dieux. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May-June 1904.

#### P PHILOSOPHY 10 • Metaphysics, 21 Epistemology, 33 • Psychological Research, 40 • Psychology, 60 • Logic, 70 • Systems, 90 • Philosophers.

- Moore (G. E.)* Philosophy in the United Kingdom for 1902. Ar. f. system. Phil., x. 2, 1904.  
[Deals with Sidgwick's Scope and Relations of Philosophy and Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau. Criticises also Schiller's essay in Personal Idealism. Schiller confuses the existence and persistence of a belief with the truth of its object.]
- Bos (C.)* La philosophie française, 1902. Ar. f. system. Phil., x. 2, 1904.  
[Discusses *inter alia* Xavier Léon's work on the Philosophy of Fichte.]
- h *Mozley (J. R.)* European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Quar. R., July 1904.  
[Discusses Merz's first two vols.]
- 11 *Opitz (H.)* Grundriss einer Seins-Wissenschaft. Th. 2. 233p. Haacke, 1904.
- 12 *Hodgson (Shadworth H.)* Method in Philosophy. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904.  
[The validity and primacy of philosophy does not depend upon its success in framing a speculative theory of the universe: all our knowledge is based upon data which are

- revelations, in the sense that we have no further test of their truth.]
- 13 *Favre (Louis)* Notes sur l'histoire générale des sciences. 131p. Schleicher, 1904.
- 14 *Fischer (Julius)* Zum Raum- und Zeit-Problem. Ar. f. system. Phil., x. 3, 1904.  
[In space and time, infinity and eternity are not to be found; they are not perceptible objective qualities, but conceptions which we form by abstracting from space and time altogether. Infinity is the negation of space and eternity the negation of time.]
- 17 *Singer (E. A.)* On Mechanical Explanation. Phil. R., May 1904.  
[It is in the development of biological science, if anywhere in experience, that we must look for facts that promise ultimately to resist mechanical explanation. Here, however, the author can find no obstacle to our progress in the direction indicated by the mechanical ideal.]
- Whetham (W. C. D.)* The Recent Development of Physical Science. 356p. Murray, 1904.  
[An attempt to consider first the philosophic foundations of physics, and then to trace some of the more important developments of the experimental investigations for which the last few years have been remarkable. The latter include the liquefaction of Gases, the problems of Solution, the conduction of Electricity through Gases, Radio-activity, Atoms and Aether and Astro-Physics. The book is as far as possible without technical language, and appeals to students of science in general.]
- Levy (L. A.), Willis (H. G.)* Radium, and other Radio-active Elements. 105p. Marshall, 1904.
- Soddy (F.)* Radio-Activity. An Elementary Treatise from the Standpoint of the Disintegration Theory. 214p. The Electrician Office, 1904.
- Strutt (Hon. R. J.)* Radium: its Properties and Possibilities. Nat. R., Sep. 1904.
- Zimmern (Antonia)* Invisible Radiations. 19th Cent., July 1904.
- 18 *Von Hartmann (Edward)* Energetik, Mechanik und Leben. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 2, 1904.  
[We can assume with certainty that when the conditions of life on the earth become gradually worse, the higher organisms, so soon as with all the progress in the arts they are no longer able to resist the encroachments of nature, will be the first to die out, and then the lower animals, until at last only unicellular creatures will linger on as a pitiable residuum.]
- 19 *Couturat (L.)* Les principes des mathématiques. iv. Le continu. v. L'idée de Grandeur. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1904.  
[Treats of the definition of irrational numbers, and of continuity, and of the relation of quantity to number, with reference to Russell's *Principles of Mathematics.*]
- Duhem (P.)* La théorie physique, son objet, sa structure (3<sup>e</sup> article). Rev. de Phil., June 1904.
- 21 *Fouillée (A.)* La priorité de la philosophie des idées-forces sur la doctrine de M. R. Ardigo. Rev. Phil., July 1904.
- Forsyth (T. M.)* The Conception of Experience in its relation to the development of English Philosophy. Mind, July 1904.  
[Experience is never only subjective or only objective. As the source of knowledge it is essentially one, and yet is never without a dual character. There is no knowledge other than interpretation of the reality present in immediate experience.]
- Kraft (Victor)* Das Problem der Aussenwelt. Ar. f. system. Phil., x. 3, 1904.  
[What we are aware of as immediately real is only the psychological manifold of the contents of our consciousness, which appear always only as objects for a subject. The problem of the external world resolves itself into the fundamental question as to the relation between being and knowledge.]
- Levy (A.)* Vorbedingungen einer jeden wahren philosophischen Erkenntnis. Ar. f. system. Phil., x. 3, 1904.  
[Such pre-conditions are recognition of the difference between subject and object, and between the ego and the human body.]
- Russell (Hon. B.)* Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions, ii. Mind, July 1904.  
[Discusses the chapters in Meinong's *Ueber Annahmen* dealing with first principles, the characteristic functions of the sentence, the most obvious cases of assumptions, the objectivity of the psychical, the apprehension of objects of the higher order, and the Objective to which a judgment refers.]
- Stout (G. F.)* Primary and Secondary Qualities. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904.  
[There is no essential difference between the primary and secondary attributes of matter so far as regards their connection with sense-experience. Both are dependent on it for the positive content which makes them more than mere powers or occult qualities. Both are independent of it as regards their existence.]
- 24 *Wells (H. G.)* Scepticism of the Instrument. Mind, July 1904.  
[Our instrument of knowledge is faulty (1) because it can work only by disregarding individuality and treating unives as similar objects in this respect or that, so as to group them under one term; (2) because it deals with negative terms by treating them as though they were positive; and (3) because it is only capable of reasoning about ideas by projecting them on the same plane.]
- 26 *Mentré (F.)* Le hasard dans les découvertes scientifiques, d'après Cl. Bernard. Rev. de Phil., June 1904.
- 27 *Bradley (F. H.)* On Truth and Practice. Mind, July 1904.  
[Author shows why the ultimate criterion of truth cannot be merely practical, states objections to any gospel of practice for the sake of practice, and examines the senses in which it may be claimed that all truth is practical. The fundamental difficulty to the doctrine that reality in the end is will he takes to be that will must imply and must presuppose what is other than itself.]
- Hobhouse (L. T.)* Faith and the Will to Believe. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904.  
[As a forerunner of thought, feeling has its place, and we should do ill to close our minds absolutely to its suggestions. But we do still worse if we deliver over our reason to its guidance. And we do worst of all when we seek to escape the whole difficulty by discrediting reason and clonding the issue between truth and falsity.]
- Creighton (J. E.)* Purpose as Logical Category. Phil. R., May 1904.  
[The view that reality must be interpreted in terms of will must logically remain purely individualistic. As such, it fails to do justice to the objective and universal aspect of experience. A string of individual purposes fails also to afford any unity to life and experience.]
- Goblot (E.)* La finalité en Biologie. Rev. Phil., July 1904.
- 28 *Mackenzie (J. S.)* The Infinite and the Perfect. Mind, July 1904.  
[The true infinite is without end, not because it goes on indefinitely, but because, like a circle, it returns into itself. It is a completely determined

- finite; and may, therefore, better be called the perfect. The perfect is not something that includes the whole of existence, but rather something through which the whole of existence is seen to have meaning.]
- 30 *Dumas (G.)* Le sourire: étude psychophysiological. Rev. Phil., July, Aug. 1904. [Author argues as against Darwin and Wundt that a sufficient explanation of laughter is to be obtained from the physiological mechanism alone.]
- 33 *Barrell (W. F.)* Presidential Address. Proc. S. P. R., vol. xviii., part 48, 1904. [Deals *inter alia* with telepathy. "What is telepathy but the proof of the reasonableness of prayer? If our creaturely minds can, without voice or sensation, impress each other, the Infinite mind is likely thus to have revealed itself in all ages to responsive hearts."] *Marie et Viollet.* Spiritisme et folie. J. de Psych., July-Aug. 1904.
- 37 *Allara (Vincenzo)* Sulla questione del Genio. Arch. f. system. Phil., x, 2, 1904. [A discussion of the 2nd edition of Lombroso's *Genio e Follia.*]
- 40 *Pfänder (A.)* Einführung in die Psychologie. 430p. Barth, 1904. [An attempt to treat psychology as wholly independent of any epistemological basis.] *Burden (H. Heath)* The Meaning of the Psychical from the Point of View of the Functional Psychology. Phil. R., May 1904. [It is the contention of the functional view that the psychical and the physical are, under certain conditions, one in our experience. They are a unity in every act; the duality is the duality of thought.] *Conrat (F.)* H. von Helmholtz' Psychologische Anschauungen. 286p. Niemeyer, 1904. [An exhaustive treatment of Helmholtz's work in psychology.] *Beck (P.)* Die Nachahmung und ihre Bedeutung für Psychologie und Völkerkunde. 173p. Haacke, 1904.
- 42 *Mack (Joseph)* Das Specific Menschliche und sein Verhältnis zur uebrigen Natur: Ein Versuch der Lösung des Ichproblems. 224p. Finsterlin, 1904.
- 48 *Hall (G. Stanley)* Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relation to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education. Vol. i. 609p. Vol. ii. 790p. Appleton, 1904.
- Otto (B.)* Beiträge zur Psychologie des Unterrichts. 342p. Scheffer, 1904.
- Tanner (Amy Eliza)* The Child; his thinking, feeling and doing. 430p. Chicago, Rand, M'Nally & Co., 1904.
- Hartenberg (P.)* Les émotions de bourse; notes de psychologie collective. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1904.
- 49 *Wentscher (M.)* Zur Kritik des psychophysischen Parallelismus. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 2, 1904. [Deals with Paulsen's reply to Busse's arguments against the doctrine of parallelism. Author holds that Paulsen's defence has failed.] *Hodgson (Shadworth H.)* Reality. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904. [All human knowledge is conditioned upon the real existence and operation of matter, in endlessly varied modes of motion and their combination.]
- 52 *Latta (R.)* Notes on a case of successful operation for congenital cataract in an adult. Brit. J. of Psychol., June 1904. [Psychological observations upon a patient who was born blind and obtained the use of his eyes at the age of thirty, through operation performed by Dr A. Maitland Ramsay of Glasgow.] *M'Dougall (W.)* The Variation of the Intensity of Visual Sensation with the Duration of the Stimulus. Brit. J. of Psychol., June 1904.
- Myers (C. S.)* The Taste-Names of Primitive Peoples. Brit. J. of Psychol., June 1904. [Experiments conducted by author whilst on a visit to the islands of the Torres Straits; examination of the taste-names of Indo-Germanic languages; information obtained by means of a questionnaire addressed to officials, missionaries and Europeans resident abroad.]
- 54 *Paulhan (F.)* Histoire d'un souvenir. J. de Psychol., July-Aug. 1904.
- Winch (W. H.)* Immediate Memory in School Children. Brit. J. of Psychol., June 1904. [Method employed was to expose to view sets of twelve consonants for a period of twenty-five seconds, after which they were reproduced in writing by the children.]
- 56 *Egger (Victor)* La parole intérieure. 333p. Alcan, 1904.
- 57 *Dugas (L.)* L'absolu, forme pathologique et normale des sentiments. 181p. Alcan, 1904.
- Glaserapp (Gr. v.)* Das Glück im Wollen und im Gefühl. 108p. Jonck und Poliewzky, 1904.
- Ribot (Th.)* La logique des sentiments. Rev. Phil., June, July 1904.
- 59 *Windelband (W.)* Ueber Willensfreiheit. Zwölf Vorlesungen. 230p. J. C. B. Mohr, 1904. [Attempts to deal with the free-will problem by disentangling the several questions involved and treating them separately. The general standpoint is that of Kant's transcendental idealism.] *Fabrion (K.)* Das Problem der Willensfreiheit. 64p. Winter, 1904.
- 60 *Rey (A.)* Ce que devient la logique. Rev. Phil., June 1904.
- 61 *Thilly (Frank)* The process of inductive inference (Univ. of Missouri Studies, v. 2, No. 3). Columbia, 1904.
- 71 *Anon.* The Pathway to Reality. Edin. R., July 1904. [Criticises Haldane's *Gifford Lectures*, in so far as individual minds are therein regarded as mere appearances. On that theory our separate minds can only appear to the Single Subject, and to Him they can be presented only for what they are—that is to say, as mere appearances, not real beings.] *Weber (M. L.)* Idéalisme et positivisme. Bulletin de la Soc. française de Phil., June 1904.
- 72 *Paulsen (F.)* Pour le centenaire de la mort de Kant. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904. [Translation of preface to 4th edition of "*Kant, sein Leben und seine Lehre.*"] *Adler (M)* Immanuel Kant zum Gedächtnis. 47p. Denticke, 1904.
- Natorp (P.)* À la mémoire de Kant (12 Février 1804). Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904. [Kant's philosophy in the full sense of the word a philosophy of culture, of the formation of the human mind, and of the realisation of the human spirit.]

*Schnedermann (Dr F.)* Die bleibende Bedeutung Immanuel Kants in einigen Hauptpunkten gezeichnet. 19p.

Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1904.

*Eucken (R.)* L'âme telle que Kant l'a dépeinte.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

[In Kant, the individual soul is not a mere complex of isolated psychical states, but a unity which becomes the basis and support of spiritual life. In consequence, man rises above the experience of the moment to the knowledge that his being is infinite and of more value than the physical universe.]

*Blunt (H.)* La réfutation kantienne de l'idéalisme.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Moore (G. E.)* Kant's Idealism.

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904.

[Colours and sounds are not sensations; space and time are not forms of sense; causality is not a thought. All these things are things of which we are aware, things of which we are conscious; they are in no sense parts of consciousness. Kant's idealism, therefore, in so far as it asserts that matter is composed of mental elements, is certainly false.]

*Couturat (L.)* La philosophie des mathématiques de Kant.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Cantoni (C.)* L'apriorité de l'espace. Dans la doctrine critique de Kant.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Milhaud (G.)* La connaissance mathématique et l'idéalisme transcendantal.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Hannequin (A.)* Les principes de l'entendement pur, de leur fondement et de leur importance dans la "Critique de la Raison pure."

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Erdmann (B.)* La critique kantienne de la connaissance comme synthèse du rationalisme et de l'empiricisme.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Parodi (D.)* La critique des catégories kantienne chez Charles Renouvier.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Basch (V.)* L'imagination dans la théorie kantienne de la connaissance.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

[Insists upon the importance of the imagination in Kant's theory of knowledge. Without the productive imagination, transcendental apperception would be impossible.]

*Boutroux (E.)* La morale de Kant et le temps présent.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

[The general trend of Kant's moral theory, so far from being in opposition to modern ethical tendencies, seems to the author in singular accord therewith.]

*Fouillés (A.)* Kant a-t-il établi l'existence du devoir ?

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Goldschmidt (L.)* Kant über Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit, Gott. 40p.

Thienemann, 1904.

*Ruyssen (Th.)* Kant est-il pessimiste ?

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Delbos (V.)* Les harmonies de la pensée kantienne d'après la "Critique de la faculté de juger."

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Riehl (A.)* Helmholtz et Kant.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904. [Translation of article in *Kantstudien*.]

*Delacroix (H.)* Kant et Swedenborg.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1904.

*Deussen (P.)* Vedānta und Platonismus im Lichte der Kantischen Philosophie. 25p. Weidmann, 1904.

76 *Vignon (Paul)* Sur le Matérialisme scientifique ou Mécanisme Antitéléologique, à propos d'un récent traité de Biologie (fin). Rev. de Phil., July 1904.

*Wartenberg (M.)* Das Idealistische Argument in der Kritik des Materialismus. 72p. Barth, 1904.

80 *Döring (A.)* Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. Bd. i. 681p. Bd. ii. 591p. Reisland, 1903.

*Waddington (C.)* La philosophie ancienne et la critique historique. 404p. Hachette, 1904.

*Strunz (Fr.)* Naturbetrachtung und Naturerkenntnis in Altertum. 168p. Voss, 1904.

*Guyot (H.)* Sur l' "ἀρεποιον" d'Anaximandre. Rev. de Phil., June 1904.

*Tannery (Paul)* Pour l'histoire du mot "ἀρεποιον." Rev. de Phil., June 1904.

84 *Boyd (W.)* An Introduction to the Republic of Plato. 196p. Sonnenschein, 1904. Plato, Phædo of. Ed. with Intr. and Notes by Harold Williamson. 292p. Macmillan, 1904.

85 *Starvell (F. M.)* The Practical Reason in Aristotle. Inter. J. Eth., July 1904.

[An attempt to set out in detail the relation Aristotle conceived to hold between the theoretic and the practical reason.]

89 *Lindsay (J.)* The Philosophy of Aquinas. Biblio. Sacra, July 1904.

90 *Snider (D. J.)* Modern European Philosophy; the History of Philosophy psychologically treated. 829p. St Louis, Sigma Pub. Co., 1904.

*Blunt (H. W.)* Bacon's Method of Science. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S. iv., 1904.

*Stephen (Sir Leslie)* Hobbes. (English Men of Letters.) 243p. Macmillan, 1904.

[This book was written by the author during the last months of his life, and has been seen through the press by Mr F. W. Maitland. It deals with the life of Hobbes, his view of the world, of man, and of the state.]

*Suarle (Victor De)* Descartes, directeur spirituel : correspondance avec la Princesse Palatine et la Reine Christine de Snède. 295p. Alcan, 1904.

*Freudenthal (J.)* Spinoza, sein Leben und seine Lehre. Bd. i. 349p. Hauff, 1904.

*Silberstein (A.)* Leibnizens Apriorismus im Verhältnis zu seiner Metaphysik. 74p. Mayer & Müller, 1904.

*Brockdorff (Cay von)* Schopenhauer und die wissenschaftliche Philosophie, ii. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxviii. 2, 1904.

[Treats of Schopenhauer's relation to the fundamental ideas of the exact sciences.]

*Coignet (C.)* Bergson (Kant et Bergson). Rev. chrétienne, July 1904.

[An account of his philosophic system.]

92 *Möbius (P. J.)* Schopenhauer. 384p. Barth, 1904.

*Töwe (Carl)* Die Schopenhauer-Porträts.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 2, 1904.

V *Pringle Pattison (A. S.)* The Life and Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.

Quar. R., July 1904.

[To hold aloft in an age of specialism the banner of completely unified knowledge was perhaps Spencer's chief claim to remembrance. He brought home the idea of philosophic synthesis to a greater number of the Anglo-Saxon race than ever conceived it before.]

See also *Hudson (W. H.)* in *Indep. R.*, July 1904.

*Barth (Paul)* Herbert Spencer und Albert Schäffle. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxviii. 2, 1904.

*Bain (Alexander)* Autobiography (with supplementary chapter by Dr W. L. Davidson). 4 portraits. 461p. Longmans, 1904.

[Review will follow.]

*Rail (R. S.)* The Last of the "English School" of Philosophers. *Fort. R.*, July 1904.

[Deals with Bain's Autobiography.]

See also *Anon.*, Professor Bain, in *Blackwood*, July 1904.

94 *Rey (A.)* La Philosophie scientifique de M. Duhem.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1904.

94V *Janssens (E.)* Le Néo-Criticisme de Charles Renouvier. 326p. Alcan, 1904.

[After a short biography of Renouvier and a general account of his system in relation to the Kantian, author describes in detail his theory of knowledge and theory of certitude, and then subjects both to a searching criticism. A bibliography of Renouvier's publications is added, as also of books and essays relating thereto.]

## V ART 83 *Sacred Music.*

*Witasek (St)* Grundzüge der allgemeinen Aesthetik. 410p. Barth, 1904.

*Santayana (G.)* What is Aesthetics?

Phil. R., May 1904.

[The question whether aesthetics is a part of psychology or a separate science is an insoluble question, because it creates a dilemma which

does not exist in the facts. A part of psychology deals with aesthetic matters, but cannot exhaust them; parts of other sciences also deal with the same.]

*Cohn (Jonas)* Psychologische oder Kritische Begründung der Aesthetik?

Archiv f. system. Phil., x. 2, 1904.

[Criticises the view that aesthetics is based upon psychology as represented by Groos, Lipps, Külpe, Lange, and Eisler.]

*Meyer (Theodor A.)* Das Formprinzip des Schönen. *Ar. f. system. Phil.*, x. 3, 1904.

*Waetzoldt (W.)* Zum Problem einer normativen Aesthetik.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 2, 1904.

*Braunschwig (M.)* Le sentiment du beau et le sentiment poétique. 240p. Alcan, 1904.

4 *Gonse (Louis)* Les Chefs-d'Œuvres des Musées de France. Vol. ii.

Librairie de l'Art Ancien et Moderne, 1904.

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G. D. H.; G. H.; and J. H. W.

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## THE CREED CRISIS IN SCOTLAND.

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THE question whether law should recognise free churches as self-governing or autonomous, and in particular whether such autonomy should extend to the revision of their creed, has been raised during the past year in a very remarkable way. It has come up under the law of trusts in Scotland. But the question itself rests on considerations of general equity, and it is not confined to any one country or to any particular jurisprudence.

We have stated the question as rather for "free" churches. But it is by no means without interest for churches which are established or which may even be essentially national. In one sense it is churches whose existence is already recognised, and whose work is promoted, by the state, who may most naturally claim from it any rights which the Christian community originally enjoyed, or may now find to be of value. But from the practical point of view this is overbalanced by the complex consideration of the rights of the state and of citizens outside the church in such a matter. Those rights may be a great deal stronger than would result from a mere bargain with the church as a separate body. The state may

in some cases claim to be the creative, or at least constitutive, authority, and the church, if not a mere department of the state, may be essentially under the regulative guidance of a parliament, or the supremacy of a Crown. And even where this is not held to be so, the mere fact of a concordat between the state and the privileged or endowed church may so limit the church's right of change and development, that any serious departure on its side might bring its charter of privilege into most equitable question. The complications are so serious that it is in every way better to leave this form of the problem on one side in the first instance, and deal rather with churches which desire no privilege from the civil power, and appeal to its mere attribute of justice.

And among free churches there does not seem to be any essential difference on this point between the two great forms into which such churches throughout the world are divided—the congregational, and that of larger aggregates and unions, provincial, national, or ecumenical. Theoretically, the congregation, as the unit of church life, is the best type for exhibiting the idea, the development, and the scope, as well as the limits of deviation, within which a church is entitled to challenge toleration and the recognition of the law. Historically, too, the congregational form, as compared especially with the Presbyterian, is that which has done most to originate and to develop such toleration. England has a vivid recollection of the time when Presbytery, backed by the “civil sword,” seemed too great a burden for a nation which had thrown off greater burdens still. But since then many things have changed. There are some fifty Presbyterian communions in the world. Of these, nine-tenths, including the largest bodies, have no connection with the state, and have renounced all privileged recognition from it. Even in the early days before this was the case, Presbytery came over the Border very powerfully at some great crises of English history, and turned the scale on the side of freedom. And it is conceivable that now, when this form of churchism has taken the side of free-

dom throughout the world, it may have important lessons to teach, especially on the matter in which it has always had a special interest—the question of creed. By creed I mean, not the utterance of religious belief of an individual, but the common utterance of such belief by a church or community.

And the question of creed also narrows itself for our practical purposes. Some creeds have an authority which is external to the particular church which accepts them. They bear to come down from Apostles, or from the Church primitive, or from some council received as ecumenical. And on such grounds they present themselves to this and that modern church as clothed with an ancient or hereditary authority. They are thus accorded an initial position which scarcely admits of freedom of choice in their acceptance, and is equally inconsistent with full subsequent liberty to reject or exchange or revise them. The same remark may be made with regard to baptismal creeds, or formulæ the acceptance of which is demanded from every member of the church on his claiming to enter it. In both these cases, though for different reasons, the church may fairly enough be said to have given the creed a position so fundamental that any change in it—certainly any change of it—might equitably raise a question in the courts as to the legal identity of the body. A different state of matters emerges when we come to the great group of Reformation creeds of the sixteenth century. Each of these is, in the first place, made by the particular church itself, not handed down to it. And though much of the doctrine contained in them is identical with that of symbols of the church ancient and mediæval, the whole confession now bears to be drawn by the living church direct from the Scripture. And as these creeds ascribe doctrinal authority and infallibility to Scripture alone, and explain carefully that councils and churches may err, the question is at once raised of their own revision. A Protestant church which had admitted into its confession what afterwards appeared to be a falsehood, or even a mischievous ambiguity,

was, of course, bound to change it. But the same thing followed when such a church had included in its first utterance what afterwards appeared to be, not untrue, but unnecessary. It may be the right, or even the duty, of a church to say many things which it never thinks of binding upon all its members, and also to emphasise in one age what that age greatly needed, but which may afterwards have to yield to things of more permanent importance.

These truisms of Protestantism, had they been adhered to, might have greatly mitigated the reluctance of churches, multitudinist or congregational, to utter from time to time an expression of their faith. And they should have modified the tendency of lawyers to treat a credal utterance as if it were a trust deed, with every clause fundamental and therefore unchangeable—to count it a dead hand closing upon property, and not a living voice from time to time uttering the faith for whose general uses the property is bestowed. For sometimes by misadventure that dead hand closes on the living throat of a nation, with violent and explosive results.

It is what has just happened in Scotland. Historically, the causes are very intelligible. When Knox and his fellows presented the Scots Confession to the Estates of Scotland in 1560, they did so, “protesting that if any man will note in this our confession any article or sentence repugning to God’s holy word, that it would please him of his gentleness, and for Christian charity’s sake, to admonish us of the same in writing,” and promising to such inquirer proof of the truth of the point questioned, or else “reformation” of it. In the Reformed Church of France, from which Knox had just arrived, the same idea was carried out still more systematically, their confession, drafted by his friend Beza, being read out on the first day of each annual General Assembly, and the question being yearly put to the house what amendments of it ought to be made. But Knox succeeded, and Beza failed, in getting the new church and its confession established by the state; and

Knox's successors within that church, however passionate in their love of spiritual independence, found frequent revisal of a document which was now embodied in statute to be impracticable. That did not prevent them from claiming for the church a right to legislate according to "God's word," as their one final standard. But it was only in great crises, when the spirit of the nation was roused, that the principle was carried out. Thus, the General Assembly, which in 1638 abolished Laud's episcopate, in 1647 threw over its native confession in favour of that of their Presbyterian and Independent allies at Westminster—a Puritan document which is of course in sympathy with that of the Reformation time, but which in no one "article or sentence" is the same. In adopting both creeds successively they were opposed by the Crown, though backed by the Estates; and after the Restoration adherence to Knox's confession was for many years of the "killing time" made a test against the Kirk and Covenant. But at the Revolution the new creed was sanctioned by statute; though without the qualifications of 1647, to which the Cameronians outside the Kirk and the spiritual independence party within it still clung. By this time a new question emerged. Locke and toleration were in the air, and the Westminster Confession is frankly intolerant in the powers it gives to the "civil magistrate" about religion and against heresy. Indeed, apart from these extreme and intolerant positions, the Scottish judges in 1839 were doubtful whether there is in the Confession any doctrine of establishment at all. That, however, did not prevent a keen controversy raging for ten years in Scotland on this very subject between the leading dissenters, now voluntaries, and the leading churchmen. But in the very middle of it an extraordinary thing happened. The Established Church itself, now led by spiritual independence men (as those outside had always been), and pressed by the modern necessities of the population in city and country, resolved in 1834 to exercise its supposed legislative powers as to church-union, church-expansion, and popular choice of pastors. A narrow majority

of the Scottish judges, confirmed by the House of Lords (and by an English vote against most of the Scottish members in Parliament), refused validity to these acts of freedom as inconsistent with establishment. Two-thirds of the Assembly protested in 1842 that if this were so they must give up establishment, and about one-half of the Assembly of 1843 fulfilled the pledge, and formed the Free Church of Scotland.

There was here no question of creed; the creed of the Church, indeed, was rather favourable to its claims. But the spiritual independence, to which the Church of Scotland gave most emphatic expression between 1838 and 1843, included creed and a great deal more. And the Free Church, electing to retain that freedom under the pressure of the widespread and long-continued suffering of its houseless congregations and homeless ministers all over Scotland (a pressure backed by the tyranny of local landowners), had for its sole compensation a sudden liberation from the weight of statute, and a right henceforth to be its own legislature in matters spiritual. One of the matters on which it had split was the claim to receive Presbyterian ministers from outside into its courts on equal terms; and one of the things to which it had to look forward (as a body at the time standing half-way between the Church established on the one hand and the Scottish dissenters on the other) was the question of future unions. There was no question of immediate union—they were at the moment in far too deadly a struggle in order to keep their own feet, and they knew that even a future union with any church would involve innumerable minor changes in tradition, in administration, in feeling, or even in faith. All the more it was necessary to provide for that future, and the immediate erection of hundreds of churches made it necessary to provide for it on the side of law. Their title would be the Trust Deed of the Church, which at present was living from hand to mouth upon annual payments. This matter engaged the attention of Chalmers and the other leaders in the earliest days of the Disruption Assembly: it was remitted to a committee of

divines and lawyers by the *second* Assembly of 1843 (an Assembly which included every minister of the Free Church in Scotland); it was completed, after not a day too much preparation, in time to be presented to and approved by the Assembly of 1844; and under it the bulk of the Free Church manses and churches are at this moment held. But they are not on the face of it now held, and they were certainly not intended by the framers of it to be held, for the Free Church. For the leading purpose of the Trust Deed of 1843-1844 is that the building (say, the church)

“shall in all time coming be used, occupied, and enjoyed, as and for a place of religious worship, by a congregation of the said body of Christians called the Free Church of Scotland, or of any united body of Christians composed of them and of such other body or bodies of Christians as the said Free Church of Scotland may, at any time hereafter, associate with themselves, under the foresaid name of the Free Church of Scotland, or under whatever name or designation they may assume.”

And while the building is to be held by local trustees for the congregation, first of the Free Church, and then of the united body, with the new name, a network of subsequent clauses puts these trustees under the regulation and defence of, and makes any proposed litigation for or against them dependent upon,

“the General Assembly of the said body, or united body of Christians, or of the Commission of such Assembly.”

All this centralisation is eminently Presbyterian. But it might go too far, and the men of 1843 knew that unions were quite as likely as other great church movements to provoke dissent, and even secession. And for secession, on that account or any other, the Trust Deed provides in the interest of congregations as follows:

“If, at any time hereafter, one-third of the whole ordained ministers having the charge of congregations of the said body, or united body of Christians, or any larger number of the said ordained ministers having charges as aforesaid, shall simultaneously . . . not only publicly separate from the said body or united body of Christians, but at the same time publicly claim and profess to hold, truly and *in bona fide*, the principles of the Protest of 1843, hereinbefore recited, and to be carrying out the objects of the said Protest more faithfully,”

then and in that case each congregation under the Trust Deed may choose for itself whether it shall adhere to the separating body, and if it so elects by a majority, the majority shall take over with them the Trust Deed building, but shall pay to the congregational minority a proportion of the net value of the building corresponding to their respective numbers.

Both these clauses show, what the rest of the Deed and the records of the transaction more abundantly prove, that the intention of the framers and Church founders<sup>1</sup> was to reserve all question of creed for the Church itself, and in certain cases even for a schism of one-third, and (with regard to the permanent property of the Church at least) to shut out from the law-courts the whole of that delicate question. One exception the Deed itself provides. The union, in order to carry the property without question, must be with "another Christian body." There were Christian bodies in Scotland with whom there was no chance of a proposed union, and with whom this Church would almost certainly not have thought it right to unite. Still, according to the universal rule of Presbytery, that was in each case a question for the Church

<sup>1</sup> The chairman of the committee of 1843 was Dr James Begg, and he reports in 1844 to the Assembly that the "plan" of the Trust Deed should be, in the event of a split such as that contemplated: "Then, *whatever the courts of law may determine*, as to which of the contending parties is to be held to be the Free Church, it shall be competent for each congregation, by a majority of its members in full communion, to decide that question for itself." And these words were unanimously approved as the plan, and passed into Act xviii. of Assembly 1844.

But the famous draftsman of this, as of the other great deeds of 1843, was Mr Murray Dunlop, and he long after reported to the Free Church, "It is obvious that one main object of the Deed was to exclude, in the event of any split in the body, any question being raised before the Court of Session as to which party most truly were carrying out the principles of the Free Church. The Model Trust Deed was framed under the advice of the late Lord Rutherford and Mr Dunlop, legal adviser of the Church, *specially for the accomplishing this object*, and these counsel, after anxiously considering its terms, were satisfied that the object would be attained by the Deed as so framed."

It is difficult to see how the plan and intention of the Free Church founders could be more clearly proved. But the words of the Trust itself are unambiguous.

itself, to be decided according to its own conscience applied to the Word of God; and unless and until such a union went far outside all probabilities, so that it could be alleged to have taken place with a "non-Christian" body, the legal question of Church identity could not arise. It is a very near parallel to the other question in the Presbyterian world, that of creed. There are many doctrines within the compass of the Confession of Faith which a Presbyterian church would not desire to give up, and would not think it right to give up, and might probably count a fundamental of faith, if it applied itself to that difficult question. But there are others within the same compass which it has purged out of its confession, or which it asserts the right to purge out in future, if it chose to take that way of change. (There is another way: it could do as the Church with which we are dealing has done before—abolish its old confession and write a wholly new one, *transshipping* into it what seemed right in the changed point of view and in the altered circumstances.) In either way, and at all times, there can be no doubt that the Presbyterian Church throughout the world reserves to itself, and to its "ruling elders" or elected representatives, the grave and responsible duty of dealing with creed, both judicially and legislatively. And the Free Church of Scotland at its birth gave the most pointed expression to this by elaborately endeavouring, whether successfully or not, to appoint for all its permanent property a system of purely church arbitration, and excluding the law-courts from re-judging these decisions; excluding them absolutely in the case of secessions, splits, and schisms, and excluding them also in the case of unions, unless the union were not with "another body of Christians."

So standing the two pillars of the Free Church constitution in 1843—an elaborate creed, but which might be exchanged or revised, facing the Church, and a Model Trust Deed for its congregational property, facing the law—the history moved on for sixty years. It moved with true Scottish slowness and caution, in the ruts which were being worn by pressure of

conscience at the same time in every Presbyterian church in the world, and had been dug a little earlier in its own admirable neighbour and ally, the United Presbyterian Church. In 1846 the Free Church changed its subscription; in 1876 it united with the Cameronians; in 1892 it passed a Declaratory Act distinguishing between things great and small in the Confession, adding to the unchanged articles on such subjects as predestination some compensatory utterances on the love of God, and (at last) abjuring persecuting and compulsory power in religion. After this minimum of ablution it resumed the courtship of "another Christian body," broken off in 1873; and on 31st October 1900 the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church were joined in what the recent judgment has made an indissoluble union under the "name or designation" of the United Free Church of Scotland. But twenty-seven men voted as a minority of the General Assembly against 643 of a majority, and promptly brought an action as the surviving Free Church for its whole property. The judges in Scotland, court after court, refused it: the House of Lords apparently hesitated at first; but, ordering a re-hearing, and strengthening its numbers, it decided on 1st August 1904 by five to two in favour of the small minority, and gave them and their adherents the accumulated property of all those years of Free Church liberality, apparently also overriding even the Trust Deed as to property embraced within it.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from the material results of this judgment in Scotland, which are something like deadlock, its principles as to creed have excited intense interest there, mixed with a little bewilderment. All through the long and conspicuously fair hearing of the case, there seemed to press upon the minds of

<sup>1</sup> It should be mentioned, however, that in the hearing before the House of Lords the separate case under the Trust Deed, and the explicit trust in favour of a new congregation under the Assembly of a new united body, were not pressed, and were indeed withdrawn; and in the event of the proposals for Parliament which at present occupy both parties in Scotland not prospering, the case of the Trust Deed property may have to be more fully tried at law in a real test case.

the eminent judges of the majority a feeling that no free church—perhaps no church at all—could be recognised by the law unless at its start it announced a programme of doctrine which it was not entitled afterwards to modify. Such a view I assume to be influential in the law of England, because even in the law of Scotland it has had an important place, and that place was derived almost wholly from the utterance of an earlier Chancellor, Lord Eldon. It is of course a convenient doctrine for the law. Anything cut and dry—especially dry, and destitute of the expansive force into which moisture and sap and life sooner or later betray a church, or indeed any other body—is particularly adapted to the pigeon-holes and compartments which a practical science like jurisprudence loves to provide. But the convenience may be bought too dear, and the classifications which seemed not too artificial to enclose English dissent may fail utterly where autonomous churches are native to the soil, and are coextensive with the people. Take the United States of America. Their charity and trust law I suppose to have been originally derived from England, but all their churches are free churches, and among them Presbyterianism holds a place from sea to sea. The largest Presbyterian communions in the world are there, and while they commenced their revision of the Westminster Confession long ago by purging out its religious intolerance and inequality, they completed it in President Roosevelt's age, by declaratory enactments amending and balancing its positions on what is in thought more elevate—predestination, for example, and the good-will of God to man. All this too was under what in Scotland would be called a "Barrier Act" dating from 1788. And American law as to such changes appears to be something like the law of the Scottish Free Church Trust Deed. For in all donations to churches, where no express doctrines are specified by the donor, that law presumes that the action of the church as to creed or otherwise, and the decision of the church majority—in Presbyterian churches, of the General Assembly or Supreme Court—are right, and gives them civil

effect. We do not go so far as yet on this side of the sea. But Scotland is more Presbyterian than any part of America; and the suggestion which has come down there this year, that churches which have once uttered a creed must be presumed to have no power thereafter to change it, seems to me to have been received by the whole country with incredulous indignation. It is no wonder. A government of immobility, tempered by periodical revolution and catastrophe, is probably the very worst government for either a church or a state. But free churches like those of Scotland, which move on from one generation to another, and have no state authority outside to pilot their course, can only escape this wooden and perilous programme by holding fast their claim to autonomy, and exercising it in well-considered and, above all, in gradual legislative development. Now, all these churches have at least this attribute of reason, that they "look before and after." They do not imitate those nations (if such nations there be) who at a given point in the stream of time are begotten out of mud, create a brand-new constitution, sit down upon the constitution so made, and have no further power of development unless an earthquake comes their way. They resemble the other and saner political family, of nations which persist through change, and live because they grow. In the present case the judicial suggestion that Dr Chalmers' address of 1843 was a prospectus, starting and controlling a novel church enterprise or company, turned out to be unfortunate historically.<sup>1</sup> But it was perhaps equally

<sup>1</sup> Dr Chalmers, a man of noble nature and enthralling eloquence, was never, even during his lifetime, regarded as an authoritative exponent of Free Church views, whether theological or ecclesiastical. Other men had that place. But he was the natural Moderator for 1843, and it is his opening address in that capacity which has been made something like a company's prospectus, binding the new institute never to make voluntarism an open question. To Chalmers (a Tory in politics) the new institute idea was particularly abhorrent, and at that moment he was bent on exactly the opposite view, of identifying his Church as the true Church of Scotland—adding, of course, the ancient idea of the independence of that "institute," as of one into which, even when unroofed by the state, "every wind of heaven may enter, but the King—

unfortunate if it implied a theory that a new-named church must rest upon an initial document; for the tyranny of such a theory over the imagination may apparently drive us wholly outside an elaborate Confession, to build our church *super hanc petram*, the eloquent morning allocution of an individual divine! Now a Presbyterian confession, elaborate or not, may very well contain within it a nucleus of fundamental and therefore unchangeable doctrines—even the Trust of 1843 claimed a right to unite only with “another Christian body.” But such a creed also contains a circumferential part—penumbra, or photosphere, or both—of tenets more dubious and tenuous and dissolvable, which it may (or may not) impose on its ministers and elders, but does not attempt to exact, as if essential to their faith, from its members and

never!” A Moderator’s address, as all in Scotland know, does not bind even the Assembly which hears it; and *because* that was well known, this, with many less eloquent documents, none of them authoritative, was freely circulated by that Assembly. But it was not circulated until it had been brought to Chalmers’ notice that the strong statement in part of it against voluntarism might be used in the future to fetter his Church in the matter of union. He at once explained to the House that his view of their relation to voluntaries was that they might work together now, and raise the question of union later on; and the Assembly, satisfied, not only appointed a committee on secular affairs, but fixed a day two months after for joining with Presbyterian dissenters in commemorating the Westminster Assembly. And there Chalmers stated more fully to both parties, that for the “aphorism of co-operation without incorporation,” so well known and oft repeated: “I would substitute co-operation now, and this with the view, as soon as may be, to incorporation afterwards.”

And in the same speech he said, still more conclusively: “Between the Free Church of Scotland and the Presbyterian dissenters of this country there is no difference of government, and no difference of theology which I am aware of; or, in other words, no insuperable bar, I will not say in the way of an immediate, but in the way of an *eventual*, and I do hope of a *speedy*, incorporation.”

I may add that these facts, published in Scotland soon after the judgment of 1st August, have caused a perhaps unfair reaction against it on the point whether the Church of 1843 then adopted or retained the doctrine of establishment. For the view that it did, there is much to be said. But they have a most legitimate bearing on the powers reserved by that Church for the future. They consign the Prospectus to the waste-basket; and show that Chalmers (who was for his time a Broad Churchman) claimed for his Church at least the latitude demanded by Cunningham (its theologian) and Candlish (its Church leader).

people. And that the mere document of creed which contains both of these classes of tenets, dominant and ancillary, is capable on Presbyterian principles of being revised, or even rewritten in whole as well as in part, of being boiled down into small compass or expanded into large, of being exchanged in favour of a new confession, native or foreign, or of being simply abolished in favour of the original and "supreme standard," of Scripture itself—that it is capable, and equally capable, of all these changes, I have during forty years' study of this class of questions seen not the least reason to doubt. Nor has there ever been a time during all those years in which Scotland was so little disposed to resign the theory of freedom as at this moment. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, after much inquiry into the legal side of this matter, has quite recently affirmed, in emphatic though unusual phraseology, the limited and partial infallibility of its Westminster Creed. The churches outside have less excuse, and have no reason whatever, for not practically carrying out the doctrine common on this point to all. That doctrine leans to an ancestral and continuous existence of the Christian Church, a continuity unbroken by such incidents as the compilation of one confession in 1560, the adoption of another in 1647, and a disruption from the state in 1843. But while it makes the origin of the Church and of all its branches a matter of conscience, and indeed something mystical and divine (as is brought out especially in the Scottish "Headship of Christ"), it is in the working of Church and creed thoroughly practical. And the practical development is extremely historical and traceable, because it is carried on (when not interfered with from without) by gradual increments of conviction, at each step proposing a minimum of change, and declining to progress by methods of cataclysm. To give up all this for a fixed document which we may disbelieve but not amend, and which throughout all time a church must profess in every detail or perish, seems a singularly unintelligent programme.

For these reasons I have no doubt that the law both of England and Scotland has before it the question which was recently vividly stated by an English critic of this judgment,<sup>1</sup> "Are there any free churches?"—in the sense, that is, of churches to which law concedes self-government and legislative power, especially in the matter of creed. If there are churches which desire no such power, their modest aspirations will be easily satisfied. But as a general rule churches, whether congregational or otherwise in form, have an instinct of conscience which sooner or later raises this point, and sooner or later presses it upon the law. And in the legal debate and development which I expect, the weight of Presbyterianism everywhere, and of Scotland in particular, will be, as already indicated, on the side of freedom and the right to revise.<sup>2</sup> For some time after the judgment of August last there was a risk that that debate might be immediate and incessant and aggressive—a continuous protest in the legislature against the *summa injuria* inflicted on a small nation—inflicted perhaps unavoidably, but by the extreme application of a rule of law which we find artificial in its nature as well as foreign in its source. I need not say that such a form of protest would be a misfortune. After the law has been laid down so deliberately, even though not unanimously, by the highest court, all advance and development from it, if they are to be successful, must be large-minded in plan and cautious in execution. And that at least requires time. Most fortunately, the immediate results of the judgment, as distinguished from its principles, and the course of things in Scotland since its delivery, have been such as to satisfy men

<sup>1</sup> Mr Stead.

<sup>2</sup> I do not count the English history of Presbyterianism in the eighteenth century, culminating on one side in the case of *Lady Hewley's Charities*, as an instance in point. For, in the first place, those churches, still nominally Presbyterian, were really separate from each other and congregationalist; and, secondly, partly for this reason, and partly perhaps because of the remaining intolerance of the law, as well as of the drift of that century's opinions, they as a body revised neither their creed nor their subscription, and they were timid or sluggish even in a congregational capacity.

on every side, and at last to convince the Government, that, apart from any question of amendment of the general law, there is a call upon the Crown or the legislature to intervene with a view to justice to all concerned.

The judgment of 1st August 1904 declared that the property of the Free Church belonged in trust, not to the Church represented by the 643 members of Assembly who had entered into the Union, but to that represented by the twenty-seven who had declined to do so. The twenty-seven were a sixth (perhaps a tenth; it depends on where you draw the Highland line) of the Highland portion of the representative body of the Free Church portion of Scottish Presbyterianism. Eleven hundred churches and manses, three admirably equipped colleges, and a hundred mission stations throughout all parts of the world, were thus apparently handed over to a few men, mostly in remote districts, and incapable—even numerically and physically—of working that great religious and educational machinery. There was only one hope for their succeeding in such an enterprise—a hope, too, which could only be entertained by men outside Scotland, who “knew not the stomach of that people.” The property is now to be held for the minority and “*those adhering*” to them: might not the Union now collapse, and some of its workers in quiet parishes cling rather to the church or the manse and “adhere” to the new trustees? (Chalmers’ two-thirds pledging themselves in 1842 melted away to one-half in 1843). No United Free Church General Assembly could meet to give formal answer for nine months yet; but its “Commission” includes every member and one more, and that body poured into Edinburgh on 10th August in a crowd far denser than that of an ordinary Assembly. And the vast and impressive meeting was absolutely unanimous. It commenced by thanking God that the path of principle was made so clear, and it affirmed that principle in resolutions bearing so closely upon our subject that some of them must be quoted. They declared:—

“In the whole region of duties and privileges created for His Church by her Lord, commonly distinguished as things spiritual, the Church as a society, as well as every Christian individually, ought to admit no other authority, and should claim liberty and right to act, or to refrain from acting, in subjection to Christ as her only Head and to His Word as her only standard.

“In particular, in the Confession of her Faith and in regulating the doctrinal obligations which it is fitting to impose upon her office-bearers, and most of all in setting forth the doctrine of the Gospel, which it is her privilege to proclaim, the Church ought to hold, and this Church has ever held, herself bound and entitled on fitting occasion, with due reverence and caution, and with a deep sense of the interests involved, to revise the statements of her Confession, and to readjust the Confessional obligations of her office-bearers.

“While owning the authority of civil rulers and judges in all things civil, and especially in questions of property, the Commission, in view of this decision, and of some of the judgments delivered, must point out that to make it a rule of law that confessions cannot be revised by the churches that from time to time frame and utter them, is to penalise the action of the Church, and so in effect to deny to her toleration so often as she performs a plain duty.

“Finally, the Commission assure their people that no suitable effort will be wanting to procure remedies for what has been almost universally regarded as a great and startling wrong in effect, though not in intention.”

The crowded Commission was unanimous, the United Presbyterian side co-operating in the most brotherly and magnanimous way. But three months have passed since then, during which the screw has been slowly rather than harshly turned. The professors and students of the New College, Edinburgh, ejected by legal process from their class-rooms, were most hospitably received by their brethren of the University there; but the professors had to resign their salaries and the students their scholarships, and both their priceless library. A million of money already burdens and cumpers the helpless hands of the minority; and as I write, the snowstorm all over the Highlands is made keener by threats of eviction of the congregations—congregations which, in some places, are a large majority of the population—from the churches where they worship. All this has been done, I do not say at all harshly, but slowly and menacingly; and what has been the result for Scotland and for the United Free Church? For Scotland outside, the result has been to turn the general feeling, perhaps even unfairly, against the victors of 1904, and to make it pretty plain that the months to come,

especially if they are to be adorned with similar proceedings, will by no means attract adherents to their body. But what has been the effect on the vanquished, the Free Church within the United Free Church? The answer is amazing. Not a single professor from the colleges, not a single missionary from solitary stations dotted between Manchuria and the Congo, not a single minister from their eleven hundred churches and manses in Scotland, not a man of them all has been at the date of writing disloyal to the Union. That was no surprise in Scotland. (A Ross-shire Highlander myself, I have no doubt if the judgment had been the other way, and if the court had affirmed with Lords Macnaghten and Lindley that the minority had no right to the property or the name of the Free Church of Scotland, the minority would have clung all the more heroically to their narrowness and their name.<sup>1</sup>) But outside of Scotland this constancy was a revelation to some observers, and all now felt themselves in front of a new problem.

For if the new trust had not lapsed, it had certainly collapsed. Any semblance it still had of standing on its feet was derived from the proposal it had made to a body outside of it, to perform nine-tenths of the duty which had been laid by law upon itself. And the body so applied to was precisely that which the judgment of law had disqualified from undertaking even one-tenth of the trust. The only way of regularising this apparently illegal compact was by the ecclesiastical submission, at least in the meantime, of the body which was to work nine-tenths of the trust to the other body which was to work one-tenth of it. But that was as hopelessly inad-

<sup>1</sup> I always hoped it might be possible to find law for dividing the property proportionally between both parties—a result very like the £50,000 which the United Free Church offered in compromise—offered much too late, however, and with this difference, that the money would, under that law, have come out of the trust funds, not, as in the case of the money offered, from the pockets of the offerers. It is true that the majority had always offered to make room for the minority themselves, and for all their views, on one side of the United Free Church Assembly. But law ought to recognise three sides to some Assemblies—a right side, a left side, and an outside.

missible on the side of church law and conscience, as the other was on the side of the law of trust. The deadlock in the execution of the judgment, the collapse in the working of the trust, were something for which neither party was to blame. But it meant confusion and misery all over Scotland, and the gratuitous dilapidation and wreck of religious and charitable machinery both there and throughout the world—machinery which, once dismantled and broken, could never be replaced. In England another view had perhaps more weight. There was no proof in this case. Had there been, it could easily have been shown that the great mass of the donors—many of them still living—gave their money on the understanding that the church was free to revise and free to unite. Nine-tenths of the funds indeed were subscribed after it had formally declared that there was, in Dr Chalmers' words, "no bar" to the incorporating union. This was perhaps the strongest equitable consideration. But the other was the more pressing. And both together were irresistible as an appeal to Parliament.

The claim for immediate legislation, put admirably by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in his Edinburgh speech, and strengthened by the adhesion of men of both political parties to the views of Mr Shaw, the member for the Border Burghs, had apparently already engaged the attention of the Prime Minister. Four years ago he had been among the first to express his approval, apart from controversial details, of the general principle of comprehension upon which the Church Union of 1900 was based. The ex-Secretary for Scotland, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, was now foremost in wise counsel to both parties, to submit their trust property to the immediate arbitration of the legislature, or to such arbitration as the legislature could sanction. There was unwillingness and delay, and latterly a hurried recurrence to evictions. But in the first week of December it was announced that the months before Parliament meets are not to be left unutilised, and that a Royal Commission for enquiry would sit without delay. It is well. Yet if this proposed remedy were to shut out the hope of

future enlargement of the general law, the writer could almost find it in his heart to regret it. It is not the first time that his countrymen, and this church in particular, have braved the loss of all things, because (as the only Scottish judge against them most accurately puts it), "contemplating themselves as a Christian church, they measure the importance of any doctrine in relation to Christianity as a whole, and not with reference to their own distinctive origin." - The freedom to do so is precisely what this church and many others claim. And what they claim as vital, law will one day give as just.

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EDINBURGH.

## THE CHURCH CRISIS IN SCOTLAND.

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DIFFIDENCE is not a marked feature in English character, and there are not many subjects which a full-blooded Englishman will not tackle. It is therefore almost pathetic to notice the hopelessness with which a person who has not had the privilege of Scots blood or a training in Scots history approaches ecclesiastical affairs in Scotland. English visitors cannot remain impervious to the prevailing atmosphere, and are obliged, even though they be Gallios at home, who care for none of these things, to give their attention to the question of the Kirk. They find at a glance that there are various Kirks, and that they are all provokingly like one another; they discover, on going a little into the matter, that the distinctions between them are extremely subtle but very pronounced, and that even the humblest people with whom they associate understand them thoroughly and hold them firmly. Very likely those distinctions may not be more important or more unintelligible than those between the different forms of dissent in England, and the average Englishman will tell you any day without a blush that he has never been able to distinguish between a Baptist and a Congregationalist. The Scots Kirk has, however, in all her branches, her divisions, her controversies, her creeds, something of the rugged strength and irresistible fascination of Scots character and scenery. No one, neither king nor statesman in history, has been able to treat the Kirk as a negligible quantity. If he tried to do so, he got into

trouble instantly, and very likely had invited a disastrous defeat. From the beginning of her separate history in the sixteenth century to 1843, the year of the last battle with the State, the Church of Scotland has been the most virile, determined, uncompromising, and unmanageable factor in Scots life. Her attitude expressed in the minds of the people challenges attention, and the English visitor does his honest best to understand the difference between the various parties in what is practically the one Scots Church. It is no reflection upon his intelligence that as a rule he fails, and comes South a chastened man, full of questions to which he has not found an answer, and ideas of his own which are largely wrong. For centuries Scotland has been one large theological debating society, and the national intellect, exercised from school days upon the most profound and speculative themes in Christian thought, has become a perfect instrument for the creation of distinctions and the pursuit of inferences. Has any nation produced a peasantry so learned in theology? to whom, according to David Deans, "Independency is a foul heresy, and Anabaptism a damnable and deceiving error," and to whom an Erastian, a Romanist, an Arminian, and a Cocceian, as well as all sectaries, are equally obnoxious. Perhaps the most wonderful achievement of the Scots intellect has not been Hume's philosophy, or Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, but the distinctions which separate the branches of the Scots Church; and the second most remarkable achievement has been understanding them. And my modest but perhaps not unuseful purpose in this article is not to discuss the law of a recent momentous decision of the House of Lords, but to explain the situation, how it came about, what it means, and what is likely to be its issue.

Before one approaches the history of the divisions in the Church of Scotland he ought to understand that idea of the Church which from the Reformation has possessed the imagination of the Scots people, and which in some of its features may have come over from the mother Church of

Rome. According to this doctrine, which is stated formally in the Second Book of Discipline, published in 1578, which has been expounded by the great defenders of the Church like Melville, and which glows and burns through the letters of a mystic like Samuel Rutherford, the Church is no creation of the State, and far less a joint-stock company holding money on a legal trust. The Church is the body of Christ in Scotland of which He is the only head; she is the bride of the Lord, and as Rutherford would say, "My mother, the Kirk of Scotland." As a Church she does not receive her power from the State, and she is not responsible to the State; the "power ecclesiastical is an authority granted by God the Father through the mediator Jesus Christ unto His Kirk gathered." In civil affairs the State was to be supreme, being also the creature of God; in spiritual affairs the Kirk was supreme. The Kirk did not desire to intrude upon the province of the State (although it would be difficult to say that she has not done so, say in the seventeenth century, when she tried to force Charles II. upon England); on the other hand, the Kirk has demanded that the State should not interfere in her province. There was to be a covenant between them, and this was to be the condition, in words that sound strangely to Southern ears, but were understood by shepherds on the hills of Scotland: "Co-ordinate jurisdiction with mutual subordination." The State was to do her work, such as making laws about property; and the Church was to do her work, attending to the spiritual welfare of the people; and Christ was King of both; but it may frankly be admitted that the Church has been more than once the dominant partner. If any Church has ever been the Church of the people, it has been the Kirk of Scotland, for she has been a faithful custodier of the national liberty, and the faithful mother of her children. The people have more or less obeyed her, and have been loyal to her, because she was loyal to them, and because by her very claim to be the Body of Christ she witnessed to the things unseen and eternal. It would be far from right to say

that the Scots mind was hankering after a theocracy in which the Kirk would really rule both in things spiritual and things civil; but it would be nearly right to say that the Scots mind regarded the Kirk as the nation dealing with spiritual affairs, and the State as the same nation dealing with civil affairs, and that, while Christ was the alone Lord of the Kirk, the King was to be acknowledged as his vicegerent in the State.

With this mystical and yet very practical idea dominating the intense imagination of the Scots people, one can see at once that the situation in Scotland would be very different from that in England. The English analogy of Church and dissent indeed will only mislead the mind and confuse the issue. The Church of England has the sovereign at her head, and is under the strict control of Parliament, which appoints her chief officers through the ministry of the day. The dissenting bodies of England have nothing to do with Parliament as Christian denominations, and do not desire any recognition at the hands of the State. But the Scots Church has believed that Church and State should be in alliance, the Church strengthening the State and the State supporting the Church. It is also worth remembering that while in England the Established Church and the Free Churches differ widely in worship, in creed, and in church government, in Scotland, if we exclude the comparatively small bodies of Roman Catholics and Episcopalians, together with a few Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists, the Scots people belong to one Church; and although that Church has been divided, all the different denominations are one in their form of worship, of belief, and of government. Were one asked to guess what would cause division in a Church so intensely national and so conscious of her own mission, he might safely say this ideal but critical relation of Church and State, and he would be right. When one grasps the fact that all the unfortunate divisions in the Scots Church are due to friction between the Church and the State, then he has got one end of the clue which will guide him to an understanding of the Scots

situation. It may indeed be said that from the year 1560, when the Church of Scotland was reconstituted as a Protestant Church, its mind has been torn between two opposing tendencies, alliance with the State and independence of the State.

When the persecution of the Stuarts ceased, and the Church of Scotland was established at the Revolution Settlement, there was even then one body of Presbyterians who separated themselves and would not form a part of the National Church. They were the representatives of the Covenanters, or, as they were sometimes called, the Cameronians, or with reference to their sufferings the Hill Folk, and they lifted up their testimony for a covenanted king and a covenanted people. In the eighteenth century the conflict between Church and State grew acute, and in 1733 certain ministers who had seceded from the Kirk constituted themselves into what was called an Associate Synod, but what was popularly known as the Seceders; and the difference between the Seceders and the Established Church was that the former insisted that congregations should have the right of choosing their ministers, while the latter was willing the parish minister should be appointed by a patron. The Associate Synod, still pursuing this interminable controversy, and still following out the lamentable principle of disruption, split into two bodies in 1747 over an oath taken by burgesses in Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Perth, and which ran: "I profess and allow with my heart the true religion presently professed within this realm, and authorised by the laws thereof." So many were willing to take this oath, so many thought that it was wrong; and the one body was called Burghers and the other Anti-Burghers, and they started to excommunicate one another. In 1761 another secession took place again on the old question of patronage, and what was called the Relief Church was formed, which, it ought to be added, was much more liberal than the other secessions. By the middle of the eighteenth century, therefore, there were the Established Kirk and four nonconforming bodies. In 1799, by way of celebrating the close of

the eighteenth century, the Burghers split into two over the power of the civil magistrate in religion; and in 1804, by way of celebrating the opening of the nineteenth century, the Anti-Burghers split into two; so that at that day and date there were seven Presbyterian bodies in Scotland, the Kirk and five non-conforming denominations. And while in England Nonconformists are less churchy than Conformists, each secession in Scotland, and each remnant of a secession, was more Presbyterian, and more high-flying in its doctrine of the Church, than the one before. With the more reasonable influence of the nineteenth century, the Scots people began to regret what had become a convention of disruption, and to have some sense of the duty of unity. In 1820 the Burghers and the Anti-Burghers united, although not without the loss of a small minority, and this Church, which was called the United Secession, amalgamated with the Relief Church in 1847. In 1839 one of the minor secessions had united with the Church of Scotland, so that, had it not been for the Disruption of 1843, the Presbyterian denominations of Scotland would have been reduced in the middle of last century to the Established Church, the Reformed Presbyterian, the United Presbyterian Church, and one of the minor secessions which called itself the Original Seceders; which at anyrate was a slight abatement in the principle of disruption, and showed some practical desire for union.

Unfortunately, while the secessions were trying to adjust their differences, the old feud had broken out in the mother Church, and as usual it was over the question of patronage, and had reached a condition of almost intolerable friction. If the patron appointed a minister whom the people did not like, the ecclesiastical court would not induct him, and therefore he could not obtain his living. The civil courts then ordered the ecclesiastical courts to induct him, and when one inferior court obeyed, the superior ecclesiastical court suspended its members from the ministry; so that things had come to a deadlock. In 1843 upwards of four hundred

ministers seceded from the Church of Scotland and formed the Free Church, which added another denomination. In 1850, therefore, there was the Established Church, which held that the State ought to endow the Church, and was willing to receive the money on the State's own terms; and there was the Free Kirk, which also held that the State ought to endow the Church, but on the Church's terms; and then there was the United Presbyterian Church, whose position by this time was that it was better for the Church to have nothing to do with the State, and whose ministers would not accept any endowment at the hands of the State. The position of the Free Church was really half-way between the two extremes—Erastianism, which would make the Church subservient to the State, and Voluntaryism, which would break the tie altogether between Church and State. The ideal of the Free Church was the ancient imagination of Scotland—Church and State working together in legal alliance and each independent in its own sphere. It was perhaps inevitable, but it has turned out very unfortunate, that great leaders of the Free Church like Dr Chalmers should have asserted in strong terms the dislike of the Free Church to Voluntaryism and their devotion to the Establishment principle, for from that day forward it was held by a certain section of the Free Church that the Establishment principle was a part of the constitution, and that any union with a Voluntary Church would be a violation of that constitution. Circumstances are, however, stronger than theories, and if a Church knows that it will never get endowment on its own terms, and that it must always be a self-supporting Church, it inevitably follows that that Church will attach less importance every year to the Establishment principle, and will regard the heresy of Voluntaryism with growing indifference. A Church which is voluntary in practice will be very apt to become voluntary in theory. Free Churchmen and United Presbyterians began to ask why they should not be one Church, and heal a wide division in Scotland, and in 1863 negotiations for union were opened. It might almost

have been hoped that, as both parties were non-established and neither of them would ever be established, and as every person knew that all the dissensions of the poor suffering Scots Kirk had been due to the unhappy union of Church and State, they would leave that perilous principle an open question. The old ghost, however, was to rise again, and after years of conference the negotiations were broken off—partly because a considerable portion of the Free Church refused to unite with the other body since, although they agreed in everything else, they differed about Establishment, partly because the minority threatened that if the union was consummated they would claim the whole property of the Free Church. This minority called itself the Constitutional Party, and was led with much shrewdness and great resources of popular eloquence by Dr Begg of Edinburgh. Many people were inclined to think that they strained the constitution of their Church, and that it was mere pedantry to say that the Free Church was bound to the Establishment principle. The recent decision of the House of Lords has shown that the minority were perfectly right in their contention, and that if things had gone to the worst, by which one means the Law Courts, they might have won their case. The majority, therefore, exercised a wise discretion, and were, one supposes, ably advised by their counsel, in abandoning their effort at union—that is, if the last importance is to be attached to property.

This failure was, however, a disaster to Scots religion, and the minds of the laity were getting sick over the senseless divisions of the Scots Kirk. It was intolerable that there should be in a country parish three Churches with not the slightest difference between them except a different theory about the relation of Church and State. It was a waste of Church money, and of the Christian ministry, and of the energy of Christian people, and it afforded constant opportunity for quarrelling and rivalry. A union of the three large branches of the Scots Church might be difficult while one branch was endowed and established, but a step in the right

direction could be taken by making another effort to unite the two disestablished bodies, and so the second negotiations for union between the United Presbyterian and Free Churches were opened. It is too soon to write the secret history of this movement, and it is open to argue either that it was a movement on the part of the laity who are tired of divisions, or that it was a movement on the part of ecclesiastics for purposes of their own. No one knows what were all the motives which actuated the leaders, no one knows what was the advice given by the law advisers. One must go upon appearances and do justice to everyone concerned; and any patriotic Scotsman must have felt that if it were possible it would be a good thing that those two Churches should become one, and most Scotsmen also hoped that the end would be a union of the three branches of the Kirk. Certainly it was laymen and not ecclesiastics who moved first in the matter, either because it was thought wiser for tactical purposes, or because the ecclesiastics had burned their fingers so severely over the former negotiations that they were not inclined rashly to repeat the experiment. Sooner or later, however, the management of affairs fell into the hands of the one living Scots Churchman who can justly lay claim to the title of statesman, and who wielded a practically absolute power in the Free Church. The Scots Church has produced from time to time leaders of conspicuous capacity and shrewd judgment, men capable of a wide outlook and skilled in administration. The most distinguished representative of this class in the past was Carstares, the adviser of William at the Revolution, and perhaps the sanest guide the Scots Church has ever had. In our day it is Principal Rainy, a man whose subtlety of mind is equalled by his integrity of character, and who, if he has failed to heal the divisions of the Scots Kirk, has at least failed grandly. He has been exposed to severe criticism from opposite quarters, and a man of his complex nature cannot be easily estimated; but this is certain, that he has not been a selfish or cunning

intriguer seeking power for himself or victory for his own views, and that he has not been guided in his action by political motives or enmity to the Established Church. He did his best to unite two branches of the Scots Kirk, not that he might be stronger to attack the Established Church, but that one wound at least in Christ's body in Scotland might be healed. If he was convinced that the Church of Scotland should be disestablished, this was not because he was indifferent to her ancient and splendid history, or because he desired to see her crippled and humbled, but because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that once she was disestablished there might be a general union, and the Scots Kirk be once more undivided as in the former days. It may have been a fond imagination, but it was one worthy of a leader of the Scots Kirk. He may have made mistakes, and for that he has suffered, but the end he had in view will one day be accomplished.

On the 31st October 1900 the greatest Church Union Scotland has ever seen was achieved when the United Presbyterian Church and the Free Church became one under the name of the United Free Church of Scotland, and the event was celebrated with profound satisfaction and amid the congratulations of many Churches. It would not be right to say that it called forth the enthusiasm of the nation, or that the two bodies flew into one another's arms. The union was rather a matter of duty than of affection; and while the ceremony which made the two Churches one was proceeding, an ominous protest was being made elsewhere. The Free Church had decided in favour of the union by an enormous majority—643 to 27—but the minority were very determined men, who were firmly convinced that a great principle was at stake, that of national religion, and who also had the courage of men with their backs to the wall. When, on the 30th October 1900, the Free Church Assembly held its last meeting in the Assembly Hall, it determined to adjourn till next day, and then to meet with the supreme court of the United Presbyterian Church in the Waverley Market hall, "there

to consummate the union which has now been legislatively sanctioned by the Church." The minority protested, and withdrew to the waiting-room of the Assembly Hall, where they constituted themselves the Assembly of the Free Church. At 11.30 a.m. on 31st October, when the union was being accomplished in the Waverley Market, the minority made their appearance at the gates of what they considered their own Assembly Hall. When they were refused admission, this handful of ministers and elders—mostly Highlanders—"constituted themselves at the outer gate as a meeting of General Assembly." In the afternoon they left Queen Street Hall, and since that day have held their courts and conducted their work as the real Free Church of Scotland. When people heard next morning how this little body had stood outside the Assembly Hall like sheep who had found the door of the fold closed, and how they claimed to be the Free Church, there were some who laughed, but there were others who were more inclined to weep. A minority for conscience sake should be dealt with very tenderly, and there were various reasons for treating this minority with great consideration. For one thing, they were men, both clergy and laity, without distinction or influence; they had no one among them like Dr Begg who commanded the ears of Scotland, or who could state their case in a popular fashion. It should also have been remembered that they were largely Celts, a race of passionate loyalty to the past and the traditional fighters of lost causes, a race also quickly touched by courtesy but absolutely intractable under oppression. And it could hardly be denied that they held in their entirety the original principles of their Church, and stood where Chalmers and the leaders of the Disruption stood. It may be quite right that a Church should change her creed with advancing light and new circumstances, and the writer holds firmly not only that the Church has this power, but that the Scots Church should have exercised it very much sooner and on a much more extensive scale.

One who takes this position is, however, on that very account the more bound to act very carefully at every step, and to deal very generously with his conservative fellow-Churchmen. Very likely the authorities of the United Free Church were guided by legal opinion when they locked those Highlanders out of their old home, and there might have been some legal danger in allowing them to meet in the empty Assembly Hall. It turns out to have been bad law, for the Hall belonged to those Highlanders and not to the Church in the market-place; and it is just possible—for a Celt is a warm-hearted man—that if the minority had found the Hall placed at their disposal, and a kindly message had been sent them from the Market hall with its thousands, the lawsuit would never have been started, and Scotland would have been saved another bitter controversy. Certainly it was a great mistake in what may be called religious politics, and of course it was an absolute blunder in law, to endeavour to dispossess the minority of the few churches where the people belonged to their way of thinking, and not to offer them one divinity hall in which to train their students. Upon the face of it, it did not strike the lay mind as quite fair, not to say quite Christian, to deny them any share in the accumulated heritage of the Free Church, but to turn them out into the wilderness, houseless and penniless, because they refused to unite with another Church whose characteristic principle of Voluntaryism the leaders of their own Church had once denounced, and because they wished to remain Free Churchmen as their fathers had been before them. It was good statesmanship to unite the two Churches, and it would have been better statesmanship to have tried to unite the three, but it was not statesmanship, and it turns out not to have been law, to penalise those Highlanders because they would not become United Presbyterians. No doubt they ought to have seen that the Stuart dynasty is impossible to-day in theology, and it would be better if they could settle down under the new régime; but a Highlander will not be driven, and loses his

reason when he imagines that he has been betrayed by his own friends. So the minority took, as it were, to the hills, and people treated their campaign as a forlorn hope. But, to everyone's surprise, they have won their Culloden.

The situation which this unexpected victory of the minority has created is incredible, and suggests *Alice in Wonderland*. All the mission stations of the Free Church scattered throughout the world were handed over to a body which has not a single missionary. The three theological colleges, with their libraries and endowments, belong now to a Church which, until yesterday, had not a professor, and has had to secure such professors as it can from outside its own ranks and from the oddest quarters. All the churches and manses of the Free Church, besides that Assembly Hall in which so much history was made, and the Church offices and colleges, now belong by law to this Highland remnant with a few Lowland camp-followers; while, on the other hand, the former Free Church of Scotland which was inaugurated by an act of unique sacrifice in 1843, and covered Scotland with churches, and made its missions famous through the world, and set an example of liberality to the Christian Church, is deprived of all her property and left without a roof under which to worship throughout Scotland. Upon the soundness of the law which has wrought this marvel the writer has no opinion to offer, and that side of the matter will be expounded by the most eminent authority on the subject of the "Law of Creeds in Scotland"; but he expresses the feeling of the lay mind in saying that nothing so absurd has been done by law in the history of the Scots people.

The irony of the situation is not lessened when one looks at the grounds of the decision; for they are two, and the first is, that the Free Church has abandoned the Establishment principle, and that by her constitution she is not at liberty to do so. When one remembers that in 1843 the Free Church paid an enormous price to be free from the control of the State in spiritual affairs, and proudly called herself by the

name of the Free Church, it is an amazing illustration of the futility of everything human to find that the Establishment principle is tied as firmly round her neck as ever, and that, having lost all her property once to escape from the Established Church, she is now to lose all she has accumulated since because she had made the Establishment principle an open question. What more could the Free Church have done to be free? Yet it is perfectly evident that she was not free, and one asks with perplexity whether Cavour's famous ideal is possible at all, and there can ever be a free Church in a free State. The other ground was that the Free Church, by certain modifications she had made on the Confession of Faith, which were really of a very modest character, had abandoned sound doctrine; and here again one is affected by the irony of the situation. If there ever has been any Church in our land which has prided herself upon orthodoxy and stormed against heresy, it has been the Free Church. Her leaders denounced Broad Church theology in every shape, and distinguished ministers were prosecuted for suggesting even a modification in the application of the Jewish Sabbath law, while Robertson Smith, who was the glory of scholarship in Scotland, was removed from his chair and died in exile from his Church. If this Church be found untrue to the Confession of Faith and the orthodox creed, then one despairs of orthodoxy altogether. It is right, however, at the same time to admit—although this did not come within the range of the House of Lords—that although Robertson Smith was expelled, his spirit remained, and Biblical criticism has found a congenial home in the Free Church. One has a shrewd idea that, if he got to the background of the Highland mind, it would be found that the remnant would not have vexed themselves so much about any statement of free grace which the Free Church made, if they believed that the Free Church was loyal to the Word of God. They were haunted with the idea that critics within the Free Church were shaking the very foundation of faith by their daring treatment of Holy Scripture; and it is open to believe,

although it cannot be proved, that there never would have been any lawsuit, and possibly there never would have been any division, if the remnant had not been scared by the higher criticism. One reason, when you go to the inwardness of things, why the Free Church left the Established Church in 1843, was that they were more evangelical; and one reason, when you get at the inwardness of things again, why the Free Church is stripped of all her possessions in 1904, is that she is less evangelical. What is a Church to do if she be penalised first for orthodoxy and next for heterodoxy?

The absurdity of the position is quite as great when one comes to the matter of property and the anxiety of the Law Courts that it should be administered according to the will of the donor. On the one hand, they take the whole of the property from the Free Church because they consider them improper people to administer it, and they hand it over to the remnant who cannot administer it at all, and this is done in order to preserve the sanctity of the law of trusts. On the other hand, they take the property of the Free Church, three-fourths of which was accumulated after that Church had declared that it did not consider the Establishment principle to be of the essence of its faith, and hand over not only the one-fourth raised, as the judges would say, upon the prospectus of Dr Chalmers, but the three-fourths raised upon quite a different prospectus, to the remnant because they are the proper people to administer such property. In other words, three-fourths of the property of the Free Church is taken away from the Church the donors love and to which they gave it, and handed over for administration to a body of men with whom the donors for the most part disagreed, and for the furtherance of whose views the donors for the most part would never have given a penny. And this is done to establish the confidence of the public in the law of trusts. As many of those donors are living, and see the churches which they have built delivered to the remnant against whom they have been voting for thirty years, one would like to

know their opinion of the law of trusts. If this law which is the fetish of English judges is intended to secure first that a trust be efficiently administered, and secondly that it be administered according to the intention of the donors, then the House of Lords have secured by law—which I wish again to say is no doubt perfect law—that this particular trust be scarcely administered at all, and next, that so far as it is administered it shall be contrary to the wishes of seventy-five per cent. of the donors.

It is indeed unreasonable and intolerable that a Church which exists for the teaching of truth and the development of the religious life should be regarded as a joint-stock company which is raising money upon a prospectus as for banking or mining. If such a Church is to fulfil her purpose and justify the gifts which have been given her, she should keep abreast of theological science, and lead her people further into truth every year; and it would be an anomaly if such a Church is denied the liberty of growth and the opportunity of life, and a grave injustice if, whenever the Church had vindicated her own existence by her intellectual sincerity and her liberty, she should be mulcted of her property. If the Church of Christ is to fulfil her purpose in history, and if she is to secure the loyalty of her people in modern times, she must be free to shape her creed according to her conviction, and it must no longer be possible for the dead creed of the past to grip her throat at any moment and threaten her with the loss of her substance because the Church is declaring the mind of Christ as He has been pleased to reveal it in those latter days by His indwelling spirit. The crisis in Scotland in the first issue gravely affects the Scots Kirk, and therefore calls forth the sympathy of every one of her sons, wherever he may be living; in the last issue it affects the freedom and the future of the Christian Church throughout the English-speaking world. The Scots Kirk has often suffered in the past, and she is ready to suffer again; she has suffered in the cause of freedom, and now, whatever happens, the world may be sure Scotsmen will not sell the pass.

# THE CHRIST OF DOGMA AND OF EXPERIENCE.<sup>1</sup>

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## I.

Most open-minded laymen probably view with unqualified satisfaction the desire recently evinced on the part of the more progressive clergy of the Established Church to restate upon a basis of rational criticism the received dogmas of Christianity. The encouraging feature of the spectacle, quite apart from the value of the results hitherto reached, perhaps mainly consists in the tone and spirit of the discussion. There is a real determination to come to a grip with the substantial issues of the problem, to remain sheltered no longer behind any wall of authority or tradition, but calmly to submit the bases, historical or logical, of the faith that is in them to a contest in the open field of reason; in a word, to justify or to reject. Meanwhile, of course, conservative orthodoxy still endeavours to protect itself by means of its time-honoured weapons, the appeal to Scripture and Apostolic theory, backed by obscure metaphor, and, in the last resort, a certain undignified intolerance of those who will not yield to it—like a peevish child who cannot explain what he wants, but is ready to snap at everyone who will not give it him. Doubtless they have their reward; but this is not to win the respect or the adherence of the vast body of those whose interest lies in discovering, not what the Church holds, but what the facts (both in the narrower,

<sup>1</sup> A further article on this subject by a Catholic writer will appear in April.

historic sense, and also in the deeper, metaphysical sense) of the Christian transformation of the world have been. "Aut doce aut discede" is the only alternative which the student of theology can present to-day to his spiritual instructors. Theologians will do well to recognise generally what some (it appears) are beginning already to recognise, namely, the growing independence in regard to theology of lay thought. Authorised leaders are likely to find themselves followed exactly so far as, and not further than, they show themselves able and willing to lead.

It is natural, in a religion so essentially bound up with the person of its Founder as Christianity, that the problems which have received the first and most serious attention should be the Christological. Already in this sphere the amount of concession made, while it has been made quietly, has been enormous. Some of the attributes once claimed on Gospel evidence for Jesus (*e.g.* omnipotence and omniscience) have been by some apologists definitely abandoned, both as unthinkable in themselves and as contrary to much even of the language of Scripture. Other thinkers have pleaded for an open verdict on such questions as these, as not constituting any integral part of Jesus' claim upon our worship and affections, while at the same time, judging by this criterion, they have insisted upon the sinlessness of Jesus as a doctrine not to be parted with at any price. Others, more advanced still, have urged that this no less than attributes like omnipotence is, both on grounds of Scriptural evidence and of reason, at least open to question. Moreover, in regard to the historical facts of Jesus' life there has been a significant tendency to drop the argument from purely historical evidence: thus, for instance, on the question of the Virgin Birth we find fewer purely hypothetical "origins" of the stories constructed with the view of showing on the one side that they proceeded direct from Mary or her friends, or, on the other, that they were gradually and imaginatively built up. Instead of this kind of discussion, in which the certainty of the result is usually in inverse proportion to the ingenuity

expended, and in which no one is ever really convinced, there has been an increasing interest in the *a priori* considerations determining to the one side or the other. The problem is not so much, What does the evidence show? as, How much of abnormal occurrence is it necessary to presume in order to account for the abnormal genius of Christ? And similarly with regard to His mental qualities, the problem is not so much, What did He believe Himself? or, What did His disciples believe Him to be? as, What is presupposed in the impression made by Him on His first followers and on the world? In all this a tendency has made itself felt to make clearer distinctions which were formerly kept fluid and hazy, alike in the grounds of belief and in the subject under discussion. In regard to the former, the authority of history is distinguished from that of faith. Certain dogmas, it is recognised, are but weakly demonstrated by history: the inquiry then becomes in what sense they are required by faith, that is, in order to make rational the devotion of the Christian to Christ. Similarly in regard to the person under discussion there is a growing inclination to recognise the difference between the historic figure of Jesus, as drawn in the Synoptists, and the quasi-metaphysical presentation of His personality, as outlined in the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles, and carried on in the faith of the Catholic Church—a distinction sufficiently sharp to call forth from M. Loisy the description “comme deux Christs.” Though perhaps more slowly in England than on the Continent, the admission of the validity of this distinction is becoming fashionable, and the fashion is a concomitant of the tendency to sacrifice even orthodoxy, if necessary, to the higher claims of truth.

It is this which gives its direction to the modern Christological question: the two camps (excluding the ultra-conservatives, who are still flogging their dead horses) are now at issue about the legitimacy of treating the distinction as valid, and the necessity which is incumbent, if it be valid, of entirely reconstructing and reinterpreting the traditional metaphysics of Christianity. The orthodox camp points out with perfect

justice that though the distinction is obviously to be traced in the New Testament, yet it is none the less obvious that no one of the New Testament writers ever had the slightest idea of separating the one portrait of Christ from the other, in any sense which implied that the titles and attributes ascribed to the exalted Christ were not due of right to Jesus of Nazareth: in fact, the whole interest and importance to them of the latter, the whole secret of His power, lay in the fact that He *was* the pre-existent Word of the Father, incarnate indeed in human form, but none the less one and the same person, as would a king be if painted now in the form of a servant, now in the plenitude of regal splendour. Thus we are reminded that the author of the "harsh words" about "Christ after the flesh" also wrote Phil. ii. vv. 5-11, or other passages to the same effect. By what right then, it is asked, do modern theologians try to divorce conceptions which for the New Testament writers were always joined together? To this the advanced party reply by a counter-question: By what right were two conceptions, so essentially disparate, ever associated? In seeking, however, to challenge this right, the advanced party suffer obviously from two inherent weaknesses in their own position, one of which discredits them in the eyes of the theological world; the other, though time will heal it, inevitably weakens for the moment their power of enlisting a very large body of sympathy. These are—

(1) The breach which they are driven to make with Scriptural tradition.

(2) The negative character of their own position. It is easy to point out the metaphysical difficulty of the view of Christ's person taken in the New Testament: it is not easy (and so far at least people have failed) to produce an alternative theory which will adequately cover the facts.

The object of this paper is to deal shortly with these two difficulties in the more liberal position: to endeavour to justify the one, and to make a tentative suggestion with regard to the other.

In the first place, be it remembered the battle no longer centres around the problem, What is the Apostolic tradition? but, What is the Truth? It would be almost unnecessary to mention such a truism, except for the strange tactics of some of the "defenders of the faith," whose attitude implies that either they do not understand the question, or they are unable to find the answer. The Bishop of London, for instance, in a "public repudiation" of a recent theory upon the Resurrection, points out quite truly that statements which militate against that theory are to be found in the Bible, and therefore that the contrary view is proved "by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." Now this is presumably intended to convince either those for whom the mere statement of Scripture *is*, or those for whom it is *not*, a "certain warrant." If the latter, it is wholly inadequate: when men in a fog are demanding light, it is not satisfying to be assured that the fog is the genuine old one, even though it has hung over "the gallant ship" (to use the Bishop's own metaphor) throughout the whole of its "voyage of 1300 years in this country alone." In fact, the length of its persistence would seem to be a reason for wishing to dispel it rather than to retain it longer. If, however, the Bishop had the former class of Christian in mind, it would seem almost superfluous to lay such emphasis on points which any of them could find out for himself, merely by opening his Bible. No doubt the Bishop understands his own duties, but it is difficult for the uninitiated to see what class of persons required his public repudiation, with such "warrants" as he had to offer, unless it be the members of his flock who had the misfortune to be born blind. Such exhibitions of episcopal apologetics are perhaps a sufficient excuse for the following plain statement of the case:—From the point of view of tradition, the orthodox are very probably in the strong position. But the yearly expenditure of time and energy on their part to prove this is, from the point of view of modern theology, a waste of powder and shot on a position no longer held by the assailants, who are meanwhile

forcing a breach through the protecting ring-wall of tradition itself. Henceforth, for all who wish to avoid an *ignoratio elenchi*, reason and not authority is the arbiter in the fight. Thus discussions about the Johannine authorship of certain views are as important as ever for the student of dogmatic history; but what the modern student of religion wants to know is rather the value of those views for modern thought, be they descended from the Apostle, the Elder, or only "another man of the same name."

"But," it will be asked, "to whom is it more natural to go to learn the truth about Jesus' person than to Jesus Himself and His disciples?" Those who put such a question do not always remember that what is sought is not the preacher on these matters, but the teacher; not phrases capable only, however admirably, of expressing and arousing an emotional enthusiasm, but the calm, thinkable truth. The ability of Jesus and His disciples to supply the former need is abundantly proved by the results of their efforts on the world's history. But no demonstration has been given, or seems capable of being given, of the claim that they have cast their message in a form which it can permanently occupy in human thought. *A priori* considerations are not favourable to such claim. Practical effectiveness and speculative insight do not always, as is sometimes arbitrarily assumed, go together. In spite of a certain school of modern philosophy, a thing need not be necessarily true because it "works." Nor does it find any more support if the internal evidence of the Apostolic theory be examined. The day is long since passed when it was possible to regard the New Testament as containing a single self-consistent system of truth, or to regard the different views of discrepant passages as merely complementary one of the other. It is, moreover, at least arguable that Jesus and the Apostles themselves never intended their words to bear the metaphysical interpretation that was later put upon them. Their language was framed to produce a persuasive appeal to the world at the time, not to serve as raw material from which

future ages, more servile than intelligent, were to extract a metaphysic; still less, in view of the spasmodic and incidental manner in which their theories are introduced, and the slight and unsystematic explanation offered of their meaning, is it possible to suppose that they intended to present the world with a full-blown metaphysic as such. Rather, one of the most striking marks of the teaching of Jesus Himself as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels is the studied avoidance of metaphysical terms. He uses sublime metaphor rather than clear definition: He expresses throughout the poetry rather than the philosophy of life. That Jesus' consciousness of God's presence and the reality of goodness were vivid in a quite unique manner is a proposition scarcely to be denied, but that His language about Himself will support the vast dogmatic construction which has been based upon it, or that the current Christology can genuinely arrogate to itself the authority of Christ, is a proposition more often assumed or supported by a lame selection of *obiter dicta* taken out of their context than satisfactorily proved. Into the passages of the Synoptists most usually quoted in this connection there is not here space to enter. Suffice it to say that the orthodox view is only one among other alternative explanations: Jesus' language is sufficiently intelligible even if He had no studied view of His own personality except such as is traceable to His absolute conviction of the love and abiding presence of God, moulded to some extent by His parallel conviction that He was the Messiah. In view of the latter claim He styled Himself the "Son of David" and the "Son of Man": in view of the former He claimed for Himself the title "Son of God," as, indeed, all men were to Him by natural right "children of God." But to anyone conscious of the very flexible significance which this term bore in the mouth of a Jew, what sort of basis does this afford of the metaphysical superstructure which has been raised upon it? The rearing of the structure, indeed, is in itself intelligible enough, if the circumstances under which it was constructed be taken

into account—in a word, if we penetrate beneath language to experience. The fact stands out that in Jesus the Apostles were confronted with a personality of overwhelming attractiveness and power of appeal to themselves, and their language must be interpreted throughout as their attempt to expound and pass on their experience to the world. In this attempt they were naturally driven to employ such conceptions as were current in their day, and notably those of Messianic anticipations and Greek philosophy, and, as we should naturally expect, they were rapidly carried out of their depth into the region of presuppositions and ideas which they could not, and perhaps did not particularly care to, analyse completely.

This is a view of the Apostolic writings and their legitimate interpretation which obviously commends itself as reasonable on *a priori* grounds to anyone who remembers that the Apostles were primarily not metaphysicians, but religious teachers. It seems unnecessary also to lay stress upon the stimulating effect of the changed view of Christian revelation which it involves, as a body of truth which advances with time and demands a new interpretation in every age, not as a set of dogmas dumped down once and for all in the world, and intended (as Euclid is taught in a bad school) to be henceforth understood, it may be, by those who have the ability, but at all events to be asserted by everyone. Needless is it, too, to point out that it encourages men to look to the future instead of to the past for the explanation of the life of Jesus and His Church, and to think for themselves instead of appealing to the speculations of others. These are the marks of a sound theory, but do not in themselves prove its soundness. What is perhaps more important to observe is that in this view we have a key, and at present the only key, to the difficulty raised by the New Testament itself. If this latter be taken as stating an exact metaphysical truth, it is so far an unsolved riddle what that truth can be: or in other words, how the attributes of the exalted Christ can have strictly belonged to

any human being, however divinely gifted. If, on the other hand, it be the language of emotion, then, given the intense enthusiasm inspired by Jesus, the description of His personality becomes a natural and easy fact: it is just what we should have expected from the men, and the circle of ideas, among whom early Christian belief sprang up. But at the same time it loses its cogency for us, and it is open to, or rather imperative for, us to search for and formulate a substitute.

To those (and they are still many) who still cleave to the older view and wish to maintain the dogma *qua* metaphysics, theology has now a single challenge: "Explain what your assertions mean, or cease to dogmatise." It is beyond doubt possible that they can be justified to reason, but it is equally beyond doubt that no such justification has yet been given.

If, as often, we are warned that the accumulated weight of centuries of experience entitles the dogmas to respect, it is a fair reply that there is no disrespect in letting go of the hand of a guide, however old, if he be blind. A marked feature, which cannot be neglected in modern discussion of intellectual beliefs, is the growing disinclination to regard mere antiquity as being in itself a guarantee of value. The principle that "the old is better" may be true as before of articles like wine and furniture: in regard to doctrine it is rapidly giving place to the opposite view. In the present case the attempt to introduce this principle is really beside the point. It is not in dispute that so far as the dogma truly represents experience it is valid: the whole question at issue is how far it can be said ultimately to represent it; and the number of centuries through which it has stood is in this connection no guarantee that it is a strictly true theory, or anything more than a rough description. Many more centuries have probably believed that the sun went round the earth than have asserted the divinity (in the ordinary dogmatic sense) of Jesus.

## II.

If, however, we may, and (in default of an explanation) must, be prepared to modify the traditional Christology which the Church has maintained as her explanation of the life and work of her Founder, what substitute is there? The answer is inevitably in the main negative. But the same principle which has awakened the problem points the way to its solution. The appeal from language to experience suggests how, even without being accurate, the current Christology may readily have arisen; the same appeal suggests what elements in it need restatement, and what can be taken up into a new theory.

A study of the New Testament shows that the experience which lay at the root of the Apostolic mission and preaching was the sense of union with the risen Christ, considered no more as a human being, but as the active spirit of God, *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα*. Clearly such a union, in view of the interpretation put on the word "Christ," is analogous to that which is necessarily realised in every deeply religious mind. The problem is, How far is it necessary or justifiable to identify this universal spirit of God with the personality of Jesus of Nazareth? The experience of the Apostles, and the fact that for them the way to this union was opened up by the influence and teaching of Jesus, fully explains the obviousness of the identification for them. Its obviousness, if we take the experience of the whole Christian Church from the earliest to the most recent times, is by no means so apparent. The Apostolic language has repeated itself quite regularly in the mouths of pious Christians, and notably in the case of that mysticism which has been prominent at various periods of the Church's history. But when we inquire precisely what importance these mystics attach to the identification of the divine spirit with whom they have communion and the person of Jesus, we find all shades of opinion from the jet black of the Fourth Gospel, in which it is absolute, to the dead white of Eckhart,

who never mentions the historical Jesus at all. Even Paul, in his relative indifference to the facts which the other Apostles had to tell him, in comparison to the revelation made to himself, is in this matter (from the point of view of orthodoxy) a black, or at least a not unblemished, sheep.

Of the extent to which in modern experience the highest spiritual life is inspired by the influence of Jesus it is hard to find a criterion. The logic which Paul turns against circumcision would make short work of any claim that any ceremonies traceable to Jesus are of necessity the sole channels of Divine Grace: while of conscious inspiration drawn from the words and life of Jesus all degrees are found, in different, though equally strenuous and spiritually minded, persons, from the warmest devotion almost to indifference; and a critic would find it hard to draw a line among these, and say how far the highest life depends upon this source, without exposing himself to a spiritual fallacy of the Sorites.

Apart from this difficulty, there are indisputably in modern life many sources, all more or less independent of the personal history of Jesus, wherein man finds God unmistakably revealed to him. Men of whom Jesus could know nothing, and whose direct debt to Him varies in all degrees from zero upwards, yet impart to the world new knowledge of truth, a new moral impulse, or a new religious fervour. In the world of literature and thought, names like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Spinoza, Browning, Dante, at once suggest themselves; in the world of art, a similar list might be found. Now, to every educated Christian the influence of Jesus must inevitably be crossed with countless other influences like these. His sayings and conduct are interpreted in the light of theirs, as theirs are by His. Even the most devoted can only recognise the historic Jesus as one, though perhaps the greatest, among many "teachers come from God"; while, if spiritual life be taken as a whole, there are many of the most strenuous who yet would not acknowledge Him, in His power of appeal to themselves, even as the greatest. Thus the tendency of Christianity has

perhaps inevitably been that the force exerted by the example and words of the historic Jesus has diminished, or rather has been gradually modified by the influence of other leaders, in all of whom indeed "worketh one and the same Spirit," but yet whose ideas have been developed independently of His. Nor can the millions to whom Mahomet, not Christ, is the Prophet of God be in this connection left out of account.

Yet even with this restriction there is a sense in which the spirit of Western life could be more truly identified with the "Spirit of Christ" than with that of any other man. The name of Christ is burnt as none other into the world's history: its impression on nearly every sphere of thought and conduct is ineffaceable. His influence was unique, because His mind was unique. To form a clear conception of Jesus is not easy; but all the records of His sayings and acts point to the fact, that while philosophy sets up a wider ideal of knowledge than we have reason to suppose that He attained, yet of the intuitional, immediate experience of present unity with God and with a perfect world, which is the characteristic ideal of the religious mind, His was the supreme type. The unqualified claim to be the "Christ, the Son of God," stands as far removed from the ordinary human sense of guilt as the intuition, "I saw Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven," stands from the ordinary sense of the strength of evil. To Him, as to no one else, reality and goodness were one, and His intuitions are therefore the outline of the figure of which all other possible knowledge can only supply the detail. Hence, if others have in various degrees apprehended the "beauty of holiness," He beyond all could utter it in "a strain the world at last should heed." Such, in fact, has been His effect on the world that it would hardly be an exaggeration to call anyone who identifies himself with the highest tendencies of our civilisation a disciple, whether consciously or unconsciously, of Jesus.

This secret power of one like whom "never man spake" is the Alpha and Omega of the Christological question. The

experience of it, whenever and wherever found, is the beginning, as the explanation of it is the end. It is, perhaps, not over-ambitious to discern to-day a tendency towards what there has not yet been throughout the history of Christianity—a scientific treatment of this central problem.

If, however, theology is to become scientific, she must adopt the essential methods of science. In the first place she must be synoptic. The narrower the area of facts considered, the more fallible is the hypothesis based upon them, and in the case of theology pre-eminently, it is just the universality or narrowness of its outlook which determines whether it is to be the most valuable or valueless of all the sciences. It is not likely that nineteen centuries of the world's experience will be capable of being compressed without violence within the limits of formulæ which appeared adequately to cover that of a relatively small sect through less than a century; and, in fact, as we have seen, there is good reason to think that if the spiritual experience of all those who have honestly "professed and called themselves Christians," still more of that of "all sorts and conditions" of religious persons, were taken into account, the historic Jesus would not be found to occupy the same position in relation to God as is ascribed to Him in the Fourth Gospel and Epistles, and crystallised in the dogma of the Church. Secondly, theology must break with her bad habit of treating first hypotheses as axioms. Assuming that the datum of Christology is the experience, reflected in various and often conflicting expressions, of Jesus as a revealer of truth, and therefore of God, the theory of His identity with the Logos is pardonable, even creditable, as a first explanation: it may be the final theme to be proved; but to take it at the outset as axiomatic is a simple *petitio principii*, a beginning at the end. Such theories do not illuminate: they only dazzle.

The only refuge is in a *δεύτερος πλοῦς*. Now the analogy which seems obviously to suggest itself as a starting-point for the understanding of the relation between Jesus and His

followers is the relation of any great teacher to his disciples. It will be enough for the many ardent devotees who object to the inadequacy of any such analogy to remember that its legitimacy is involved in the mere description of Jesus as a "teacher come from God"; and that, unless set in their right relation to some such general conception, individual expressions of emotion, however intense, become emptied of all their significance. Its appropriateness is confirmed by the circumstance that in the relation of teacher to disciple we find a real communion of spirit with spirit which from the point of view of the disciple gives us an experience indistinguishable in its essential characteristics from that described in the New Testament; while in the function of the teacher we find an analogy which both enables us to give a concrete meaning to the claim that Jesus is the revealer of God, and also supplies the necessary modification to the language in which the New Testament expresses that claim.

Any attempt to work out the analogy and analyse the facts would require a paper, or a volume, to itself. The briefest suggestion only can be made.

The growth of the disciple under the influence of his master can be described either as a development of his own spirit into that of the teacher or the growth of the teacher's spirit into him. The nature of a spiritual union makes it impossible to say which of these metaphors is the more appropriate. For, on the one hand, minds do not react externally upon one another: the communication of ideas between mind and mind involves a real union of the two, and not a transference, as it were, of the contents of one box into another. On the other hand, the ideas thus implanted are not a foreign importation into the mind of the disciple: *νοῦς ἐστι δύναμις πάντα τὰ νοητά*, and if it were not so, no instruction could avail, for it would never be assimilated. If by it the pupil's mind is transformed, it is because the new ideas call forth and develop its own real, though latent, content. Now both these metaphors are to be found in the New Testament.

It is important here to note that, even though Jesus be regarded as only one among many teachers, yet the phrases which express the indwelling presence of His spirit are not merely rhetorical hyperboles, but describe, as accurately as metaphor can describe, a real spiritual fact. On the other hand, it is important also to note that the development-view is likewise recognised in the New Testament. If it is true to say that through Jesus humanity became Divine, it is likewise true that it was because He first revealed, and so called out, the divinity which is implicit in human nature. Jesus speaks of God as already "your Father which is in Heaven" in the same discourse in which He invites men to be the children of God: the spiritual relation to which He calls them is already an established fact. The way in which He vindicates His own claim to Divinity is still more striking: it is to appeal to a principle which makes a like claim for all men: "I have said, 'Ye are gods: ye are all children of the Most High.'" It must, however, be remembered that to attempt to isolate either aspect of such a relation, and to estimate how much of its result is due to one side and how much to the other, is to attempt an impossible calculus. All that can be said is that neither could have been what it is without the other. The "Spirit of Jesus," had He not found a world ready to receive His message, would have meant a very different power from "Christ the Head of the Body, the Church." So the world, but for Jesus, would still have been, even more than it is, ignorantly worshipping an "unknown God."

We may perhaps express the point thus:—In a union of personalities such as we have described, the disciple experiences a real loss of his individuality: he loses his own characteristics, and both in habits of mind and in conduct, increasingly reflects the character of his master. But (and here lies the paradox of such a relation) his personality does not thereby become weakened and more dependent, but acquires stronger individual powers: if it loses its old individuality it gains a new one. In the New Testament description of the union of the Christian with Christ both these aspects appear. On the

one hand, the mind is "transformed into the image" of Jesus: on the other hand, its relation to Jesus is not one of slavish dependence and loss of individual freedom, but one of intelligent, and therefore free, co-operation. In the Synoptic teaching particularly Jesus is represented as encouraging this independence of personality. But even the Fourth Gospel, which represents the union as of the closest kind, is quite clear on this point. "I have not called you servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth: but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you."

In thus describing the relation as one of friendship, we have a yet further hint whereby, on the analogy of everyday experience, the paramount personal influence of Jesus may be explained: for it is in friendship where the communion of two minds is deepest, and therefore touched with emotion, that the reaction of one upon the other is strongest.

This to-day is a more suggestive line of thought than the other. By it we can see how the tacit personal influence of Jesus involved for His followers a real spiritual union with Him, the nature of which was fully studied and described only after He was gone.

A similar union is implied likewise in the influence of the records of His life and words upon the world ever since. It is often supposed that in the spiritual experiences which a study of them has called forth we have a phenomenon which puts the case of Jesus out of all relation to the case of others who by their writings have inspired men. The personality of Jesus, it is thought, is a living, active spirit, which can speak to us from beyond the grave in a way quite impossible for others. Yet in the intellectual and emotional affections which every day are aroused in us by the inheritance that others have left, we have experiences similar to those aroused in active friendship, and similarly able to stimulate our life. Their appeal comes through the written word, not directly through the senses of hearing, sight, and touch. But this is only a

difference of medium, which does not infringe the reality of the spiritual intercourse. A friend can speak to us by letter as well as by word, and through the same medium not only to us but to generations yet unborn. In contemplating them, as in our thought of an absent friend, we may not feel the same sense of joy in reciprocated affection as we find in the case of one who is living and present: yet that we are thereby elevated and brought nearer to God is a real fact of spiritual experience. Now such experiences, when derived from meditation on others, may be stronger or may be weaker than those aroused by meditation on Jesus;—different persons will differ about this;—but there is no evidence, unless we make the double error of mistaking emotion for logic and eliminating contrary testimony, that our relation to the historic Jesus differs essentially from our relation to other great teachers of the past. All alike are centres of spiritual life: the thoughts of all are being carried on and developed in the body of their disciples by the same Spirit who is “guiding the world into all truth”: but for none can an equality or an identity with that Spirit be claimed.

At the same time, the other side of the question cannot be left unsaid. Though the isolation of Jesus is an exaggeration, it was guided by a right instinct in so far as it was meant to emphasise the unique moral force which He carried. The features of human friendship could in His friendship be more clearly felt, and its stimulus could survive His death more powerfully than in any other case, just because, as we have seen, His own personality was unique.

But the modern habit of explanation by the idea of development rightly protests that to over-emphasise the uniqueness is to frustrate any explanation of it at all. To cut apart divinity and humanity, spiritual and natural, is to reduce the former terms to negative abstractions, of which nothing can be said except that they are not the latter. The flaw in the Apostolic interpretation of this revelation of God in Christ was an over-statement, not indeed carried to this extreme degree, but of the same kind: they translate the unique relation of His

mind to the Spirit of God into an absolute identity, in which all thought of difference (except for a few saving clauses) is lost.

History supplies a suggestive parallel. The founder of Western reflection preceded by only about four centuries the founder of Western religion. Each taught orally and left no written record of his faith and spiritual experience. In each case the tradition separates itself into two unmistakably distinct pictures, the one drawn by hearers whose enthusiasm may probably have exceeded their power to understand the full significance of their teacher's message, and the other drawn by a writer who himself possessed an original and powerful faculty for speculation. May it not be that in the one case, as certainly in the other, this latter picture receives colour from the philosophic conceptions of the artist, and is invested by his independent imagination with a "light that never was on sea or land?"

If so (and it is impossible to believe it should have been otherwise), it may be that a real service may be done both to history and to the right understanding of the work and life of Christ by modifying and re-stating the conceptions whereby the New Testament writers seek to explain it. What is most remarkable about their conception is the accuracy with which the features of the experience are drawn and the wealth of content which they make it possible to read into those conceptions by identifying the Founder of their Faith with the Spirit in Whom "all things live and move and have their being." If to-day we are less confident of this way of explanation, this is from no wish to under-estimate their work, but from a sense that there is no habit more fatal to Theology than dogmatic assertion of unproved and obscure assumptions reached, not by patient gropings after truth, but by leaps in the dark. To "aim at a million" is often to "miss the unit." In the more tentative method of adding "one to one" lies the surer, if slower, way to success.

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## A PLEA FOR MYSTICISM.

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MYSTICISM is best described by naming its opposite, "intellectuality." Not that mysticism does not use intellect, but it uses this to elaborate, and convey to others, something which has first been found by a higher faculty; that is, as a supplemental, and not as an original, organon of discovery.

Theology is properly "God-wisdom." "Logos" includes both "ratio" and "oratio"; it is the wisdom that finds; and the wisdom that describes, sets forth, and justifies what has been found. But the former of these two seems, in our day, to have become neglected. We all are inclined to set a higher value on faculty which we have developed by labour and effort than on faculty which we find in ourselves. Not that the intuitive faculty does not require to be fostered and developed; but its development is a matter of heart, rather than of head. The basest of men may master the higher mathematics, and make marvellous discoveries in any of the physical sciences; and so it seems that truth is independent of moral character, and dependent only on intellectual ability.

So it is, in any searching that does not propose as its end to affect moral character; but this is just what theology does propose, when rightly understood. Hence high scholarship, though a great aid, is not the first requirement: the highest scholar may seek in vain for that which opens naturally and immediately to the lowly and humble lover of good.

For theology is both an art and a science: and just as no amount of knowledge of the science of painting will make a man an artist, so no amount of scholarship will make a man a theologian. If he has the God-discerning intuition, scholarship will be a potent aid in enabling him to trace the power and wisdom of God in all departments of the physical universe; the doing of which will fill him with delight. Scholarship will help him also to place his perception before others; not to give it to them (that he cannot do); but to guide them as far as may be on to the lines which, if followed, may lead to the development in them of the same faculty to perceive.

“Can man, by searching, find out God?” The presumed answer is “No.” Mark now the different attitude with regard to this answer taken by the materialist, the mystic, and him who stands between the two, the intellectual theologian. The materialist says at once, “Then let us devote our efforts to what we can find out.” The intellectual theologian says, “If we cannot find God, we can perhaps find out something about Him.” The mystic says, “If I cannot find God, perhaps God can find me.” We may dismiss the materialist at once. With him we are not now concerned. He runs to and fro, and finds out many things, which are as the body without the life; and the world remains still unhelped in any really effective way.

But of the other two spirits is not this true? There is all the difference in the world between the idea, “I have to find God that I may possess Him,” and the idea, “God has to possess me, that I may find Him.” When Wordsworth said,

“Think you, ’mid all this mighty sum  
Of things for ever speaking,  
That nothing of itself will come,  
But we must still be seeking?”

he expressed the spirit of the mystic. What we have to find is something that is already in us, but hidden under the external self-nature. God’s word to us is, “Open thy mouth

wide, and I shall fill it." He stands ready to enter, and all we can do, or have to do, is to "open the door."

So, like Naaman, we feel disappointed because we are not set to do "some great thing." What is the use of the years of hard labour to acquire learning if it is not the means of success in this search? Learning is a great thing in this world; it is the door to positions of influence and respect. The true mystic never despises learning; but he must sometimes grieve to see learning tempt men on to false lines of investigation; to regard the head, and neglect the heart. We shall be told that it need not do so; and we admit this: but it will, unless heedfully watched. We are reminded of the distinction between the righteous man and the good man. The one is widely respected, the other wins no public recognition, but in crises of life which has the more power? What is the distinction between "righteousness" and "goodness"? It is this: that the former is valued for the sake of its results, the latter for its own sake. The distinction may seem slight, but is none the less very real.

Mysticism has been rejected by many because they understand it to be a forbidding of any other pursuit than that of God, and any other method than that of intuition. This is a misapprehension. Our Lord said, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all other things shall be added." One of the greatest of Mystics, Jacob Boehme, said, "Let men seek out the marvels of God in every department of knowledge." They are of the things which shall be added. God first; then everything else follows, and illuminates and glorifies our knowledge of God.

General acceptance of any idea, however spiritual, by men who have not developed the spiritual faculty in themselves, tends to the materialisation of that idea. For the acceptors are men in flesh and blood, whose horizon reaches not beyond this world, and its estimations and rewards. They think they have got to possess the idea, instead of letting the idea possess them. If it possessed them, it would lift them up to its own

level; but when they possess it, they drag it down to their level. They proceed to analyse and dissect it; they turn it upside down and inside out, to find out all about it. They fail to recognise that what they thus handle and analyse is not the idea itself in its living power, but its body, its expression in form of words.

For every idea is a living power until this is lost in controversy about the terms of its enunciation. The truer attitude is to give oneself up to it; using the terms as one uses the stalk of a rose, to bring it near that we may smell it. No one who is wholly "sane" inquires about a delight, with a view to questioning whether it is really as good as it feels. He may, properly, use intellect to expand the delight by conveying what his heart feels to the knowledge of his head, or to others; and thus developing the delight by marking how it ramifies into a score of other departments, and by making others partake of it with him. Thus an Arabian author says,

"Give me wine to drink; and tell me, 'This is wine.'"

This is the right order: drink first; inquire about names (if to do so will increase the joy) afterwards. Psyche loses her Eros when she insists on inquiring whether what feels good to the heart looks good to the eye; for this is to judge of the fruit by the root; an inversion of the true order. All through the world is sown one great, vast joy; everywhere to be found by such as can seek rightly. But it is as if some enemy envied man this joy, and would persuade him that to question is higher than to accept. Does not many a man feel that vice is good? Yes: because he knows only his animal nature. But when the true, divine nature is possessed, its feeling is always to be trusted. For this feeling is the surest thing of all; and the divine nature is in all; though it may be undeveloped, or atrophied by exclusive reliance on intellect. The attitude of doubt oftener robs us of good than saves us from accepting an unworthy good. When the heart truly loves, it does not use intellect as a test, but as a developer.

The mystic is one who recognises this, and feels that the

world has lost God in questions about Him, and would fain recall the poor world to the happier spirit. But the enemy has insinuated doubt. "How do you know that what you feel is the highest good?" he suggests; "there may be some error, some mistake. You must have proof; you must look carefully for the possibility of a contrary conclusion. I am your true friend; my aim is only to save you from what may be a too hasty conclusion. Till you have asked all possible questions, and tried all possible experiments, you can be sure of nothing. You cannot know but that a little further inquiry might not show you an error that you have as yet failed to detect. Therefore put your whole effort into investigation; else you may be concluding without the knowledge of all the facts, and be accepting less than the possible of joy."

And thus the joy is never found; for never comes the time when a new experiment cannot be made, or an old one made over again to see if some difference in the process may not give some difference in the result.

Talk like this to the young man who has found his first, true love, and you will be met with astonishment. And rightly so; for love admits of no doubt. Love is its own assurance; and if you could deprive it of its assurance, you would have deprived it of its life. If "all things are possible to him that believeth," much more are they so to him that loves.

The methods of mysticism might be differently described by different mystics, but at root they would be the same. There must first be a strong conviction that there is something better to be found than we at present have; that man has lost his "pristine sanity"; that is, there must be what the old writers meant by a "conviction of sin." I say, the old writers, advisedly; for the expression is often now used in an absolutely false way. Then there must be an eager desire to find, or rather, to be found by, the true apprehension. This desire must so possess the soul that everything else becomes of secondary importance. It must be more than a mere pre-

paredness to receive what may come ; it must be a willingness to go any length to meet it. For while it is true that man cannot get truth of himself, he can, and must, make every effort to put himself in the way of receiving it. He must look into the Scriptures to learn from them the sort of life he ought to live, and the sort of character he ought to cultivate in order to fit himself for the reception. For what we are seeking is not a dead thing that lies there till it is found, but the living God, who is everywhere ; revealing Himself only to such as, by striving to become like Him, prove that they regard themselves as His children.

For the knowledge sought is knowledge of the true, divine nature, which is shut up in hiddenness under the earthly nature. This is properly self-knowledge, but not of the "self" which we at first know. That divine nature in which God at first made us has been lost ; it has disappeared ; and instead of it (and over it, hiding it), we find the nature we know here and now.

The process may be, and has been, spoken of under many different figures. It is a process of spiritual alchemy, a transmutation of our fallen nature into its "pristine sanity": and of this process it has been said, "All that you need for it is in you from the first, but has to be discovered." You need a "solvent," by which you may bring your external nature into solution, for no purification and sublimation can be accomplished while it remains "fixed." You need a "vessel," which will not be itself dissolved by the solvent. You need a "fire," at once to aid "solution" and assist "sublimation"; and you must be artist enough to know how to regulate the heat of this fire, which must vary in the different stages of the process. And you must have a transmuting agent (which they called the "tincture"), without which all the rest is in vain.

All this, which will sound like a jargon of folly to the materialist, is full of most interesting significance to the "artist." The "fire" is the taking up of the cross, tribulation. The "solvent" is the power of our desire after the divine nature. The "vessel" is endurance. The "tincture" is

the divine nature, already in us, but hidden. "Solution" is the surrender of the will. "Sublimation" is the raising up of the character, and of the whole man, into oneness of will with God.

The result of the process, which is very gradual, will be the gradual attainment of power to help and uplift others, and of being drawn ever more and more into union with the Lord. This is not a union in which all self-identity will be lost. That is a fallacy that besets the intellectual apprehension of these mysteries. We say that in true marriage the two become one; so they do: one in heart, hope, and effort; but neither loses his or her identity or individuality. Nay, rather is this increased; the consciousness of Being becomes a greater joy and a higher delight; for the more I become, the more I have to offer to the one I love.

Why is it that the world turns away in contempt from this philosophy? Why is so much of brilliant ability and earnest study put into the criticism of Scripture, and so little into the effort to discover the mind of God as revealed therein? We are told that there is so much uncertainty in intuitive ideas; it is so easy to be mistaken. Surely this is not so.

There is indeed a false mysticism, a spirit which loves to investigate, intellectually, abstruse and unusual paths; and seeks to find therein power to give effect to its desires; and thus strengthens, rather than seeks to get rid of, the fallen nature. But this is readily distinguished from genuine mysticism, for it is ever associated with pride, coldness and hardness of heart, and a love of pre-eminence. The false mystic seeks disciples, not teachers; he condemns as worthless every opinion but his own; and there is an entire absence of that glowing love to all men, that longing to serve and uplift, that distrust in his own advancement and knowledge, which ever characterise the true mystic.

So far from intuitive ideas being "uncertain," and hard to verify, we suggest that the reverse is the truth. There is nothing so sure as that God is, and is Love, and is ever

seeking to draw men out of their fall into oneness with Himself. No one doubts that to be meek and humble, and kindly and serviceable, is to be as God would have us.

“Oh, but,” it will be replied, “this may be very true; but we cannot do without criticism. We might find ourselves believing all sorts of inaccuracies. We might think that the world was created in six ordinary days; whereas it is proved now that it took thousands of years. We might think that Adam and Eve were real people, who ate of a tree which was forbidden to them, and thus brought us out of life into death; whereas it is probable that this is but a myth; beautiful and interesting and poetical, no doubt, but not an historic occurrence. We might believe that the Book of Isaiah was written by the prophet of that name, whereas it seems to be the work of several authors.”

Does, then, the living of the divine life depend on accuracy upon points such as these?

And while we are wasting our best efforts on these really inconsequential points, the world remains unhelped. Competition increases, injustices and frauds of all sorts flourish; the power of money grows greater; and we have to confess that we do not possess the power to lift up and convert to a better spirit the wastrels and failures of life.

So entirely is this the case that we have grown to regard it as the thing to be expected. We have set up as the high-water mark of our aims, “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”; which is an admission that some must be left to their fate. All that seeks beyond this is said to be visionary and impractical. So it is, *if* the aim of true life is to secure the greatest amount of things of which the supply is limited; so that if one gets more, someone else must have less. But if the centre of gravity of life could be so re-adjusted that we could take for our desires those things of which the supply is unlimited, at once all the trouble would end, and the supposed impossible be accomplished.

This can only be done by means of a change of heart; a

thing proved to be possible by having been accomplished in certain cases. And if possible for one, why not possible for all? We are all of one blood; we are all partakers of the divine nature. There is a real reason for the failure, though it is one we fain would hide; and that is, that we have not the will to try the experiment whole-heartedly; we are unwilling to bring ourselves into solution. We want to go to heaven *when we die*, but *not before*. I will believe in the asserted impossibility when I see the same, or anything like the same, effort put into the attempt at self-knowledge, which is the knowledge aimed at by the mystic, as has for centuries been put into intellectual study; and, after reasonable time has elapsed, find that no good result has come of it.

GEORGE W. ALLEN.

BRADFORD.

## THE WARP OF THE WORLD.<sup>1</sup>

NEWMAN HOWARD.

I. To all who are not deficient in the musical sense, great *motifs* and melodies carry a conviction that they are not composed, not pieced nor botched in the maker's workshop, but quarried out of the foundations of the world. This feeling is innate, not acquired: children possess it in the highest degree. I knew one who, taken at the age of eight to a rural conventicle, heard a chant since known for the theme of Beethoven's "In questa tomba," and thereafter a whole summer through, week-nights and Sundays, went in quest, sat in the high-backed pews, peered out on hueless windows and whitewashed walls,—alert for the unveiling of a mystery, a voice and a vision met at the outset of his adventure of life. So, to them of Camelot, the Sancgreal: "Anon they heard cracking and crying of thunder, that them thought the place should all to-drive. In the midst of the blast entered a sunbeam more clearer by seven times than ever they saw day; and all they were alighted of the grace of the Holy Ghost; then began they to behold other things, and either saw other by their seeing fairer than ever they saw day. Then entered into the hall the Holy Graile covered with white samite, but there was none might see it, nor who bare it. And when the Holy Graile had been borne through the hall, then the holy vessel departed suddenly, that they wist not where it became. Then had they all breath to speak."

<sup>1</sup> It is suggested that this and the two following articles, though entirely independent in origin, should be considered as forming a group.—*Ed.*

All this indeed may be said of music, the Grail, the love-feast, and withal the Olympus and Elysium of the industrial age. There the gods walk, the dryads dance, fawns frolic, and Persephone gathers her flowers. The lovers of the beautiful—alas for our modern folly!—are banned the quest in their crafts; but they may yet snatch an hour at the keyboard or fiddle-bow, and behold her floating before them in a haze of falling notes. War cultivates this mystery because it stirs the pulse of valour; merriment, for it may be the very soul of dance; religion, for its deeper song is of one kind with conscience and the sacred emotions. No lexicon catalogues its glowing phrases, yet are they more than words, a universal speech—pages from a book bound up in the blood, the passions, the flowers of the field and the stars of the sky.

“They knew not whence it became,” this “hieroglyphical and shadowed lesson of the whole world”—for such, in Sir Thomas Browne’s fine phrase, is music; they knew not whether it was impalpable vision, or very flesh and blood kindled in the light of day. A vision, truly; but to what law does it conform? Are they laws of matter or of spirit, or of both, which regulate these cadences, so potent to rend our hearts like a tale of beauty?

To that question we address ourselves, probing to this end those hard ribs and vertebræ of things, the law of numbers and geometry; not, however, mistaking the bones for the life, or overleaping in unscientific haste that central fact which outweighs all facts—the conscious life, which neither number nor matter in any wise explains. Of which more hereafter, the intent meanwhile being to suggest, not to assert—in science to point some promising lines of research, in philosophy to accentuate the certitudes of intuition in a day when ratiocination alone has respect.

II. Physically, music may be said to issue of a series of molecular vibrations, rhythmic both as to their magnitude and sequence—mathematically ordered, that is to say, both in space and time. The seat of these motions is the thinking

brain; the ear is only the messenger. Sound from without can provoke or fortify the musical thought; but the thought itself belongs to the intellect. Beethoven was deaf: with his mind he heard his music, with his ears in later life not a note. Without the whisper of a sound the mind can set in motion a melody never heard; and once shapen, it seems a thing inevitable, organic, alive.

To inquire into all the vibrations and sequences so shapen would be impossible. Let us then consider only the axis or focus on which all melody, counterpoint, and harmony revolve. This is the basal chord, the chord of rest, or major triad; and the vibrations upon which this chord is founded depend upon the root numbers 3, 4, and 5,<sup>1</sup> and the multiples of either number by 2 or a power of 2,—as  $2^2$ ,  $2^3$ ,  $2^4$ ,  $2^5$ . These multiples,—binaries, for convenience, we will here call them,—form in music the octaves. No other prime numbers enter into the vibrations of the diatonic scale. Except on this chord of rest, or the less restful minor triad, no melody was or ever can be finished: as well might the feet rest on air as music on another close. On this are founded all chords and counterpoints, on this are resolved all discords; from this we climb or modulate, as by simple steps natural to the ear, through all the keys.

So much of the chord of rest. But music, like life, is the interplay of rest and unrest; and the extreme circumference of permitted unrest, the breaking-point as it were, is reached

<sup>1</sup> More logically these numbers should be stated as 2, 3 and 5, the number 4 being included in the powers of 2. But two straight lines in geometry cannot enclose a space, so that the number 4 is more conspicuous in the phenomena which we have to compare. Thus it becomes clearer to emphasise the numbers 3, 4, and 5. Taking, for illustration, the second inversion of the major triad of the key of G, for D (concert pitch) we have approximately 300, for G 400, and for B 500 vibration-frequencies to the second. Into the minor triad the semi-discordant or semi-stable  $\frac{1}{10}$ th enters, producing a sense of unrest and finality (*compare Radium as above*). Hence it was, probably, that Bach and the earlier composers so often finished their minor-key compositions abruptly with a major triad, or merely the key-note unharmonised. We have not here touched the question of "Temperament," though that possibly has its counterpart in physical resolutions.

in the major seventh, with 15 vibrations to each 16 of the tonic.

It will hereafter be seen that the perfect concords of 3, 4, and 5 lie at the root of all cosmic structure, being in every way fundamental in the progression of the "elements." And it is perhaps noteworthy that radium, a kind of breaking-point among the elements, is of a weight and rhythm equal to 225 units, against 240, *i.e.*,  $\frac{1}{16}$ ths, of uranium, the extreme octave of the elements.

III. Is there in the nature of things any explanation of this limitation of concord to the relation 3, 4, and 5? Both mind and matter are conditioned by space and time, and music depends on rhythm in both—in the breadth and in the duration of its successive vibrations. We shall not be surprised, then, if the laws of musical harmony,—the terms, that is to say, on which vibration will pass from mutual conflict into mutual peace—are those of the shapes in which the contents of space, parts or particles of matter to wit, if in motion, will pass into stability; and if in close relation, will be brought to fit without gap or obtrusive angle. For harmony is in fact the fitting of sounds, the smooth running of diverse waves in curves derived from these well-fitting angles; and the throb of discord comes of the jostling of molecules in conflict because the angles do not fit. Chemistry teaches us that the molecules of air and gases are equally diffused, and it is obvious that their vibrations can only avoid jostle when they observe the laws of spatial regularity.

Now assuming a similar key or unit of size—and on this assumption also all laws of chemistry are based and found to work the best—particles of matter can obviously only fit without gap or conflict of angles if their faces and angles are equal; and of figures thus shapen there are only five: not man nor God, unless He be unconditioned by space, can make any shape or figure of this regularity except the 4, 6, 8, 12, and 20 faced polyhedra—called the tetrahedron, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron, and icosahedron. Their facial

angles are limited to 3, 4, and 5, and by these numbers or their binaries we count all their features and relations, including their relations to the square of the radius of a circumscribed sphere.

It is part of our purpose, then, to suggest that this law, interacting with the law of stable motion hereafter discussed, lies at the root of all rhythm and order in mind and matter. There are striking coincidences between these two laws, and it may be that they are essentially one and the same. Or is it that they are two laws, nearly but not quite in accord; that, as it were, the wheels of motion jar at one point; and of this friction issues a continual alternation of rest and unrest, a rhythmic pulse of sleeping and waking, making and unmaking, growth and decay, death and life renewed?

Before passing from the one law to the other, from the law of spatial regularity to that of stable motion—from the polyhedral to the vortical law (for brevity's sake we may be permitted these terms)—let it be noted that free repulsive magnetic needles of the above numbers, controlled by central attraction, have been proved, by Meyer's experiment, to place themselves exactly at the polyhedral angles.

IV. Long before the Christian era the atomic theorists of Greece and Rome, from Leucippus to Epicurus and Lucretius, had surmised that matter, seemingly still, was, in reality, in rapid motion. An eternal hail of colourless corpuscles deflected into whirling vortices—how, without divine agency, deflected was not clear,—this begot all things, live and dead, so they imagined—these corpuscles being too small for sight, and *a-toma* or indivisibles. In place of the seeing gods they enthroned blind chance and hueless matter, immoral as their gods, but how far less picturesque!

The last years have seen the dawn of a revolution in science as great as that which in the sphere of religion overthrew the many gods and crowned the One. Matter, as we have understood it, there is none, nor probably anywhere the indivisible atom. The so-called elements are systems of

electronic corpuscles, bound together by their mutual forces too firmly for any human contrivance completely to sunder them—alike, nevertheless, in their electric composition, differing only in the rhythms of their motion. Electricity is all things, and all things are electric. Between grey matter and bright electricity we prefer the last: it is vivacious; it loves and hates, flashes, burns, leaps, and sleeps—in the tick of your watch it will fly round the earth. Like Ariel, it is quick as thought; nay, perhaps, it is Thought itself—thought which conjures up “this insubstantial pageant”—“such stuff as dreams are made of,” yet not in the least likely to fade and leave not a wrack behind. It cheats us into the dream of solid substance by whirling in furious battalions, and by its sheer energy holding that space that we once called the atom. A drop of water may contain as many “atoms” as the world contains drops of water; and if the atom were magnified into a cathedral, each electron would be as a crumb in the cathedral. But those crumbs themselves are probably each a universe with its worlds and its atoms.

Such is the force of these electrons that a few of them, if harnessed to the task, would in a short time lift a battleship on to Ben Nevis. Imagine, then, the importance of a stable line of motion, a path in which they do not jostle or collide—no conflict of angles, no space unfilled.

What are the laws of this path, this line of motion, this mutual immunity from conflict? We had our surmise, a conjecture merely,<sup>1</sup> but founded on the rhythm of music, life, geometry, vortices, the stars, and the “elements.” Professor J. J. Thomson, with learning quite beyond our reach, confirms it, and gives, perhaps, the clue to a solution of the whole problem.

Negatively electrified corpuscles in a sphere of uniform

<sup>1</sup> See *Athenæum*, April 30. The subject was mentioned to the Editor of that Journal in January last. Mathematicians will refer to Professor J. J. Thomson's brilliant paper in the *Philosophic Magazine* for March, and await with eagerness the extension of his calculation.

positive electrification will be in stable equilibrium, if in steady motion, supposing they are of the numbers 3, 4, and 5. No higher numbers are stable unless by the support of inner rings of these numbers. At high motion they move "like a rigid body," as it were a whirling disc or shell, at the facial angles of the polyhedra, to wit, an equilateral triangle if 3, a square if 4, a pentagon if 5. At lower motion it seems that they will move spherically, like a spinning ball; if 4 in number, then at the angles of a tetrahedron.

The inference seems clear. Figures of the third dimension—solids as we call them—require at least two rates of motion. Governed in their inward motions by mutual attraction and repulsion, whirled round in a wild marriage of motion, the laws of their internal union make, without clash or conflict with their neighbour atoms, for that external regularity whereby they can best survive; a lesson of the law that obtains in biology, an example also of the social instincts of kindness and justice by which alone society can be preserved. And as with the simple vortex ring of 3, 4, and 5, so also with the complex. Single rings exceeding 5 are not stable, but there is no limit to the number of corpuscular rings which may be made stable by inner rings. To the ends of survival, however, it is inconvenient to have rings or shells exceeding 12 or 20; for no solid can be equifacial or regular with more than 20 faces or 20 angles—the 20-faced solid has 12 angles, and the 12-faced 20 angles. It is, then, a striking confirmation of our theory of the interaction of the polyhedral and vortical law to find that the complex electro-corpuscular systems with outside faces of 20 behave, in respect to what chemists call "valency," exactly like the chemical elements. For every added unit inside up to 4 they will bear on the outside ring one more unit; for every further addition they will bear one less. Futhermore, they have progressions like those of the elemental weights— $3+8+13$ , making 24, and 16, and 20 binaries again of 3, 4, and 5. Besides these progressions, the table shows two others, one of 7, another of 12; and these

answer to a second series of stable electronic corpuscles— $1+6+12$ ; lithium, with 7 units of hydrogen, being the first combinable element, and fluorine, with 19, the last of the same series.<sup>1</sup>

It must not, however, be thought that these 12 or 20 shells with their inside supports represent the number of electrons contained in each "atom." About 1000 have been counted in the hydrogen "atom"; so that lithium contains some 7000 and uranium 240,000. For each shell is a system, and each system is built up of sub-systems. There can, so to us it seems, be very little doubt that the minute projectile of which a hydrogen "atom" contains 1000, is itself a complete system, much like the hydrogen "atom" itself; and so on *ad infinitum*. For it can hardly be by a coincidence that we find in the spectrum of hydrogen a system of numbers suggestive of the numerics of the whole catalogue of the elements, that is to say, of the whole universe itself. Thus Mendeleëff's table of all the elemental weights is founded on a limitation of the differences of quality to 8 varieties in the two first series and 19 in the later series; and, omitting the first two lines, we have *in lines 3 to 11 progressions of 24 superimposed 8 times on 7 and 12 or 19*. Now, in hydrogen spectrum the relative wave-lengths can be precisely obtained, reading  $m$  as numbers from 3 to 11, by multiplying  $\frac{m^2}{m^2-2^2}$  by 24 times 8 and by 7+12 or 19. Can it be that the  $2^2$  suggests lines undiscovered in the dark ends of the spectrum—lines corresponding to the two omitted lines in the table? In any case the coincidence seems to show that the lightest atom rehearses the order of the whole universe.

<sup>1</sup> See Mendeleëff's table (double-group), on which all chemical classification is founded. The progressions of 16, 20, and 24 are traceable more or less exactly throughout; but the following may be instanced: C  $12+16$ =Si 28;  $+20$ =Ti 48  $+(8 \times 24)$  in oblique lines=U 240. Of 7 and 12 we have binary geometric progressions perfect in each term from Li  $7 \times 16$  to Cd 112, and from C  $12 \times 16$  to Ir 192. These last, however, are not, like the former, generally in regular lines. There are no other progressions.

It will be said that we are comparing weights with wave-lengths—two things totally dissimilar; and so at first sight it would appear. But, in fact, it has recently been discovered that the wave-lengths of the spectra of all the elements are an exact expression of the weights, so that the one can be ascertained from the other. And music itself also depends on wave-lengths—vibrations resembling though not identical with those of light. Sound has even a power of attraction and repulsion, like magnetism and light itself. In truth, therefore, strange as it may seem, the table of the elements is the chart of a keyboard of vibrations essentially comparable to those of music. Every element is as a chord with its harmonics; and it is probable that they combine, resolve, and modulate by similar laws, not as in radium only, with its chord of the major seventh, but perhaps also in the functions of oxygen and carbon in the processes of life and death: all which is summed, felt, consciously known, in the mirror of music:

“What? Those lesser thirds so plaintive, sixths diminished, sigh on sigh,  
Told them something? Those suspensions, those solutions—‘Must we die?’  
Those commiserating sevenths—‘Life—might last! We can but try!’”<sup>1</sup>

V. If this polyhedro-vortical law of the 3's, 4's, and 5's be fundamental in cosmic structure, we shall expect to see the numbers recurrent in natural phenomena of a widely divergent order. Our expectations are answered.

Students of astronomy are aware that, according to “Bode's law,” there is in the distances of the planets from the sun a binary progression of 3, with 4 added to each term. The weakest point in the usual statement of Bode's law lies in the distance of Mars from the earth, which is generally strained to 6 points, though it is in fact only 5 points. Let us restate the figures without this error.

	Mercury.	Venus.	Earth.	Mars.	Astds.	Jupiter.	Saturn.	Uranus.	Neptune.	
By polyhedral law, .	4	+ 3	+ 3	+ 5	+ (2 <sup>2</sup> )3	+ (2 <sup>3</sup> )3	+ (2 <sup>4</sup> )3	+ (2 <sup>5</sup> )3	+	?
Equals, . . . .	4	7	10	15	27	51	99	195		
Actual, . . . .	4	7	10	15	27	53	96	192		

<sup>1</sup> Robert Browning, “A Tocatta of Galuppi's.”

The disturbance of Jupiter's numerical relation may be noted in connection with its slight self-luminosity. Saturn and Uranus fall into numerical relations which are precisely binaries of  $3 \times 4$ —numbers recurrent in the atomic table. We comment on the coincidence with the diffidence of imperfect astronomic learning. Differences of mass it seems need not trouble us. A hydrogen atom with about 1000 electrons holds the same space as an atom of uranium with 240,000. It is a question of more or less energy in the electronic or nebular battalions, and a closer or looser packing. If we imagine a previous nebular state, might not these two factors, in the change from nebulæ to planets, be converted into the terms of mass and speed in relation to the sun? The predetermining cause of the relations 3, 4, and 5 in the relative distance lies, so we would suggest, in the different convenience of the five regular polyhedra as means of marshalling the electronic battalions. Three battalions of equal force will at their extreme angles cover a smaller or larger space according as they are arranged in a pentagon, a square, or an equilateral triangle; and in all figures of the third dimension regular and therefore fitted for survival, the dominating numerical factors are 3, 4, and 5.

In the distances of the satellites from the surface of their primaries, there are indications of the same law, and also in the width of Saturn's rings; but in Saturn's outer planets it is obscure. The numbers of the satellites are also significant: four larger to Jupiter, four to Uranus, four larger and four smaller to Saturn; and the same with the sun's planets: four major asteroids; and to the Earth and Neptune one each at the same distance. Jupiter's small planet and the minor asteroids, compared with the larger in each case, are as  $\beta$  to  $\gamma$  rays. Chemical and vortical valency, of which we have spoken, the power, to wit, of the elements and vortex rings to annex molecules or corpuscles without loss of stability, is limited, like those planets and satellites, to the number 4. Are planets and satellites, then, annexes alien in origin and in rate

of motion, in time of greater stability sufferable, but flung out like aliens from a city in time of stress; finding, however, at due distance a point when their motions and mutual attractions were in equipoise? Whether flung out in throes or left behind in shrinkage, why these four or eight and no others, unless the cause be as we suggest?

In biology, to return to our main argument, the insistence of the numbers 3, 4, or 5, and their binaries, is even more remarkable. The law is traceable in mammals as in insects; perhaps not only toes and fingers and facial organs are instances, but also the sixty bones of arms and legs in their agreement with those sixty stable vortex rings which accord so well with chemical phenomena. In botany we have illustrations still more marked. The numbers 3, 4, and 5, or their binaries, are practically universal in the organ of flowers. The first number, as distinguished from the latter numbers, marks the line between the two great kingdoms of vegetation, the Monocotyledons and Dicotyledons.<sup>1</sup> The ordinary observer may verify the numerical law for himself in a country ramble, always remembering, however, that a flower-head is not necessarily a single flower—instance the daisy, scabious, thistle, dandelion, and clover, which are cities of flowers, whereof each citizen conforms to the numeric law. There are cases, relatively very few, as of buttercup, rose, or St John's Wort, in which petals and sepals conform, but the stamens are of indefinite numbers. A few rudimentary organs may here obscure the regularity, or there may be an occult relation to the law of complex vortices. The law, however, is undoubted. To the shallow objector it will seem that these numbers are likely thus to occur merely because they are simple. He is used to seeing petals, wings, hands, claws, and limbs, in flower, bird, beast, and insect, in 3's, 4's, and 5's; it has always seemed to him so natural. In truth,

<sup>1</sup> It may be remarked that in the less complex or Pythagorean stage of music the root number 5 in relative vibrations was wanting. This number seems only to enter into the more complex botanical evolutions.

however, as there were a thousand other ways in which Newton's apple might, but for gravitation, have fallen, so also there are thousands of other numbers which would have served the end of plants as well as these, save for a central and all-controlling law of molecular structure. Nay, indeed, but for this law so strong is the tendency of life to diversification that assuredly, as in hue, shape, texture, and mechanism, so also in number of organs, the variety would have been infinite. As it is, however, the law of the 3's, 4's, and 5's may be said to extend, practically without exception, over tens of thousands of plants, each widely different one from another and of world-wide distribution.

Nor does our case rest on numbers alone, either here or in the chemical elements. Without reference to our present synthesis, Mr Jay Hambidge<sup>1</sup> notes that, applying the formula of the facial angles of the regular polyhedra to the radii of curves and circles of flowers and insects, it never failed him. His unit was obtained, *e.g.*, from the body of the butterfly compared; and the only proportion found not strictly of the polyhedral angles was that of the bisecting perpendicular. This may be regarded as a geometrical binary. Thus in his admirable study of spirals,<sup>2</sup> Mr Theodore Cook notes the coincidence between the logarithmic spiral of the shell of *Nautilus Pompilius*, which also, he says, Mr A. H. Church, the distinguished Oxford botanist, tells him is the characteristic line of life force. The spiral proves to be derived from angles of 60°, which occur in the section of a regular icosahedron; and the hexagonal shape of cell-formation is also probably to be referred to the same section. But how, Mr Cook asks, if this be the line of life force, are we to account for the spiral of *Ammonites Obtusus*, so familiar in limestone fossils? It proves that this spiral

<sup>1</sup> Paper read before the Hellenic Society; abstract in *Nature*, Nov. 20, 1902.

<sup>2</sup> *Spirals in Nature and in Art*, by Theodore A. Cook. John Murray, 1903. Since writing this paper I am told that Professor Donkin exhibits spirals of the musical chord which my informant finds exactly to agree with Mr Cook's shell-spirals.

answers exactly to a logarithmic curve of  $30^\circ$ —a similar binary to that observed by Mr Jay Hambidge.

The investigation needs to be pursued further, but with three cautions: (1) The test is only to be applied to the adult or climacteric point of growth. Here, as in the musical triad, we reach rest or stability; this is the close and consummation of the old life, the floor and foundation of the new. But in growth and decay, the plant is the passing note, the chord not yet resolved. (2) Geometric law is absolute and abstract, qualifying all things, but nowhere found exact. There can be no geometrically perfect line in Nature; for none is held except against odds. The purest chord contains its own discordant harmonies, wherein lie its beauty; the stablest element contains the nucleus of instability, whereby it is restlessly urged to mingle with its fellow-element. The life force outclasses and overmatches its opposing environment; but it suffers in the strife. The shell-spiral has fought the flux of the waves; the curve of the petal has battled with the winds and shadows, the cold eddies, and the shimmerings of light. For every life-cell is a soldier, every leaf a regiment foraging for light; and the line wavers like the ranks of a victorious army. Hence the artist, true to Nature, draws not with rule and compass, but with Nature's own free hand. For, as Mr John Davidson finely said, Nature is an artist, not an artisan. (3) The surrender of the part to the whole must not be forgotten. Sections of life-cells are hexagonal, as we have remarked; a hexagon being the section of an icosahedron, or 20-faced solid; and this also is the shape of the so-called atom or molecule if, as Professor J. J. Thomson's argument suggests, it is formed of 20 rings enclosing a sphere. But, like the working bee for posterity and his queen, each cell sacrifices its own perfect development for the climacteric blossom, fruit, or seed. Thus the hexagonal section is preserved only with restrictions, distortions, and compression. It is a misshapen factory drudge cramped at the weaving of rich apparel for the cradle of the young seed. And so with other developments. Our formula

must not be pressed to fit transition, obsolescence, modification, or rudimentation. We are reading a law of Nature's inmost architecture by a hieroglyph on its outer walls; we must take the broad sense, the cumulative indices, not quibbling where the scribe's hand wavers or slips.

VI. What is the place of the conscious life in this ravel of whirling electrons? Is life, as certain of those gruesome philosophers, the monistic atheists, would have us believe, merely a transitory by-product of the blind machine? Does the knowing issue of the essentially unknowing, the moral of the essentially immoral, the pitiful and just of the ruthless and unjust; and this not as the seed unfolds to the flower, and in unfolding reveals its meaning, but as an affair of chance, the froth and fume at the wave-top of a sterile ocean of matter? The notion belongs to that crude order of thinking by which the electric spark has been thought, not latent in the amber, but a something rubbed into existence out of nothing.

Or is the conscious life, as dualism implies, a guest in the house of the electrons; abiding their laws, studious of their beauties, slumbering on the smooth path of their concords, awake at the bright shocks of their limited discords—yet capable of passing thence to another field of sentience, the keyboard of whose music will be other than that of the vortical and polyhedral scale, a field which begins where this leaves off? The monist objects that since no voice speaks to us in this house of life from another, therefore no other can exist. In truth, the objection shows only that the walls are built well and soundly; it by no means disproves that "in my Father's house are many mansions." Nay, the very walls themselves—as, for instance, in the limitations of the vortical and polyhedral scale—suggest possibilities beyond. "But," says the monist, "the life waxes and wanes with the physical force, there is a physical co-relative to every mental and spiritual emotion; therefore indubitably the one must be the other." Does it then follow because the wine is poured in when the

cup is moulded, and leaks when it is cracked, that therefore the wine is the cup?

A third alternative may be considered. Is the conscious life the universal *feel* of the electronic and molecular system? Does the cerebral matter contain, as it were, a battery or ferment of change corresponding to that of the whole external universe, so that it possesses inwardly the counterpart of all outward phenomena? Even so the process is unexplained by which, as with a lambent light, one object after another becomes luminous to the conscious self. Nor, indeed, however we may allocate to a given cerebral tract a given faculty, can we assert that in this space or chamber alone this function is possible. For it seems probable that like rhythms of inertia and acceleration exist in sphere and sub-sphere; that, in fact, the whole universe may be rehearsed in the hydrogen atom. If this be the case, life is as likely to exist on the revolving orbs within this atom as on Mars or the other planets. And to itself this life would seem not smaller than ours to us. Magnitude and speed are relative; they have no absolute values. The landscape, to our mind's vision vast, fills but a fraction of an inch on our retina. All Shakespeare's plays, Wagner's music dramas, Beethoven's symphonies may as well have been conceived in one electron of their brains as in the whole grey matter. And if the materialist reply with cerebral statistics, proving that many clever men have had larger brains than many fools, let him weigh the intelligent brain of the ant—the creature intellectually perhaps the most like man—against that of the elephant or the whale. A scientist of some fame remarked that there was no room for God or Heaven among the stars, the ether, and the atoms; so sure was he that he had plumbed and penetrated them all. This, perhaps, was the foolishest thing ever said. Infinitudes there are of the large and small, the swift and slow, of ultra-red and ultra-violet waves, whereof our senses tell us nothing. If our eyes were like the photograph film, sensitive to other rays or ray-waves than light, one world of hues and shadows would

die from our vision and another emerge. And so of our touch ; if the motions of our life-cells were those of a smaller, and probably, therefore, a swifter and more penetrating electron, the resistance of the rocks might be as air ; if of a larger and less penetrating, the air might be as rock. From one key of size or sentience to another it is conceivable that the life may pass as naturally as the electric message through the air. To those, then, who dogmatically assert that there is no life save in this little ferment of oxygen and carbon whereunto our senses are keyed and co-ordinated, it may safely be replied that, on the contrary, there may be life, sentient and intelligent, within and without us, as actual and assured as our own, we to it and it to us as *tenuis aura*, thin air, unintelligible, unseen, and unheard.

The refusal to recognise these infinite possibilities of infinite space is one cardinal error of those who affirm this monistic view of life in matter. A like error is that, while seeing the material in all things spiritual or mental, they decline to see the spiritual or mental in all things material. If life be one with matter, then matter is moved by will ; it remembers and regrets, hopes and despairs, is proud and ashamed, has a conscience and compassion, fear, bravery, sincerity, love and hate. And these inward behaviours of matter are not less actual, not less scientific facts, not less affairs of law, than its outward behaviours, its attraction, repulsion, radiation, resistance, electrolysis, and the like, which our limited sense of sight, touch, and hearing perceives. It may be that the outward is the counterpart of the inward ; that the blended chemical feels a marriage joy, the radiated electron a wild exultation of adventure ; that the double pulse of atomic motion is a kindling throb of life like breath and heart-throb ; and that music in all its melodies and motives is a veritable revelation of the feel of all these life adventures. Certain it is that in the rightly regulated inward, or spiritual and mental, emotions there lies a music as rigorous as that music which we have traced through the

motions of the stars, the elements, and the flowers. Nor are these moral attributes or behaviours part merely of the relations of man to man, a social contract or convenience. Insincerity, envy, and pride are jarring notes—notes, as it were, beyond the limits of that semi-discordant seventh, discords which set the teeth on edge. And they jar not only in the social music, but also in the brain itself. Passions, uncontrolled by that positive electrical field of conscience, beget a decomposition of the mental and spiritual forces which is ultimately also a physical decomposition. Thus the lines of the face which make beauty in a woman suggest loyalty, sincerity, compassion, courage, and the like; lines, by the way, probably connected with the polyhedral law, so that the law is a spiritual as well as a material law. And if it be objected that beauty may mask a beautiless character, we answer that always the fair face is atavistically, if not actually, the index of a fair soul. And if, in features by wholesome inheritance wrought into lines of beauty, a soul o.<sup>c</sup> pride, envy, insincerity, or cruelty has been sown, as the life advances the features perceptibly change; the frank, brave eyes grow furtive, the gentle mouth grows harsh; decomposition has set in, physical because spiritual; and if the decay be unchecked the race perishes in the end, lust-stricken or mad from the jar of passions uncontrolled, just as a musical organ may be destroyed by a continuity of discordant blasts. The brain is indeed a cosmos like the universe; conscience makes the vortical stability of the conscious life; the moral laws are the inward counterpart of those outward laws which materialistic monism, a philosophy more aptly described as immoralism, calls “A mechanical process, in which we may discover no aim or purpose whatever . . . an eternal fluctuation with no trace of a moral order.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The phrase is quoted from a book which, strangely enough, seems to be regarded as authoritative among materialists. Strangely, we say; for their creed, however sterile and repulsive, is intelligible and capable of dispassionate and logical utterance; whereas the book in question is in the main no better than a rodomontade of violent assertions and vilifications,

It will be replied that, in spite of these reactions between physical and moral order, no moral law can exist in a world where the evil prosper and the good are punished—where a ferocious Alva lives and dies honoured and without pain, and a heroic Joan of Arc saves her country only to perish in agony and shame. This is indeed a fact—a hideous one if unexplained; and that nature is “so careful of the type, so careless of the single life,” is neither a truth nor an explanation. The individual is the world; save through the individual the world is unknown; individually the good man is punished, and if there be a moral order ruling all things, to him must it be compensated. This forces us to the conjecture of a life beyond or behind—an undiscovered  $x$  which squares all false equations. The reason for the surmise lies in the hideousness of the alternative, the hideous being, as in music, the false to Nature.

We have seen that neither the monist nor dualist position forbids this possibility—that in fact life may pass, and by means quite natural, from one key of sentience to another. We have also seen that the beautiful is proved to be the true in music, that perfect mirror or reflex of the inner life of the soul—of all those emotions whose right regulation is morality itself. If the artist-in-sound flies unerringly to the central universal laws, is it not probable that the artist-in-life may also be on the track of a supreme truth, when to solve the hideous discord of life's injustice he postulates a life beyond?

bespattered with savage hints such as that “the Christians of the early centuries ought . . . to have been exterminated with fire and sword.” It is fair, however, to say that the book has lucid intervals, as when the author rather contradictorily admits that life-evolution “seems on the whole to be a progressive improvement, an historical advance from the simple to the complex, the lower to the higher, the imperfect to the perfect”; a fact which in itself suggests a moral order; or when at the finish he remarks that “we do not know the thing-in-itself that lies behind those knowable phenomena,” and that “we must even grant that this essence of substance becomes more mysterious the deeper we penetrate.” It is permitted only to these pseudo-scientific philosophers to vociferate on almost every page their “proofs,” their “consistency,” their deductions “for ever established,” when they confess to an unknown quantity in their calculations which may stultify the whole.

Music and immortality seem to have been conceived at the same stage of evolution and by a like intuition. The savage, alike in music and philosophy, suspected no such secrets of Nature; for his evolution it may be that there was neither the dream nor the potentiality. For if, as the materialists affirm, the sentient protoplasm was self-evolved in the blind cosmos of matter, why not at a given evolution of the inward cosmos the germ of a new sentience,—as it were, a flying election newly organised, first fructified in the old cerebral tracts, but not their prisoner, not the slave of the old magnitudes and rhythms of time and space? On this stirring of a new life within, our highest have staked their assured present life. When Æschylus looked from the crags of Caucasus, the type of a thousand heroic crucifixions, to a hope beyond—when Socrates, confiding in the eternal justice and the voice of conscience, saw life beyond the hemlock cup, these followed the musician instinct of the beautiful, solving the discords in the life-music by an intuition which runs before reason to a goal as sure.<sup>1</sup>

One whom we knew long since, unsuspecting of any central universal law in music, remarked that under its potent spell he no longer doubted the high destiny of the soul—he knew himself immortal. Another, a most pitiable cripple, shipwrecked in all save the noble intelligence, hobbled away from the hearing of a Beethoven symphony exclaiming, “I have heard that music for the fiftieth time; you see what I

<sup>1</sup> Nor does the postulate fail in the practical test. Pericles and Marathon mark the reign of honour, courage, and justice, splendours in the eyes of anthropomorphic deism or idealism, absurdities according to the new pseudo-scientific immoralism and tigrimorphism; and this reign has endured. That which survives and rules is likely to be nearer to the laws of Nature than that which fails. Immoralism was recrudescient in the Epicurean philosophy of Rome. And it brought Rome to a pass whence only it could be saved by the moralism of the Christians, nourished on that other optimistic tragedy of the Promethean Christ. The event repeated itself in quattrocento Epicurism. For, in truth, though the philosophy of Epicurus may be perfectly sincere and, if our physical senses are the only witnesses of truth, more rational than that of Plato and Christ, since its outlook excludes the moral order, in the end it inevitably destroys that moral order, and so destroys itself.

am ; yet, with this in my soul, I go down Regent Street a god !”

It was a great saying of a great modern scientist the other day, that “the universe was infinite in an infinite number of ways.” If this be true, then, the polyhedral limitations may be limitations only of our intelligence ; and in that case in all the successions of music, so inevitable, so palpable and perfect to the inner sense—successions that travel beyond the polyhedral chord, returning thence as to a rallying point, the floor of our present footing—we may be spelling out new laws of a new being. It is a guess, a wild guess, perhaps ; yet, whatever may be the undiscovered  $x$  which squares the inequations of life, when we learn that music, the felt reflex of the soul’s rightly-regulated emotions, is also a mirror of the central universal laws, we may put aside the arid and hideous prospect of materialistic immoralism, and gain assurance in the swift certitudes of intuition, believing not without proof that “Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty ; that is all ye know on earth and all ye need to know.”

NEWMAN HOWARD.

ABERDOVEY.

# THE UNIVERSE AND BEYOND: THE EXISTENCE OF THE HYPERCOSMIC.

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*Ni la contradiction n'est marque de fausseté, ni l'incontradiction  
n'est marque de vérité.*—PASCAL.

THE inductive proof of the doctrine of evolution seems destined to be ultimately judged as the great contribution of Natural Science to modern thought. Among the presuppositions of that doctrine, among the axioms, as one may call them, of science, are found the following:—

(1) The assumption of the universal and eternal reign of *law*: the assumption that the universe, the theatre of evolution, the field of natural science, is and eternally has been a genuine Cosmos, an incarnate rational logos, an embodiment of reason, an organic affair of order, a closed domain of invariant uniformities, in which waywardness and chance have had nor part nor lot: an infinitely intricate garment, ever changing, yet always essentially the same, woven, warp and weft alike, of mathetic relationships.

(2) The assumption, not merely that the universe is cosmic through and through, but that it is the *all* conjunctively—the all, that is, in the sense of naught excluded; the assumption, in other words, that it is not merely *a* but *the* cosmos, the *sole* system of law and order and harmony, the complete and perfect embodiment of the *whole* of truth.

Such, I take it, are among the principles, the articles of

faith, more or less consciously held by the great majority of the men of science and their adherents.

As for myself, I am unable to hold these tenets either as self-evident truths, or as established facts, or as propositions the proof of which may be confidently awaited. Truth, for example, especially when contemplated in its relations to curiosity—at once *the* psychic product and psychic agency of evolution—less seems a completed thing coeval with the world than a thing derived and still becoming. Again, while the assumption of the cosmic character of our universe is of the greatest value as a working hypothesis, I am unable to find in the method of natural science or in that of mathematics any ground, even the slightest, for expecting conclusive proof of its validity. In striking contrast, on the other hand, with this negative thesis, there is found in the realm of pure thought, in the domain of mathematics, very convincing evidence, not to say indubitable proof of the proposition, that no single cosmos, whether our universe be such or not, can enclose every rationally constructible system of truth, but that any universe is a component of an extra-universal, that above every nature is a super-natural, beyond every cosmos a hypercosmic.

These are among the theses presented in the following pages, not in a controversial spirit, let me add, nor accompanied by the minuter arguments upon which they ultimately rest.

We all must allow that truth is. To deny it denies the denial. Such scepticism is cut away by the sweeping blade of its own unsparing doubt. But *what* it is—that is another matter. The assumption that truth is an agreement or correspondence between concepts and things, between thought and object, is of very great value in practical affairs; it very well serves, too, the *immediate* purposes of natural science, especially in its cruder stage, before it has learned by critical reflection on its own processes and foundations to suspect its limitations, and while, like the proverbial “chesty” youth who disdains the

meagre wisdom of his father, it is apt to proclaim, innocently enough if somewhat boastfully, a lofty contempt for all philosophy and metaphysics. Although the assumption has the undoubted merit of being thus useful in high degree, it is, when regarded as a definitive formulation of what we mean by truth, hardly to be accepted. For, not only does it imply—what may indeed be quite correct, but is far from being demonstrated, and far from being universally allowed—namely, that “thing” is one and “concept” another, that “object” and “thought” are twain, but even if we grant such ultimate implied duality, it remains to ask what that “agreement” is, or “correspondence,” that mediates the hemispheres and gives the whole its truth. The assumption is slightly too naïve and unsophisticated, a little too redolent of an untamed soil and primitive stage of cultivation. Much profounder is that insight of Hegel’s, that truth is the harmony which prevails among the objects of thought. If, with that philosopher, we identify object and thought, we have at once the pleasing utterance that truth is the harmony of ideas. But here, again, easy reflection quickly finds no lack of difficulties. For what should we say an idea is? And *is* there really nothing else, except, of course, their harmony? And what is that? And is there no such thing as contradiction and discord? Is that, too, a kind of truth, a kind of harmonious jangling, a melody of dissonance? The fact seems to be that truth is so subtle, diverse, and manifold, so complex of structure and rich in aspect, as to defy all attempt at final definition. Nay, more, the difficulty lies yet deeper, and is in fact irresoluble. Being a necessary *condition* thereto, truth cannot be an *object* of definition. To suppose it defined involves a contradiction, for the definition, being something new, is something *besides* the truth defined, but it must itself be true, and, if it be, in that has failed—the enclosing definition is not itself enclosed, and straightway asks a vaster line to take it in, and so *ad infinitum*. To define truth would be to construct a formula that should include the structure, to conceive a water-compassed ocean,

bounded in but shutting nothing out, a self-inmersing sea, without bottom or surface or shore.

Happily, to be indefinable is not to be unknowable and not to be unknown. And we are absolutely certain that truth, whatever it may be, is somehow the *complement of curiosity*, is the proper stuff, if I may so express it, to answer questions with. Now a question, once one comes to think of it, is a rather odd phenomenon. Half the secret of philosophy, said Leibnitz, is to treat the familiar as unfamiliar. So treated, curiosity itself is a most curious thing. How blind our familiar assumptions make us! Among the animals, man, at least, has long been wont to regard himself as a being quite apart from and not as part of the cosmos round about him. From this he has detached himself in thought, he has estranged and objectified the world, and lost the sense that he is of it. And this age-long habit and point of view, which has fashioned his life and controlled his thought, lending its characteristic mark and colour to his whole philosophy and art and learning, is still maintained, partly because of its convenience no doubt, and partly by force of inertia and sheer conservatism, in the very teeth of the strongest probabilities of biologic science. Probably no other single hypothesis has less to recommend it, and yet no other so completely dominates the human mind. Suppose we deny the assumption, as we seem indeed compelled to do, in the name of science, and rejoin ourselves in thought, as we have ever been joined in fact, to this universe in which we live and have our being; the other half of the secret of philosophy will be revealed, or illustrated at all events, in the strangeness of aspect presented by things before familiar. Note the radical character of the transformation to be effected. The world shall no longer be beheld as an alien thing, beheld by eyes that are not its own. Conception of the whole and by the whole shall embrace *us* as *part*, really, literally, consciously, as the latest term, it may be, of an advancing sequence of developments, as occupying the highest rank perhaps in the ever-ascending hierarchy of

being, but, at all events, as emerged and still emerging *natura naturata* from some propensive source within. I grant that the change in point of view is hard to make—old habits, like walls of rock, tending to confine the tides of consciousness within their accustomed channels—but it can be made and, by assiduous effort, in the course of time, maintained. Suppose it done. By that reunion, the whole regains, while the part retains, the consciousness the latter purloined. I cannot pause to note even the most striking consequences of such a change in point of view. Time would fail me to follow far the opening lines of speculation that issue thence and invite pursuit. But I cannot refrain from pointing out how exceedingly curious a thing curiosity itself becomes when beheld and contemplated from the mentioned point of view. For it is now the whole that meditates, the universe that contemplates—a once *mindless* universe according to its present understanding of the term, not then knowing that it was, unwittingly unwitting throughout a beginningless eternal past what it had been or was or was to be; lawless, too, perhaps, could the stream of events be reascended, though blindly and slowly *becoming* lawful through habit-taking tendency: a self-transforming insensate mass composed of parts without likeness or distinction, continually undergoing change without a purpose, devoid of passion, and neither ignorant nor having knowledge. At length a wondrous crisis came, an event momentous—when or how is yet unknown, perhaps through fortuitous concourse of partless, lawless, wayward elements. At all events, the unintending tissues formed a nerve, the universe awoke alive with wonder, mind was born with curiosity and began to look about and make report of part to part and thence to whole, the age of interrogation was at hand, and what had been an eternal infinity of mindless being began to question, and know itself, and have a sense of ignorance. In the whole universe of events, none is more wonderful than the birth of wonder, none more curious than the nascence of curiosity itself, nothing to compare with

the dawning of consciousness in the ancient dark and the gradual extension of psychic life and illumination throughout a cosmos that before had only *been*. An eternity of blindly acting, transforming, unconscious existence, assuming at length, through the birth of sense and intellect, without loss or break of continuity, the abiding form of fleeting time. Another eternity remains to follow, and one cannot but wonder whether there shall issue forth in future from the marvel-weaving loom another event, or form or mode of being, that shall be to the modern universe that both is and knows, as the birth of soul and curiosity to the ancient universe that was but did not know. A speculation by no means idle, but let it pass.

I wish to point out next, briefly, that curiosity is not only a principle that leads to knowing, but a principle and process of growing. By it the universe comes not merely to understand itself, but actually to get bigger thereby. For if there be an invariant amount of matter, there is also mind increasing; if there be objects that total a constant sum, there are also ideas that multiply. A new query and a new answer are new elements in the world, by which the latter is added unto and enriched. Curiosity is the aspect of the universe seeking to realise itself, and the fruit of such activity is new reality, stimulating to new research. Imagine a body with an inner core of outward-striving impulses producing buds at every radial terminus. Such is knowledge—a kind of proliferating sphere, expanding along divergent lines by the outward-seeking of an inner life of wonder. Wherefore, it appears again that truth, the complement of curiosity, itself grows with the latter's growth, and, being never a finished thing, but one that both is and is becoming, is not to be compassed by definition nor fully solved in knowledge.

In respect to truth, then, the upshot is: we are certain that it is; not, however, as a closed or completed scheme of relationships, but as a kind of reality characterised by the phenomena of growth and of becoming; it does not admit of

ultimate definition; we know, however, in a super-verbal sense, through myriad manifestations of it to a faculty in us of *feeling* for it, what it is; we recognise it as the motive power, the *elixir vitæ*, the sustaining spring of wonder; it discovers itself as the wherewithal for the proper fulfilment of the implicit predictions and intimations of curiosity; as *the* thing presaged in a spiritual craving, confidently, persistently proclaiming its needs by an infinitude of questionings.

And now as to the remainder of my subject, the tale is quite too long to be told in full. But room must be found for a partial account, for important fragments at all events.

What, then, shall we say mathematics is? A question much discussed by philosophers and mathematicians in the course of more than two thousand years, and especially with deepened interest and insight in our own time. Many an answer has been given to it, but none has approved itself as final. Naturally enough, conception of the science has had to grow with the science itself. For it must not be imagined that mathematics, because it is so old, is dead. Old it is indeed, classic already in Euclid's day, being surpassed in point of antiquity by only one of the arts and by none of the sciences; but it is also living and new, flourishing to-day as never before, advancing in a thousand directions by leaps and bounds. It is not merely as a giant tree throwing out and aloft myriad branching arms in the upper regions of clearer light, and plunging deeper and deeper roots in the darker soil beneath. It is rather an immense forest of such oaks, which, however, literally grow into each other, so that, by the junction and interrescence of root with root and limb with limb, the manifold wood becomes a single living organic whole. A vast complex of interlacing theories—*that* the science now is actually, but it is far more wondrous still potentially, its component theories continuing more and more to grow and multiply beyond all imagination, and beyond the power of any single genius, however gifted. What is this thing so marvellously vital? What does it undertake? What is its motive?

How is it related to other modes and interests of the human spirit ?

One of the oldest and at the same time the most familiar of the definitions conceived mathematics to be the science of magnitude, where magnitude, including multitude as a special kind, was whatever was capable of increase and decrease and measurement. This last—capability of measurement—was the essential thing. That was a most natural definition of the science, for magnitude is a singularly fundamental notion, not only inviting, but demanding consideration at every stage and turn of life. The necessity of finding out how many and how much was the mother of counting and measurement, and mathematics, first from necessity and then from joy, so busied itself with these things that they came to seem its whole employment. But now the notion of measurement as the repeated application of a constant unit has been so refined and generalised, on the one hand through the creation of imaginary and irrational numbers, and on the other by use of a scale, as in non-Euclidian geometry, where the unit suffers a lawful change from step to step of its application, that to retain the old words and call mathematics the science of measurement seems quite inept as no longer telling what the spirit of mathesis is really bent upon. Moreover, the most striking measurements, as of the volume of a planet, the swiftness of thought, the valency of atoms, the velocity of light, the distance of star from star, are not achieved by direct repeated application of a unit. They are all accomplished by *indirection*. And it was perception of this fact which led to the famous definition by the philosopher and mathematician, Auguste Comte, that mathematics is the science of *indirect* measurement. Doubtless we have here a finer insight and a larger view, but the thought is yet too narrow, nor is it deep enough. For it is obvious that there is much mathematical activity which is not at all concerned with measurement, either direct or indirect. In projective geometry, for

example, it was observed that *metric* considerations were by no means chief. As a simplest illustration, the fact that two points determine a line, or the fact that a plane cuts a sphere in a circle, is not a *metric* fact, being concerned with neither size nor magnitude. Here it was position rather than size that seemed to some to be the central idea, and so it was proposed to call mathematics the science of magnitude, or measurement, and *position*.

Even as thus expanded, the definition yet excludes many a mathematical realm of vast, nay, infinite extent. Consider, for example, that immense class of things familiarly known as *operations*. These are limitless, alike in number and in kind. Now, it so happens that there are systems of operations such that any *two* operations of a given system which follow one another produce the same effect as some other *single* operation of the system. For an illustration, think of all possible straight motions in space. The operation of going from *A* to *B* followed by the operation of going from *B* to *C* is equivalent to the single operation of going from *A* to *C*. Thus, the system of such straight operations is a *closed* system. Combination of any two of them yields another operation, not without, but *within* the system. Now the theory of such closed systems—called groups of operations—is a mathematical theory, already of colossal proportions, and still growing with astonishing rapidity. But, and this is the point, an abstract operation, though a very real thing, is neither a position nor a magnitude.

This way of trying to come at an adequate conception of mathematics, viz., by naming its different domains, or varieties of content, is not likely to prove successful. For it demands an exhaustive enumeration not only of the fields now occupied by the science, but also of the realms destined to be conquered by it in the future, and such an achievement would require a prevision that none perhaps could claim.

Fortunately there are other paths of approach that seem

more promising. Everyone has observed that mathematics, whatever it may be, possesses a certain mark, namely, a degree of certainty, not found elsewhere. So it is, proverbially, the exact science *par excellence*. Exact, you say, but in what sense? To this an excellent answer is contained in a definition given by an American mathematician, Professor Benjamin Peirce: *Mathematics is the science which draws correct conclusions*, a formulation something more than finely paraphrased by one of my own teachers thus: *Mathematics is the universal art apodictic*. These statements, though neither of them may be entirely satisfactory, are both of them telling approximations. Observe that they place the emphasis on the quality of being *correct*. Nothing is said about the conclusions being true. That is another matter, to which I will return presently. But why are the conclusions of mathematics correct? Is it that the mathematician has an essentially different reasoning faculty from other folks? By no means. What, then, is the secret? Reflect that conclusion implies premises, and premises imply terms, and terms stand for ideas or concepts, and that *these*, namely, concepts, are the *ultimate* material with which the spiritual architect, which we call the reason, designs and builds. Here, then, we may expect to find light. The apodictic quality of mathematical thought, the certainty and correctness of its conclusions, are due, not to a special mode of ratiocination, but to the character of the concepts with which it deals. What is that distinctive characteristic? I answer: *precision, sharpness, completeness,<sup>1</sup> of definition*. But how comes your mathematician by such completeness? There is no mysterious trick involved; some ideas admit of such precision, others do not; and the mathematician is one who deals with those that do. Law, says Blackstone, is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power of a state commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. But what are a state and supreme power and right and wrong? If all such terms admitted of

<sup>1</sup> *i.e.*, in terms of the absolutely clear and *indefinable*.

complete determination, then the science of law would be a branch of pure, and its practice a branch of applied, mathematics. But does not the lawyer sometimes arrive at correct conclusions? Undoubtedly he does sometimes, and, what may seem yet more astonishing, so does your historian and even your sociologist, and that without the help of accident. When this happens, however, when these students arrive, I do not say at truth, for that may be by lucky accident or happy chance or a kind of intuition, but when they arrive at *conclusions* that are *correct*, then that is because they have been for the moment in all literalness acting the part of mathematician. I do not say that for the aggrandisement of mathematics. Rather is it for credit to *all* thinkers that none can show you any considerable garment of thought in which you may not find here and there, rarely enough sometimes, a golden fibre woven in some, it may be, exceptional moment, of precise conception and rigorous reasoning. To think right—that is no characteristic striving of a class of men. It is a common aspiration. Only, the stuff of thought is mostly intractable, formless, like some milky way waiting to be analysed into distinct star-forms of definite ideas. All thought aspires towards the character and condition of mathematics.

The reality of this aspiration and the distinction it implies admit of many illustrations, of which here a single one must suffice. There is no more common or more important notion than that of *function*, the term being applied to either of two variable things such that to any value or state of either there correspond one or more values or states of the other. Of such function pairs, examples abound on every hand, as the radius and the area of a circle, the space traversed and the rate of going, progress of knowledge and enthusiasm of study, elasticity of medium and velocity of sound or other undulation, the amount of hydrogen chloride formed and the time occupied, the prosperity of a given community and the intelligence of its patriotism. Indeed, it may very well be

that there is nothing which is not in some sense a function of every other. Be that as it may, one thing is very certain, namely, a very great part and probably all of our thinking is concerned with functional relationships, deals, that is, with pairs or systems of corresponding values or states or changes. Behold, for example, how the parallelistic psychology searches for correlations between psychical and physical phenomena. Witness, too, the sociologist trying to determine the correspondence between the peacefulness and the homogeneity of a population, or, again, between manifestations of piety or the spread of populism and the condition of the crops. It is then here, in the wondrous domain of correspondence, the answering of value to value, of change to change, of condition to condition, of state to state, that the knowing activity finds its field.

What is it precisely that we seek in a correlation? The answer is: *when one or more facts are given, to pass, with absolute certainty, to the correlative fact or facts.* To do this obviously requires formulæ or equations which precisely define the manner of correlation, or the law of interdependence. Where do such formulæ come from? I answer that, strictly speaking, they are never *found*, they are always *assumed*. Now, nothing is easier than to write down a perfectly definite formula that does not tell, for example, how cheerfulness depends on climate, or how pressure affects the volume of a gas. Nay, a given formula may be perfectly intelligible in itself, it may state, that is, a perfectly intelligible law of correspondence, which, nevertheless, may have no validity at all in the physical universe and none elsewhere than in the formula itself. What, then, guides in the choice of formulæ? That depends upon your kind of curiosity, and curiosity is not a matter of choice.

Just here we are in a position where we have only to look steadily a little in order to see the sharp distinction between mathematics and natural science. These are discriminated according to the kind of curiosity whence they spring. The

mathematician is curious about definite abstract correspondences, about perfectly-defined functional relationships *in themselves*. These are more numerous than the sands of the seashore, they are as multitudinous as the points of space. It is this assemblage of pure, precisely-defined relationships which constitute the mathematician's universe, an indefinitely infinite universe, worlds of worlds of wonders, inconceivably richer than the outer world of sense. This latter is indeed immense and marvellous, with its rolling seas and stellar fields and undulating ether, but, compared with the hyperspaces explored by the genius of the geometrician, the whole vast extent of the sensuous universe is a merest point of light in a blazing sky.

Now this mere speck of a physical universe, in which the chemist and the physicist, the biologist and the sociologist, and the rest of nature devotees, find their great fields, may be, as it seems to be, an organic thing, connected into an ordered whole by a tissue of definable functional relationships, and it may not. The nature devotee *assumes* that it is and *tries* to find the relationships. The mathematician does *not* make that assumption and does *not* seek for relationships in the *outer* world. Is the assumption correct? As man, the mathematician does not know, although he greatly cares. As mathematician, man neither knows nor cares. The mathematician does know, however, that, *if* the assumption *be* correct, every definite relationship that is valid in nature, every type of order and mode of correlation obtaining there, is, in itself, a thing for his thought, an essential element in his domain of study. He knows, too, that, if the assumption *be not* correct, his domain remains the same absolutely. The two realms, of mathematics, of nature science, are fundamentally distinct and disparate forever. To think the thinkable—that is the mathematician's aim. To assume that nature is thinkable, an incarnate rational logos, and to seek the thought supposed incarnate there—these are at once the principle and the hope of the nature student. Science, said

Riemann,<sup>1</sup> is the *attempt* to comprehend nature by means of *concepts*. Suppose the nature student is right, suppose the physical universe really is an enfleshed logos of reason, does that imply that *all* the thinkable is thus incorporated? It does not. A single ordered universe, one that through and through is self-compatible, cannot be the whole of reason materialised and objectified. *There is many a rational logos*, and the mathematician has high delight in the contemplation of *inconsistent systems of consistent relationships*. There are, for example, a Euclidian geometry and more than one species of non-Euclidian. As theories of a *given* space, these are not compatible. If our universe be, as Plato thought, and nature science takes for granted, a space-conditioned, geometrised affair, one of these geometries may be, none of them may be, not all of them can be, valid in it. But in the vaster world of thought, all of them are valid, there they co-exist, and interlace among themselves and others, as differing component strains of a higher, strictly supernatural, hypercosmic, harmony.

It is, then, in the inner world of pure thought, where all *entia* dwell, where is every type of order and manner of correlation and variety of relationship, it is in this infinite ensemble of eternal verities whence, if there be one cosmos or many of them, each derives its character and mode of being, — it is there that the spirit of mathesis has its home and its life.

Is it a restricted home, a narrow life, static and cold and grey with logic, without artistic interest, devoid of emotion and mood and sentiment? That world, it is true, is not a world of *solar* light, not clad in the colours that liven and glorify the things of sense, but it is an illuminated world, and over it all and everywhere throughout are hues and tints transcending *sense*, painted there by radiant pencils of *psychic*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Riemann: "Fragmente Philosophischen Inhalts," in *Gesammelte Werke*. These fragments, which are published in English by the Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago, are exceedingly suggestive.

light, the light in which it lies. It is a silent world, and, nevertheless, in respect to the highest principle of art—the interpenetration of content and form, the perfect fusion of mode and meaning—it even surpasses music. In a sense, it is a static world, but so, too, are the worlds of the sculptor and the architect. The figures, however, which reason constructs and the mathematic vision beholds, transcend the temple and the statue, alike in simplicity and in intricacy, in delicacy and in grace, in symmetry and in poise. Not only are this home and this life thus rich in æsthetic interests, really controlled and sustained by motives of a sublimed and supersensuous art, but the religious aspiration, too, finds there, especially in the beautiful doctrine of invariants, the most perfect symbols of what it seeks—the changeless in the midst of change, abiding things in a world of flux, configurations that remain the same despite the swirl and stress of countless hosts of curious transformations. The domain of mathematics is the sole domain of certainty. There and there alone prevail the standards by which every hypothesis respecting the external universe and all observation and all experiment must be finally judged. It is the realm to which all speculation and all thought must repair for chastening and sanitation—the court of last resort, I say it reverently, for all intellection whatsoever, whether of demon or man or deity. It is there that mind as mind attains its highest estate, and the condition of knowledge there is the ultimate object, the tantalising goal of the aspiration, the *Anders-Streben*, of all other knowledge of every kind.

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## “MIND AND MATTER”<sup>1</sup>:

*A Criticism of Professor Haeckel.*

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PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S credentials, as an eminent biologist, and as the explainer and introducer of Darwinism in Germany, doubtless stand high; and it is a great tribute to his literary ability and eloquence that a fairly abstruse work on so comprehensive a subject as “The Riddle of the Universe” should have obtained so wide a circulation, and have been welcomed by masses of thinking readers, especially by many skilled artisans, in this country. But, in spite of Professor Haeckel's many advantages for the task, it is a question whether even he is competent to survey the whole of existence in an authoritative and dogmatic manner, and to lay down the truth in such a way as to carry conviction and certainty from henceforth onward.

To the intelligent artisan or other hardheaded reader who considers that Christian faith is undermined, and the whole religious edifice upset, by the scientific philosophy advocated by Professor Haeckel under the name “Monism,” I would say, paraphrasing a sentence of Mr Ruskin's in a preface to *Sesame and Lilies*:—Do not think it likely that you hold in your hands a treatise in which the ultimate and final verity of the universe is at length beautifully proclaimed,

<sup>1</sup> Presidential Address to the Birmingham and Midland Institute.

and in which pure Truth has been sifted from the errors of all preceding ages. Do not think it, friend: it is not so.

For what is this same "Monism"?

Professor Haeckel writes almost as if it were a recent invention, but in truth there have been many versions of it, and in one form or another the idea is quite old, older than Plato, as old as Parmenides. It is as a matter of fact a hypothesis, a philosophic guess, a grasping after unity—a unity to which the human mind seems impelled—an attempt to realise the essential simplicity and oneness of all existence by including everything in one single fundamental Reality, of which the whole world, with all its diversity of sensual impressions and consciousness, is but an assemblage of appearances.

As a working hypothesis such an attempt at unification is eminently appropriate; and for some form of ultimate Monism there is no doubt much that can be said. No attack on Professor Haeckel's position need be an attack on this philosophic idea; the two are quite independent of each other; but what we have to recognise is that it *is* an idea, a hypothesis, an aim, an ultimate aim which as yet is very far from being attained, an aim which Philosophy may well strive after, but which Physical Science in its own field has not made the slightest pretence of having accomplished. It has barely yet unified even the chemical elements, and its progress must be slow. But philosophically we cannot be satisfied with dualism, we are all inclined to look forward to an ultimate monistic view. Such a view truly belongs to Philosophy, and not to Science; and for a man of Science to overstep the barrier and pretend that he comes with scientific authority to take official possession of that territory upon which it has been the long-cherished wish of Philosophy to enter, is, so to speak, to take the bit between his teeth and to bolt away from his scientific tether altogether; the result being that he either loses himself in a mystical region where Science is no more feasible, or else he maltreats and degrades such portions of philosophic nomenclature as he

can get hold of; subsequently retiring with these trophies to his own side the boundary, there to exhibit them as verbal representations of some mighty reality which he alone can clearly perceive. He may try to fit them in as part of a coherent scheme of ordered knowledge, but they are really fragments of another order of things, and in order to force them into the puzzle map before their true place has been discovered, a whole system of substantial fact must be disarranged, dislocated, and thrown away. A premature and cheap Monism is therefore worse than none at all.

We cannot be permanently satisfied with dualism, but it is possible to be over-hasty, and also too precisely insistent. There are those who seem to think that a monistic view of existence precludes the legitimacy of speaking of soul and body, or of God and spiritual beings, or of guidance and management, at all; that is to say, they seem to think that because things can be *ultimately* unified, therefore they are unified proximately and for practical purposes. We might as well urge that it was incorrect to speak of the chemical elements, or of the various materials with which in daily life we have to deal, or of the structures in which we live or which we see and handle, as separate and real things, because in the last resort we believe that they may be all reduced to an aggregation of corpuscles, or to some other mode of unity.

So also there are some thinkers who are so impressed with the subjective character of “time” that they are barely willing to admit it as a real element in Evolution or other natural process. Time they say, and say perhaps quite rightly, Time is an illusion. They have only to press this to extremes, and presently they will become unwilling to catch a train, or to ask what o’clock it is. Whether it be an aspect of some fourth dimension or not, as I for one am inclined to think it is, time is real enough, and it is an essential ingredient in the world of our present experience.

It is probably true that our life and that of the animals are branches of one fundamental vitality, but it does not follow

that we are wrong in speaking of different races of men and discriminating them from quadrupeds and fishes and birds.

The language of dualism or of multiplism is not incorrect or inappropriate or superseded because we catch ideal glimpses of an ultimate unity ; nor would it be any the less appropriate if the underlying unity could be more clearly and completely grasped. The material world may be an aspect of the spiritual world, or *vice versa* perhaps, or both may be aspects of something else ; but both are realities all the same, and there need be no hesitation in speaking of them clearly and distinctly as, for practical purposes, separate entities.

It is no more dualistic to speak separately of God and Nature than it is to think of the reasonable soul and human flesh as one man. Moreover, just as variety of matter exists, so it is not unlikely that variety of spirit exists ; and that a Divine Spirit, though transcendent, is also immanent in the material universe, that universe which appeals to our senses, and has enkindled in some of us a passionate enthusiasm for the true, the beautiful, and the good.

These three great attributes excite Professor Haeckel's, as they excited Goethe's, worship and admiration ; the three "goddesses," as he calls them, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty ; but there is no necessary competition or antagonism between these and the other three great conceptions which aroused the veneration of the philosopher Kant : God, Freedom, and Immortality ; nor does the upholding of the one triad mean the overthrow of the other ; they may be all co-eternal together and co-equal ; provided that by the term "God" *in this connection* is meant, as usual, something limited by our conceptions, something corresponding to our human ideal of perfection, some personified aspect or higher mode of being, and is not intended to represent the Sum-total of Existence ; whereby, of course, it would become all-inclusive, and impossible to catalogue with anything else. Nor are either of these triplets inconsistent with some reasonable view of what may possibly be meant by the Christian Trinity. The total

possibility of existence is so vast that no single formula, nor indeed any form of words however complex, is likely to be able to sum it up and express its essence, to the exclusion of all other modes of expression.

Concerning "Truth," there is no need to speak: it cannot but be the breath of the nostrils of every genuine scientific man. That which is not true, meaning thereby that which contains no element of truth, cannot but be bad and hideous; but his ideas of truth should be large enough to take into account possibilities far beyond anything of which he is at present sure, and he should be careful to be undogmatic and docile in regions to which at present he has not the key.

The meaning of "Goodness," the whole domain of Ethics, and the higher possibilities of Sainthood of which the human spirit has shown itself capable, are at present outside his domain; and if a man of science seeks to dogmatise concerning the Emotions and the Will, and asserts that he can reduce them to atomic forces and motions, he is exhibiting the smallness of his conceptions, and gibbeting himself as a laughing-stock to future generations.

The atmosphere and full meaning of "Beauty" also he can only dimly grasp. If he seeks to explain it in terms of sexual selection, or any other small generalisation which he has recently been able to form in connection with vital procedure on this planet, he is explaining nothing: he is merely showing how the perception of beauty may operate in certain cases; but the inner nature of beauty, and the faculty by which it is perceived, are utterly beyond him. At heart, and in moments of leisure, he cannot but feel that the unconscious and unobtrusive beauty of field and hedgerow must have originated in obedience to some primal instinct, in fulfilment of some immanent desire, some lofty need, quite other than anything he recognises as human.

And if a poet, witnessing the cloud-glories of a sunset, for instance, or the profusion of beauty with which snow mountains seem to fling themselves to the heavens, in districts

unpeopled and in epochs long before human consciousness awoke upon the earth : if such a seer feels the revelation weigh upon his spirit with an almost sickening pressure, and is constrained to ascribe this wealth and prodigality of beauty to the joy of the Eternal Being in His own existence,—to an anticipation, as it were, of the developments which lie before the Universe in which He is at work, and which He is slowly tending towards an unimaginable perfection,—it behoves the man of Science to put his hand upon his mouth, lest, in his efforts to be true in the absence of knowledge, he find himself uttering, in his ignorance, words of lamentable folly or blasphemy.

II. Haeckel's main propositions on which his whole scheme is based are two, which, paraphrased and indicated very briefly, may be said to be :

- (1) The inorganic origin of life, will, and consciousness.
- (2) Persistence as a test of real existence.

The first is equivalent to a developed kind of spontaneous generation : a hypothesis contrary to, or at least quite unsupported by, the facts of science as at present known—the facts of biogenesis;<sup>1</sup> for though the origin of life may be the

<sup>1</sup> In the preliminary rough draft of this Address the sentence ran :—“the facts of biogenesis so emphasised by Professor Huxley” ; but it was pointed out, by critics who had nothing but newspaper abstracts from an advance proof to go upon, and were not aware of the amplifications and qualifications which were verbally given during the delivery of the Address, that so brief a reference to Professor Huxley's views might be capable of misinterpretation. Huxley vigorously contended that spontaneous generation had not yet been scientifically proved or experienced : he did not mean to assert—was indeed particularly careful not to assert—that it had never anywhere occurred. Nor do I mean to assert this, for plainly, here life actually is ; but I say that its origin, and the manner of it, are at present unknown : spontaneous generation is a speculation, not an ascertained fact. A reader of Haeckel might easily assume that it was scientifically established that life could spontaneously originate from dead matter, without animation from anything outside itself ; and moreover that the atoms of matter possessed, in themselves and their forces, the elements not only of vitality but of the further developments of consciousness and will. My contention, throughout, is not that Professor Haeckel's statements are necessarily untrue, but that they are of the nature of philosophic speculation or brilliant guess-work.

outcome of the science of the future, it certainly has no place in the science of to-day.

The second is what he calls "The Problem of Substance." He assumes that physicists will grant him that matter and energy are the two things which are *conserved*, that they are uncreatable, indestructible, eternally permanent; these therefore he calls by one name "Substance," and says that substance is the sum and totality of all existence. This he regards as the deep reality, and all else as appearance. He holds that matter and energy include everything that is real; that life, consciousness, free will, spirit, joy, etc., are but attributes or functions or developments of something implicit in these fundamental things; and that these things, together with their attributes, not only constitute the universe as we know it, but that they also constitute the deity—all the deity there is.

In this central chapter of his book, *The Problem of Substance*, he trenches constantly on physics, and I propose to comment upon it at a greater length very soon, but it would take too long now. I will content myself with saying that both the conservation of energy and the conservation of matter are doctrines very far from being axiomatic. It is singular that even during Haeckel's lifetime the atom shows signs of breaking up into stuff which is not ordinary matter; and it is quite likely that before long fresh atoms of matter may be brought into being in a laboratory.

I admit, however, that a certain speculative hypothesis, really underlying Haeckel's contention though not explicitly formulated by him, deserves consideration. It is not a scientific theory, but it is a plausible assumption. There is a sense in which the guess is plausible that real existence is a permanent thing; that anything which really and fundamentally *exists*, in a serious and untrivial and non-accidental fashion, can be trusted not suddenly to go out of existence and leave no trace behind. Arbitrary collocations may and must be temporary, but there may be in each a fundamental

substratum which if it can be reached will be found to be eternal.

A multitude of things obviously perish, thereby showing themselves to be trivial or accidental arrangements according to our hypothesis. A flame is extinguished and dies, a mountain is ultimately ground into sand by the slow influence of denudation, a planet or a sun may lose its identity by encounter with other bodies. All these are temporary collocations of atoms; but it appears now that an atom may break up into electric charges, and these again may some day be found capable of resolving themselves into pristine ether. If so, then these also are temporary, and in the material universe it is the ether only which persists—the ether with such states of motion or strain as it eternally possesses,—in which case the ether will have proved itself the material substratum and most fundamental known entity on that side.

But are we to conclude therefore that nothing else exists? that the existence of one thing disproves the existence of others? The contention would be absurd. The category of *life* has not been touched, in anything we have said so far; no relation has been established between life and energy, or between life and ether. The nature of life is unknown. Is life also a thing of which constancy can be asserted? When it disappears from a material environment is it knocked out of existence, or is it merely transferred to some other surroundings, becoming as difficult to identify and recognise as are the gases of a burnt manuscript? Is it a temporary trivial collocation associated with certain complex groupings of the atoms of matter, and resolved into nothingness when that grouping is interfered with? or is it something immaterial and itself fundamental, something which uses these collocations of matter in order to display itself amid material surroundings, but is otherwise essentially independent of them?

Professor Haeckel would answer this question with a contemptuous negative, and the treatment which he would thus give to life he would also extend to mind and conscious-

ness, to affection, to art, to poetry, to religion, and all the other facts of experience to which in the process of evolution humanity has risen: I say he would answer the question, whether these had any real existence other than as a necessary concomitant of a sufficiently complex material aggregate, with a contemptuous negative; but I challenge him to say by what right he gives that answer. His speculation is that all these properties are nascent and latent in the material atoms themselves, that these have the potentiality of life and choice and consciousness which we perceive in their developed combinations. As a speculation this is legitimate, but the only answer that can by science legitimately be given at the present time is the answer given by du Bois Reymond, *ignoramus*, we do not know.

Professor Haeckel would no doubt reply to some of the above criticism that he is not only a man of science, but also a philosopher, that he is looking ahead, beyond ascertained fact, and that it is his philosophic views which are in question rather than his scientific statements. If that is clearly understood I am perfectly content. As a philosopher Professor Haeckel can claim no particular weight for his opinions more than those of any other philosopher; and if he writes as a philosopher, even if he writes erroneously, it is not for me, who am no professed philosopher, to controvert him. If this be clearly understood—and perhaps Professor Haeckel as a cultured and broad-minded man would himself admit it—his book can be left to its proper purpose of doing good rather than harm. It can only do harm by misleading, it can do considerable good by criticising and clarifying and informing; and it is an interesting fact that a man so well acquainted with Biology as Professor Haeckel is should have been so strongly impressed with the truth of some aspect of the philosophic system known as Monism. Many men of science have likewise been impressed with the probability or possibility of some such ultimate unification.

It would be extremely surprising if any attempt yet made

had already been successful. An excessively wide knowledge of existence would seem to be demanded for the success of any such most ambitious attempt, but, though none of us may hope to achieve it, many may strive to make some contribution towards the great end; and those who think they have such a contribution to make, or such a revelation entrusted to them, are bound to express it to the best of their ability, and leave it to their contemporaries and successors to assimilate such portions of it as are true, and to develop it further. From this point of view Professor Haeckel is no doubt amply justified in his writings; but, unfortunately, it appears to me that although he has been borne forward on the advancing wave of monistic philosophy, he has, in its specification, attempted such precision of materialistic detail, and subjected it to so narrow and limited a view of the totality of experience, that the progress of thought has left him, as well as his great English exemplar, Herbert Spencer, somewhat high and dry, belated and stranded by the tide of opinion which has now begun to flow in another direction. He is, as it were, a surviving voice from the middle of the nineteenth century; he represents, in clear and eloquent fashion, opinions which then were prevalent among many leaders of thought—opinions which they themselves in many cases, and their successors still more, lived to outgrow; so that by this time Professor Haeckel's voice is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, not as the pioneer or vanguard of an advancing army, but as the despairing shout of a standard-bearer, still bold and unflinching, but abandoned by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in a fresh direction.

III. Let us consider what are the facts scientifically known concerning the interaction between mind and matter. Fundamentally they amount to this: that a complex piece of matter called the brain is the organ or instrument of mind and consciousness; that if it be stimulated mental activity results; that if it be injured or destroyed no manifestation of mental activity is possible. Moreover, it is assumed, and need not be

doubted, that a portion of brain substance is consumed, oxidised let us say, in every act of mentation, using that term in the vaguest and most general sense, and including in it unconscious as well as conscious operations.

Suppose we grant all this, what then? We have granted that brain is the means whereby mind is made manifest on this material plane, it is the instrument through which alone we know it, but we have not granted that mind is *limited* to its material manifestation; nor can we maintain that without matter the things we call mind, intelligence, consciousness, have no sort of existence. Mind may be incorporate or incarnate in matter, but it may also transcend it. Brain is truly the organ of mind and consciousness, and to a brainless race these terms, and most other terms, would be meaningless; but no one is at liberty to assert on the strength of that fact, that the realities underlying our use of those terms have no existence apart from terrestrial brains. Nor can we say with any security that the stuff called “brain” is the only conceivable machinery which they are able to utilise: though it is true that we know of no other. Yet it would seem that such a proposition must be held by a materialist, or indeed by a monist if that term be employed in its narrowest and most unphilosophic sense—the sense in which it is used by Professor Haeckel,—a sense which would be better expressed by the term materialistic-monist, with a limitation of the term matter to the terrestrial chemical elements and their combinations, *i.e.* to that form of substance to which the human race have grown accustomed—a sense which excludes ethereal and other generalisations and unknown possibilities such as would occur to a philosophic monist of the widest kind.

For that it may ultimately be discovered that there is some intimate and necessary connection between a generalised form of matter and some lofty variety of mind, is not to be denied; though also it cannot yet be asserted. It has been surmised, for instance, that just as the corpuscles and atoms of matter, in their intricate movements and relations, combine to form

the brain cell of a human being; so the cosmic bodies, the planets and suns and other groupings of the ether, may perhaps combine to form something corresponding as it were to the brain cell of some transcendent mind. The thing is a mere guess, it is not an impossibility, and it cannot be excluded from a philosophic system by any negative statement based on scientific fact. In some such sense as that, matter and mind may be, for all we know, eternally and necessarily connected; they can be different aspects of some fundamental unity; and a lofty kind of monism can be true, just as a lofty kind of pantheism can be true; but the miserable degraded monism and lower pantheism which limits the term "god" to that part of existence of which we are now aware—sometimes indeed to a fraction only of that,—which limits the term "mind" to that of which we are ourselves conscious, and the term "matter" to the dust of the earth and the other visible bodies, is a system of thought appropriate perhaps to a fertile and energetic portion of the nineteenth century, but not likely to survive as a system of perennial truth.

The term "organ" itself should have given pause to anyone desirous of promulgating a scheme such as that.

"Organ" is a name popularly given to an instrument of music. Without it, or some other instrument, no material manifestation or display of music is possible; it is an instrument for the incarnation of music—the means whereby it interacts with the material world and throws the air and so our ears into vibration, it is the means whereby we apprehend it. Injure the organ and the music is imperfect; destroy it and it ceases to be possible. But is it to be asserted on the strength of that fact that the term "music" has no significance apart from its material manifestation? Have the ideas of Sir Edward Elgar no reality apart from their record on paper and reproduction by an orchestra? It is true that without suitable instruments and a suitable sense-organ we should know nothing of music, but it cannot be supposed that its underlying essence would be therefore extinct or non-existent

and meaningless. Can there not be in the universe a multitude of things which matter as we know it is incompetent to express? Is it not the complaint of every genius that his material is intractable, that it is difficult to coerce matter as he knows it into the service of mind as he is conscious of it, and that his conceptions transcend his powers of expression?

Those who think that reality is limited to its terrestrial manifestation doubtless have a philosophy of their own, to which they are entitled and to which at any rate they are welcome; but if they set up to teach others that monism signifies a limitation of mind to the potentialities of matter as at present known; if they teach a pantheism which identifies God with nature in this narrow sense; if they hold that mind and what they call matter are so intimately connected that no *transcendence* is possible; that, without the cerebral hemispheres, consciousness and intelligence and emotion and love, and art and all the higher attributes towards which humanity is dimly groping, would cease to be; that the term "soul" signifies "a sum of plasma-movements in the ganglion cells"; and that the term "God" is limited to the operation of a known evolutionary process, and can be represented as "the infinite sum of all natural forces, the sum of all atomic forces and all ether vibrations," to quote Professor Haeckel (*Confession of Faith*, p. 78); then such philosophers must be content with an audience of uneducated persons, or, if writing as men of Science, must hold themselves liable to be opposed by other men of Science, who are able, at any rate in their own judgment, to take a wider survey of existence, and to perceive possibilities to which the said narrow and over-definite philosophers were blind.

IV. Matter possesses energy, in the form of persistent motion, and it is propelled by force; but neither matter nor energy possesses a power of automatic guidance and control. Energy has no directing power: (this has been elaborated by Croll and others: see, for instance, *Nature*, vol. 43, p. 434, thirteen years ago, under the heading "Force and Determin-

ism"). Inorganic matter is impelled solely by pressure from behind, it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a preconceived course nor seek a predetermined end.

An organism animated by mind is in a totally different case. The intangible influences of hunger, of a call, of perception of something ahead, are then the dominant feature. An intelligent animal which is being pushed is in an ignominious position and resents it; when led, or when voluntarily obeying a call, it is in its rightful attitude.

The essence of mind is design and purpose. There are some who deny that there is any design or purpose in the universe at all: but how can that be maintained when humanity itself possesses these attributes? Is it not more reasonable to say that just as we are conscious of the power of guidance in ourselves, so guidance and intelligent control may be an element running through the Universe, and may be incorporated even in material things?

A traveller who has lost his way in a mountain district, coming across a path, may rejoice, saying, "This will guide me home." Him Professor Haeckel, if he were consistent, should laugh to scorn, saying, "What guidance or purpose can there be in a material object? there is no guidance or purpose in the Universe; things *are* because they cannot be otherwise, not because of any intention underlying them. How can a path, which is little better than the absence of grass or the wearing down of stones, know where you live or guide you to any desired destination? Moreover, whatever knowledge or purpose the path exhibits must be *in the path*, must be a property of the atoms of which it is composed. To them some fraction of will, of power, of knowledge, and of feeling *may* perhaps be attributed, and from their aggregation something of the same kind may perhaps be deduced. If the traveller can decipher that, he may utilise the material object to his advantage; but if he conceives the path to have been made with any teleological object or intelligent purpose, he is abandoning himself to superstition, and is as likely to

be led by it to the edge of a precipice as to anywhere else. Let him follow his superstition at his peril!”

This is not a quotation, of course, but it is a parable.

Matter is the instrument and vehicle of mind; incarnation is the mode by which it interacts with the present scheme of things, and thereby the element of guidance is supplied; it can, in fact, be embodied in an intelligent arrangement of inert inorganic matter. Even a mountain path exhibits the property of guidance, and has direction: it is an incorporation of intelligence, though itself inert.

V. Consider our own position—it is surely worth considering. We are a part of this planet; on one side certainly and distinctly a part of this material world, a part which has become self-conscious. At first we were a part which had become alive; a tremendous step that—introducing a number of powers and privileges which previously had been impossible, but that step introduced no responsibility; we were no longer indeed urged by mere pressure from behind, we were guided by our instincts and appetites, but we still obeyed the strongest external motive almost like electro-magnetic automata. Now, however, we have become conscious, able to look before and after, to learn consciously from the past, to strive strenuously towards the future; we have acquired a knowledge of good and evil, we can choose the one and reject the other, and are thus burdened with a sense of responsibility for our acts. We still obey the strongest motive doubtless, but there is something in ourselves which makes it a motive and regulates its strength. We *can* drift like other animals, and often do; but we can also obey our own volition.

How it all arose is a legitimate problem for genetic psychology, but to the plain man it is a puzzle; our ancestors invented legends to account for it, legends of apples and serpents and the like; but the fact is there, however it be accounted for. The truth embedded in that old Genesis legend is deep; it is the legend of man's awakening from a merely animal life to consciousness of good and evil, no longer obeying his primal

instincts in a state of thoughtlessness and innocency—a state in which deliberate vice was impossible, and therefore higher and purposed goodness also impossible,—it was the introduction of a new sense into the world, the sense of conscience, the power of deliberate choice; the power also of conscious guidance, the management of things and people external to himself, for pre-conceived ends. Man was beginning to cease to be merely a passenger on the planet, controlled by outside forces; it is as if the reins were then for the first time being placed in his hands, as if he was allowed to begin to steer, to govern his own fate and destiny, and to take over some considerable part of the management of the world.

The process of handing over the reins to us is still going on. The education of the human race is a long process, and we are not yet fit to be fully trusted with the steering gear; but the words of the old serpent were true enough: once open our eyes to the perception and discrimination of good and evil, once become conscious of freedom of choice, and sooner or later we must inevitably acquire some of the power and responsibility of gods. A fall it might seem, just as a vicious man sometimes seems degraded below the beasts, but in promise and potency a rise it really was.

The oneness between ourselves and Nature is not a thing to be deplored; it is a thing to rejoice at, when properly conceived. No one can be satisfied with conceptions below the highest which to him are possible: I will not believe that it is given to man to think out a clear and consistent system higher and nobler than the real truth. Our highest thoughts are likely to be nearest to reality: they must be stages in the direction of truth, else they could not have come to us and been recognised as highest. So also with our longings and aspirations towards ultimate perfection, those desires which we recognise as our noblest and best: surely they must have some correspondence with the facts of existence, else had they been unattainable by us. Reality is not to be surpassed, except locally and temporarily, by the ideals of knowledge and

goodness invented by a fraction of itself; and if we could grasp the entire scheme of things, so far from wishing to “shatter it to bits and then remould it nearer to the heart’s desire,” we should hail it as better and more satisfying than any of our random imaginings. The universe is in no way limited to our conceptions: it has a reality apart from them; nevertheless they themselves constitute a part of it, and can only take a clear and consistent character in so far as they correspond with something true and real. Whatever we can clearly and consistently conceive, that is *ipso facto* in a sense already existent in the universe as a whole; and that, or something better, we shall find to be a dim foreshadowing of a higher reality.

That is my creed, and, optimistic though it be, it seems to me the only rational creed for a man of science who, undeterred by any accusation of dualism, realises strongly that our entire selves—our thoughts, conceptions, desires, as well as our perceptions and our acts—are all

“but parts of one stupendous whole,  
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.”

OLIVER LODGE.

# THE NEW SAYINGS OF JESUS AND THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

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WHEN Drs Grenfell and Hunt in 1897 brought from Oxyrhynchus a fragment of a papyrus book containing Sayings of Jesus, which were clearly not derived from the Canonical Gospels, hopes were generally expressed that the discovery would be supplemented by further fragments from the same collection.

Now that this hope has been justified, and they have given to the world the beginning of the collection of the Sayings of Jesus, of which they found part in 1897, though the new fragment is part of another manuscript, many points of interest have naturally been raised, but in the present paper I only wish to draw attention to the importance of the title of the collection in connection with the history of early Christian literature.

It runs "These are the (wonderful?) sayings which Jesus the living (Lord?) spake to . . . and Thomas, and he said to them, . . ." and affords, as the Editors point out, a remarkable justification of two comments which were made on the first fragment.

Dr Lock<sup>1</sup> suggested that the title of *Logia*, which Drs Grenfell and Hunt adopted in 1897, was not quite justifiable,

<sup>1</sup> *Two Lectures on the "Sayings of Jesus,"* by W. Lock and W. Sanday, Oxford, 1897, p. 16.

and regarded *Logoi* or *Sayings* as more probable: few criticisms have ever been more completely justified. The title has been found, and it is *Logoi*, not *Logia*.

In a similar way Dr Rendel Harris, in the *Contemporary Review* of September 1897, discussed the way in which the beginning of the collection may have been worded. His method was to bring together four well-known passages in which a somewhat peculiar form of citation is used, namely:—

- (1) Remembering the words of the Lord that he said . . . .  
Acts xx. 35.
- (2) Remembering the words of Jesus the Lord which he  
spake . . . . Clem. ep. ad Cor. xiii. 1.
- (3) Remember the words of Jesus our Lord, for he said  
. . . . Clem. ep. ad Cor. xlvii. 7.
- (4) Remembering what the Lord said . . . . Polycarp 2.<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion which he drew from these passages was that there was in existence in the first and second centuries a collection of *Sayings of the Lord*, known to Paul, Clement, and Polycarp, which began, "We ought to remember what things our Lord said in his teaching, for he said . . . ."

The similarity of this to the beginning of the new *Sayings* is remarkable (though it is the irony of fate that the part on which Dr Rendel Harris was most probably confident, viz., "We ought to remember," is just the part which finds no support in the papyrus), and it is hardly too much to say that the existence in the second century (at the least) of a collection of sayings such as he suggested is now raised to the level of a fact established by documentary evidence. The questions remain, Is it probable that it was known to Paul, Clement, and Polycarp, and if so, what relation does it bear to the mass of facts and theories which go to make up the Synoptic problem?

In the first place, as an amendment to Dr Rendel Harris' proposition, I would suggest that Luke should be read in the

<sup>1</sup> In all these passages the word translated *words* is *λόγοι*, and I should prefer *sayings*, which I adopt from this point.

place of Paul; the reference to *Words* or *Sayings* in Acts xx. 35 is, it is true, placed in the latter's mouth, but it is very improbable that the speeches in Acts represent verbatim reports rather than Luke's compositions, either based on general accounts or on his own views of what might have been said, in the way practised by other historians.

How far, then, is it probable that the sayings quoted above from Acts (= Luke), Clement and Polycarp imply a knowledge, at the end of the first and beginning of the second centuries, of a definite collection of *Sayings* such as the Oxyrhynchus fragments preserve?

It has generally been admitted that the formula of quotation used by these writers refers to some definite tradition as to Christ's words. The only question raised has been whether this tradition was written or oral. The saying in Acts has generally been ascribed to oral, and the sayings in Clement and Polycarp to written tradition, preserved either in our Gospels or in their predecessors, but, probably because of the ordinary character of the word "sayings," its common use by the three writers has not often been regarded as referring to the title of the source of their quotations. It has been felt that "Sayings" is so little remarkable a word that it is unnecessary to suppose that it is a definite title of a book, and to write it *Sayings* rather than *sayings*.

It is at this point that the new discovery is so important; it shows that *Sayings* was the definite title of a definite book, and the critical situation is now reversed. Formerly it was possible to argue that *Sayings* is not a technical title, and that before Dr Rendel Harris could substantiate his claim he must show that the use of the word in Acts, Clement and Polycarp was not due to the merest coincidence in a very natural phrase. Criticism knew nothing of any collection of our Lord's words entitled *Sayings*, and Dr Rendel Harris seemed to have no very conclusive answer. Now, however, it is his turn, and he can ask his critics why,

since *Sayings* is proved to have been in use as a title, they hesitate in recognising allusions to it in the four passages in question,—and they in turn seem to have no adequate reply.

This is not to assert that Drs Grenfell and Hunt have found a MS. of the original collection of sayings. All that we can say is that Clement, Polycarp and Luke quote different sayings of Jesus, probably from a collection entitled *Sayings*, and Drs Grenfell and Hunt have found a collection with this title. The presumption is perhaps slightly in favour of the view that it is not the original document, but is based on it. It is, however, impossible to prove this, or to show that it ever contained the same sayings as were quoted by Luke, Clement and Polycarp, and the question in this way presents at the same time a parallel and a contrast to the problem afforded by the relations which subsist between the Synoptic Gospels and the quotations of the words of our Lord in the Apostolic Fathers.

We have in the latter several probable allusions to the same traditions as are preserved in the Synoptic Gospels, but there is no mention of these by name. The evidence is solely the evidence of identity of language and subject matter. Therefore, while it is possible that we have in these allusions traces of the use of our Gospels themselves, it is equally possible to explain them as due to a knowledge of the material which was used by the compilers of the Canonical books. Similarly we have now references to a collection of *Sayings* and a fragment of a document bearing this title. But the reason for bringing these facts into close connection is solely that of identity of title; there is no evidence for or against the theory of similarity of contents, so that whereas in the one case we can prove similarity of contents but not identity of title, in the other we show identity of title but not similarity of contents, and in both cases the deficiency of evidence may perfectly well be accidental.

But it may be well to ask whether we can find further allusions to a collection entitled *Sayings* in early Christian literature.

One thinks at once of a famous group of passages (1 Tim. i. 15, iii. 1, iv. 9, 2 Tim. ii. 11, and Tit. iii. 8) in the Pastoral Epistles, which contain the phrase *Faithful is the saying*, for it has often been suggested that the reiteration of the phrase implies quotation. This may well be; but at first sight, at all events, it seems not quite probable that the document from which the writer is quoting is a collection of *Sayings of the Lord*, unless indeed he is quoting very loosely. For instance, in 2 Tim. ii. 11 the *Faithful saying* is probably the sentences following—"For if we died with him we shall also live with him; if we endure we shall also reign with him, etc.," which, unless St Paul is changing his quotation from the first to the third person, can scarcely be taken from a collection of *Sayings of the Lord*. I should not like to build any argument on the supposition that St Paul was not quoting loosely in this way, but it would be wrong to assume that he is so doing in order to make his words evidence for the existence of the collection which we are considering. These passages, therefore, had better be left on one side.

A possible reference may also be sought in Rev. xxi. 5: "And he saith, Write, for these words (Sayings) are faithful and true," and in Rev. xxii. 6: "And he said unto me, These words (Sayings) are faithful and true," but it is difficult either to prove or to refute the suggestion, though the recurrence of the word *faithful*, taken in connection with passages in the Pastoral Epistles, is perhaps sufficiently striking to suggest that *faithful* or *true* are more probable than *wonderful* in the reconstruction of the title of the new fragment.

Let me turn to another source of information.

So much has been written concerning the famous quotation from Papias in Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, Bk. III., 39, that one hesitates to suggest anything fresh in connection

with it; yet a comparison with the title of the new papyrus is certainly tempting. It will be remembered that Papias, speaking of Mark, after saying that he reproduced the preaching of St Peter, goes on to state that the latter "framed his teaching to meet the immediate wants of his hearers, but not as making a collection of the Lord's sayings."<sup>1</sup> The obvious inference from this is that Papias was contrasting the teaching of Peter and the Gospel of St Mark, which was a representation of it, with the work of someone else who had made a collection of *Sayings*. If so, Papias must have known some such collection, and probably attributed it to some contemporary of Mark. It has been assumed by some that he is only referring to *the Logia* which he ascribes to Matthew, but we have now at least learnt the truth of Dr Salmon's statement that *Logoi* is not *Logia*, though some scribes of Eusebius altered the text so as to leave no room for doubt on the point. Others, again—such as, I believe, Dr Julicher—think Papias is throughout this passage contrasting the Synoptic Gospels with the Johannine. I would submit, however, that the strict interpretation of Papias' words is that he refers to three documents—

- (1) St Mark's version of St Peter's teaching.
- (2) An anonymous collection of *Sayings of the Lord*.
- (3) *The Logia* of St Matthew.

It is, of course, possible that the Matthean *Logia* were only the *Sayings* under a title of greater distinction,—in fact, that, like Drs Grenfell and Hunt in 1897, he found *Sayings* and called them *Logia*, but it is somewhat more probable that the document to which Papias refers was a definite recension<sup>2</sup> of the original *Sayings* made perhaps for catechetical purposes, as this theory more readily explains the signs of numerical arrange-

<sup>1</sup> The text is unfortunately not certain. There seems to be fair MS. evidence for *λογίων* instead of *λόγων*, but it is so easy to explain the former as due to the context and so hard to explain the latter if it be not genuine, that at present *λόγων* seems the preferable reading.

<sup>2</sup> Especially when we read, as we probably should, *συνετάξατο* rather than *συνεγράψατο* in the text of Eusebius l.c.

ment which, as Sir John Hawkins has pointed out in *Horæ Synopticæ*, pp. 131–135, exist especially in those parts of the First Gospel, which probably represent the Matthean *Logia*.

This suggestion may also derive some support from a comparison of the three titles—*Sayings*, the *Logia*, and *Gospel*.

*Sayings* is certainly the simplest, and, therefore, is, on a *priori* grounds, likely to be the earliest. *The Logia* or *Oracles* seems to imply a conscious comparison with the Old Testament, which was not seldom referred to under this name. *Gospel* in its technical sense seems to imply the most developed thought and to be the latest of the three. Moreover, it is quite possible that some direct references to the *Sayings* are preserved in the Logian parts of the First Gospel. It is well known that Papias wrote five books of commentary on the *Logia*. The obvious deduction (though, of course, not a certain one) is that the comment had a fivefold division, because the text commented on had one also, and Sir John Hawkins on p. 132 of his *Horæ Synopticæ* points out a convincing reason for regarding this obvious deduction as correct, when he shows that the collection of *Logia* used by the compiler of the First Gospel was divided into five *Pereqs* or Chapters, the endings of which can be traced in Matt. vii. 28; xi. 1; xiii. 53; xix. 1; xxvi. 1. It is surely a very strong point in favour of the theory that it was based on an earlier collection of *Sayings*, that in three out of these five passages the formula from which Sir John draws his conclusion is, "When Jesus had finished these *Sayings*."

From Papias and the Matthaean *Logia* the student of the Synoptic Gospels naturally expects to be led to the preface of St Luke, which, in spite of its apparent simplicity, has been used as the foundation of so many varying theories.

It has been shown that there is some reason for thinking that Luke knew a book entitled *Sayings*, and quoted it in Acts xx. 35. It is therefore not improbable that he alludes to it in his preface. In this he tells us (1) that many have tried to set out an account of the "things fulfilled among us"; (2)

that he has done this himself with unusual care, using original sources ; (3) that his object was to assure Theophilus of the certainty of the *Sayings* concerning which he had been instructed.

The wide meaning of *Sayings* once more renders the point doubtful, but the word translated *instructed* is at least probably technical, and refers to organised instruction, and if *Sayings* was the title of a book, it may have been Luke's intention to remind Theophilus of the definite instruction which he had received, and of the book on which it was based. In fact, Luke seems to be claiming to give the historical setting for the teaching which Theophilus had first received in the form of a manual of instruction, and this accords with the fact which has so often been noted that Luke often gives the historical setting for teaching, which has none in Matthew.

If this be so, we may take it as probable that the book of *Sayings* lies behind much of the teaching in the First and Third Gospels ; by Luke it was used directly, but by the compiler of the First Gospel probably in the form of the edition made by Matthew, which was known to Papias as *the Logia*.<sup>1</sup>

What, however, is to be said on this theory of the allusion in the papyrus to Thomas? I think it is fairly obvious that this collection of sayings cannot be identified with the Gospel of Thomas, and am inclined to suggest that the original *Sayings* were an anonymous collection. One redaction of them became *the Logia* of Matthew, and this was used by the compiler of the First Gospel, to which it gave its name. Another redaction was associated with the name of Judas Thomas, and may have been used by the compiler of the Gospel of that name, which I see no reason for supposing to have been originally merely the fragment of narratives referring to the childhood of the Lord, which is still extant. This is,

<sup>1</sup> It is an interesting question whether we ought not to find an allusion to this document in Polycarp 7, ὅς ἂν μεθοδεύῃ τὰ λόγια τοῦ κυρίου, especially as Polycarp seems to imply that the λόγια do not include the μαρτύριον τοῦ σταυροῦ and, as suggested above, the last chapter of *the Logia* seems to have ended at Matt. xxvi. 1, just before the account of the Passion begins.

of course, merely conjecture, but the same may be said of all theories as to the origins of early Christian literature: the only test which can be applied is that afforded by their power to co-ordinate facts supplied by literary criticism and archæological research.

It may perhaps not be out of place to anticipate one objection to these suggestions. Their central point is the theory that a collection of sayings similar to the Oxyrhynchus papyri was in existence earlier than our First and Third Gospels, and probably contemporaneously with the Second. They are directly opposed to the preference shown by Dr Sanday, in his lecture on the first fragment, for the view that the *Sayings* had their origin under conditions of thought which the Gospels had created. They rather imply that they are the product of the same conditions as those which gave rise to the Canonical books. Dr Sanday's opinion is one which has a value because it is his, as well as because of the arguments which he advances, but I think, though I am not sure, that at least one of the presuppositions which weigh with him is that a desire to know the facts of the ministry must have preceded the desire to know the sayings of our Lord independently of their historical contexts. It is this belief which also seems consciously or unconsciously to have lain behind the theories of those who, like Professor Harnack, were inclined, at least until the publication of the new fragment, to regard the *Sayings* as extracts from lost Gospels, especially the Gospels according to the Egyptians and according to the Hebrews. Is this presupposition valid? I would submit that it is more probable that the earliest generation of Christians were more anxious "to remember the words of the Lord Jesus" than to picture His doings among the Jews and the facts of His ministry. So far as Jewish circles were concerned, this seems to me almost to be proved by the analogy of the Pirque 'Abhôth, to which Dr Burney<sup>1</sup> has drawn attention. There we have direct evidence that the

<sup>1</sup> *Lock and Sanday*, op. cit. p. 47.

Jews were interested in the teaching of the Fathers, but scarcely cared at all for the details of their lives. It seems to me that the new *Sayings* afford considerable indirect support to the view that behind our Gospels lie two kinds of record, one based on the Jewish plan, which gave *Sayings* without a complete historical framework, and the other probably due to the desire for more historical information, which certainly must have arisen very soon especially in Gentile circles. The Gospel of St Mark would seem to belong to the latter class, Grenfell and Hunt's *Sayings* may be the descendants of the former, and *the Logia* of Matthew may also belong to the same category, while St Luke's Gospel may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy Theophilus' desire to understand the origin of the sayings on which his instruction as a catechumen had been based, by giving him a Gospel which joined the *Sayings* in their earliest form to as much historical background as could be found.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

LEIDEN.

# THE INNER MEANING OF LIBERAL THEOLOGY.

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THE translation into English of some of Professor Harnack's lectures, and the publication of two little books by M. Loisy, have had the effect of calling popular attention to the growth of an unfamiliar type of religious thought, and have shown to many people—what they had not seriously recognised before—that the traditional theology can no longer expect to reign without a rival in its own field. There are signs, too, that a large number of men who could not be counted among professed theological students, are feeling a genuine desire to know accurately what this new type of religious thought is and means.

A recent writer of the High Anglican school has asserted that "the old Nestorian heresy is being resuscitated among us," and has spoken in such a way as to make it plain that he would group among modern "Nestorians" not only Professor Harnack but M. Loisy also. That this opinion rests upon misunderstanding seems hardly to need showing. And yet, nevertheless, it is an opinion which is worthy of our careful consideration. For is not this misunderstanding a singularly instructive one? Does it not, indeed, help us to put our finger upon the exact spot at which the most important divergence between the newer philosophical theology and the older traditional theology takes place?

It has become the fashion to say that the great difference between the old theology and the new consists in the fact that the former believes in a "transcendent" or "other-world" God, the latter in an "immanent" God. Whatever may be the merits of this form of expression, it is at least clear that it is not likely to convey any very exact conception to the mind of the general reader. Might it not, perhaps, help to express the truth more intelligibly if—using an almost exactly opposite phrase—we said that popular theology regards God and man as "existing side by side in the same world," in a sense in which philosophical theology cannot so regard them? God, as popularly conceived—as for the purposes of the religious imagination we quite rightly conceive of Him—is a Person among persons, and moreover a Person living in Time as human persons do, watching with interest the events and changes of human history, and therefore Himself living through a changing experience. According to this view God and man exist side by side in the world of Time: God is an elder contemporary of man, existing first without man and then existing alongside of him. But a God regarded as existing in Time is half-incarnate already. And if on this theory of God we attempt to construct a Christology which shall speak of Christ as God, and at the same time admit the limitation of Christ's human knowledge, we must inevitably, it would seem, arrive at a view which may justly be called Nestorian. If Christ as man was really ignorant of some truth of which Christ as God was at that very same moment aware, it seems hard to see how—if we think out the meaning of our words—we can deny that the divine Christ and the human Christ are two distinct persons.

But, for the modern philosophical theologian, man as we know him in history and God as we know Him in religion do not in this sense exist "side by side" nor "in the same world." "God," says M. Loisy, "is not a character in history."<sup>1</sup> We know Him, not by mere reasoning, nor by

<sup>1</sup> *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 215.

the mere collection of historic facts, but by an effort of the moral consciousness. God, for Professor Harnack, is not an object of "knowledge." Knowledge cannot show us the "meaning of life," nor the great Reality by which our lives ought to be directed. "We are unable to bring our knowledge in space and time, together with the contents of our inner life, into the unity of a philosophic theory of the world. It is only in the peace of God which passeth all understanding that this unity dawns upon us." "Belief in the living Lord and in a life eternal is the act of the freedom which is born of God." To become certain of God we must "with steady will affirm the forces and the standards which on the summits of our inner life shine out as our highest good."<sup>1</sup> In other words, it is by the will, not by knowledge, that we come into relation with God. In the world of "knowable objects" He has no place.

Upon the distinction thus drawn it is worth our while to concentrate our attention. When M. Loisy contrasts "the Christ of history"—a figure purely human and unmiraculous—with "the Christ of faith"<sup>2</sup>—risen, glorified, divine—a casual reader might suppose that M. Loisy regarded the latter as the product of credulous fancy; that, in fact, his attitude was the same as that of Hume when he said satirically that "our holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason." Similarly, when Professor Harnack treats God as not being "knowable," the same casual reader might take him for a mere agnostic. But if he read further, he would soon see that he had misjudged both these eminent writers; that both of them are men to whom religion is the chief interest and God the chief reality; and that the distinctions which they have drawn are expressions of their conviction that whole-hearted devotion to this highest interest does not forbid us to find room for historical and scientific studies. The more clearly it is seen that religion is what they chiefly have at heart, the less perplexing and unfamiliar will their intellectual attitude

<sup>1</sup> *What is Christianity?* pp. 151, 163, 300, 301.

<sup>2</sup> *Autour d'un petit livre*, pp. 111, 90, 134.

appear. The assertion that mere knowledge cannot show us the highest realities of life has a fairly familiar sound to all religious people; and a broad line of division between scientific interests on the one hand, and ethical and religious interests on the other, has in various ways been drawn for us by so many modern writers, that few of us can be wholly unaccustomed to examples of this mode of thinking. Kant's distinction between speculative and practical reason, Schopenhauer's doctrine of Will and Idea, Mr Münsterberg's assertion that "our real inner subjective life" is "not an object but an attitude, and therefore neither in time nor in space," the contention of Feuerbach<sup>1</sup> that religion is hostile to theoretic study and æsthetic contemplation, that "God as the object of religion is essentially an object of feeling, not of the intellect, of the heart's necessity, not of the mind's freedom, in short, an object which is the reflex, not of the theoretical, but of the practical tendency in man" (a view which he supports by quoting the saying of the mystic that "God is an unutterable sigh lying in the depths of the heart")—all these phrases, or echoes of them, have found a place even in current popular literature. The teaching of these various writers is, of course, not identical. But they have this one thing in common, that they serve to familiarise our minds with quasi-dualistic conceptions, and thus prepare us for the doctrine that the objects of religious faith and the objects of science do not simply exist in the same world side by side with one another.

This conception, nevertheless, is not a very easy one to grasp, and therefore it is important that, both as teachers and as learners, we should avail ourselves of every method by which we can make it clearer. A valuable hint on this subject is to be gathered from Mr Bosanquet's admirable essay, "The True Conception of another World."<sup>2</sup> Any person, indeed, who possesses influence with any of our Bishops might use

<sup>1</sup> *The Essence of Christianity*, Miss Evans' translation, p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> See his translation of *The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art*.  
Kegan Paul.

that influence to worse purpose than in persuading him to make the reading of this short paper obligatory upon all the "honours" men who present themselves as candidates for ordination. Mr Bosanquet's essay points us to the employment of illustrations drawn from the sphere of æsthetic beauty. We may work upon this hint by making a direct comparison between our experience in matters of art, and some of the specific experiences which belong to religion.

In looking at the work of a great painter we perceive before us a canvas covered with pigments of various colours, and at the same time, if we are persons of taste, we perceive that the picture has beauty. The beauty is as real as the pigments. If a Philistine, not perceiving the beauty, thought it the creation of our fancy, we should know that the error was on his side, not on ours. But there is a sense in which the beauty and the pigments are not "side by side in the same world." The pigments are in space; the beauty is not in space. If the beauty were regarded as something occupying space, the Philistine might prove his case by saying that since the pigments covered the whole surface there was no room in the picture for any beauty. The absurdity of such an argument would bring home to us what is meant by saying that these two objects of our consciousness belong to different worlds.

But, turning to religion, may we not speak in almost the same words of the devout recipient of Holy Communion? The devout communicant is as truly sure that God is present in the Sacrament as the art-critic is sure that beauty is present in the work of art. His assurance depends upon the fact that he has himself "found" Christ in this sacrament. He may perhaps believe further that Christ is present in a spatial or quasi-spatial manner in the sacramental elements; but this opinion rests upon theory, not upon experience. For, unless he believes himself to have witnessed one of those miraculous apparitions which play a part in the Eucharistic Theology of the Middle Ages,<sup>1</sup> he will not allege that he has "found"

<sup>1</sup> See St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, Part III., qu. 76, art. 8.

Christ in the elements. And just so far as we accept the comparison between the presence of Christ in the Sacrament and the presence of beauty in the picture, we shall cease to think that the reality of our sacramental experiences needs to be guaranteed by the doctrine of Transubstantiation, or by the doctrine of Consubstantiation, or by any theory which should put the Eucharistic presence on the level of a physical miracle.

The same comparison would lead us to see in the Incarnation, not the Godhead concealed behind, or veiled beneath, the manhood, but the Godhead revealed in the manhood and through it. In a material sense there is nothing in the painter's work beyond the canvas and the pigments. Physical dissection would reveal canvas and paint and nothing else. In the same way, it may be said, historical criticism will find in the life of Christ a human history, and a human history only; and the historian will be able to show us in Christ no superhuman mode of consciousness, though to the man who is not a mere historian, but a Christian also, this same life will rightly appear as a revelation of the inmost nature of God.

The effect, we may say, which this comparison between religion and art would have upon our religious life in general would be to make us regard it as the special office of faith, not to add to the number of facts which we believe in, but to place the known facts of life in a new light—not to add something fresh, but to interpret what is given—so that we should find our chief happiness, not in the hope of Heaven or in the records of miracles, but in that frame of mind which can see in all things the hand of God; and should look to see death conquered and its sting taken away,<sup>1</sup> not by future glory, but

<sup>1</sup> Compare the following passage in Mr George Meredith's *Rhoda Fleming* (chapter vii.): "My prayer at my bedside every night is that I may die for him. We used to think the idea of death so terrible! Do you remember how we used to shudder together at night when we thought of people lying in the grave? And now, when I think that perhaps I may some day die for him, I feel like a crying in my heart with joy." Everyone who has insight enough to understand the transformation of feeling here described will see that it is not meaningless to speak of present religious faith as conquering future death.

by present love and faith. "Whatever seeming calamity happens to you," says Law,<sup>1</sup> "if you thank and praise God for it, you turn it into a blessing. Could you therefore work miracles, you could not do more for yourself than by this thankful spirit." These words, if taken seriously, assign at least as high a religious value to the internal as to the external miracle.

And thus it will be seen that the new tendencies in theology—if what has been said has represented them truly—are not alien from certain well-known types of devotional feeling. "Jesus Christ," says the opening line of a Revivalist hymn, "is all I want." It is obvious that men who use such language as this are speaking, not of the Christ of history as such, but of the Christ of present experience. They are making implicitly a distinction similar to that of M. Loisy between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith, between the Christ who is "in space and time" and the Christ who is ever present to those who pray and live in His name. In a Christian household—it is sometimes said—Christ should be the "unseen guest at every meal." This does not mean that Christ is an imaginary figure with whom the Christian holds imaginary colloquies. To those who know this type of piety from personal observation it is clear that the "Christ of faith" is no creature of fancy, but a serious factor in rational life. And the man who, in the strength of such faith, can say that he does not need to look for happiness to the glories of Heaven, because in present union with Christ he finds perfect peace, occupies a position curiously close to that of writers whose way of expressing themselves is very different from his. "The man," says Mr Bradley,<sup>2</sup> "who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness, seeks he does not know what. Dissatisfied with the reality of man and God as he finds them there in experience, he may be invited to state intelligibly what in the end would content him. For God and man, as two sensible existences, would be degraded beyond recognition. The God who could exist would assuredly be no

<sup>1</sup> *Serious Call*, chap. xv.

<sup>2</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 448.

God." The Revivalist hymn-writer and the Idealist philosopher are at least at one in this, that they are not dissatisfied with the reality of man and God as they find them in experience—that their chief aim in dealing with experience is not to fill up its gaps, but to approach it in the right mental attitude.

Enough then, perhaps, has been said to show one way at least in which we may explain ourselves to those who fancy that recent thought has a tendency towards "Nestorianism." It is not in its religious estimate of Jesus, but rather in its metaphysical conception of God and the world, that the new theology differs from the old. Indeed, even the most agnostic views as to the origin of the world are not necessarily inconsistent with a Christian estimate of Christ. However the world was made, Christ for the Christian has at any rate made all things new, and this may well seem a greater miracle than the original creation. There are those, indeed, to whom it does not seem so plain a title to divine honour to have created the world as to have lived the life recorded in the Gospels. There are those to whom the belief in Christ's Godhead is based solely upon the fact of experience that, among the great men who have taught us and inspired us, He stands alone in having saved us. There are those who, quite apart from any theory as to His relation to the Creator, have felt that it is attachment to Him which alone has made their lives of value. If anyone wrote of Plato as Mr Matthew Arnold has written of Christ, we should say, and say rightly, that he had "made a God" of Plato. It ought to be clearly recognised that a type of thought which "makes a God" of Jesus Christ cannot justly be called un-Christian.

It is evident, then, that the lesson taught by our new teachers must have an important bearing upon popular religious conceptions and upon religious practice. Its chief effect will be to deliver us from the error of identifying religion with belief in the supernatural, an error of which it is not difficult to see the pernicious consequences. Unless we go

through life with closed eyes, we cannot but notice how very many men there are who are prevented from seeking salvation through Christ by a purely intellectual obstacle—namely, by the fact that they have always taken for granted that except to the believer in miracle the notion of salvation through Christ must be unmeaning.

It does not follow, however, because religion and the belief in the supernatural are not one and the same thing, that therefore belief in the supernatural has no place in religion at all. And it is probable that the theologian of the traditional type will always seem to the popular critic to be on strong ground when he insists that there are two subjects, namely, Miracles and the Personality of God, on which the teachers of the newer school have not said the last word. It is at least worth while to consider whether the popular critic, if this is his view, may not turn out to be right.

Of these two subjects it is the former which leads to the keener controversy, not because it is felt to be the more important, but because in the case of miracles the difference between the opposing views is more readily grasped. In this discussion, indeed, no less an interest appears to be at stake than the hope of Heaven. A Heaven, in the usual sense of the word, can hardly be conceived except as one continued violation of the natural laws with which we are acquainted; and—in spite of all that may be said by men of science—it is likely that, whatever view popular religion may come to take with regard to the recorded miracles of the past, it will stubbornly refuse to abandon its faith in this great miracle of the future.

The world, as ordinary experience shows it, may be compared—if we revert for a moment to the comparison already employed—to an unfinished picture, a picture which incompletely realises the ideal which has given it birth. The chief merit of the man of taste is that he can discover the ideal even in an imperfect embodiment. But at the same time he would not be without interest in seeing the picture completed. Similarly, we might argue, though the chief

function of religion is to interpret in the light of Christian conceptions the world as we have it, it cannot be a matter of indifference to us to learn whether the world can be expected to embody the Christian ideal in completeness or not. The belief in Miracles, in Heaven, in an Atonement—regarded popularly as the washing away of the stain left upon the world by past evil—are beliefs by which religion seeks to justify its conviction that of the world seen as a whole it can be truly said, "Behold, it is very good." Whatever may be the ultimate truth about Space and Time, to the imagination at any rate these are indispensable forms. If imagination is to present to us a picture of the world at all, it is as a world existing in Space and Time that it must be presented; and before the ordinary modern man there stand, in fact, two alternative pictures. On the one hand there is the world regarded as the series of events presented to us by popularised science and secular history; on the other hand there is the world as it is represented by traditional religion, a world consisting of this same series of natural and historical facts, with certain supernatural additions. We can hardly be without interest in inquiring which of these two pictures comes nearest to the truth. The "Time-and-Space World" is not one department of the world among others; it is the whole world regarded as existing under these forms. That this is not a final or self-consistent way of regarding reality is one of the great lessons of Idealist philosophy, and is implied in all that has been said above. But so long as we take Space and Time on their own terms, they must be thought of as including everything which exists. And it is on their own terms that we do, as a matter of fact, take them during at least nine-tenths of our lives. Therefore to get the truest representation of reality which the forms of Space and Time will admit, and to decide between the two alternative pictures of the world already described, is of real importance to us.

And does it not become plain that the total rejection of miracle will here lead us into considerable difficulties? In

thinking of the world under the form of Time, must it not be the natural inclination of the religious man to look forward to that "realised dominion of the good" which Professor Harnack speaks of as the "goal"? But is there the slightest reason to think that we are being conducted to any such goal by the unimpeded working of natural laws? How, for example, apart from physical miracle, can human life rid itself of one of its most conspicuous blemishes—that accompaniment of physical foulness which civilisation is always seeking to hide but can never remove? It is only those who are without sensitiveness in regard to what is physically loathsome who can fail to see how pitifully civilisation—with its increasing need of the sanitary engineer—comes short of that "realised dominion of the good" which we desire. It is surely true to say that without a physical, as well as a moral, remaking of man the triumph of the Christian ideal will not have been attained.

It must, however, be recognised that, in spite of all arguments of this kind, there is a vast number of modern men to whom the belief in physical miracle is a thing absolutely impossible. Controversy on this question must for many a long year divide the religious world. But though we cannot expect that the two parties will readily come to agreement, we may at least ask that they shall learn to understand one another's position. On the one hand, it ought to be recognised that belief in miracles may be defended on other grounds than those which rest on mere unintelligent attachment to traditional doctrines. On the other hand, it ought to be freely admitted that belief in miracles is no necessary part of a vigorous Christian life. It is surely not too much to say that the man who in modern days, and in light of modern distinctions, regards the outward bodily miracle as the basis of his religion, gives us good ground to suspect that the inward miracle of grace has not yet come within the range of his experience.

CHARLES J. SHEBBEARE.

# THE JOHANNINE PROBLEM.<sup>1</sup>

## III. INDIRECT INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

### *Concluding Article.*

[The two preceding Articles will be found in *The Hibbert Journal*, April 1903 and January 1904, vol. i. p. 510 and vol. ii. p. 323 respectively.]

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THE preceding article, devoted to the direct evidence of Rev. i. 1, 4, 9, xxii. 8, and Jn. xxi. 24, has shown that both editors claim authorship *for the Apostle*. The former presents his compilation of Palestinian prophecies as visions given the Apostle while temporarily in Patmos for "the churches of Asia." The latter seemingly conceives the gospel he edits as written in Palestine—a view adopted by the Muratorianum, and in harmony with the earlier second-century authorities, who look upon Palestine as the home of apostolic tradition. The later "Asiatic" view finds its first outspoken champion in Irenæus, who fully recognises, whether from internal evidence or by authentic tradition, that the X literature was written "to refute the error of Cerinthus," and is necessarily of Asiatic provenance. To admit the claim of the appendix, it therefore becomes needful to understand verse 24 as applying to Proconsular Asia. For this view there was a twofold basis: (1)

<sup>1</sup> In order to enlarge the space for the text of the article, the copious footnotes of the author have, with his consent, been withheld.

the pseudonymous claim of Revelation ; (2) the testimony of Polycarp in the earlier Quartodeciman controversy to have had intercourse "with John and other Apostles." Accordingly, Irenæus transfers the entire Palestinian group of "Apostles and elders, the disciples of these," referred to by Papias as his authority, to Asia, and assumes that both Papias and Polycarp were in constant intercourse with them in Asia. The one interpretation of the appendix involves the improbability of a Palestinian provenance for the X literature ; the other has against it the conflicting claims of Revelation, and the absence of all early trace of the supposed Ephesian residence, even when limited to one Apostle.

The indirect evidence of Revelation, unwillingly betraying its composite character and artificial adaptation to circulation at a later date and in another atmosphere from that for which its visions were first intended, rightly outweighs with most critics even the emphatic assertions of its editor regarding its origin in Patmos. For similar reasons the indirect internal evidence of the Epistles and Gospel is admitted on both sides to be the decisive factor in the Johannine problem. The four writings are at least from the same school, if not from the same pen ; in fact, such infinitesimal differences in style and doctrinal standpoint as are pointed to by a few ultra-critical scholars are quite explicable from the fact that the Gospel has undergone at least one editorial revision. To this evidence of Gospel and Epistles we must now give our attention.

The most obvious data as to authorship are those derivable from the Epistles, for these are at least written in the first person, and apparently without intentional veiling of the author's identity. He was an "elder" in both senses of the word ; for the reference to Gaius as among his "children" (3 Jn. 4), and the general address "my little children," would be grotesque in a young man. The official sense is implied in the superscriptions (2 Jn. i, 3 Jn. i), the "commendation" of the itinerant evangelists (3 Jn. 5-8) and the salutations to and from churches (2 Jn. i. 13). In fact, we have a curious parallel

between this group—(1) a personal note to Gaius, (2) a letter to the church directly or indirectly known to the writer (the same apparently to which Gaius belongs), (3) a “general epistle” somewhat in the nature of an encyclical—and the group written by Paul to the same region.

The internal evidence of the Johannine Epistles is as clear as tradition itself that they were written “concerning them that would lead you astray.” The heretics hold to a Christ who “comes by water (of the baptism) only, and not by water and blood” (of the crucifixion). They deny “that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh”; they profess a love for and knowledge of God that in practice is divorced from the law of pure morality and self-denying service to brethren. There is no good reason to question the verdict of both ancient and modern times, which finds here the Docetic heresy of Asia made famous by the name of Cerinthus, and more fully known to us through the violent opposition of Ignatius and the occasional references of Polycarp and Papias. Our author, in a passage echoed by Polycarp, identifies it with “Antichrist, that was to come in the last days,” accompanied by his “false prophets,” herein rationalising on the older apocalyptic eschatology. A further trace of his official station and relation to the conflict in progress appears in the note to Gaius, when he speaks of coming to regulate affairs in the church, whose controlling authority, Diotrephes, not only rejects his messengers, and scorns his letter (1 John ?), but “prates against” the Elder himself “with wicked words.” Not even 1 Jn. i. 1-3, however, indicates that he was an Apostle, or a personal disciple of Jesus.

It is the object of the writer to oppose the “false prophets who are gone out into the world” with a true “witness,” in which he seeks the participation (*κοινωνία*) of his readers (i. 1-4). At first he speaks in behalf of a body of teachers, who perpetuate the historic tradition of the concrete, tangible, human reality of the incarnate Logos, and who transmit his “new commandment.” From iv. 12 on, the whole body of those who are conscious of the abiding presence of God and

the gift of the Spirit are associated with the writer and his fellow-presbyters in their "witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." Thus *the Church* in its continuous life becomes the true "witness of Messiah" against the Antichrist, (1) by its unbroken historic tradition (i. 1-3, iv. 14), (2) by the abiding inner witness of the Spirit (iv. 15-16, v. 7-12). The conclusive evidence that the body of witnesses to the historic, human reality of the manifestation of the Logos spoken of in 1 Jn. i. 1-3, is not limited to such as could boast of personal intercourse with Jesus is the parallel reference to the incarnation of the Logos in the Gospel, i. 12-16, where it would be absurd to interpret "tabernacled among us" as "among the Twelve Apostles," even if verse 16 did not similarly make witnesses of all who have shared in his "fulness of grace and truth." The "we" of 1 Jn. i. 1-3 must therefore be measured by that of Jn. i. 12-16, where it can only mean "as many as received him," the spiritually begotten Israel of God, in contrast with οἱ ἰδιῶι that "received him not."

But it is argued that a personality of such commanding ability as to produce these sublime writings, even if not of apostolic rank, at least could not remain unknown. It is indeed true that we have here a masterful mind, one whose very simplicity is the best evidence of its greatness. With wonderful precision the subtleties of Gnostic sophistry are penetrated, and the heart of the error laid bare. The essence of the Christian revelation is made to be participation in the divine nature; but the participation is by virtue not of the intellectual but of the moral nature; "for God is love, and whosoever loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God." Obedience to the "new commandment" of Jesus is therefore the true gnosis. The false is revealed by its moral laxity. Yet this reversion to the historic Christ and "the word handed down from the beginning," so characteristic of the age, is by no means forgetful of Paul. On the contrary, this emphasising of "love which builds up" against "gnosis which only puffs

up" is the burden of Paul's every letter. The Gospel is, as in James and the second-century literature, a *nova lex*; but our author is even more pronounced than Paul in making sonship a matter not of the imitation of God (Mt. v. 45), but of being "begotten of God," by "having in us the mind that was in Christ Jesus" (Phil. ii. 1-13). Moreover, if there is a harking back to the historic tradition, it is, as with Paul, far from a mere matter of remembered words and rules and deeds of Jesus, but an interpretation of the great spiritual principles revealed in the divine life. No praise can be too high for the admirable poise and delicacy with which the true *via media* is defined by this master mind between ethics and mysticism, and the spiritual universalism of Paul firmly knit to the historic tradition of the mother church. If to move with such poise and power over all the heights of the philosophy of religion, sweeping the horizon of both Greek and Hebrew thought, discriminating the heart of true Paulinism from the mists and subtleties of pseudo-Pauline theosophy—if this be the mark of one of the original Twelve, then beyond question the X literature is apostolic, no matter what difficulties stand in the way of the Ephesian residence. But such was certainly not the case when Paul secured immunity for his gospel of the uncircumcision from "James and Peter and John, those that were<sup>1</sup> esteemed to be pillars"; for he won it only after a struggle, and on the express stipulation that he should keep to the Gentiles, and they to the circumcision. These characteristics are far from those of the fishermen sons of Zebedee in synoptic story, where every instance of their separate appearance suggests less of broad-minded tolerance, less emancipation from the narrow exclusiveness of Jewish provincialism, than in Peter himself. Nor can we call these natural characteristics to expect from an unlettered Galilean fisherman, almost, if not wholly, ignorant of Greek, removed to unfamiliar surroundings, and now approaching one hundred years of age!

Or is the argument from exclusion simply a challenge to mention some possible Ephesian author besides the Apostle

John? One might easily demand in return the naming of an author for Hebrews. But for purposes of illustration the challenge may be accepted. Justin Martyr was converted at Ephesus at about this date by "a certain old man, by no means contemptible in appearance, exhibiting meek and venerable manners," who proved to be not only familiar with Plato, but a past master of the Socratic method. This venerable man convinced the young truth-seeker that "the philosophers cannot judge correctly about God, or speak any truth, when they have no knowledge of him, *having neither seen him at any time nor heard him*; but that Christianity possesses a knowledge that "those who appear worthy of God *shall never die*"; a knowledge guaranteed by the revelation of God in Christ as a life-giving spirit sent by God as foretold by the prophets. He urged him also to be rather a "*lover of deeds and truth than of words*" (*φιλολόγος*). Justin had not seen this Christian philosopher since, but "whilst revolving his words in mind found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable."

Let the author of the X literature be conceived as this nameless Christian elder and philosopher of Ephesus. The attributes implied by such authorship will comport as well, to say the least, with what we know of him, as with what we know of the son of Zebedee.

The nameless "elder," whoever he was, would seem to have been of Jewish birth, like most of the early teachers of the Church. This we might infer from the slightly Semitic style of his Greek, and the designation "Gentiles" applied to unbelievers in 3 Jn. 7. The Gospel makes it probable that he had visited Jerusalem, Jacob's Well, and other sacred sites, also that he is in command of certain gospel material not employed by the Synoptists, which sometimes supplements, corrects, and explains their narrative. The question is whether these occasional superiorities are not merely what ought to be expected of any intelligent writer, in an age when many had "taken in hand to draw up narratives" of the gospel story, and could draw from the still copious stream of oral and written

tradition. For there are also undeniable inferiorities in point of really historical representation which may well make it impossible to attribute the general picture to an eye-witness. We must study, therefore, the general view-point and character of this gospel.

First-century testimony reveals to us as the two types of gospel recognised in Palestine: (1) compilations of the Lord's teachings (*συντάξεις τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων*), of which Matthew's was the accepted standard; (2) continuous narratives (*διηγήσεις*, Lk. i. 1) of Jesus' career, including "both what he did and taught" (*Acts i. 1, ποιεῖν τὲ καὶ διδάσκειν*; cf. Papias, *ἡ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα*). In this latter field the Gospel of Mark was accepted, though with considerable qualifications. The field of each type of gospel is apparent. For the home field catechetical training in the teaching of "the Way" would be required. Where the story of the Nazarene Messiah was unknown, or his claims not admitted, the story must be so told as to present and prove them. Instruction in the "teaching" could be subordinated. The beginnings of such a missionary gospel already appear in what has justly been called the "short compendium of Mark" in Acts x. 36-41. The catechist's gospel was the *Logia* of Matthew; the "apostles'," evangelists', and apologists' was the "preaching of Peter," as embodied in Mark. But we have even better evidence for a third type of gospel, wholly disregarded by the Palestinian witnesses, and at first having no representative embodiment. It is that which attached no importance to the earthly career of Jesus, except in so far as it illustrated the great principles of the faith, but bent all its energies toward interpreting the significance of his person as the "spiritual man from heaven," "Christ the Wisdom of God and the Power of God." This was the gospel of Paul, almost incredibly disregarding of the particular sayings and doings of Jesus, but more than atoning for it by the tremendous emphasis put upon the Christ, whom it presented as the pre-existent Logos, who humbled himself and took on him the form of a servant, became obedient even unto the death of

the cross, and for this had been exalted even to the throne of God himself. What this Pauline, spiritual gospel could become in the Gentile world is illustrated in the perverted form by Docetism, with its fantastic incarnation literature, most characteristically of all in Marcion's mutilated travesty of Luke, which began, "God came down to Capernaum, a city of Galilee," etc. (Lk. iv. 31). What the Pauline Logos-gospel could become in its *true* development is illustrated in our Fourth Gospel. But he who looks in it for historical accuracy will be justly disappointed; for its aim is simply to *interpret* the career of the historic Jesus in the light of its own doctrine of the Incarnation as expressed in the prologue. The distortions are admittedly such as must naturally ensue when the synoptic story, innocent of any notion of pre-existence, introducing Jesus' public career as a resumption of the interrupted work of the imprisoned prophet, and leading by degrees to the final recognition by the Twelve of a higher calling for their Master, is recast in the light of the doctrine of the atonement, and the Pauline Christology. Thus the Vocation to the Messiahship which opens the older story (Mk. i. 1-13) is replaced by a condensed outline of the theory of the Incarnation of the Logos (Jn. i. 1-18). It is inconceivable that the incarnate Logos should require a revelation of his own calling; hence the baptismal vision is transferred to the Baptist, who becomes thus divinely entrusted with his "witness to Israel." The Baptist's own work loses every trace of independent significance. He is not Elias. His baptism is not "of repentance unto remission of sins." It is expressly contrasted with the atonement of "the Lamb of God," which does "take away the sin of the world." The rite is purely and simply a prefiguration of the approaching "baptism of the Spirit." John borrows the symbol from Christianity, not *vice versa*. He resists all attempts to give to his mission any independent significance, to his baptism any other value or meaning than simply that the atoning Lamb "should be made manifest to Israel" (Jn. i. 19-36, iii. 22-30).

Jesus' earliest disciples are drawn to him by the testimony, which they verify for themselves, that this is the Messiah, *in the sense of "the Son of God," the atoning "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world."* The next receive evidence from Jesus that he possesses that insight into the hidden recesses of the heart which characterises the Logos, and an assurance of future experience of the Son of man as mediator of all heavenly powers, which in this gospel takes the place of the apocalyptic promise at the Confession of Peter, i. 31-51. The belief of the disciples is confirmed by a miracle symbolical of the superseding of the water of "the Jews' manner of purifying" by the sacramental wine provided when Jesus' "hour is come," ii. 1-11.

It remains that the Messiah thus revealed to "his disciples" should offer himself to Israel. Hence the historic appeal to Israel by cleansing the temple. In synoptic story this precipitates the final scene of the drama; for it is on the one side a gage of battle to the unfaithful husbandmen in control of God's vineyard, on the other a rallying token to the right-minded in Israel. It is the Reformer's *coup d'état*, and belongs at the climax, when Jesus at the Passover at last avows openly his Messianic claims and purpose. The ante-dating of this avowal in the Fourth Gospel carries with it this connected scene, though its historical consequences fail to appear. Its logical position must now be at the very outset, although the utterance around which it centres, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will build it again," still betrays its relation to the passion story. According to Jn. ii. 21, Jesus gave this as an enigmatic prediction of his resurrection, the Sign of the Son of man, ii. 12-22.

From this point on the account of the public ministry (Jn. iii.-xii.) consists of a series of argumentative and expository dialogues, whose usual starting-point is a sign (*σημείον*) or symbolic act of supernatural power, the scene, with slight exceptions, being the "feasts of the Jews" at Jerusalem.

The exceptions are: (i.) iii. 22-30, properly a continuation

of i. 19-51. (ii.) iv. 1-45, a Samaritan Ministry, which for this gospel takes the place of the Gentile Mission of Mk. vii. 24-viii. 27. In the dialogue Jesus presents "the gift of God," the outpoured Spirit, superseding local cults by "access for Jew and Gentile in one Spirit unto the Father." (iii.) iv. 46-54, a healing word of power at Cana, the scene of the first "sign" and (according to the appendix, xxi. 2) the home of "Nathaniel." (iv.) For the first time we reach in chapter vi. a point of coincidence with the Markan outline. The Feeding of the Multitude and Walking on the Sea (on occasion of Passover) become here the text for an interpretation of the sacrament as betokening victory over death.

The rest of the public ministry takes place at four feasts in Jerusalem. Chapter v. contains a dialogue on the Authority of the Son of Man which begins with a Healing on the Sabbath, and is continued, as if without break, in vii. 15-24. It covers the same doctrinal ground as the section of Mark (ii. 1-iii. 6) introduced by a similar healing, and from its relation of the authority of Moses to Jesus (v. 45-47, vii. 19-24) shows the unnamed "feast" to be Pentecost, the Feast of the Giving of the Law.

The ensuing dialogues are as follows: (1) Tabernacles (signalised by the rite of water-pouring) in chapter vii., perhaps originally divided into two parts (*cf.* vii. 14, ἡδὴ τῆς ἑορτῆς μεσοῦσης), (a) Jesus' offer of himself in Samaria as giver of the Living Water (iv. 4-42), and (b) to rulers (iii. 1-21) and people (vii. 37-39) in Jerusalem. (2) Dedication, or the "Feast of Lights," wherein Jesus, after healing a blind man, offers himself as "the Light of the World" (viii. 12-x. 42). The colloquy with the Pharisees includes an elaboration of the doctrine of spiritual birth of the prologue (i. 12-16; *cf.* iii. 5-8), developing Paul's doctrine of the Spiritual Seed of Abraham (viii. 31-44; *cf.* Gal. iii. 9, 26-29, iv. 21-31); also the parable or allegory of the Good Shepherd, based on Ezek. xxxiv., in line with Mk. x. 42-45. (3) Passover (Redemption from death), introduced by the raising of Lazarus, when Jesus, after an

anointing of double sense, both royal and sepulchral (xii. 1-8), presents himself to Jerusalem as "the King of Israel" (verses 12-16), but to the request of the Greeks answers with the Pauline-Ignatian doctrine of the cross as the *μηχανή τῆς σωτηρίας*, uplifting the whole redeemed race into a participation in the passion and resurrection of the Son of man (xi.-xii.).

The second half of the final visitation of Jerusalem forms the concluding section of the Gospel: (1) A prolonged Farewell Discourse to the Twelve, introduced by the rite of foot-washing (which in this gospel takes the place of the synoptic Lord's supper), and concluded by the High-priestly Prayer, replacing that of Gethsemane (xiii.-xvii.). (2) The sacrifice, coincidentally with the paschal lambs, of the Lamb of God (xviii.-xix.), and his resurrection (xx.).

The discourse develops the theme of mutually ministrant love as the "bond of perfectness." The Pauline doctrine of the *unio mystica* is set forth under the symbol of "the True Vine," which the sacramental prayer of *Διδαχή*, "We thank thee, Father, for the holy vine of thy servant David" (*i.e.* the vine of Ps. lxxx. 8-19), now proves to be the Church, as "the Israel of God," the "body of Christ." It continues in the line of Lk. xxii. 35-38, Mt. x. 16-25a, giving the "new commandment," xv. 9-14, the warning of persecution and promise of the Paraclete, xv. 15-xvi., and an assurance of divine help and victory, c. xiv. The prayer for the unity of the Church in Christ "to the praise of the divine glory" (ch. xvii.), echoes repeatedly that of Paul in Eph. i. 3-14.

The story of the passion lays special stress on the voluntary nature of Jesus' self-offering, xviii. 1-11; the spiritual character of his kingdom, 28-40; the repeated rejection of Jesus by the Jews when offered to them as "your king," xix. 1-22; and fulfilments of scripture demonstrating the need and, above all, the historical reality of the suffering and death of Christ, 23-42.

The resurrection story of chapter xx. follows a purely Jerusalem type, apparently the same represented in Mk. xvi.

9-20 and in Celsus, and excludes even more completely than Luke the Galilean form represented in the appendix (c. xxi.), by overcoming all doubts, excluding in particular Docetic conceptions of a phantasmal resurrection body, and bestowing the Great Commission and endowment with the Holy Ghost, xx. 21-23. The return to Galilee, resumption of the old occupation by the disciples, and new overcoming of doubts, and special commission of Peter and John by Jesus (chapter xxi.), are fundamentally incompatible with this.

It is admitted by such advocates of Johannine authorship as Luthardt and Sanday, that this representation of Jesus' career is highly subjective, and idealised in a degree difficult, at least for moderns, to impute to an actual eye-witness. These successive great discourses, all revolving around the religious significance of the person of Christ and the Pauline doctrines of the new birth from the Spirit in baptism, access for Jew and Gentile in one Spirit unto the Father, the Law as merely a witness to Christ, the sacrament as spiritual food, etc., have no resemblance to the synoptic teaching of Jesus. They are *per contra* identical in style with the three Epistles. Intelligent comparison involves at once the admission that we have here an *interpretation* of Christian doctrine placed in the mouth of Jesus, but embodying the Pauline Christology. In short, it is the incarnate Logos who speaks, revealing the nature and significance of his mission, offering himself successively in Galilee, Samaria, and Judæa. Certain transpositions of the material of this gospel appear to have occurred at some period of its history, which have been variously explained by Hitzig, Bertling, Norris, Spitta, Wendt, Blass, Burton, and others.

Space limitations quite forbid argument on this question, yet even without the admission of transposition the general structure of the Gospel will be admitted to reflect substantially the following plan :—

i. Baptism of John. Galilean [and Samaritan] Ministry. At PASSOVER, the Feast of *Unleavened Bread*, Christ offers

himself as the *Bread of Life*, cc. i.-vi. [i. 6-8 transposed from after 18; 15 secondary; ii. 1-22 secondary; ii. 23-iii. 21 transposed from after vii. 30 (so Tatian); iii. 31-36 from after iii. 10; iv. 4-42 from after vii. 10 (Tatian), 43-54 retouched; c. v. transposed from after c. vi. (Tatian)].

ii. Judæan Ministry, consisting of three visitations of Jerusalem, corresponding to the three to the barren fig-tree of Lk. xiii. 6-9, cc. vii.-xii.

(1) At PENTECOST, the Feast of the *Giving of the Law*, Jesus offers himself as *Giver of the Higher Law*, c. v. and vii. 15-24.

(2) At TABERNACLES, the Feast of *Water-drawing*, he offers himself as *Giver of the Water of Life*, c. vii. [except 15-24. After verse 10 add iv. 4-42; after 30, ii. 23 (retouched)-iii. 10, 31-36, 11-21; vii. 37-44 transposed from after 52].

(3) At DEDICATION, the Feast of *Lights*, he offers himself as the *Light of the World*, cc. viii.-x. [Transposed from the order x. 22-25, 7, 8 (retouched), 10-18, 26-39; ix. 1-x. 5, 9, 6, 19-21; viii. 12-59; x. 40-42.]

iii. Final Visitation. PASSOVER, Feast of the *Slain Lamb*. Christ comes to Zion as her King, cc. xi.-xx.

(1) The Prince of Life manifested and conspired against by the rulers (c. xi.); anointed; welcomed as King; revealed as Saviour of the Race; rejected by the Jews, c. xii. [Verses 1-19, 42-50 transposed from after 36a].

(2) Among "his own," cc. xiii.-xvii. [xiii. 16, 20, 36-38 secondary; c. xiv. after c. xvi.].

(3) Sacrifice of the "*Lamb of God*," and Resurrection, cc. xviii.-xx. [xviii. 15-18, 25-27 and c. xxi. secondary; xviii. 24 after 13 (so Syr<sup>sin</sup>)].

With or without the proposed restorations of material regarded as transposed, the above outline of Jesus' career clearly schematises the self-manifestation of the Logos in full accord with the theoretic standpoint of the prologue and in relation to the Jewish feasts.

It must fall within the range of conceivability that an intimate personal follower of Jesus should, after the lapse of some sixty years, present this subjective portrait instead of the rich materials derivable from the storehouse of his own memory; for a scholar of no less eminence than H. H. Wendt, while rejecting the narrative framework, can deliberately accept the discourse material of the Fourth Gospel as representing for substance the actual testimony and writing of John. And certainly the position of those who admit an intentional idealisation is far stronger than that of those who attempt at all costs to reconcile this representation of Jesus' teaching with the synoptic. But this preference of the evangelist for his own elaborations of themes drawn from the Pauline mysticism, this substitution of seven allegorical "I am's" for the parables, and dialectic expositions of the Logos doctrine for Jesus' call of publicans and sinners to repentance and forgiveness, is extraordinary in one who professes, with apparent sincerity, to be bent on delivering "the message which ye heard from the beginning."

But the works of the Christ are schematised in correspondence with the discourses, and are equally irreconcilable with synoptic representations. In John "the beginning of his signs" is a prodigy at Cana, which, even if we decline to add to it the Healing of the Nobleman's Son, as both preceding Mk. i. 14, makes the synoptic account of the beginnings at Capernaum in a simple exorcism insignificant, and the amazement of the witnesses incredible. The seven successive and symbolic demonstrations of power culminate in the raising of Lazarus, which is made the immediate occasion of the final tragedy, xi. 45-53. For this superlatively dramatic scene of the incarnate "Life" standing before the open sepulchre and, in the presence of a "multitude from Jerusalem" and round about, commanding the four days' dead to "Come forth," the Synoptists have simply the healing of a blind man, who hails Jesus as "Son of David" and "follows him in the way." It is equally difficult to explain how they could be ignorant of a

scene so indissociable from the final tragedy, in which all the Twelve participated; or how they could pass over unmentioned so prodigious a demonstration of divine power.

But it is not merely the general scheme of the "signs" which is irreconcilable with synoptic story, but their intrinsic character. The most typical miracle of all, exorcism, which had given rise to charges of collusion with Beelzebub, disappears altogether. Instead of healings drawn from Jesus when entreaties overcame his reluctance, and compassion yielded what foresight of the resulting importunities moved him to deny, we have "manifestations of the glory" of the Logos, not only volunteered, but deliberately enhanced in difficulty to overwhelm cavil. Requests for miracle in the Fourth Gospel are rebuked. Even the question to Philip "Whence are we to buy bread?" was only put "to prove him; for he himself knew what he would do." And he had already determined to do it when "he lifted up his eyes and *saw a great multitude coming unto him,*" without any evidence of need. In their character the miracles disregard the limitation Jesus put upon all wonder-working faith, viz., that it must not "tempt God," but accept the manifestation of his will in the ordinary course of nature. If the Synoptists sometimes fail to recognise this distinction between wonder-working faith and thaumaturgy, the fourth evangelist does so systematically. Jesus counted it to be tempting God to defy gravitation, and self-exaltation to turn stones to bread; but the Logos-Christ not only walks on the sea, but turns water to wine just to show his power. Even when he seems to be seeking the power for some exceptional marvel from God, the prayer(?) is not real, but only "because of the multitude which standeth around" (xi. 40-42).

In spite of the manifest effort to present the reality of Jesus' humanity, the unreality is glaring. The inconsistency of the Son of God being betrayed by a disciple whose wicked intent he had failed to fathom, and of his being unable to overcome the petty power which took his life, had been held up to ridicule

already by the predecessors of Celsus. It is met in this gospel by the transformation of the rebuke to Simon, "Get thee behind me, Satan," into a declaration of Jesus that he had knowingly chosen one of the Twelve as "a devil," the evangelist explaining that "he spake of Judas the son of Simon." Not only does Jesus choose Judas for the purpose of betrayal, but forces him to the Satanic mission (xiii. 26-30). His unwilling captors too must be spurred on by him to their task. The whole Roman cohort, when he said, "I am he," "went backward and fell to the ground." Jesus quells resistance and compels them to take him (xviii. 1-11). Pilate's reluctance is met by Jesus' assurance that the greater blame rests on another. Certainly no room is left to doubt that "no man taketh his life from him," that he has "power to lay it down and to take it again"; but what becomes of the Jesus of Gethsemane? Has not the evangelist, in spite of himself, given us a mere semblance of real human life, wrestling for light and faith? Let that scene be answer which takes the place of Transfiguration and Gethsemane in one, xii. 23-33. The soul of the Logos-Christ himself is for a moment "troubled" at the vision of his "hour." He comes to the verge of the prayer, "Father, save me from this hour," but he does *not* utter it. Only, "Father, glorify thy name." And the Voice of the Transfiguration, and ministrant angel of Gethsemane, are explained together in the sense of xi. 42 as "a voice which came not for my sake, but for your sakes." Even the agony of prayer "with strong crying and tears unto Him who could deliver him from death" has become an unreality!

It is our admission that in face of a conception of Jesus as simply the incarnate Logos, "tabernacling" among men, fully conscious of "the glory which he had with the Father before the world was," of his very message as "things which he heard and saw in heaven with the Father," of his purpose from the beginning as the atoning death, the synoptic representation *must* be transformed. And there are those who can believe that the developed Pauline Christology and atonement doctrine might so affect one of the Twelve, in extreme old age,

as to produce this transformation in his conception of the Master's life. But an almost equal unreality and historical contradiction affects the purely human characters. Judas is no longer man, but devil incarnate. Even the murmuring of the Twelve at the waste of ointment is transferred to his shoulders and the motive made actual theft. Peter and John are informed in so many words of the purposed betrayal, but lift not a finger to interpose. All the disciples, in fact, are assumed to recognise in Jesus, from a period long before his Galilean ministry, not only "the Messiah" (i. 41) foretold by "Moses and the prophets" (i. 45), but the "Lamb of God" that atones for "the sin of the world" (i. 29, 35). The contradiction herein implied to Mt. xvi. 13-23 is generally recognised, and this is, of course, more reasonable than the harmonistic device which asserts that Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi imputed Messiahship *in a higher sense than here!* But it must be admitted that the antedating by one of the Twelve of his own and their perception of Jesus as Messiah, in the sense here meant, stands on a different footing from a theoretical presentation of the life and teaching of Jesus in the light of the Logos doctrine.

But there is one character more prominent in this gospel than in any other. Even Zahn admits the essential justice of Baldensperger's observations, renewing those of Michaelis, that our evangelist has a special interest in rectifying exaggerated conceptions of the Baptist, and showing that if in some sense Jesus did "come after him," nevertheless he was infinitely "preferred before him," because (as pre-existent) he really "was before him" (*πρωτός μου*). Hence the elaborate pains taken to define the nature of John's baptism and *μαρτυρία* (i. 6-8, 15, 19-34), and to relate how he pointed his disciples to Jesus as the only true baptiser and procurer of forgiveness, the Bridegroom of Eph. v. 25-29, who purifies his own Bride, i. 35 f., iii. 22-30. John the son of Zebedee himself, according to this gospel, was foremost among those who thus became the first followers of the Christ through the testimony of

their former master, the Baptist. As he preceded Peter in the intimacy and confidence of Jesus (xiii. 22-26), and in the new founding of the Church through faith in the resurrection (xx. 1-10), so even in original discipleship (i. 35-42). John's account of the work and teaching of the Baptist should therefore be, on every consideration, accurate and just. But that of the Fourth Gospel is opposed not only to the historical probabilities and the testimony of Josephus, but to the most ancient and unimpeachable of all authorities, the repeated and undisputed references of Jesus himself. These are thoroughly in agreement with the representations of Lk. iii. 7-17, Mt. iii. 1-12, and the Baptist's own followers in Acts xix. 1-4, according to which John's teaching was not a pointing to Jesus as the Lamb of God and baptiser with the Holy Ghost, but an exhortation to repentance and warning of the impending judgment, when the "Messenger of the Covenant" should come with his baptism of fire (Mal. iii. 1-5). The "Johannine" representation stands at a much further stage of advance along the same road our Mark is already treading, when he transforms the mere "answer" of the Baptist, in Lk. iii. 15-17, into the subject of his "preaching." Momentarily diverted from his theme by questionings as to himself, the Baptist had declared the execution of the coming judgment to be in the hands of a "Stronger than he"; then returned to his original warning. This mere allusion Mark turns into the main subject of the Baptist's preaching, gives it special application to Jesus personally, and with the Baptist's antithesis of the baptism of water *vs.* the baptism of fire, conflates a promise *made by Jesus* (Acts i. 5, xi. 16) "John baptised with water (*cf.* Acts xix. 4), but ye shall be baptised with the Holy Ghost." The divergence here from the earlier conception of John's work and attitude toward Jesus is as manifest as its doctrinal motive is apparent. In the Fourth Gospel it is carried much further still.

But we must turn from these general changes in the point of view involved in the later doctrinal conceptions, passing

over the multitude of minor implications, to come at once to the question of sources.

As we have seen, the author is *not* attempting to draw from the storehouse of his own memories of Jesus, if he had them. He is elaborating for the most part the great themes of Pauline Christology and soteriology. But he admittedly uses Mark and Luke, and perhaps Matthew; and indications are not wanting that he draws, directly or indirectly, from certain uncanonical cycles of tradition, some of them known to the author of the appendix as well. What, then, is the nature of his dependence on these sources?

Luke, in omitting the Anointing in Bethany of Mk. xiv. 3-9, because it seemed to him a doublet of his own story of the Repentant Harlot, vii. 36-50, retained a trait or two to embellish this latter in verse 37 (last clause), 38 (last clause), and 46, perhaps also the name "Simon." He produced thus the extraordinary representation of an anointing of the feet (!) with precious ointment, which was then *wiped away with the woman's hair*. It is the Lucan *conflation* which serves our evangelist as the basis of his account of the Anointing in Bethany, Jn. xii. 1-7 (8?). This one illustration of the nature of his dependence on the Synoptists should serve the purpose of many in its bearing on the question of apostolic authorship.

Notoriously the reader is assumed to know synoptic story. The presuppositions of iii. 24, vi. 70, xi. 1, 2 are familiar. But we have similar presuppositions of data *not given in synoptic story, nor in any other quarter accessible to us*. The Baptist refers to a saying of which we have no record, i. 30. Nathaniel's experience, referred to in i. 48, is hopelessly lost to us; also the relation to the narrative of ii. 12, iii. 25, iv. 43-45, and many other passages. The superstition referred to in v. 7 has been restored to the text by some second-century scribe who knew the source, but the insertion v. 3 b, 4 is not genuine. In xix. 35, we have even a distinct reference to the reporter of the alleged spear-thrust, to which great importance is also attached in 1 Jn. v. 6, because of its doctrinal significance against

Docetism. But as to who the ἐκεῖνος was (or gave himself out to be) who made this report, we can only say that the guess of the author of the appendix (viz., John himself, author of the Gospel) is a very bad one, and that the story reappears in slightly different form in the spurious addition to Mt. xxvii. 49, while Rev. i. 7 employs the scripture fulfilment.

Much might be said of the already marked tendency (carried so much further in the period of the spurious gospels) away from the period illuminated by the Markan tradition into the unknown. The traditions connected with Bethany (c. xi.), with Cana and the unknown figure of Nathaniel (ii. 1-11, iv. 46-54, xxi. 2 (!)) present tempting fields for conjecture. Still more suggestive is the extraordinary phenomenon of chapter xiii., substituting a rite of foot-washing for the Lord's supper. In any other writer the suppression of this sacrament in favour of a lustration would certainly suggest the use of a Gnostic source characterised by repudiation of the memorial of the Lord's death and by a Christ coming "by water only, and not by water and by blood." So that there is some excuse even for the wild lucubrations of Kreyenbühl. In reality the attachment of the interpretation of this rite, vi. 51-58, to the narrative which commemorated the institution of the ἀγάπη (vi. 1-21) not only reflects the practice of the Church in making the sacrament follow upon the ἀγάπη, but in one sense agrees with historic tradition; for, as Lk. xxiv. 35 shows, the *special* symbolic sense attached by Jesus to the "breaking of bread" on the last supreme occasion was only an adaptation to that occasion of a practice which had been observed at least since the time of the great Galilean ἀγάπη.

But we must turn from such remoter problems of the history of this "Johannine" material to one of the gaps (if we may coin a term) which has an immediate bearing on the question of the traditional authorship.

Undeniably there is throughout the Gospel a curious "veiling" of the sons of Zebedee, particularly John, which has led advocates of the traditional authorship to talk of the

“modesty” of the author, ignoring the fact that this superficial suppression of the name is but a diaphanous veil for claims of pre-eminence, of priority in every title to religious authority over Peter in particular, which strike the follower of synoptic tradition as fairly astounding. This is a singular type of “modesty,” especially in a writer who, if anyway possible, should assure to his readers the historical trustworthiness of his report by saying, “I, John, am he that heard and saw these things.” In view of this, the most noteworthy of all the “gaps” is that implied in i. 40, 41, where we wait (but wait in vain) to hear of the call, anterior to Peter’s, of the first and “beloved disciple,” and to learn why he bears this remarkable title. The answer which I have to suggest is based upon the phenomena of the appendix, so much of which is occupied with a harmonistic balancing of the relative claims of Peter and John, and the rest with a restoration of the Galilean (Petrine) tradition, side by side with that of Jerusalem, regarding the resurrection. Adjustment is the motto of this editor. Suppose, then, that the source employed related the call of John in some such laudatory way as the spurious *Acts of John*, representing this Apostle by name as “the beloved” because specially chosen by Jesus for exceptionally intimate relations with himself. Suppose that the evangelist who used this “Johannine” source felt the same need of adjustment of this material in order to give it circulation at all in a Church fully committed to the primacy of Peter, which the writer of the appendix feels towards the work as he edits it, on the score of these conflicting claims of primacy. The result would be that the bolder and more outspoken declarations would be shorn away, leaving the underlying substance of the claims as they now appear. Conjecture is admittedly hazardous, but until some better explanation is offered of the *twofold* aspect of the case, both the making *and* the veiling of the claims, this must be accepted.

It is needless to add our protest against the Tübingen “holy-coat” miracle. The Fourth Gospel is not woven in one

piece. It would be incredible at so late a date. It is an old garment with many a patch of unfulled cloth. Only the elaborate embroidery by which the whole is overlaid makes it appear "seamless." We may never be able to separate or identify the materials, but that is not yet a reason for giving up the attempt. Fundamentally they are Palestinian.

And one factor of the long and doubtless complicated history is assured. The appendix represents an editorial hand surely distinguishable from that of the principal author, whom we have every reason to identify with the sublime "theologian" of the Epistles. Also the list of those who admit the evidence of transpositions grows longer and more formidable, and includes now even Blass, since Syr<sup>sin</sup> has cast its weight into the balance. Long ago Scholten conceded on linguistic grounds that ii. 13-22 contains an interpolation by the author of the appendix. We may now add that it is a doublet of vi. 30-35 interpreting the sign of the Son of man to be the resurrection after three days, in line with Mt. xii. 40; whereas Jn. vi. 30-35 follows Lk. xi. 30 in interpreting it as Christ himself. And if it be not interpolated from some other source, why is Jesus made to speak of God as "my Father" (ii. 16) without exciting offence, whereas in v. 17 the appellation evokes a charge of blasphemy? Both halves of ch. ii. are later appended narratives, drawn from unknown sources to supplement the self-manifestation of the Messiah in i. 35-51, but really serving, along with the transferred material of iii. 1-21, to separate it from its true sequel in iii. 22-30. A similar origin for what relates to Peter's denial in xiii. 36-38, xviii. 15-18, 25-27, unmistakably connected as it is with the appendix on the one side, and the displacements of ch. xiv. and xviii. 12-28 on the other, has been shown elsewhere. The revision seems to have aimed at adjustment to synoptic tradition, but it marks only the final stage of a process which was far from being a casting in one piece.

Our review of the indirect internal evidence of the X literature must come to a close, if not a conclusion. But however

much it may lack of cogency or definiteness on the affirmative side, it is hard to see how unbiassed minds can find in it any solid ground for the rough and ready judgment expressed by the final editor in his appendix (xxi. 24), and thenceforward canonised by tradition. We see, indeed, a desperate clinging to the traditional view, even after the admission is made that the author is using ideal conceptions rather than historical data. But that is only because there is so little appreciation of the religious value of the more critical view. Some nameless Elder-theologian of Ephesus seems a meagre substitute for the bosom Apostle, especially when the colours for his portrait are all borrowed from the literature in debate. In reality we have in the five writings of the Ephesian canon a literature which should be viewed as the exponent of the life of one great branch of the Church in its most critical period. Especially the X literature in its whole structure reveals to us the effort of Paulinism in the second generation after the great Apostle, and in the principal seat of his activity, partly to define itself over against the pseudo-Paulinism of the Docetic Gnostics, partly to find solid anchorage, like that of the mother church, in the historic life of Jesus, and the "new commandment which he gave unto us."

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## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### M. LOISY'S TYPE OF CATHOLICISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1904, p. 126.)

FOR reasons which are sufficiently well known, M. Loisy is unlikely for the present to enter upon any controversy; and the school of thought with which his name is associated may be considered apart from him. It will seem to many that Professor Gardner misconceives both its origin and its significance. The former was not controversial, but scientific and religious; the latter is not particularist, but general: Liberal Catholicism is part and parcel of a movement which affects not the Church of Rome only, but the Christian Church as a whole. *L'Évangile et l'Église* was not designed "to refute the great Liberal theologians of Germany"; its author expressly disclaims the intention of "refuting" Harnack; his purpose is to comment, to criticise, and to supplement. He is a Roman Catholic; but to the substance of the work this fact is irrelevant. Science is science, not apologetic: applied to the critical movement in theology the antithesis of Catholic and Protestant is out of place. Richard Simon, its founder, was a Catholic. It has been represented in our own day by men of such different standpoint and spiritual ancestry as Strauss and Renan, Lightfoot and Harnack, Montefiore and Duchesne. Knowledge, as such, is unsectarian; and the first object of the movement in question is to know. Secondly, as new knowledge bearing directly or indirectly on religion tends to unsettle men's religious convictions, "by reason of the refraction with which it enters into their conceptions," the Churches entered upon the work of *Vermittelung*—sifting, rejecting, discriminating, making "both one." In the Church of Rome the questions at issue were later to arise and more difficult of solution; the first, because from the beginning this Church had discouraged speculation; the second, because her history and genius were such as to commit her peculiarly to her past. But it is impossible for any one section of the community to stand permanently outside the common life. Nor can the attempt to do so be made with impunity.

The Conservatism of the Roman Church has preserved, it is said, the faith of the simple. It may be so. What is certain is that it has undermined that of the educated. From no religious body is the leakage so large and so significant. And rarely do castaways from the bark of Peter escape shipwreck; rarely does the fragile raft that bears them find shelter from the perils of wind and tide.

Knowledge, however, like light, diffuses itself: the labours of theologians affect the general atmosphere of thought. It was so here. Everywhere there was a stir and a commotion; among intelligent laymen, in seminaries and novitiates, a feeling first of curiosity, then of disquiet, made itself felt. A chain hangs together by its weakest link; and, as link after link of the received system snapped, men asked in dismay, Must the whole go? It is a mistake to suppose that the average Catholic is a bigot, or even an enthusiast, in religion. What is true is that he is not in the least interested in theology; he takes it for granted—as the average Protestant did fifty years ago. The Ultramontane party, powerful as it is, is not, and has never been, large numerically. But it is in possession; it is noisy and unscrupulous; and quiet men, who, especially in Latin countries, keep out of politics, secular or ecclesiastical, let things go their own way. While this was so there was no possibility of a *Reformkatholizismus*; men of scholarly temper were crushed, or fell away. But little by little the inertia of the central mass is yielding; the leaven of inquiry is leavening the whole lump. Hence a twofold change in the situation: the rise of a school of scientific theology in the Church; and the attempt on the part of its representatives to do for their co-religionists what Harnack and Sabatier have done for theirs: to show that the Gospel has lost nothing of its ancient power; that it is compatible with, or rather the complement of, modern society, modern knowledge, and modern life. That this eternal Gospel takes for them the form of Catholicism, as for Harnack and Sabatier that of Protestantism, is a thing indifferent. Liberal Catholicism is in no sense the antagonist or rival of Liberal Protestantism. The two are varieties of one and the same standpoint, as it is found in this or that environment, that of Latin or of Reformed Christianity. They can be at variance only on the assumption that the Gospel is inseparable from a particular setting, either Catholic or Protestant. If Professor Gardner makes this assumption, if he thinks it necessary or desirable for Catholics to secede from the historic Church, Catholic and Roman, Catholics, however Liberal, will part company with him. If he does not, he and they are workers in a common cause.

So much for the origin and significance of Liberal Catholicism. Its precise theological position is less easy to define. It is neither possible nor desirable to formulate a confession of faith with regard to matters which for the most part are not of faith, for men who stand on different intellectual levels, as they are behind, ahead, or in advance of the knowledge of their time. It may be said, however, first, that the achievement of scientific theology, whether in the hands of Protestant or Catholic theo-

logians, has been to show the relativity of even our religious knowledge, and consequently the inadequate and provisional nature of theological formulas and thought; secondly, that sectarian and party lines are losing their significance. Theology has become positive and historical; the distinction is not between Protestant and Catholic, Liberal and Conservative, but between those who know and those who do not know. With regard to the inferences to be drawn from the facts scholars differ; with regard to the facts they are at one. Professor Gardner finds a paradox in the position which, while recognising that the weight of evidence is against the immediate institution of the Eucharist, as we have it, by "the historic Jesus," accepts the doctrine of transubstantiation. "If we may take an everyday event as a matter of faith, why cannot we accept as a matter of faith an event which took place two thousand years ago?" The two things are not *in pari materia*. The one is an event which either did, or did not, take place. The other is not an event at all, but the expression of a fact of spiritual experience in the language of mediæval philosophy. The substance is to be distinguished from the form. The latter is variable, and has in fact varied; the former, impatient of the trammels of thought and language, escapes them, and is free. Were we formulating the doctrine to-day our terminology would be modern, not mediæval. Perhaps we should avoid definition, refusing to stereotype a living truth in a dead formula. Why add another to the many milestones which, marking in their time the advance of thought, become for later generations barriers to its further progress? Dogma is essentially symbol: hence at once its strength and its weakness. The one, because only under the veil of symbolism can truth become current coin; the other, because the symbol and the symbolised inevitably pass over into one another; the thing signified is confounded with the sign. Their precise relationship escapes us. The sign may be allegory or fact, accommodation or actuality, or stand somewhere intermediate between the two. But, be this as it may, its truth is truth of idea; its meaning passes outside and beyond itself; it is "our pedagogue to bring us to Christ."

"It is not very easy," says Professor Gardner, "to understand whereon, in the view of M. Loisy, rest the exclusive claims of the Roman Church." M. Loisy has put forward no such claims. He has not discussed the relation in which the Roman Church stands to the other Christian Churches. For him, the Church is something larger than either Romanism or Protestantism; he defines it in notable words as "*la conscience collective et permanente du christianisme vivant*." Conceived on such lines, her notes and attributes pass out of the field of controversy on to higher ground. By the Church herself we understand mankind viewed from the religious standpoint; by her teaching, the religious consciousness of mankind as a whole; by her infallibility, the fact that this consciousness in the long run justifies itself—"portae inferi non praevalerunt adversus eam." Such conceptions are, indeed, far from those embodied in Papal and Conciliar definitions. The Mediæval Church was an attempt to

realise under the conditions of time and space an idea which could only be realised beyond them: the actual falls short of the ideal. But the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between the two standpoints is not more impossible here than in the problems of Christology and Soteriology common to the orthodox Churches, Protestant and Catholic; or, to take larger ground, in the reconciliation of the Fatherhood of God with the existence of evil, or the brotherhood of man with the fact of war. *Schadenfreude* is out of place.

“Tua res agitur cum proximus ardet”:

or, in Scriptural language, we are members one of another; and, if one member suffer, the others suffer with it; for the life of the body resides not in the parts, as such, but in the whole.

To many nurtured in the, in some respects, freer air of the Reformed Churches it may seem strange that Catholics of the type indicated by Professor Gardner do not go a step further; that, seeing in Catholicism a phase through which the religious idea has passed, and from which it has emerged, they do not discard it for faith without form. Here, again, the difficulty is not peculiar to Catholics. It will be enough to refer in this connection to Jowett's sketch of a Liberal clergyman in the Sermon on the death of Dean Stanley,<sup>1</sup> and to Newman's suggestive saying that “in a religion which embraces large and separate classes of adherents there is always of necessity to a certain extent an exoteric and an esoteric doctrine.”<sup>2</sup> Religion, like nationality, is one of the stable factors of life. Faith without knowledge transfers men from one Church to another; the faith that saves discerns here as elsewhere the One in the many. “Neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem,” but “in spirit and in truth.”

In the case of Catholics there are special reasons which make the alternative of secession unacceptable. Catholicism produces in its adherents a certain aristocratic temper, founded half on fact, half on sentiment. Protestantism does not suggest itself to them as a possible alternative; they know nothing of it, and are not attracted by it; they simply pass it by. In some ways this is to be regretted: were it otherwise, not a few whom the Church could not retain might have been saved from scepticism. But the fact is as stated: for Catholics in general Catholicism and Christianity are convertible terms. Seceders, indeed, there have been; but, with rare exceptions, their example has not been such as to encourage secession; it is not the finer natures that secede. Nor is this surprising. The Catholic Church is built—*non sine numine*, we may believe—on a long and intimate knowledge of human nature. Her sacraments, her ritual, her liturgy compass our life from birth to death with an atmosphere of blessing; her hands, like that of the Spouse in the Canticles, drop with myrrh. Be her shortcomings what they may, she appeals strongly to the feelings and the imagination; separation from her involves too great a strain to be undergone with impunity. There is “a more excellent way.” The difficulties

<sup>1</sup> *Biographical Sermons*, pp. 144-146.

<sup>2</sup> *Via Media*, ed. 1877, Preface.

in the way of conformity are seldom so great that they cannot be overcome by patience and good temper. Were we called upon to plan a religion for ourselves, we could, no doubt, frame one on larger lines. But our lot is cast with that of our fellows; our position is inherited, not made. Nor need we regret that this is so. In religion, as elsewhere, we suffer many things gladly for the sake of the whole. The idea of Catholicism is greater than its actual realisation: let us not lose hold of the former because the latter progresses less rapidly than we could desire. A great society changes slowly, and the governing body is the last to be affected by the change. With not a little of our surroundings we may be out of harmony. But "we may be in the Church, and far from agreeing with the temper and spirit of many Churchmen." And "the aspirations after a higher state of life than that in which we live may in a measure fulfil themselves. We may create that which we seek after." It is improbable—to put it on no higher ground—that a Church so intimately associated with the past of humanity should break with its future; as it is impossible, however great the temporary displacement of ideas occasioned by it, that the advance of knowledge should not ultimately confirm and deepen the religious life of mankind.

ROMANUS.

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### THE AXIOM OF INFINITY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April and July 1904.)

THE Hon. B. Russell's finely-tempered criticism in the July number of this *Journal* of my article in the preceding edition calls for a brief reply. That criticism relates itself to two capital contentions of mine: (1) that the existence of the infinite has not been proved; (2) that it does not admit of proof.

Mr Russell seems to concede that (1) is correct, or, in stricter justice, perhaps I should say he avows it, so far at least as his own publications are concerned, for such I take to be the significance of his words: "The strict and detailed proof, with all the apparatus of logical rigour, is too long to be given incidentally, and was therefore reserved by me for vol. ii. of my *Principles of Mathematics*." This volume has not yet appeared.

It is in respect to (2) that our views differ or appear to differ widely, seeming, in fact, diametrically opposed. Contradictory opinions are always interesting; in matters so far above the illiberal cares of concrete life, they are even agreeable. To be highly enjoyable, however, contradiction must not be seasoned with misapprehension of meaning. It must be a pure antithesis, maintained and beheld in the light. For, whatever may be true of the language of diplomacy, that of science and philosophy craves, above all things else, to be perfectly understood. In the present case, if I rightly construe Mr Russell's words, I must think he has missed the true incidence of my own. The fault is no doubt partly, it may be wholly, mine. The subject-matter is so extremely tenuous, almost too subtle and

sly for words. It is, nevertheless, of the highest logical and epistemological importance, and so, unless one be willing to abandon the study as hopeless, nothing remains but to try and try again.

Mr Russell represents me as maintaining "that a special axiom is covertly invoked in all attempted demonstrations of the existence of the infinite." As stated by me, the axiom is: Conception and logical inference alike presuppose absolute certainty that an act which the mind finds itself capable of performing is intrinsically performable endlessly, or, what is tantamount, the assemblage of possible repetitions of a once mentally performable act is equivalent to a proper part of the assemblage. It was not my intention to maintain or to seem to maintain that this "certainty" was "specially" invoked, "covertly" or otherwise, in the mentioned attempted demonstrations, but rather, as I hope appears on its face, that it is involved in all conception and in all logical inference—*i.e.*, then, doubly involved in *all* argument, whether about the infinite or about the finite. The truth of this thesis, I said, as it is involved in the *concept* of proof, does not itself admit of proof, but can be *shown* and *seen*; and I tried to show it, *in re* both inference and conception; *in re* inference, as resident in our apodictic feeling, as living in the sense of validity of syllogistic form, a sense prior to and *uncontingent* on any question, whether a class to which the form applies is or is not infinite. This sense, I held and I hold, is a kind of certainty transfinite *a priori*, an essential part of the very meaning of the term proof, an element of its being, and hence not to be gained by proof. If the reader be interested to refer to the syllogistic form cited by me (p. 550, April), he cannot fail to see that that form is *ready* to apply to infinite classes *c*, *c'*, *c''*, *whether there be any such or not*. Formal validity means at least such readiness. To conceive the matter vividly, this sense of validity is as a sheaf of rays of applicability running out *as if* to the elements (one ray to each element) of infinite classes. Now, and this is the point, even if such object classes be supposed not to exist, the infinite sheaf of rays of applicability are there just the same, for these belong to argument as such, as an abstract and purely formal thing; only, in the case supposed, most of them empty their logical charges into nonentity. *This* infinity, then, is assumed, when it is said: there is such a thing as valid argument or proof or demonstration.

Behold the same fact from another point of view. Let  $u_1$ ,  $u_2$ , and  $u_3$  be three universes. Suppose it granted that  $u_1$  contains none but finite assemblages, that  $u_2$  contains infinite assemblages, and suppose it neither affirmed nor denied that  $u_3$  contains infinite assemblages. Now consider the *form*: (1) every element  $e$  of the assemblage  $E$  attracts an element  $e$  of  $E$ ; (2) no  $e$  of  $E$  is attracted by more than one  $e$  of  $E$ ;  $\therefore$  (3) every  $e$  of  $E$  is attracted by an  $e$  of  $E$ . Is this form valid? That means, is (3) *implied* in (1) and (2)? Now every logician knows, and everyone can readily see, that (3) is true whenever (1) and (2) are true, if  $E$  be finite but not if  $E$  be infinite. Hence in  $u_3$  the form is not valid, for  $u_3$  *may* contain infinite ensembles and  $E$  might chance to be one of

them. Neither is it valid in  $u_2$  for a like reason, even more obvious. Is it valid in  $u_1$ ? Here (3) is true whenever (1) and (2) are true, but it is not *implied* in them. Note the distinction: true but not implied. Proposition (3) is implied in (1) and (2) joined to another proposition: *E is in  $u_1$* . But the form in question does not tell whether *E* is in  $u_1$  or not. Hence the form is not valid even in  $u_1$ , where, nevertheless, it always yields correct results and consequently may be used *as if* it were valid. If the form be modified by adding the statement, *E is in  $u_1$* , the new form is valid not only in a single  $u_1$  but in each of an infinitude of  $u_1$ 's, if there be such an infinitude, and, if there be not, the new form nevertheless has its perfect validity ready made for such an infinitude whether this last may or may not by some possibility come to be. The notion of validity obviously transcends the finite universe  $u_1$ : the rays of applicability of a valid argument-form cannot themselves all be in such a universe nor each find there an element to discharge upon.

But I have been using such dynamic terms as "sense" and "know" and "feel." Mr Russell prefers what I call the *static* hypothesis, viz., that the subject-matter of logic is quite independent of mind, is, and would be, if mind were not. Let us grant it, and accordingly suppose there is a realm *L* of pure logic in which, mind or no mind, every form and kind of *implication* was and is and shall be, just as we may suppose all plane curves to exist even though none of them has been drawn in fact or in thought. In *L* there is, then, such a form *F* as that used by me (p. 550, April). Also, mind or no mind, there is, in or not in *L* as you like, another realm *A* of classes of elements *e* to which *F* *relates*, has, that is, to each *e* the relation *r* of being applicable to it. These *r*'s are as numerous as the *e*'s. The *r*'s belong to *F* as *F*, as a pure form in *L*, so that even if the *e*'s be supposed to vanish, the *r*'s do not therewith fail to be, they persist as properties of *F*, they merely fail to *reach* (the vanished), *F* is still ready with its *r*'s for the *e*'s whether *A* have them or not. This last statement is doubtless correct, but I do not here insist upon it, because, in strictness, I do not need it. Suppose the *e*'s infinite in number, then certainly the *r*'s are so too. But this assemblage of *r*'s is attached to *F*, belongs to *L*, constitutes indeed what we mean by the validity of *F*. Hence *F* as valid, involves infinitude. Hence to *prove*, no matter what, is to *use* infinitude. Hence to try to prove that there is infinitude involves trying to prove that proving is a possible thing. The nature of the circle is evident.

And it must now be evident, too, that Mr Russell's statement (p. 811, July) of my "contention" is very erroneous. The contention mentioned by him is not made by me either explicitly or implicitly. It is plain, too, that I am under no obligation to my own thesis to examine his "outline" of a proof (which remains to be given) that the number of numbers is infinite. I do not deny that there is such a thing as proof, I admit it, and I admit that the number of numbers can be proved to be infinite. But such a proof does not prove that *infinity is*. It assumes that, assumes

it in holding itself as proof, as a thing consisting of valid forms of ratiocination, and so uses the assumption (that infinity is) in proving that the kind of thing assumed to be, characterises the number of numbers. The distinction is entirely clear. Logical *principia* are one thing. Logical proofs another. The former cannot be proved. They come into light, not through ratiocination, but only, as Aristotle so well knew, through inarticulate dialectic, cloistral reflection. And one of these principles is that validity of a reasoning-form involves an infinitude of *r's*, rays, relations, of applicability, even if there be supposed to be no *other* infinitude. Nothing, in my judgment, is more important for the science of modern logic and the theory of knowledge than the clear perception and firm seizure of that fact.

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### THE DEGRADING OF THE ANGLICAN PRIESTHOOD.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1904, p. 120.)

UNDER this emphatic heading, in the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*, Mr Manning attempts to indicate the causes of the deterioration of the English clergy. Among these there loom large in the early part of the article the doctrines supposed to be inculcated at the theological colleges. As these institutions can account for some thousands of the clergy, it cannot be a matter of indifference to inquire into the truth of charges preferred against them in the pages of a responsible journal. It is the object of this note to show that Mr Manning's indictment rests rather upon superficial impressions than upon the true facts of the case. Briefly, he charges the colleges with encouraging their students to regard themselves as a priestly caste lifted above the laity, despising marriage, and stifling thought. If these accusations were well founded it would certainly be high time for drastic reforms, for such a system could only end in producing a clergy utterly alienated from the people they are sent to teach. Under the first head Mr Manning writes that the young clergyman is taught that he is to be "miraculously endowed with spiritual power." It is always difficult to deal with an argument which contains the word "miraculous"; but if the sentence means that it is held that God's ordinary laws are suspended in order to annihilate the effects of a young man's ignorance and inexperience, it may be safely answered that no theological college has ever committed itself to such an astounding assertion. On the contrary, men are taught that God's law works for them as for others, that as in the natural sphere organ corresponds to function, so in the spiritual, He never imposes a task upon anyone without offering also the help of His Spirit. Nor could the most ingenious glossing banish this belief from the English Ordinal. It is the absence of this conviction rather than its presence which is

liable to produce arrogance. The second charge runs thus: "Marriage will be permitted, it is true: but as a concession; it will not be for him the higher life." This may create some mirth among those who are familiar with the interiors of theological colleges. The Principals of many, probably the majority, of the colleges are themselves married, and it would be somewhat difficult for them to inculcate the view here imputed to them. Nor would it be quite practicable for their subordinates—even if they wished to do so—to hold them up in lecture or conversation as examples of those who had fallen from the "higher life." Men are certainly told that some classes of work can be done better by unmarried than by married clergy, and also as clearly that for other spheres it is better to be married. Stress is also laid upon the selfishness of marrying before there is an income to support a wife; and in one of the newer colleges, which provides free training on condition that a portion of the cost is afterwards refunded, the students are required to undertake not to marry till this has been done. But it might be supposed that Mr Manning, with his nervous fears of mendicancy among the clergy, would have found this most laudable. If celibacy ever becomes the rule among the English clergy, it will be the fault not of the theological colleges, but of the delusion that the possession of inadequate endowments releases the laity from all responsibility for the support of the ministry.

The third indictment will perhaps appear the gravest to the readers of the *Hibbert Journal*. The colleges are said to discourage acquaintance with modern theological research, and bar progress in thought. We will make a present to Mr Manning of the admission that they have certain definite ideas as to what is lawful in the preaching of a clergyman. If those who, for want of a better name, are called Broad Churchmen insist, as they have a right to do, that there is no place for such sheer mediævalism as the doctrine of Transubstantiation in the English Church, they must also be prepared to allow that in dealing with the Creeds the priest has his limits. It is salutary to remember that this view was strongly held by no less a person than Dr Martineau, who expressed himself with emphasis against those who retained posts in the Church without recognising such limits. But it is a far cry from this to the stifling of thought, and the latter will only be laid to the charge of the theological colleges where facts are either unknown or ignored.

Mr Manning's sketch of the product of these colleges exhibits the young clergyman as reading nothing but devotional works and ecclesiastical newspapers, and dismissing with contempt the higher criticism. Those who received their first introduction to the higher criticism in a theological college as students, or who have spent some time there in trying to teach its principles to others, find it difficult to regard such a caricature seriously. To make men specialists in this or any other branch is neither possible nor desirable in a year, but at least care is taken that they shall become acquainted with the main lines of modern criticism of the Old and New

Testaments. The Principals do not, as Mr Mauning seems to imagine, spend their time in smothering P., J., and E., and anathematising all who question the apostolicity of 2 Peter. If the libraries contain the Dictionaries of Smith and Hastings, they contain also the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, and Harnack stands on the shelves as well as more orthodox theologians. As a University journal remarked in reviewing, not long since, a book by the Vice-Principal of Cuddesdon, the charge of obscurantism, as urged against theological colleges, has no point; and we have a right to ask that critics of these institutions shall first be sure of the facts before framing such general indictments.

Without making exaggerated claims on behalf of the colleges, it may be said that they do endeavour to take their part in the promotion of a love of learning among the clergy, and some of the results should be enough to modify the blank pessimism of Mr Manning. Men are constantly reminded before their ordination that to be "diligent in reading the Holy Scriptures and in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same" is as binding a part of the ordination vows as any of the other of the undertakings then given. The spirit thus inculcated has made them ready to welcome such efforts as those put forth by the lately founded Central Society of Sacred Study. The reading circles in connection with this Society are often conducted by an official from the nearest theological college, and a glance at the leaflets of the Society is enough to demonstrate that they could be accepted by nobody who was not prepared to receive light from modern scholarship. In the present year, when the Fourth Gospel is suggested for study, Loisy and Schmiedel are remembered as well as Godet and Westcott. The influence of such a society cannot fail to raise the standard of clerical thinking. It may even help to remove the "fearsome nebulosity" which Mr Manning detects in what he calls "ruridiaconal" meetings. In the mystery surrounding this adjective it would be rash to attempt the refutation of his statement. Does he allude to meetings presided over by rural deans? If so, it is enough to reply that not even in the incompetence which he now finds pervading the clergy is learning so despised that deans, rural or otherwise, are derived from deacons.

The object of this contribution is not to deny that much still remains to be done to bring the learning of the English clergy to the level which it ought to attain, but only to suggest that a more scientific and, if the word may be allowed, more sympathetic treatment than Mr Manning's would give greater help. The need of the present moment is to make both the clergy for themselves and the laity for them remember the truth of the saying, "Limitation is strength." The inspiration of the pastoral office must come from the spiritual and mental culture for which place must be found amid the minutiae of parochial life. But the remedy is largely in the hands of the laity. The more they consent to help by personal service and undertaking of pecuniary responsibility, the freer will their clergy be to devote themselves to the sound learning which has distinguished the Anglican priest in the past.

There are signs, some of which have been indicated above, of a growing desire among the clergy to give themselves more to study. The effect may not appear all at once, but it would be most regrettable if the superficial opinion that nothing is being or will be done should pass unchallenged and injure a good cause. It would be welcome to many if the *Hibbert Journal* would some day entrust to experienced hands the task of formulating in its pages suggestions for the forwarding of this good work. One of the great needs of the present is to revive the study of the philosophy of religion, and such a journal is obviously a fitting place in which to look for guidance in this.

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LEEDS CLERGY SCHOOL.

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### THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1904, p. 160.)

WHILE I am grateful to all those who have in one way or another manifested an interest in my article on the Problem of Evil, my present business is merely to reply to the three critics whose contributions were inserted by the Editor in the October number of *The Hibbert Journal*. Those contributions are interesting both in their agreement and in their difference. All three agree in finding the source of my supposed error in the omission of any reference to the Freedom of the Will; they differ in minor points. But in order not to beat the air in argument, I must be allowed to restate the positions in my article which have been attacked. It will then be possible for the reader to judge with what success the critics have assailed them.

I said that Christian Theology was involved in a plain contradiction in ascribing evil to the will of a being who was all-powerful, all-good, and all-wise. It is not necessary to assert that "God is all," nor even that "God is good"; but, if people insist on doing so, they must accept the conclusion that follows from those propositions, namely, "There is no evil." If anyone doubts whether this conclusion does follow, let him look at the matter in this way. The proposition "God is all" is an equation between its terms, so that the subject and predicate may be interchanged. The syllogism therefore may be read thus—

God is good,  
All is God,  
∴ All is good.

That reasoning stands, and will stand, so long as the construction of our minds and the laws of thought remain what they are. It is not therefore very likely that my critics have done much to upset it. If they lack the courage of the Christian Scientists to assert the conclusion, there is nothing left for them but to deny one or both of the premisses. Let us see then what it is they say.

Miss Sybella Gurney tells us that "It is just because God is all, in other words, each one of us is a sharer in the Divine Nature, and therefore in right of this possesses free-will, that evil has been brought into the world." In so saying she attacks the proposition "God is good." For, if it be admitted that we are not good, while it is maintained that we are God, then, so far forth as we are God, it follows that God is not good. The distinction which she draws between the "Divine Personality" and the "essential Being" of God conceals an ambiguity which allows people to assert or deny at convenience the proposition "God is all." His essential being, Miss Gurney would doubtless say, includes all, but not so His divine personality. Where then does evil come in? It does not belong surely to the divine personality of God! Therefore it attaches to His essential being. This is a proposition which a sense of reverence deterred me from asserting with regard to the God we worship. Those who insist on maintaining that God is all have to accept the devil as an aspect of God, and to deny that God is purely good.

The Rev. A. Sloman does not insist upon so doing. Instead of the proposition "God is all" he would substitute "God is over all," which at once arouses curiosity as to where the All came from. Was it there always, limiting the action of God, and justifying the assertion of theology that "the higher morality can only be evolved through suffering"? If not, God must himself have imposed the law that perfection should be attainable only in this way. On the former hypothesis we must now be in the best of all possible worlds (which for aught I know may be the case), on the latter in a world which is not only relatively to circumstances but absolutely the best. What God does without let or hindrance cannot but be best. A world therefore in which all tends to good must be better than a world in which all *is* good, but which lacks the divine gift of freewill. On this showing there is no real evil, and we can sing with the trio of angels in Faust—

Thine aspect arms thine hosts with might,  
 Unfathomable Power!  
 And all thy glorious works are bright,  
 As on their natal hour.

But somehow we are more occupied nowadays with "the still, sad music of humanity."

Mr J. Howard Spalding frankly admits that we must regard God's power as limited; otherwise "we could not rationally think of God as perfectly good." But the limits, he appears to say, are self-imposed. God has a character in accordance with which He is bound to act. Having an infinity of love and wisdom, He cannot do anything that is unloving or unwise; and, as He creates things, not out of nothing, but out of Himself, He is bound to act towards them according to the nature He has given them, and not otherwise. Further, Mr Spalding considers that in God there must be room for infinite becoming as well as for infinite being. This last remark is interesting and suggestive, but its application is not

clear. God, according to Mr Spalding, allows evil in the sense in which a good father may allow a headstrong son to learn from experience, when he feels that further opposition would do more harm than good. But Mr Spalding seems to forget that the power of the human parent is limited by *external* conditions over which he has no control. If he asserts that there are similar external conditions in the case of God, then he also is denying that God is all. In appealing to Swedenborg's doctrine as "the only rational interpretation of the facts of life," he does in effect deny the other premiss also, namely, that God is good. For it is part of that doctrine that the heavens are exactly balanced by the hells, a view which may be true, but is certainly not cheerful.

ST GEORGE STOCK.

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### THE ATONEMENT.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1904, p. 802.)

PROFESSOR MASTERMAN writes: "We have left a long way behind the old ideas of . . . the imputing of a vicarious offering." It may, perhaps, be asked, have we left a long way behind the facts—the facts as recorded by the evangelists in their narrative of the grievous suffering and death of a voluntary victim? We have too, as facts, the express assertion of the sufferer that the Son of man came "to give His life a ransom for many," and the positive declaration of St Peter that "Christ also suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God." The suffering, then, is undisputed, and a definite purpose for it is assigned. That purpose is the conveyance to man of an inestimable benefit. These two—the suffering and the benefit resulting—are linked together. Can it then be maintained that the benefit would have been conferred without the suffering? and if the benefit had not been conferred, must not the condition of those for whom it was intended have remained wretched and miserable, unransomed, far off from God? Is it possible, then, to eliminate the idea of substitution of a vicarious offering from the contemplation of the events of the Passion? It is difficult to see how this can be. But there is no reason, while recognising that eternal justice demanded the offering, why we should speak in language which attributes to the Deity "parts and passions," as an "angry God."

In such a view, as has been indicated, of the Cross and Passion of Jesus the Son of God—the most extreme, undeserved suffering, resulting in the most supreme blessing—may not some hint be found towards the understanding of that which is so frequently spoken of as the cruelty of Nature? May not all undeserved suffering be part of an eternal law by which the greatest possible result and blessing is secured?

JOHN H. R. SUMNER.

GRASMERE.

## REVIEWS

*A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* By John Theodore Merz. Vol. i. (1896), Introduction—"Scientific Thought," Part I. pp. xiv+458. Vol. ii. (1903), "Scientific Thought," pp. xiii+807.—Edinburgh and London: Blackwood & Sons.

THE author is to be congratulated on the completion of the second volume of a very remarkable book, which might be roughly described as a continuation of Whewell's *History of the Inductive Sciences*, though, as we shall see, it is even more than that. Many years ago Merz was dominated by the philosopher's desire to contribute towards the unification of knowledge, and this led him to undertake the long task of making himself "acquainted, at first hand, with the many trains of reasoning by which, in the separate domains of science, of practical and of individual thought, such a unification has been partially and successfully attempted." He worked himself into the heart of the various scientific movements of the nineteenth century, and while he has doubtless got a deeper appreciation of some of them than of others, he has, we believe, succeeded in understanding their true inwardness, and of making this intelligible to his readers. A task so ambitious as that of surveying the whole advance of scientific thinking throughout a remarkably progressive century might seem almost superhuman, but Merz has accomplished his intellectual cartography with signal success. No one could have done this but a man of great plasticity of intelligence and of no less marked stability of judgment; he has taken all science for his province, and yet he is never embarrassed or platitudinarian. Whether it be chemistry or biology, astronomy or geology, physics or psycho-physics, or even mathematics, we find the same clear mind throughout, grasping the meaning of the great steps, detecting lines of influence, and critically appreciating the chief results. From those portions of the book that deal with subjects with which we are more or less familiar, we can infer something of the labour and devotion involved in this splendid achievement.

As to the plan of the book. The introduction explains that the author, whose memory carries him back to the middle of the nineteenth century, whose schooling and education embodied the ideas of a generation before

that time, can claim to have some personal knowledge of the greater portion of the last century, of the interests which it created, and the thoughts which stirred in it. "It is the object of these volumes to fix, if possible, this possession; to rescue from oblivion that which appears to me to be our secret property; in the last and dying hour of a remarkable age to throw the light upon the fading outlines of its mental life; to try to trace them, and with the aid of all possible information, gained from the written testimonies or the records of others, to work them into a coherent picture, which may give those who follow some idea of the peculiar manner in which our age looked upon the world and life, how it intellectualised and spiritualised them." The nineteenth century was unequalled in the accumulation of knowledge, but in condensing and idealising knowledge "it has probably not equalled the ideal greatness of Greece in the Periclean age, the brilliancy of the Renaissance in Italy, or the great discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France and England. What our century has done is this: it has worked out and deposited in special terms of language a clearer view of the correct methods for extending knowledge, and a peculiar conception of its possible unity." To expound this is one of the chief aims of the book. The author's first three chapters deal with the scientific spirit in France, Germany, and England; he then proceeds to sketch the history, methods, and results of what he calls the scientific "views of nature"—astronomical, atomic, kinetic or mechanical, physical, morphological, genetic, vitalistic, psychophysical, and statistical; then follows a remarkable chapter on the development of mathematical thought during the nineteenth century; finally, a retrospect and prospect lead us to look with expectation to the third volume, which will deal with philosophical thought.

It will be seen, then, that the author's plan is to give a rationalised account of the manifold ways in which the scientific spirit, confronting nature, has applied its various instruments of research—telescope, test-tube, blow-pipe, spectroscope, balance, scalpel, microscope, and so on; and has followed certain recognised modes of procedure—observational, experimental, statistical, and so on, with diverse immediate objectives, but always making towards the construction of a working thought-model of the phenomenal cosmos, and always resulting, it appears, in fresh revelations of Order and Unity, or in what may amount to the same thing, improved conceptual formulæ applicable to great series of sequences. What Merz has achieved is to illustrate scientific progress in the various departments without losing touch with concrete discoveries and without losing sight of the general intellectual movement and the influences which conspired to aid it. The result fascinates the reader and compels his admiration. It would be impertinent to be eulogistic, but if the sections on, say, astronomy and geology appeal to experts in these departments as those on biology do to us, then our description of the whole work as "Whewell up to date" will be faint praise indeed.

There have been several good histories of particular sciences—

of chemistry, astronomy, geology, and so on—but Merz's book is not a history of science or of sciences. It is a history of *scientific thinking*. It deals rather with the strategy of the scientific spirit than with its detailed tactics, except in so far as the latter must be expounded in order to afford an understanding of the former. This must be borne in mind, else the work would seem superhuman in its ambitiousness. The history that Sachs gave of botany to the advent of Darwin rises in one's mind as a type of the best scientific historiography; there is movement and sequent progress in it; we feel, as we read it, the trend and significance of the changing outlooks on the earth's Flora, and this is the sort of history-writing which Merz has achieved. At times, of course, he condescends to minutiae, giving chapter and verse for every statement, supplying chronological details of successive discoveries, and discussing questions of priority and affiliation. But his great success lies in showing the general movement of scientific thought; he does this by a skilful selection of characteristic concrete examples, by keeping always close to the great masters, and by having himself a keen scientific insight which has enabled him to discriminate between the essential and the merely prominent. He has travelled through half a dozen or more great harvest-fields, and has gathered in each the best ears.

One of the devices of his success in making a readable book out of a theme so gigantic is of some interest. We refer to the footnotes which often, if not on the whole, exceed the text in quantity. The text flows serenely on without them—they may be left for the second or third reading, but they serve to save the text from ponderousness and to corroborate it with circumstantiality. They are the most interesting footnotes we ever read in a scientific treatise—erudite, suggestive, and convincing. They help us to understand the unembarrassed freedom of the text; but when that steers us through an intricate period, such as the development of organic chemistry or of modern physiology, we cannot help wondering whether the terse clearness which the author has attained was due to writing at white-heat after long simmering, or to the repeated distillation of less condensed vintage.

The astronomical view of nature was well defined long before the nineteenth century, for it is centred in Newton's gravitation formula. "In the whole wide range of physical and chemical, not to speak of other natural phenomena, there is probably no [other] instance of a simple mathematical relation having been applied to so large a field of facts, found so trustworthy a guide, and been so unfailingly verified." The Newtonian formula is unique as to universality and accuracy. "And yet the very extent of this field must not blind us to the fact that for the explanation of molecular phenomena, or even for such processes as happen continually under our eyes and our hands, this universal law of gravitation has practically done nothing." It was and is a dominant view of nature; as Kundt said in 1891: "The present generation is still more or less accustomed to think in the manner of Newton's view of nature, in which

the supposition of forces acting at a distance appears as the most simple view ; we feel it difficult to step out of this circle of ideas." But it has had to give place to, or to allow itself to be supplemented by, another and independent way of regarding nature.

This other way is the atomic view of nature, whose history reaches from Dalton to Ostwald. It is a hypothesis resting upon the fact that substances combine in fixed proportions and fixed multiple proportions, and upon the further observation that bodies both in the solid and liquid state show different properties in different directions of space. "But as to the nature of the differences of elements the atomic view gives no information ; it simply asserts these differences, assumes them as physical constants, and tries to describe them by number and measurement. It gives us no insight into the nature of these forces on which depends the formation or destruction of chemical compounds. It neglects the study of chemical affinity." Thus the atomic view is "at best only a provisional basis, a convenient resting-place, similar to that which Newton found in physical astronomy, and on which has been established the astronomical view of nature."

The kinetic or mechanical view of nature rehabilitated the doctrine of antiquity that everything around us and in us is in a state of perpetual flux. It made the whole world more alive. The undulatory theory of light, the kinetic theory of gases, and the kinetic theory of electricity are well-known steps in this section of the history, which "have gone a long way to destroy the older astronomical view of natural phenomena, which explained many effects by the action at a distance of particles of ponderable or imponderable matter. The firm conviction has taken hold of the modern scientific intellect or imagination that space is a plenum filled with a continuous medium, and that the undoubted atomic nature of ponderable matter may be owing merely to a specific and unmodifiable form of motion with such properties as Lord Kelvin has shown to belong to vortex filaments."

So far the author has dealt with three great generalisations—the law of gravitation, the atomic theory, and the kinetic or mechanical theories of light, electricity, and magnetism. All of these, he is careful to notice, belong in their first enunciation to antiquity, "though they have only within the last three hundred years been expressed in sufficiently precise terms to permit of practical measurements and mathematical description." Moreover, it is interesting to notice that "the first step towards a scientifically comprehensive employment of the familiar but vague terms of attraction, of atoms, and of undulations came in each case from some solitary thinker of this country : from Newton, from Dalton, from Thomas Young. The systematic elaboration, however, belongs to the combined scientific exertions of all the civilised nations of the world." But the author goes on to show that none of these three principles, important as they were, appeared sufficient to cover the whole field. "The law of gravitation embraced cosmical and some molar phenomena, but led to

vagueness when applied to molecular actions. The atomic theory led to a complete systematisation of chemical compounds, but afforded no clue to the mysteries of chemical affinity; and the kinetic or mechanical theories of light, of electricity, and magnetism led rather to a new dualism, the division of science into sciences of matter and of the ether." A unification was needed, and one of the great achievements of the second half of the nineteenth century has been in this direction—the application of the conception of energy to cosmical, molar, and molecular phenomena alike.

This brings us to the physical view of nature, to discuss which has been a task of no ordinary difficulty. "Power," "work," "energy," "availability," "dissipation," "entropy," "conservation," "correlation"—what controversies have raged around each term! Joule, Carnot, Thomson, Helmholtz, Tait, Clerk-Maxwell, Ostwald, and how many more—what achievements each name recalls! The general outcome has been a clarifying or an idealising of the two conceptions of matter and energy, the conviction that energy is a real thing (if not the only real thing in the so-called outer world), and a debate whether it is not necessary to adopt a third something—the ether—as a medium wherein displacements of energy occur.

At this point the book makes a fresh start, for the author introduces a distinction between abstract and descriptive sciences. So far, he says, he has been dealing with the abstract study of natural objects and phenomena; but, besides "the abstract sciences, which profess to introduce us to the general relations or laws which govern everything that is or can be real, there must be those sciences which study the actually existing forms as distinguished from the possible ones, the 'here' and 'there,' the 'where' and 'how' of things and processes; which look upon real things, not as examples of the general and universal, but as alone possessed of that mysterious something which distinguishes the real and actual from the possible and artificial." This seems to us somewhat difficult doctrine.

The morphological view has to do with the form and architecture—the static relations—of actual things, whether they be crystals or stars, plants or mountain-ranges, animals or river-basins. The genetic view must do likewise. This is sternly logical, and Merz notes in justification that "one of the greatest changes which the present age has witnessed has been the breaking down of the old landmarks and of the stereotyped divisions which existed in the beginning and all through the first half of the century." Needless to say, therefore, he takes relatively little interest in the classification of the sciences; it is with *modes of scientific thinking* that he is concerned.

Our difficulties are somewhat matter-of-fact. (a) The animal morphologist has the same general objective as the crystallographer, but he works with different tools and methods and in a different atmosphere, inevitably influenced by the conviction that his subject was once alive and had an ontogeny and a phylogeny. How far is there utility in classing bio-morphologist, geo-morphologist, crystallo-morphologist, astro-

morphologist (of course Merz does not use these barbarisms) under one section—the morphological view of nature? The same query may be repeated for the genetic and even for the vitalistic views. (b) In many lines of physiological work there is necessary and profitable abstraction from the life of any particular organism, and similarly for embryology. The abstracting is not merely a device for better description of actual objects in nature; it is a deliberate attempt to interpret the general phenomena of metabolism. Is it not, therefore, in great part simply the physical view of nature over again? (c) From the author's point of view, as expressed in some sections, the subject-matter is not to be thought of specially, the morphological view includes minerals, mountains, mammoths, mice, and mosses; but what is the particular justification for a separate "psycho-physical" view of nature unless that is related to certain well-known peculiarities in the life of higher organisms? And (d) we cannot bring ourselves to see that there is any "statistical view of nature," for it seems to us that we have here to do simply with an organon of research, a tool, a kind of technique, a method of investigation, applicable to gases and meteors as much as to the variation and heredity of organisms. It may be, however, that our difficulties are due to some misunderstanding.

The eighth chapter, on the morphological view of nature, tells of the gradually more and more penetrating analysis of the static relations of organisms and other things. The intact organism, the component organs, the web of tissues, the individual cells, the intricacy of protoplasmic structure—every one knows how far descriptive analysis has already gone on each of these levels. Perhaps the author might have given more crispness to the "biological" part of this chapter and of the tenth by incorporating Geddes's *Synthetic History of Biology*, which shows how morphology and physiology have followed the logical path, suggested in our last sentence, of more and more penetrative analysis, associated with the synchronous perfecting of instruments. But he points out in a most interesting way how the morphological view was broadened and deepened by excursions into the remote past and the distant present, by studying things *in situ*, by penetrating into the invisible, and so on. One of the striking results was the transition even in morphology to a kinetic point of view. "Rest and fixity of form seem only to exist apparently or for transient moments in the history of natural events; and even the finished and recurring structures of living beings, which appear to our eyes to be possessed of so much finality and sometimes of so much finish, owe these qualities only to the comparatively short space of time during which we are permitted to gaze at them, and to our ignorance of the slow but endless changes to which they are nevertheless subject. The morphological view also took note of the relatedness and apparent recurrence of definite forms called types, of the so-called fixity of species and the succeeding characteristic periods of creation, and sought to explain these morphologically; *i.e.*, it sought in the abstract study of forms—sometimes geometrical, sometimes artistic—the key to an understanding of the

recurrence as well as the continued variation of definite types. But the relationship was mostly looked upon as ideal, not real." In this chapter, as in its neighbours, we feel the difficulty of imposing logical schemata upon history; thus many of the most illustrious representatives of the morphological position were also swayed by the growing genealogical views, and while there is some warrant for calling the period from 1800–1860 "the morphological period of natural science," it was at the same time very actively physiological. Moreover, morphology with cleared eyes is more to the front to-day than ever it was before. It is hard to punctuate history.

The genetic or, as we prefer to say, the "genealogical" view of nature is finely sketched. From Leibnitz, Kant, and Laplace, whose cosmogonic theories are referred to as pertaining to the "Romance of Science," we are led to Hutton and Lyell, to Wolff and Von Baer (of whose work there is an admirable appreciation), thence to the pioneers of the evolution-formula, such as Lamarck and Treviranus, till we find ourselves in familiar company, with Darwin and Wallace, Haeckel and Spencer. The chapter ends up with an indictment: "From and through organisms we first learnt to look upon the whole of nature as having a history and a life. Imperceptibly we have been led to study life, the genesis of things, on the large scale and in the abstract, and in so doing have lost sight of the life which goes on around and near us. Both the morphological and genetic views of nature started with a biological interest, but have gradually lost sight of it." This seems to us too hard a judgment, but it leads to the next chapter.

To our thinking there is no more successful chapter in the book than that which discusses the vitalistic view of nature—conventionally stated, the physiological point of view. Here the author follows the swings of the pendulum between vitalistic and materialistic schools. Bichat and Liebig, Johannes Müller and Claude Bernard, Lotze and Du Bois-Reymond, and the other masters are duly recognised, and the influence of each is appreciated. "Have we come nearer an answer to the question, What is Life? At one time, for a generation which is passing away, we apparently had. But a closer scrutiny has convinced most of us that we have not. . . . The spectre of a vital principle still lurks behind all our terms. . . . Neither the physiological nor the psychological unity is intelligible to us. . . ." The dilemma of the purely mechanical and the vitalistic biological theories, and the compromises between these, lead on to the psycho-physical view of nature, which we leave to the reviewer of the third volume.

We have interested ourselves for years in the history of biology since the time of Buffon, and Merz has paid us the compliment of using our historical sketch with some approbation. In many respects he confirms our impressions and verdicts, and we can only say that his treatment of the subject which we tried to tackle has filled us with envious admiration.

In his retrospect Merz says that "the most important outcome of the scientific work of the century does not lie in the region of thought, but rather in that of practical application." When we think of the doctrine of the conservation of energy, or the theory of the ether, or the conception of genetic continuity, or the doctrine of descent, or the theory of natural selection, and so on, the author's verdict seems somewhat hard-hearted.

Another general impression is of great interest. "In almost every instance, in following up the various aspects of scientific thought, I have had to show how they have brought us to problems which cannot be solved by the means which we call scientific or exact; and in many instances I have shown how the foremost scientific thinkers themselves have been led up to inquiries which they variously termed philosophical, metaphysical, logical, or psychological. Such has notably been the case with the ultimate conceptions of the atomic theory, of the doctrine of energy, and, still more, with the conceptions which underlie the scientific treatment of the phenomena of life and consciousness. The further we have advanced from the simple mechanical conceptions of motion and inertia and mass, into the phenomena of the actual world of natural objects which exhibit order, development, purpose, and consciousness, the more we have been obliged to make use of terms not capable of being defined by the simple categories of exact or mathematical thought; and with whatever zeal some of the foremost thinkers have in the course of the century attempted to express these more indefinite conceptions in terms of mechanical science, they have only partially succeeded, and have certainly failed in banishing them from the scientific vocabulary. Such conceptions have always crept in again, proving that they are indispensable even to the purely scientific comprehension or description of natural objects, or of nature as a whole." In other words, science has not explained and does not attempt to explain the terms of its formulæ; the biologist, for instance, postulates life which he cannot explain, but, given organisms, he seeks to show how the gradual ascent of life may be accounted for. Even if the gulf between vital metabolism and non-vital chemical changes were bridged, it would mean an increased draft on the credit account of "the properties of matter"; and there is not the remotest chance that the bank of common sense will allow the biologist to run any more adventures for the metabolic—far less the mechanical—exploitation of the kingdom of the conscious.

"There are two words which stand out prominently as indicating the two grand and complementary conceptions which either underlie all scientific inquiry or result from it." The first of these is ORDER—an intelligible order, a kinetic order, a progressive order—the closer definition of which forms one of the main themes of the author's erudite narrative. The analysis and formulation of this order is scientific business; "the subject which remains for philosophical discussion is not any special form of order, but the fact that any kind of order exists at all, and that it is accessible to the human intellect. Clearly this is a question

which affects Nature, the object, as much as the human Intellect, the subject. But if the idea of Order underlies all scientific thought, standing as it were at the entrance of scientific reasoning, there is another idea which stands at the end of all scientific thought. This is the idea of UNITY in its most impressive form as Individuality. It remains over as an ultimate empirical fact to which scientific reasoning advances, of equal importance with Order." Personally, we should prefer to say that what scientific investigation discloses is an initial and fundamental order, which is continually unifying itself afresh, through a process which we call evolution, the best flower of the process being the developing human spirit. What Merz says is that "the scientific mind advances from the idea of order or arrangement to that of unity through the idea of continuity," and we suppose that we mean the same thing.

Why is this book so fascinating, with all its scholarly details, with all its inevitable technicalities, with all its patient tracking of scientific thought through labyrinthine turns and twists? The author gives the answer: "The reason why the conceptions of order, unity, and individuality have received so much attention lies in this, that they have not only a logical meaning as instruments of thought, but also, as the words themselves indicate, a practical meaning, being bound up with the highest ethical and æsthetic, as well as with our social and religious interests. The word order means something more than arrangement when we speak of the social or moral order; the word unity is more than an arithmetical conception when we speak of the unity of action or of purpose, or the unity of design in art; the word individuality acquires a higher meaning in the term personality." We respectfully and gratefully salute the author!

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*Early Hebrew Story: Its Historical Background.*—By John P. Peters, D.D.—London: Williams & Norgate. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904.

THIS small book on a great subject deserves a welcome, both for its own sake and for the author's. Dr Peters is the Episcopal rector of a large parish in New York, where, we may be sure, he does not let the grass grow under his feet, and can only enjoy in the quiet of the night what Milton calls the "still air of delightful studies." He has also done good service in the past both as Professor of Biblical Literature in the Episcopal Seminary at Philadelphia, and as the first leader of the expedition to Babylonia sent out in 1888 by the University of Pennsylvania and by

some public-spirited citizens. Of this arduous but delightful exploring work the two stately volumes, *Nippur, or Explorations and Adventures on the Euphrates* (second edition, 1898), are the monuments. The present work displays the same enthusiasm and the same manly frankness as the narrative of exploration, nor can I think that it was necessary to publish a highly favourable expression of opinion by the Faculty of the American Theological Seminary under whose auspices the lectures which compose this work were delivered.

The phrase "early Hebrew story" itself clearly shows the lecturer's point of view. It is not history that we seek in the early books of the Old Testament. As Gunkel—as frank and as reverent a scholar as Dr Peters—well says, "The writing of history is not an innate endowment of the human mind," and our author (following, if one remembers right, our own lamented Earle) compares the beginning of Israelitish history with David to the beginning of English historical writing with Alfred. Comparisons, indeed, abound in these pages. The deliverance from Egypt, which "stamped and influenced the thought of Israel for ever," is likened to the "War of the Revolution," to which the remark is added that the events of the following period passed away in both cases from the popular memory. Similarly, the literary effect of the conquest of Samaria on Jerusalem and Judah is paralleled by that of Constantinople in 1453 A.D. on Rome and the West.

More important, however, are the introductory hints on the place of early Israel in the history of contemporary civilisation. It is suggestively said that "the nation of Israel came into being in the struggles and confusion of (these same) dark ages, one of the world's great periods of travail, between 1300 and 1000 B.C.," and that "David's reign, which we may place about 1000 B.C., represents the recommencement of a period of enlightenment" (p. 43).

In Lectures II.-IV. we are introduced to the views of a historical or archæological critic of the Old Testament on the formation of the Twelve Tribes, on the patriarchs, and on the tempting subject of Survivals, Legendary and Mythical. Apart from information common to all good books of a critical tendency concerned with this subject, one may indicate two or three statements about which the oft-repeated "I suggest" or "I think" (so natural to a lecturer) is specially justified. First, the suggestion that the four tribes called sons of concubines were originally Canaanite tribes or clans, which were subdued or attached by the Leah tribes and the Rachel tribes respectively. Next, the idea that "the tendency to reckon the component parts of the nation by twelve . . . may be due, not to the influence of lunar worship, but merely to a method of numerical calculation," the method, namely, of counting the closed hand or fist in addition to counting the fingers of the hand (pp. 55-57). Next, the theory that the personal name Samson (Shimshon) and the place-name Beth-shemesh suggest a connection with a non-Israelitish god, and so favour the view about the four "sons of concubines" mentioned

above. Next, the idea that Psalm xlii.-xliii. was, in its original form, a psalm of the old northern shrine of Dan—an idea which, one fears, may indicate a belief in the substantial accuracy of verse 7 in the received text. And lastly, the suggestion that the ancient hero Daniel (Ezek. xiv. 14) “may have been in some way connected with the same tradition or the same conception which shows itself in the name of the tribe Dan” (p. 93). Whatever may be thought of these interesting ideas, it will be granted that Dr Peters’ view of the origination of the stories of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and, to some extent, Joseph, in myths, legends, and traditions of sanctuaries is a sound one. His view of Joseph, it may be noted, is affected by his acceptance of the view maintained lately both in Germany and in England (see *Encyclopædia Biblica*, “Joseph”) that the story of Joseph’s viziership under the Pharaoh is a reflection of the conditions of the rule of Amen-hotep IV. of Egypt and his apparently Semitic vizier, Janhamu. Whether the lecturer is right in laying so much stress on the connection of the S. Babylonian city called Uru and the Mesopotamian city of Harran with the cultus of the Babylonian moon-god Sin, is questioned by the present reviewer. That “Ur of the Chaldees” is Uru has often been said, but not yet proved. Nor is it perhaps a good extension of the theory which makes Abraham’s family connected with the cultus of Uru and Harran, to say that in the “Judæan narrative” Abraham “stands in a similar relation to what was evidently in primitive times a famous seat of the same worship south of Palestine” (p. 158). And though the reviewer himself once held the same view, he now feels bound to warn the student against believing too easily the connection of Milcah and Sarah with the goddesses associated with the god Sin at Harran (p. 170). But he tempers this friendly censure by admitting the tact and insight with which the lecturer has treated the difficult subject of the “sexual cult” (pp. 181-184).

But again the questioning spirit revives when one is asked to believe that Moses is partly at least a historical figure. Alas! how gladly would one believe it! But where are the historical elements? The case seems to the reviewer only in part analogous to that of the Babylonian king Sargon of Agadè. No one can now be found to doubt that this Sargon is a historical personage with mythic accretions. But can one really venture to say the like of Moses? Unfortunately, we have to be told that “the scope of these lectures will not permit” the lecturer “to discuss the question of what Moses did” (p. 194). Possibly a discussion would have revealed the fact that only the thinnest of partitions (but see the startling words on p. 96) separates the lecturer from critics who may be thought to be a trifle bolder. For Dr Peters strives to be as far as possible conciliatory. He will not object to the remark that he is sound on the significance of Abraham; equal frankness on the part of other Church scholars is perhaps to be desired.

At this point, it may be allowed to call attention to the recognition or discovery of the place-name “the field of Abram” in the great list of names connected with the invasion of Palestine by Sheshonk I. Professor Erman

made the discovery some time ago, but—such is his wealth of material—forgot it. It was reserved for Professor J. H. Breasted (of Chicago University) to re-make it and to publish it (see the *American Journal of Semitic Literatures*, October 1904). This seems to the reviewer to confirm his own opinion that Abram is, not primarily a personal name, but the name of a district or region.

Lecture V. brings us into the thick of eagerly debated problems relative to the Hebrew cosmogony and views of primeval history. That additions of importance to critical discussion have been made by the lecturer can hardly be claimed. His view that the name Enoch may be connected with the last member of the Babylonian name En-medur-*anki* is surely very unfortunate, and he has missed the best solution of the problem relative to those names of the primeval Babylonian kings in Berossus, with which Professor Fritz Hommel has compared the names in the primitive Hebrew genealogies (Gen. iv., v.). But here again our gratitude to the frank and genial lecturer far outweighs our sense of an occasional falling short, which indeed may be due to a want of judgment in the reviewer, who cannot claim to be in agreement with Dr Peters (see the *American Journal of Theology*, October 1904) on all fundamental critical questions. The concluding lecture on the Moral Value of Early Hebrew Story is all that could be desired for a general audience.

Once more, a hearty welcome to this excellent work. Only, let the reader remember that there is, or at least ought to be, no such thing as critical orthodoxy, and that from scholars of different schools but of equal honesty and reverence there is much for the duly prepared reader to learn.

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*Paulus: sein Leben und Wirken.*—Von Prof. Lic. Dr. Carl Clemen.  
I. Teil: Untersuchung. II. Teil: Darstellung. — Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1904.

It is some time since there last appeared a comprehensive work on the Apostle Paul, written on a considerable scale, and aiming at strict historical accuracy. Of discussion of the Acts and of the Epistles there has indeed been no lack, as the reader of the new Encyclopedias can tell. In this country and in America, the Epistles have been dissected into fragments and their authenticity disproved; English scholars have examined the antiquities of the subject, mostly with a view to proving that Acts may be entirely trusted, and that the Epistles are thoroughly in keeping with their situation in history; and in Germany critical historical examination has gone hand in hand with a profounder study of Pauline doctrine and its relation to the various movements of the early

Church. He must be a bold man who undertakes to control and digest all the material that has accumulated since Baur, Renan, and Hausrath wrote their books on Paul, and to tell us how the foundations now stand, and what kind of building may be properly erected on them.

No one acquainted with the books published by Prof. Clemen ten years ago, his *Chronologie* and his *Einheitlichkeit der Paulinischen Briefe*, 1893 and 1894, can doubt his capacity for the task he has now undertaken. In the former he examined the Acts and the Epistles historically, and propounded theories of his own as to the composition of Acts and the order in which the Epistles were written. In the latter he collected a great mass of information as to the various modern attempts to determine how the materials of the Epistles stood before they were edited in their present form. In this book his attitude was in the main conservative; he declined, for good reasons shown in each case, the vast majority of the proposals to dissect the Epistles into smaller original pieces, and to discard sections of them, larger or shorter, as due to the editor. A number of these proposals, however, he adopted, and he put forward some of his own. These books proved him to be a scholar of immense patience and diligence, as well as of great resource and acumen, and they are cited by every writer on Paul's life and teaching.

Prof. Clemen's new book on Paul is a handsome work in two volumes, the first containing discussions which go over the ground of his earlier works, but contain many modifications of his earlier views; the second giving the "narrative," and forming an independent work, which may be read by itself, but is furnished with references to the pages in the first volume.

The volume entitled "Discussion" does not form exactly light reading: no reader of Prof. Clemen's former books would expect it, nor would it be in place. It is and must be a dry business, however necessary, to deal with sources of history, and to determine what treatment they have undergone from the hands through which they passed, and how far they are to be accepted as genuine and credible. After a short preface, in which the miraculous is put aside as not pertinent to the fixing of historical truth (we may believe in miracle in the sense of *mirabile*, a wonderful thing connected with religious experience, not in the sense of *miraculum*, a breach of natural law), we are at once introduced to the objections which have been made to the Pauline Epistles by Dutchmen and others. The general objections, such as those of van Manen, are disposed of in a few pages, partly by citations from Clement and other early writers, but principally by the evidence of the life and reality with which the Pauline epistles are so full. The individual epistles are then taken up and we are conducted through each of them, as in the earlier book on the unity, each proposed excision or rearrangement or emendation being subjected to careful argument. Here Prof. Clemen expects the reader to know something about the course of the discussion; he does not tell us in the text whose proposal he is considering, but at

once deals with it as if we knew all about it. Only in the notes does he tell us against whom he is arguing, and who agrees with him; and as this is done very fully, the book forms a complete guide to the literature of the subject, and the various views hitherto taken. As we read, we find that the author has changed his position on many points: with great candour and modesty, he names himself now and then among those against whom he is arguing. The changes he has undergone are in a conservative direction: he now retains passages in the Epistles which he formerly excised, and drops some of his historical reconstructions. Galatians, Romans, both Thessalonians, Colossians, with Philemon and Philippians, are accepted nearly as they are, Romans xvi. being now taken, after Sanday and Headlam, as addressed not to Ephesus but to Rome, though the doxology is, as formerly contended, a later addition. The Corinthian epistles are also held to be thoroughly genuine, but 2 Corinthians is held, as is now so commonly done, to be made up of two letters, that standing x.-xiii. having been written before i.-ix., as stated in Kennedy's book on *The Second and Third Epistles to the Corinthians*. Only 2 Cor. vi. 14-vii. 1 is out of place; it is a part of the pre-canonical letter referred to 1 Cor. vi. 9. On Galatians there is an elaborate argument on the North or South Galatian question, and the latter view is adopted, mainly for the broader reasons stated by Ramsay, though Ramsay's subsidiary reasons are mostly declined. With this it is connected, that Prof. Clemen in this book gives up the late date of Galatians, which was an outstanding feature of his *Chronologie*, and now holds it to be the earliest of the epistles. Colossians is assigned to the Cæsarean, not the Roman captivity. Ephesians is, as before, denied to be a work of Paul; and of the Pastoral Epistles only some fragments of a personal nature are accepted, as they are by Moffatt and many scholars, but these with great confidence.

In the detailed examination of Acts which follows that of the Epistles we find the author faithful in the main to his former positions, but not incapable of altering them in cases where new light has shone. His instincts are conservative as to the matter of the narratives; he accepts as credible the cures of the Apostles, so similar to those in the Gospels, the person of Simon Magus, the communistic arrangements of the early Church, the mission of Paul and Barnabas by the Church at Antioch (only not in any hierarchical sense), the vows taken on various occasions by Paul. He does not accept what he calls legendary ornamentations, as in the stories of Ananias and Sapphira, of the death of Herod, of the opening of the prison at Philippi. He believes therefore in a good early source, which was treated in various ways afterwards. Acts, as we have it, follows that source in the main, but in viii. 3-xi. 19 there is disorder; Philip's journey to Samaria should come later, and the episode of Cornelius which formed the initiation of Peter into the Gentile mission. The speeches are by the editor, though the situations of them and the main ideas in them may be authentic. The view that Paul only preached to Gentiles after finding

that the synagogue rejected the Gospel is unhistorical; he went to the synagogue first, but at once looked out in every place he came to for a way of approaching the Gentile population. The "James-clauses" in chap. xv. are not authentic, nor the meeting, chap. xxviii., with the Jews at Rome. The "we-source" is of the highest value; it was written by Luke, soon after the events recorded. Who wrote Acts as a whole, or where the book was written, we cannot tell. The author of it was acquainted with Josephus, and uses him. Prof. Clemen considers throughout Acts the comparative merits of the canonical text ( $\alpha$ ) and that of Codex Bezae and other authorities ( $\beta$ ), and comes uniformly to the conclusion that the former is closer to the facts, and to be preferred.

Are any facts about the Apostle Paul to be gleaned from the Apocryphal Acts, now being so successfully studied? From the Acts of Paul (the literary composition of which Prof. Clemen discusses minutely, in connection with Schmidt's edition now published of the Coptic Acts, in the present number of the *Zeitschrift für die NT. Wissenschaft*; Miscellen zu den Paulusakten, p. 228-*sqq.*), he decides that nothing is to be gained; these Acts not being based on old oral tradition, but due to the invention of the presbyter of Asia, who, as Tertullian tells us, wrote the book to glorify Paul. The famous description of the Apostle's personal appearance is declared to be nothing more than conventional; whether Thecla ever existed it is impossible to say. Prof. Clemen believes the story of the crucifixion of Peter in the Acts of Peter to be historical, as readers of his *Niedergefahren zu den Toten* already know, and is inclined to accept some statements about Paul, both in this book and in the later *Acts of Peter and Paul*; conflicting here with Lipsius and with Schmiedel in his article on Simon Peter, *Encyclop. Bibl.* 4609-19.

The volume of "Discussion" concludes with a chapter on the chronology of Paul. Prof. Clemen finds it difficult to fix any absolute dates in this chronology. He thinks it impossible to determine the year of the accession of Festus on which Harnack's chronology is based, and all the other proposed attachments to secular history are to his eyes uncertain. It is necessary, therefore, to count forward from the year of the conversion, which was that after the Crucifixion, here fixed by arguments from the Gospels at Easter 30 A.D.; and the statements in Acts fill up the time satisfactorily from 31 to August 64, the end of the two years' imprisonment at Rome, which is also the date, Prof. Clemen holds, of the Apostle's death. The attempt to fix the order of the Epistles, from their relation to each other in point of doctrine, is in this book declared to be impossible, with the exception that those epistles in which the Apostle looks forward to seeing the Parousia without dying, *i.e.* 1 Thess., 1 Cor., are earlier than those in which he looks forward to his own death and resurrection, 2 Cor., Rom., Philippians. The order of the Epistles arrived at in the *Chronologie* was 1 and 2 Thess., 1 and 2 Cor., Rom., Gal., 1 Phil., Col., and Philemon, 2 Phils. In the present book we find the order Gal., 1 and 2 Thess., 1 Cor., 2 Cor. x.-xiii., 2 C. i.-ix., fragments in 2 Tim. and Titus, Rom.,

Col. and Philemon, fragments in 2 Tim. from Cæsarea and from Rome, Philippians.

It seems right that when a theologian of high repute publishes a new work, the main results should be stated at which he has arrived, and that, when he has changed his views, this should be mentioned, so that he may no longer be connected with positions he has ceased to hold. This is all we have done up to this point. Full examination will no doubt appear of what Prof. Clemen has now advanced as to the Acts and the Epistles, the Apocryphal Acts, and the chronology. His first volume must be regarded as a work of great importance, to be studied by every serious reader of the New Testament, both as a guide to the present course of critical discussion and as an independent and most suggestive contribution to exegesis.

The second volume, the "Narrative," can be read by itself. The lay reader will find in it a representation of the life and doctrine of Paul which he can read with ease, and which places the subject before him as it stands after the work of criticism has been thoroughly done. To the student it offers the advantage of a full set of references to the former volume, which enable him to examine step by step the critical substructure on which the narrative proceeds. Every kind of reader will admire the writer's freedom from prejudice, and his habit of drawing from scholars of every type what is substantial and valuable. On the one hand, he has not forgotten Baur, Renan, or Straatman, or Pfeiderer, while, on the other, he cites freely Ramsay and Zahn, and has an eye for recent philological and antiquarian research.

The opening chapters on the Roman and the Jewish world in which Paul was brought up are extremely well informed and illuminating statements. Ramsay's article on the religion of Greece and Asia Minor in the new volume of the *Bible Dictionary* might have added something to the former chapter had it been published sooner; and as to the statements on Greek philosophy when Christianity appeared, much more will be found in the opening of Pfeiderer's *Urchristenthum*, 2nd edition, than Prof. Clemen could make room for; but all that is given is to the point. The chapter on the primitive Church contains an admirable condensed statement of the doctrine of Christ; it is shown how Jesus occupied a more advanced position as to sin and forgiveness than did Paul, though the God believed in was in both cases the same. What Prof. Clemen believes to be historical of the first eight chapters of Acts is then related, and we come to Paul. Here Tarsus has first to be dealt with in its geographical, scenic, political, educational and philosophical aspects; then we are taken over the route by which the young Jew travelled to Jerusalem, and are told of what he saw, and of the life and training he had there; then we hear of the inner experience by which he broke inwardly with the law while yet a Jew, for this is the meaning Prof. Clemen gives to the words, Gal. ii. 19, "I through the law died to the law," and was prepared to accept the Gospel. The journey to Damascus also is graphically treated: when we come to the conversion it is very briefly stated, and no comments are made on it, our author not showing a tendency to fine writing here or anywhere. In the following

chapter, on the new views, a very complicated discussion is presented in a simple form in a few pages, not with the logical sharpness we almost expect from a German writer dealing with this theme; conclusions are put forward rather than arguments. Here we have references to the discussions of Beyschlag, Holtzmann, Titius, Pfeiderer, Cone, and others. The chapter is a marvel of arrangement and condensation.

We need not follow the writer in his treatment of the Apostle's career. He often reminds us of Conybeare and Howson by the care with which he brings before us the natural beauties of the Aegean and the sites famous in mythology or history near which Paul passed on his travels, though he confesses that the Apostle was indifferent to both. In these matters also the latest information has been sought: the geographical articles of the *Encycl. Bibl.* are much quoted. The narrative is singularly uncontroversial in tone. The writer having made up his mind that though the facts deducible from the Epistles are of the first authority, the facts contained in Acts are also to be accepted where they do not conflict with the Epistles, proceeds to weave a story out of the two sets of facts, so as to do justice to both. The result, as we know already in this country, of such an undertaking is an account of the Apostle somewhat lacking in interest. Facts from the two sources are placed side by side, and stand there, stiff and awkward, like soldiers accidentally mixed together from different regiments. Take, for example, the account of the foundation of the church at Thessalonica. From the epistle we learn that the believers at Thessalonica came to the Church direct from heathenism, 1 Thess. i. 9; that Paul wrought at his trade among them, and was long enough with them to set them an example of good Christian living, dealing with them individually, forming strong bands of affection with them, and teaching them all the various parts of Christian belief and duty. Acts gives quite a different story; that Paul preached in the synagogue at Thessalonica, founding on the Scriptures and teaching lessons about the Jewish Messiah with such effect that some of the Jews believed, and in addition to these a number of proselytes. According to Acts, moreover, Paul was only three weeks, or the inside of four weeks, at Thessalonica. In Clemen, ii. 157, we are told that what Paul says, 1 Thess. i. 5, ii. 2, of his effective preaching when he came to Thessalonica, refers to his addresses in the synagogue, which his Gentile converts only knew by report; and that he carried on a mission both to the Jews and to the Gentiles at the same time. That is no doubt probable, but Acts does not say so, and shows itself in this case so imperfect a witness that its statements are scarcely entitled to be taken up into the narrative. The line adopted by Prof. Clemen yields a somewhat external and unsatisfying picture of Paul's experiences and actions. The story is not told from the Apostle's point of view, nor animated, it must be said, by vivid enough appreciation of the motives and principles which nerved him for his great contendings. We are present in his journeys, and told accurately what he saw, and who was with him at each place—no one could have told us all this more admirably. But the Council at Jerusalem is dis-

posed of in five pages, in which we are told that "Paul took Titus with him to Jerusalem as a living proof of the rightness of his position"; and then, on the same page (139), that "Paul would not have been disinclined to circumcise Titus, out of consideration for the Jews and Jewish Christians, only he was afraid those Judaists would make capital out of the occurrence, and make it a precedent in dealing with Gentile Christians." This is referred to at the close of the book as showing how capable Paul was of compromise and of being guided by circumstances. But in the account of the Council, Prof. Clemen does not appear to realise the gravity of the question which was there decided, nor the greatness of Paul's anxiety about it. Surely Galatians teaches us that the demand for the circumcision of the Gentile Christians was not one on which he was likely at that time to compromise.

In the accounts of the Epistles, which he introduces each at its due place, Prof. Clemen gives an abridged version of the original, and does not enter on explanation, even of difficult passages, as he could so well have done. The book leaves us, therefore, with the impression that it is the Paul of Acts rather than the Paul of the Epistles who has been placed before us, and that more is needed for a knowledge of the Apostle of the Gentiles as he was. The admirable sketch of the personality (p. 314) is too short to remove this impression. We conclude this very inadequate notice of a book of great value by quoting a passage in which what some readers may feel wanting in the earlier parts of the narrative is in part supplied (p. 317):—"Paul was an enthusiast—not only inasmuch as he had visions and spoke with tongues more than any of his converts, but more especially from the fact that he conceived the plan of bringing his mission to bear on the whole world in the year or two which, at first at least, he believed to be allowed him till the coming of the Lord. True, he thought only of the countries adjoining the Mediterranean, and even, of these, left Egypt and Africa out of account; yet was the task he undertook a most enormous one. We experience something like a feeling of awe when we see how, even at the time when he was forced to leave Ephesus and Corinth behind him, he held fast his intention to penetrate further to the West; and how, a prisoner at Cæsarea, and then at Rome, he conceived ever new plans, and thought it possible that after his appeal to the Emperor was heard, he should be delivered from the jaws of the lion, and discharge his office as a preacher among all the Gentiles. How many other difficulties, besides, had he to contend with—bodily weakness, poverty, the attacks of enemies of every kind. In truth, only an extraordinary enthusiasm could have remained steadfast, in spite of all this, to the aim he had once set himself, and kept him from growing weary, till his life itself came to an end."

ALLAN MENZIES.

UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS.

*Ideals of Science and Faith.*—Edited by George E. Hand.—  
George Allen.

THIS striking little volume entirely justifies its modest claim to be an effort towards that reorganisation and reconstruction in which religion and science must go hand in hand. Necessarily of varying degrees of excellence, the essays contained within its covers may be said to be cumulative in value; for, although each is written independently of the others, yet they are mutually complementary, and even, with one single exception, mutually confirmatory. Always vigorous and often both clear and cogent, most of them—though not quite all—achieve that fine simplicity which results from mastery of difficult and complex problems, the elimination of every unnecessary word or thought.

In these ten papers we find, on the one hand, distinguished and representative men of science, and, on the other hand, typical men of faith, whose names are of themselves enough to indicate that they do not all come from one small camp.

The editor tells us that he sought to suggest a discussion, not to close it; and how wide is the scope of that discussion may be incidentally indicated by mentioning that the contributions which come with the most conclusive weight are the three essays by Sir Oliver Lodge, already familiar to readers of the *Hibbert Journal*, the little paper by Professor Muirhead, and the Apologia of Father Waggett.

Any utterance of Sir Oliver Lodge must necessarily command attention; his three essays here reprinted, even had they appeared anonymously, would still have been of the utmost importance. At once lucid and illuminating, they are likely to appeal, by the perfection of their style, even to those who differ most from the writer.

That so-called science and so-called religion seem to clash, only through the narrowness and limitation which too often in either takes the name of orthodoxy, but that "the region of Religion and the region of a completer Science are one" (p. 48); that, though we often speak as if God Himself could not alter what we are pleased to call "the course of Nature," yet we ourselves constantly alter the inanimate processes of Nature; that the frequent answering of our prayers, through the actions of our fellow-creatures, may well have its parallel in the Divine help given through an unseen "cloud of witnesses" (pp. 40, 41 and 42); that we too readily ignore the daily and hourly influences which, "though beyond the pale of science, are some of them inside the Universe of fact" (p. 37)—all this the author urges with a straightforward clearness and common sense which cannot fail to leave their mark on any unprejudiced mind. And, accepting the animal genealogy of the mortal body—our "moving tent" amid the dust and whirl of time—he is not entirely silent as to the conceivably higher ancestry of that inmate, concerning whom Browning wrote that, when the Master honours his lowly roof, none

who look upon "the human face Divine" can doubt that He is "in residence."<sup>1</sup>

Professor Geddes and Professor Arthur Thomson, in the admirable paper which follows, point out that science is an intellectual attitude rather than a body of facts, and that, though it may be the duty of the ideal biologist—in other moods perhaps poet, philosopher, or theologian,—in seeking to "interpret scientifically the nature, continuance, and evolution of life, . . . to make his sensory experience of them as full as possible, . . . and to arrange them in ordered series, to detect their inter-relations and likenesses of sequence, to reduce them to simpler terms, to find their common denominator, and finally to sum them up in a general formula, which he often, unfortunately, calls a 'law,' . . . he does not delude himself by imagining that his 'law' is an *explanation* of the facts which it formulates" (pp. 52, 53).

In common with other contributors to the volume, these two essayists are careful to note that, as Karl Pearson has said, "the problem of whether life is or is not a mechanism, is not a question of whether the same things, 'matter' and 'force,' are or are not at the back of organic or inorganic phenomena,—of what is at the back of either class of sense-impressions we know absolutely nothing,—but of whether the conceptual shorthand of the physicist, this ideal world of ether, atom, and molecule, will or will not also suffice to describe the biologist's perceptions" (p. 56).

As regards the problems of heredity and the theory of evolution, they emphasise the importance of remembering that "the fact of variability has to be set against that of continuity, and the plastic power of environment against the persisting power of natural inheritance" (p. 60). That which makes for ever-increasing differentiation and integration, makes also towards "ever completer unfolding or liberation of the psychical life" (p. 62). They pause, moreover, upon the fact that, though we know not when or how Man emerged, "it is unthinkable that the evolution process should break down at the finish" (p. 66). Exceedingly just is their condemnation of the cheap or coarse processes by which Darwin's picture of the struggle for existence has been degraded and brutalised in its process of reproduction at the hands of less cautious and reverent disciples, whereas "the struggle for existence is [hardly more than] a convenient formula for a certain aspect of life" (p. 72). Biology and theology, they say, are both seeking to establish the unity of Nature. And if biology is revealing new methods and new possibilities of uplifting and regenerating the race, can it not also be contended that the development of theology itself "may be recognised as the continual endeavour to express and symbolise, for the individual and for the race, the mystery, the process, the ecstasy, the agony, the progress, and the ideals of Life" (p. 79), so that "biological science must indeed become the handmaid of religion" to whom the theologian can offer "the interpretation of Life" (p. 80)?

<sup>1</sup> "Parleyings with Certain People," p. 155.

Even more fundamental, perhaps, is the carefully expounded argument of Professor Muirhead. He asks whether it be possible that the "path to a more spiritual view of the world which a generation ago seemed to be closing, has once again been re-opened." His paper is designed to show that, "so far as psychology is concerned, the evidence points to the open door" (p. 85). Like the previous writers, he too maintains that the failure of a mechanical explanation of the universe is in no way dependent on the defeat of abiogenesis—a defeat which may at any moment be reversed. It results from a general stultification of the mechanical theory rather than from any mere lack of success hitherto in seeking to evoke the organic from the inorganic, from no less vast a maladjustment, indeed, than is indicated by the fact that, so far, "the attempt to explain the universe in terms of physical energy has brought us to an *impasse*" (p. 97). The author's image of what may await us when, having used physical conceptions as keys for the interpretation of a definite order of facts, we may not impossibly pass on into a new order which requires another kind of handling, is to remind us that "we use a saw to make a fiddle; we throw it away when we come to play upon it" (p. 100). The physical conceptions—those useful instruments of thought which man has fashioned for himself—may, like the saw, have come first, but they are not, for that reason, first in dignity; and when psychology has shown that, though the evolution of mind has seemed to come last in the order of creation, here also "the last shall be first," then it will be the part of philosophy to lead on a step further and show "as it may, that the purposes of humanity can only be rendered self-consistent and comprehensible when taken as part of a larger scheme which embraces and reconciles them" (p. 102).

The next essay, in spite of its literary defects—its sometimes inverted or clumsy sentences, and sometimes unnecessarily ugly words such as "cultural" or "motivation"—is singularly suggestive and individual, full of power and humour. The writer, Mr Victor Branford, brings his thesis before the outward eyes of his readers in two illustrative diagrams which should enable the dullest thinker to grasp his contention that neither so-called science nor so-called theology holds a monopoly of formalism, or of that rigid "ceremonial" thinking which is often carelessly and misleadingly labelled dogma; that, on the contrary, there are among all thinkers and workers, whether industrial, political, artistic, philosophical, historical, or scientific, not only the two extreme types—the idealist and formalist—but also all the multitudinous intervening grades and *nuances*. He maintains, and it only needs to be clearly stated to obtain assent, that there is a centre of religious idealism where all these varying "group-interests" meet, and strengthen what is highest and best in each; there is also an outer circle of adherents to all the groups, who become slaves of their own formulæ, and losing the vital principle of growth and evolution and interaction, mistake means for ends, and tools for achievements, become in fact "the victims of their own intellectual machinery."

What is needed is a sociological crusade from the centre, bringing to bear all the forces that regenerate and educate mankind (p. 155).

Mr Bertrand Russell, with considerable literary ability, sets forth what in the last resort is the high faith of an idealist who gives up all hope of immortality, that hope with which logically the very idea of God, as the Master taught of Him, is necessarily bound up. The ethical beauty of this essay is essentially that of Christ's own arresting words, as they are traditionally reported to us, when He taught that only through readiness to surrender all that is life to a man, is man's life truly found.

Professor Patrick Geddes, in his "Educational Approach," has left us deeply in his debt, if only for his forcible, yet diplomatic, condemnation of "the centralising hierarchy, the examination-machine, the inspectorial steam-roller," and that invention so dear to "mammonised England," the system of "payment by results." How true it is, for instance, that "the eternal ideals may be reached by every road, . . . yet may be lost at every sign-post" (p. 182), and that, "be it in Church schools or in State ones, dry-rot is dry-rot still" (p. 181).

The "Presbyterian Approach" of the Rev. John Kelman is a forcible paper, temperate, open-minded, just. In its historical interest, its courage, straightforwardness, and simplicity, it is very timely, and will be best honoured by giving, in the author's own words, his appraisal of the right place and meaning of our Sacred Books. "So far as we have gone, the history of the past, viewed by the light in which the newer conception of the Bible has placed it, shows that at the present point in the progress of thought, science and religion are not in the least degree at strife. They need no reconciliation. "'The facts are God's facts,' and the scientific knowledge of them is God's ever new and wonderful revelation, unfolding itself not in one book, closed two thousand years ago, but in every book written to-day by any honest and competent investigator" (p. 244).

Very important is Mr Ronald Bayne's reminder, in the paper which follows, that the Bible "was not written by a man, but in sober fact by a nation" (p. 250). His essay is mainly a spirited and well-argued plea for an English theocracy in the sense in which Maurice and Kingsley understood the term. It may be that on some points he goes too far and writes too strongly; but there is no school of thought within the Church which can be the worse for his judicious lesson that in "the condemnation of any natural activity of the human spirit," . . . "the injury" may be "just as obvious and deplorable in the maimed kingdom as in the unreclaimed world"; and that "it is impossible for a son of the Church of England to be complacent. What she is is so tormentingly below what she might be" (p. 268).

Father Waggett's conception of the Church, as here expounded, has much in common with what Maurice embodied in his *Kingdom of Christ*, and Loisy in his volume entitled *The Gospel and The Church*; but, while equally deep and satisfying, and almost equally broad, his thought is more impassioned, more eloquent. After maintaining that Christ "came that

He might gather together men into one and make them into a Body" (p. 288)—that "the object of all His ministry and passion is to get for Himself and make for Himself and . . . present to God a perfect Church," he adds on a later page that all "our study of the past, all our anxiety about Sacraments and Orders and unity of action, are wholly and finally worthless, unless at the ground and root of them there is the care to increase in the essential life and joy of God's presence" (p. 295). Yet, notwithstanding his beautiful image of the Church as defined by her great central Light and, to human eyes, necessarily illimitable in those star-like rays which from their very nature defy finite measurement and boundary line, those of us who delight most in his *Apologia* may perhaps venture to divide from him when (on p. 299) he seems to make the intellectual avowal of our Lord's Divinity, while here on earth, the one test of citizenship in His kingdom; and we do so divide, some of us, not only because we are taught to measure men by the fruits of character and conduct, rather than by their theological opinions, but also because we believe there is many a man who, whilst not consciously worshipping the brief earthly manifestation of the Eternal Word, yet, in surrendering himself with highest trust and adoration to the Infinite Godhead, receives and loves and obeys—and in fact *worships*—all that is symbolised in our imperfect words when we speak of our Lord's Divine Humanity; just as the devout Jews in the wilderness are said to have been baptised into the Christ whom they had never beheld, and to drink of that Rock which followed them.

But a word must now be said about the last essay in the book, an essay which is not only valuable in itself, but which is also associated with a distinguished name. Mr Ward maintains that the intellectual progress retarded by the Roman Catholic Church might, but for her influence and authority, have lost in certainty and beneficence what it gained in crudeness and rapidity, since, if either so-called science or so-called theology had proceeded with too swift a step, retrogression and destruction would have alternated with each careless and superficial advance. Authority, he thinks, should always guard the traditional faith until it is clear that the modification of form involved in its new development will in no way mutilate its essence.

To this it may be answered that those who worship the Truth, believing Him also to be the Way and the Life, must ever be content, when once they have done their part in sifting evidence and weighing experience, to leave the progressive elimination, as well as the progressive evolution, to the guardianship of Him who is the Life and Light of men.

ANNIE MATHESON.

WOKING.

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*The Religion of the Universe.*—By J. Allanson Picton, M.A., author of *New Theories and the Old Faith*, *The Mystery of Matter*, etc.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1904.—Pp. 379.

THIS interesting volume endeavours to bring up to date the chapters on “The Philosophy of Ignorance” and “Christian Pantheism” which appeared thirty years ago in the author’s treatise on *The Mystery of Matter*. *The Religion of the Universe* professes to be in substantial agreement with the worship of the “Unknowable,” as set forth in Spencer’s *First Principles*. Mr Picton has, however, succeeded in giving to his work a much more theistic appearance than Spencer’s agnosticism presents; and he has done this by claiming that, though we cannot know God as He is in Himself, we can yet progressively learn what He is in relation to man. We will first indicate those features which the author regards as opposed to theism, but which are, we think, quite in harmony with theism as it appears in the writings of thinkers like Lotze and Martineau. In the first place, he objects to conceiving of God as the “Ultimate Cause” of the Universe, because, he says, philosophy has shown that the word “cause” should only mean the antecedent phenomenal conditions of an event; yet he himself more than once uses the word in its metaphysical sense, as, for instance, when in refuting materialism he says, “We are nearer the truth when we think of this Universe as the ceaseless interplay of impressions made on us, we know not how, by a Life.” What is this but to represent the self-existent Life which makes impressions on us as exerting precisely the same kind of *metaphysical* causality as that which the theist ascribes to God?

Again, Mr Picton is at some pains to prove that the Universe cannot have a First Cause, because there is no reason to think that the cosmical process had a beginning in time. The more recent theists to whom we have referred are quite at one with our author here; for they do not assent to the statement made by some earlier theists that “an infinite regress of scientific causes is unbelievable.” They conceive that all finite and dependent existences, present as well as past, have their ground and cause in the ever-present, ever-active originating and sustaining energy of the Absolute Reality. God, in their view, is not found by seeking for Him in the distant past, but by penetrating into the heart of present reality. And when Mr Picton further asks, How could a Universe be created of nothing? these theists would reply that finite entities appear to arise by God’s self-individuation, to some extent, of His own being; and that, therefore, both matter and mind are modes of spiritual life. Nor is our author really in antagonism with such theism when he contends that personality cannot be ascribed to God; for it is clear from several passages in the work that he means by this no more than that the inner life of the Eternal is *unimaginable* by us, since our powers of imagination are necessarily limited to the experiences of our own finite personal life.

Nothing that Mr Picton says disproves man's ability to *think* of God as an infinite and eternal self-consciousness. Indeed, he himself repeatedly speaks of the "Divine consciousness," and of "the super-personal consciousness of God." Though this Divine consciousness is not picturable by our minds, it is yet thinkable; and a belief in its reality is all that is necessary to explain and justify the experience of personal communion with the indwelling God. In like manner, when Mr Picton rejects the conception of God as an external artificer, he does not thereby refute recent theism; and we venture to think that he is quite mistaken in supposing that the force of the argument from design is lessened when philosophers no longer think of an *opifex deus*.

But while there is much in *The Religion of the Universe* which recent theists would rather welcome than assail, there are also many passages that suggest a form of pantheism which can hardly be described as "Christian." The important question, whether it is open to the human personality in seasons of temptation to determine itself on either the noble or the ignoble side, is treated in an ambiguous way which suggests that the writer is sometimes following the deliverance of his own moral consciousness, and at other times is adapting his language to Mr Spencer's monistic philosophy. Although he tells us that "the Will is no more than a phænomenon," he evidently holds that the Self which wills is a metaphysical reality of some sort. Is, then, this Self free in its moral self-determinations? In one part of the book Mr Picton appears to assert that it is; for he maintains that "the essence of moral evil is sin against God," and that the act of free choice "involves responsibility and deserves praise and blame." This account of the matter sounds very strange as coming from a thinker who dedicates his book to the author of the *First Principles*; but the explanation appears to be that, when Mr Picton is in a Spencerian mood, the so-called moral freedom turns out to be a very questionable article; for we are told that "we are so enmeshed and involved in untraceable relations to our true and infinite self that it is impossible to say how far we are only taking our part in the action of the universal will." But surely it follows from this statement that it must be equally impossible for us to say how far moral evil, or sin against God, has a real existence.

Mr Picton's doctrine that we cannot know God as He is in Himself is as little satisfactory to the theist as is his doctrine of moral freedom. Our perception of, and devotion to, the Ideal appears utterly meaningless, if it involves no true insight into the real nature of God. Artists and poets in their worship of Beauty, philosophers in their attempts to intellectually apprehend the Ultimate Reality, saints and mystics in their consciousness of communion with the Father within them, all believe that, however imperfect and distorted may be their vision of God, it is yet a vision of some real aspect of the Eternal One. Emerson, when he says, in the essay on "The Oversoul," that on the ideal side of our being "we lie open to the deeps of spiritual nature, to the *attributes of God*," appears

to give a more satisfactory account of the facts of spiritual insight than is presented in Mr Picton's version of Spencer's agnosticism.

In this brief notice it has been necessary to confine attention to the main ideas which form the framework of our author's *Weltanschauung*; but dissent from the fundamental philosophy does not render us ungrateful for a volume which is enriched with much original thought, and pervaded by the glow of religious emotion. One of the most valuable features of the book is the treatment of the apparent natural evil in the world; and the very acute and striking remarks on the supposed suffering of animals do much to relieve the difficulty which the existence of such suffering presents to a theistic reading of the cosmos.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

OXFORD.

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*The Problem of Existence, its Mystery, Struggle, and Comfort, in the Light of Aryan Wisdom.*—By Manmath C. Mallik, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law.—London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904.

WHEN Matthew Arnold penned his beautiful stanza—

The East bow'd low before the blast  
In patient, deep disdain;  
She let the legions thunder past,  
And plunged in thought again—

of what precisely was he thinking? The context shows that he had in mind that nearer Asia which was affected by Roman conquest, Syria, and especially Judæa. But in this connection the lines are not particularly appropriate. For though the Jews have made some notable contributions to human thought, yet on the whole they were, and are, rather a practical than a speculative people. Moreover, instead of bowing low before the blast, they hurled themselves with a fanatical fury against the embattled might of Rome. Were it not for the word "legions," we might take these lines, apart from their context, to refer to the clattering of Alexander's hoplites through India. The Greeks had a great respect for the Gymnosophists of that country. Arrian tells us that Alexander, who, as the disciple of Aristotle, had leanings towards philosophy, was desirous to converse with some of them, but that Dandamis, the head of the school, would neither go to him himself nor allow his followers to do so. He declared that he wished for nothing which Alexander could give him, and feared nothing which Alexander had power to ward off from him. Accordingly, we are told, Alexander did not try to compel him, since he perceived that the man was free indeed. Now, what was it that these naked sages of India were thinking about in their long ages of self-absorbed contemplation? We know little enough about it. Or, if there are those among us who do know, their knowledge has not yet filtered down into the

common stock of thought. Practically we seem to imagine that our own philosophy and our own religion, which have their roots in Greece and Judæa, exhaust the thought of the world. Under these circumstances we ought to be grateful to Mr Manmath C. Mallik, whose name proclaims him an Oriental, for coming forward to enlighten the Western mind as to the wisdom of the ancient Aryan sages of India. The author of this book cannot himself be regarded as a very deep thinker. There is more of Xenophon than of Plato about him. His work abounds in truisms and platitudes, and we occasionally meet statements which it is difficult not to regard as foolish. But for all that he is interesting, as giving us a new outlook upon the world. He has command of a fluent English style, which is sometimes highly rhetorical and likely to appeal to the general reader. He is himself well versed in Occidental thought and literature. Indeed we are tempted to wish that he knew less about these things, as we might then feel more confidence in him as an exponent of pure Indian thought. Sometimes an uneasy suspicion suggests itself that we are listening to the voice of our old friend Jacob, disguised as a stranger from the Far East. Especially is this the case when we read of "Satan" and our "first parents." Still there is an old-world flavour about the book, which to some extent guarantees its genuineness. Imagine, for instance, a philosopher who at this time of day seriously takes for granted the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water as underlying all physical existence! We seem transported back into the atmosphere of the Greek Schools, and to be listening to a contemporary or predecessor of the Stoics.

Assuming the book then fairly to represent the mental attitude of our Aryan brothers, let us see how their way of envisaging the universe differs from our own.

To begin with, that moral and personal God, which we regard as essential to the very idea of religion, is wholly absent from their minds. In place thereof we find "an omnipresent, omnipotent, omniparous, and omnivorous Essence or Ether, from which all spring, in which all have their being, and into which all disappear at their dissolution" (p. 111). We believe that the soul, having come into being at birth, will continue to exist for ever. They believe further that it has existed always. Immortality is with them an inseparable attribute of the soul. We believe that the soul, after its brief probation in this mortal sphere, passes to eternal bliss or eternal woe. They believe that, unless it has succeeded in quenching all desire, it will come into earthly existence again in a form which is somehow determined by its previous conduct (p. 63). "There can be no other explanation," declares our author, "for the amount of evil which prevails in the world, for the immunity often enjoyed in this life by the evil-doer, and for the success which at times attends the wicked." We believe that we are lost and fallen beings and have need of a Divine Saviour to restore us to peace with God. They believe that there is no help for man save in man. "The human mind has no one except its own self to help it to release itself from the bondage

of ignorance and of evil desires" (p. 265). We believe in an ultimate restitution of all things. They believe that the wheel of existence goes on for ever without beginning and without end, remorselessly grinding out good and evil, joy and sorrow, and that the thing to be aimed at is for the individual to escape from it, and to pass into the still region called Nirvana, "where beyond these voices there is peace." This does not consist in annihilation, but in losing the consciousness of self. The soul that could do this "would look with unconcern upon the evanescent creation, would not be swayed from its even balance by any event, convinced at all times of each such event being only a ripple in the wave of life, and would maintain throughout its earthly career perfect serenity without elation in prosperity or despondency in adversity, conscious only of the eternal presence out of which all ripples spring" (p. 21).

Self-consciousness, we are told, is the root of "worldliness." There is no Dualism in things, but man is somehow conscious of a Dualism, and so long as he continues in this state he can never enter upon eternal joy, which is only to be attained by the individual becoming merged in the universal being. In order to rid ourselves of this false Dualism, we must suppress the appetites with which, we are told, the mind is gifted merely that it may have the opportunity of keeping them under control (p. 50). They are somewhat curiously classified as "anger, avarice, delusion, envy, lust, and vanity" (p. 43). Anger can never be beneficial, though the simulation of it may sometimes be permissible in a wicked world (pp. 45, 148). The mind must cease "to have any worldly thought, good or bad," before it can "approach the Godhead out of which it sprang" (p. 286). The suppression of evil desire ought to come first, but that is not enough until it has taught us the vanity of all desire (p. 317). "The stages recognised by the Sages for the attainment of bliss are:—(1) laudable desire; (2) exercise of reason; (3) weakening of desire; (4) suppression of all desire; (5) disappearance of all objects of desire; and (6) godliness.

It is evident that a philosophy of this sort is not one calculated to ensure success in this coarse mundane sphere. But, then, neither is the Christian religion, which was accepted, but never assimilated, by the burly barbarians of the North. There is this much however to be said in favour of Christianity, that it lends itself better than Indian ideas to becoming a social religion, whereas the latter naturally lead to asceticism. Of this there are two kinds. "The first is the control of the breath of life, and the second is the light of knowledge" (p. 272). "Forced or coercive asceticism," which consists in the control of the breath (p. 272), incapacitates the mind alike for evil and for good (p. 273). The reader who wishes to acquire the art of controlling the breath of life must read page 276. With patience he may attain to wonderful results, as, for instance, to lift his "material frame partially in the air, to feel the unity of the eternal essence, to observe the cogitations of other minds (or to practice what is called thought-reading) at pleasure, and even to manifest oneself

spiritually wheresoever and to whomsoever one chooses. This is however the last stage, which is difficult and rarely possible of attainment by social man. Hence those whose ambition it is to attain it reside in seclusion, in localities inaccessible to worldly mortals." Here we have a manifest allusion to the Mahatmas, with whom Madame Blavatsky at one time made us familiar. I believe she derived her knowledge of them from Philostratus' life of Apollonius of Tyana, with which she was well acquainted through the medium of an English translation. In that veracious work the Indian sages are described as walking in the air about three feet above the ground and performing other marvels, such as were ascribed to Koot Hoomi. If Mr Mallik has any evidence of the existence of Mahatmas otherwise than in the imagination of Madame Blavatsky and of the Indian disciples whom she fascinated by her personality, he would be doing us a real service by adducing it.

The resemblance of Indian to Greek Philosophy will at once strike the classical student who reads this volume. The parallelism might be drawn out in many particulars of which space does not here allow. But it would be interesting if someone with the requisite knowledge would explain how this parallelism came about. Is it due merely to the workings of the same Aryan mind? Or did it arise from actual contact between Greeks and Indians? If so, when? And which side was it that influenced the other?

The Christian Scientists will do well to take note of the coincidence with their own views which pervades Indian philosophy. "Pleasure and pain," we are told, "do not appertain to the body, nor do they affect the soul; but they proceed only from desire nursed by ignorance, on the expulsion of which all sense of pleasure and pain disappears" (pp. 316, 317). "Desire nursed by ignorance" is the Indian equivalent of that "carnal mind" to which the delusion of evil is due. How this delusion comes about in a world in which all is God and all is good, the Christian Scientists do not explain. At least I am unable to accept the explanation that has been offered me, namely, that evil is due to a delusion of the devil, and that the devil does not exist!

Mr Manmath Mallik, on the other hand, has a solution of the problem of being against which no logical objection lies, however unpalatable it may appear on other grounds. It is that we are creatures in the dream of an Infinite Being, who, omnipotent though he be, cannot change the laws of his mental action, "since he is not awake nor able to exercise his powers" (p. 104). What, then, when the sleeper awakes? We shall go where dreams go to. Shall we say to him, "Dream on" or "Awake thou that sleepest"? In the last number of this Journal Mr Schiller suggested the idea of a cosmic nightmare, of which we have not yet learnt to dissipate the spell. But if we are the creatures in that nightmare, we cannot hope to dissipate the spell; and, if we could, where should we be?

ST GEORGE STOCK.

*Biographia Philosophia: A Retrospect.*—By Alexander Campbell Fraser.  
—W. Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh and London, 1904.—Pp.  
xiv + 335.

THIS book will receive a warm welcome from many generations of old students, and may well appeal at the same time to the interests of a wider circle of readers. It has been published in a year of philosophical autobiographies; and, more fortunate than Bain or Herbert Spencer, Professor Fraser has himself seen the appearance of the story of his own life and thought, and still bears lightly the burden of his eighty-five summers. The narrative is enlivened by many picturesque glimpses of character and incident during a period of great social and intellectual change. The author's own life has always been lived in interesting surroundings. But it has been the uneventful life of a scholar; and, from early years to old age, its dominant note has been the persistent and consistent sifting of experience in quest of truth. "The *Biographia*," as the author says, "was introduced for the sake of *Philosophia*, so that it was not a story of personal incidents for their own sake. The narrative is intended partly to infuse some familiar human interest into this account of a philosophical endeavour to deal with the riddle of the universe, and partly to show how racial, educational, and social influences, as well as changing phases of thought and national sentiment, in the last eighty years of the nineteenth century, have tended to direct the issue of that intellectual endeavour."

In the author's case, as in many other cases, the religious perplexities of boyhood gave the first stimulus to metaphysical reflection, while the circumstances of his life left him free to devote his whole mind to the problems of man's place and destiny in the universe. The chief formative influences upon his thought were probably Hamilton, who first introduced him to systematic philosophical study, and Berkeley, who attracted him early in life, and to the elucidation of whose thought he devoted his maturity. Hamilton's own positive contribution towards a solution never seems to have satisfied him, and indeed contained little to satisfy anyone. The elaborate idealisms of the post-Kantians struck him with astonishment at their pretensions, but produced no logical conviction. The great achievements in science, of which the century was full, were seen only to arrange the materials and bring the problem to a point without giving any solution of it. All through the intellectual development which he traces, it is clear that Professor Fraser was never far from the Berkeleyan view, which he ultimately came to formulate and enforce—that the essence of all things is spiritual, and that the constancy of natural law is an evidence that the power at the heart of the universe is a moral power. "That every new discovery of a natural cause was a fresh revelation of God had become" (he says) "my habitual conception. If *all* active causation or power, as seen at our point of view, must be spiritual—if natural law is only the grammar

of the divine language of nature—then positive science, instead of extinguishing metaphysics and religion, must deepen and enlighten both. Cosmical change is then the immediate issue of omnipresent and omnipotent will.” And the view of the universe, as a moral universe, gives the clue to the riddle of man’s destiny: “As to the posthumous life, may we not leave our terrestrial embodiment in theistic faith and hope, departing like the patriarch, when he went out, ‘not knowing whither he went’; assured at least that we live and die in a universe that *must* be fundamentally divine, and in which, therefore, all events, death included, must co-operate for the realisation of divine ideal good to those who seek the good?”

W. R. SORLEY.

CAMBRIDGE.

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*The Lausiatic History of Palladius.*—By Dom Cuthbert Butler.  
—Cambridge University Press, 2 vols., 1898 and 1904.

SPACE forbids me to give more than an abstract of the contents of these two volumes, which, however, are epoch-making for the study of the origins of Christian and Oriental monasticism. We have before us a perfectly critical edition and an exhaustive examination of a book which has perhaps been more widely diffused among Christians, and has had a deeper formative influence on their religion, than any other, the New Testament alone excepted. The Benedictine Order, to which Mr Butler belongs, may be congratulated on the completion of a work so entirely worthy of its best traditions.

The Lausiatic history, so called because it was dedicated to Lausus, a dignitary of the Byzantine Court, is an account of the monks of Egypt between 388 and 399, written in Greek about A.D. 420, by Palladius, who had passed those eleven years among them. In his first volume Mr Butler shows that the book contains a genuine history; and this he isolates, with the help of the MSS. and of the old Eastern versions, from later and less historical accretions. Earlier critics, *e.g.*, Weingarten and Lucius, had argued that the work was a mere romance. The latter of these two scholars, Dr Lucius, it may be remarked, had, by similar and equally superficial arguments, tried to show that Philo’s account of the Therapeutæ was neither Philonean nor historical. His ill success in both fields of research is notable.

In his first volume Mr Butler classifies the various recensions and versions of Palladius, and then, after a clear and careful account of early Egyptian monasticism and of the changes subsequently introduced in the system when it passed eastwards into the hands of S. Basil, and westwards into those of S. Benedict, he begins his second volume with a review of the various families of text, based on an examination of fifty-three Greek

MSS. and of the Latin version of Rufinus, of the Coptic edited by Amelineau, and of the Armenian, Ethiopic, and Syriac versions, the last of which has recently been edited and translated by Dr Budge.

After thus initiating us in the principles on which he constructs his text, Mr Butler gives us the text itself, which fills a hundred and seventy pages, over the half of each page consisting of *testimonia* and variants; and the volume ends with a hundred pages of notes, chronological tables, and indices. It also contains a map of monastic Egypt, marking the many places mentioned in the text.

It is significant of the growing sense of the value of this page and phase of Christian history, so long almost buried under later accretions or obscured by rash criticism, that Dr Preuschen, in 1897, published a work covering nearly the same ground as Mr Butler's, in which he arrived at the same conclusions with regard to the historicity of Palladius' memoirs.

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11 *Pascal (C.)* Dei e diavoli; saggi sul paganesimo fiorentino. 182p. Firenze, 1904.

*Stawell (F. Melian)* Hellenism and Christianity. Indep. R., Nov. 1904.

[The hope of the "Incarnation" might be called the very life of Christianity. But it need not imply anything necessarily unique in the position or powers of Christ. Stoicism held in suspension the unsolved problems of Hellenic thought; it needed the supplement of the principle involved in Christianity.]

14 *Acland-Troyle (R.)* The Church and Modern Society. Sermons preached at St Andrews, Pau. 98p. Skeffington, 1904.

*Tuker (M. A. R.)* The Title "Catholic" and the Roman Church. 16p.

Cath. Truth Soc., 1904.

- Heath (Richard)* The Captive City of God; or, the Churches seen in the Light of the Democratic Ideal. 192p. Fifield, 1904.
- Hocking (Silas K.)* Chapters in Democratic Christianity. 90p. Fifield, 1904.
- Loane (M.)* The Religion of the Respectable Poor. Cont. R., Nov. 1904.
- 15 *Trevelyan (G. M.)* On Religious Conformity. Indep. R., Dec. 1904.  
[True opinions can only spread by dint of courageous avowal. Outside "our Father's house" are many mansions.]
- 20 *Anon.* The Christian Society, I. The Jewish Community. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.
- Hass (F. W.)* The Development of a Political System in the Early Christian Church. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1904.
- 21 *Neighbor (R. E.)* The Diaconate: A New Testament Study. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1904.
- 26 *Kalweil (Paul)* Kant's Stellung zur Kirche. 88p. Beyer, 1904.  
[For his own personal religious needs Kant did not require the Church. It had, however, importance for him as a public institution, as an educator of the people.]
- 40 *Granger (F.)* The Inspiration of the Liturgy. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.  
[The faith of the Church at its beginning is found in creed and liturgy; the doctrine and worship of Christ there found determined what writings should be regarded as canonical; and no textual or higher criticism of the N.T. really affects the authority of the most ancient creed.]
- 41 *Burkitt (F. C.)* The Palestinian Syriac Lectionary. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.  
[Against Prof. Marshall's theory (*J. of Th. St.*, April 1904) that the lectionary was composed in Egypt.]
- Droosten (P. H.)* Poems of Liturgical Lectons and Gospels. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.
- 43 Book of Common Prayer, commonly known as Laud's Liturgy for the use of the Church of Scotland. Intr. by J. Cooper. Blackwood, 1904.
- u *Wordsworth (C.)* and *Littlehales (H.)* The Old Service-Books of the English Church. 336p. Methuen, 1904.  
["Antiquary's Books."]
- 45 *Hunter (J.)* Devotional services for public worship. Abridged edit. 146p. Dent, 1904.
- 50 *Burrage (Champlin)* The Church Covenant Idea: its origin and development. 230p. Phil. Amer. Bapt. Publ. Soc., 1904.  
[Traces the history of the Church covenant, or oath, from apostolic days to the Reformation, where it appeared among the Anabaptists who "covenanted with God to do His will, and had been admitted into the 'body of Christ,' or the Church of God, by baptism."]
- v. Dobschütz (Prof.)* Sakrament und Symbol im Urchristentum. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1905.  
[Exegetical and historical study. Baptism and the Lord's Supper were derived from Jesus himself, and regarded as more than symbols, being sacraments spiritually efficacious, though entirely removed from the later magic realism.]
- 51 *Rogers (C. F.)* Baptism by Affusion in the Early Church. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.
- 53 *Andersen (Azel)* Das Abendmahl in den zwei ersten Jahrhunderten nach Christus. 100p. Ricker, 1904.
- 90 *Morgan (G. Campbell)* Evangelism. A Study of Need and Opportunity. 100p. Revell, 1904.
- D DOCTRINE** 10 "God, 22 "Christ, 60 " Eschatology, 70 " Faith, 90 Apologetics.
- Moberly (R. C.)* Problems and Principles. Being Papers on subjects Theological and Ecclesiastical. Ed. by R. B. Rackham. 428p. Murray, 1904.  
[A Collection of the various papers which the author finds occasion to print and publish. They deal on the one hand with many of the serious practical problems which are likely to vex the church in the near future, and on the other with theological problems bearing on the doctrines of Atonement and divine Personality.]
- Terry (G. F.)* The old theology in new age. 284p. S. C. Brown, 1904.  
[Author has tried to fulfil the neglected half of the theologian's duties, viz., to interweave the best "Forward thinking" with the conviction that the theology of the schools must become the ethics of humanity.]
- Mackintosh (H. R.)* Dogmatic Theology: Its Nature and Function. Expos., Dec. 1904.
- h *Clemen (Carl)* Die religionsgeschichtliche Methode in der Theologie. 39p. Ricker, 1904.
- Emery (Louis)* Introduction à l'Étude de la Théologie Protestante, avec Index Bibliographique. 710p. Rouge et Cie, 1904.
- Swing (A. T.)* Outline of the doctrinal development of the Western Church, based on the "Dogmengeschichte" of Friedrich Loofs. 87p. Oberlin, Swing, 1904.
- 12 *Hügel (Baron Frédéric de)* Du Christ Éternel et de nos Christologies Successives. (Extrait de "La Quinzaine" du 1<sup>er</sup> Juin 1904.)  
[The Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel are not historical documents of the same order. The Synoptics are nearer to the phenomenal truth, they show us the Messiah; the Fourth Gospel to the absolute truth of the Word. The two representations must be combined. Comparison of author's position with that of M. Blondel.]
- 17 *Pritchard (C. H.)* Is Christianity Miraculous? S. P. C. K., 1904.
- 29 *Clarke (J. Langton)* The Eternal Saviour-Judge. 353p. Murray, 1904.
- 30 *Gant (Frederick James)* From our Dead Selves to Higher Things. A Course of Human Experience and Progressive Development. 140p. Elliot Stock, 1904.
- 60 *Fechner (G. T.)* The little book of life after death: translated from the German by M. C. Wadsworth, with Intro. by W. James. 136p. Bost., Little, 1904.  
[By the great German physicist and philosopher, first published in Germany in 1836, and now first translated into English. The author believes that each individual leads three lives on earth; the first he designates as that before birth during which the body develops from the germ; the second, that between birth and death during which the spirit unfolds and grows; the third he describes as that after the death, being the only real life, a higher evolution of the life we now live.]
- 63 *Skirine (J. Huntley)* Personality and Body: A Study in the Resurrection. Cont. R., Dec. 1904.
- 65 *M'Taggart (J. Ellis)* Human Pre-existence. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1904.  
[The belief in human pre-existence is a more probable doctrine than any other form of the belief in immortality. Reasons are given for thinking that immortality would still have meaning and value even though it have to be admitted that memory is not immortal. Particularly people who love one another might still continue in their love.]

- Osler (William)* Science and Immortality. 94p. Constable, 1904.
- M<sup>c</sup>Connell (S. D.)* The Evolution of Immortality. 204p. Macmillan, 1904.
- Hemphill (S.)* Immortality in Christ. 112p. Simpkin, 1904.
- 70 *Boutroux (E.)* Esprit et autorité. Rev. chrétienne, Aug. 1904. [Analysis of the thought of the late Ang. Sabatier's *Les Religions d'autorité et la religion de l'Esprit.*]
- 76 *Bertrand (A. N.)* Psychologie de l'intolérance. Rev. chrétienne, Oct. 1904.
- Berle (A. A.)* The Illusions of a Personal Theology. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1904. [Deplores insistence on personal views in theology, which means disunion and loss of moral power.]
- 80 *Churchman (P. H.)* An Appeal to the New School of Theology (II.). Biblio. Sacra., Oct. 1904. [Asking the advanced school for positive teaching, instead of negative criticism and attacks on conservatives.]
- 81 *Denney (J.) and others.* Questions of Faith; Series of Lectures on the Creed. 220p. Hodder, 1904.
- Bindley (T. H.)* Pontius Pilate in the Creed. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904. [The name not only fixes the date of the Crucifixion, but locates the beginnings of the Creed in Syria.]
- 83 *Gibson (Edgar C. S.)*, ed. Report of the Meetings in Defence of the Athanasian Creed, held Jan. 1873. New edition. 65p. Longmans, 1904.
- 90 *Horne (C. Silvester)* Common-Sense Christianity. Some Christian Evidences for the Man in the Street. Freedom of Faith Series. 128p. Clarke, 1904.
- E ETHICS 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics, Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.
- Garvie (A. E.)* Conscience and Creed. Expos., Sept. 1904. [Showing how progress in ethical consciousness modifies creeds and interpretations of creeds.]
- 1 *Anon.* The Return of the Catechist. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904. [Describes books useful for catechetical teaching, and sketches the S. Sulpice method.]
- 2 *Augustine (St., Bishop of Hippo)* Confessions. (Miniature Library of Devotion.) 156p. Seeley, 1904.
- 3 *Gifford (O. P.)* Old and New Evangelism. Baptist Rev. and Exp., Oct. 1904.
- 6 *Brierley (J.)* Common life. 320p. J. Clarke, 1904.
- Illingworth (J. R.)* Christian Character: being some Lectures on the Elements of Christian Ethics. 214p. Macmillan, 1904. [The aim is expository: to indicate in outline the essential and permanent elements in Christian life and conduct. Author thinks the fundamental nature of the Christian character, as exhibited by its best representatives, has always remained the same.]
- Zöckler (O.)* Die Tugendlehre des Christenthums. 390p. Bertelsmann, 1904.
- Robins (H. E.)* The ethics of the Christian Life; or, the science of right living. 483p. Phil., Griffith & R., 1904.
- Garvie (Alfred E.)* The Christian Personality. (Christian Ideals.) 148p. Bagster & Sons, 1904.
- Stapleton (J. H.)* Moral briefs: a concise, reasoned, and popular exposition of Catholic morals. 311p. N. Y., Benziger, 1904.
- 10 *Aristotle.* Ethics. Ed. with Intro. by J. Burnet. Methuen, 1904.
- Sorley (W. R.)* The Ethics of Naturalism. A Criticism. (2nd ed.) 352p. Blackwood, 1904. [Numerous additions have been made to this edition of a well-known book. A new chapter on the "Nature of the Moral Standard" appears, and various recent contributions to evolutionist ethics are discussed.]
- Friedmann (J.)* Die Lehre vom Gewissen in den Systemen des ethischen Idealismus. 81p. Geyer, 1904.
- Koppelman (W.)* Kritik des sittlichen Bewusstseins vom philosophischen und historischen Standpunkt. 393p. Reuther & Reichard, 1904. [Seeks the solution of the ethical problem in the direction indicated by Kant, but deviating from him in the account of the fundamental moral principle.]
- Laguna (T. De)* Ethical Subjectivism. Phil. R., Nov. 1904. [The view that virtue is knowledge is not incompatible with ethical subjectivism, and can be reconciled with voluntarism.]
- 20 *Hesse (A.)* Natur und Gesellschaft. 245p. Fischer, 1904.
- Ramsay (Alexander)* The Christian Citizen. (Christian Ideals.) 140p. Bagster, 1904.
- Daireaux (Marie)* La sur-action. Rev. Phil., Sept. 1904. [Abnormal action in times of moral transition occurs in three types, which are discussed.]
- Montgomery (H. J. B.)* English Prisons and their Methods. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1904. [A strong indictment of the English Prison System as providing "forcing houses for criminals, paupers, and lunatics."]
- 23 *Clark (J. B.)* Problem of Monopoly. Macmillan, 1904.
- 26 *Devine (E. T.)* The principles of relief. 495p. N. Y., Macmillan, 1904.
- Rogers (C. F.)* Charitable relief (Hand-books for clergy). 192p. Longmans, 1904.
- 27 *Macmillan (Margaret)* Education through the Imagination. 210p. Sonnenschein, 1904.
- Barth (Paul)* Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, iii. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxviii 3, 1904. [Discusses the Greek method of Education and the conception of Pedagogic in Plato and Aristotle.]
- Bacon (B. W.)* The Problem of Religious Education and the Divinity School. Amer. J. of Theol., Oct. 1904. [Protestantism, in the absence of governmental authority, is threatened with anarchy. The remedy lies in the submission of the Reformation principle of the right of (unenlightened) private judgment to the expert authority of learning and in the maintenance of the highest standard of religious education.]
- Thompson (H. M.)* Moral Instruction in Schools (continued). Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1904.

[The theological systems of instruction at the present day are very little suited for imparting moral instruction. The article contains a plea for the introduction into our schools of moral instruction on a non-theological basis.]

*Boone (R. Gause)* Science of Education. 407p. Scribner, 1904.

*Froebel (F.)* Education of Man. (Int. Educ. Series.) 366p. S. Appleton, 1904.

*Hayward (F. H.)* The Educational Ideas of Pestalozzi and Fröbel. 119p. Holland, 1904.

*King (H. Churchill)* Personal and ideal elements in education. 277p. N. Y., Macmillan, 1904.

*Norris (W. F.)* Elementary schools (Handbooks for the Clergy). 186p. Longmans, 1904.

*How (F. D.)* Six great Schoolmasters: Hawtrey, Moberly, Kennedy, Vaughan, Temple, Bradley. Illus. 292p. Methuen, 1904.

*Fowler (J. T.)* Durham University, earlier foundations and present colleges. (College Histories.) 324p. F. E. Robinson, 1904.

*Davies (J. L.)* Working Men's College, 1854-1904. Records of its history and work by members of the College. 306p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Britan (Halbert H.)* Music and Morality. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1904.

[The man who lives exclusively in the realm of music may fail to cultivate those mental traits which alone give a strong moral character. Still, a genuine appreciation of the higher conception of music signifies a mental development that easily lends itself to an appreciation of beauty under any form, and hence moral beauty.]

*Dugas (L.)* Psychologie des examens. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1904.

[Examinations rest on a just principle and are a social necessity. Defects as pointed out by Balzac, Taine and Jules Simon dwelt upon, and reform in present system advocated.]

*Robertson (John M.)*, ed. Courses of Study. 524p. Watts, 1904.

*Macpherson (Hector)* Books to Read, and How to Read Them. 252p. Blackwood, 1904.

28 *Jordan (Alfred)* The Bias of Patriotism. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1904.

[Any patriotism which regards the interests of a people as questions solely of physical power, or territory, or trade, is narrow and confining. The proof of an advanced stage of culture is the capacity to take advantage of the best influences exerted by humanity at large.]

*Marquet (F.)* Sur l'idée de Patrie. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Sept. 1904.

["One's country" signifies the ideal of a type of individuality. War contradicts such an ideal, which individuals can realise only in peace.]

30 *M'Carthy (James)* The Christian at Home. (Christian Ideals.) 140p. Bagster, 1904.

*Keller (Helen)* My Key of Life: Optimism. Essay. 68p. Isbister, 1904.

*Freeland (John)* Domestic Affection in Saintly Characters. Dub. R., Oct. 1904.

36 *Shearer (W. J.)* The management and training of children. 287p. N. Y., Richardson, 1904.

*Urwick (E. J.)*, ed. Studies of Boy Life in our Cities. Written by various Authors for the Toynbee Trust. 320p. Dent, 1904.

84 *Mackenzie (W. W.)* Licensing Act, 1904. Full explan. notes, intr., appendix. 104p. Butterworth, 1904.

F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons

*Allen (James)* By-ways of Blessedness. 207p. Savoy Pub. Co., 1904.

*Anderson (J. B.)* The Power of the Holy Spirit for Witnessing. Baptist R. and Exp., Oct. 1904.

*Smyth (J. K.)* The Work of the Ministry. New Church R., Oct. 1904.

2 *Ainger (Alfred)* The Gospel and Human Life. Sermons. 364p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Brooks (Phillip)* Seeking Life, and other Sermons. 382p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Bradley (Dean)* Innocents' Day Addresses. Delivered in Westminster Abbey. 137p. Murray, 1904.

[These addresses have been gathered together by Dean Bradley's daughter, who says her father merely endeavoured to instil into the hearts of the children the teaching of Christ in its most beautiful and simplest form. They are a fitting memorial of the Dean.]

*Edwards (Jonathan)* Selected Sermons, ed. with Introd. and Notes by H. N. Gardiner. 212p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Davidson (Randall T.)* The Christian Opportunity, being Sermons and Speeches delivered in America. 199p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Mortimer (Alfred G.)* Life and its Problems. (World's Pulpit Series.) 238p. Brown, 1904.

*Westcott (Brooke Foss)* Peterborough Sermons. 400p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Wellton (Right Rev. Bishop)* The School of Faith. Sermons preached in Westminster Abbey. 210p. Bemrose, 1904.

*Wilberforce (Basil)* Speaking God of His Name. Sermons. 241p. Brown, 1904.

*Jones (Spencer)* Now and Then, and other Sermons. (World's Pulpit Series.) 209p. Brown, 1904.

*Selby (T. G.)* The God of the Patriarchs. Brief Studies in the Early Scriptures of the Old Testament. (Present-Day Preachers, vol. ix.) 290p. Marshall, 1904.

j *Campbell (R. J.)* Sermons to Young Men. (World's Pulpit Series.) 216p. Brown, 1904.

*Lucas (Herbert)* In the Morning of Life: Considerations and Meditations for Boys. 306p.

G BIOGRAPHY 2 English

H *Delehaye (H.)* S. Grégoire le Grand dans l'hagiographie grecque. Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 4.

2 *Bremond (H.)* Sir Thomas More (Blessed Thomas More). Tr. Harold Child. (The Saints.) 222p. Duckworth, 1904.

T *Bunyan (J.)* By author of "Mark Rutherford." (Literary Lives.) 258p. Hodder, 1904.

- Gilmour (R.)* Samuel Rutherford. Study biographical and somewhat critical in History of the Scottish Covenant. 256p. Oliphant, 1904.
- Worley (George)* Jeremy Taylor. Sketch of his Life and Times, with a popular exposition of his works. 239p. Longmans, 1904.
- V *Smith (Goldwin)* My Memory of Gladstone. 92p. Unwin, 1904.
- Creighton (Mandell)* Life and Letters. By his wife. 2 vols. With Portraits and other Illustrations. 432, 544p. Longmans, 1904.
- Johnston (John Octavius)* Life and Letters of Henry Parry Liddon. With concluding chapter by the Lord Bishop of Oxford. 424p. Longmans, 1904.
- Hirst (F. W.)* Adam Smith. (English Men of Letters.) 240p. Macmillan, 1904.
- Cobbe (Frances Power)* Life of Frances Power Cobbe, as told by herself. Additions by the Author. Intro. by Blanche Atkinson. Posthumous Edition. 722p. Sonnenschein, 1904.
- ["My life," says the authoress, "has been an interesting one to live, and I hope that this record of it may not prove too dull to read."] *Tooley (Sarah A.)* The Life of Florence Nightingale. 344p. Bousfield, 1904.
- Garnett (Richard)* Coleridge. (Miniature Series of Great Writers.) 112p. Bell, 1904.
- Guiney (Louise Imogen)* Hurrell Froude. Memoranda and Comments. 7 illustrations. 439p. Methuen, 1904.
- Knight (W.)* Retrospects. (First Series.) 310p. Smith, Elder, 1904.
- Ménant (D.)* Max Müller et M. Malabari. Rev. chrétienne, Oct. 1904.
- Moberly (W. H.)* Robert Campbell Moberly. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.
- [Written to correct, from an inside point of view, the appreciation in the *Ch. Q. R.* of April 1904.] *Stubb's (William)*, Bishop of Oxford. Letters, 1825-1901. Ed. by William Holden Hutton. 436p. Constable, 1904.
- Bertouch (Baroness De)* The Life of Father Ignatius, O.S.B., the Monk of Llanthony Abbey. 599p. Methuen, 1904.
- Conway (Moncure D.)* Autobiography, Memories, and Experiences. 2 vols. 404, 423p. Cassell, 1904.
- [Review will follow.] *Covell (G.)* Life and Letters of Edward Byles Cowell. 492p. Macmillan, 1904.
- 3 *Atkins (H. G.)* Johann Wolfgang Goethe. (Little Biographies.) 180p. Methuen, 1904.
- Ellis (W. A.)* Life of Richard Wagner. Vol. iv. Kegan Paul, 1904.
- 4 *Dartique (H.)* Les idées religieuses de George Sand. Rev. chrétienne, Aug. 1904.
- H HISTORY x *Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.*
- Greenidge (A. H. J.)* A History of Rome during the Later Republic and Earlier Principate. Vol. i. From the Tribune of Tiberius Gracchus to the second Consulship of Marius, B.C. 133-104. 508p. Methuen, 1904.
- Harnack (Adolf)* The Relation between Ecclesiastical and General History. Cont. R., Dec. 1904.
- [Address at St Louis Congress.] *Révillé (Jean)* L'Histoire des Religions et l'Histoire ecclésiastique. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1904.
- [Address before the second International Congress of the History of Religions at Basle, Sept. 1904.] x *Adler (E. N.)* American Autos. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.
- [A list of cases, and statement of a number of charges.] *Haynes (E. S. P.)* Religious Persecution; study in political psychology. 220p. Duckworth, 1904.
- C *Evetts (B.)* History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria. 1. St Mark to Theonas (300). Arabic Text, trans. and annotated. "Patrologia Orientalis," 1, 2. 103-214p. Paris, Didot, 1904.
- Burkitt (F. C.)* Early Eastern Christianity: the Syriac-speaking Church. St Margaret's Lectures, 1904. 240p. Murray, 1904.
- Görres (F.)* Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des 40. jährigen. Waffenstillstandes zwischen dem Christentum und dem antiken Staat seit 260. Z. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 3, 1904.
- Offord (J.)* Two Greek Physicians at the Court of the Cæsars. Biblia, Oct. 1904.
- Ortroy (F. van)* Saint Ambrose et l'empereur Théodose. Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 4.
- [Denying, against the Duc de Broglie, the historicity of Theodoret's story of Ambrose forbidding Theodosius' entrance into the cathedral at Milan.] *Von Destimon (Justus)* Untersuchungen zu Flavius Josephus. (Wissensch. Beil. z. Jahrbesher. des Kgl. Gymn. zu Kiel, Progr.-Nr. 330.) 35p. Kiel, 1904.
- Palmer (E. H.)* Eagle and the Cross. Glimpses of Imperial Rome in the Life of Christ and the Church. 352p. Skeffington, 1904.
- H *Harrison (Frederic)* Theophano; The Crusade of the Tenth Century. A Romantic Monograph. 352p. Chapman, 1904.
- Freeman (E. A.)* Western Europe in the Fifth Century. An Aftermath. 386p. Macmillan, 1904.
- M *Church (A. J.)* The Crusaders. A story of the war for the Holy Sepulchre. With Illustrations by George Morrow. 380p. Seeley, 1904.
- Poncelet (A.)* Le légendier de Saint Felix de Pavie, imprimé en 1523. Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 4.
- R *Berbig (G.)* Akten zur Reformationsgeschichte in Coburg und im Ortslande Franken. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1905.
- S *Nichols (Francis Morgan)* The Epistles of Erasmus. From his earliest letters to his fifty-first year. Arranged in order of time. English translations from his correspondence, with a commentary confirming the chronological arrangement and supplying further biographical matter. Vol. ii. 638p. Longmans, 1904.

*Wernle (Paul)* Die Renaissance des Christentums im 16<sup>ten</sup> Jahrhundert.

J. C. B. Mohr, 1904.

[No. 40 of the "Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte."]

- 1 English Monasteries, from Saxon days to their dissolution. 124p. Palmer, 1904.  
*Rhoades (James)* The Little Flowers of St Francis of Assisi. Rendered into English verse. 318p. Chapman, 1904.

2 *Anon.* The Oxford School of Historians. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
 [Brief estimates of Stubbs, Freeman, Green, Froude, Powell, etc.]

2S *Gheyn (J. van den)* Note sur le manuscrit no. 9890-92 de la bibliothèque royale de Belgique et le lieu de sépulture de B. Jean Fisher. Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 4.

*Frere (W. H.)* English Church in reigns of Elizabeth and James I., 1558-1625 (Hist. of Eng. Ch., v. 5). 428p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Plummer (Alfred)* English Church History, 1575-1649. 179p. Clark, 1904.

2W *Anon.* Religion in Cambridge. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.

*Innes (A. T.)* The Religious Forecast in England. Amer. J. of Theol., Oct. 1904.

4U *Wadia (P. A.)* The Philosophers and the French Revolution. 131p.

Sonnenschein, 1904.

56W *Freer (Miss Goodrich)* Inner Jerusalem. Constable, 1904.

## I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R. C.

Church 3 Anglican.

C *Corssen (P.)* Die Vita Polycarpi.

Z. f. d. neuest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1904.

[Writer identifies Pionius, the author of the Vita, with Pionius the Martyr, believes him to have possessed an authentic Asiatic tradition, and uses his statement that Polycarp received his teaching from Christ to discredit Irenæus' testimony that he received it from the Apostle.]

*Cramer (J. A.)* Die erste Apologie Justins. (Continued.)

Z. f. d. neuest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1904.

*Delehaye (H.)* Castor et Pollux dans les légendes hagiographiques.

Anal. Bolland., Tome 23, fasc. 4.

[Contests Rendel Harris' theory in his *The Dioscuri in the Christian Legends.*]

*Hilgenfeld (A.)* Der unitarische Pseudo-Ignatius.

Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 3, 1904.

*Hilgenfeld (A.)* Pseudo-Clemens in moderner Façon.

Z. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 4, 1904.

[Criticism of Waltz's book on the pseudo-Clementine writings in *Texte u. Untersuch.*, xxv. 4.]

*Jenkins (C.)* The Origen-Citations in Cramer's Catena on 1 Corinthians.

J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.

*Robinson (J. Armitage)* Recent Work on Euthalius. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.

*Souter (A.)* An unknown Fragment of the Pseudo-Augustinian *Questiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti.* J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.

*Turner (C. H.)* The Letters of S. Isidore of Pelusium. J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.

*Feltoe (C. L.)*, ed. The Letters and Other Remains of Dionysius of Alexandria (Cambridge Patristic Texts.) Ed. by Dr A. J. Mason. 283p. Clay, 1904.

H *Paschal (G. W.)* Study of Quintus of Smyrna. 82p. Univ. of Chicago, 1904.

1 *Duchesne (E.)* Le "Domostroï." Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1904. [A Russian sixteenth century book of Christian instruction. Translation is given.]

2 *Anon.* The Intellectual Condition of Roman Catholicism in Germany. Edin. R., Oct. 1904.

*Anon.* France and the Vatican. Edin. R., Oct. 1904.

*Mater (André)* Disestablishment in France and its Consequences.

Cont. R., Oct. 1904.

*Ward (Wilfred)* Church and State in France. Mont. R., Dec. 1904.

[An attempt to give the opinion of the fair-minded public in France concerning the situation.]

3 *Addison (D. D.)* The Episcopalsians. (Story of the Churches.) 252p.

N. Y., Baker, 1904.

*Rawnsley (H. D.)* The Venerable Bede: his Life and Work. A Lecture delivered in the Town Hall, Sunderland. With an Appendix giving some account of Anglian Art in N. Britain, and a description of the Bede Memorial. Ill. by Charles Clement Hodges. Simpkin, 1904.

*Ryle (H. E.)* On the Church of England. Sermons and Addresses. 286p.

Macmillan, 1904.

W *Anon.* The English Church in Syria. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.

[Chiefly in its attitude to Christians of the Eastern churches.]

*Anon.* Church Reform. I. The Increase of the Episcopate. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.

*Anon.* Liverpool Cathedral and Diocese. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.

4 *Hoog (J. M. J.)* De evangelische richting en de belijdenis der Nederl. Herv. Kerk. Th. Tijds., Sept. 1904.

[Historical argument to show that these two are not in harmony.]

*Harris (J. Rendel)* The Influence of Quietism on the Society of Friends. Th. Tijds., Sept. 1904.

[Study of the teaching of Madame Guyon (article in English).]

5 *Beveridge (W.)* Short history of the Westminster Assembly. 186p.

T. & T. Clark, 1904.

*Brown (J.)* Commonwealth England. (Eras of Nonconformity.) 160p.

T. Law, 1904.

Free Church Union Case. Judgment of House of Lords, Aug. 1, 1904. Rev. by their Lordships. Blackwood, 1904.

Free Church of Scotland Appeals (The). Ed. R. L. Orr. Auth. report. Hodder, 1904.

*Nicoll (W. Robertson)* The Scottish Free Church Trust and its Donors.

Cont. R., Oct. 1904.

*Douglas (C.)* The Scottish Free Church Question. Cont. R., Nov. 1904.

*Anon.* The Case of the Scottish Churches. Quar. R., Oct. 1904.

- Anon.* Scottish Churches and the Law of Property. Edin. R., Oct. 1904.
- P.* Will the Scottish Crisis produce a Man? Fort. R., Dec. 1904.  
[Scotland waits for a second Chalmers, theologially emancipated. That he will be found in any of the Presbyterian Churches it would be rash to prophesy.]
- Stalker (J.)* John Knox: His Ideas and Ideals. 250p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.
- Lewis (H. Elvet)* Nonconformity in Wales. (Eras of Nonconformity.) 130p. Law, 1904.
- W Morris (G. P.)* Impending changes in Congregationalism. 15p. Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1904.
- Hurst (J. Fletcher, Bp.)* The History of Methodism. In 7 vols. VI. 3, Brit. Meth.; V. 4-6, World-wide Meth.; V. 7, American Methodism. N.Y., Eaton, 1904.
- 8 Graves (Charles)* A Century of Village Unitarianism. Being a History of the Reformed Christian (Unitarian) Church of Trenton, Oneida County, N.Y., 1803-1903. 96p. Ellis Co., 1904.
- L LITERATURE.** 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.
- Lee (Vernon)* The Nature of Literature, ii. Cont. R., Nov. 1904.
- R Saintsbury (George)* A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe. From the earliest texts to the present day. Vol. iii.: Modern Criticism. 676p. Blackwood, 1904.
- 2 Jones (W. Lewis)* Thomas Traherne and the Religious Poetry of the Seventeenth Century. Quar. R., Oct. 1904.
- S Elton (C. I.)* "William Shakespeare, his Family and Friends." Ed. by A. H. Thompson, with Memoir by Andrew Lang. 532p. Murray, 1904.
- T Donne (J.)* Poems. Ed. by E. K. Chambers. Intr. by G. Saintsbury. (Muses Libr.) 2 vols. 304, 336p. ea. Routledge, 1904.
- V Baillie-Saunders (Mrs)* The Philosophy of Dickens. A Study of his Life and Teaching as a Social Reformer. 176p. Glaisner, 1904.
- Barry (W.)* Heralds of Revolt; studies in modern literature and dogma. 400p. Hodder, 1904.
- Jack (Adolphus Alfred)* Shelley. An Essay. 128p. Constable, 1904.
- Anon.* Christina Rossetti. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1904.
- Rossetti (Christina G.)* Poetical Works, with Memoir and Notes by W. M. Rossetti. Macmillan, 1904.
- Myers (Frederic W. H.)* Fragments of Prose and Poetry. Ed. by his wife, Eveleen Myers. With Portraits. Longmans, 1904.
- W Masterman (G. F. G.)* After the Reaction. Cont. R., Dec. 1904.  
[Discusses the literary work of some of the younger English writers of to-day.]
- Phillips (Stephen)* The Sin of David. 77p. Macmillan, 1904.
- Wells (H. G.)* The Food of the Gods, and how it came to Earth. 326p. Macmillan, 1904.
- 3 Brederek (—)* Das Lied "Wie schön leuchtet der Morgenstern" und seine Lesarten. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1905.
- 4 Tilley (Arthur)* The Literature of the French Renaissance. 2 vols. 380, 376p. Clay, 1904.
- Soissons (Count S. C. de)* Maeterlinck as a Reformer of the Drama. Cont. R., Nov. 1904.
- 5 Anon.* The "Advocatus Diaboli" on the Divina Commedia. Quar. R., Oct. 1904.
- 9 Jebb (Sir Richard C.),* ed. Sophocles: Tragedies. Trans. into English Prose. 384p. Clay, 1904.
- Müller (A.)* Aesthetischer Kommentar zu den Tragödien des Sophokles. 525p. Paderborn, 1904.
- Murray (Gilbert)* The "Trojan Women" of Euripides. Indep. R., Dec. 1904.  
[The whole drama is a study of sorrow, a study too intense to admit the distraction of plot interest. Its inmost theme is the comforting power of sheer tragedy. Author translates some of the finer passages.]
- Glover (Terrot Reaveley)* Studies in Virgil. 326p. Arnold, 1904.  
[After an account of the age and the man, the author devotes the latter half of the book to a presentation of Virgil's interpretation of Life.]
- Ward (G. E.),* ed. The Quatrains of Hali. In the Roman Character. With Trans. in English. Frowde, 1904.
- M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY.** 4
- Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*
- Viénot (J.)* Le Congrès d'histoire des religions à Bâle. Rev. chrétienne, Oct. 1904.
- Curtiss (the late S. I.)* The Origin of Sacrifice among the Semites as deduced from facts gathered among Syrians and Arabs. Expos., Dec. 1904.  
[Sacrifice seems originally to have been regarded as payment for services rendered.]
- Frazer (J. G.)* The Origin of Circumcision. Indep. R., Nov. 1904.  
[Deals with certain ceremonies of the Australian aborigines, taking as text a number of totemic rites in which use is made of the blood of the men of the toteme. The evidence suggests that in the belief of the ancient Semites, the grave was a bourne from which only the circumcised traveller would return.]
- Frazer (J. G.)* Artemis and Hippolytus. Fort. R., Dec. 1904.  
[A chapter from forthcoming edition of *The Golden Bough.*]
- Frobenius (Leo)* Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes. 433p. Reimer, 1904.
- Wendland (P.)* Σωτήρ. Z. f. d. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1904.  
["A religious-historical investigation." Greek and Latin usages are examined.]
- 4 Beha-Ullah.* Le Livre de la Certitude (*Kitab-el-Ikan*), un des livres sacrés du Behaïsme, traduit du persan par H. Dreyfus et Mirza Habib-ullah Chirazi. 219p. Leroux, 1904.
- 5 Suyematsu (K.)* The Religions of Japan. Indep. R., Dec. 1904.

- [An attempt to explain the relative positions of Confucianism, Shintoism and Buddhism in Japan.]
- 6 *Menant (Mlle. D.)* Les Parsis à la cour d'Akbar.  
Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1904.  
[The substance of two papers read by Jivangi, J. Modi before Bombay branch of Royal Asiatic Society, to prove that Zoroastrianism was introduced to Akbar by Indian and not Persian Zoroastrians.]
- 7 *Adler (M. N.)* The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela (*continued*).  
Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
[Text, with facsimiles, and translation.]  
*Singer (C.)* The Falashas.  
Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
[A letter from an Abyssinian to Dr Singer, describing these people, who, settled in Abyssinia, practise Judaism.]  
*Poznański (S.)* Zu dem Geniza-Fragment, *J. Q. R.*, xvi. 690 ff. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
*Hirschfeld (H.)* The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge, vii.  
Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
*Belasco (G.)* Isaac Pulgar's "Support of the Religion." Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
[Account of an interesting thirteenth century defence of Judaism against the attacks of Abner of Burgos, a Jewish convert to Christianity.]  
*Belleli (L.)* The High Priest's Procession on the Day of Atonement.  
Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
*Steinschneider (M.)* Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters (*continued*). Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
*Guttmacher (Adolf), Rosenau (William)*, eds. Year-Book of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Vol. xiv. 252p.  
Williams & Norgate, 1904.  
Jewish Addresses. Delivered at services of the Jewish Religious Union during first session, 1902-3. 270p. Johnson, 1904.  
*Sidgwick (Mrs Alfred)* Scenes of Jewish Life. 310p. Arnold, 1904.  
*Wolf (L.)* The Zionist Peril.  
Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.  
[Unsparring condemnation of the Zionist movement.]
- 8 *Basset (R.)* Revue des périodiques sur l'Islam (1899-1902). *Concluded*.  
Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1904.  
*Evans (A. A.)* The beliefs of Early Mohammedans respecting a future existence.  
J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.
- 10 *Nassau (R. Hamill)* Fetichism in West Africa. Forty-one years' observation of native customs and superstitions. 389p.  
Duckworth, 1904.  
*Haslitt (W. C.)* Faiths and folklore; Dictionary of national beliefs, superstitions, popular customs, past and present, with their classical and foreign analogues described and illustrated, forming a new edition of "Popular Antiquities of Great Britain," by Brand & Ellis. 684p. 2 vols.  
Reeves, 1904.
- 31 *Cooke (J. H.)* The Book of the Unseen World. Baptist Rev. and Exp., Oct. 1904.  
[Referring to an allegorical poem engraved on an Egyptian sarcophagus (King Seth's), now in London.]  
*St Clair (G.)* The Book of the Dead.  
J. of Th. St., Oct. 1904.
- 51 *Giles (Lionel)*, ed. The Sayings of Lao Tzu. Trans. from the Chinese. (Wisdom of the East.) 54p. Orient Press, 1904.  
*Old (W. G.)*, ed. Book of the Simple Way of Lao-tze. Wellby, 1904.
- 73 *Nelson (Nels L.)* Scientific aspects of Mormonism, or religion in terms of life. 360p. Putnam, 1904.
- 94 *Hovitt (A. W.)*, ed. The Native Tribes of South-East Australia. 819p. Macmillan, 1904.
- P PHILOSOPHY** 10 \* *Metaphysics*, 21  
*Epistemology*, 33 \* *Psychical Research*, 40 \*  
*Psychology*, 60 \* *Logic*, 70 \* *Systems*, 90 \*  
*Philosophers*.
- Windelband (W.)*, ed. Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Bd. i. 186p. Winter, 1904.  
[Festschrift for Kuno Fischer's eightieth birthday. Contains important contributions on Psychology by Wundt, on Logic by Windelband, on the Philosophy of Religion by Tröltzsch, and on Ethics by Bauch. Otto-Liebmann contributes a poem.]  
*Blum (E.)* Le II<sup>e</sup> Congrès International de Philosophie (Genève, Sept. 1904.).  
Rev. Phil., Nov. 1904.  
*Liebmann (O.)* Gedanken und Tatsachen. Philosoph. Abhandlungen, Aphorismen und Studien, Bd. ii., Heft 4. 145p.  
Trübner, 1904.
- 11 *Baez (Ernest Belfort)* A Handbook of the History of Philosophy. For the use of Students. 3rd ed., revised. 435p.  
Bell, 1904.
- 10 *Arnold (Robert Brandon)* Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality. 384p.  
Macmillan, 1904.  
[Review will follow.]
- 11 *Spiller (G.)* Voluntarism and Intellectualism. Phil. R., July 1904.  
[Voluntarism and Intellectualism are each one-sided. The truth is an organic unity of both.]
- 12 *Flint (Robert)* Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum, and a History of Classifications of the Sciences. 340p. Blackwood, 1904.
- 13 *Strutt (Hon. R. J.)* The Becquerel Rays and the Properties of Radium. 222p. Arnold, 1904.  
[Aims to give a clear and simple account of the phenomena of radio-activity without sacrificing accuracy.]  
*Nichols (Herbert)* A Treatise on Cosmology. Vol. i., Introduction. 455p. Massachusetts, 1904.  
[An analysis, criticism and reconstruction of the fundamental conceptions of Physics and Psychology.]  
*Weggy-Prosser (F. R.)* "Man's Place in the Universe." Dub. R., Oct. 1904.  
[Wallace has successfully shown that the solar system is situated near, or comparatively near, to the centre of the stellar universe.]  
*Haackel (Ernst)* The Wonders of Life. 501p. Watts, 1904.  
[Translation of *Die Lebenswunder*, in which is presented a mass of biological evidence for the views as to the origin and nature of life advanced in the *Riddles of the Universe*.]  
*Hibbert (W.)* Life and Energy. An attempt at a New Definition of Life. With Applications to Morals and Religion. 182p. Longmans, 1904.

- Kingsland (John P.)* Man and his Environment. Thoughts of a Thinker. 380p. Murray, 1904.
- 19 *Duhem (P.)* La théorie physique, son objet, sa structure. Rev. de Phil., Sept., Oct., Nov. 1904. [Poincaré's doctrine of many irreconcilable yet equally true theories about one group of physical facts is refuted by the systematic nature of real fact.]
- Couturat (L.)* Les principes des mathématiques.—La Géométrie. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Sept. 1904.
- Lechalas (G.)* Une nouvelle tentative de réfutation de la géométrie générale. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Sept. 1904.
- 21 *Russell (B.)* Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions, iii. Mind, Oct. 1904. [Tries to establish the principle, as against Meinong, that all presentations and all judgments have an object which is not merely immanent. Author, however, admits that the explanation of falsity presents grave difficulties.]
- Rogers (A. K.)* Scepticism. Phil. R., Nov. 1904. [No Scepticism is or can be absolute, for all intelligent doubt involves a belief in something as true.]
- 25 *Pillsbury (W. B.)* The Psychological Nature of Causality. Phil. R., July 1904. [Structurally the idea of a cause is always characterised by strain sensations. The functional conditions are frequency of concurrence and harmony with other experience.]
- 27 *James (William)* Humanism and Truth. Mind, Oct. 1904. [All the sanctions of a law of truth lie in the very texture of experience. Absolute or no Absolute, the concrete truth for us will always be that way of thinking in which our various experiences most profitably combine. Author maintains that finite experience is self-supporting.]
- Schiller (F. C. S.)* In Defence of Humanism. Mind, Oct. 1904. [Reply to Bradley. If our "choice" does not affect the rigidity of "fact," it is an illusion which ought not even to seem to exist; if there really be "selection," then it must introduce a possibility of arbitrary manipulation of reality.]
- 28 *Leighton (J. A.)* The Infinite New and Old. Phil. R., Sept. 1904. [Criticism of Dedekind, Cantor, Royce and Russell. The infinite may indeed exist as the positive and individual limit of the various indefinitely continuable series of experiences, which, however, in themselves only prove that there is an element of self-transcendency in our consciousness.]
- 35 *Foucault.* L'Évolution du Rêve pendant le Réveil. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1904. [Dreaming is the product of a double mental process,—the one occurring during sleep, and the other after sleep, and chiefly in the act of waking.]
- 40 *Taylor (A. E.)* Mind and Body in Recent Psychology. Mind, Oct. 1904. [A defence of the doctrine of Interaction as the most satisfactory theory of the connection between body and mind from the psychological point of view. An elaborate criticism of the contentions of Stout, Ebbinghaus and Münsterberg in favour of Psychophysical Parallelism.]
- Ward (James)* The Present Problems of General Psychology. Phil. R., Nov. 1904. [Subjectivity is identical with selective (rather than creative) activity, and, as such, it is a necessary and irreducible aspect of experience. The process of making psychical mechanisms is an essential part of psychical life.]
- Wundt (Wilhelm)* Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte. Bd. i. Die Sprache, Teil 2. 683p. Engelmann, 1904. [In this second part of the first vol. of his great work Wundt deals with word forms, formation of sentences, change of meaning, and the origin of speech.]
- 44 *James (William)* Does "Consciousness" exist? J. of Phil., Sept. 1, 1904. [Consciousness as an entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.]
- James (William)* A World of Pure Experience. J. of Phil., Sept. 29 and Oct. 13, 1904. [A sketch of a metaphysical system of what the author calls "radical empiricism." Such a system starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order. It does full justice to conjunctive relations, without treating them as being true in some supernal way.]
- 48 *Giessler (C. M.)* Der Einfluss der Dunkelheit auf das Seelenleben des Menschen. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 3, 1904. [Under the influence of darkness the mental functions of man sink back to their more primitive condition. Not only bodily but also spiritually we are "sonnenhaft."]
- 49 *Godfernaux (A.)* Le parallélisme psychophysique et ses conséquences. Rev. Phil., Oct. and Nov. 1904.
- 53 *Münsterberg (Hugo)* Perception of Distance. J. of Phil., etc., Nov. 10, 1904.
- Abbott (T. K.)* Fresh Light on Molyneux' Problem. Mind, Oct. 1904. [Discusses Dr Ramsay's "Three Cases of Blindness in which Sight was Acquired in Adult Life."]
- Washburn (M. F.)* A Factor in Mental Development. Phil. R., Nov. 1904. [An attempt to explain the development of the higher mental functions from the possibility of reacting to stimulation that neither hurts nor helps the organism at the moment of its operation.]
- 57 *Jankélévitch (Dr)* De la nature du sentiment amoureux. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1904.
- 60 *Hartman (Eduard von)* Die Grundlage des Wahrscheinlichkeitsurtheils. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 3, 1904. [All attempts at proving empirically the truth of calculated probabilities have only meaning in the sense of furnishing an inductive ground for the validity of the presuppositions on which the calculation rests.]
- 64 *Vailati (G.)* Sur une classe remarquable de raisonnements par réduction à l'absurde. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Sept. 1904. [Number of illustrations; given of this process of reasoning.]
- 71 *Hawtrey (R. G.)* Science and Idealism. Indep. R., Nov. 1904. [A discussion of Mr Balfour's Presidential Address to the British Association.]
- Strong (C. A.)* Idealism and Realism. J. of Phil., Sept. 15 and 29, 1904. [Solution of difficulty between idealists and realists lies in holding that matter exists independently of the thought of it, but exists in the shape of sensation.]
- 72 *Universität Königsberg.* Zur Erinnerung an Immanuel Kant. Abhandlungen aus Anlass der hundertsten Wiederkehr des Tages seines Todes. 374p. Verlag des Waisenhauses, Halle, 1904. [A noteworthy production, containing contributions from fifteen members of the University.]

- Caird (Edward)* The Influence of Kant on Modern Thought. Quar. R., Oct. 1904. [Three living movements of thought correspond roughly with the three "Critiques," and these are Agnosticism, Moral Idealism, and thorough-going Idealism. Kant's whole philosophy may be regarded as a pathway of transition between two disparate views of the world and of man's place in it.]
- Valentiner (Theodor)* Kant und die Platonische Philosophie. 94p. Winter, 1904.
- Bauch (E.)* Luther und Kant. Kantstudien, ix. 3 und 4, 1904. [An exhaustive treatment of Luther's influence on Kant.]
- Riehl (A.)* Anfänge des Kritizismus. Methodologisches aus Kant. Kantstudien, ix. 3 und 4, 1904. [It was the merit of the critical theory to have shown what philosophy really is and means, and what function remains to it in an age of positive science.]
- Wernicke (A.)* Die Theorie des Gegenstandes und die Lehre vom Dinge-an-sich bei Kant. 32p. Meyer, 1904.
- Messer (A.)* Kant's Ethik. Veit, 1904.
- Elsenhans (Theodor)* Kant's Rassentheorie und ihre bleibende Bedeutung. 52p. Engelmann, 1904.
- 80 *Gomperz (H.)* Die Lebensaufassung der griechischen Philosophen. 328p. Diederichs, 1904.
- Husik (Isaac)* On the Categories of Aristotle. Phil. R., Sept. 1904. [The whole work is genuine and one of the earliest attempts of Aristotle.]
- 86 *Hart (J. H. A.)* Philo of Alexandria. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1904.
- 89 *Aveling (F.)* The Necessary Inference. Dub. R., Oct. 1904. [Consideration of the difficulties felt in regard to the "five ways" of Catholic Philosophy.]
- 90 *Brunschvicg (L.)* La révolution cartésienne et la notion spinoziste de la substance. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Sept. 1904. [Spinoza did not merely summarize the Cartesian view of substance, but freed the conception from barrenness and ambiguity. Neo-platonism is discoverable in Spinoza.]
- 92 *Busse (L.)* Die Weltanschauungen der grossen Philosophen der Neuzeit. 164p. Teubner, 1904.
- Pfleiderer (Otto)* Herder. Rede zu Gedenkfeier. 31p. Reimer, 1904.
- Woodbridge (F. J. E.)* Jonathan Edwards. Phil. R., July 1904. [Edwards' work has failed because of the want of connection between the really profound thinking of his earlier years and his later Calvinistic theology.]
- V *Spencer (Herbert)* First Principles. New ed. 512p. Williams & Norgate, 1904. [First volume of a new and cheaper re-issue of Spencer's works.]
- Royce (Josiah)* Herbert Spencer. An Estimate and Review of H. Spencer, with a chapter of personal reminiscences by J. Collier. 34p. Fox, Duffield & Co., 1904.
- Hudson (W. H.)* An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Watts, 1904.
- Taylor (J. J.)* Herbert Spencer. Baptist Rev. & Exp., Oct. 1904.
- Sidgwick (Henry)* Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses. Edited by Mrs Sidgwick and Arthur Sidgwick. 380p. Macmillan, 1904. [The Essays deal mainly with literary, economical, sociological and educational topics. The volume opens with a fine treatment of *Ecce Homo*.]
- W *Caldwell (W.)* Recent Tendencies in American Philosophy. Crit. R., Oct. 1904.
- V **ART** 83 *Sacred Music.*
- Hobbes (John Oliver)* The Artist's Life. 138p. Laurie, 1904.
- Lübke (Wilhelm)* Outlines of the History of Art. Ed. by Russell Sturgis. 2 Vols. 626, 557p. Smith, Elder, 1904.
- Gaultier (P.)* Ce qu'enseigne une œuvre d'art. Rev. Phil., Sept. 1904. [A work of art is distinguished by its style, and its value is that it reveals the personality of the author. For a moment we become, in contemplating it, a Raphael, a Mozart, or a Praxiteles.]
- Reinach (S.)* The Story of Art throughout the Ages. An illustrated record. From the French by Florence Simmonds. 316p. Heineman, 1904.
- u *Richter (Jean Paul) and Taylor (A. Cameron)* The Golden Age of Classic Christian Art. 428p. Duckworth, 1904. [Review will follow.]
- Sparrow (W. S.),* ed. The Gospels in Art. The Life of Christ, by Great Painters from Fra Angelico to Holman Hunt. 232p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.
- 33 *Hogarth (D. G.)* The Palace of Knossos. Quar. R., Oct. 1904. [An account and appreciation of Mr Arthur Evans' work in Crete.]
- 52 *Bell (Malcolm)* Sir Edward Burne-Jones. (Newnes Art Library.) Newnes, 1904. *Burne-Jones (G.)* Memorials of Edward Burne-Jones. 2 vols., with 45 Photographures and other illustrations. 318, 372p. Macmillan, 1904.
- 55 *Cartwright (Julia)* The Life and Art of Sandro Botticelli. 205p. Duckworth, 1904.
- 67 *Hamerton (P. G.)* The Etchings of Rembrandt. With an Annotated Catalogue of all Rembrandt's Etchings, by C. Dodgson. 95p.; plates, 50. Seeley, 1904.
- 80 *Fuller-Maitland (J. A.),* ed. Grove's Dictionary of Music. Vol. I. A to E. Macmillan, 1904. [The first volume of this new edition contains an exhaustive article on Brahms, contributed by the editor, and biographies of Berlioz and of Byrd by Messrs Hadow and Squire, together with much other fresh material.]
- 83 *Altar Music.* Supplement to Provost Staley's Altar Service Book. Ed. by F. Burgess. Dc La More Press, 1904. *Oakeley (E. M.)* Life of Sir Herbert Stanley Oakeley. 278p. G. Allen. 1904. G. D. H.; G. H.; and J. H. W.

# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## THE EDUCATION OF A MINISTER OF GOD.

The Right Reverend W. BOYD CARPENTER, D.D.,  
Lord Bishop of Ripon.

THE Churches complain that there is a reluctance among men of the highest intellectual stamp to enter the ranks of the Christian ministry. The world talks freely of the unpopularity of the parson. The critics come into the discussion, and describe the average training of the clergyman as unlikely to produce the right type of man. The defenders of existing training institutions are not afraid to take up the gauntlet, and to declare that the methods of training adopted are not calculated to turn out into the world a number of conceited obscurantists out of touch with modern thought, and out of sympathy with modern needs. The public can only read the statements, the criticisms, and the defences made, and wonder what is the truth of the matter. I cannot pretend to enlighten the public, but I think I may venture to say what will probably be felt by many more, that in controversies of this kind there is a tendency to mistake the part for the whole, and to judge the average crop from the survey of a few neighbouring fields. Would it not be safe to say, that the parson is not quite so unpopular as some

think, that the training of the clergyman in theological colleges is neither so good nor so bad as it has been described, and that it is difficult for young men brought up as the average Christian minister is brought up, in the free atmosphere of many discussions, with frequent and plentiful theological literature within his reach, to grow up wholly obscurantist or ignorant of the trend of modern thought, or the general influence of the higher criticism? Broadly speaking, the condition of things is not so dark as pessimism paints it, nor so bright as hope desires. There are features which call for anxiety, and there are other features which may well awaken deep thankfulness. We are, in fact, living in a time of transition: it is difficult for us to measure the significance of the changes which are taking place: it is natural that some symptoms should awaken alarm; it is quite possible that these should be overlooked by optimistic minds, and it is at least equally possible that hopeful symptoms may be ignored by pessimists; while for those who wish to judge matters impartially, unbiassed by hope or fear, it will be admitted that it requires great sagacity, insight, and foresight to be able to balance the evil symptoms and the good, and to forecast the probable outcome of the present conditions.

I am to speak of the aims and methods of training for the Christian ministry. Let me explain the sense in which I understand my task. First, I do not take it to mean that I am to give a summary, a sort of catalogue raisonnée, of the various systems of clerical training now in existence. To do this would require personal acquaintance with all those institutions which, with varying success and unquestionable earnestness, are devoted to the preparation of young men for the ministry. These institutions have multiplied of recent years, and this fact is of itself an evidence of the genuine desire to send out men well equipped for the work which lies before them. It may be the case—personally I have no doubt on the subject—that in some institutions the training is of a type which is neither modern nor in any noble or true sense

catholic ; but whatever criticisms may be levelled against the training in this particular or that, the existence of such a large number of theological training schools is at least a token that the Christian Churches are in earnest about this matter. Of the recognised aims or special methods of existing institutions I am not in a position to speak. I do not understand that I am expected to enter into a defence or a criticism of existing methods. I understand that my task is rather to set up a sort of ideal standard of aim, having regard to the intellectual, social, and moral conditions of our own times, and to indicate, as far as space will allow, some of the methods by which this standard may be reached. When thus stated the task is too great, and its proper treatment would require a treatise rather than an article. It becomes necessary, therefore, to introduce some limitations. The clergyman of to-day is required to be a servant of all work : to train him for all that he is expected to do would require a year in a business house, a year in a college of music, a year in a hospital, a year in a gymnasium, not to speak of a year or two in the galleries of Europe, for he is expected to manage finances, clubs, schools, entertainments, athletics, and the multitudinous varieties of movements which mark parochial activity. It is clear that to speak of the training requisite for all these duties, if they are duties of his office at all, is beyond the range of an article like the present. The limitation which I make, therefore, must be one which leaves out of view the infinite and infinitesimal details of clerical occupation, and which includes only the religious influence which the Christian minister exercises as a personality and a teacher. Hence the subject before us becomes the standard of aim set before those who have to send forth men to exercise full and legitimate influence as Christian teachers in the world, and the methods which may contribute to the attainment of such a standard.

The moment we try to form some ideal of the Christian minister we find ourselves compelled to remember the double aspect of his work. As a teacher we think of his intellectual

equipment : we desire that he should be intelligent, alive to the conditions of his own age—if not learned with the learning of an expert, yet sufficiently learned to appreciate the general direction of the tide of thought and the way in which it has been influenced by currents set in motion in other days. He must be alive to the changes of mental attitude and of standards of value which have arisen in modern times. On questions of thought, scientific discoveries, and criticisms, he needs to be abreast of his age. In these matters we desire his adequate intellectual equipment.

But we cannot think of the Christian minister without thinking of more than his intellectual equipment. We must think of him as a messenger who has a message of eternal significance to men. It is well that he should be a man who understands his own age, but unless he brings to men words which compel them to measure life by the standard of eternal values, his office is that of a lecturer, not that of a preacher : he is lacking in that prophetic and ministerial force which men rightly expect from those who minister in spiritual things.

The caution which the bishop in the Church of England gives to the archdeacon on presenting the ordination candidates well expresses the double qualification of which I have spoken : "Take heed that the persons whom ye present unto us, be apt and meet, for their learning and godly conversation, to exercise their ministry duly, to the honour of God, and the edifying of his Church." The qualifications here expressed would be accepted as needful by every Christian communion. They mean adequate intellectual equipment and personal ministerial fitness. The one we can perhaps provide ; the other is a gift beyond all human power to bestow, and yet it is a qualification which needs to be given greater prominence, and which would be more likely to be met with, if the great spiritual laws of man's nature as set forth in Christ were more fully realised.

These two qualifications furnish me with my text : Intellectual equipment, united to modern needs, and a personal spiritual meetness needed in every age.

It is not the aim of this article to discuss or to criticise the ideals, either of aim or method, which find acceptance in existing theological training schools; but I may point out some aspects of clerical training which, so far as my experience goes, might be considered with advantage, and which, if recognised, might give greater completeness of aim, and perhaps modify existing methods.

The theological student should be helped to realise:

1. The real change which the adoption of the scientific method has wrought. This change is so often treated, as it seems to me, in a superficial way, and the true significance is therefore lost sight of.
2. The increasing importance of recognising the ethical bases of religious belief.
3. The witness of the religious consciousness in (a) non-Christian religion, (b) Christian experience.

On these three matters it will be needful to enlarge in order to make the points clear.

1. The Christian teacher cannot adequately discharge his duty towards a large class of thoughtful people, unless he understands the change of mental attitude which has taken place of late years in consequence of the adoption of scientific methods. He must understand what this change really is: he must not confuse mere symptoms with the radical nature of the change. Too often the accidental features of a movement are mistaken for its essential principles. There are some who imagine that the essential significance of the scientific trend of thought is to be found in the controversy respecting the miraculous, or respecting inspiration or revelation.

But to speak in this way appears to me to confuse symptoms with the disease, and to mistake the ripples on the surface with the trend of the tide. The true change in the intellectual attitude to-day is not in any changed opinions upon this or that Biblical fact or theological dogma, but in the change from an unscientific to a scientific method of dealing with all problems. In former times—and the tendency remains strong in some quarters even to-day—men's views

were the result of a series of influences derived from theories which were generally accepted, but had never been adequately tested. They were deductions from theories "in the air," not from facts upon solid ground. Movements of water and air were explained on the theory that Nature abhorred a vacuum—but no one to-day will accept a metaphor as an explanation. Every theory is asked to substantiate itself. Theories are not challenged as untrue, but because they seem to demand acceptance upon a wrong or insufficient basis. It needs to be remembered that a certain truth is not necessarily denied because a man points out that the grounds upon which it is held are unsatisfactory. When I tell a man that his faith is ill-founded I do not mean that his faith is untrue. If a girl believes that her lover is good because she thinks him good-looking, I do not mean to imply that her lover is not good when I tell her that her reasons are bad. If a man who wears a charm passes through battle unhurt, I may dispute the virtue of the charm without denying the fact of his preservation from wounds or death. The searching for the true causes of phenomena does not destroy the phenomena.

The scientific spirit declines to accept fancies or impressions as evidence. It asks that at the root of conclusions there should be facts, and that doctrines of all kinds should show that they are not the thin-spun products of a logic which works from assumptions, but that they are conclusions which can be traced back to facts.

Hence theology, if she is to hold the high place to which she once aspired as "*omnium disciplinarum suprema et dignissima*," must accept and work by the best recognised methods. If she is to provide guidance for the thoughts, and food for the souls of men, she must gird herself to seek out all that is true in the name of the Lord: she must base her theories on solid ground: she must detach essential principles from transient forms: she must, by translating those principles, give them expression in forms intelligible to men's minds to-day, and show that she can yet minister food convenient

to a hungry world. Thus she will be able to satisfy man's soul, without straining his intellectual honesty. She will bring him a message of God, from the great deep, without violating that reasonable order which man feels to be also a gift of God.

2. The increasing importance of recognising the ethical bases of religious belief.

I am disposed to think that sufficient attention has not in some quarters been paid to the fact that men's minds have undergone a change in their view of the bases of belief. In saying this I wish not to be misunderstood: I am not saying that the basis of real faith is, or can be, altered. My own conviction is that it is constant, and that no age can stale or invalidate the essential conditions of faith; but I think that our view of the bases of belief has changed, and changed in the right direction. This change, however, has not been always recognised, perhaps not always understood. Perhaps it may be described by saying that the ethical basis of faith is becoming recognised. Assent to a proposition, or belief in a fact, may enter into consideration in a discussion on matters of belief: they may be factors—valuable factors—in aiding the mind to clearness of perception, but unless they can ally themselves with some ethical quality or principle, they will entirely fail in evolving anything that can rightly be called faith. In other words, the creed, whatever it is, must make an ethical response if it is to become a spiritual power. The only avenue to spiritual conviction is an ethical one: you may reach intellectual assent, theological harmony, neat and compact systems of belief, through other channels, but without the sanction of the moral nature there is no faith. As it is true that as soon as the moral sense is revolted, belief in previously accepted doctrine disappears, so it is true that it is only when the moral nature is called into active response that we can expect spiritual conviction. If, therefore, our teaching shows no point of contact with ethic, it will be, as far as spiritual response or faith is concerned, entirely valueless.

It is, I hope, needless to develop this truth. Whenever

religious belief is out of touch with current ethical standards it withers. "The stories of the gods of Olympia were felt to be fictions, because they were found to be immoral" (Jowett). "When gods do ill, why should we worship them?" asked Sophocles (Philoctetes, line 451-2). The saving element, if we read the Old Testament scripture rightly, is that ethical one on which the prophets insisted: in standing for righteousness they stood beside man's conscience for faith. In insisting on the impartial righteousness of Jehovah, they may have wounded the pride of their contemporaries, but they preserved the faith of the people from destruction. They established the principle that man must alter his character or conduct in order to enjoy true harmony with God. This principle could never afterwards be lost sight of. In the teaching of Christ it received endorsement and development. He insisted that ethic was at the base of spiritual religion. The gift was not to be offered till the worshipper has put right his moral conduct. "First be reconciled with thy brother," meant that as long as our ethical relationship with our brother man was wrong, acceptable worship of God was impossible. We have only to endeavour to turn this simple precept into practice to discover what a tremendous religious revolution must result. If the worshipping Christian world were once to recognise the significance of this word of Christ and to act upon it, mankind would witness the most stupendous example of religious earnestness which it has ever seen. If every Christian man felt that he must straighten out his relations with his brother man before he could enter into the spiritual harmony with God, and were to act upon this conviction, there would be more wrongs righted in a week than a hundred years of legislation could effect. Duties would be fulfilled which are now allowed to lapse; employers would share more largely with their workmen; workmen would give hours to amend the work which they had scamped; plumbers would go to houses to put into honest sanitary condition the drains which through wicked avarice they had left murderously defective;

directors of public companies would repudiate glowing and alluring prospectuses; old feuds which pride had long kept up would be reconciled; gentle apologies for angry words would be made; cruel insinuations would be withdrawn; the dishonourable action, justified in the name of religion, would be seen in its true light as the wickedest affront to religion. The revolution which would result would be deep and widespread; it would enter into every house: the petty irritations, the angry nagging, the chilling sulkiness, would be felt to be wrongs which no approach to the altar of God could atone for; they must be righted in the house. And yet this revolution, so vast and so deep, would be nothing more than the acceptance of an elementary principle of Christ—an elementary principle which is so obvious that it is continuously overlooked. Thenceforward it would be felt vain to teach as religious truths doctrines which revolted the moral sense, or to expect the acceptance of principles which did not root themselves in the conscience. Spiritual religion is indeed a step beyond mere moralism, but it takes the ethical step for granted. We cannot stand on the spiritual step without feeling that in the evolutionary order ethic is necessary to it. It is only when the moral nature is called into activity that the spiritual conviction can be experienced.

As soon as this principle is grasped, all pretence of mere official authority is at an end. The Christian minister can justify his authority by the reality of his appeal to the moral sense of mankind. To attempt to reach it in any other way is either to provoke failure or to win a success more disastrous than any failure. In other words, the Christian minister must carry the conscience of men with him, or he must abdicate. His message is nothing unless he commends himself to the consciences of men.

It would not be difficult to illustrate this position by reference to examples drawn from the past and from the present. If the revival in Wales shows us men paying their old debts, returning loans, exhibiting a high and honourable contrition

for past wrongs—in fact, first reconciling themselves with their brothers—we begin to count the revival a true work. If religious teaching is so framed that worshippers go on contentedly perpetrating wrongs, permitting oppressions, extorting from their neighbours more than is right, excusing dishonour under the pleasing epithet of smartness, ordering what they cannot pay for, allowing misery to exist and increase because they are either too unkindly heedless, or too recklessly extravagant to settle their accounts, we must admit that such religious teaching is an absolute failure. Further, if the religious teaching pretends that it can, by some official charm or authority, straighten out man's relationship with God, while his relationship with his brother man is unjust, dishonourable, unforgiving, unkind, then that teaching can no longer be called religious. It is fraudulent, it is immoral, as all teaching is that does not insist that the spiritual must include the ethical, inasmuch as love is, and must from its nature be, the fulfilling of the law.

One great aim of the Christian ministry, therefore, is to be prophetic, *i.e.* to have a message to give which goes straight to the consciences and hearts of men. Whatever official dignity, whatever splendour of historic association, whatever right of ruling, may belong to the minister of any Church, he is a merely negative quantity unless he stands in this prophetic relation to his people. It seems to me that this fact needs to be kept clearly and constantly before the minds of all who aspire to the ministry of the Church of Christ. If I mistake not, this is the principle which underlies many apostolic utterances which meet us in the New Testament. The apostles disclaim any authority which is not directed to the ethical and spiritual faculties in their hearers. They are men who commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God (2 Cor. iv. 2); the ministry with which they are entrusted is a ministration of righteousness (2 Cor. iii. 9). They disclaim all desire to be lords over God's heritage; they prefer to rest their authority upon the force of moral example: they

seem to be constantly echoing the appeal of their Master to His contemporaries—"Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" Their faith in the power of goodness as a self-witnessing and self-vindicating force is clear and unhesitating. The wisdom which they offer to men is marked by ethical qualities, or, best of all, is embodied in the exemplary ethic of their Lord's life. Time will vindicate its value; for wisdom is justified of her children.

3. Some attention should be paid to the witness of the religious consciousness of man, as expressed in non-Christian religions or in the spiritual experience of Christendom.

In turning the thoughts of students to these fields of inquiry, we are able to show them how great has been the widening of the theological domain in recent years. To assure men of this is to do a real service. A timid fear has haunted the minds of many that the domain of theology has been slowly but surely narrowed. Men hear of science and shudder, deeming that science has ruthlessly entered the field and cried to theology, "Hands off." They have felt for theology the sort of pathetic loyalty which affection feels for a discrowned queen—a loyalty full of pity, and yet fearful lest in showing pity they may be lacking in respect. In the same way devout students are sometimes led to think of theology. Once she was free of all realms, and her writ was accepted everywhere; but she has seen province after province torn from her grasp, and she is left the doubtful monarch of a small and threatened territory.

But a little reflection will show us that to speak thus is to mistake the position. All the discoveries of science, in whatever field, add to the store of human knowledge and of ascertained truth, and theology is not denied the usufruct of these. She may, to use an illustration, have been refused the right to dictate the mode of cultivating certain tracts. This has now been left to the expert, but theology is not the poorer, but the richer by every advance which is made: the increase of our knowledge of God's universe is the increase of

opportunity to theology. I do not mean here that she is to confuse facts and intellectual methods by transferring into the spiritual sphere the application of laws which have proved themselves effectively explanatory in the physical sphere. When we have many acres to cultivate, we use different methods of cultivation according to the crop we desire or expect. Laws are not forces, but only portfolios for the classification of facts, and it is neither sound science nor sound theology to treat them as if they were powers in themselves. But while we may avoid the mistake of failing to classify facts according to their nature, we may nevertheless find in all facts and laws, when properly used, helps to theological conceptions. The widest investigation of Nature leaves us with the conviction of an all-energising mystery which awakens or stimulates the religious consciousness: the general fidelity of Nature strengthens our conception of a faithfulness which is behind it: the struggle of life is a struggle upwards, and, as Mr Fiske has shown, challenges our faith in the destiny of man. The idea that religious thought has had her borders curtailed, appears to me a misapprehension.

But to let this pass. There have been wide realms added to the kingdom of theology in recent years. Formerly, theology was confined to our bookshelves; now it ranges over the world of men past and present. We have abandoned the narrow conception that theology can only refer to one class of books, or the books of one religious system. We believe to-day in Him who is the One of the whole earth, who left not Himself without witness, and we can trace His footsteps in every age, in every land, and among every people. Further, we begin to understand the value and significance of man's religious consciousness, wherever and however it may have expressed itself. The view which regarded all religions outside Christianity as false religions has given place to a kindlier and a truer conception. We still realise the dark and desperate deeds to which false thoughts of God or superstitious fears of evil spirits drove men; but we feel a sym-

pathetic interest in the struggles of those who were feeling after God if haply they might find Him. We gain much from the study of other faiths than our own. We find that they yield valuable evidence of the needs of man's soul, and of the nature and claims of his religious consciousness. We are led to study religion—not in the treatise of the theorist, but in the movements of that which is our subject of religious thought, emotion, and feeling—the soul of man.

It has been far too often taken for granted that theology has no other function than that of providing a more or less complex system of intellectual theory. Happily, we are now ushered into realms which were long disregarded. We are invited to observe religion in action. Religion we all allow to be a force—a real, wide-spread, and invincible force—in the world. As St Beuve says, "Chassez la religion par la porte, elle rentre par la fenêtre." Religion refuses to be expelled. It is a force of constant and recurring power; and wise men now begin to study this force, and to study it, not among the tomes of theorists, but as a working force, and to study it where, as a working force, it can best be seen, viz., in the realm of its activity, *i.e.* in the souls of men. Hence the value of the comparative study of religion; hence the value of those recent studies which produced such books as James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Granger's *Soul of a Christian*, Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*, and treatises like Dr Forrest's *The Christ of Theology and the Christ of Experience*, and of kindred articles which will be familiar to the readers of this Journal.

Enough has been said in books and articles such as these to show us that everywhere the domain of theology is gaining in extent and richness, and that so far from her holding a doubtful strip of ever-narrowing territory in her hand, she is the heiress of a wide and almost illimitable territory, as wide as the race and as full of varied interests as the rich and diversified drama of the soul of man.

What is required, therefore, in the training of those who

are to be Christian teachers and ministers, is the cultivation of an intelligent interest in this widening field of theology. The epithet, a theologian, ought not to be applied to a man whose only title to the name consists in a pedantic acquaintance with the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries, with the canonists of the Middle Ages, and perhaps a perfunctory acquaintance with the far greater men, the divines of the Reformation period. Pfleiderer's dictum that no man is a theologian who is acquainted with his own religion only will be accepted by all intelligent students to-day. When criticism is directed against the mental equipment of the ordination candidate of our own time, and he is described as eaten up with an ignorant and official arrogance, there is a certain measure of truth in it. The horizon of the average ordination candidate is not wide enough; he is not, as a rule, given a sufficiently large outlook, and where this is the case things are seen in false proportion. Alike the significance and the insignificance of things is misunderstood, because the principles of interpretation are not world-wide in their range. Doctrines are measured too much in relation to degrees and precedents, and too little in relation to God and man.

But however carefully we train the aspirant to the ministry in the intelligent appreciation of modern needs, we shall have done little if he is not sent out, not only with the conviction that he has a message to give, which is not of time but of eternal things, but with a message which so possesses his soul that he feels it to be a necessity of his life to give it to men. It has been thought that the realisation of modern difficulties exercises a paralysing influence on religious earnestness. The feeling of doubt, it is said, casts its veil over the whole field of truth, and all things seeming dim, nothing stands forth with strong and defined outline: no truth seems clear enough to be sure of—to live for and to die for. It may be admitted that with some this is the case; and no doubt the belief that this is the case is largely accountable for the determined adoption of an obscurantist attitude in some quarters. "If

we allow," it is said, "this truth or that truth to be held as doubtful, we shall end by having nothing certain; and if we have nothing certain, we have no message to give." Hence it is that too often we are treated to the sturdy dogmatism of unappeasable ignorance on the one side, and the grave and almost ominous silence of thoughtful men on the other. I do not know how it may appear to others, but to me it is very little consolation to be told that Thersites is shrieking in the streets while Achilles is pondering in his tent. I regret the silence of Achilles, but I deplore the noisy ignorance of Thersites. I do so all the more because I do not think that frank recognition of modern difficulties should silence the kings of modern thought: indeed, from one point of view we may argue that the realisation of modern tendencies brings into greater clearness the eternal message of Christianity. For if there is one thing which thinking men will be ready to admit, it is that the time-form of the expression of truth is transitory: it has found expression in this or that particular form, because that form was the clearest and fittest to the epoch in which it was expressed; and no thoughtful man will confound the salient principle of the truth with its time-form. For the same reason, he will be slow to condemn the time-form, as conveying no truth, however unsuitable he may deem it to express the truth to modern minds. He will, if he is fair-minded, endeavour to realise the condition under which the time-form was evolved, and he will seek for the principle which it was designed to convey; he will discard the accidental as far as possible and give prominence to the essential. Now is it not obvious that when this habit prevails men are more likely to bring into clearness those principles of truth which are independent of time, and to reach what we may call the constant factors of faith? The man who is to minister, should realise as a personal possession the faith which draws its strength from changeless sources of power.

He must measure all his message from some principle which stands beyond the touch of things which change or die.

He must realise that he is not dealing with questions which are measurable by earthly meridian lines or variable standards. In other words, he must realise the supreme place which love holds in the message of Christ. To do this he may have to alter what I may call the spiritual meridian from which he has been taught to measure doctrines; for owing to influences which one need not investigate or explain, popular theology has frequently taken as its meridian line some aspect of evil, as though with this all things began, and from this all things were to be measured.

It is painfully surprising that this should ever have been the case among those who had their Bibles in their hands; but it was so, and the effects of the adoption of this line of measurement remain with us, and they can only disappear by degrees. This is not the place to enter into a discussion respecting the theological value of the terms the Fall—original sin—evil, unless to remark in passing that a writer in this Journal (Oct. 1904), in endeavouring to clear his Church of complicity in what he regards as somewhat barbarous teaching, ignored the authoritative catechism of the Council of Trent. It really is better, is it not, to admit that in their teaching respecting sin, nearly all Churches fell into the mistake of giving it such an emphasis that it became too often the meridian line of popular theology, and the true, scriptural, and Christ-given meridian line was forgotten. The meridian line of popular theology was *evil* in some form or another: the meridian line of Christ was love.

It must not be thought that this difference of meridian is merely a nominal difference, or one which can be corrected, as in geographical measurement, by a little added or a little taken away. On the contrary, by making evil the meridian line, all calculations respecting man's position are made on the basis of his relationship to this antecedent evil, and not, as it ought to be, by his relationship to God. Clearly, however, according to the teaching of Christ, the true measurement of man's position is only found by measuring his true relationship to God.

In other words, we start from that eternal love which is antecedent to any and every experience of man, which is before all things in man and in man's history. Yet some fear that by taking love—the true eternal love—as the axis of reference, that we shall make light of sin or fall into moral flabbiness. On the contrary, evil lies like a darker shadow against that radiance of love than ever it can against some strange or desolating experience of man. It is the soul that has been brought into relationship with the love of God that knows in its uncompromising clearness the sinfulness of sin. But such knowledge does not work moral paralysis as some of the fatalistic theories of the past have done. We are on the right road when we measure all things from that love. We are on the right road, because we are able to step into the realm of things spiritual. It is absolutely essential that the Christian teacher should, if he is to retain the prophetic element of his office, link his teaching with ethic. Only so can he reach the conscience of man; but the Christian teacher can never be content with the realm of ethic. He is the minister of a religion which has indissoluble links with morals, but he is the minister of a spiritual religion, *i.e.* of a religion which lifts man into the realm from which moral force springs. We are climbing to the upper springs of religious life, where we pass into the region of things spiritual, *i.e.* into the region where love inspires all activities. In other words, morals which are practised as morals are scarcely moral. Morals, to be genuine, must spring from something higher than themselves; they arise from deep personal conviction of an abiding and changeless relationship. "Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." "He that loveth not, knoweth not God." It is needless to press this point further. But it is needful to say a few words about the Christian development of this principle. According to simple Christian conceptions, love lies at the back of all things—God's love. Only love can really work a life in harmony with God; love only can perceive the

significance of life ; but this love in man, like his other powers, needs education and development. In early stages it is crude and rudimentary : to see and understand its greatness and its inspiring force man needs both the training of life and revelation of life. Now in Christ the revelation of life and love is complete. Love descends, love identifies itself with the needs and the weaknesses of men ; love lives among men ; love works for men ; love dies for men ; love is stronger than death, and vanquishes all the powers which have caused men pain, misgiving, and fear. Love, as revealed in Christ, discloses to man the high and ennobling qualities of love, and in this way reveals the true path of life. Love is not the simple caretaking faculty, nor is it the passionate power which takes possession of the loved one : it is the power which grudges no cost, and shrinks from no pain, and rejoices even in sacrifice. It is only so that love can play its full part, and it is only in love that life—man's life—fulfils itself. Put these thoughts into Christian phraseology, and we say that spiritual religion means the life of a spirit which fulfils the life of Christ. Christ is born, and the Christ spirit must be formed in men : Christ dies, and so the self also in man must be crucified, for how can love live alongside the life of self ? Christ rises, and the true self is only found when the old self has been crucified. Then only does life become normal according to the order of God, which is love : then only does man enter into true relationship : for the relationship of heaven is perfect in love, and the relationship of earth is perfected only in love—only they who love not their lives unto the death have tasted true life. These thoughts are written large and clear in Christian seasons and in Christian sacraments : these thoughts never fail to reach the depths of the soul of man, for they set before him his worth, his failures, his possibilities. These thoughts or principles of Christ constitute the principles which mark the step from moralism into spiritual religion, and it is their presence in teaching which makes the Christian minister so

much more than a prophet, even though he be least in the kingdom of heaven. The teacher who has grasped these will never be wanting in a message to give to his fellowmen: he will be always ready, without pedantry and without shallow emotion, to preach simple Christ to simple men; for I know no better way to secure the light of a true understanding and the zeal of an earnest spirit than in the insisting that it is only in the way of Christ that man can come to his true maturity, and that only in the way of the Cross can man realise the value, beauty, and power of true life.

Let me briefly summarise the aims. We should train men to know their own times; to extend their study beyond the narrow limits of a few centuries; to explore the facts of religious consciousness in all systems, and in all ages; to understand that only as they bring their teaching into ethical contact with men can they expect spontaneous recognition of their authority, and to make men realise that ethical demands finally force men back into spiritual experience; for final and soul-satisfying harmony with God can only be reached in that supreme personal surrender of which love is the inspiration, and the Cross of Christ the changeless and significant symbol.

The methods by which these aims may be secured can only be briefly indicated. Historical study, if we give a wide meaning to the words, must hold a conspicuous place in preparation. This study would include the study of what man is, and of what are the needs which his lame endeavours after religion reveal; the study of the spiritual harmony which is so evidently and sufficiently exhibited in the New Testament; and lastly, the study of the wonderful verifications of New Testament principles in the religious experience of Christendom, followed by the frank recognition that these principles of spiritual harmony or reconciliation have found verifying exemplification in all Churches, and in all ages, and in all lands.

W. B. RIPON.

## MR BALFOUR AS SOPHIST.<sup>1</sup>

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THERE is a saying of Hegel's, often quoted, that "a great man condemns the world to the task of explaining him." If mystery be the true measure of magnitude, Mr Balfour is indeed great. For the task of defining his real attitude towards natural science, naturalism, nature and spirit, has hitherto proved insuperable. Many will remember the extraordinary height to which the tide of criticism arose in the weeks and months following the first publication of his *Foundations of Belief*. Everyone appreciated "the classical graces and felicities of his style," the lucidity of his arguments, and the aptness of his illustrations. Everyone understood him; for here at last was a master in philosophy who was also a master in exposition.

But everyone understood him in his own way, and the ways were many. The estimates formed, even of the main purpose and outcome of the book, were as contradictory as they were confident. Parliamentary dialectics in metaphysics seemed to be as baffling as metaphysical subtleties in politics. That naturalists should understand him in one way, and theologians in another, was to be expected. But theolo-

<sup>1</sup> Will the reader take the term "sophist" in the light of two ancient and one modern description? (1) "He argues only out of the superfluity of his wits" (*Theætetus*). (2) "He is like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus; he takes different forms and deceives us by his enchantments" (*Euthydemus*). (3) "His intellect is not his guide, but his accomplice."

gians differed amongst themselves ; and so did the naturalists, agnostics, scientific men, and philosophers. To some he was the champion of Christian truth, the Butler of the new age ; to others, speaking from the point of view of the same sect, he was not " Mr Balfour the Christian," but " Mr Balfour the sceptic." " God forbid," they cried, " that religion should ever be led to rest its case on pleadings like these !" " Universal doubt, rather than religious dogma, will gain by the stroke that strikes reason to the ground."

The confusion amongst his scientific critics was even greater than that amongst the theologians. Many thought that he aimed at discrediting the methods and refuting the results of science. Others again " do not know any modern philosophical book which indicates more unqualified acceptance of these results, or which is more pervaded by the atmosphere, of the most recent science." <sup>1</sup>

Mr Balfour himself, on the reissue of the book, recognises that " his presentation of his views has been shown by experience to be peculiarly liable to misconceptions." <sup>2</sup> With the courtesy he has taught us to expect from him, he attributes these to himself. And he sets himself to remove them. He devotes a long introduction to them ; he relegates certain chapters to an appendix, so that they may not distract the reader's attention from the main argument ; and he adds a summary of the whole. No one, it might be thought, could struggle more valiantly to be plain. Nevertheless, in his Presidential Address to the British Association, last year, he points to a " train of thought which," as he says, " has long interested me, though I acknowledge that it never seems to have interested anyone else."

Now, that train of thought seems to me to be a vital part of his philosophising. In it is to be found the central difficulty which drove him into reflection, and the real cause of the ambiguities which have proved so baffling to both his

<sup>1</sup> Professor Pringle Pattison's *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 248.

<sup>2</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, eighth edition, Pref. vii.

scientific and his theological reviewers. For it turns upon the derivation of man's rational powers, and therefore his spiritual interests, from a natural source. That train of thought appears in his *Foundations of Belief*, but it appears amongst such a host of skilfully stated arguments, which successively charm and entangle the reader, that its significance is not easily realised. By pointing it out in his Presidential Address Mr Balfour has done a real service. He has placed his critics in his own "line of vision," and enabled them at last to revise their opinions of his system in the light of his own central conception.

"The train of thought which has long interested Mr Balfour, and never anyone else," circles around the notion that the premisses and the instrument of scientific, or philosophic, knowledge vitiate each other. "In order of logic, sense-perceptions supply the premises from which we draw all our knowledge of the physical world. It is they which tell us there *is* a physical world; it is on their authority that we learn its character."<sup>1</sup> But that which comes first in order of logic, which supplies reason with the material on which it is to operate, and "provides the platform on which we erect the proud fabric of the sciences," is *second* in order of causation. The sense-perceptions "are effects due (in part) to the constitution of our organs of sense. What we see depends not merely on what there is to be seen, but on our eyes. What we hear depends not merely on what there is to hear, but on our ears."<sup>2</sup> With other eyes and ears, with a differently fashioned "mechanism of perception," the perceptions which we should have, "the premisses from which we should be drawing all our knowledge of the physical world" would be quite different. Everything, therefore, depends upon whether we have been so fortunate as to be endowed with a mechanism which is reliable, fitted to present the truth about things. Or are we to say that with *any* kind of mechanism — except that which was passive, transparent, which simply left the

<sup>1</sup> *Address*, pp. 20, 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 21.

material unmodified, and which, therefore, would be useless, we should still be dealing with things as they seemed and not as they are? In other words, do the means of knowledge necessarily destroy the possibility of knowledge? Mr Balfour does not need to ask this fundamental question; he can get his sceptical conclusion otherwise. For, whether any mechanism of perception, which did not distort in revealing, is possible or not, he is clear that *our* mechanism has no such excellence. The very nature of things prohibits it. "Eyes and ears and all the mechanism of perception have, as we know, been evolved in us and our brute progenitors by the slow operation of natural selection. And what is true of sense-perception is, of course, also true of the intellectual powers which enable us to erect, upon the frail and narrow platform which sense-perception provides, the proud fabric of the sciences."<sup>1</sup> And if we answer that it matters not whether our powers come by natural selection or by immediate creation, provided that when they do come they are reliable, Mr Balfour replies: "The blind forces of natural selection . . . could never, except by accident, have endowed mankind, while in the making, with a physiological or mental outfit adapted to the higher physical investigations. So far as natural science can tell us, every quality of sense or intellect which does not help us to fight, to eat, and to bring up children, is but a bye-product of the qualities which do."<sup>2</sup> "It is presumably due to these circumstances that the beliefs of all mankind about the material surroundings in which it dwells are not only imperfect but fundamentally wrong." And perhaps it was even better so. "Too direct a vision of physical reality might have been a hindrance, not a help, in the struggle for existence, because falsehood was more useful than truth"; or perhaps "with so imperfect a material as living tissue no better results could be attained."<sup>3</sup> In any case, the foundations of knowledge are false. "Our knowledge of reality is based upon illusion. And man has to face the difficulty of extracting from experience beliefs

<sup>1</sup> *Address*, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

which experience contradicts." There is "divergence between matter as conceived by the physicist and matter as the ordinary man supposes himself to know it, between matter as it is perceived and matter as it really is; and the first of these two quite inconsistent views is wholly based on the second."<sup>1</sup>

The premisses with which sense-perception provides us being false, an intellect which reasoned accurately would be a misfortune. For accurate reasoning from false premisses can only arrive at false conclusions. But man is not necessarily shut in to this fate. The natural selection which has evolved his senses has also evolved his intellect. "It is hard to see why evolution, which has so lamentably failed to produce trustworthy instruments for obtaining the raw material of experience, should be credited with a larger measure of success in the provision of the physiological arrangements which condition reason in its endeavour to turn experience into account." Two negatives constitute a positive; two failures may neutralise one another and bring success. There is a bare chance that nature may have corrected one blunder by committing another. The imperfect intellect she has evolved may, by its inconsequent methods, neutralise the illusions in the sense-perceptions which constitute its premisses.

But the chance is evidently very remote. And, what is more deplorable still, we could not know it even if it did happen. "I cannot either securely doubt my own certainties or be certain about my own doubts." "My opinion about the original causes which produced my premisses, as it is an inference from them, partakes of their weakness."<sup>2</sup> The fact is, that on this basis there can be no criterion whatsoever of knowledge; and one is puzzled to know how Mr Balfour has discovered that the sensuous material of knowledge is illusory, and the reason which operates upon that material is defective. A truer conclusion, were any reliable conclusion possible in such circumstances, is that which he draws near the close of his Presidential Address, where he reviews, as a whole, "the general scheme of thought

<sup>1</sup> *Address*, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, p. 286.

which is built out of materials provided by natural science alone." "One thing at least will remain," he says, "of which this long-drawn sequence of causes and effects gives no satisfying explanation, and that is knowledge itself. Natural science must ever regard knowledge as the product of irrational conditions, for in the last resort it knows no others."<sup>1</sup>

The same conclusion is pressed upon us with marvellous literary skill in his *Foundations of Belief*. "Reason," he says, "has to recognise that her rights of independent judgment and review are merely titular dignities, carrying with them no effective powers; and that, whatever her pretensions, she is, for the most part, the mere editor and interpreter of the utterances of unreason."<sup>2</sup> "Forget, if you please, that reason itself is the result, like nerves or muscles, of physical antecedents. Assume (a tolerably violent assumption) that in dealing with her premises she obeys only her own laws. Of what value is this autonomy if those premises are settled for her by purely irrational forces, which she is powerless to control, or even to comprehend?"<sup>3</sup>

And what applies to reason, applies to morality also. "Morality and reason are august names, which give an air of respectability to certain actions and certain arguments; but it is quite obvious on examination that, if the naturalistic hypothesis be correct, they are but unconscious tools in the hands of their unmoral and non-rational antecedents, and that the real responsibility for all they do lies in the distribution of matter and energy which happened to prevail far back in the incalculable past."<sup>4</sup>

"This," he exclaims, "is scepticism indeed; scepticism which is forced by its own nature to be sceptical even about itself; which neither kills belief nor lets it live." And I quite agree. Such scepticism cannot *deny* the validity of knowledge, nor the truth of its materials in sense-experience, nor the cogency of the arguments founded upon this material; because its denial

<sup>1</sup> *Address*, pp. 23, 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, p. 288.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 284, 285.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

is based upon what it assumes to be false. It cannot *assert* their validity, for the same reason. The real result, therefore, is that we can leave it out of account ; for, as it can neither assert nor deny, nor even doubt, *it is not an attitude of thought at all*. It is a scepticism which destroys itself, and can be ignored in favour of a more promising method. If there ever was an occasion where the philosopher was justified in starting afresh, or rather was compelled to do so, and to repudiate in their entirety the presuppositions out of which such consequences follow, this is such an occasion. This, I may say, is precisely what Kant did, introducing what he calls the Copernican change into metaphysics. For, having found that philosophy got into a *cul-de-sac* by assuming that thought must conform to objects, he bethought him of asking if it could not fare better if it assumed that objects must conform to thought. And it is this which constitutes the transition from Naturalism (or Materialism) to Idealism.

Had Mr Balfour done the same, that is, had he reconstituted the very basis of his system by offering an idealistic instead of a materialistic view of the natural world, the value of his contribution to philosophical thought and of his defence of religion would have been less ambiguous. But he has not done this. He has convinced himself clearly of the impossibility of deriving knowledge, morality, religion, together with the rational powers which they imply, from what he calls non-rational and non-moral conditions ; but he seems to admit that the conditions *are* of this character, and that if there were any others, science could not know them ; and hence, if science is to arrive at other conclusions, or the natural conditions are to issue in other consequences, more agreeable to man's spiritual needs, it must be by the intervention of some new power.<sup>1</sup> The result is that the unification of science and theology, or of the realms of nature and spirit, which he offers is not only "provisional," as he calls it, but ambiguous. And I fear I must add that the interest which has centred

<sup>1</sup> See *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 312, 313.

around Mr Balfour's speculations was originally aroused and is still sustained by their ambiguity, rather than by their intrinsic cogency, and that his critics have erred in assuming that he has thought anything out into systematic conclusiveness.

This ambiguity reveals itself in the uncertain and varying account which he gives of the source of scepticism. He has advanced three different views, which are mutually inconsistent; and, what is more baffling still, he passes from the one view to the other at his own pleasure. From the language which he employs in his Presidential Address (as well as from large portions of the *Foundations of Belief*), we find that he holds *natural science* responsible for the intellectual scepticism and the negation of ethics and religion which he repudiates. We may go further: it is natural science which is responsible for the view that sense-perceptions are illusory, that the reason which deals with them is a defective instrument produced by natural selection, and that this defective instrument must adopt the illusory deliverances of sense as its premisses, for it has no others. These conclusions Mr Balfour does not repudiate. He accepts them, and finds in them a demand, or at least an opportunity, for bringing in theology to the assistance of science.

But this is to convict the theories advanced by modern science of being not only incomplete but self-stultifying. Its very aim is absurd, for it seeks to derive reason from unreason; and its success would be worse than failure, for the reason it would evolve is such that its conclusions cannot be trusted. Mr Balfour has thus challenged the validity of modern science, not merely in respect to particular theories, but in its fundamental notions, and, therefore, in all its compass. And we can well understand how the prospect of refuting modern science might make him recoil. We shall find him, therefore, withdrawing his charge against modern science, partly on the ground that, properly speaking, science does not raise these ultimate questions of the relation of the realm of nature to that of spirit; partly because, as

it can only deal with non-rational conditions, it can come to no other conclusions; and partly because no other conditions exist, for nature itself leads to these conclusions, so long as it is left to its own course and not diverted therefrom by the preferential action of a deity. Whether these reasons are consistent with one another or not, I do not even ask. Mr Balfour employs them all, and in doing so shows his anxiety not to tilt against windmills.

He would rather attack Naturalism than natural science. "It is not with science, nor with scientific results as such, that Mr Balfour has any quarrel," says Professor Pringle Pattison. . . . "It is the *naturalistic interpretation of science* which he attacks, the attempt to make science do duty for philosophy, to substitute the history of a process for a theory of its ultimate ground and source."<sup>1</sup> The language consistently employed in the Presidential Address does not bear this out, nor is Mr Balfour always careful to distinguish between *natural science* and *Naturalism* in his *Foundations of Belief*. Nevertheless, he makes the distinction, and we can afford to give him the benefit of it, even though we cannot, like Professor Pattison, attribute his inconsistent use of it to "careless use of language," or to "love of mischief," or to "an almost wilful pleasure in shocking the reader." What, then, is the distinction?

This distinction between science and philosophy, whether naturalistic or other, has often been drawn, though rarely with such eloquence as by Mr Balfour. It is a commonplace amongst idealists. And the advantages it appears to offer are many and great. The first of these I have already touched upon. It averts a conflict with natural science, and fastens the quarrel on an illegitimate extension of the principles of science to a region where they were not intended to apply. This is an advantage which will be welcome to all who know how precarious the tenure of religious beliefs must be, if they can be held only in despite of natural science. To those who

<sup>1</sup> *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 248.

can maintain their religious beliefs only on condition of overthrowing the deliverances of modern science, "Each new discovery in geology, morphology, anthropology, or the 'higher criticism' arouses as much theological anxiety as it does scientific interest. They are perpetually occupied in the task of 'reconciling,' as the phrase goes, 'religion' and 'science.' This is to them, not an intellectual luxury, but a pressing and overmastering necessity."<sup>1</sup> Mr Balfour's method will bring relief to many in our days—for, on this view, science and religion can each go its own way, ruling each within its own province with undisputed power. Their marches do not touch, and there can be no quarrel between them.

And not less is the advantage to the theoretical critic. For the task of exposing the logical errors of Naturalism ought to be much lighter than that of confuting natural science. All that is necessary is to point out the false steps in the argument by which Naturalism passes from the premisses with which it is supplied in the theories of natural science to its own sceptical and illegitimate conclusions. It is both surprising and disappointing that Mr Balfour has not done this. Nowhere, so far as I have been able to ascertain, has he converted his general charge against Naturalism of wrongly claiming affinity with science, into definite proofs of illegitimate inference. "On its positive side," he tells us, "the teaching of Naturalism is by definition identical with the teaching of science."<sup>2</sup> What precisely, then, are the logical errors which Naturalism commits when it pretends to erect its negations upon these foundations? In what respects are its claims to ally itself with natural science false? Mr Balfour gives no answer. He does not drive in the wedge between the theories of sciences which he would fain not challenge, and the conclusions of Naturalism, some of which, at least, he emphatically rejects. He is content with a rhetorical assertion of the distinction between them.

<sup>1</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, p. 278.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 384.

What, then, does the distinction amount to, and what is its value? Is it that, while science lays down certain theories of nature and refrains from drawing *any* conclusions from them which can affect the truth of man's spiritual beliefs, Naturalism follows out these theories to their conclusion? "Science," we are told, "is in no way concerned, for instance, to deny the reality of a world unrevealed to us in sense-perception, nor the existence of a God, who, however imperfectly, may be known by those who diligently seek Him. All it says, or ought to say, is that these matters are beyond its jurisdiction; to be tried, therefore, in other courts, and before judges administering different laws."<sup>1</sup> Are we to understand by this that the province of nature which science seeks to explain, and that of religion and morality with which ethics and theology are concerned, are veritably separate from one another and mutually independent? Mr Balfour rejects this illusory remedy. Man cannot separate the realm of nature from the realm of spirit: he lives in both. Nor can he refuse to endeavour to reconcile all his beliefs, scientific, ethical, and religious, so far as possible, into a self-consistent whole. He expressly discards "the remedy which consists in simply setting up, side by side with the creed of science, another and supplementary set of beliefs which may minister to wants and aspirations which science cannot meet." He would "unify all belief into an ordered whole, compacted into one coherent structure under the stress of reason."

Not to attempt this task is to do violence to reason; for its function and essential life is this of endeavouring to unify experience in a coherent whole. Naturalism is therefore not to blame for attempting to make its way from one set of beliefs to another, nor, if it finds them inconsistent, for rejecting the less probable for the more assured. And, on the other hand, it is evident that we gain nothing from the mere silence and self-restraint of natural science. The problem of coordinating its theories with the spiritual beliefs of mankind

<sup>1</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, p. 280.

remains, whether science attempts to solve it or not. There are problems, as Kant showed, which rise from the very nature of reason, and which, therefore, man must ask, and attempt to answer—if not by the methods of science, then by those of Naturalism, and if not by Naturalism, then by some other philosophic method. And when the attempt *is* made, the question of the congruence of science and theology is the question of the validity of *each*. The truth of *both* science and theology is at stake, if the inquiry is impartial.

And this, as a matter of fact, is the process exhibited by Mr Balfour himself, at least so far as science is concerned. For, having omitted to show that Naturalism is a *false* deduction from natural science, and at the same time assigned the positive content of Naturalism to science, it is evident that he cannot, merely on the ground that it maintains an obstinate silence, acquit science of complicity in the negation of the things of spirit. He is driven, reluctantly no doubt, and against the warnings of his most sympathetic and cautious critic, to attribute to science itself the necessity of proceeding from irrational conditions, the doctrine of the illusoriness of sense-perception, of the defectiveness of reason, and of the impossibility of maintaining belief in freedom, morality, and religion. We have seen him do this in his Presidential Address in the most unambiguous way. The inconsequence and ineptitude of absolute scepticism lie in the very premisses of natural science, and Naturalism only makes them vocal.

And yet, Mr Balfour is not satisfied. Yet, he would acquit science rather than face the stupendous enterprise of proving that the theories it offers of natural facts are erroneous. Hence we find him aver that science cannot do otherwise than it does. The only conditions it *can* know are those which he calls irrational, and the only premisses it *can* employ are the illusions of sense-perception. If other than naturalistic conclusions, fundamentally negative of the spiritual beliefs of mankind, are to flow from natural science, it must not be left to its own resources. "Considerations like these,"

he says—after enumerating those which are most fundamentally sceptical, sceptical as to all knowledge and as to the very instruments of knowledge—“do undoubtedly suggest a certain inevitable incoherence in any general scheme of thought which is built out of materials provided by natural science alone.”<sup>1</sup> It is no matter who the builder is, whether it be the naturalist or another. We require fresh material. We must borrow some new conceptions from elsewhere; otherwise, “though you may indeed have attained to science, in no wise will you have attained to a self-sufficing system of beliefs.” He consequently has recourse to theology. “Unless it borrow from theology, a philosophy of science is impossible. . . . Science is at least as much as theology compelled to postulate a Rational Ground or Cause of the world, who made *it* intelligible and *us* in some faint degree able to understand it.”<sup>2</sup>

We were told, a little while ago, that science was indifferent to theological postulates. It might admit if it pleased the reality of other experiences than those arising from sense-impressions, and the existence of a God.<sup>3</sup> “All it says, or ought to say, is that these matters are beyond its jurisdiction.” Now, however, we find that science is vitally concerned in these conceptions. It must admit them in order to avoid fundamental incoherence in its own doctrines. There are contradictions within science which it can avert in no other way—to say nothing of its incapacity to meet the other needs and aspirations of mankind.

What, then, are these contradictions? In which of the sciences are they to be found? Are they in mathematics, or in physics, or in some one or all of the biological sciences? Here, once more, Mr Balfour avoids the attempt to give a definite and explicit answer. No doubt, he can point out, as idealists have frequently done, that the several natural sciences deal with separate aspects of nature. Nature is a whole, but the sciences, by means of more or less artificial devices, separate her into departments, “rending her seamless garment.” There is no

<sup>1</sup> *Address*, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, p. 393.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 462.

science which pretends to forego that kind of abstraction which helps it to simplify its problem. And, as idealists have further shown, there is one essential aspect of reality which all the natural sciences, taken together, abstract from and omit to consider, namely, its relation to mind. But it does not follow, and Mr Balfour has not attempted to show, that such abstraction introduces contradictions *within* the natural sciences: that mathematicians, for instance, say and unsay the same things, or that the physicists offer self-contradictory solutions of the same facts. In short, he no more tests the actual content of any one of the natural sciences than he exposes the inconsequent logic of Naturalism. His main condemnation of them rests upon the ground that they do not yield conclusions, epistemological, ethical, or religious, which the sciences, if they know what they are about, do not pretend to offer, and the truth of which Mr Balfour has, in any case, taken for granted, on "Authority."

Natural evolution, taken to mean evolution by natural selection, he, indeed, shows to be incapable of yielding a rational account of sense or reason, of knowledge, or morality or religion. But he neither examines this particular conception of evolution, nor the way in which it is employed by the sciences. Had he done so, he would have found in the first place that natural science itself does not rely solely on natural selection to account for anything—not even for the evolution of an ape, far less for the evolution of reason and sense and religion. Natural selection can only select, and its operations are purely negative. It can bring nothing new, except fresh collocations. For the appearance of anything new, for the slightest step forward, even Darwin had to assume "accidental variation" to furnish the new departure which natural selection might afterwards favour. But Mr Balfour fastens this utterly inadequate conception of evolution upon the natural sciences *as such*. He even seems to accept it as the only theory possible for natural science; and then he employs it to discredit its results as a whole, by showing that they lead to

epistemological and other contradictions. More careful critics have shown that the contradiction lies in this way of viewing evolution, and have shown it to be of itself inadequate even for the purposes of natural science.

The same criticism applies to Mr Balfour's account of science as based upon sense-perceptions which are illusory, and of his view of reason, which is evolved out of non-rational conditions by irrational methods, and condemned to extract the truth from the illusions of sense. In this conception of the paradoxical condition in which human knowledge is placed, according to which what is first in order of logic is second in order of facts, there is a mass of assumptions which philosophers repudiate. Amongst them is the assumption that the objects of experience have a nature of their own prior to experience; that the senses which are given us to know facts necessarily distort the facts; that the operations of reason are posterior to those of sense-perception, and not immanent in them in such a way as to give them all the range of both the truth and falsehood which they possess.

Mr Balfour has not attempted to prove that these opinions, challenged by Idealism, are true. He does not seem to have thought of even questioning them, but has accepted them as a matter of course, after the manner of the ordinary consciousness. They are "the clash o' the country-side," which he dignifies with the name of "Authority." Instead of examining them in order to see if they are self-consistent, or if they agree with the facts, he points out inconvenient consequences that would flow from them; and these consequences are inconvenient because they do not conform to other beliefs, mainly ethical and religious, which may be or may not be true, and which, at any rate, are not shown to be true by Mr Balfour, but accepted in the same uncritical way.

The result is that it is not possible to form a clear or consistent conception of Mr Balfour's attitude towards natural science. His attitude is, in fact, self-contradictory. The account given by science of the natural derivation of reason, of

its consequent defectiveness, and of its dependence on illusory sense-perceptions, is made the ground on which Mr Balfour appeals from reason and science to "authority" and "theology." It is thus accepted as true. But, on the other hand, as it leads to the rejection of ethical and religious beliefs, taken as authoritative, it is rejected as untrue. So that the result is that Mr Balfour adopts the particular scientific beliefs, or so-called scientific beliefs, as to natural selection, etc., as true, but rejects natural science as a whole as false. He admits them in detail *in order to* condemn them as a whole; he admits them as proving the untrustworthiness of reason, and rejects them because they are not reconcilable with ethics and theology.

Let me put this matter, which is vital to Mr Balfour's whole method of argumentation, in another way. From one point of view it would seem that natural science can have no material on which to erect its theories except sense-perception.<sup>1</sup> "That *is* experience," he tells us, "and in this region of belief there is no other."<sup>2</sup> Science can know only irrational, or non-rational, conditions. From another point of view, Mr Balfour contemplates correcting the results which flow from natural science by adding a new postulate to its premisses. He bids it "borrow from theology the conception of a Rational Cause or Ground of the world."<sup>3</sup> But, how can Mr Balfour say that science can know only natural conceptions, and at the same time that it can borrow others; that its only premisses are sense-perceptions, and that it can still have amongst its postulates the conception of a First Cause? If he answers that the first is the *material* of knowledge, and the second its formulating conception, we ask, is the new conception, or theological postulate, which science must adopt to modify the content of the natural sciences, or is it to remain otiose? In the first case *mere* sense-perceptions do not constitute the whole of the materials of science, but sense-perceptions

<sup>1</sup> See *Presidential Address*, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 393 and 289.

carrying within them the evidence and consequence of their Rational Cause : and this, I may say, is remotely akin to the very modification adopted by Idealism, which refuses to regard sense and its objects as unrelated to spirit. In the second case the natural and ultimately sceptical character of science would remain unchanged. Once the natural sciences have placed the theological conception in the rear of their several hypotheses, everything could go on as before, the natural selection of reason from irrational conditions included. The *proximate* grounds of man's beliefs would remain non-rational, and the *ultimate* ground, the Rational Ground or Cause, would occupy a position of *otium cum dignitate*, somewhere in the background.

And this latter is the alternative really adopted by Mr Balfour, at least in the first instance. His reconciliation of science and theology consists in the external addition to science of a postulate which science does not, and cannot, use. But science cannot adopt or borrow in this external way and remain science ; and if it could, the borrowed postulate goes for nothing unless it modifies the system of beliefs into which it is introduced.

Mr Balfour himself ultimately sees the ineptitude of this superficial and mechanical remedy. And, as he is pressed back in his search for the causes of scepticism from Naturalism to natural science, so he is, in turn, forced back from natural science, and natural science *plus* a theological postulate, upon nature itself.

The Deity which science is called upon to postulate must not only be behind nature as its first cause, but must also interfere with its processes. God must be "immanent," and yet not equally immanent in all His works. "Having created all, He yet favours only a part,"<sup>1</sup> "working by preferential methods." "When once we have realised the scientific truth that at the root of every rational process lies an irrational one ; that reason, from a scientific point of view, is itself a natural product ; and that the whole material on

<sup>1</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, p. 394.

which it works is due to causes, physical, physiological, and social, which it neither creates nor controls, we shall be driven in mere self-defence to hold that, behind these non-rational forces, and above them, guiding them by slow degrees, and, as it were, with difficulty, to a rational issue, stands that Supreme Reason in whom we must thus believe, if we are to believe in anything.”<sup>1</sup> And, if we ask for the grounds which constrain science to adopt this “belief in God, and to attribute to Him reason and what I have called ‘preferential action,’ Mr Balfour answers that science must either do so or confess itself to be an illusion.”<sup>2</sup> At no smaller cost can we reconcile the origins of science with its pretensions.” This hypothesis, and this alone, makes its doctrines coherent, reconciling it not only with theology, but with itself.

And the argument thus applied to science will apply in like manner to ethics. “It is impossible to refuse to ethical beliefs what we have already conceded to scientific beliefs. For the analogy between them is complete. Both are natural products. Neither rank among their remoter causes any which share their essence. And as it is easy to trace back our scientific beliefs to sources which have about them nothing which is rational, so it is easy to trace back our ethical beliefs to sources which have about them nothing which is ethical. Both require us, therefore, to seek behind these phenomenal sources for some ultimate ground with which they shall be congruous; and as we have been moved to postulate a rational God in the interests of science, so we can scarcely decline to postulate a moral God in the interests of morality.”<sup>3</sup>

Nor can we rest here. By a further use of the same method of reasoning, Mr Balfour shows that not only science and ethics compel us to adopt the conception of a Deity who, being active and prompted to exercise providential care over nature, is much more than a metaphysical substance or subject,

<sup>1</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 311, 312.   <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.   <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 312, 313.

but that other departments of our experience force us in the same direction, and lead us to a still fuller definition of the Deity. We require an æsthetic God to account for our æsthetic beliefs, as well as an ethical God to account for our moral opinions. Ultimately, indeed, experience demands a Christian God, who has incarnated Himself in man. And it is natural to conclude that, if Mr Balfour had only persevered, he could have shown that there is no single need or aspiration of human nature which does not justify us in postulating a corresponding attribute in the Deity by whom the need may be met. Might he not have shown us that there must be an Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Baptist God, in order to satisfy the wants of the Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Baptist sectarian? And would not the same follow as to the adherents of the different political sects?

But it is time to examine this argument. It promised ill at first, triumphant as it is at the close. It began with non-rational conditions as constituting experience—for these *are* experience, as he tells us. It deduced from these conditions both sense-perceptions and reason; but the former are illusory and the latter is defective, and this defective reason has nothing to work upon except illusions. It imposed upon science an impossible task; for out of these illusions and by means of a defective reason it was to extract from experience what experience contradicts, and to infer the spiritual from the natural. But although its premisses are illusory, its instrument is defective, and its task is impossible, all ends well. For science is bidden, and authorised, to borrow the conception of a Deity—bidden by the needs of our ethical, religious, and æsthetic experience, all to be regarded as authoritative because they rest upon “Authority.” Then science is made to recognise *within itself* the need of this Deity, and permitted to define the Deity in accordance with its own needs; and ethics and religion and æsthetics are granted the same privilege. And the privilege is a great one, for much can be done if one is allowed to “borrow” a Deity. This theological postulate

firsts corrects the results of science (and that without altering its non-rational premisses, except by *adding* to them); it helps it over the *mauvais pas* from the natural to the spiritual; it even changes nature itself, or at least guides some of its processes "by slow degrees and as it were with difficulty"; and thus, at last, we get all we can desire—namely, a world directed so as to answer to all our preconceptions, and with science, ethics, art, religion all reconciled.

How comes it about that theology can be made to yield whatever science may happen to want in order to help it to the right conclusions, and that science itself demands just those things which theology can yield? How are we to account for the fact that God has precisely those attributes which will make up the defects amongst the postulates of science, and that science postulates precisely those attributes which God has? The credit and debit sides agree perfectly, but can we be sure that the accounts are not cooked? Science and religion are reconciled, but is it possible that their *contents are defined by reference to one another*? Whence does the rational necessity spring which draws them to one another, and makes them complementary? Does it arise from science, or does it arise from theology?

Let us ask science first, and it may happen that we need not trouble to ask theology.

Science we have found engaged on the explanation of natural facts; and, if taken strictly, it does not raise the problems of knowledge, morality, or religion, nor seek to give any account of the world of reality as a whole. In this respect it does not count one way or another; for it makes no pretensions, and it has a right to be hypothetical as to its principles, proximate as to its methods and limited as to its province. It is only from science which seeks for ultimate solutions, that is, from science endeavouring to become a philosophy, that these difficulties can arise, or the solution of them could be expected. But science seeking to be a philosophy fails, as we are told; for its premisses are natural, or

non-rational, and it must therefore lead to Naturalism. And Naturalism breaks down in every way, and utterly. For it not only fails to account for the moral and religious beliefs of mankind, but also for knowledge: it contradicts itself speculatively and collapses into complete scepticism.

Now, so far, the conclusions of Mr Balfour cannot be challenged; I agree that Naturalism fails. Nor do I dissent from the consequence that he draws from its failure: Naturalism, having turned into scepticism, removes itself as well as that which it doubts or denies, and thereby leaves its place empty. The problem must be attacked in some other way, and the investigation conducted on some new hypothesis. I shall go further, and say that I agree with Mr Balfour in maintaining that only a spiritualistic, or idealistic, hypothesis will suffice. All these truths are the commonplaces of modern Idealism, and they may even be said to be shared by the ordinary consciousness of the day.

But the value of the transition from the one hypothesis to the other depends upon the way in which it is brought about. And a philosopher must be judged not merely by the aims with which he sets forth and the results at which he arrives, but by the way in which he gains them. In short, a philosopher must obtain his conclusions by a philosophic method. I admit, indeed, that when an author takes his stand upon the illusoriness of the materials of knowledge and the defectiveness of reason, and then claims the right to bring in "Authority" and a "Deity" to act preferentially upon the data of reasoning, there is a certain ineptitude in demanding that he should admit the rights of ordinary argumentation. But, so long as he does not preface his remarks, like an ancient prophet, with a "Thus saith the Lord," we may perhaps be allowed to reason with him.

And the method of reason, *i.e.* of scientific or philosophic thinking, of advancing from a worse to a better hypothesis is obvious enough. In the first place, the discarded hypothesis is detected as not fitting the facts,—the facts, that is to

say, *which are relevant to it, and for which it professes to account.* In the second place, this implies that there is some element in the facts, held to be real, which the hypothesis either omits or distorts. Or in other words, a truth or what is assumed to be a truth, is manifested in the facts and not manifested in the theory of them. Hence, taking the experience as a whole, it is found to be incongruous; and either the recognised truth or the proffered theory has to be discarded or modified. And, in the last place, the recognised truth, gradually made more definite, either modifies the original hypothesis, or furnishes the whole, or an element, of a new hypothesis.

But the method of the ordinary or uncritical consciousness is different. Gathering its experiences into departments, or "universes of thought," as the phrase goes (for neither can *it* be entirely discontinuous), it may hold them all together, although they are inconsistent; or it may reject any one of them, not because it contains incoherencies within itself, but because it is incongruous with some other department which it takes as authoritative. It may, *e.g.*, turn its back on science although it can discover no defects in its theories, and do so simply on the ground that it is inconsistent with its theological beliefs, which are themselves substantiated by no process of demonstration.

Now, the gravamen of my charge against Mr Balfour is that he employs this latter way. I make the charge reluctantly, for it means denying that his method is philosophical at all, and putting him in the class "of the imitators who turn into philosophers" to whom Plato gives such hard names. It is the method of the Sophist, who employs reason, not in order to discover the truth, but to prove his prejudices: a method one can recommend to the Pragmatists as less violent and quite as effective as "*The Will to Believe.*"

I am aware that one at least of his critics has identified Mr Balfour's method with that of Kant (so far as he could do so without detracting from Mr Balfour's originality, or obscuring

his superiority to the cumbrousness and pedantry of the older writer), and his conclusions with those of Kant's idealistic successors.<sup>1</sup> But Idealism seemed to me to have sought and found its better hypothesis *within* the facts of ordinary and scientific experience. It convicted Naturalism of having omitted one aspect or element of reality. Merely "natural" objects it finds unknowable or mere — things-in-themselves. What ordinary and naturalistic thought deemed to be independent of experience, it showed to be objects *of* experience, and *already* in relation to sense and thought. But this means that the "conditions" under which the natural sciences operate are not merely natural or non-rational, as Mr Balfour avers. The processes of nature, nature itself, are already in some way related to spirit, for only so are they conceivable. The dualism of nature and spirit becomes for Idealism a "duality in unity." It refuses to sunder reality into independent parts—a subject out of relation to object or an object out of relation to subject; because it has recognised that thus sundered they disappear into an object which cannot be known, and a subject which cannot know.

Hence, according to the idealistic view, natural science, when it is engaged upon its natural problems, is endeavouring to interpret an aspect, element, or province of a world which is intelligible, and therefore a manifestation of reason. When it seeks to represent such a world as evolving the senses and the reason of man, it does not find itself confronted with the impossible task of showing how the natural can become spiritual, the non-rational rational, or the non-moral moral. Evolution, for it, is not a breach of identity, or the achievement by means of divine preferential action of something at the end of the process which did not in some potential way exist there at the beginning. It is a process by which a rational world, that is, a world which is the object of reason, gradually reveals and realises itself as a manifestation of reason.

The method of Idealism is thus the result of the criticism of

<sup>1</sup> See *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 278, 279.

natural knowledge in the light of its data ; it is the criticism of natural knowledge by itself, and the advance of natural science upon itself. Hence science, within its own province and limitations, instead of dealing with non-rational conditions, is deemed to be engaged upon the problems of Idealism ; for it is proving, gradually as it advances, the intrinsic correlation and interpenetration of mind and its object, and, in this sense, proving that the world *is* spiritual. In a word, from the point of view of Idealism, *justice to the facts of nature* demands a spiritual postulate.

With this method I find Mr Balfour's to be in sharpest contrast. It is allied to it in nothing except in its dissatisfaction with Naturalism and in its general aim. Mr Balfour's method has all the characteristics of that of the ordinary consciousness ; for it is unsystematic, uncritical, and dogmatic. He has accepted the results of Idealism in so far as he considers that the ultimate explanation of the world must be spiritual ; but he has not adopted the principle of Idealism, if that means the consistent application of it to facts so as to overcome the dualism of nature and spirit. For nature remains to him "natural," in the sense of extra-rational, to the end. Even divine "preferential action" does not change its character in this respect.

And how does he obtain the preferential action of his Deity ? It is again after the manner of the ordinary consciousness, which borrows from one province of experience anything it may happen to need in order to correct the defects of another province. Mr Balfour brings in theological conceptions, whose validity is not justified, in order that he may attain results which are also unjustified. And, of course, the method is successful, and the reconciliation of science and theology is complete ; for are not the conceptions of the latter *added* to those of the former ? There are, obviously, no contradictions too deep to be remedied by a preferential Deity ; and we can never fail of reasons, so long as we allow our wants to dictate them.

"The argument from needs to their satisfaction is the

constructive principle on which Mr Balfour depends, and furnishes, I think, the key to a true understanding of the book."<sup>1</sup> So says Professor Pringle Pattison, and I agree with him. But before we can allow our needs to determine our opinions, we must assure ourselves in the first place that these needs are themselves valid. For, in the last resort, reason can recognise no necessity except that which comes from reason. Kant was interested in the defence of morality and religion as deeply as Mr Balfour; and his critical philosophy derived its motive from his desire, if possible, to maintain the freedom of man, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. But he did not first adopt these as true, and then try to foist them in amongst the premisses of natural science. He examined the ordinary presuppositions of the knowledge of nature and found them abstract. He propounded a new principle, according to which the facts of nature were other than merely natural; for they were shot through and through by their relations to rational spirit. Hence, it was by a rational necessity that he was driven along a way, which ultimately leads to the fundamental denial of the dualism of nature and spirit with which ordinary knowledge is afflicted. Freedom followed as a consequence of his view of nature, and nature became itself a manifestation of the Absolute.

But this fundamental reconstruction of nature we do not find in Mr Balfour's argument. The object of science, he tells us, "is physical reality; a reality which may or may not be capable of direct perception; a reality which is in any case independent of it."<sup>2</sup> That is to say, he sets forth from the conception of reality which it was the main triumph of Idealism to prove impossible. And all the processes of nature he continues throughout to describe as having that independence of spirit which Idealism could attribute only to things-in-themselves, and therefore to things unknowable and non-existent.

<sup>1</sup> *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 275.

<sup>2</sup> *Presidential Address*, p. 5.

But, it may be asked, does not Mr Balfour alter these non-rational conditions by borrowing the theological postulate of a providentially operative Deity? The answer is that he changes the results and retains the conditions. He maintains the pure naturalism of science, and by a theological *tour de force* makes it appear to yield spiritual conclusions. In truth, however, these conclusions do not, in the end, spring from nature, but from the "preferential action" of his postulated Deity. Mr Balfour was under compulsion to maintain the pure "naturalism" of the world in order to create the necessity for the theological correction of it. Science must persist in representing its conditions as non-rational, for this is the only justification that can be offered for calling in the "preferential Deity." The weakness of science is the theologian's opportunity. Science must postulate God in order to achieve its ends of giving a coherent account of human experience; and it must give an incoherent account of human experience in order to postulate God. The proof of the things of spirit rests upon the failure of a natural explanation of the world; and yet we must accept this erroneous explanation as truth, in order to justify the bringing in of its external correction by means of a theological postulate. Science must continue its irrational endeavour of eliciting spirit from nature, reason from matter, in order that, later on, the existence of spirit may be postulated; and having postulated spirit, science must still cling to its old error. Science is the drunkard who teaches temperance by exhibiting the horrors of drunkenness. It is at the same time the naturalistic negation of religion and the guide to religion: an atheist proving the existence of God.

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## THE CRUX OF THEISM.

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THE religious apologist devotes much effort to maintaining, and his scientific opponents to contesting, a number of propositions which would, even if their truth were demonstrated, do nothing towards establishing what the former really desire to establish, excepting to show that this doctrine or body of doctrines cannot be dismissed beforehand as essentially incredible and absurd, but deserves to be examined carefully on its own immediate merits. If those, then, who believe these essentials of theism to be false, and desire to show that they are so, will but concede to the theists all those preliminary points which in no way tend to prove that the theist's creed is true, but merely require to be conceded in order that its truth may be debatable, they will not only be shortening the discussion by getting rid of what is not essential to it, but they will simplify it by forcing their opponents to deal with essentials only.

A familiar illustration of this, and an apt introduction to what will follow, is afforded us by the manner in which most of our religious apologists still waste so large a part of their time in attacking irreligious science as a system of crude materialism. "The real peril of naturalistic science," says a recent clerical writer of exceptional candour and acumen, arises from the fact that it is a system "according to which stuff is the ultimate reality, and thought the mechanical product of things"; and he points, as a refuge from this, to "that more than valuable philosophy," according to which "the ultimate

reality is spirit, and the existences we observe are real for spirit and in spirit only." Now the reasons why materialism is obnoxious to the defenders of religion are several; but it will be sufficient here to give our attention to one of them, which is that materialism is determinism in its most palpable form. The crucial point, then, at issue between them and their opponents here is not the reality of "stuff," but the reality of man's free will. Now, I may observe in passing that the scientific thinkers of to-day do not actually, any more than the most spiritual theist, profess a materialism of the kind that is thus imputed to them. Let us suppose, however, that this was not the case. Let us suppose that all men of science did, at the present moment, accept matter in the way in which a child accepts it, as a self-existing and seemingly lifeless solidity, and had never suspected, till their present critics attacked them, that this way of looking at things could be open to philosophic question. The point on which I here desire to insist is this—that, instead of defending their position, they might surrender it at the first onslaught; and so far as the crucial question between them and the theists is concerned—that is to say, the moral free-will of man—they would have altered the situation in one way only. They would have freed the discussion of a wholly irrelevant element which did but distract attention from the point really at issue. How this is can be very easily explained.

But by accepting the proposition that matter is a mere subjective appearance whose movements symbolise the movements of a mind or spirit which is (as the theist maintains it is) "the ultimate reality" of the universe, we do nothing to invalidate the fact that the processes of the universal spirit take place in the same order, and with the same unbroken uniformity, as that discernible in the phenomena by which the spiritual processes are symbolised. Such being the case, then, the evidence (which the anti-materialist as such has done nothing to challenge) that the individual mind or spirit is nucleated by a process of evolution out of

something which, though spiritual, is other than itself but continuous with it, and, being continuous with it, conditions all its movements, remains practically what it was. We have a spiritual determinism instead of a physical determinism, the former representing philosophically more correct ideas than the latter, but leading, so far as freedom is concerned, to no other conclusion.

Nor, so far as freedom is concerned, is the situation in any way altered, if we advance a step farther in the language of theistic religion, and give to the "ultimate reality" of which matter is a manifestation the name of God, instead of the vaguer name of spirit. I am not here referring to that use of the name of God which implies the assertion of a general purpose in the universe, which each individual operation is specially designed to subserve. This we will consider presently. I am here referring only to the more limited theory that each particular phenomenon apprehended by man's senses is an effect produced in our consciousness by the direct volition of Deity. Such, for example, is the theory of Berkeley: and it has been reproduced by Romanes, the distinguished coadjutor of Darwin, in a posthumous volume which has lately been edited and issued by the Bishop of Birmingham, as a contribution to Christian apologetics.

Romanes, who experienced, during his later years, a strong desire to return to the theism which he had previously abandoned, imagined that he had taken an important step in this direction by identifying all natural causation with a living cosmic will. But this doctrine of the cosmic will would affect the argument only if it implied that the order of nature, consisting, as it were, of a series of divine illusions, is less uniform and calculable than we are at present accustomed to consider it, and that we are at liberty to postulate breaks in it when and where we please. But even those who attach to the conception the value which Romanes attached to it, do not suggest that it carries with it any implication such as this. Romanes himself admits that when all is said and

done, the empirical uniformity of nature remains the same as ever. We cannot, he says, get over the fact that "everything which happens has a cause, and that the same happening has always the same cause—or the same consequent the same antecedent." And if this holds good of the volitions of the universal spirit, it will *à fortiori* hold good of the volitions of the individual man, who can hardly be supposed to derive from universal spirit a freedom not belonging to universal spirit itself.

Thus even if the scientific determinists of to-day—men such as Haeckel and the followers of Spencer and Huxley—were really materialists, as their theistic critics imagine them to be, they might do provisionally what, as a matter of fact, they do actually—namely, repudiate materialism as completely as their critics themselves do, without affecting, in any of its essential bearings, the only religious question here at issue between them. But though the question would not be altered in any of its essential bearings, it would be altered, for practical purposes, in one most important way. We should, by having divested it of all irrelevant difficulties, be able to see clearly what its essential bearings are, and both parties would be compelled to give their whole attention to these. There would be no more bickerings over the possibility or the impossibility of "brute matter" being the parent of life and spirit. The whole universe—matter and man alike—would be accepted as a going concern, on the terms dictated by the theistic thinkers themselves. The question at issue would be, therefore, reduced to this:—how can the will and spirit of the individual man be conceived of as independent of the universal will and spirit from which by slow stages they are discovered visibly emerging, by which they are constantly sustained, without whose nutriment they would die, and with which (so far as observation can show us anything) every one of their movements is connected? Whether the theist will, when the problem is stated thus, be able to make his own position good, is a separate question altogether which cannot be discussed

here. He will at all events have taken a first step towards doing so by realising clearly what the nature of his task is.

And now let us turn from the theistic critique of materialism to an argument of another kind, on which, in their controversy with science, the apologists of religion lay even greater stress, and which at the present moment they are urging with renewed vigour. This is the argument—I have made allusion to it already—which aims at showing that the evolutionary process of nature not only consists of separate, or (as we may say) of cellular, volitions on the part of the universal spirit, but implies also certain definite and far-reaching purposes which these cellular volitions build up into actualities. Thus Mr Balfour, in his address to the British Association at Cambridge, urged that the development of certain of the cerebral faculties of man—those, for example, of the philosopher and the master of speculative mathematics—cannot have been due to any survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, because, whatever benefits they may bestow on mankind ultimately, they equip their actual possessors with no immediate advantage over their rivals, and must, therefore, be due to some “teleological factor” immanent from the very first in the process of vital evolution.

Now this argument of Mr Balfour's, and many others similar to it, however great their force, can be met with plausible answers; and we will therefore assume that men of science generally reject the teleological doctrine, or set it aside as doubtful. Such being the case, then, what I am going to point out is, that they may here make to their opponents a provisional concession as complete as their real concession in respect of the question of materialism, and yet may leave the entire point at issue, in so far as it possesses any theistic significance, in the same state in which it would be were this concession withheld—except, again, for the one single fact that this concession having been made, the real question at issue is isolated from questions irrelevant to it, and the theist is compelled to confine himself to what he really wants to prove.

For what is the utmost that the teleologists are seeking to prove here? Simply that the results of evolution—of organic evolution especially—in spite of the indirectness of the means employed in reaching them, are results pre-conceived by a personal and quasi-human intelligence, who has deliberately arranged the means so as to issue in an intended end of some kind; and they are seeking to prove this by two separate contentions—firstly, by the contention that evolution is not inconsistent with purpose, and secondly, by the contention that, for various reasons, it implies it.

Now the first of these is a truism which seems useful to the theist only because some opponents of theism have been so ill-judging as to question it. It merely means that an intelligent and purposive Deity may reasonably be conceived of as doing on an enormous scale what ingenious children do constantly on a small scale. Such children, if they have enough wooden bricks for the purpose, will build a miniature causeway, often of great length, which rises and falls after the fashion of a switchback railway, turns back on itself, crosses itself on bridges, and surprises the spectator by the audacity of its curves and gradients. On this causeway they will place a series of bricks set upright, in such a manner that when the first one is tipped forwards it will knock down the brick in front of it, and so on through the whole line; and any number of structures, such as little turrets or pillars, may be pre-arranged also, which shall be knocked down in the process. So far as the teleological argument which we are here considering goes, the whole evolutionary universe is a toy of this description; and the appearance of man, and the development of man's faculties, will be comparable to the collapse of the structures as the falling bricks touch them. Nothing is easier than, by looking on things in this light, to show that the most deliberate preconception of ends is perfectly compatible with the most indirect means of reaching them. More intelligence is shown, and more indisputable purpose also, by a boy, if he knocks down a brick by means of two hundred other

bricks, than would be shown by him if he knocked it down by the direct touch of his finger.

The teleologists, then, let it be granted, are perfectly right in their first contention—namely, that science does not even suggest that divine purpose is an impossibility. In itself, however, it does nothing to prove that divine purpose is an actuality. This second contention rests on different grounds altogether; but though these to many minds seem futile or inconclusive, let the truth of this second contention be similarly granted also. What, as champions of theism, do the teleologists gain? A moment's consideration will show us that they gain nothing but a clearer insight into the propositions which they still have to establish. We are dealing here with the theistic doctrine of God, just as we were dealing previously with the theistic doctrine of man; and in what do the distinguishing features of this doctrine of God consist? They do not consist of an assent to the general theorem that the spirit which actuates the universe, must actuate it with purposes of some sort, any more than Christianity consists of an assent to the theorem that Christ acted with purpose, like all other human beings. The theistic doctrine of God is not a doctrine that the supreme mind acts with purpose, but a doctrine that it acts with purposes of a highly specialised kind. The character of these, not the existence, is what, in his controversy with science, the theist has to establish.

Let us, then, reflect, although it is familiar to all of us, on what the character claimed by theism for the purposes of God is.

We will take first the most general quality ascribed to them. This is, that, in a moral sense, they are supremely and entirely good. So much we assume; and then at once comes the question of what the standard is by which their goodness is to be tested. Now to such a question the general answer is obvious. They are to be tested by the relations which they bear to the consciousness of sentient beings. So much will be admitted by everyone as obvious to

common sense; but the theist asserts it in a form far more precise than this. The essential goodness which the theist ascribes to the purposes of God is a goodness which is what it is because it relates to man. Even this way of putting his case is not, however, sufficiently definite. The term "man" may stand for two things. It may stand for the race or for the individual. In the logic of theism, which the religious apologists of to-day too often forget, it stands primarily for the individual.

Of all the purposed and deliberately contrived effects, then, which result from the long train of pre-arranged evolutionary causes, those by which alone, for the theist, the goodness of God's purposes is to be tested are individual human beings, as the process of evolution produces them. What the theist, therefore, is bound to prove—or his theism falls altogether to the ground—is that the human beings thus produced exhibit in their constitutions and their circumstances, if we treat the evidence fairly, an infinite and loving care concentrated on every one of them, by a God who purposed their existence with a view to their individual beatitude, the most precious element of this being an intimate union with Himself. God, in short, according to the theistic doctrine, virtually addresses each human being thus:—"I have made you in order that you should be perfect, even as I, your Father, am perfect. My love for you, and my desire for your perfection are so vast, that you, yourself individually, might be the only thing made by me, and the whole end of creation might be the welfare of your single soul. Moreover, my power and wisdom being equal to my infinite love for you, all the processes of nature with which your existence is connected have been ordered by me in the way best fitted to endow you with all the faculties and dispositions necessary for the kind of life that I require of you, and with the circumstances which will best enable you to bring them to full development."

But what are the facts of the evolutionary process in reality, when thus considered in relation to the individual

human being? How far do they afford us any evidence—how far do they even suggest—that the intelligent God of evolution whose existence we are assuming to be indubitable, possesses a character which would entitle Him to use such language as the above? This is the vital question which we have now isolated, and which the apologists of religion and its scientific opponents can now discuss clearly on its own immediate merits.

The difficulties which the theist encounters here are proverbial; but the principal point to which I wish to direct attention is not the difficulties themselves, but the various means by which to-day our theists are endeavouring to escape from them.

The most familiar of these consists of a very old argument, the form of which has been modified in order to suit new circumstances. It aims at counterbalancing the evidence afforded by the cruelties of nature that the Controller of nature cannot be wholly benevolent, by concentrating our attention on a certain class of facts which are said to attest His benevolence in a way so precise and conclusive that all indications to the contrary are obviously quite misleading. These facts, as described in the language of contemporary apologetics, consist principally of the striking and elaborate adaptation of the human organism to its environment and to its own needs, and the reciprocal adaptation of the environment to the needs of the human organism. To many minds the argument seems plausible even now; and before the conception of a slow and selective evolution had superseded that of direct creations, it may well have seemed irresistible. For all thinkers, however, who are willing to look facts in the face, the force which it once possessed has now disappeared entirely; and, before we proceed farther, let us see precisely why.

The reasons why it has lost its force are two.

One of these is to be found in the reflection now forcibly thrust on us, that an adaptation, such as that on which the theist dwells, of the human organism to the needs and condi-

tions of its life, is an absolute necessity if man is to exist at all. A devil, if he were to make men with the deliberate purpose of torturing them, would have to adapt them to their environment as ingeniously as a benevolent God would. Therefore the nicety of our bodily mechanisms—though we may grant that it points to Intelligence, who had in view from the first the production of the human being, tells us nothing of the sentiments with which He regards His creature ; and we are left to infer these from another class of facts altogether.

And here we come to the second of the two reasons why the argument now under consideration has lost what was once its force. If we consider the Supreme Being as the producer of the human race, we may see in His method of producing it a certain purposive care, having for its object the realisation of some preconceived type or types, more harmonious perhaps, and highly gifted, than any that have existed yet. But though such a process might be called divinely benevolent in so far as it affected the superior specimens of humanity, who more or less closely approximated to the final type in question, it could not be called benevolent to the human being as such ; for the essence of the method is, as we all know, to produce a majority who in various degrees are failures, in order to produce a minority who cluster round the line of success ; “ it can,” says a recent writer, “ be no possible extenuation to point to the final result as order and beauty, so long as the means employed by the Omnipotent Designer are known to have been so terrible. . . . Am I told,” he continues, “ that I am not competent to judge of the purposes of the Almighty ? I answer that if there are purposes, I am able to judge of them as far as I can see ; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appear to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when they appear to be malevolent.”

The writer of these words was Romanes, and they occur in the posthumous volume already alluded to, whose editor is the Bishop of Birmingham. They give us the crucial

problem reduced to its bare essentials. The writer encumbers himself with no doubtful points of philosophy. Everything which philosophically is claimed by theism he concedes to it. He concedes the existence of intelligent purpose in the universe. He concedes its active presence in every process of nature ; but what he means in the above passage is, that though the facts of nature admit of, and may even demand a God, they are, on the face of them, utterly inconsistent with a God possessing the character which it is the essence of theism to attribute to Him, and which alone could render Him an object of religion, or even of interest, to mankind. So far as they go, they destroy the fundamental doctrine of His equal and fatherly love for each human soul individually ; and if that doctrine disappears, whatever else remains, the whole fabric of theism falls to pieces along with it.

He is not, however, prepared to leave the question thus. His whole object, on the contrary, in such a passage as the above, as the name of his editor might assure us, is merely to state difficulties as a first step towards solving them. Bishop Gore is certainly to be thanked for having made this small volume public. Romanes was the disciple, the fellow-worker, and the intimate friend of Darwin ; and he shared, and elaborately defended, during the most active part of his life, those anti-theistic opinions with which the name of Darwin is associated. A peculiar interest attaches, therefore, to the manner in which a man, thus exceptionally qualified, endeavoured to meet those scientific negations, with which nobody was more familiar, or had expressed more vigorously, than himself.

The arguments of Romanes with regard to the point now before us—namely, the compatibility of God's goodness to the individual with the scientific facts of evolution—are, we shall find, not new. They are new, however, in one at least of their applications, whilst their successful isolation from all irrelevant questions gives them a farther value of a quite exceptional kind.

They divide themselves into two groups, one of which deals with the sufferings and so-called cruelties involved in the evolutionary process in so far as it affects the individual, whilst the other deals with this process as related to mankind generally. The first group—those dealing with the case of the individual—are little more than a re-statement of the familiar orthodox doctrine that the evils which God, with so much seeming injustice, inflicts through nature on man, are inflicted on him for his own good, and are really blessings in disguise. It may, says Romanes, be scientifically affirmed on the evidence of objective facts that, in addition to the cognitive faculties which science itself uses, man possesses another—namely, the faculty of spiritual “intuition,” which discerns a certain inward state called spiritual goodness, or sanctity, as the one supreme object for which men are meant to struggle; and since suffering rightly borne is one of the chief means of sanctification, “the worst sufferings can be welcome, if faith in such an object justifies them.”

His second group of arguments may be briefly summarised thus. If we turn from the case of the individual to the history of the human race, whatever may be said of the waste and cruelties of nature, it is impossible to deny that man has been methodically rising from conditions of the most abject kind, in which this spiritual goodness, as we now know it, and as the world's great saints have exhibited it, was inconceivable, to conditions in which examples of it (amongst Christians at least) have been numberless, and an appreciation of its value universal. In this fact, says Romanes, spiritual intuition discerns an indubitable end or purpose worthy of an all-good God. So much, then, being granted, if we revert to the teachings of science, and, realising that evolution is God's method of working, consider what evolution is—if we consider that it is a “winnowing out” of what is spiritually bad or inferior, in order that what is spiritually the best may alone ultimately survive—we see that the great difficulty which it has suggested to the mind of the agnostic is really no difficulty at all. What

seems to be an aimless waste when we examine the process piecemeal, is, when we examine this as a whole, and in relation to the results in which it issues, found to be not a waste, but an essential part of the means by which God's definite ideal of human goodness and sanctity is from age to age being progressively realised; and nothing is waste which is essential to an ulterior purpose. If this argument, says Romanes, is not clear enough as it stands, we can easily make it so by comparing man's spiritual evolution to something which is, in a smaller and lower way, analogous to it—namely, the system of competitive examination. This system involves, as we all know, the failure and rejection of a large number of candidates; but its object being to secure for certain posts those persons best fitted to fill them, if it gradually raises the quality of the competitors who receive appointments, and if no other system equally efficacious is practicable, it is wasteful only from a limited point of view, being admirably adapted to the purpose, for it has been instituted by statesmen, and it illustrates instead of discrediting their patriotic care and wisdom.

We will now briefly enquire what these two groups of arguments are worth.

As to the first, this need not long detain us. We may start with admitting that there is an element in it of well-known truth. In individual cases suffering of certain kinds doubtless purifies character, and contact with evil develops the appreciation of good. But, as theists themselves bear witness, both by their religious creed and by their morality, neither suffering nor contact with evil can be essential to goodness as such; for—to take the evidence of their own creed first—goodness, according to them, will reach its climax in Heaven; and in Heaven both evil and suffering are expected by them to be wholly absent; whilst, according to them, in the second place, one of the first of our moral duties is to minimise both, so far as may be possible, on earth. If God, therefore, be omnipotent, the question is still untouched of why He did not arrange that all men should be spiritually

perfect from the first, instead of dragging them through the mud in order that they should be washed clean; and to these objections must be added the farther fact which Romanes oddly enough altogether neglected, that, though in certain cases suffering may raise and purify, in others, if we judge both by the same test of experience, its only possible effect is to harden, to embitter, and degrade.

But the apology of Romanes is open to a more damaging criticism still. When defending suffering as an incident of organic and of spiritual evolution, he arbitrarily limits its meaning to the mere sensation of pain, and closes his eyes to what is really by far the most important part of it—namely, the moral disabilities, or the doom of spiritual loss, resulting from congenital defects in the organisms of the victimised individuals, or analogous defects in the environment which has surrounded them like a second womb. A long and painful illness may chasten the temper of a saint, but how can a depraved nervous system, congenital lust or ferociousness, a congenitally callous conscience, or stunted intellectual powers, afford those who are not saints any help in attaining sanctity? How can evils such as these be reconciled with the goodness of a God for whom the sanctity of each single soul is the main purpose of evolution? The plain truth is that Romanes, when in the interests of theism he attempts to get rid of the difficulties which he had formerly urged in opposition to it, not only does not get rid of them, but he does not even touch them. He merely hides them from himself by restating them in a different form.

That such is the case becomes even more apparent when we consider how he deals with evolution considered under its wider aspect, and tests it by reference to its efficiency in improving the spiritual type, rather than in developing through its discipline the spirituality of each individual. The true character of his argument, in this connection, is clearly shown by the comparison which he himself institutes between the process of evolution and the system of competitive examina-

tions. If the nature of the case would allow us to limit our observation to the high spiritual qualities developed by the successful competitors, and either not to give our attention to the rejected candidates at all, or else to accept them as a foil which enhances the brilliancy of the others, Romanes would no doubt have succeeded in giving us an intelligible picture of God's benevolence towards man, as evidenced and realised by evolution. But the rejected candidates cannot be ignored thus. They constitute the standing difficulty. It is, let me repeat, the distinguishing feature of theism to ascribe to God an infinite and equal love for every one of His human children; and the immolation of most of them by the competitive or evolutionary process is not made more consonant with such love by the most adroit demonstration that the many are immolated for the good of the favoured few. This argument, which Romanes urges in the interests of theism, is merely a variant of one which all theists scout as abominable, to the effect that prostitution can be justified as a moral agency, because it diverts superfluous passion from the sanctities of the family circle.

But in order to understand fully the useless and suicidal character of this whole line of apologetic, we must follow Romanes through a farther stage of his argument, by which he sought to develop his defence of a mere natural theism into a new moral vindication of the orthodox Christianity of his boyhood.

The one great objection to Christianity as distinct from natural theism, which is apt to present itself to the modern scientific mind, is, says Romanes, that which was felt most strongly by Darwin, of whose views as to this question he speaks from personal knowledge; and it is an objection, we may note in passing, which was felt by Napoleon also. It consists of the fact that Christ and the Christian revelation made their appearance so late in the world's history, and that their influence even now has extended itself to so small a proportion of mankind. It is an objection the force of which

Romanes had once felt himself. Let us see how he answers it on behalf of his reviving faith. "It is," he says, "remarkable that Darwin of all men should have been worsted by this fallacious argument; for it has received its death-blow from the theory of evolution itself. That is to say, if it be true that evolution has been the method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the lateness of Christ's appearance must have been designed; for it is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without having violated the method of evolution." And in the same way, referring to the religion of the Hebrews, from which, as he recognises, that of orthodox Christianity is inseparable, he urges that though it contained in its earlier stages, as many books of the Old Testament show, much that was childish in the way of belief, and much in the way of morality that is to ourselves detestable, these facts now are perceived to be quite compatible with the supernatural revelation of the religion, and the supernatural inspiration of its scriptures, because we understand now that man, as the creature of evolution, could not have been moralised and intellectualised otherwise than with extreme slowness, and revelation must first have accommodated itself to his scanty powers of understanding it.

Now let us grant that all this, so far as it goes, is true. Let us grant that the whole human race prior to the days of Abraham, and three-fourths of human beings who have lived subsequent to the days of Christ, have failed to participate in the blessings of God's unique revelation, for the simple and sufficient reason that God's method of creating them necessarily made them unfit for, or kept them out of reach of, His favours. And let us grant further that the errors, the barbarisms, and the immoralities, by which in its earlier stages this unique revelation was disfigured, were due to the fact that even the children of revelation themselves were not in a condition to appreciate anything better. Let

us grant this:—but what then? The argument simply exhibits the course of man's spiritual development as a re-enactment, on a larger scale, of the organic development of each living species. Some organisms are born fit for a given kind of life and survive. Others, which are born unfit, suffer and disappear miserably. Some men are born fit for the blessings of the spiritual life. The rest can no more reach them than a legless man can run. The spiritual evolution of mankind—the production of human beings fit for that communion with God which is assumed to be man's true end—has, according to this view of it, been realised in the following way. First, for untold millenniums men groped in a spiritual darkness, learning some crude moralities in the school of their tribal strugglings, and explaining themselves and nature by a variety of grotesque superstitions. Of these, some were less grotesque than others, and were more closely associated with a serviceable rule of life. Such survived because of their superior fitness. The others, with those who professed them, dwindled away or perished. Thus there gradually emerged the organised idolatries of antiquity, not wholly ignoble, but stained with a thousand abominations. Then at last, at a date comparatively recent, there emerged from the germ of a single Asiatic household a tribe whose religion happened, like an organic "sport," to vary from any other that had thus far developed itself. This was the religion of the Hebrews—the children of Abraham. This surpassed the rest because it substituted one God for many—a God whose power was universal though His sympathies were purely tribal, and though the character imputed to Him contained for a long time, in spite of its moral dignity, a number of monstrous elements. This religion, coming nearer to the truth than the others, exhibited a unique persistency, as a result of free competition, not of supernatural monopoly; and from this tribal religion of the Hebrews, as a farther evolutionary "sport," there emerged finally the religion of the Hebrew Christ. The religion of Christ being "fitter" than

that of the Old Covenant, partly by reason of its own inherent superiority, partly by reason of the progress of human conditions generally, continues, in virtue of its "fitness," to survive and flourish, superseding gradually but surely all other religions, in exact proportion as non-Christian races become gradually able to appreciate it, and political and social circumstances allow it to be rightly presented to them. Such being the case, then the conclusion of Romanes is this—that if the fact of the natural man being the product of evolutionary survival—"winnowed," as he puts it, like grain from the chaff of inferior organisms—does not disprove but rather proves, that his production was designed by God, the fact that the spiritual man—the man fit for the blessings of revelation—was "winnowed" out in the same gradual way, does not disprove the fact that God designed to save him, and provide him with the means of salvation in proportion as he was fit to use them. On the contrary, it merely shows that God, with a sublime consistency, works through evolution in all spheres alike, and that the superficial difficulties by which Darwin allowed himself to be perplexed, instead of casting a doubt on God's all-benevolent purposes, are absolutely inseparable from His divine method of reaching them.

To this we can only answer that, the more inseparable such a winnowing process is from that method of dealing with man which the Deity has deliberately chosen, the more impossible does it become, so far as observation can guide us, to credit Him with the moral character which Christian theism ascribes to Him. It is astonishing that Romanes should have overlooked this obvious criticism; but neither the nature of his argument, nor his blindness to the real results of it, is in any way peculiar to himself. On the contrary, long before he had himself formulated it, his editor, the Bishop of Birmingham, had urged it in *Lux Mundi* as though it were already a sort of sacred commonplace. If the world is scandalised by the slow development and slow spread of revealed truth, the Church, says Bishop Gore, has an answer which is as complete

as it is short and gentle. "You are ignoring," says the Church to the world, "the gradualness of the spirit's methods." The apologists of Russian autocracy might, with just as much reason, answer those who condemned the recent massacres in St Petersburg by saying, "You are ignoring the violence of the Little Father's methods." The answer which the world makes to the Church is this: "We are not ignoring the gradualness of the spirit's methods at all. The gradualness of the methods is precisely what we criticise and arraign."

The utter irrelevance of the argument which the Bishop suggests will be shown by a consideration of the circumstances which would at once render it reasonable. It would be reasonable if the human race were one single and continuous individual. In that case God might well say to man, "When you were a child I talked to you in childish language, and told you little because you could understand little. As your understanding grows, I will tell you more and more, and gradually you will put the childish things away from you." But what we have to consider in reality is no such case as this. It is not the case of an individual with one single and continuous existence. It is a case of individuals innumerable, each with his own private soul, the dealings of "the Spirit" with which are rounded by that soul's experience; and if the "spirit's" methods are really so extremely gradual that the majority of men who have thus far come into existence have had no opportunity, owing to personal unfitness or circumstance, of receiving the priceless gift of the "spirit's" revealed truth, the majority of men would hardly be persuaded to believe that their heavenly and omnipotent Father desired the illumination of all of them, by being assured that it was nothing but His method that condemned them to the outer darkness.

Romanes, in attempting to answer "the fallacious argument" of Darwin, does but translate Bishop Gore into the language of Darwinian science, concentrating on the moral methods of Grace the criticism already directed against the

moral methods of Nature, and, instead of removing the difficulty which Darwin felt, does but restate it in a more precise and more appalling form.

To put the matter briefly, the more fully it is admitted that conscious and deliberate purpose on the part of an Almighty God is revealed in, and is essential to, the evolutionary process generally; the more strongly it is insisted on that this process is God's method of working, chosen by Himself with a full foreknowledge of its consequences; and the more clearly it is realised that the birth and growth of Christianity is an example of the same process exhibited on an enormous scale; the more hopeless becomes the task of reconciling that process, by any direct reference to its details as we ourselves know them with the theist's conception of a God who in a Christian sense is good, or with whom, as an object of religion, man has any concern at all.

The difficulty is to get theists to see this; and what mainly prevents their seeing it is the fact that the whole controversy between theism and modern science is generally so encumbered with questions having only a secondary relevance that the simple and obstinate character of the crucial issues are hidden by them. These questions of secondary relevance relate, as we have just seen, partly to what is called materialism, partly to purpose in the universe; and if either side objects to what I have urged here, the objection certainly should not come from the theists. For what I have urged is that, as to these secondary questions, the theists should be allowed by their opponents to have everything their own way. Let the men of science admit that, if the theists like the word, the whole universe is a fundamentally spiritual fact, all natural causation being a volition of universal spirit; and that universal spirit, through evolution, works towards purposed ends. This being done, the theists will have no excuse for mistaking the nature of the propositions which it is their sole business to prove—namely, that the individual spirit, though evolved from universal spirit and dependent on it, nevertheless possesses an

autonomous moral will of its own; and that the universal spirit, though producing individual spirits under conditions seemingly incompatible with anything but the misery of most of them, is nevertheless consumed with an equal love for all.

That the theistic position is capable of a rational defence, I, for one, believe as fully as Romanes did, or as his editor does; but, before any system of rational defence can be formulated, it will be necessary to abandon the system which, confining itself to a certain stratum of facts, endeavours to effect an immediate and entirely fallacious reconciliation of the doctrine of God's goodness to the individual with the observed processes of Nature. One of the first lessons which the theist should learn is, that far more harm is done to the interests of theistic belief by the use of bad arguments in defending than by the use of bad arguments in attacking it.

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## THE LORD IS A MAN OF WAR.

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ULTIMATE perfection seems suggested by the union of opposites in their very antagonism, emerging from the everlasting clash of atoms and ions, unfolding throughout the dynasties of nature and departments of Thought and restated predicates, and expressing itself behind and beyond the fundamental principle of subject *plus* object. We posit one (self), and immediately the other (not self) arises to confront and complete the synthesis by apparent contradiction. The perpetual interaction of these two factors appears the law of the Cosmos. And the synthesis is antithesis. Indeed, the unit of knowledge might be better defined (not as subject *plus* object but) as subject *contra* object. Life, according to both science and philosophy, appears to be a ceaseless conflict, a condition of unstable equilibrium, the product of rival forces contending for the mastery, in which Evil the Eternal Minus is being gradually eliminated and will perhaps go on being eliminated for ever and ever. The world, yet in its giant infancy, is simply realising itself in God, or we may say, on the other hand, that God is surely realising Himself in us, and will continue so to do when all the relics of all the civilisations of Greece and Rome and the Modern Age have been swept away like so many toys or idle epiphenomena. Man now is like a sleeper darkly awakening from a dream. And now and then and here and there he gets glimpses of blue sky, and begins to understand some simple truths, though at present he only can touch their uttermost fringe.

Attraction is repulsion, and again and even more so repulsion is attraction. The mysterious battle, physical, moral, mental, spiritual, proceeds and must proceed for ever. Time is cheap, and we have all eternity before us. *Deus patiens quia æternus.* Every day, in some moral crisis, souls are infinitely attracted by the very temptations that repel them most. And love, while it solicits, yet at the same time bids us recoil in unspeakable despair. The final free volition, the turning of the balance, depends on the individual temperament, taken in connexion with the education and the environment. *The Lord is a Man of War, the Lord is His Name.* Progress by antagonism, life by antagonism, issues in our consciousness as His fundamental law, to which He submits Himself and by which He limits Himself—if indeed it be a limit at all [and not the metaphysical content of infinity]. The end here is the pursuit and the pursuit is the end, fighting for an attainable and yet unattainable perfection. This unity in division seems embedded in the mind as an integral and organic part of the Cosmos. We are born *both* Platonists and Aristotelians, *both* Realists and Idealists, *both* Materialists and Spiritualists. No doubt one factor must be the predominating partner or combatant, but still (the truth remains) we possess by an inexorable psychological necessity the two constituents and two competitors, if one only exists to be always negated. Light and shade, joy and sorrow, right and wrong, good and evil, hope and fear, life and death, are the opposed and yet united ways in which we think and feel and suffer and know and live. Like the two pillars Jachin and Boaz, stand before the porch of the Temple of Truth the Everlasting Yea and the Everlasting Nay. It seems almost superfluous to add that we experience, we find, nothing quite pure and separate and unmingled. Our emotions are mixed, love is never far from hatred nor smiles from tears. No error seems to be all error, and no truth all truth. Love and truth for ever keep purging themselves of the contradictory alloy, and in the process become love and truth. There can be no rest, no truce for either

antagonist. Peace would be fatal to the good, and this solution would merely be its dissolution. God fulfils Himself in many ways, but emphatically and pre-eminently by conflict. To stand still for a moment is to go backward or fall. Probably the explanation of this tremendous problem lies rooted in the very Nature of God, who is at once Himself male and female, One and All, limited and unlimited, and still essentially a Personal God. Metaphysically, indeed, how could He express Himself otherwise than by this fundamental law of the Universe? Is subject without object a thinkable fact? And as soon as we have subject and object as the *principium principiorum* for any practical thought, or useful conduct, we see it must inevitably be not simply subject *with* object, but subject *against* object, in an antagonism which alone makes life possible and fruitful. There is true teaching and profound philosophy in the third chapter of Ecclesiastes. And again, "God hath set the one over against the other."

Amid the fog and cloud of combatants who strive for they know not what, appear to emerge a few principles which no one disputes, that may be received as certain as any facts. Man is a religious being, and man is a sociable being, and sociable because religious. He fears, he loves, he worships a Power or Powers beyond and above him, and yet around and even within him. This awe, this wonder, which is a kind of broken knowledge, draws man to man not merely for purposes of mutual defence, but also for purposes of a common cult. For the Power or Powers outside man, and yet somehow mysteriously associated with him, must be revered and propitiated by rites and ceremonies and offerings. Primitive man seeks protection against his very God, whom he admires, hates, dreads, and yet always adores, and finds it in the gregarious life of the family and tribe, through all the predatory stages and pastoral stages, down to the colossal and glorified egotism of hostile nationalities and ethnic enmities. But from the very outset he believes and disbelieves, he accepts and he rejects, according as the factor of faith or

reason predominates. For at the beginning of things the religious feeling, religiousness, embraces two different and opposed and yet congruous factors, the sense of and the appeal to authority or tradition, and the sense of and the appeal to inquiry. And these two factors are one in the light of a higher unity which transcends and includes them both. They are absorbed and harmonised in its grasp. And here we reach the bedrock of the human mind, which in its constitution is compelled to work by and through contraries, and can only achieve any fruitful or satisfactory results by the collision of opposites. It seems futile to quarrel with the machinery of the given *φροντιστήριον* or thinking shop. The way we are driven we must go, the way we are built we must follow, for much as we may modify we did not make ourselves, and even Plotinus submitted to his limitations. The conflict then between faith and reason, prescription and the right of private judgment, Catholic and Protestant, religion or science, is and must be eternal, simply because it is rooted in a psychological necessity. We see in the contest but the dualism of Nature, the two sides of the human mind apparently fighting against each other and yet really co-operating to the same end—"to one far-off Divine result." It is the everlasting *unfitness* of things—yes, even the survival of the *unfittest*—that arrives at any issues at all. To ask for stable equilibrium is to ask for death. The perpetual friction, the impertinent schisms, the strife of contending interests, the armed and antagonistic camps, all these are only so many evidences of the mind divided against itself that thus attains some new and higher unity. Faith and reason must quarrel, because in no other way can truth be elicited, but their unceasing quarrel is merely the quarrel of friends who agree to differ and differ to agree. We cannot repudiate our nature and the very framework of our minds. It is impossible to think out anything except in this manner. But the misfortune remains, that some people will have nothing to do with reason. This, however, only applies to religion and its collaterals. For in the ordinary

affairs of everyday life both parties thankfully welcome and employ the assistance of both reason and faith alike, or, at any rate, of the one they profess to despise most. Indeed, men of science, who are scornfully sceptical as to the blessings of faith, in worldly matters often distinguish themselves by being curiously and even childishly credulous. Logic hardly enters into practical procedure yet, and our greatest men display the most splendid inconsistencies. The magnificent philosopher descends from his mountain summits, to be the easy prey of a bubble company or the idle sport of some specious and fraudulent friend. Even he cannot remember always to consider both sides of the question, and bring both sides of his mind to bear upon it—to consent simply after just and adequate criticism. It seems strange that the persons who perceive most clearly the advantages of competition, with or without equality of opportunity, whether in Party Government or in fiscal discussions, or vestry meetings, cease to be rational when their own private interests are touched or their particular clique is concerned, and become either brutally critical or blindly credulous, till the local disturbance has passed. They refuse to exercise both their faith and reason, which are equally their royal prerogatives.

An accurate psychological analysis would assure any observer that the broadest and grandest harmonies arise from the battle of incongruous elements. No permanent conquests can come otherwise. Protestantism is only one aspect of the human mind as it moves and works, and represents the forces of science, reason, free inquiry, liberty of thought and action, the right of individual initiative. The word may be an offence to many, but the thing remains and is and must be a fundamental fact. We cannot escape from it, because we cannot escape from the natural operations of our minds. Whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not, we are Protestants to the bitter end, in so far as we ever dare to think and act for ourselves, and go our own way in any deliberate path of reasoned preference. The spirit is ingrained in the grossest

slave. At times he breaks his bonds, renounces his task-masters, and chooses to be himself. We must breathe the mental atmosphere that we find, though we dearly love to forge fetters for ourselves as well as others. Protestantism, incidentally connected with a particular piece of history and religious development, at bottom means the instinct of independence that may be scotched but cannot be killed outright. Fire burns in its coldest ashes, and what is more terrible than dead fires? It would be ridiculous, were it not so infinitely pathetic, to see great minds repudiating their birthright and the specific regalia of their royalty, in repudiating their Protestant privileges! It is denying the pit from which they are dug and the rock from which they are hewn. The man flying from his shadow seems less absurd and pitiable than the man who endeavours to elude himself and the machinery of his own mind, and that which makes man pre-eminently man—the power of reasoning. To protest is to exercise an inalienable right and to take our stand upon the charter of our humanity. It does not imply the narrow claims of bigotry, the call of ignorance and intolerance and prejudice, in spite of the accidental excrescences too frequently associated with the name. The so-called Reformation was really the renaissance of the soul, and the human mind re-awakening to its inheritance and dignity, and denouncing the monopoly of freedom. The protagonists in this supreme outcome did not guess their own greatness, could not perhaps then know its tremendous significance, were too close to the events evolving to measure their dimensions, but still they were fighting none the less for the liberties of the human mind. That a particular creed assumed all the credit and revelled in a glory that was more rational than religious, and carried off the apparent honours of victory, proved of small consequence in the light of the final issues. The zealots of a sombre superstition sharpened the sword that they bore really against it and themselves. Contemplating murder, they committed suicide.

The same necessity emerges from the opposite and cor-

relative of Protestantism, the passion for tradition and the appeal to authority. As they contradict and exclude each other, so they complete each other in a higher synthesis. Catholicism possesses its own justification in the *testimonium animæ naturaliter Catholicæ*. Were the mind purely, simply, and entirely Protestant, we should lack the needful antagonism from which alone all good effects proceed. The clash of the rival energies tends to a better balance in the long run and to fertility. Either force by itself is a barren virgin. The mind that is all Catholic and always and only Catholic will be starved and stunted, dare nothing, do nothing, hope nothing, be nothing. Its life is death, the growth of the grave—*corruptio optimi pessima*. Let authority have its proper place and weight, let it be respected and obeyed in reason and season, but unless it is also criticised, questioned, and mercilessly attacked, it will act but as the paralysing influence of the dead hand. Till authority has been turned upside down, pulled to pieces, dragged in the mire and trampled on, it can be of little use or value. It will stand out of drawing, with false proportions and misleading perspective. Authority must be denied, and denied again and again, before it may be fully affirmed, and it must be crucified first if it would be crowned hereafter. Untested, unexamined, unmeasured, it exists as a source of danger, and breeds disease and decay. But when it has been challenged, chastened, purged with flame, it comes from the ordeal if storm-beaten strong, and if pruned a blessing, to abide among the world's few permanent possessions. But what would free inquiry be without this salutary and solid check? An evil and not a good, a tyrant and not a servant, a traitor and not a friend, for there is no autocracy so cruel as the licence in the masquerade of liberty. Only one greater argument than authority exists, only one greater power, and that is freedom. But they correct and qualify each other's virtues, they supplement each other's deficiencies, they antagonise each other in a fruitful embrace and are reconciled in a broader and loftier unity. The uncatholic mind that scorns tradition

becomes hard, narrow, and unproductive. And just by the constant action and reaction between faith and reason, authority and criticism, do churches grow and states flourish in a common movement towards a civilisation which will reconcile differences by merging them in a vaster and deeper union. Opinion, the weapon of the one, and the stormy petrel of evolution, always ahead of present institutions, and faith the weapon of the other, for ever meet and for ever clash like positive and negative, but yet when most divided are most agreed, and work out in friendly strife the inevitable ascent.

If, indeed, religion is the ultimate interpretation of life, as it appears to be, and not philosophy, we may expect to find its track everywhere and the key at last to all the questions that really are questions. For there abound inquiries that should never be asked, and when asked should never be answered. We mean, of course, the problems bound up with the limitations of the mind, beyond the reach of experience and observation, in which psychology only plays with words and draws mere verbal distinctions. These may be the money of fools, they are certainly but the counters of wise men. And now, if we speak of the communities into which the social instinct has grouped us, we discover immediately the same dualism, the old antagonism of divided interests, the two hostile camps, which yet by their very opposition hold each other together, and are overcome at last by the working power of a higher unity. As in the sphere of religion we found the synthesis by contradiction in faith and inquiry, in authority and reason, so here in society we find the radical antithesis of the Conservative and Liberal, stability and instability, progress and repose. The appeal lies in one case to tradition and in the other to critical opinion, and they correspond respectively to the two great sides of the human mind, the faculty that accepts and retains, and the faculty that discusses and denies and lives in the chronic condition of a sort of divine discontent. And the perpetual interaction and interpenetration of these rival contending powers keep

the given community alive in health and strength, compel it to put forth new shoots, purge it of dead or dying branches, and prove what is demonstrated every moment that the world is ruled, not merely by a little sense, but by not a little compromise and paradox.

It is the incompatibles, rather than the compatibles, that unite at last. We follow the line of most and not of least resistance, to the fret and friction of unoiled wheels and unaccommodating agencies, that combine best when they quarrel, and are devoted friends because contending foes. Oh, the transparent riddle of life, with its advancement by repugnant elements and reconciliation through the fiercest mental repulsion! Party government displays a true, an unerring instinct. It is the one way in which nature moves and God acts. We prove our position by negatives and our rules by exceptions, and in each exclusion we equally include. To deny something is to define something, and to admit this is to reject that, and to stand still in one direction is to go forward in another. Life, Nature, human Nature, has never got beyond the nursery rhyme, "Mistress Mary, quite contrary." Browning's lines imply a very great deal more than they say, and we may always read infinite suggestions between his lines. And what he never does say is what he says the best.

"Smooth Jacob still robs homely Esau,  
Now up, now down, the world's one see-saw."

There is a blind spot (*macula lutea*) in the human eye and a blind spot also in the human mind, and it is the blind spot (as with Nelson) that has the farthest and fairest vision. The comprehensive intuition, which receives on trust the reconciliation of the eternal dualism everywhere in a stage higher, but does not understand or attempt to explain the mode of operation, takes the report kneeling, and in the sublime ignorance of a universal negative realises the fundamental agreement in difference. Custom means much, but progress means more, and their internecine war stands justified by its grand results. Christ called Himself the "way," and symbolises

the onward march and endless victories of Truth. His has been well styled the Church Militant, and wherever works the spirit of healthy progress, there works also the spirit of Christ on the crest of the flowing tide and in the van of aggressive good. And, after all, the final appeal is to the moral sanction, behind brute force, and below the ramparts of bayonets. The mere secular arm would be paralysed without, unless fortified by some sort of faith in some sort of creed or Providence. And when the smoke of battle has cleared away, and the thunder of the guns is still, the last word will be spoken by religion, and the last stand will be made at the Cross, in the name and power of Him who came to bring a sword, and to conciliate interests by division, through perpetual Progress by Antagonism.

“The Lord is a Man of War, the Lord is His name.” All through the Bible, both in the Old Testament and the New, we discover this teaching, and the love that perpetually strives with sinners, and could not be love unless it did strive and was just and righteous and even cruel. The wrestling of Jacob with the angel at Peniel displays a vivid object-lesson of the eternal truth. “I will not let thee go, except thou bless me.” “As a prince thou hast striven with God and men and hast prevailed.” But did Jacob seek the conflict? For our purpose and the result that followed, it matters not in the least. “There wrestled a man with him, until the breaking of the day.” The contest bore abundant fruit, “And he blessed him there”—and we may fairly add—and therefore and thereby. Again, we have a similar story in Joshua. “Behold, there stood a man over against him with his sword drawn in his hand. And Joshua went unto him and said unto him, Art thou for us or for our adversaries? And he said, Nay, but as captain of the host of the Lord am I come.”

God’s attitude, to say it with reverence, is provocative, and presents an eternal challenge to the human will. We are solemnly warned to stand for ever on our guard, and risk no chances in the warfare. God fights for us and with us, but

He also fights *against* us by the very constitution of His own law and perhaps of His own Being as our Adversary, and yet (as such) our greatest Friend. "Faithful are the wounds of a friend."<sup>1</sup> And so we read in Isaiah, "Therefore He was turned to be their enemy and He fought against them." Blessings come by the way—"as they went they were healed"—and incidentally as it were. In a world militant, of which every cell and every atom is a soldier and fights for its own hand, and thus and only thus for every other and for God, we (who are all co-existences) cannot live a selfish separate life. Happiness is no object, but life is. And there can be no growth, no progress, without more resistance than mere friction of bearings. "Who would be free themselves must strike the blow." We have life not to hoard and not to spend on ourselves, but to grow, through self-development, by self-sacrifice, in an endless battle that wins by losing. God's challenge cannot be evaded. It is the aspect of nature as well as the aspect of grace, and to decline it is to fall out of the order and fail in the very reason for our existence. *Si vis pacem para bellum*. Every new fact is a new challenge, and every old truth will have to be re-interpreted, and every fresh truth must find its ultimate justification at Calvary. The whole Cosmos hangs upon the Cross of Christ.

EASTBOURNE.

F. W. ORDE-WARD.

<sup>1</sup> In that remarkable revelation of character, called *De Profundis*, by the late Oscar Wilde, there are passages which read like the cry wrung from a lost soul on the edge of eternity, with a depth of passion not to be mistaken for mere literary pose, and afford a grim confirmation of our main thought. "Now it seems to me," he writes in Reading Gaol, where the most conscientious and self-respecting artist would hardly care to attitudinise, at p. 59, "that Love of some kind is the only possible explanation of the extraordinary amount of suffering that there is in the world. I cannot conceive of any other explanation. I am convinced that there is no other, and that if the world has indeed, as I have said, been built of sorrow, it has been built by the hands of Love, because in no other way could the soul of man, for whom the world was made, reach the full stature of its perfection. Pleasure for the beautiful body, but pain for the beautiful soul." Here we have a pathetic testimony to the eternal duel between the flesh and the spirit, and the result in a religious awakening and a higher moral synthesis.

## CHRISTIAN, GREEK, OR GOTH?

“Love thou the gods and withstand them, lest thy fame should fail at  
the end,  
And thou be but their thrall and bondsman, who <sup>their</sup> <sup>were</sup> ~~wast~~ born for their very  
friend.”

W. MORRIS.

H. W. GARROD,

Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.

A GREAT English novelist once made at the beginning of one of his novels a tripartite division of the inhabitants of the globe, distinguishing the highest mammals as Men, Women, and Italians. A great German philosopher speaks somewhere of “cows, women, sheep, Christians, dogs, Englishmen, and other democrats,” making of these a single class which may be supposed, for moral and intellectual purposes, not to “count.” In both these seemingly paradoxical deliverances we have an attempt to classify the types of morality. I say “paradoxical”; for classifications like these do, I think, appear over-hasty. The principle underlying them seems somehow not truly scientific. But I am not sure that it is really more capricious than the principle upon which many ethical treatises, commonly regarded as scientific, endeavour to reduce moral ideas to a certain definite number of types. The moral universe, like the physical universe, is commonly supposed to consist of two hemispheres. There is the Christian world, and there is the pagan world. The pagan world, again, is, for the purposes of ethical science, subdivided into Greeks and

Barbarians. The really important world is supposed to be the Christian world. Nothing else really counts very much. The Greek world is allowed to count a little, partly because there still are a few Christians who obstinately insist on combining Christianity with common sense, and even with knowledge, but chiefly, perhaps, because the conscience of Christianity is uneasy when it reflects that it owes to Hellenism a debt which it is unwilling openly to acknowledge. But the pagan world as a whole—some indulgence being allowed to Hellenism—is treated as morally not significant. Whatever in morality is not either Greek or Christian, the good Christian who knows a little Greek regards as without value. The moral systems east of Suez may have *interest* for the western European, but they have not *value*. They must not be allowed to enter into, they only confuse, the moral calculations of persons living on what may be called the respectable side of Suez—the side which acknowledges the eleven commandments.

This attitude of Europeans towards non-European morals is perhaps inevitable. A different attitude might very well end in a disaster to Western society of incalculable magnitude. I pass over, therefore, a certain moral snobbery in it, and will not even arraign its want of scientific method. I will accept this division of moral humanity into the two classes of Christians who know Greek, and non-Christians who probably do not, and who may, therefore, all of them be regarded as a single sort of persons, and cognate, one may conjecture, with “cows, women, sheep, dogs, and other democrats.” The question I am here concerned to raise is this: “Is not our classification of the moral ideas of the Western world quite as inexact and unscientific as our separation of Western from Eastern morality?” We recognise in Europe two kinds of morality—the Greek and the Christian. Every man, in so far as he is moral, is either a Christian or a Hellenist, or a little of both. Christ or Apollo—there is no third alternative. In the whole code

of European morals there is not a single idea which is not either Jewish or Hellenic in its origin.

This is the ordinary classification of Western ethical ideas; and this classification I venture to call both inadequate and false. It omits a class of ideas which I believe to have been, and to be, forces more potent in Western society, more impelling and more sustaining, than either Christianity or Hellenism. We are debtors both to the Greek and to the Jew: and that the debt which we owe to both these peoples is considerable I am far from denying. But that we owe to these peoples the whole of our morality, or the best of it, I do deny. I believe that in the best and most effective lives that are lived by men to-day there are operative certain moral principles, of which those who live by them are, perhaps, only imperfectly conscious, but which, none the less, are more powerful in holding society together than those furnished by the morality either of Greece or of Palestine.

What I mean I may best express something after this fashion. No one sitting down to write a history of architecture would dream of confining his treatment of the subject to, let us say, the Greek and Byzantine styles. A professedly comprehensive treatise upon architecture which omitted all mention of Gothic would be thought to be the work of a lunatic—of a lunatic in æsthetics. In just the same way it seems to me to be a kind of ethical lunacy to write a treatise upon morals in which nothing is said of the influence upon the conduct of life of the ideals of the peoples of northern Europe. Yet this is what our professors of ethical theory one and all consistently do. They discourse to the full extent of their knowledge upon Greek morality; they discourse, beyond the extent of their own or any man's knowledge, and abandoning experience completely, upon Christian morality. But they leave out of account altogether what I may venture, for want of a better name, to call Gothic morality. They imagine the peoples of the

North to have come southward in an "entire forgetfulness" of all social tradition, and an "utter nakedness" of moral ideas. In this ethical nudity these northern peoples would have perished, it is supposed, of exposure to a world demanding rules of life and conduct, had they not betimes clothed themselves in a warm-flannel Christianity, and shod themselves with a second-hand Hellenism. The movements of these northern peoples are regarded as more or less on a par with the brute forces of Nature, and as not attaining to moral significance until informed by the spirit of Christianity, and, later, by that of Hellenism.

I believe that a truer analysis than is usually attempted of the moral ideas which lie at the root of European progress will exhibit the falsity of these conceptions.

Morality may be said to be an attempt to realise certain types of men. Each one of us endeavours to be a particular kind of man. Each has, as we say, an ideal of what he ought to be. To be moral is to live, if not up to, yet towards, that ideal. The ideal of Christianity is what we may call holiness. The ideal of Hellenism may be said to be understanding or intelligence, under which word I would include a delighted co-operative energy of both senses and intellect. Or I may express this, perhaps—for I am not concerned, or obliged, to be precise—I may express this by saying that the ideal Christian type of man is the saint, the ideal Hellenic type the *φρόνιμος*.

How far are either, or both, of these two ideals the motive powers of life as it is lived, and of life in so far as it progresses? As far as progress—which I will here define simply as going forward without slipping back again—as far as progress is concerned, I do not think it can be said, if we keep closely to the great facts of human history, that the Greek or the Christian ideal has been, or that both in conjunction have been, in a true sense progressive. Hellenism indeed went forward, but the very rapidity of its forward movement wrought its fall. It fell, and it failed. It failed, it is true,

from the excess of its own ideals, like the craftsmen of whom Shakespeare says that "striving to do better than best, they do confound their skill in covetousness." But none the less it failed. Its failure is sufficiently proved by the fact that Christianity was able to supersede it. Christianity conquered it, because Christianity stood firmer on its feet. Yet it only stood firm on its feet because it stood still. The golden period of Christianity, in the strict sense, was that in which humanity was more stationary than in any other—the period covering those centuries which, despite the sedulous whitewashing of fashionable historians to-day, are still rightly spoken of as the Dark Ages—and which might even more appropriately, I think, be called the Black Ages. The attempt, again, inaugurated by the Renaissance to combine Hellenism and Christianity—spirited and gallant though it was, and much as it did for the deliverance of the human intelligence—that attempt cannot, I think, be shown to have resulted *by itself* in any real progress.<sup>1</sup> In saying this I must not be understood to mean that from the Renaissance down to the present time the human race has been standing still, much less to mean that

<sup>1</sup> When I say that the Renaissance did not in itself result in any real progress for the human race, my position is this: The fruits of the Renaissance *in itself* are to be seen in Italy, and consist in every kind of moral corruption. The *Renaissance in itself* failed: what succeeded was the *Renaissance plus the Teutonic spirit*. "Fugitive and exiled Greece," in the memorable language used of Reuchlin by Argyropolus—"fugitive and exiled Greece found a refuge beyond the Alps"; and it was this alliance of Hellenism and Teutonism which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saved Europe. Nor must we forget the great contribution of Chivalry (in the institutional sense) to the Reformation. The issue of the Reformation, in its initial stages, was Knighthood *versus* Priesthood. Hütten and Sickingen are hardly less important than Luther himself. Indeed, from one point of view they are more important. Enthusiasts for the Gospel as they were, they yet could not help feeling at many points its unreality, and detected in themselves, often enough, a preference for the ideal of manhood or knighthood rather than for that of saintliness. Of the company of knights that gathered round Hütten at Ebenburg, the pious D'Aubigné relates:—"The warriors who were there assembled at last grew weary of hearing so much said about the *meek virtues of Christianity* . . . so that Œcolampadius used to exclaim: 'Alas! the word of God is sown here upon stony places'" (D'Aubigné, *Hist. of Reformation*, i. ch. 9).

for the five-and-twenty centuries which have elapsed since Hellenism first became a power in the world there has been no progress. Clearly and beyond dispute there has been progress. But what I maintain is, that this progress has been almost as much in spite of as because of Hellenism or Christianity or both. Moreover, there still is progress. But the motive power underlying it comes, I believe, neither from Athens nor from Jerusalem. I do not believe that the best men to-day, the men who make progress, who carry the race forward, are really and truly, if they could analyse justly their moral sentiments, much influenced by the ideal of either the saint or the *φρόνιμος*. They were born Christians, and therefore they honestly believe that they desire to be saints. They were taught Greek, and therefore they honestly believe that they bear an affection towards "sweetness and light," and that they desire to be men of fine intelligence and vivid sensibility. Nevertheless, we only believe, as Emerson says, we only believe as deep as we live. And how do these men live? They do not in general deserve the name of saints, and would be mortified, I fancy, if it were applied to them. Neither are they, in general, subtle in their perceptions nor of an impassioned sensuosity. You will perhaps say, "They have these ideals: it is only that they fall short of them." That may be so. Personally, I think they imagine rather than possess these ideals. But, in any case, I would go on to make this observation. The kind of man whom in real life these men genuinely admire, with whom they associate most gladly, is neither the saint nor the *φρόνιμος*. They are perhaps distantly patronising of such, but they do not ask them to dinner. Look, further, not only at what they approve, but at what they disapprove. They are easily tolerant of a great many sins which Christianity regards as deadly—the sins of the flesh, for example, the sin of wealth, the sin of pride, the sins of hatred and revenge. In church they acquiesce, indeed, in calling these things sins; but out of church they take the world, as they are fond of saying, they "take the world as it comes" and

men for what they are worth ; they have a distaste for a man of strict living ; they say " best men are moulded out of faults," and they are prone to carry their pity for human frailty to a point at which it passes into admiration. But even out of church they do recognise one deadly sin. All sins save one they will forgive their neighbour until seventy times seven. But one sin hath no forgiveness. Its nature I shall best indicate by an illustration drawn from a story familiar to us all. There was a certain king named David who took unto himself his neighbour's wife, whose name was Bathsheba. The husband of this Bathsheba was one Uriah, who, under the circumstances, was an inconvenience to King David : who, therefore, betraying him by the way of his noblest ambitions, stationed him in the forefront of a fight from which he was not likely to return home alive. Nor did he. We are told that David was a man after the Lord's heart. That is probably the witness of a partisan historian. David is not after the heart of most decent-minded human beings. But why ? Because he was an adulterer ? I think not. Because he was a murderer ? I do not believe that either. David is not after the hearts of most of us because, to employ a familiar phrase, he was not a gentleman. That is the sin which hath no forgiveness. But by this sin of not being a gentleman I do not mean the sin of being badly dressed, the sin of having a provincial accent, the sin of being what is called an impossible person. These sins men will often condone, though often of course they will not. But by the sin of not being a gentleman I mean something different. By not being a gentleman I understand failure in two ideals—the ideal of chivalry<sup>1</sup> and the ideal of honour. I believe that anyone who seriously interrogates his conscience will, if he continues the process for a sufficient time, come to admit that these two ideals are more really and truly than any others the regulating principles of what he calls his moral

<sup>1</sup> By "chivalry" I mean throughout, not, of course, the *institution* (which came from the south of France *circa* 1000 A.D.) but the spirit which finally issued in the institution.

life. What we ultimately believe in, everyone of us, cook's son and duke's son alike, is these two things—the spirit of chivalry and the spirit of honour. These are the out-of-church morality of all of us, and the men we like—or love—are the men who govern their lives by this morality, however defective in other respects their ethical creed may be, whatever their frailties, and however dark, I will even add, however dark their sins. So long as a man possesses these two qualities of chivalry and honour he may always be sure of finding friends who will stand by him in the hour of disgrace and of moral disaster. The love of women has passed into a proverb for constancy. We marvel at the kind of men to which women remain constant—

“Wronged women with wan hearts and starving eyes,  
Waiting for those they love to come again.”

The objects of their devotions are as often as not, to all appearance, men of wasted and worthless lives. There is no man, it is said, too bad but for some woman to love him. Yet what they love, I think, is not the man, not a dissolute life, but the rags and tatters of honour and chivalry which still cling often to those whose moral corruption, in the ordinary sense of the word moral, seems complete.

These two ideals, chivalry and honour, are neither Greek nor Christian. I take them to be the peculiar property and creation of the northern races. I may call them the cardinal virtues of Gothic morality. That they do not belong in their essence to the ethical systems of Greece will, I fancy, not be disputed. The ideal type of man which the ordinary Greek set himself to emulate was, I suppose, the Odysseus type. He would be a bold man who should maintain that the character of Odysseus is either chivalrous or honourable. Most of us, I fancy, regard him in the light of a cunning rogue, who had gloriously exciting adventures, but whom not all the gods and goddesses of the Olympian hierarchy could have turned into a gentleman. In popular accounts of the social life of Greece one frequently comes across the phrase a

“Greek gentleman.” I cannot speak for others, but I myself, whenever I encounter that phrase, am unable to rid myself of the feeling that it imparts false associations into the history of the Greek world, and that there were no Greek gentlemen in our sense. The nearest approach to a portrait of a gentleman in Greek literature is the picture of the *μεγαλόψυχος* offered by Aristotle in the *Ethics*. I do not think I shall encounter serious opposition when I say that the *μεγαλόψυχος* of Aristotle may have been a coxcomb, but he was not a gentleman. He resembles a gentleman in a novel of Disraeli, but no other kind of gentleman.

It may, with a greater show of reason, I think, be contended that the ideals of chivalry and honour in their noblest form (for they have, of course, like everything else, their corruptions) are a product of Christianity. There is a sense in which this may justly be maintained, but as it is not the sense in which it generally is maintained, I will try and make clear my own view of the relation of the Christian ideal to the ideals of chivalry and honour.

The northern nations had not sufficient fineness of perception readily to embrace, or deeply to feel, the attraction of Hellenism. And, in general, the approach to Hellenism was only possible to them through Christianity. They readily embraced Christianity, because the North, like Christianity, and in contra-distinction to Hellenism, is deep and earnest and sombre. But none the less the Christian ideal of the “spiritual” man was one in accordance with which the northern nations were as little able, ultimately, to govern their lives as the peoples of the South. I say to “govern their lives” advisedly, for North and South alike accepted, and accept, Christianity with their lips: but they do not, as I said, live as deep as the supposed, or official, depth of their faith. For I am convinced that the ideal which all healthy nations and all healthy individual men (if they could impartially analyse their ideals) set before themselves, is not the spiritual man, but what I may call the best kind of natural

man. The morality of the North accepted with its lips the spiritual man, but in its life it soon began to make, in all directions, a return upon the natural man. Chivalry and honour I take to be the two main directions in which it essayed, at first perhaps unconsciously, this regress upon the natural man. Chivalry and honour, in other words, are the product of Christianity, in so far as they are an undefined and instinctive protest against it. Christianity was the stimulus which produced these two ideals: but this reaction upon stimulus no more resembles the instrument of the stimulus than the reaction upon a pin-prick resembles the point of a pin.

I shall perhaps make this clearer if I speak for a moment of the distinction between these two ideals. Chivalry and honour are, both of them, in their first conception, associated with the profession of arms. It is thus inevitable that at many points the two ideals should run into one another. None the less they do admit of distinction. I may express what I conceive to be the distinction between them thus—Chivalry is to honour as the flesh is to the world. Christianity had said, “In my flesh dwelleth no good thing”; it had represented the body as the enemy of the spirit; it had discountenanced marriage and had hinted a not obscure approval of “some that were made eunuchs for the kingdom of God’s sake.” Against that, chivalry is a brilliant and powerful, though erratic, protest. It had also proclaimed, with a complacency akin to exultation, that “the fashion of this world passeth away”; it had made an ideal of what St Paul calls the “fool for Christ’s sake,” and accounted those alone blessed who, in the cause of Christ, had made themselves “as the filth of the world and the offscourings of all things unto this day.” “Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being defamed, we intreat” (1 Cor. iv. 12). Against all that, so unnatural, so pusillanimous, so impossible, the ideal of honour is a righteous and necessary and enduring protest. “I am a man of peace,” says Clough’s *Dipsychus*:—

“I am a man of peace,  
 And the old Adam of the gentleman  
 Dares seldom in my bosom stir against  
 The mild plebeian Christian seated there.”

But it is to the motions in the blood of this old Adam that European society, as I believe, owes, and has always owed, its salvation. The world and the flesh are two things which mankind will never consent to do without. The essence of life is that it should be lived naturally. The instincts of the average man are healthy, I will even say holy. No religious or moral organisation which sets itself in opposition to these can hope ultimately to succeed. Behind the religious or moral, or, indeed, any other kind of lawgiver, stands, not, as has been said, the “armed conscience of the community,” but the great, unarmed, irresistible body of healthy human instinct. Its cry is ever still “Panem et Circenses,” “Give us the world and the flesh, or we will smash every window in your palace of painted superstition.”

At this point I will pause to anticipate two objections.

In the first place, it may possibly be objected—I may even say it will probably be objected—that the ideals of chivalry and honour have, beyond a doubt, in certain ages, and in certain societies, been the source of all kinds of evils. I will not retort, as I fairly might, that the same is true of Christianity itself. Nor will I call in question the correctness of the objection. In regard, indeed, to the former of these two ideals, it is, I think, undeniable that the so-called “ages of chivalry” were in many ways anything but respectable. I will even consent to call them in many ways disreputable. The ideal, again, of the man of honour has been prolific, among certain nations, of great abuses. What I would say in this connection is this: “You cannot have the world and the flesh if you are not willing to pay the price of them.” Chivalry and honour are two great principles which it is to the interest of mankind to keep always alive at whatever cost. Though I should see these two principles, employing

as their instruments lust and bloodshed, destroy a whole nation of men, I could none the less say, "Let us go forward; that is the price we must expect to pay for these two precious things."

But I would notice also that these two ideals are progressive. Take, for example, honour. This ideal is undoubtedly responsible for the practice of duelling—a practice, I may notice in passing, which, while it still obtains among most European nations, is neither Jewish nor Greek. That we in this country are well rid of this strange practice I do not doubt. But that it has served in the past a useful purpose, and that it still does so in many highly civilised countries, this I do not doubt either. I will offer one illustration. If we read a speech of any of the great ancient orators, a speech, let us say, of Demosthenes or Cicero, what is it in any such speech that, after the eloquence, chiefly excites our astonishment? I imagine it is the evidence of a principle which, though nowhere exactly formulated, seems to have been accepted by the ancient world generally, and which might be expressed in words thus: "If A differs from B on a question of politics, A to be at liberty to call B by all the indecent names he can think of, and to attribute to him all the vices; and B to be allowed a like freedom in respect of A." Why was that sort of thing possible in Greece and Rome? It was possible, I cannot doubt, because the Greeks and Romans were strangers to the practice of duelling—because their sense of honour was, in comparison with ours, somewhat blunt.

The second objection which I wished to anticipate is this. "How," it will be asked, "does it come about that, if these two ideals are, as you say, the real bonds of European society, men are so deceived as to live by them without being conscious of them?" The explanation is, I think, this. Chivalry and honour are not so much principles as instincts. Indeed it is because they are instincts that they are so fundamental in our moral life. Instinct is to principle as poetry is to prose. Chivalry and honour dwell in the same element of mystery as that with which poetry is surrounded. We speak of poetry

as existing in the mind of a poet. It would be more correct to say that the mind of a poet is poetry. And just so chivalry and honour are not ideas in the mind of their possessor, they are themselves his mind. It is the same with religion. The religious mind and its religion are one. And here I would even venture on an over-bold speculation. What religion is in its ultimate nature, I do not know. But take from religion these two ideals, chivalry and honour, and what do you leave?<sup>1</sup> Huxley said that he learned from being in love that there was such a thing as religion. From such a man, that is an unexpected and surely impartial testimony. Nor is this experience of Huxley, I imagine, unique. I would even suggest that it is general—would suggest that the passion of love is the nearest approach to “pure religion and undefiled,” which it is granted to the majority to attain. That it is

“The angel woman faces we have seen  
And angel woman spirits we have guessed,”

which are the source of the deepest thoughts about God and the universe which the ordinary man ever comes to entertain. And do we not owe this, when all is said and done, to chivalry? It is certainly not to be found in Greece, and in Hebrew literature the ideal women seem to be such figures as Rahab the harlot and Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite.

It cannot, again, be denied that the ideal of honour fills a large space in the life of religion. This ideal may be both public and private—that is, a patriotic or a personal ideal. We hardly realise the extent to which much of our religion is a kind of purified patriotism. The God of our fathers has still more power and attraction for us than any god of philosophy—“the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the

<sup>1</sup> These two ideals, I may notice in passing, have not been without effect on the development of the *doctrine*, as well as of the ethics, of Christianity. Their influence may be clearly seen, for example, in the theory of the Atonement sketched by Anselm in the *Cur Deus Homo?* I may refer in this connection to the interesting remarks of Sabatier (*Doctrine of Atonement*, E. T., pp. 68 *sqq.*), who calls attention to the manner in which the conception of Feudalism generally affected the dogma of the Atonement.

God of Jacob,"—"Our fathers hoped in thee." But though this ideal of public honour plays a large part in the best life of religion, the ideal of private honour is more important still. The religious life, on any view of it, consists in a certain relation of the individual towards what I may call his invisible environment; it consists in a certain way of being affected by the unseen things of the world. When we have exhausted the so-called facts of science, there is always something left over which we cannot reduce to any kind of position

"In the dull catalogue of common things."

This something impresses us chiefly as power. We can never escape from the sense of being in the presence of what a great English philosopher has called the "unknown and unknowable potency which lies behind phenomena." Consequently we cannot help attempting to enter into some relation to this power. What is the kind of relation which we should try to establish? Christianity teaches a relation of self-abasement, Hellenism a relation—I do not think I am unjust to it—of æsthetic contemplation. Neither relation is satisfactory, neither a true one. What I take to be a truer relation I can only indicate very generally. It is said of Abraham that he was "the friend of God." Emerson, in one of his *Essays*, puts forward a remarkable conception of the proper relation of a man to his friend. "Let him be to thee," he says, "a kind of beautiful enemy, untameable." We must never carry worship to a point where we lose self-respect. The highest love is characterised by a certain lofty independence. I would say, therefore, "Let God be to you *a kind of beautiful enemy, untameable*. Do not lose your independence, courage, self-respect, in presence of this unknown and unknowable power." "When you travel," says Thoreau, "to the celestial city, ask to see God, not one of the servants." There you have the same kind of idea. The Lord thy God is doubtless a jealous God. But a man also should be jealous in the same way—should be jealous, that is, of his honour.

It is this sense of honour operating, perhaps unconsciously, in religion, which has through many perilous centuries saved the human spirit from the worst forms of superstition. This religious self-respect, this independence, this courage, have come down to us from the northern nations. These peoples' conception of God was less exalted, it is true, than the Jewish, less beautiful than the Greek : but their attitude towards their conception seems to me nobler and braver than that of either Christianity or Hellenism. The hope of religious progress to-day lies, I think, in the growing tendency of modern nations to take up and develop this attitude. I will offer here two illustrations of the kind of religious sentiment which I call braver and better than the Christian or Hellenic. The first I take from Beaumont and Fletcher's *Bonduca*. It gives us the sentiment of the northern religions in its least regenerate form ; but it is none the less not a bad type of the attitude I am trying to express :—

“Cease your fretful prayers,  
Your whinings and your tame petitions :  
The gods love courage armed with confidence,  
And prayers fit to pull them down : weak tears,  
And troubled hearts, the dull twins of cold spirits,  
They sit and smile at. Hear how I salute them :—  
— Divine Andate, thou who hold'st the reins  
Of furious battle and disordered war,  
And proudly roll'st thy swarty chariot wheels  
Over the heaps of wounds and carcasses,  
Sailing through seas of blood : thou sure steeled sternness,  
Give us this day good hearts, good enemies,  
Good blows on both sides, wounds that fear or flight  
Can claim no share in.”

The other illustration I will offer is of a different character. It consists of a passage from a writer whom I have already mentioned more than once in this paper, a writer near to our own time who has always appeared to me more clearly than any of his contemporaries to have perceived the lines upon which the religion of the future must travel. I speak of Emerson. The passage to which I refer is one in which he endeavours to express his conception of the nature and

function of Prayer. In the emphasis which it lays upon the necessity in religion of courage and self-dependence, in the demand which it makes upon the sense of honour in a man, it is neither Christian nor Greek but northern:—

“In what prayers,” says Emerson, “do men allow themselves! That which they call a holy office is not so much as brave and manly. Prayer looks abroad and asks for some foreign addition to come through some foreign virtue, and loses itself in endless mazes of natural and supernatural, and mediatorial and miraculous. Prayer that craves a particular commodity—anything less than all good—is vicious. Prayer is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view. It is a soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul. It is the spirit of God pronouncing His works good. But prayer as a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft. . . . As soon as a man is at one with God he will not beg. He will then see prayer in all action. The prayer of the farmer kneeling in his field to weed it, the prayer of the rower kneeling with the stroke of his oar, are true prayers heard throughout nature, though for cheap ends.”

I will ask indulgence at this point for an attempt to synthesise the conclusions towards which I have been moving in this essay. It cannot, I think, be denied that there is at the present day among thinking persons a widespread dissatisfaction with the moral ideals of Christianity. Those who feel this dissatisfaction most deeply plead with us for a return upon the Greek view of life. With this plea I confess myself to some extent in sympathy. I sympathise with it as an endeavour to make the moral life beautiful and joyous. At the same time I do not believe that the human race is ever likely to find in Hellenism a satisfaction for its deepest aspirations. Neither Hellenism nor Christianity nor any fusion of the two can give us what we want. Hellenism is superior to Christianity in and so far as it is more natural. But what we want, if we are to live good and effective lives, is something that shall have the naturalness of Hellenism and yet at the same time a deeper

earnestness, a character more vigorous and robust. The morality of the North, with its two cardinal virtues, Chivalry and Honour, seems to me more able than anything else to supply this want. What is needed to-day is a return upon this morality, not a return upon Hellenism. At many points this morality stands in closer relation to Hellenism (to which, of course, it owes nothing) than to Christianity, to which it owes much. This is due simply to the fact that it is, like Hellenism, more natural, truer to the deepest instincts of mankind, than Christianity. It leaves men certain things of which they will never allow themselves ultimately to be deprived, and which Christianity has endeavoured to take from them. But it is, as I said, more robust, of a greater virility than Hellenism; for the North is pre-eminently robust and virile, Hellenism and the South pre-eminently delicate, volitant, fickle.

~~to tell her~~  
 "O tell her, ~~tell her~~, thou that knowest each,  
 That bright and fierce and fickle is the South,  
 And dark and true and tender is the North."

This northern morality, moreover, has in it, what Hellenism had not, a conquering and progressive power: for the northern races are conquering races. They move by their mass. Hellenism had no mass, no volume: it remained thin and isolated. It conquered Rome indeed, yet it conquered only because it corrupted. But the moral ideals of the North have conquered Europe by sheer strength, by a native imperial strength and energy. It is a conquest indeed which Europe has not acknowledged. We have been conquered without knowing it. We imagine ourselves still to be living under the moral constitution of Christianity. But we are, I believe, official Christians and not real Christians. At the bottom of his nature, if he could only get down there and scrutinise it honestly, each man of us is governed by the moral ideas of the North. What is wanted to-day is that we should frankly accept this moral conquest of the northern races, live openly under the government of their ideals,

identify ourselves with these ideals, and develop them. As it is, we dissimulate. I would say then—"Let us not be ashamed to acknowledge that by which we really live. Let us have done with pretence. Let us cease to call ourselves Christians when we do not follow Christ. Let us cease attempting to reduce Christianity to a metaphor and to make the words of Christ mean to us what they never meant to him. Neither let us, escaping Christianity, conduct in a kind of moral conservatory a flirtation with Hellenism which can come to nothing. Let us remember that we are ourselves of the North, and that our moral constitutions have a natural affinity for the ideals of the North. These ideals have, it is true, become so confused with other moral systems that it is often extremely difficult to distinguish the northern elements in our ethical creed from other elements of a different origin. But it is, I think, possible to distinguish as essentially northern the two ideals of which I have here chiefly spoken, chivalry and honour: and in the development of these two ideals the peoples of Europe will, I believe, in the future find the brightest employment for their moral faculties."

I may be allowed to add here a note upon what it will occur to some persons to regard as a strange omission. I have made no mention in this paper of a moral conception which there is good reason to regard as in its origin northern—the ideal of Duty. This omission was intentional. I have omitted to speak of this ideal, for three reasons. In the first place, though I regard the conception of duty as northern in its *origin*, yet in so far as it operates in our lives to-day it is, I think, quite as much Christian and Hellenic as what I call Gothic. Secondly, it is not any particular virtue, nor, like the Platonic justice, the whole of virtue, ὅλη ἀρετή, but it is merely a way of looking at virtue and the virtues. And thirdly, it seems to me to be, on the whole, a wrong way and a bad way of looking at the virtues. I have not left unread the famous apostrophe of Kant, but I confess myself not much moved by it. I am even prepared to maintain that so

long as we are conscious of performing a good action from a sense of duty we are immoral. To be moral is to identify the whole of ourselves with the whole of good. So long as we think of "duty," we make a false and base distinction between ourselves and the good. Morality is a union of moral subject and object. We suppose that Nelson's famous message, "England expects every man to do his duty," had something to do with the victory at Trafalgar;—but falsely. The men who won the battle of Trafalgar were the men who did more than their duty. So long as we do only our duty we are not only unprofitable, but ineffective, servants. I will go even farther. I will maintain that there have been more crimes done in this world in the name of duty than good deeds. It resembles, in this respect, liberty. "O duty, how they have played with thy name!" The more we make the sense of honour take the place of the sense of duty, the truer and braver men do we become. As far as my own feeling goes, the very word "duty" sends a chill to the heart. The word "honour," on the other hand, seems to quicken the pulse every time it is spoken. It belongs to the world of romance, desire, enterprise, and limitless possibility. It carries with it all those associations in which, as children of the North, we English are most at home. I am reminded here of some lines in which a young Oxford poet has apostrophised what he calls "The Adventurous Spirit of the North,"—lines which seem to me to give beautiful expression to a part of the sentiment which hangs about the ideal of honour. I can hardly do better than close my paper with a citation from them.

"Seal on the hearts of the strong,  
 Guerdon thou of the brave,  
 To nerve the arm in the press of the throng,  
 To cheer the dark of the grave.  
 Far from the heather hills,  
 Far from the misty sea,  
 Little it irks where a man may fall,  
 If he falls with his heart on thee."

H. W. GARROD.

# THE RESURRECTION OF OUR LORD AND RECENT CRITICISM.

REV. C. F. NOLLOTH, M.A.

THE Resurrection of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the Christian religion. If it can be shown that it is not a fact, the whole Christian system falls to pieces. St Paul does not hesitate to make it essential to the holding of the faith, and therefore, in effect, "*articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae.*"

No language of blame can be too strong for one who tries to erect a matter of indifference into a position of vital consequence. But St Paul's attitude has the sanction of the best thinkers of every age until we come to comparatively recent times. If we except the Docetic denials of the first two centuries, it has been only within the last fifty years that a Christianity without the Resurrection has been thought to be possible.

The Resurrection as a fact has been attacked by two kinds of critics: 1. Those hostile to Christianity, who, realising its importance in the Christian scheme, have tried, by explaining it away, to get rid of Christianity itself as a reasonable religion; 2. Those who, looking not unkindly on Christianity and acting professedly in the interests of truth, seek to retain the religion while practically parting with its central fact.

With these last, the friendly critics, and perhaps the more dangerous ones, the present article is intended to deal.

At the root of the opposition to the Resurrection lies the

familiar argument against miracles—that they are violations of the order of Nature. The uniformity of Nature is a hypothesis of which we all make hourly use. But when we speak of Nature it is often forgotten that it comprises the world of spiritual and moral as well as material phenomena—a world throughout which God freely acts in carrying out His purposes. Therefore, what may appear to us a violation of natural law may be in strict accordance with God's method of action in His universe as a whole.

When Matthew Arnold tells us that “miracles do not happen,” he ventures upon a statement which, as a sweeping negative, is not only incapable of proof, but is directly at variance with a vast amount of evidence which, on the showing of Mill,<sup>1</sup> is of the kind that underlies all our reasonings. To say that miracles do not occur is to construct arbitrarily a theory of the universe which excludes a personal God and denies the Divine origin of man and his relation to God. Only on a purely atheistical conception of the universe can miracles be said to be impossible. On a theistic conception, they may happen where there is sufficient reason for them.

Dr P. W. Schmiedel, in opening his discussion of the Resurrection,<sup>2</sup> says that his “examination of the subject will not start from the proposition that ‘miracles are impossible,’ for,” as he adds, “such a proposition rests on a theory of the universe, not upon exhaustive examination of all the events which may be spoken of as miracles.” In this admission he is in agreement with the present state of philosophic thought.<sup>3</sup> No one can reasonably allege the impossibility of miracles. All that need be said under that head is, that if a natural explanation can be found for a phenomenon, we must accept it rather than a miraculous explanation. We have the highest

<sup>1</sup> *Essays on Religion*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> *Encyclop. Biblica*, vol. iii. p. 4040, Art. “Resurrection-and-Ascension-Narratives.”

<sup>3</sup> Even Professor Paulsen, who does not admit the miraculous, allows that “should occasion demand, philosophy has a place for miracles.” *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 297, Eng. trans.

sanction for so doing. Our Lord Himself practised restraint in the use of miracle; a similar restraint should control the belief we extend to the report of a miracle. When Herod heard of Christ, he suspected that He was John the Baptist risen from the dead. It was the credulity of mere superstition prompted by an uneasy conscience; whereas the Apostles, when first confronted with the news of the Resurrection of Christ, withheld belief and were only convinced by the overpowering force of the fact. Their belief was no credulity; it was an act of reasoned faith.

Now the whole force of recent criticism is directed to find a natural explanation of the supernatural element of the Resurrection story, an endeavour quite justifiable, so long as the value of that element is allowed for and the ascertainable facts are duly taken into account. Two facts are admitted: 1, The first Christians believed that Christ rose from the dead; 2, the Catholic Church is founded on that belief. The problem is, to account for the origin of the belief. Impatience of miracle dictates that, if possible, it shall be accounted for by the ordinary working of natural causes. Schmiedel's explanation is that "possibly—probably, if you will," it can be explained by "subjective visions." The visionaries regarded what they had seen as objective and real; the reporters (Evangelists, etc.), simply recording what the visionaries told them. "The vision hypothesis," says Zöckler,<sup>1</sup> "since the middle of the last century has almost everywhere obtained an advantage over its older rivals. It exercises an almost unbounded sway over the circles of present-day theological liberalism." "In the vision hypothesis," continues Schmiedel,<sup>2</sup> "it is only the judgment of the visionaries as to the objective reality of what they had seen, which is set aside; every other biblical statement of fact, unless found inconsistent with some other biblical statement, remains unaffected." "The error which the vision hypothesis points

<sup>1</sup> *Real-Encyclopädie für Prot. Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd edit., Art. "Jesus Christus."

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 4085.

out affects merely the husk—viz., that the risen Jesus was seen in objective reality, but not the kernel of the matter, that Jesus lives in the spiritual sense.”<sup>1</sup>

There we have in brief the latest and perhaps the ablest attempt to account for the primitive belief in the Resurrection of our Lord on other grounds than that of its objective reality. There is a serious, reverent tone in Professor Schmiedel's discussion of the subject, combined with great learning and ingenuity, which raises it above the level of many similar undertakings. But the presence of such an article in an Encyclopædia edited by an Oxford Professor of Biblical Exegesis has caused considerable surprise. For before dealing with Schmiedel's hypothesis, think what it involves. The Gospels become the record of the delusions of a few enthusiasts. The Resurrection as an objective fact disappears from history, and with it, if we may trust St Paul,<sup>2</sup> the whole fabric of Christianity as a creed and a rule of life.

What can be alleged against the position of Schmiedel?

I. The mental and spiritual attitude of the apostles as recorded in the Gospels forbids the conclusion that they were visionaries—victims of hallucination. A “subjective vision” requires a certain psychological preparation. To see Christ risen in such a way as to believe Him to be risen when in truth He was not, would require an anticipation of such an event as likely—a readiness for it. But nothing is more remarkable in the Gospel narratives than the almost cruel exposure of the disciples' despair and unbelief in a Resurrection of their crucified Lord until it was forced upon them with all the stubbornness of fact.<sup>3</sup> “They knew not the Scripture, that He must rise again from the dead.” When He appeared, “they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed they had seen a spirit.” “They, when they had heard

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, p. 4085.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 17. Cf. Prof. Denney in *Expositor*, Feb. 1905, p. 120.

<sup>3</sup> “On n'embaume pas un corps dont on attend la résurrection d'un moment à l'autre.” Réviell, *Jésus de Nazareth*, ii. p. 433.

that He was alive and had been seen of her, believed not." If the Gospels contain any sure information of the apostles' state of mind, they represent it as a condition which rendered it impossible for them to be the subjects of visions internally caused, objectively interpreted. Of the mental material necessary for the production of such visions they had none.

II. But the unfairness of such reasoning suffices to condemn it. You cannot retain a Christ once dead, as living, without "the husk" of the objective reality, unless you play with the meaning of words. Of course, at the moment of His death on the Cross, and afterwards, our Lord was living and upholding all things as God. But the Christian religion and the Christian Church were not founded on the impassibility and unchangeableness of God the Eternal Son, but on the fact of the restored bodily life of Him Who in His human nature died upon the Cross.<sup>1</sup>

The "husk" of the objective reality of Schmiedel is the kernel of the whole matter. Besides, he offers us a false antithesis—spiritual and real. The opposite to spiritual is not the real or objective. The spiritual is the real *par excellence*. In the language of the New Testament the spiritual (τὸ πνευματικόν) is sometimes contrasted with the natural (τὸ ψυχικόν), sometimes with the carnal (τὸ σαρκικόν), but not with that which is objectively real. People try to commend a view by calling it spiritual, while emptying it of its value. "Spiritual" expresses, as no other word in the language, the nature of the Infinite God. Jesus Christ is Spirit in virtue of His Godhead. But He is man in virtue of His Incarnation. To say that He lives is, in respect of His Godhead, a truism. To say that He lives in the spiritual sense, though denying that He, the Man Christ Jesus Who truly died, truly rose again, is a meaningless assertion. It

<sup>1</sup> "Es ist nicht der Glaube an ein geistiges Fortleben Jesu, den sie aussprechen und in Anderen begründen wollen; es ist die Thatsache seines leibhaftigen Hervorgegangenseins aus dem Grabe, auf die sie ihren Glauben und ihre Hoffnung gründen" (1 Cor. xv. 17-23). B. Weiss, *Das Leben Jesu*, edit. 1902, ii. p. 553.

conveys nothing. To die requires a body. To rise again, to live after death, requires a body. A spiritual, disembodied life is not human life in the full, true sense of the word.<sup>1</sup> The thought of the Incarnation should have prevented such a misconception. It implies the union of the Deity with complete manhood. It is a sacrament. To deny the Resurrection of Christ is to destroy the nature of the sacrament and to make of the Incarnation a temporary phenomenon, not, as Scripture represents it, an eternal fact.

And here comes in the evidence of the empty grave. No critical theory has been able to dispose of that evidence. Strauss himself has refuted the theory of a swoon (instead of death) and subsequent revival and appearance to the disciples. "It is not worth the trouble to disentangle the tissue of a fancy which lacks all historical feeling, or to try to prove that a Christ weak, slowly recovering, finally dying again, could never appear to the disciples as the conqueror of death and the grave."<sup>2</sup> A hint of fraud on the part of the disciples disgraces the pages of Rénan's *Les Apôtres*,<sup>3</sup> and, with his account of the part played by Mary Magdalene in the evolution of the Resurrection faith, is not entitled to serious consideration.

To show the straits to which the critic is reduced, let it suffice to quote Schmiedel's remark—"That Paul knew of the empty sepulchre can be maintained only in conjunction with the assumption that, for particular reasons, he kept silence regarding it."<sup>4</sup> But St Paul said that Christ had risen:<sup>5</sup> this, in the ordinary use of language, implies coming forth from His grave. Schmiedel himself admits this: "That Jesus was buried and that 'He has been raised' cannot be affirmed by any one who has not the re-animation of the body in mind. . . . If He was to rise from the dead, His body must needs come forth from the grave, otherwise the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. St Thom. Aquin., Summa I., Quæst. xc., Art. IV., Conclusio. Vide Bishop H. E. Ryle in *The Faith of the Centuries*, p. 159.

<sup>2</sup> B. Weiss, *Leben Jesu*, ii. p. 554.

<sup>3</sup> P. 16.

<sup>4</sup> P. 4058.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor. xv.

idea of Resurrection would be abandoned.”<sup>1</sup> And this admission is a reply to Canon Henson. In his apparent adhesion to the view of Schmiedel that “the first appearances of Christ were in Galilee, and that the tidings of them must have arrived at Jerusalem much too late to allow of examination of His sepulchre with any satisfactory results,” he remarks: “If so much be conceded, what becomes of the argument based on the empty tomb?”<sup>2</sup> But why should this be conceded? As Dr Loofs says: “St Mark is the only source for this transfer of the appearances of the risen Christ to Galilee” (St Matthew being founded on St Mark, and the Gospel of Peter<sup>3</sup> being dependent on St Matthew); and again: “I come to the result that among the Resurrection records, that of John and that of Luke with their purely Jerusalem appearances<sup>4</sup> deserve—according to purely critical considerations of the sources—the preference to the record of the Mark and Matthew Gospel. . . . It does not disturb me that I cannot estimate much in detail. I trust to the Johannine record in that which it says about the concreteness of the appearances of the risen Christ . . . . and I find it confirmed by that record that similar thoughts must lie behind 1. Cor. xv.”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 4059.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1904, “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ.”

<sup>3</sup> Verses 59, 60, as numbered by Harnack.

<sup>4</sup> Loofs does not accept as coming from St John himself the appendix to the Gospel contained in chap. xxi.

<sup>5</sup> *Die Auferstehungsberichte und ihr Wert*, pp. 26, 32, 36. But there is no reason to assume that the Jerusalem appearances of St John and St Luke, and the Galilee appearances of St Mark (St Matthew, St John xxi., and Gospel of St Peter) are mutually exclusive. With Bishop Westcott it may be maintained that there is room for both sets—Jerusalem, Galilee after the eighth day, Jerusalem again. The evidence for each group of appearances is adequate, although certain details are difficult to harmonise. Disparity in minor matters is common to all historical records of the same event narrated by different writers. The independence of the New Testament witnesses, as shown by variations in details, combined with their agreement on the central facts, makes for the historical character of their narratives. *Vide* Professor Sanday in Hastings’ *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii. p. 640. “Of the great historical value of St John, I have, like most biblical students, become more deeply sensible, the more closely I have studied it.” Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, p. vii.

But we can bring Schmiedel to reply to Canon Henson. "If," says the latter, "as can hardly but be the case, St Paul certainly did not believe all this (*i.e.* the physical details in Luke xxiv.), then it follows that to his mind Resurrection was quite conceivable apart from physical resuscitation, and that so far as his doctrine goes there was no importance in the empty tomb." "Revivification," says Schmiedel, "can only occur in the case of a subject that is capable of dying—in other words, in a body."<sup>1</sup> "Whatever," writes Harnack, "may have happened at the grave and in the matter of the appearances, one thing is certain: this grave was the birthplace of the indestructible belief that death is vanquished, that there is a life Eternal."<sup>2</sup>

Here we must ask if it is possible to define the nature of our Lord's Resurrection body. That in one sense it was identical with the body which was crucified is clear from the recognition which He received from the apostles, and from the fact that the wounds were still visible. If it had not been so identical, He could not be said to have risen again; an entirely new body would not fulfil the requirements of a Resurrection. But though identical with the body which hung upon the Cross, it was transfigured, changed in its powers and characteristics, spiritualised. Material barriers offered no hindrance to its movements. It was to be recognised or not as He willed. As we gather from the incidents of the walk to Emmaus, to see Him required a certain moral condition. The risen body of Christ, true, human body as it still was, had been spiritualised, "clothed upon" by the new conditions of the heavenly life. It had already entered into the sphere of the Eternal, and, therefore, Weiss is correct in saying that "with His Resurrection, Christ is simultaneously exalted to Heaven; He did not need a special journey to Heaven . . . . When His appearances ceased, He was to be considered as gone into heaven."<sup>3</sup> Schmiedel, indeed, holds that "the Resurrection

<sup>1</sup> P. 4077.<sup>2</sup> *Wesen des Christenthums*, p. 101.<sup>3</sup> *Leben Jesu*, ii. p. 569.

and Ascension are a single act; Jesus is taken up directly from the grave or from the underworld into heaven. . . . The view that Jesus was taken up into heaven forty days after His Resurrection rests solely on Acts i. 3, 9, and thus on a datum which did not become known to the compiler of Acts till late in life. . . . In his Gospel the author of Acts has assigned the Ascension to a time late in the evening of the day of His Resurrection." But the passages (Luke xxiv. 13, 29, 33, 36, 50, 51) to which Schmiedel refers,<sup>1</sup> as placing the Ascension on the evening of the Resurrection day, do not bear out that interpretation. The Ascension narrative of verses 50-53 simply follows on the account of the Resurrection; there is no time connection. When Professor Denney says that St Luke here means the final separation of Christ from His disciples, and that "it seems to take place on the most natural construction of the whole passage (verses 13-53) on the evening of the Resurrection Day, whereas in Acts i. it is forty days later,"<sup>2</sup> the definite time statement of St Luke in Acts i. ought to govern the interpretation of his Gospel (xxiv. 13-53) where there is no such mark of time. Nor is Acts i. 3, 9 the only passage recording a lengthened period during which Christ appeared to His disciples; St Paul in his speech at Antioch expressly says, "He was seen many days of them."<sup>3</sup> Weiss seems to meet the requirements of the question when he says: "Since the appearances of the Risen One all had for their aim to make the disciples sensibly certain of His bodily Resurrection, so it is quite conceivable that this His definite departure from the earth (*i.e.* His Ascension proper) was sensibly demonstrated ("veranschaulicht wurde") to them by His disappearing in a cloud, and seeming to be raised up to Heaven with it."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 4060 and 4059. "Confirmed by Ep. Barn. xv. 9." So Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 146, and in *Das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss*. But see Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, Art. "Ascension."

<sup>3</sup> Acts xiii. 31.

<sup>4</sup> *Leben Jesu*, ii. p. 577.

The appearances of Christ during the forty days are too well grounded in the primitive tradition to be dismissed on the plea of the inadequateness of the authority for that precise period; and the fact that the number 40 is of frequent symbolical use is no argument against its correct use in the present case, but rather the contrary.

But to return to the nature of our Lord's Resurrection body. St Paul and St Luke are said to be at variance when, in spite of the former's insistence on the spiritual character of the body at the general Resurrection—"flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God"—St Luke represents our Lord as saying, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have."<sup>1</sup> But the "flesh and blood" which St Paul means correspond with what he calls in the same verse "corruption"—"neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." The body of Christ could not be so described. The saying of the psalmist—"Neither wilt thou suffer Thy Holy One to see corruption"—is declared by both St Peter and St Paul to be fulfilled in Christ: by St Peter in his speech on the day of Pentecost; by St Paul at Antioch—"He whom God raised up saw no corruption." The sinless body of the incarnate Son of God had nothing to lay aside as unfit for God's presence. All it needed for its new life was to be "clothed upon," invested with its new powers as a spiritual body. "Nothing is taken away, but something is added, by which all that was before present is transfigured."<sup>2</sup> When Canon Henson asks, "Is the Resurrection really inconceivable apart from the materialistic notions

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 50; St Luke xxiv. 39. Is St Luke, who, as Irenæus says (*Adv. Hæres.*, iii. 1) "was a follower of Paul, and placed in a book the Gospel preached by him," likely to have written anything contradictory to his teaching on so vital a part of the Gospel? Cf. Weiss, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 557.

<sup>2</sup> Westcott, *Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 164; cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Marcion*, v. 10; *De Resur. Carnis*, c. 50; Irenæus, *Adv. Hæres.*, v. 9; and cf. Rom. viii. 11. Dr Loofs, referring to the appearances of the risen Christ, speaks of "die wie in einen Schleier der Uebersinnlichkeit gehüllte Sinnenfälligkeit—oder soll ich sagen: die in ein Kleid der Sinnenfälligkeit gehüllte Uebersinnlichkeit?" *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

which current Judaism contributed to the earliest literature of the Christian Church?" we answer "Yes," if by "the materialistic notions" he means the actual bodily presence of Christ with His disciples after His Resurrection. When he asks, "Is the faith of the Church in a Divine Christ, living, present, active, really built on an empty tomb?" we again answer, "Yes," if he means to assert that after the third day the tomb in the garden still held The Crucified passing speedily to corruption. By his approving references to the article of Schmiedel, although he does not state his attitude towards the vision hypothesis, Canon Henson shows that his sympathy is with those who deny that Christ is risen in the sense in which the Church has always believed Him to have risen—in the only sense in which the words have any meaning. When he claims the support of Bishop Westcott for his views—"The popular conceptions of a carnal Resurrection very speedily overpowered the teaching of the New Testament in the early Church"<sup>1</sup>—he should have noticed that Westcott's very vague word "carnal" is to be taken in connection with what he says on the same page, "All that belonged to His humanity was preserved, and at the same time all was transfigured."

III. The character of the appearances of the risen Lord as recorded excludes the tenability of the vision hypothesis. "Appearances of the risen Jesus did actually occur—*i.e.* the followers of Jesus really had the impression of having seen Him." "How can we explain the only fact which has emerged in the course of our examination—the fact that Jesus was seen? (1 Cor. xv.)"<sup>2</sup>

Schmiedel, in casting about for an answer to his question, rejects Keim's theory of an image of the risen Christ produced in the apostles' souls immediately by God, "a telegram from heaven"; for by this theory of an objective vision, miracle is still retained. Besides Keim, it is held by Weizsäcker,

<sup>1</sup> *Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 287; *vide* Swete, *Ap. Creed*, pp. 93, 98.

<sup>2</sup> Schmiedel, *op. cit.*, pp. 4061 and 4076.

Pfleiderer, and Réville, who writes: "Jésus a triomphé de tous ses ennemies dans le cœur et la conscience des siens; voilà le fait inéluctable. Si les visions des premiers disciples étaient imaginaires quant à la forme, elles n'en contenaient pas moins une haute vérité."<sup>1</sup> Weizsäcker<sup>2</sup> compares the appearance of Christ after resurrection to that at His transfiguration; but the comparison is destructive of his theory of objective visions; for in the transfiguration, the bodily, tangible presence of Christ was not annihilated by its garment of light; when the glory passed it was seen to be the same.

The objective theory being set aside on account of its miraculous element, Schmiedel finally turns to the subjective hypothesis: "In opposition to objective visions, the image seen in subjective visions is a product of the mental condition of the seer." But, as already said, it is quite untenable in view of the Gospel records: they would have to be re-written if it is to be maintained. A passing, momentary appearance, a silent coming and going, might have left the beholders uncertain of the report of their senses. Our Lord took care that their faith should have more to rest upon. They "did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead." Such is St Peter's solemn assurance to Cornelius, and it tallies with the Gospel accounts.<sup>3</sup> Yet Schmiedel can say "That the risen Jesus ate or was touched, was never observed." He meets with a direct negative, evidence which must render his theory untenable: but it is not thus to be disposed of. It is part of the primitive tradition. When his method of dealing with stubborn evidence is fully considered, his arguments alleging the state of mind of St Peter and of St Paul as

<sup>1</sup> *Jésus de Nazareth*, vol. ii. p. 478; *vide* Zöckler, *op. cit.*, Art. "Jesus Christus," pp. 35, 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Apostolische Zeitalter*, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Cf.* Weiss, *Leben Jesu*, ii. p. 562. "Der Vorstellung blosser Christusvisionen widerspricht aber unsere gesamte evangelische Überlieferung. Es ist nicht bloss eine Gestalt welche die Jünger sehen, und eine Stimme die sie hören; Jesus wandert mit ihnen und setzt sich mit ihnen zur Tische," u.s.w. *Cf.* Acts x. 41.

ready to believe in a resurrection, have little weight. You cannot appeal to evidence, in support of a theory, which you have already set aside in the interests of another aspect of that theory. The fatal defect of Schmiedel's reasoning is that he alternately accepts and rejects the witness of the original sources. No psychological preparedness in the apostles for a vision—even if it existed, and the evidence is entirely against it—could account for an expression such as this, "We did eat and drink with Him." No subjective impression can explain the experience of St Paul at Damascus, and the change in life and thought which it effected.<sup>1</sup> To ask us to believe such improbabilities in the interests of naturalism, is to ask us to accept miracles more difficult of belief than the fact itself: our common sense and our moral sense alike rebel.

If the hypothesis of subjective visions fails to explain the appearances of the risen Christ which we find recorded in the Gospels and 1 Cor. xv., and alluded to in many other parts of the New Testament, it also fails to account for the existence of the Christian Church. On the admission of our critics, the Church is founded on the belief in the Resurrection as a fact. Now, to say that Christianity, the most potent factor in all history, the most fertile in eliciting all that is best in character and life, the most beneficent institution that the world has known, a religion adapted as none other to all races and varieties of mankind, having therefore something which meets the need of humanity as a whole—to say that Christianity is due to the misguided enthusiasm of a few fanatics, who mistook their own fancies for tangible reality and, as they

<sup>1</sup> "1 Cor. ix. 1 compared with 1 Cor. xv. 8 shows clearly that Paul considered the Damascus appearance as one of the same kind and value as those given to his fellow apostles, and grounded the full validity of his apostolate on the fact that to himself also a bodily sight of our Lord had been imparted." Zöckler, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

"The  $\omega\phi\theta\eta$  recurring six times (1 Cor. xv.) points to six definite processes of an historical kind . . . the first five of them could not have been thought by the apostle to be other than external Christophanies: wherefore also the sixth event—the Christophany before Damascus—must be understood in the same external sense."—*Ib.*

thought, saw and touched and ate bread with a Christ Who all the time was lying in His grave and lies there still—is to make demands on our credulity which are more than we can bear.<sup>1</sup>

And the vision theory fails to account for the facts of personal religion—those spiritual experiences which cannot be ignored by the critic, but which, as facts of consciousness, claim scientific recognition and treatment. Like the Death and Resurrection of Christ, on which they profess to be based, they pass on their higher side beyond the reach of scientific investigation; but they are sacramental, and on the other side they touch earth and can be analysed and discussed. They are realities. Try to account for the spiritual experience of St Paul, St Augustine, St Francis d'Assisi, and the great army of martyrs and confessors from St Stephen onwards, by the theory of unconscious self-deception, and you may as well try to balance a pyramid on the end of a straw. It will not bear. The Christian consciousness asserts its saneness. If we knew the saints only in their moments of ecstasy and enthusiasm, we might say, "these are delusions, paroxysms of 'life's fitful fever,' signs of an overwrought nervous sensibility"; and though wrong in our judgment, our mistake would be excusable. But it is hard to find excuse for one who, with the whole life of a St Paul, an Augustine, a Francis, before him, can say, as he traces the constancy of their lives even unto death, "these were men whose lives were the highest expression of what human life can be; but after all, they were the victims of a delusion; for that on which their life was built and from which it drew its inspiration had no ground in fact."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "The vision hypothesis in every one of its recent expressions and in every form in which it may yet deck itself out goes to pieces (scheitert) on the Church-founding activities and the world-regenerating character of the life of faith of the apostles."—Zöckler, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> "The world-subduing faith of the disciples can no more be explained by deception of the senses and feverish excitement than by treachery and lying."—B. Weiss, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 557.

## THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD.

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THE immediate judgments of experience fall into two broadly contrasted classes, which may be described in brief as judgments of fact and judgments of worth. The former are the foundations on which the whole edifice of science (as the term is commonly used) is built: science has no other object than to understand the relations of facts as exhibited in historical sequence, in causal interconnection, or in the logical interdependence which may be discovered amongst their various aspects. In its beginnings it may have arisen as an aid to the attainment of practical purposes: it is still everywhere yoked to the chariot of man's desires and aims. But it has for long vindicated an independent position for itself. It may be turned to what uses you will; but its essential spirit stands aloof from these uses. It has one interest only—to know what happens and how. Otherwise it is indifferent to all purposes alike. It studies with equal mind the slow growth of a plant or the swift destruction wrought by the torpedo, the reign of a Caligula or of a Victoria; it takes no side, but observes and describes all, "just as if the question were of lines, planes, and solids." Mathematical method does not limit its range, but it typifies its attitude of indifference to every interest save one: that of knowing the what and how of things.

<sup>1</sup> An official address to the Ethics Section of the International Congress of Arts and Science, St Louis, U.S.A., 23rd September 1904.

We can conceive an intelligence of this nature, a pure intelligence, or mere intelligence, to whose understanding all the relations of things are evident, with the prophetic power of the Laplacian Demon and the gift of tongues to make its knowledge clear, and yet unable to distinguish between good and evil or to see beauty or ugliness in nature. We can conceive such an intelligence; but it is an unreality, a mere abstraction from the scientific aspect of human intelligence. Pure intelligence of this sort does not exist in man; and we have no grounds for asserting its existence anywhere. In the experience which forms the basis of mental life, judgments of fact are everywhere combined with and coloured by judgments of worth. And the latter are as insistent as the former, and make up as large a part of our experience. If we go back to the original judgments of experience, we find that they are not only of the form "it is here or there," "it is of this nature or that," "it has such and such effects"; just as large a part of our experience is of another order, which may be expressed in judgments of the form "it is good or evil," "it is fair or foul."

Nor does the way in which scientific judgments are elaborated give any rationale of the distinction between good and evil. If we ask of science, "What is good?" it can give no relevant answer to the question. Strictly speaking, it does not understand the meaning of the question at all. The ball has gone out of bounds; and science cannot touch it until it has been thrown back into the field. It can say what is, and what will happen, and it can describe the methods or laws by which things come to pass: that is all; it has only one law for the just and the unjust.

But science is very resourceful, and is able to deal with judgments of worth from its own point of view. For these judgments also are facts of individual experience; they are formed by human minds under certain conditions, betray certain relations to the judgments of fact with which they are associated, and are connected with an environment of social

institutions and physical conditions of life: they have a history therefore. And in these respects they become part of the material for science; and a description of them can be given by psychological and historical methods.

The general nature and results of the application of these methods to ethics are too well known to need further comment, too well established to require defence. But these results may be exaggerated and have been exaggerated. When all has been said and done that the historical method can say and do, the question "What is good?" is found to remain exactly where it was. We may have learned much as to the way in which certain kinds of conduct in certain circumstances promote certain ends, and as to the gradual changes which men's ideas about good and evil, virtue and vice, have passed through; but we have not touched the fundamental question which ethics has to face—the question of the nature of worth or goodness or duty.

And yet it is this question only which gives significance to the problems on which historical evolution has been able to throw light. Moral ideas and moral institutions have all along been effective factors in human development, as well as the subject of development themselves. And the secret of their power has lain in this, that men have believed in those ideas as expressing a moral imperative or a moral end, and that they have looked upon moral institutions as embodiments of something which has worth for man or a moral claim upon his devotion. These ideas and institutions would have had no power apart from this belief in their validity.

But was this belief true? Were the ideas or institutions valid? This question the man of science, as sociologist or historian, does not answer and has no means of answering. He can show their adaptation or want of adaptation to certain ends, but he can say nothing about the validity of these ends themselves. It is implied in their efficiency that these ends were conceived as having moral value or moral authority. But to what ends does this moral value or authority truly

belong? and what is its significance?—these are questions which the positive sciences (such as psychology and sociology) cannot touch, and which must be answered by other methods than those which they employ. The positive sciences have no means of determining the nature and valid application of the distinctive concept involved in moral experience.

The moral concept is expressed in various ways and by a variety of terms—right, duty, merit, virtue, goodness, worth. And these different terms indicate different aspects opened up by a single new point of view. Thus “right” seems to imply correspondence with a standard or rule, which standard or rule is some moral law or ideal of goodness; and “merit” indicates performance of the right, perhaps in victory over some conflicting desire; and “virtue” means a trait of character in which performance of this sort has become habitual. The term “worth” has conveniences which have led to its having had considerable vogue in ethical treatises since the time of Herbart; it lends itself easily to psychological manipulation; but it does not seem to refer to a concept fundamentally distinct from goodness. Between “goodness” and “duty,” however, there seems to be this difference at any rate, that the latter term refers definitely to something to be done by a voluntary agent, whereas, in calling something “good,” we may have no thought of action at all, but only see and name a quality.

There lies here therefore a difference which is not a mere difference of expression.

On the one hand it may be held that good is a quality which belongs to certain things and has no special and immediate reference to volition: that we say this or that is good as we say that something else is heavy or green or positively electrified. No relation to human life at all may be implied in the one form of judgment any more than in the other. That relation will only follow by way of application to circumstances. Just as a piece of lead may serve as a letter-weight because it is heavy, so certain actions may

come to be our duty because they lead to the realisation of something which is objectively good in quality.

According to the other view goodness has reference in its primary meaning to free self-conscious agency. The good is that which ought to be brought into existence; goodness is a quality of things, but only in a derivative regard, because these things are produced by a good will. It is objective, too, inasmuch as it unites the individual will with a law or ideal which has a claim upon the will; but it does not in its primary meaning indicate something out of relation to the will: if there were no will there would be no law; apart from conscious agency good and evil would disappear.

The question thus raised is one of real and fundamental importance. "Ethics" by its very name may seem to have primary reference to conduct; and that is the view which most moralists have, in one way or another, adopted. But the other view which gives to the concept "good" an independence of all relation to volition is not always definitely excluded, even by these moralists; by others it has been definitely maintained: passages from Plato might be quoted in its support; and quite recently a doctrine of the principles of Ethics has been worked out which is based on its explicit recognition.<sup>1</sup>

If we would attempt to decide between these two conflicting views of the ethical concept, we must, in the first place, imitate the procedure of science and examine the facts on which the concept is based. To get to the meaning of such scientific concepts as "mass," "energy," or the like, we begin by a consideration of the facts which the concepts are introduced to describe. These facts are in the last resort the objects of sense-perception. But, as we have seen, no examination of these sense-percepts will yield the content of the ethical concept; good and evil are not given in sense-perception; they are themselves an estimate of, or way of regarding, the immediate material of experience. Moral

<sup>1</sup> *Principia Ethica*, by G. E. Moore (1903).

experience is thus in a manner reflex, as so many of the English moralists have called it. Its attitude to things is not merely receptive; and the concepts to which it gives rise have not mere understanding in view. Objects are perceived as they occur; and experience of them is the groundwork of science. There is also, at the same time, an attitude of approbation or disapprobation; this attitude is the special characteristic of moral experience; and from moral experience the ethical concept is formed.

This reflex experience, or reflex attitude to experience, is exhibited in different ways. There is, to begin with, the appreciation of beauty in its various kinds and degrees and the corresponding depreciation of ugliness or deformity. These give rise to the concepts and judgments of æsthetics. They are closely related to moral approbation and disapprobation, so closely that there has always been a tendency amongst a school of moralists to strain the facts by identifying them. A certain looseness in our use of terms favours this tendency. For we do often use "good" of a work of art or even scene in nature when we mean "beautiful." But if we reflect on and compare our mental attitudes in commending, say, a sunset and self-sacrifice, it seems to me that there can be no doubt that the two attitudes are different. Both objects may be admired; but both are not, in the same sense, approved. It is hard to express this difference otherwise than by saying that the moral attitude is present in the one and absent in the other. But the difference is brought out by the fact that our æsthetical and moral attitudes towards the same experience may diverge from one another. We may admire the beauty of that which we condemn as immoral. De Quincey saw a fine art in certain cases of murder; the finish and perfection of wickedness may often stir a certain artistic admiration, especially if we lull the moral sense to sleep. And, on the other hand, moral approval is often tempered by a certain æsthetic depreciation of those noble characters who do good awkwardly, without the ease and grace of a gentleman. John

Knox and Mary Queen of Scots (if I may assume for the moment an historical judgment which may need qualification) will each have his or her admirers according as the moral or æsthetic attitude preponderates—the harsh tones of the one appealing to the law of truth and goodness, the other an embodiment of the beauty and gaiety of life, “without a moral sense, however feeble.”

Nor is æsthetic appreciation the only other reflex attitude which has a place in our experience side by side with the moral. Judgments about matters of fact and relations of ideas are discriminated as true or false; an ideal of truth is formed, and the conditions of its realisation are laid down. Here again we have a concept and class of judgments analogous to our æsthetical and ethical concepts and judgments, but not the same as they, and not likely to be confused with them.

Beside these may be put a whole class of judgments of worth which may be described as judgments of utility. We estimate and approve or disapprove various facts of experience according to their tendency to promote or interfere with certain ends or objects of desire. That moral judgments are to be identified with a special class of these judgments of utility is a thesis too well known to require discussion here, and too important to admit of discussion in a few words. But it may be pointed out that it is only in a very special and restricted sense of the term “utility” that judgments of utility have ever been identified with moral judgments. The jemmy is useful to the burglar, as his instruments are useful to the surgeon; and they are in both cases appreciated by the same kind of reflective judgment. Judgments of utility are all of them, properly speaking, judgments about means to ends; and the ends may and do differ; while it is only by a forced interpretation that all these ends are sometimes and somehow made to resolve themselves into pleasure.

It is enough, however, for my present purpose to recognise the *prima facie* distinction of moral judgments or judgments

of goodness from other judgments of worth, such as those of utility, of beauty, and of truth (in the sense in which these last also are judgments of worth). Had the question of the origin and history of the moral judgment been before us, a great deal more might have been necessary. For our present purpose what has been already said may be sufficient: it was required in order to enable us to approach the consideration of the question already raised concerning the application and meaning of the moral concept.

The question is, Does our moral experience support the assignment of the predicate "good" or "bad" to things regarded as quite independent of volition or consciousness? At first sight it may seem easy to answer the question in the affirmative. We do talk of sunshine and gentle rain and fertile land as good, and of tornados and disease and death as bad. But I think that when we do so, in nine cases out of ten, our "good" or "bad" is not a moral good or bad; they are predicates of utility, or sometimes æsthetic predicates, not moral predicates; and we recognise this in recognising their relativity: the fertile land is called good because its fertility makes it useful to man's primary needs; but the barren and rocky mountain may be better in the eyes of the tourist, though the farmer would call it bad land. There is an appreciation, a judgment of worth in the most general sense, in such experiences; but they are in most cases without the special feature of moral approbation or disapprobation.

There remains, however, the tenth case, in which the moral predicate does seem to be applied to the unconscious. One may instance J. S. Mill's passionate impeachment of the course of nature, in which "habitual injustice" and "nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another" are spoken of as "nature's everyday performances";<sup>1</sup> and, twenty years after the publication of Mill's essay, a similar indictment was brought by Professor Huxley against the Cosmic Process for its encouragement of selfishness and

<sup>1</sup> J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, pp. 35, 28.

ferocity.<sup>1</sup> These are only examples. Literature is full of similar reflexions on the indiscriminate slaughter wrought by the earthquake or the hurricane, and on the sight of the wicked flourishing or of the righteous begging his bread; and these reflexions find an echo in the experience of most men.

But the nature of this experience calls for remark.

In the first place, if we look more closely at the arguments of Mill or Huxley, we see that both are cases of criticism of a philosophical theory. Mill was refuting a view which he held (and rightly held) to have influence still on popular thought, though it might have ceased to be a living ethical theory—the doctrine that the standard of right and wrong was to be found in nature. It was in keeping with his purpose, therefore, to speak of the operations of nature as if they were properly the subject of moral praise or blame. In the same way, when Huxley wrote, the old doctrine which Mill regarded as philosophically extinct and only surviving as a popular error had been revived by the impetus which the theory of evolution had given to every branch of study; and Huxley was criticising the evolutionist ethics of Spencer and others who looked for moral guidance to the course of evolution. He, therefore, was led to speak of the cosmic process as a possible subject of moral predicates, not necessarily because he thought that application appropriate, but in order to demonstrate the hollowness of the ethics of evolution by showing that if the moral predicate could be applied at all, then the appropriate adjective would be not “good” but “bad.”

Perhaps there is more than this in Huxley; and Mill's expressions often betray a direct and genuine moral condemnation of the methods of nature as methods of wickedness; and, still more clearly, this immediate moral disapproval may be found in expressions of common experience as yet uncoloured by philosophy. But if we examine these we find that, while there is no reference to philosophical theories about nature, the things approved or condemned are yet

<sup>1</sup> T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics* (Romanes Lecture).

looked upon as implying consciousness.<sup>1</sup> In the lower stages of development this implication is simply animistic; at a later period it becomes theological. But, throughout experience, moral judgments upon nature are not passed upon mere nature. Its forces are regarded as expressing a purpose or mind; and it is this that is condemned or approved. The primitive man and the child do not merely condemn the misdoings of inanimate objects; they wreak their vengeance upon them or punish them; and this is a consequence of their animistic interpretation of natural forces. Gradually, in the mental growth of the child, this animistic interpretation of things gives place to an understanding of the natural laws of their working; and at the same time, and by the same degrees, the child ceases to inflict punishment upon the chair that has fallen on him or to condemn its misdemeanour. Here the moral judgment is displaced by the causal judgment; and the reason of its displacement is the disappearance of mind or purpose from amongst the phenomena. When the child comes to understand that the chair falls by "laws of nature" which are not the expression of will, like the acts done by himself or his companions, he ceases to disapprove or to resent, though he does not cease to feel pain or to improve the circumstances by setting the chair firmly on the floor. The recognition of natural causation as all that there is in the case leaves no room for the moral attitude. So true is this that the same result is sometimes thought to be a consequence of the scientific understanding even of what is called moral causation: "tout comprendre est tout pardonner"—as if knowledge of motive and circumstances were sufficient to dispense with praise or blame.

Moral judgments of a more mature kind on the constitution and course of nature form the material for optimistic and pessimistic views of the world—at least when these views rise above the assertion of a preponderance of pleasure or of pain in life. But, so far as I can see, in such moral judgments nature

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. 20 ff.

is never looked upon as consisting of dead mechanical sequences. It is because it is looked upon as the expression of a living will or as in some way—perhaps very vaguely conceived—animated by purpose or consciousness, that we regard it as morally good or evil. Apart from some such theological conception, it does not seem to me that the nature of things calls out the attitude of moral approval or disapproval. Things are estimated as useful for this or that end, they are seen and appreciated as beautiful or the reverse, without any reference to them as due to an inspiring or originating mind ; and in one or other of these references the terms “good” or “bad” may be used. But when we use the term good in its specifically moral signification, we do not apply it to the inanimate, except in a derivative way, on account of the relation in which these inanimate things stand to the moral ends and character of conscious beings.

So far, therefore, as the evidence of moral experience goes, it does not support the view that the “good” is a quality which belongs to things out of relation to self-conscious activity. And, in so far, the peculiarity of the moral experience would seem to be better brought out by the conception “ought” than by the conception “good.”

But here a difficulty arises at once. For how can we say that anything ought to be done or to be except on the assumption that it is antecedently good? Is not such antecedent and independent goodness necessary in order to justify the assertion that anyone ought to produce it?

The question undoubtedly points to a difficulty ; and if that difficulty can be solved it may help to bring out the true significance of the moral concept. The judgment which assigns the duty of an individual—according to which I or anyone ought to adopt a certain course of action—involves a special application of the moral concept. It binds the individual to a certain objective rule or end. The individual's desires as mere facts of experience may point in an altogether different direction ; the purpose or volition contemplated and

approved by the moral judgment has in view the union of individual striving with an end which is objective and, as objective, universal. This union involves an adaptation of two things which may fall asunder and which in every case of evil volition do fall asunder. And the adaptation may be regarded from either side: on the side of the individual, application to his individuality is implied; the duty of one man is not just the same as the duty of any other; he has his own special place and calling. But he is connected with a larger purpose which in his consciousness becomes both an ideal and a law, while its application is not limited to his individuality or his circumstances.

All this is implied in the moral judgment. It is not limited to one individual consciousness or volition. But it does not follow that the predicate "good," in the ethical meaning of the term, is or can be applied out of relation to consciousness altogether. At the earliest stages of moral development we find it applied unhesitatingly wherever conscious activity is supposed to be present—to anything that is regarded as the embodiment of spirit; and it is applied to the universe as a whole when the universe is thought of as the product of mind. "Good" is not even limited to an actual existent; it neither implies nor denies actual existence. "Such and such, if it existed, would be a good" is as legitimate, though not so primitive, an expression of the moral judgment as "this existent is good." But it does imply a relation to existence. It does not even seem possible to distinguish except verbally between "good" and "ought to be." And this "ought" seems to imply a reference to a purpose through which the idea is to be realised.

This conception "ought to be" is not the same as the concept "ought to be done by me." The latter is an application of the more general concept to a special individual in special circumstances; and this is the common meaning of the concept duty. The former is the more general concept of "goodness." It may be called objective, because it does

not refer to any individual state of mind; it is universal because independent of the judgments and desires of the individual; and when the goodness is not due to its tendency towards some further end, it may also be called absolute.

The point of the whole argument can thus be made clear if we bear in mind the familiar distinction between "good in itself" and "good for me now." That the latter has always a relation to consciousness is obvious: it is something to be done or experienced by me. But there must be some ground why anything is to be or ought to be done or experienced by me at any time. Present individual activity must rest upon or be connected with some wider or objective basis. What is good for me points to and depends upon something which is not merely relatively good, but good in itself or absolutely. Yet it does not follow that this good in itself is necessarily absolute in the sense of having significance apart altogether from consciousness. Its absoluteness consists in independence of individual consciousness or feeling, not in independence of consciousness altogether. It is objective, rather than absolute in the literal sense of the term. The good in itself, like the relative good, is an aspect which can only belong to a consciousness—to purpose. The moral judgment on things—either on the universe as a whole, or on anything in the universe which is not regarded as due to the will of man—is only justified if we regard these things as in some way expressing consciousness: either as directly due to it, or as aiding it, or as in conflict with it. From any other point of view to speak of things as good or evil (unless in some non-ethical sense of these terms) seems out of place, and is unsupported by the mode of application which belongs to the immediate judgments of the moral consciousness. If the moral concept has significance beyond the range of the feelings and desires of men, it is because the objects to which it applies are the expression of mind.

This is not put forward as a vindication of a spiritual Idealism. It is only a small contribution towards the meaning

of "good." A comprehensive Idealism may not be the only view of reality with which the conclusions reached so far will harmonise. But it is the view with which they harmonise most simply. The conception of a purpose to which all the events of the world are related is a form in which the essential feature of Idealism may be expressed; the view of this purpose as good makes the Idealism at the same time a moral interpretation of reality, and allows of our classing each distinguishable event as good or evil according as it tends to the furtherance or hindrance of that purpose.

This doctrine of the significance and application of the ethical concept would enable us to reach a definite view of the nature of Ethics and of the way in which it is related to the sciences and to metaphysics. The ethical concept is based upon the primary facts of the moral consciousness, just as scientific concepts have at their basis the facts of direct experience. The primary facts of the moral consciousness are themselves of the nature of judgment—they are approbations or disapprobations. But all facts of experience involve judgments, though these judgments may be only of the form "it is here," or "it is of this or that nature." Again, the primary ethical facts or judgments cannot be assumed to be of unquestionable validity: we sometimes approve what is not worthy of approval, or disapprove what ought to have been approved. Our moral judgments claim validity; and their claim is of the nature of an assertion, not that one simply feels in such and such a way, but that something ought or ought not to be. They imply an objective standard. But the objective standard, when more clearly understood, may modify or even reverse them. Our primary ethical judgments—all our ethical judgments, indeed—stand in need of revision and criticism; and they receive this revision and criticism in the course of the elaboration of the ethical concept and of its application to the worlds of fact and possibility. In the same way it may be contended that the direct judgments of experience upon which

science is based need criticism and correction: though their variation may be less in amount than the variation of moral judgments. The colour-blind man identifies red with green, and his judgment on this point has to be reversed; the hypersensitive subject often confuses images with percepts; exact observation needs a highly trained capacity. The correction and criticism which are needed come from objective standards; and these are the result of the comparison of many experiences and the work of many minds.

It is not otherwise in the case of Ethics. Criticism brings to light inconsistencies in the primary judgments of approbation and disapprobation, as well as in the later developments of the moral judgment. And these inconsistencies must be dealt with in a way similar to that in which we deal with inconsistencies in the judgments of perception and of science. The objective standard is not itself given once for all; it has to be formed by accumulation and comparison of moral experiences. Like the experiences on which science is based, these have to be made as far as possible harmonious, and analysis has to be employed to bring out the element of identity which often lurks behind apparent contradiction. They have also to be made as comprehensive as possible, so that they may be capable of application to all relevant facts, and that the scattered details of the moral consciousness may be welded into a harmonious system. In these general respects the criticism of ethical concepts proceeds upon the same lines as the criticism of scientific concepts. The difference lies in the concepts themselves, for ethics involves a point of view to which science must always remain a stranger.

W. R. SORLEY.

## THE TESTAMENTS OF THE XII. PATRIARCHS

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IN this article I propose to introduce the reader to a veritable romance in the region of ancient religious literature.

The Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs consist of the last commands of the twelve sons of Jacob, addressed to their children. Each patriarch gives a brief history of his life, in which he emphasises his particular virtue or vice. He next exhorts his children to emulate his virtues or shun his vices, and subjoins a number of ethical remarks on the virtues or vices in question. Finally, he deals prophetically with the destinies of his descendants, emphasising the premier rank of Levi and Judah, and foretelling the evils that would befall them if they attempted to disown the hegemony of Levi.

The Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs are first referred to by name and quoted by Origen. They are occasionally mentioned in catalogues of the sacred writings and by Church Councils up to the close of the sixth century. Then for six centuries they completely disappeared, and were not rediscovered till the middle of the thirteenth century. The account of this event is worth reproducing, as it is given by a contemporary chronicler, Matthew of Paris, in his *Historia Anglorum*, 1252. "At this time Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, . . . accurately translated the Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs from Greek into Latin. These had been for a long time unknown and hidden through the jealousy of the Jews, on

account of the prophecies of the Saviour contained in them. The Greeks, . . . who were the first to come to a knowledge of this document, translated it from Hebrew into Greek, and have kept it to themselves till our times. And neither in the time of the blessed Jerome, nor of any other holy interpreter, could the Christians gain an acquaintance with it, owing to the malice of the ancient Jews" (iv. 232). In the fifth volume of this work the chronicler recurs to this subject, and informs us how the Bishop of Lincoln got knowledge of this work through John de Basingstokes, who, while studying at Athens, had lighted on the Greek MS., and induced the Bishop to procure a copy of this work from Greece. From this MS., which is at present in the library of the University of Cambridge, a Latin translation was made by the aforesaid Bishop, with the help of a Greek named Nicolaus, of the Abbey of St Albans. This translation gained an immediate and widespread popularity, and from it, in course of time, translations were made into most of the languages of Europe.

The prophecies regarding Christ referred to by Matthew of Paris, and which he and the learned of his time took to be genuine Jewish prophecies of the Messiah, were in later times adduced as grounds for rejecting the Jewish authorship of the work, and ascribing it to a Jewish Christian writer of the second century A.D.

Since the Messianic prophecies in the Testaments have been the subject of prolonged controversies, and since any just comprehension of the book hinges on a right judgment as to their origin, we must turn for a brief space to their consideration.

First of all I will quote a few of these. In the Testament of Simeon (vii. 2) we find: "For the Lord shall raise up from Levi as it were a high priest, and from Judah as it were a king, God and man"; in vi. 5, 7: "The Lord—appearing on earth as man . . . God taking a body and eating with men." In Test. Levi xvi. 3: "Ye shall slay him as ye suppose, not knowing of his resurrection (?); in Test. Zeb. ix. 8: "Ye shall

see God in the fashion of man." That the above statements could not have sprung from any other than a Christian source is too obvious to need further comment. On the other hand, that the main body of the work could have been written by any other than a Jew of the Pharisaic school is likewise impossible. The main part of its statements, references, and allusions cannot be understood unless from a knowledge of the Talmud, Targums, and Midrashim, and the history of pre-Christian Judaism. The problem now before us is shortly: We have here a work of considerable extent, which, with the exception of a dozen or more of clauses, is thoroughly Jewish in thought and idiom. These clauses are of Christian origin, and spring, moreover, from conflicting Christological views: some of them speak of Christ as a mere man, others as the God-man, and others practically identify Him with the Father, as the Patripassians.

To account for these conflicting Jewish and Christian elements, Grabe (*Specil. Patr.*, 1714, i. 129-144, 335-374) suggested that the book was written by a Jew, and subsequently interpolated by a Christian. This hypothesis, however, was, for the time, so successfully combated by Corrodi (*Krit. Gesch. des Chiliasmus*, ii. 101-110) that most subsequent writers, such as Nitzsch, Lücke, Ritschl, Hilgenfeld, Dillmann, and Sinker have practically ignored the question of the integrity of the book, and confined themselves mainly to the discussion of its religious and national affinities.

To show the hopeless confusion into which criticism was plunged by rejecting the hypothesis of Grabe and pursuing a wrong method, we have only to observe that, while Nitzsch, Langen, and Sinker maintained the author to have been a Jewish Christian, Ritschl and Hilgenfeld averred that he was a Gentile Christian. Kayser dissented from both views, and derived the work from Ebionitic circles; and, strangest of all, we find Ritschl, in a later edition of his great work, abandoning his earlier contention and advocating a Nazarene authorship.

At last the criticism of the book was lifted out of the

region of fruitless logomachies by Schnapp in 1884, who revived Grabe's hypothesis of Christian interpolation, but developed it to rather illegitimate extremes. Recent research has notably confirmed Grabe's hypothesis; for Conybeare's collation of the Armenian version of the Testaments proves that, when the Armenian version was made, the Greek text was free from several of the Christian interpolations that now deface it. With the vast body of materials now in our possession in the Greek, Armenian, and Slavonic versions, and the Hebrew and Aramaic fragments, we are able to establish the fact that in the Testaments we have a Jewish book that was subsequently interpolated, not by one, but by a series of Christian scribes.

We have now to consider the question of the original language of the Testaments. Apart from Grabe, no notable scholar has advocated a Hebrew original till within the last decade. Even Grabe, though he declared for a Hebrew original, advanced no linguistic arguments in support of his contention. It is remarkable that such an eminent critic as Dillmann could write (Herzog, *Real Encyclopædie*, xii. 362): "Since the publication of Nitzsch's study all are agreed that the book is not a translation, but was originally written in Greek." The judgment of Dr Sinker of Cambridge is still more pronounced: "The Testaments in their present form were no doubt written in the Hellenistic Greek, in which we now possess them, presenting as they do none of the peculiar marks which characterise a version." On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that by his reproduction of the Cambridge MS. with collations from the Oxford, Vatican and Patmos MSS., Dr Sinker has rendered yeoman service to all students of this work. To two Jewish scholars, Kohler and Gaster, within the last ten years belongs the honour of reopening the question of the Hebrew origin of the Testaments. Only Gaster, however, has offered any linguistic evidence. But his article on this question, though it contains a few excellent points, failed to establish his thesis.

Stimulated by the remarks of Kohler on this subject, the present writer has for some years been making a special study of this question.<sup>1</sup> The results of this study will now be placed before the reader.

In the first place, Hebrew constructions and expressions are to be found on every page of the Greek text. That is, though the vocabulary is Greek, the idiom is frequently Hebraic, and foreign to the genius of the Greek language. This is not conclusive as to a Hebrew original; for the writer might have been a Jew translating and expressing his thoughts in Greek.

Secondly, paronomasiæ, or plays upon words, and proper names, which are lost in the Greek can frequently be restored by retranslation into Hebrew. Such plays on words are frequent throughout the Old Testament. But even the presence of these in a limited degree is possible in an original Greek work, if the author were a Jew and rendered into Greek the current etymologies of his people. But there is a third class of evidence, and, where this is found in an abundant degree, there can be no question as to the original being Hebrew. Thus, when we find, in the case of obscure or unintelligible passages, that the source of obscurity or unintelligibility in the Greek becomes clear on translation into Hebrew, we may with certainty conclude that our Greek text is a translation from the Hebrew.

Before dealing with illustrations, I would first observe that there are two recensions of the Greek text. Sometimes these agree word for word through whole sentences and paragraphs. At times they disagree in a single word or phrase or entire paragraph. Now, in the case of such disagreements we find that sometimes one text is obviously right and the other corrupt, and that by retranslation of the two into Hebrew we

<sup>1</sup> The present writer hopes within the next twelve months to publish, through the Oxford University Press, a critical edition of the Greek text, with the supplementary evidence of the Armenian and Slavonic versions and of the Hebrew and Aramaic fragments; and also a translation and commentary, through Messrs A. & C. Black.

understand at once how the mistranslation in the one case arose: or again both may be corrupt, and retranslation enables us to discover the original text underlying the corruptions. I will now give some examples. First, in the Test. Reub. (iv. 1) Reuben says to his children, according to one recension: "Expend your energies on good works and on learning" (*μοχθοῦντες ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν*); the second recension is here unintelligible: "Expend your energies on works and departing in learning" (*μοχθοῦντες ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἀποπλανώμενοι ἐν γράμμασιν*). If we translate both into Hebrew we see that the difference between them arose from reading *ישרים* (= *καλοῖς*) wrongly as *ישרים* (= *καὶ ἀποπλανώμενοι*), *i.e.* *וכרים*. Again, in Test. Levi. vi. 10 all the versions agree in describing the Shechemites as "forcibly carrying off the wives of strangers and banishing them." Now, the Hebrew word for "banish," *ידיחו*, means also "to seduce to idolatry." This suits the context. Again, in xiii. 5 we have the following couplet, according to the first recension:

Do righteousness, my sons, on earth,  
That you may be made sound in heaven.

For "may be made sound" the second recension has simply "may find." But neither yields any right sense. When retranslated, their Hebrew equivalents show that the true text, from which they each differ by a slight corruption, was probably:

Do righteousness, my sons, on earth,  
That you may have treasure in heaven.

In the Test. Jud. ii. 2 one recension reads: "I prepared it for my father and he ate"; the other: "I prepared food for my father." The difference arose in Hebrew by the transposition of two letters. Again, in iii. 3 of the same Test. Judah says: "I hurled a stone of sixty pounds and gave it to his horse and killed him." Here "gave" (*נתתי*) is unintelligible, but its equivalent in Hebrew differs but slightly from a word *בתתי*, which means "crushed," or from *הכיתי*, which means "smote." Thus, "I hurled a stone of sixty pounds and smote his horse and killed it."

Sometimes the translation of the true text and likewise that of its corruption are embodied in the Greek, as occurs occasionally in the LXX. A single instance will suffice. In Test. Napt. vi. 2 we have the following peculiar statement: "A ship came sailing along full of salt food without sailors." Here "full of salt food" = מְלֵיחַ or מְלֵחַ, which is simply a corruption of בְּלֵא מְלֵחַ = "without sailors."

I shall content myself with two more examples. In Test. Jud. xix. 2, Judah says, after his sin with Tamar: "Had not the prayers of my father run, I should have died childless." Here "had run" = נָרַץ, corrupt for נִרְצוּ = "had been accepted." In Test. Dan i. 4, Dan declares: "I confess that in my heart I rejoiced at the death of Joseph and I was glad that he was sold." This, of course, is nonsense. The nonsense is due to the intrusion of a single letter in the Hebrew. When removed, the text runs: "I confess that I had resolved on the death of Joseph and that I was glad that he was sold."

From these and many such restorations of the text we conclude that the original of the Testaments was written in Hebrew. This conclusion is in harmony with the fact that the Testaments are a sister work of the Book of Jubilees, and belong in the main to the same school of thought. Now, Jubilees was written in Hebrew by a Pharisee in the latter half of the second century B.C. We shall presently see that the Testaments belong to the same period.

The next point to which I would draw attention is that the book was written by a priest who was also a Pharisee; for it emphasises the distinctive doctrines which marked off the Pharisees from the Sadducean party.

Now that we have discovered that the Testaments were written in Hebrew by a Jew of the Pharisaic party, it will not be difficult to determine the date. Thus, Reuben (vi. 10, 11) admonishes his sons: "Draw ye near to Levi in humility of heart, that ye may receive the blessing from his mouth; . . . because the Lord hath chosen him to be king over all the nation." Here a high priest who is also king is re-

ferred to. Such a combination of offices naturally makes us think of the Maccabean priest-kings of the second century B.C. Moreover, the possibility of doubting this reference is excluded by the words that immediately follow: "And bow down before his seed; for on our behalf it shall die for you in wars visible and invisible." And again, in Test. Sim. v. 5: "Levi shall wage the wars of the Lord." Thus the high priest is not only high priest and civil ruler, but also a warrior. That the Maccabean priest-princes are here designed cannot be reasonably doubted. But if we pursue the references on this subject, further marks and tokens of this priestly dynasty come to light. Thus, it is said that this priesthood shall be called by a "new name" (Test. Lev. viii. 14). Now, the Maccabean high priests were the first Jewish priests to assume the title "priests of the Most High God." This title, anciently borne by Melchizedek (Gen. xiv. 18), was revived by the new holders of the high priesthood, when they displaced the Zadokite priesthood, the legitimate holders of the office. This title is found in Josephus, the Talmud, the Book of Jubilees, and the Assumption of Moses. A kindred title of the same significance appears also in the 110th Psalm, where the priest-king, taken by a growing number of expositors to be Simon the Maccabee, is addressed as a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek. In due accord with this, our text (Test. Lev. viii. 14) declares that this new name should mark a new priesthood.

These statements could be made of any of the Maccabean priest-kings in the latter half of the second century B.C., all of whom were pure in life, noble in character, and pre-eminent for their extraordinary gifts as high priests, civil rulers, and military commanders. To this new high priesthood, after deep misgivings on account of the break in the succession of the high priesthood, the Pharisees attached themselves, and remained the steadfast supporters of the Maccabees till nearly the close of the second century B.C., when the Maccabees joined the Sadducean party and became the active oppressors of the Pharisees. Of these Maccabees—the Maccabees of the first

century B.C.—it would be hard to speak in fitting terms. They were the basest of men. Their infamy is painted in lurid colours by contemporary writers. Indeed, it chanced that some of the interpolated sections in the Testaments contain a bitter invective against these degenerate scions of a great stock. Thus, in Test. Lev. xiv. 5 we read: “The offerings of the Lord shall ye rob, and from His portion shall ye steal, and before sacrificing to the Lord ye shall take the choicest parts and eat them contemptuously with harlots.” Josephus recounts this very fact of Alexander Jannæus.

From the above facts we see that our book, written as it was by a Pharisaic upholder of the Maccabees, must have been written some time between 153, when the office of the high priest was first assumed by Jonathan the Maccabee, and the closing years of the second century B.C., when the Maccabees abandoned the Pharisaic party and became Sadducees. But we can determine the date between closer limits. To one of the Maccabean high priests of this period prophetic gifts are assigned by our text (Test. Lev. viii. 15), in conjunction with the functions of kingship and priesthood. Now, in all Jewish history, from Moses to the Christian era, the triple offices of prophet, priest, and king were ascribed only to one man, *i.e.* John Hyrcanus. Josephus, both in his *Antiquities* and his *Wars of the Jews*, dwells on Hyrcanus' uniqueness in history in this respect. Even the Talmud acknowledges his prophetic gifts. Seeing, therefore, that the Testaments refer to John Hyrcanus, we conclude that they must have been written between 137 and 105 B.C. The discovery of the true date of the Testaments has transformed this work from being a mere literary curiosity of the second century A.D. into an historical document of first-class importance of the second century B.C.

The discussion of the date has brought before our notice a most remarkable though temporary revolution in Jewish belief. In studying the works of the second century B.C., the reader is struck by the all but entire absence of the figure of the Messiah descended from Judah. When this hope is expressed

it is practically without significance, and its belated appearances seem due mainly to literary reminiscence. And yet this century is far from being wanting in descriptions of the Messianic king; but his descent is no longer traced to Judah but to Levi. This expectation finds emphatic expression in the Testaments. How can such a novel expectation have arisen, an expectation so much at variance with all past prophecy? There can hardly be a doubt that it was owing to the descent of the great Maccabean family from Levi. Around the various members of that family everything that is noble and memorable in the Jewish history of the second century revolves. Is it a matter of wonder, therefore, that the zealous Jews, who were looking for the speedy advent of the kingdom of God, thought that this kingdom was to be introduced by the Maccabees, or even that the Messiah himself was to spring from that family? I cannot pursue this subject further here than to quote from the Testaments one of their noble Messianic hymns, the subject of which is the great Maccabean prince, John Hyrcanus, celebrated in Jewish history as at once prophet, priest, and king (Test. Lev. xviii.):

1. And after their punishment shall have come from the Lord the priesthood shall fail.
2. Then will the Lord raise up a new Priest,  
And to him all the words of the Lord shall be revealed;  
And he shall execute a righteous judgment upon earth for a multitude of days.
3. And his star shall arise in heaven as of a king,  
Lighting up the light of knowledge as the sun the day,  
And he shall be magnified in the world.
4. He shall shine forth as the sun on the earth,  
And shall remove all darkness from under heaven,  
And there shall be peace in all the earth.
5. The heavens shall exult in his days,  
And the earth shall rejoice because of him,  
And the angels of the glory of the presence of the Lord shall be glad in him.
6. The heavens shall be opened,  
And from the temple of glory shall come upon him sanctification  
With the Father's voice, as from Abraham to Isaac.

7. And the glory of the Most High shall be uttered over him,  
And the spirit of understanding and of sanctification shall rest upon him.
8. He shall entrust the majesty of the Lord to his sons in truth for  
evermore ;  
And there shall none succeed him for all generations, even for ever.
9. And in his priesthood shall sin come to an end,  
And the lawless shall cease to do evil.
10. And he shall open the gates of paradise,  
And shall remove the threatening sword against Adam.
11. And he shall give to the saints to eat of the tree of life  
And the spirit of holiness shall be on them.
12. And Beliar shall be bound by him,  
And he shall give power to his children to tread upon the evil spirits.
13. And the Lord shall rejoice in His children,  
And the Lord shall be well pleased in His beloved for ever.
14. Then shall Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob exult,  
And I will be glad, and all the saints shall clothe themselves with joy.

I will now deal shortly with three points : (i.) The use of the Testaments as a handbook of morals in the Jewish Church ; (ii.) The influence of the Testaments on the New Testament ; (iii.) Some prominent features of their ethical teaching.

(i.) The Testaments consist mainly of haggada, that is, of tales and homilies of an ethical character, in which Biblical stories are expanded and embellished. The Testaments are essentially an haggadic work, and treat from an edifying and homiletical standpoint the chief incidents in the lives of the sons of Jacob. Thus, for instance, in three of the Testaments the duty of chastity is enforced in connection with the stories of Joseph, Reuben, and Judah. Reuben and Judah tell at length the stories of their fall and make full confession, not seeking in aught to extenuate their guilt ; while Joseph narrates his temptations, but withal with so much unnecessary detail, and such a note of self-righteousness, that we cannot regard this amplification of the canonical record as anything but a failure. Now, I have drawn attention to these incidents because there are excellent grounds, as Kohler has pointed out, for believing that these very narratives in the Testaments are referred to in the Talmud (Sotah 7, Jer. Sota i. 16), which

directs that the president of the high court of justice, when trying a woman suspected of unchastity, should urge on her the duty of confession, and recite to her "words of the haggada, historical facts which occur in the early writings, as the story of Reuben regarding Bilhah and of Judah regarding Tamar." The interest of such a fact it is needless to urge.

(ii.) We now turn to their influence on New Testament writings. So long as the Testaments were regarded as a work of the second century A.D., their numerous coincidences with the diction of the New Testament were merely interpreted as due to their dependence on the New Testament. But when the chronological relations of these two books are reversed, the question at once becomes of no little importance. From a comparison of the Testaments with the New Testament, it becomes manifest that the former were known and used by several of the New Testament writers. In the short space at my disposal for this question, I can give you only the more obvious points of connection, and I shall confine myself mainly to those where the likeness is not only one of thought but of diction as well.

My first examples will be drawn from the Pauline Epistles. First of all, there is the well-known passage in 1 Thess. ii. 16: "Wrath hath come upon them to the uttermost," which is a word-for-word quotation from the Test. Lev. vi. 10. Next, Romans xii. 21, "Overcome evil with good," is the equivalent of Test. Benj. iv. 3, "By doing good he overcomes the evil." With Rom. xii. 19, "Avenge not yourselves, but leave room for God's wrath," compare Test. Gad. vi. 7, "Forgive him . . . and leave vengeance to God." With 2 Cor. vii. 10, "Godly sorrow worketh repentance unto salvation," compare Test. Gad v. 7, "A true godly sorrow . . . leadeth the mind to salvation." With 1 Tim. ii. 5, "One mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus," compare Test. Dan vi. 2, where Michael is described as the angel "who intercedeth for Israel, the mediator between God and man." With Eph. v. 6, "Let no man beguile you with vain words," compare Test. Naph. iii. 1, "Beguile not your souls through vain words."

With 1 Cor. vii. 5, "Defraud ye not one the other, except it be with consent for a season, that ye may give yourselves unto prayer," compare Test. Naph. viii. 8, "There is a season for a man to be with his wife, and there is a season to abstain with a view to prayer." With 2 Cor. vi. 14, 15, "What communion hath light with darkness, and what concord hath Christ with Beliar," compare Test. Lev. xix. 1, "Choose for yourselves light or darkness, the law of the Lord or the works of Beliar." With Phil. ii. 15, "Ye are seen as lights in the world," compare Test. Lev. xiv. 3, "Ye are the lights of Israel."

The following Pauline phrases are found also in the Testaments: "the God of peace," "the spirit of holiness," "singleness of heart," etc.

From the above evidence, which is not exhaustive, we conclude that St Paul knew and used the Testaments.

St James may have used the Testaments. Thus, with James i. 15, "Lust when it is conceived," compare Test. Benj. vii. 2, "The mind conceiveth through Belial." With iii. 10, "Out of the same mouth cometh blessing and cursing," compare Test. Benj. vi. 5, "The good mind hath not two tongues of blessing and cursing." With iv. 7, "Resist the devil and he will flee from you," compare Test. Sim. iii. 5, "If one flees unto the Lord the evil spirit runneth away from him," or Test. Iss. vii. 7, "Do these things and every spirit of Beliar will flee from you."

With 2 Peter ii. 3, "with feigned words," compare Test. Reub. iii. 5, "feigning words"; with ii. 4, "reserved unto judgment," compare Test. Reub. v. 5, "reserved unto eternal judgment"; with iii. 20, "defilements of the world," compare Test. Benj. viii. 3, "defilements of the earth." With Rev. vi. 1, "a door opened in heaven," compare Lev. v. 1, "he opened me the doors of heaven"; with Rev. ii. 7, "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life," compare Test. Lev. xviii. 12, "And he shall give to the saints to eat of the tree of life."

The Fourth Gospel has drawn upon our text in one notable passage. Thus, we can hardly help concluding that the famous words, "the true light that lighteth every man"

(i. 9), are based on Test. Lev. xiii. 4, "the light of the law that was given to lighten every man." We might observe that even the designation of Christ as "the Lamb of God" is not without a parallel in Test. Joseph xix. 3, where the Messiah is called a lamb, or a lamb without spot. In the latter passage, however, the associations of the word are quite different from those in the Gospel. From St Luke x. 19 might be adduced the following remarkable parallel: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents . . . and all the power of the enemy." With this compare Test. Lev. xviii. 3, "He shall give power to his children to tread upon the evil spirits." Again, with ii. 19, "Mary kept all these things, pondering them in her heart," compare Test. Levi vi. 2, where, after seeing a vision, Levi says: "And I kept these things in my heart," and after a second vision, in viii. 19, "And I concealed this in my heart and told it to no man." With the last clause we might compare Luke ix. 36, "And they told no man in those days any of the things which they had seen."

Turning now to St Matthew, we find one or two remarkable parallels, and these parallels occur in the words of our Lord. With Matt. vi. 19, 20, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth, . . . but lay up your treasures in heaven," compare Test. Lev. xiii. 5:

Do righteousness, my children, on earth,  
That you may have treasure in heaven.

With both passages we might compare the words which the Talmud assigns to a Gentile king who lived about 10 A.D.: "My fathers laid up their treasures on earth: I lay them up in heaven." In Matt. vi. 22 it is said, "If thine eye be single thy whole body is full of light." In Test. Iss. iii. 4 Issachar declares, "I slandered none, I hated none as I walked in singleness of eye."

I shall conclude this section by showing that the great doctrine of forgiveness as taught by our Lord was in part the same with and in part a development of that taught in the Test. Gad vi. 3-7, which runs as follows: "Love ye one

another from the heart, and if a man sin against thee, cast forth the poison of hatred and speak peaceably to him, and retain not guile in thy soul. And if he admit his offence and repent, forgive him." With this let us compare Luke xvii. 3, "If thy brother sin, rebuke him: and if he repent, forgive him"; and Matt. xviii. 15, "If thy brother sin against thee, go show him his fault between thee and him alone: if he hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother." So far the parallel is perfect in thought, and so close in diction that it is hard to suppose our Lord to have been unacquainted with our text. For the meaning of forgiveness in both cases is the highest and noblest known to us—namely, the restoring the offender to communion with us, which he had forfeited through his offence. This is the essence of the doctrine of divine forgiveness—God's restoration of us to communion with Him—a communion from which our sin had exiled us. I confess that until I had studied this passage in the Testaments I had regarded our Lord's teaching in this matter as unique.

But though our author regards forgiveness in the full sense as restoration to communion, he is well aware that this is often impossible. Thus forgiveness comes often to be synonymous with banishing the personal feeling of resentment which arises within us when we suffer a wrong, and which, if indulged, leads to hate. And again, "If a man seek to injure you, do him a good turn and pray to God for him, and so the evil will be removed from your heart." And again (vi. 7), "But if a man persists in his wrongdoing, even so forgive him from the heart, and leave to God the avenging." We thus see that our author had not only risen above the vulgar error of identifying forgiveness with the remission of penalties, but that he had come to distinguish between the different forms that true forgiveness essentially assumes in certain cases.

From the Testaments' doctrine of forgiveness, we naturally pass to their teaching on other ethical questions. But we can only touch on a few of these scattered utterances.

(iii.) Their warnings against hatred are very emphatic. "Hatred is an evil thing, for it constantly mates with lying" (Test. Gad v. 1) "It is blind also: no wrathful man can truly discern any person" (Test. Dan ii. 2). The duty of self-mastery is inculcated: "If any man speak against you, do not be moved to anger: if you are commended as good men, do not be uplifted. Do not be carried away either by self-complacency or dissatisfaction" (Test. Dan iv. 3). Envy is to be overcome, for it is (Test. Sim. iii. 2) apt to dominate the whole mind of man. It suffers him neither to eat nor to drink nor to do any good thing. So long as he that is envied flourishes, he that envies him pines away. Deliverance from envy comes from the fear of God. Thereby a man's mind is relieved of its burden, and he can sympathise with him whom he envied, and join hands with his well-wishers. Envy is provoked by the prosperity of others. Wherefore, exhorts our teacher here, "if a man is prospered beyond you, do not be grieved, but pray for him that his prosperity may be perfected" (Test. Gad vii. 1).

I may fitly close our short study of this work with its noble glorification of wisdom (Levi xiii. 3 *sqq.*):

3. Everyone that knoweth the law of God shall be honoured  
And shall not be a stranger whithersoever he goeth.
4. Yea, many friends shall he gain more than his parents,  
And many men shall desire to serve him  
And to hear the law from his mouth.
7. Get wisdom with diligence in the fear of the Lord :  
For though there be a leading into captivity  
And cities and lands be destroyed  
And gold and silver and every possession perish,  
The wisdom of the wise can nothing despoil him of,  
Save the blindness of ungodliness and the callousness that comes of sin.
8. For even among his enemies shall wisdom be a glory to him,  
And in a strange country it shall be a fatherland,  
And in the midst of personal foes shall prove a friend.

R. H. CHARLES.

## THE HISTORICAL JESUS AND THE CHRIST OF EXPERIENCE.

### “ROMANUS.”

I. THE simple Christian and the religious philosopher, or, to revert to an earlier terminology, the Pistic and the Gnostic, are alike apt to overlook the part played by the imagination in belief. The one leaves out of account the fact that conceptions which are identical in our mind are so often by association rather than coincidence; the other, dealing with these conceptions in the abstract, forgets that, while abstract for thought, their existence is conditioned and concrete; and is surprised to find that his speculations are suspect in the eyes of the community, which regards them as a danger to faith. “Novelty is often error to those who are unprepared for it, from the refraction with which it enters into their conceptions,” says Cardinal Newman. Nor is it only in the older Churches that such misgivings are entertained. An eminent Scottish divine, Dr John Ker, while confident of the ultimate, looked with anxiety to the near future of religion. “I dread the middle passage: ‘they feared, as they entered in the cloud.’”

The results of the critical study of the Old Testament have been to a great extent assimilated by the Churches. They are felt, on the one hand, to be inevitable; and, on the other, the subject-matter with which they deal is remote. With the New Testament it is otherwise. Here the critical position, in fact equally inevitable, is resisted, because it is held to be incompatible with Christian belief. It is a true instinct which

leads the Christian community to reject conclusions, however plausible, which make faith impossible; for faith is a faculty which, like a natural appetite, postulates its object; though this object may be, and often is, other than we conceive it. But it is an equally true instinct which leads the student to refuse to play fast and loose with fact in the interest of theory. No fact, he knows, is at variance with another fact; the universe is large enough to contain and justify them all.

A fear exists in many quarters that the criticism to which the Gospel narrative has been subjected should obscure, on the one hand, the figure of the historical Jesus, and, on the other, the relation in which this figure stands to the Christ of religious experience. The two questions are distinct, and should be kept apart. The testimony of the Gospels to their central Figure is one thing; the relation of this Figure to the Christ of Christian experience another; and the difficulty of defining this relation is not appreciably affected by the greater or less clearness with which the Jesus of history is conceived. The oldest of the creeds marks at once the distinction between and the oneness of the conceptions: *and in Jesus Christ*—here we have the historical—*His only Son our Lord*—here the religious Christ. The one belongs to external, the other to internal experience. With regard to the latter, the existence of its object cannot be assumed; nor, supposing it to exist, can its relation to the Jesus of the Synoptics be inferred from history. Spiritual things are compared with spiritual, and spiritually discerned.

The original bridge between the two notions was the conviction borne in upon the disciples that the Jesus who had died on Calvary was not, and could not be, dead. This, rather than its symbol, the empty grave, was the assurance of the first Easter.

“Mors et vita duello confluxere mirando :  
Dux vitæ mortuus regnat vivus.”

Seen in this new perspective, life and death were no longer contradictories. The hard and fast line between them was

replaced by a borderland which, partaking of each, was neither: it was, as you viewed it, luminous shadow or shadowed light. Here faith begins. Seek it, O artist, O thinker, O Christian! for it is the home of beauty, of reality, of life. We too, if we will, may attain to this conviction. The consciousness of Christ is the other side of our self-consciousness: and now as of old, in the sacred page as in His visible ministry, Jesus elicits from those who approach Him the confession, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God." Till we can unite these positions, the two Christs, the historical and the experienced, are separate forms, each losing something of His significance. When we have done so, they are one: before and behind us the horizon opens; "the veil is done away in Christ."

In *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* Professor Bousset sums up concisely the bearing of New Testament criticism on our knowledge of the Founder of Christianity. In form an answer to Kalthoff's paradoxical, if brilliant, *Entstehung des Christentums*—an attempt to account for Christianity without Jesus—the book possesses positive as well as negative value. It meets Kalthoff's hypothesis less by direct refutation than by placing the facts in their proper light and setting; so placed they speak for themselves. It is natural that the question should be asked. The Christian reads the Gospels from the standpoint of Christianity, and not only of Christianity, but of the Christianity of his particular place and time. As long as he confines himself to this standpoint no great difficulties arise.

"Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque;  
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua."

It is inevitable, however, that he should go beyond it; the standpoint in question, indeed, by inner necessity passes over into its other. To complain of this is to complain of the order of things of which we form part, and in which we find ourselves; as well complain of the law of gravitation, or of our inability to fly. Study and reflection reveal contradictions

and lacunæ in the narrative; in vain do we endeavour to reconcile the several accounts of the institution of the Eucharist or of the date of the Passion, the various versions of the Beatitudes or of the Lord's Prayer. The questions suggested, but left unanswered, are many. Why did Jesus conceal His Messianic mission? Why did He go up to Jerusalem? Why did Judas betray Him? Why was He condemned? Again, His sayings are known to us only in a translation; the Aramaic original is lost. Above all, the idea of compiling a biography was foreign to the Evangelists, even to the Synoptics; their purpose was to proclaim the Gospel, not to reproduce the life, of Christ. There is no attempt at a chronology; St Mark, whose Gospel represents the earliest narrative, written or unwritten, gives us the scantiest and most fragmentary accounts of the surroundings of Jesus, His home, His parents, His time. The Logia are, as they stand, the creation of the Christian community; a structure raised by Christians on the foundation of certain sayings attributed by tradition to Christ. Hence an open door for interpretation, paraphrase, tendency-writing. "Der Glaube ist der Feind der Geschichte." Not only do the genuine sayings of Jesus lose their *Augenblickscharakter*, by being taken out of their environment and stereotyped, but the authenticity of the whole becomes doubtful; He is reported as saying what it was thought fitting that He should say, not what He actually said.

Such difficulties, formidable as they may appear, assume sufficiently modest proportions when faced. They proceed mainly from a wrong orientation. Once rid ourselves of the idea that the Evangelists intended to give us what we understand by history, that they reported the sayings of Jesus *verbatim*, like a shorthand writer, and the position is changed. It is not the position which we thought we occupied, but it is adequate to our needs, and—what the former was not—impregnable. The record, considered as a record, is imperfect; to many questions regarding it and Him who is its object the

only answer open to us is, I do not know. But knowledge as such is not our part; and, for the rest, criticism heals the wounds which it has inflicted. If it opens our eyes to the strata of tradition which lie between us and the historical Jesus, it also enables us to penetrate them, and touch the underlying fact. In passages—such, *e.g.*, as Matt. xvi. 23, xxiv. 36; Mark iii. 21, 31–35, x. 18; John xiv. 28—which on the face of them run counter to later belief we light upon the granite of history. The words of the Saviour stand out unmistakably from the didactic setting in which they are embedded, and reveal Him. The wonders of His divine life, remaining indeed wonders, become credible when subjected to an analysis which separates alloy from pure metal, report from reality, form from fact. Nor, searching as it is, is this analysis arbitrary; “we”—not the individual apart, but now, as of old, the Christian community—“we have the mind of Christ.” Let us gather up the fragments that remain; they will suffice us. “*Jérusalem est sortie plus brillante et plus belle du travail en apparence destructeur de la science moderne. Les pieux récits dont on a bercé notre enfance sont devenus, grace à une saine interprétation, de hautes vérités: et c’est à nous qui voyons Israël dans sa réelle beauté, c’est à nous autres critiques qu’il appartient vraiment de dire—‘Stantes erant pedes nostri in atriis tuis, Jerusalem.’*”

II. To pass from the Synoptics and the Acts to the Epistles of St Paul, or the Pauline and Joannine writings, is to enter another hemisphere; new constellations have risen on the horizon, the old have disappeared. The central fact is no longer the message but the Person of Jesus; His relation to the Father; His cosmological significance; the mysterious efficacy of His death. Theology has taken the place of faith; philosophy of religion that of the Gospel; Christology, soteriology, anthropology have come in upon us like a flood. The transition was inevitable. The facts of consciousness, in themselves immediate, come before us in the time-and-place setting provided by our environment. They transcend

this setting, but they are conditioned by it: "the Divine Light never descends unclothed." The consciousness of Jesus and of the first generation of Palestinian believers was Messianic; the belief in the Parousia was the nearest approach to a dogma in the Apostolic community. With new conditions and surroundings a new setting came, and it is a testimony to the fidelity of the Synoptic writers that the traces of this setting are so scanty, that the distinction between the new and the old is so marked. Profound must have been the impression left on the community by the Person of Jesus to account for this; for the idea of historical accuracy was foreign, as has been said, to the Evangelists. The extension of Christianity among the Jews of the Diaspora gave rise to theology; the breakdown of the belief in the Parousia to the organisation of the community into a Church. The religious experience of the Galilean peasants who had lived under the influence of the immediate presence of Jesus had been cast in moulds inadequate to that of later Christians—men less simple, less direct, further from the Person of the Master, in contact with the larger world. This found expression in forms borrowed from Greek speculation and Alexandrian theosophy—forms now outworn, but then living and vigorous. The Logos theory, the conception of Christ's pre-existence, of the relation of His Essence to that of the Father, of His union with a particular human nature, of the manner in which this union was effected, of His marvellous entry into and departure from the world—all this was new; the original followers of Jesus would have recognised neither the formula nor the thought. But, as applied to dogma, true and false are unmeaning epithets; dogma is, rather, a suitable or an unsuitable vehicle of the idea—and this idea, varying as is its setting, is the same yesterday and to-day and for ever: the manifestation of God in Christ.

"God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." That this was so is, from the nature of the case, incapable of logical proof or disproof: the proposition in so far as it can be

proved, in a larger sense of the word, must prove itself. "I believe in God as long as you do not prove Him to me," said a philosopher; the so-called Evidences of Christianity, at least in our time, tend rather to disbelief than to belief. A spiritual religion, Christianity cannot with impunity take other than spiritual ground: to fall back upon the letter is to break with the law of its being; this is, having "begun in the Spirit," to be "perfected in the flesh." With the best intention, that of making faith accessible, theologians have resolved Christianity into a series of propositions deduced one from another, each fitted into its proper place as in a puzzle, and furnished with its appropriate proof. Vain effort! The letter killeth; the words of Jesus are spirit and life. We cannot make faith easier than He has made it; the attempt to do so recoils upon us: it is "another Gospel, which is not another," a turning back to the "weak and beggarly elements" to which, by some evil fascination, men desire "to be in bondage over again." The faith that saves is an experience, not the conclusion of a syllogism. But it is an experience not of an elect few, but of mankind. In measure, in intensity, it differs: "there are diversities of gifts." But none is excluded, none can exclude himself, from the common heritage: the light "lighteth every man coming into the world,"

It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the history of Christianity is the history of a long, though happily only partially successful, endeavour to get away from the teaching of Christ. The little company of believers, men full of the Spirit, waiting for the daily expected coming of the Lord, became a World-Church, stereotyped and self-sufficing; a net containing good and bad alike. Hence a certain arrest of life-process. The liquid fire cooled down and crystallised, the water of life congealed. But it was a winter frost, not a glacial epoch; beneath the lava crust the fires burned as ever, under the ice the river ran. Nor may we condemn unreservedly the limitations, permitted or self-imposed, by which the free working of the Spirit was hindered: a lesser evil may

be a relative good. There is scarcely a heresy that cannot justify itself by an appeal to antiquity. The inference is not that the appeal to antiquity is mischievous, but that it is an insufficient reason for separation from the community, which is guided by other than antiquarian considerations. In vain do we look for Catholicism, hierarchical, sacramental, dogmatic, in the Gospels or in the first age of Christianity; it is not there. It is growth, though a very early growth, not the original; a growth produced by the change, the greatest and most far-reaching that the Church has experienced in her long history, from the Christianity of the Apostolic to that of the post-Apostolic age. This is not to say that the change was arbitrary, or that the system as it stands has no claim upon us. The English laws of to-day are not those of the Confessor; but it is the former, not the latter, that are in possession, and to which our obedience is due. Again, in judging the formulas of the past we have to consider them not as abstract, not as they appear to the average man, ill-informed and loosely thinking, of to-day; but as concrete, in the light of the circumstances under which they were framed, and in relation to their opposites. Thus the focus is changed, and the burden of subscription lightened, whether the document to which assent is demanded be the Westminster Confession, the Thirty-nine Articles, or the Creed of Pius IV. The Nicene watchword, *e.g.*, has ceased to have an obvious meaning for us; we no longer think in the manner that it presupposes. But the fourth century was not the twentieth. The Arian formula, more consistent with primitive usage and even belief than the Athanasian, would have passed over too easily into the *ψίλος ἄνθρωπος* negation: the self-identity of Christian teaching was preserved by change. So, to go further back, St Paul with a touch of scorn answers the cavils of smaller men who appealed against the liberty of the Gospel to the example and the words of Christ (2 Corinthians v. 16-17). There is a faith in the past which is infidelity to the present. "Alexandrinismus ist allemal das Ende jeder Geistesrichtung, die keine

Kraft in sich fühlt, sich offen zum Werdenden zu bekennen, und den schaffenden Geisten der Zeit zu vermählen."

The error lay not in the change, but in the stereotyping of the change: "one good custom" may "corrupt the world." "All that turned into abuse was at first successful and convenient, and met some need," says Bishop Creighton (*Life*, ii. 62), speaking of mediæval corruptions. "What was done for practical utility became a basis of speculative ingenuity." The penitential system of the early Church was an improvement on the harsher discipline of the first age which Novatian would have perpetuated, but it became an anachronism, a narrowing of the Gospel, and passed away. Roman was an improvement on Byzantine Christianity; yet Rome, unchanging as she boasts herself, is changing and will change. It is survival, not change, that is hurtful; but this bondage to the past is of our own making; the Gospel is free. Once, no doubt, dogma was a help to faith; now, for many, it has become a hindrance, a mist falling between us and the sun. Scholastic formulas are often stones of stumbling. Or, like the graveclothes of Lazarus, they cramp and fetter: "loose him, and let him go." It is probable, to go back to the question of evidences, that in their time the arguments of the Apologists, the dialectic of the Schoolmen, and the "proofs" of later evidential writers were aids to conviction. They did not bestow faith—only God can do this—but they removed obstacles to faith. Now, for many of us, they create these obstacles. If so, let us leave them behind us, fixing our eyes on that which is loftier, diviner, than they. But to pass beyond the symbol is not to lose hold on the thing symbolised. If theologians, smitten with the disease of system, have taken shadow for substance, we need not, because we see that it is shadow and shadow only, forget that there is no shadow without substance: this remains, picture it to ourselves as we will. "Oh! comme nous nous torturons l'esprit à plaisir en cherchant dans ces grandes choses le petit équilibre logique où s'ajustent provisoirement nos petites idées!"

III. The position which resolves faith in Christ into a fact of internal experience will be met by the question, How is this experience related to that realised in the non-Christian religions, or in religious consciousness untouched by creed? The difference between the two, it may be answered, while not unimportant, is rather one of form than of substance. The former is contained potentially in the latter; the act of redemption is co-extensive with humanity; the Spirit of Christ is larger than the Churches of Christ. There are implicit as well as explicit Christians; the Christian religion, St Augustine well says, has been in the world from its beginning, though it has only been called Christian since the coming of Christ in the flesh. This is the significance of the cosmological Christ of St Paul, and of the Joannine Logos speculation: "the living God is the Saviour of all men, specially"—not solely—"of them that believe." Whether a man belongs to a Christian Church, or to which of the many Churches he belongs, is not necessarily indifferent, but a thing decided, generally speaking, by circumstances—time, place, heredity, temperament: men are led by many ways to one goal.

The religious consciousness takes two distinct forms as it realises more vividly the nearness or the remoteness of God. In the one case it sees in Him a Father; in the other a Judge: in the former it goes to Him direct, relying on a Father's love and the kinship of spirit with spirit; in the latter, conscious of offence, it fears an angry Deity, and seeks for mediation between itself and Him. Each standpoint has its strong and its weak points. The one, while discerning more truly the relation between God and man, is apt to make little of sin, and to be "at ease in Zion"; the other, while reading human nature as it is more accurately, makes God in the likeness of man. It substitutes an arbitrary Dualism for the Divine harmony of the universe; and, forgetting the emphatic "I commanded it not, neither came it into my mind," of the prophet (Jeremiah vii. 31), allies itself with evil shapes of

darkness as intermediaries between man and the God who "is not far from each one of us," in whom "we live, and move, and are." If Christianity, interpreted by theologians from St Paul to Luther, has leant to this misconception of God, it has at least replaced many mediators by One Mediator, a material by a spiritual sacrifice. Nor, one-sided as it is, is this interpretation of consciousness without its justification. Wernle speaks of the sense of sin in its acute form as a *Krankheitssymptom*; and the phrase, harsh and even repellent as it is, contains a truth. But if they that are whole need not a physician, the sick are the majority; and the mission of religion is universal, the ministry of Christ is for all.

The Gospel unites the two positions. The written record which contains it is regulative; it restrains at once the one-sidedness of piety and the extravagance of speculation. Hence its permanent value; it is a touchstone by which we discriminate the false in religion from the true. Proclaiming the nearness of God, it recognises the estrangement of man. By birth a son, he is in "a far country"; he must rise and go to the Father's house. The conditions of return are easy; the belief involved in it is simple and instinctive. "He that cometh unto God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him." To which may not the Church, taught by the Spirit, add the words placed by the author of the Fourth Gospel in the mouth of Jesus?—"I am the way, the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father but by me."

"ROMANUS."

## THE RELIGION OF ROME—CLASSICAL AND CHRISTIAN.

M. A. R. TUKER.

WHEN we think of Rome as the cradle of more than one civilisation, we should also recollect that the Roman has matured two great religions: the religion of ancient Rome and the religion of Western Christendom. Not that we can think of the Roman as a religious people, in the sense in which the Asiatic has always been and remains to this day religious, the sense in which the Hebrew or the sense in which the Egyptian was religious. The Roman never had either the imaginative philosophy which produced the religion of Greece, nor the metaphysical mysticism which made the Hindu faiths. He had in fact in common with the Hebrew, whom he was so totally unlike, a complete absence of the metaphysical temper, of mysticism, of asceticism; and, like the Hebrew, he did not apply any richness of imagination to religion. What he had was a genius for bringing the other world to the support of this, and what he created was the conception of religion as *piety to the State*; and it is in this form that religion survives in the sympathies and the sentiment of the Roman people. In the pagan world this State was secular, in the Christian world this State is the Catholic Church; but in both cases the spiritual came to the support of the temporal—ancient Rome deified the State by making it the subject of the Roman piety; Christian Rome moulded religion into a citizenship, and the Church became a *civitas*. *Civis romanus*

*sum*, "I am a Roman citizen," has never ceased to be the all-embracing formula of Roman orthodoxy.

The original Roman theogony was Etruscan. Behind the veil were the three great gods, the shrouded gods, answering to the Jove, Juno, and Minerva (*Menrva*) of later times. Round them were their "Senate," the twelve gods and goddesses known to the Romans as the *Dii consentes*; and everywhere was the great Latin cult of Vesta, the cult of the hearth. But when Rome was built its first king made of these elements the Roman religion: Numa, as a matter of fact, appears to have been the Roman Moses, and to have led his people forth, not to the worship of their one tribal god who was above all gods, God and Lord, the unique divine realisation of the Hebrew people, to become the root of the monotheism of the Western world, but to the worship of a unit which made of the State the family, of the commonwealth the family's hearth. It was, perhaps, his genius which made the Hearth-divinity preside over the little polity and confuse and identify for ever the pieties of the home with the pieties of citizenship. It is these two elements—the theological unit of Judæa and the political unit of Latium—which, meeting in Rome in the age of Claudius, created the religion of the West. Not once but twice had the Romans come and wrested the sceptre from Judæa; under Titus, and again in the Roman organisation of Christianity *venerunt Romani et tulerunt eorum locum et gentem*.

We see, then, that the Roman religion was never a great imaginative creation, but was always a great statecraft; and that Roman religion began to be Roman statecraft when Numa identified the affections and the piety of the hearth with the affections and the piety of the *respublica*, and made the State the social unit. The original ingredients of Roman religion, however, had nothing to do with statecraft; they were the ingredients of nature-worship, the ingredients brought by a pastoral people. At the source was a reverence for natural things; and old Latin paganism had the peace which belongs

to the pastoral life, and to the religion which is founded on the careful observance of potent rites disturbed as yet by no speculative questionings. But it was not free of the gloom of nature-worship—the obverse side of nature-cult—fearful, suspicious, weighted with destiny, as one imagines the religion of Etruria to have been. It is much later in its history that Rome was captivated by Greek religion and transferred to its crude impersonal gods the brilliant divine personifications of an imaginative people. The Latin had never been familiar with his gods, perhaps because they always remained impersonal abstractions, gods who did not use human speech, but whose language was the lightning-bolt of Jupiter and the wave-lashing triad of Neptune. Into what had really always been impersonal, the Greek came infusing warm human life, making the gods speak the language of men, and inviting men to speak to them in their own tongue. Greek religion was subtler, more individual, freer, more joyous than Latin. The pious customs which constituted the earlier Latin religion had begotten a sense of obligation in the worshipper, but it was conscience as the response to an external stimulus; and the peace it brought was a formal peace, *ex opere operato*, not a peace brought home to the individual conscience face to face with the Divine. It is because conscience implies more of individualism than ever entered into Roman religion that Roman religion has always remained without it. It was only in the jaded period of the later empire that the Romans turned altogether from the simple, natural, large elements of the religion of their soil to the fantastic, emotional, and complex cults of Isis and Mithras. The simple religion of the field and the hearth, of natural law, of orderliness and decorum, of a piety provoking and sustaining a sense of *what was owed* to the gods, to the dead, to that State which incarnated the religion of the gods, fell away on the eve of Christianity before the foreign novelties of Greece and Egypt, better suited to the luxuriousness of mind and the growing introspection of a people who had undergone

the influence of Greek thought as something indeed always alien to their nature, yet necessary to their place in the world.

When Peter's successors planted a Judaic sect on the ruins of this paganism they had only to follow the genius of Numa's religion in the creation of the Catholic Church—the *civitas Dei*. Here, we may feel, an essential element of the new religion—the idea of the kingdom of God—came naturally to supplant the older State religion; and the conception of the nation as a family was eminently germane to the fraternal maxims which grouped round the idea of the *ecclesia*. But as old Rome had not stopped to inquire concerning small things, so it had never penetrated to interior things, and the kingdom of God translated into the language of Rome lost in the process all its interior characters. What was delicate and subtle had never entered into Roman religion, but neither had what was petty, extravagant, or indecorous. Religion was no delicate aroma, but a concrete duty; not an individual choice, nor an individual necessity, nor an individual attraction, but a public rite, a public piety, a public decorum; and these characteristics, as we shall see, inhere in Roman religion to-day.

It is in its liturgy that the mind or, if one may call it so, the temperament of the Roman Church found an ample and worthy expression; and it is in what it lacked as much as in what it put forward that the genius of the Roman rite is seen to differ entirely from that which presided at the making of the mass in every other part of Christendom. The effusion, the imagery, and the gracious parts added from Gaul, the mysticism of the Oriental, the philosophy of Greece, the Northern inwardness and intimacy, contributed nothing to it. Like Roman religion itself, it was not a creation of the imagination or the intellect, nor the outcome of devotional sentiment; it was the creation of the Christian polity clothing its religious data, its religious certitudes, in a becoming garment—giving them a form, expression, a public characterisation. If there was no effusion there was largeness; in place of tenderness

there was disengaged from the formal stately public act a perfect liberty of spirit. All through it was the public act itself which justified and consecrated, which was the sanction of the reality the criterion of the fitness of worship. Here, besides, *sacramenta* were not mere signs nor *symbola* mere figures—they were stately vehicles of universal realities, always and everywhere adequate, worthy, co-ordinating, effectual. Roman ritual was quite bare of those things which in England and France are thought ritualistic; its only ritual consisted in the so-called “manual acts,” that is, in the things which had to be done; those very things which the Eastern Church removed from the sight of the congregation, creating “ritual” as a superfluous symbolism to engage the attention of the people. But the Roman dealt in real things, not imagery; nakedly setting forth his *sancta* in the dry light of a realism which had no reticence joined to a great reticence of the emotions. This was the temperament of all Roman religion, pagan and Christian, a persistent rejection of all that could be described as unctuous, a setting forth of worship as a great public piety which justified itself. Unlike the Greek whose god must be behind a curtain, the Roman required the divine to be recognised, always and everywhere, in the *respublica*, in the act which had public sanction, public significance, public utility. The deacons come to the holy table bearing a cloth; one stands at one end and throws the roll across to the deacon at the other end; the oblations of the people are manipulated before the assembly; the wine collected in small phials is poured into a large chalice, repoured into a bowl; the pontiff collects the oblation bread, so do the priests, while acolytes stand at the side holding cloths to receive it; and the same things, not rites but familiar usages, are repeated at the Communion, when bishop and deacons again pour, mix, distribute, wash and put away the holy things and the sacred vessels in the presence and with the assistance of the people of God. Here was nothing “common or unclean”; it was the wisdom of Roman ritual justified of her children.

It will be seen at once how widely different was such a conception of worship from that elaborated in the East or from that which we owe to the vague awe, the dreadful sense of mystery, of the middle age. If we compare the Roman basilica with a Greek or Gothic church this difference is immediately sensible. The former owed nothing to mystery, to dimness. The celebrant faced the people, as he still faces them in all true basilicas; he did not turn his back on them. No early building, indeed, was flooded with light while glazing was in a crude state and wind and weather had to be kept at bay; but the Christian basilica was not darker than other buildings, there was no religious twilight. And as we see it to-day in *Santa Sabina*, *Santa Maria in Cosmedin*, *Santa Maria in Domnica*, *SS. Nereo e Achilleo*, *Santa Maria Maggiore*, or in the ruined basilicas of *Santa Domitilla* and *San Stefano*, so it was centuries ago—flooding the mysteries with what light there was because it was the church of a people who cared for no mysteries which could not bear the light. Nevertheless, the simple realism of the Roman ritual by no means meant, for him who could see, the absence of mysticity. Rather it recalled one to the suggestive and sane mysticity which inheres in all common things, in all common uses. Whether the somewhat rugged Roman, with his inattention to small matters and to the unobvious, saw the mysticity of the early Christian service and the early Christian basilica, may be doubted; but though it is certain he had not set himself to create this mysticity it is equally certain that he could not banish it from his churches.

Italian religion is not the same thing as Roman religion. Rome has not been “the most religious city in the world” because it felt religion more than those nations and provinces whose religious character differed so profoundly from its own, but because it was able to institute it on a scale as universal as its own imperialism. The Neapolitan has the superstition and poetry, the emotional impressionism, of the genuine South; but such a repulsive scene as the peasant, upheld by his friends, licking his way to the altar along the filthy church floor, could

not be witnessed in Rome. It would be difficult to imagine a Roman wishing to be exorcised after putting his head into the English or American church to see the stained glass windows. The "Roman of Rome" leaves such things, together with the swallowing of pious-text pills, to the unrestrained fervour of some of our English Catholics. The Roman has less religious passion and also much less abandonment to the external than the Southerner or even the Englishman. Rome has had—with one illustrious exception—no great saints since the sixth century; she has been evangelised by saintly visitors from Sweden, from Tuscany, from Siena, as the primitive Church had been edified by the itinerant Gospel visitors called "prophets." From Lombardy, Venice and Umbria, from Parma, Ancona, Florence, Pisa, Naples and the Abruzzi—saints, seers, missionaries, mystics, reformers, have brought her their message; but the terrible proverb *Roma veduta fede perduta* records the impression she has often made on visitors less elect than these. Not Rome but Venice counts as the "devout city" of Italy, and the well-known story of the Jew who became a Christian on the ground that no religion could have survived Roman corruption unless it were divine, was told me in Rome by a prelate as an encouraging episode.

It was said by Matthew Arnold that the Latin people never cared enough for Christianity to reform it; they never thought it worth while, it is true, to break with the Church to find Christianity. The Italian, moreover, had none of the things which made the Puritan—not his fierce dogmatism, the Judaic strain of his piety, his dread of the external, his contentment with doctrinal formulas. Joined to an indubitable attachment to Catholicism—the magic of which inspired the art even of men who did not believe it—the Italian had also too keen an intuition of the real religious issues (as we understand them to-day) to exchange ecclesiastical tradition for Biblical dogmatism. Christianity was for him much more of a self-justifying religious tradition and much less of a dogmatism than

it was for the Protestant. The Christianity which the Italian would have liked was the Christianity of S. Francis, familiar, meek, tolerant, a genuine discipleship; and it did not irk him to add to this the forms of Catholicism. Like the Reformers, the Italian of the sixteenth century knew little of Church history, but his instinct was on the side of reintegration rather than disintegration of the religious forces enshrining the Christian revelation. The earlier Italian religious movements were almost entirely, like that of the seraphic *frate*, on the side of informing historical Christianity with the new spirit of Christ. A great horror of the ways of Rome, never echoed by the Romans, did nevertheless penetrate religious Italy, and few people realise that it was among the Franciscans, not among the reformers, that papal Rome was first branded as the "scarlet woman," the unclean Babylon of the Apocalypse.

Has Protestantism the evangelic marks which the Italian, consciously or unconsciously, lays down for Christianity? And what chance would Protestantism have in Italy? It will bear repeating that the Puritan's definition of Christianity would never at any time have found acceptance with the Italian; he never could have cared for reform in doctrine and discipline which did not necessarily, did not primarily, involve a real evangelic reform. When one remembers how very little Protestantism was, in its inception, on the side of dogmatic freedom, and that it put a theological formula before all other matters of the law, one may admit that the Italian, though he did not reform, may yet have loved true Christianity. In the next place, the intense individualism of Protestant worship is distasteful to the Italian who, as we have already realised, does not ask or require that subordination of the society to the individual which religious subdivisions imply, and he would always be repelled by the phenomena of revivalism. It is instructive for us to realise that such things are stigmatised as "buffoonery" by the Italians, whose own elaborate ritual often appears to suggest that description to the Protestant. In the third place, he dislikes

the *réclame* of Protestantism, its self-advertisement, the distribution of tracts at church doors and in the public streets. To his mind no religion worthy of the name can have need of such support. The Sister of Charity and the *frate* indeed appear familiarly among them in their strange dress, not as they, yet part of themselves, reminding the people of the great ideals of their religion, tracts in their own persons but making no *réclame*.

Indeed, the way in which all external expression is regarded by the Italian differs radically from the way in which it presents itself to the Anglo-Saxon and the Teuton. Wagner declared that as soon as the German is called on to be artistic he becomes a buffoon. We in England, also, do not know how to express ourselves by means of external symbols; but the Italian experiences no such difficulty. We are not at home with them; he is. If we use them we exaggerate; he gives them their true proportion and place. He can always be taught by his senses, and he is not, as we are, deluded by them. We, in fine, do not know what to do with the external; he does. His sense of humour is active just where the Englishman's is quiescent; he is not capable, for example, of laying store by this or that little bit of ceremony. The evangelicalism of the Italian, therefore, which one hopes he may some day achieve, will be unlike Anglo-Saxon Christianity—as the catacombs are unlike a "Little Bethel"—he will always require gracious surroundings, he will always ask for the arts to assist his imagination, and prefer fine music, and even the perfume of incense, to the bids for his soul made by the preacher. That is his reticence, and as it differs from the Anglo-Saxon's the latter does not understand it. The Italian will always best respond to a service conceived in the spirit of the mass, with its mystical renewal enacted before his eyes, at once exterior and interior, public and intimate; but with no individualistic note, no dependence on the personal element. On the other hand, its "respectability" of English Church religion would be as little tolerated among Italians as the

*réclame* of sheer Protestantism. There is absolutely nothing answering in the Italian temperament to that pride and pleasure in the respectability of church and chapel going which is so potent a factor in England. The sects which proselytise in Rome are the American Methodists, Baptists, and Wesleyans; many of the better educated preferring to all these the native Waldensian Church. One of the chief attractions of what I have called sheer Protestantism lies in its familiarity as compared with the stiff and terrible "respectability" of the English Church. But this is precisely where Italian Catholicism has itself never failed, and the Catholic in Italy is already accustomed to familiar and simple relations with priest, monk, and friar—to a complete democracy of sentiment. I was recently motioned to a vacant seat by a dignified French ecclesiastic who was giving out the usual notices from the altar after the Gospel of the mass; a Latin priest will notify the congregation by a gesture when he is about to preach and they can sit down; even an English Catholic priest I know of turns to the people before beginning the Christmas midnight mass to wish them and theirs a happy and blessed festival. These fraternal familiarities do not lack in the Non-conformist chapels, but they would most certainly be deemed out of place and not quite decorous in the English Church. Latin simplicity and human interest, the brotherhood of class, oppose themselves here to English self-consciousness, English inflexibility, the Puritan sense of propriety; and no one can have lived in Italy without seeing instances multiplied in all ranks of the clergy of that familiarity without loss of dignity to which we have not the key. Another thing little understood in England is that the Italian is not "priest-ridden"; he does not depend upon or run after the priest, and the attitude which the priest in Ireland and the minister in Scotland have been able to assume towards the people would never have been possible in Italy. The Roman, more especially, has never ceased to let his satire play upon popes and cardinals, and has known how to do so without scorning dogma and discipline.

The *bigotte* is not an Italian type, and is disliked and distrusted, in either sex, when met. The Roman peasant trudging into the city on Sunday morning halts at the big church of S. Paul in the Via Nazionale, enters, and walks up to the top. A verger at once points out to him his place in the house of God—for this is the American Episcopal Church—and he returns to the door: he was uncertain about the church, but he is quite certain now—this is not Latin Christianity. But if the Italian comes to London another surprise is in store for him; he goes to the Catholic church and finds he must take a ticket for his footing there—and, often, he goes no more; he has not sufficient threepences and sixpences; he does not mind being poor, but he does not think it very fitting to label you from the start as a threepenny Catholic or a sixpenny Catholic.

These things show that certain qualities of Italian Catholicism—its familiarity, its independence (for the Italian has greater liberty of spirit though the Anglo-Saxon has greater liberty of conscience)—are the outcome of the Latin spirit and can only be enjoyed where this has sway. It has most influence in Italy and least in Germany. In the city which inherits the sour persecuting spirit of Westphalia, for example, Catholicism is a very different thing from what it is in the land of its birth. There the faithful are a regiment—human automata—standing up and kneeling down with the uniformity of clockwork; everyone who enters is suspected, everyone who stands at the door creates scandal, the priests are quæstors and their vergers are lictors. Such things certainly have their compensations for the Teutonic and even the Anglo-Saxon mind—but how different they are from the tolerant liberty of the *domus Dei* in Italy which is, by the same title, the house of the people, with all that familiarity of spirit loved by S. Francis, that utter freedom from self-righteousness! Twice in the course of twelve years, in my personal knowledge, visitors to Cologne Cathedral, in both cases women and Catholics, were assaulted by the beadle in charge and hustled by physical force out of the building, their

innocent desire having been to enter the chapel where they supposed the reserved sacrament to be. The Englishman is no bully, and he does not easily feel that desire to assault which possesses the Teutonic official; moreover, if there is one thing he understands it is political liberty—but I may venture on a rough guess that the vergers of some of our cathedrals—St Paul's not excepted—have the making of a Cologne beadle in their souls.

The question of racial religious characteristics apparently resolves itself into one of compensations. For those who think that Catholicism decorated with the notes of Puritanism, with the sour Teutonic or the dour Spanish accompaniments to religion, or with the florid sentimentalism of the Gaul, loses its birthright, Italian Catholicism will always retain its primacy: but they must bid good-bye in Italy to memories of religious recollection and mysticity, to the beauties and sedateness possible among an interior people who are not wooed by the senses; the beauty of holiness will have to be pictured through a mist of dirt, ignorant superstition, and slovenliness, but not athwart the haze of bigotry, cant, and self-gratulation.

The Roman skeleton of religion has been clothed upon by other races, who have filled in, expanded, and added those things which fitted Christianity for reception among more complex and introspective or more devout natures; but in the eternal city itself, from the catacombs to a solemn mass in S. Peter's, the religion of Latium and the religion of imperial Rome have set their indelible seal on Christianity. The familiar pastoral figure of Christ with his crook in catacomb frescoes, carrying a pail, the milk of the Eucharist, has its primitive counterpart in the shepherd's god Lupercus, "driver away of wolves," whose worship was celebrated in *Roma Quadrata* by the original settlers, clad in their goat-skins, who offered him milk as a libation. But he who said *Ego sum pastor bonus* is gathering the sheep (and the goats), not driving away the wolves, and he is giving the food which is himself to them, not asking it of them. The Person of Christ had

introduced as much of the intimate and personal as Roman religion was capable of assimilating ; but the moral implications of this personality—after the first brilliant epoch of the planting of the faith, with its consciousness of the Person of Christ and its realisation of the moral uses of the eucharist—were never really appropriated by Rome. Again, the master of ceremonies at papal mass prompts the pontiff at each stage of the function as did his predecessors for Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius when they too officiated as *pontifex maximus*. The very chairs of the bishops in Rome (where no bishop save the pope or a cardinal in his titular church sits on a throne) are the *curule* chairs of the Roman magistrates. Nay, more mysterious still are the roots of sacred things in Latin soil, for the Roman pontiffs were to adopt that Etruscan pontifical system in which both civil and ecclesiastical functions were vested in the *Lucomones*. Though Greek theology twice enriched Latin religion, pagan and Christian, nowhere is religion less Greek and more Roman than in Rome. It may be said to be the distinctive feature of Christianity that it is a preaching religion ; in France and in England it is more a preaching religion than in Italy, but it is least of all a preaching religion in Rome ; and so it has always been. There is no pulpit in the Roman basilica. In the eternal city as elsewhere Christianity in its inception was a Jewish sect ; it rose there as elsewhere among the “Jews of the dispersion,” and certain Hebrew things, lections, chants, and exposition of the Scriptures, at once took their place in its public worship. But Rome has, here also, preserved less of the Judaic strain of piety than any other Christian Church. The Roman has blotted out the Hebrew element.

At the founts of the Roman and the Hebrew story we come indeed upon one mysterious link—the history of each people begins in a fratricide. As Cain slays Abel so Remus is slain by Romulus, but there the likeness ends ; there is no reproach in the Roman story—“the voice of thy brother’s blood” cries out through the whole course of Hebrew history.

The act of Romulus founded what was most precious to the Roman, his kingdom of God on earth—the Roman state, the Roman polity; the act of Cain awoke what lay at the source of Jewish theocracy, the persuasion of sin and of righteousness, the kingdom based on the conscience. Neither has ever been able to enter freely into the sentiment of the other. Romulus is a hero, Cain is outcast humanity; but the temple to Romulus still evokes more response in Rome than the moral considerations connected with Abel.

It is the *pax romana*, the peace of the Roman empire, which was actually established as “the Peace of the Church.” The peace, juridical or religious, of a world which acknowledged the sway of Rome. Without were barbarians and heretics; within was the *civis romanus*. It was a peace consistent with all war save internecine, and Rome, whether political or religious, created in the world it conquered the ambition to live and die united to the greatest of earthly entities—to live and die, as catacomb epitaphs to orthodox strangers dying in Rome record, *in pace*. The Roman citizenship becomes the Catholic citizenship through the mediation of the apostle who could say “but I am a Roman born,” while setting forth imperially a Palestinian sect to the Gentile world. The stranger Roman citizen who dies in Rome for Christ links two worlds with his blood, dedicates that new *imperium* where Rome may claim that all homage is paid *et mihi et Petro*, confounds those two things which the Master of the Gospel “of the kingdom” had set apart, the things of Cæsar and the things of God.

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ROME.

## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### M. LOISY'S TYPE OF CATHOLICISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1904, p. 126: January 1905, p. 376.)

#### I.

It is painfully difficult to speak in small compass about the rich thinkings on the deepest subjects of a man still alive but tongue-tied. Yet both Professor Gardner and "Romanus" seem to have so imperfectly appreciated M. Loisy's meaning on certain important points, that I should like, unprompted, unaided, unrevised by my close friend, to briefly restate what I think him to have equivalently said.

As to "Romanus," amidst excellent remarks that, surely, presuppose another philosophy, he in places obscures or misses the specific character of M. Loisy's position—the living combination of two convictions, each with a physiognomy of its own. M. Loisy holds the critical method to apply to the historical attestations and phenomena of religion, in the same manner as it does to other kinds of history. At this level "the distinction is" indeed "not between Protestant and Catholic, but between those who know and those who do not." And he is possessed by the believer's conviction that the Roman Catholic Church, in a specific manner and degree, holds and helps to produce in us, in varying depths and successive forms, the true spiritual reality and meaning underlying that phenomenal history. "L'Église est la conscience collective et permanente du Christianisme vivant"; "son histoire est celle de l'Évangile dans le monde." She is thus certainly more than "mankind viewed from the religious standpoint"; nor is it "a thing indifferent, that the eternal Gospel takes the form of Catholicism or Protestantism." Here even the least gracious of Professor Gardner's strictures involve a truer apprehension. For if M. Loisy has indeed not discussed the relations of the Roman Church to the other Christian bodies, he has, whilst insisting upon the historico-critical method and materials, as common to all men of education; upon a stock of religious devotedness and experience, as common to all religious souls and corporations, and, in greater depth and extent, to Christian ones; and upon certain intellectual virtues and

achievements amongst many Protestant scholars as models for ourselves—everywhere implied, and often affirmed, certain real religious advantages, gifts and claims of the Roman Catholic Church, as above and upon all other bodies.

Now, I take Professor Gardner to be instantly nettled by any such pretensions, when professed by an educated Western, in face of all the Christian devotedness readily observable in the large non-Roman Christian bodies energising under our very eyes. But has he considered M. Loisy's impressive asides concerning our common coming difficulties—our ultimate attitude towards those non-Christian four-fifths of the human race? Here too, whilst gladly learning from the sincerity, the common convictions, and even the developments which, in some directions, may well be in advance of the Christian, we shall no doubt discover, as compared with the Christian fifth, not an endless variety of ultimate equivalents, but a real difference of central religious worth. But if so, then to claim a lesser precedence for the substance of Catholicism, over other Christian bodies which are far less preponderant in Christendom than non-Christians preponderate in the world at large, is not *a priori* unreasonable.

And, on perhaps his deepest general point, I am, with Professors Holtzmann and Troeltsch, persuaded that M. Loisy is simply right. "The truth and force of tradition consists in the insight, that primitive Christianity, as attested in the New Testament, does not directly stand for Christianity itself, but only for one, although indeed the most original, of its forms and presentations." "The formula for the essence of Christianity cannot be a simple concept—say, the Divine Sonship, or the Religion of the Spirit. It must be a complex idea,—the special Christian form of the fundamental conceptions simultaneously present in all religion. . . . Not that which, for the consciousness of any one stage, stands in the foreground, but the germinal, expansive element contained within that consciousness, is the essence and its continuum." Only at such depths can M. Loisy be apprehended justly. "Early Christian history," says Professor Gardner, "cannot be handed over to historical science, while early Christian doctrine is received on faith." This assumes history, philosophy, faith, to be all on the same level. Yet we distinguish between and combine neurology, and belief in a spiritual soul; evolution, and faith in a creative Intelligence: indeed, this discipline brings a virile depth to our convictions.

"One cannot first accept an authority and then prescribe its limits." No. But one can take seriously that authority's fundamental axioms: that grace and doctrine indeed require *some* nature and history, but cannot exact *a priori* just so much of both: for both are assumed to be naturally, historically given and provable.

"Why does M. Loisy allow Rome to silence him?" many ask. Because for him Rome has, religiously, more to give and more to receive than any other religious body throughout the world.

## II.

IF I reply briefly to some of the remarks of "Romanus" and Baron von Hügel on the views expressed in my paper with the above heading, I do so in no controversial mood. Since M. Loisy has been silenced by authority, and since everyone must feel the pathos of his position, criticism is disarmed. Yet his books are current in the religious world, and one must make account of them. And his attitude is one which must interest every Christian: his problems are the problems of all of us.

I have read the paper of "Romanus" with care, and it leaves me in perplexity. Romanus boldly states what are the thoughts of M. Loisy; but if one turns the pages of *Autour d'un petit livre* one finds on every page statements of quite another cast. Now, it is clear that M. Loisy must be judged rather from his own writings than from the statements of his friends. His style is singularly clear. And in my article I cited his words, or literal translations of them, in almost every case in which I attributed an opinion to him. Again, when "Romanus" asserts that *L'Évangile et l'Église* is not controversial, one has but to turn the pages of the book to find controversy everywhere. And when "Romanus" says that, "applied to the critical movement in theology, the antithesis of Catholic and Protestant is out of place," that may be the view of "Romanus" himself, but it is not the view expressed by M. Loisy. I need not repeat what is written at p. 128 of my paper as to M. Loisy's attitude of fixed hostility towards Protestantism. It is quite impossible to accept "Romanus" as an exponent of M. Loisy's views, in face of his own words.

It appears to me to be a question of great interest whether it is possible for the authorities of the Roman Church to accept the methods and results of historic criticism, while still claiming for that Church infallibility in questions of faith and morals. M. Loisy apparently thinks that it is possible; and here, to my great regret, I feel myself obliged to accept the view of his opponents. Conceivably the Roman Church might tolerate some degree of freedom in Biblical criticism, but could she extend that liberty to the interpretation of early Church history? This is a matter on which one desires light; but neither "Romanus" nor Baron von Hügel gives it.

The growth of the historic spirit causes difficulties in all branches of the Church; and perhaps theoretically the difficulties are as great in the case of the Anglican as in that of the Roman Church. But there is the essential difference that the one is comparatively free, the other subject to a rigid and highly organised despotism. If clergymen in the Anglican Church take a broad view, they may be abused, but they cannot, if they have courage, be silenced. It is obvious how different things are in the Church of Rome; and Anglicans, looking with sympathy on the painful position of men like M. Loisy, find it difficult to realise that these sufferings are

inevitable. Of course, if the sufferers really believed that the Roman Church had exclusive claims, their duty to it would be clear. "Romanus" tells us that M. Loisy has put forward no such claims for the Roman Church; but he does not expressly say that M. Loisy does not *allow* such claims. And to the readers of *L'Évangile et l'Église* it will appear that in fact he does allow them. "Romanus" tells us what are the motives which keep many dissatisfied Romanists in their Church. "Catholicism produces in its adherents a certain aristocratic temper, founded half on fact, half on sentiment. Protestantism does not suggest itself to them as a possible alternative; they know nothing of it, and are not attracted by it; they simply pass it by." One can easily understand this frame of mind; it is precisely the attitude of many Anglicans towards dissent. It is an attitude very natural to the natural man. But I do not understand "Romanus" to assert that such motives sway the leaders of the Liberal movement. I am sure that the reasons which impose silence on M. Loisy at a time of crisis like the present are of a very different, and a more religious, order.

Baron von Hügel says that M. Loisy's view is that the Roman Church possesses certain religious advantages and gifts above other bodies. There I suppose all reasonable men would agree with M. Loisy. In the same way, Anglicans and Wesleyans and other bodies have some religious advantages over each other and over the Roman Church. If they had not, they would not have such strong vitality. If the Roman Church were always as moderate as this in her claims, she would make no enemies,—and no converts.

"Romanus" asks if I would have the Romanist Liberals come out of their Church. It is a question which I shall not venture to answer. If they see any hope of liberalising the Roman Church from within, I can well understand their clinging to her. But is this possible? One would like to think so; but the voice of history seems to speak to the contrary. The growth of the historic spirit is as fatal to the idea of an infallible Pope, or even an infallible Church, as it is to the idea of an infallible Book.

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### THE VIRGIN BIRTH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904, p. 461.)

THERE is one question asked by Sir Oliver Lodge in his excellent article on "The Re-interpretation of Christian Doctrine" to which I should like to suggest a reply. He asks, "What is the good of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth? Can a divine spirit not enter into a man born of two parents?"

No complete reply can be attempted in the short space that alone I can ask for; nor, I fear, can even the brief suggestion I am venturing to

attempt be likely to be acceptable to minds to which no world but this is real.

However, my suggestion is as follows. We all are born into this world of two parents; and, although we cannot fully explain why it should be so, we do invariably find that (emerging from the dual birth into consciousness) we carry through it with us no recollection of the state from which we came. The great power of Christ as the Redeemer of the race arose from the fact that He did not through the act of birth fall into a like loss of recollection. To Him, the Father was no mere object of faith. There have been men of robust faith since Christ lived, but none who had quite the power He had, because the unseen was to them a faith, and not a direct cognition. Faith has its periods of ebb and flow; at times it is clearer and fuller, and at times weak and dim. For faith is the (to us transcendent) fact perceived by intuition, and not by direct cognition. There had been men of faith before Christ, as well as since; surely what the world wanted was one who could speak from *knowledge*.

Therefore I can readily see the scientific necessity of a difference in process of birth between the Redeemer of the world and all the rest of mankind. Had He been born as we are, He, like us, would have awaked to a consciousness in which was no direct cognition of spiritual verities.

Our Lord never spoke of His knowledge of the Father and of spiritual verities as "faith." He bade others believe, because He knew that to man, born of father and mother, nothing but faith is possible. So completely does this process of birth immesh us in the veil of the flesh that spiritual realities can be but dimly discerned within us, and do not lie naked and open. The organs of spiritual discernment are there, indeed, but latent, embryonic, and few are at pains to develop them even to a slight extent. So it becomes hard for us to trust this dim intuition against the clear cognitions of the external faculties. But if One has visited earth, Who could call Himself "the Son of Man who is in heaven," and if what He declared to be the eternal verities are in harmony with what our dim intuition indicates to us, the very highest degree of confirmation results; and we are emboldened to act fearlessly on what we feel rather than on what we see.

If it be asked, how do we know that birth apart from the intervention of a human father results in the possession of "open vision"? I can only reply that a difference in the process must produce a difference in the result. There is no doubt that the "male" element is likely to result in conveying to the child a nature wherein the divine spirit is more deeply buried under passional impulses, and more closed to spiritual perception.

The requirements in our Lord's case were: (1) enough of our earthly nature to make Him visible and audible to the eyes and ears of ordinary men; but (2) not enough to close Him as completely as we are closed to spiritual perception.

GEORGE W. ALLEN.

## REVIEWS

*Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses.*—By Henry Sidgwick.—  
Macmillan & Co., 1904.

IN spite of the fact that most of them have been published before, the editors have done a service in bringing together these papers. More than the other posthumous publications, they enlarge our conception of the writer, and are likely to endear the memory of the man. They fall, as the editors point out, into three groups—literary, sociological, and educational, separated from one another by various intervals of time, from the essay on *de Tocqueville* in 1861, to that upon *The Relation of Ethics to Sociology* in 1899, and including subjects so various as *Shakespeare and the Romantic Drama*, *Bentham and Benthamism*, and *Idle Fellowships*.

As the second of these divisions is by far the largest, and is likely to be of the greatest interest to readers of the *Hibbert Journal*, this notice confines itself chiefly to the sociology of the volume. There is, however, one exception. In the above grouping the modesty of the Prefatory Note has concealed the theological interest which attaches to the first three of the literary essays, and especially to the first, and which justifies a somewhat fuller reference to them in these pages.

The essay on *Ecce Homo* reminds us of the stir that Seeley's anonymous work was making in 1866. Like the book, the criticism was anonymous, and, by the freedom, boldness, and vivacity of the style in which it is written, suggests the advantages of that method of reviewing. It shows the influence that Strauss and the views of the advanced school of criticism had upon the mind of the reviewer. It is the absence of any clear understanding of the positive contribution of this school to New Testament criticism that he marks as the fundamental defect of the book. It is this, he thinks, that forces us to rank it as an historical essay "very low," and "leaves us with an uneasy feeling that even what we admire in it may prove unsound when closely tested." What he finds admirable in it, I need not say, is the exposition of the chief principle and supreme rule in the ethics of Jesus. But even here he has little difficulty in showing that Seeley's picture of Christ issuing an "edict of comprehension" from the Mount, making morality for the first time positive and universal,

discovering in the love of man a new continent in the moral globe, is drawn from our point of view, not from the point of view of a true historical criticism. We feel, as he says, that "if Jesus planted, Jean Jacques and Comte have watered." In an interesting passage he shows that while, of course, the doctrine of love holds a prominent place in the Synoptic Gospels, faith is more prominent still, and that Jesus would probably have reversed Paul's estimate of *πίστις* and *ἀγάπη*, in support of which he notes that while the word *ἀγάπη* occurs only twice in the Synoptics, it occurs over a hundred times in the other books of the New Testament. Nor is the result of Christ's teaching properly described as the creation of a positive morality. What He really effected was the internalising and universalisation of what had been too external and limited. Yet even here much was only implicit in His teaching. While the simplicity and grandeur of the conception He formed of man and his position and value in the universe are undoubted, the evolution of this conception was gradual, and was not completed at His death. It was left to St Paul to see what was involved in it with reference to the old dispensation and the universality of the Gospel message. The writer is at his best in bringing home this criticism from the side of Seeley's treatment of the attitude of Jesus to the Scribes and Pharisees, where the determination to acknowledge no growth and development in the mind of the Master betrays him into a caricature of the psychology of bigotry and legalism, all the more dangerous because of the universal application he assigns to it. There is a fine liberality and penetration characteristic of Sidgwick, combined with an enthusiasm he does not often permit himself, in the passage beginning "We have not so learned Christ; it is not thus we would be filled with His spirit."

The same spirit of broad-minded humanity, combined with critical penetration, is manifest in the essay on the *Prophet of Culture*. He shows that, in his antithesis of culture and religion, Matthew Arnold has failed to probe either to the bottom, and thus to give any real help in what Sidgwick calls the profoundest problem of ethics, the union of the sweetness and light of culture with the fire and strength of religion. He gives his own ideal of their relation finely as "the union of the golden and the silver sides of the famous shield, each leading to the same 'orb'd perfection' of actions and results, but shining with a diverse splendour in the light of its different principle." The source of this failure in Arnold he finds in a lack of just the culture which he proclaims. Hence his insensibility to the finer side of dissent, "the feeling that worship ought to be the true expression of the convictions on which it is based and out of which it grows," a feeling that is often combined with a passion for unity. Instead of bringing to the problem of nonconformity the instinct "which will guide him round the lacunæ of apprehension that the limits of his nature and leisure have rendered inevitable," he judges religious differences as a dog judges human beings, by his scent. There is the same want of insight in his treatment of action in general. There is a

temperance in action as in other things—a need to temper enthusiasm with renouncement. But those who realise most clearly what social action means, the mass of disagreeable and mechanical details that have to be faced in the effort to influence dull or careless or bigoted people for the sake of ideal ends, will be the least likely to offend the simplicity of its inner spirit by unsympathetic criticism. In a word, the culture that Arnold advocated was itself a species of Philistinism, without any eye for “the sap of progress, the creative and active element of things,” or “the instinct that can see beauty in the stage of becoming.”

In the last of these semi-theological essays the author finds a more congenial subject in Clough, the humane poetical sceptic who found not even Philistinism alien to him. Clough was the poet of sceptical moods in ethics, æsthetics, and religion that were typical of his generation. How far in acting in and on society is the soul free to adopt courses repugnant to its own ideal? What are Love and Desire? whence come they?

“From subtle airs around,  
Or from the vulgar ground?”

What, above all, is our religious faith? A tale that is told in the night—

“A rumour, changeful, vague, importunate, and loud,”

or the voice of an inner reality of which the outward fact is only the symbol? Sidgwick calls these the moods of his youth, and hints that in outgrowing them Clough outgrew his inspiration. The present generation, familiar with the application of the theory of evolution to religious and social phenomena, has come to realise more clearly the distinction between origin in time and significance for life, and is more likely to recognise the irrelevancy of criticism of the letter to the vitality of religious faith. Perhaps this is the reason why it has somewhat outgrown its interest in poetry of this kind. But it is not likely to outgrow its interest in the form of solution that Clough discovered for himself, and indicated in the prose essay *The Religious Tradition*, which is here quoted. Where, he asks, is this to be sought? Not in churches and creeds, but everywhere “in life, in action, in submission, so far as action goes, in service, in experiment, in patience, in confidence . . . everywhere among all who have really tried to order their lives by the highest action of the reasonable and spiritual will.”

The fourth and fifth essays are more purely literary. We pass from the last of them on *Shakespeare and the Romantic Drama* to the first of the sociological papers on *Bentham and Benthamism*, in something of the spirit in which we might pass from a mountain glen to a penitentiary. Fortunately, the essay is largely on Bentham's personality, a subject on which it is not easy for anyone, least of all for Sidgwick, to be dull. The ethical interest of this paper centres in the view of the posthumous *Deontology*, which the contradiction between the serene optimism of that work and the bitter pessimism of the *Constitutional Code* seemed to Sidgwick

at this period to force upon us. The doctrines that it is demonstrably the interest of kings and aristocracies to govern well, and that it is demonstrably certain they will never think so, he at that time regarded as an impossible combination even in a philosopher. As we are reminded in the note on p. 374, Sidgwick afterwards changed his view on this subject, holding that the assumption of the *Deontology* that vice may be defined as miscalculation of chances is necessary to reconcile the two doctrines that Bentham undoubtedly held:—(1) That his own greatest happiness is the proper object of the individual; (2) that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the plain but true standard of right and wrong.

The other sociological essays to which we now come are chiefly occupied with the discussion of three important closely connected questions—the present position and prospects of Political Economy, Socialism, and the place of the new Science of Sociology.

That upon the *Scope and Method of Economic Science* is a general defence of the main English tradition against the criticism of the historical school. It has never been an article *stantis an cadentis scientiæ* in England, Sidgwick maintains, as it was among the French physiocrats, that *laissez faire* led necessarily to the justest distribution. It is truer to say that, to the English economists from Adam Smith downwards, the maxim of *laissez faire* had, as Cairns put it, no scientific basis, but was a mere handy rule of practice, and that it was pessimism rather than optimism as to its working, that was to be laid to their charge. Still less are they responsible for the incarnation of the abstraction of the economic man. The important question at issue between them and their German critics is not whether ordinary motives of self-interest should ever be limited by law, but whether other motives operate in such a way as to destroy the general applicability of the method of economic analysis, which assumes that each party to any free exchange will prefer his own interest to that of the other party. The danger in the present day, even among English economists, is of failing to give sufficient attention to the more latent and complicated, but very effective, manner in which competition is found operating, even in countries where custom is strongest. "Historical economists," he says, "are apt to insist too one-sidedly on the progress in economic theory attained by studying the industrial organisation in different stages of its development; they do not sufficiently recognise that other kind of progress which consists in conceiving more clearly, accurately, and consistently the fundamental facts that remain without material change. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, but our historical friends make no attempt to set before us the new economic pudding which their large phrases seem to promise. It is only the old pudding with a little more ethical sauce and a little more garnish of historical illustration." The danger, of course, is that in this culinary resourcelessness they should be driven to have recourse to piquant relishes of foreign extraction, as some English representatives of this school are at present in danger of doing. To all such the

excellent passage on free trade, and protection on p. 179 may be commended for careful study.

In the essays on *Economic Socialism* (VIII.) and *The Economic Lessons of Socialism* (X.), the same line of defence is adopted against socialism. The latter is an important acknowledgment of the influence which socialism has had on orthodox political economy. Although there is only one reference to the writer's own opinions (p. 242), one cannot help reading into this essay an autobiographical note of the greatest interest. To the controversy with socialism he attributes the clear consciousness at which English economists arrived at an early stage of the two parts into which their doctrine fell—(1) the account of the natural production and distribution of wealth apart from Government interference, and (2) the proof that this had the best attainable result, and of the relative uncertainty attaching to the latter. This influence reached its height in Mill's conversion to the view that a far better division of the product of industry may be expected when we come, as he hoped we should, "to make it by concert on an acknowledged principle of justice." Having reached this point, Mill was prepared to deal with the unearned increment of land on socialistic principles, and may even be said to have anticipated Henry George; but capitalistic production still seemed to depend on the maintenance of profit and interest as the reward of abstinence, and thus to provide an impregnable defence against a thorough-going socialism. The argument really rested on the comparison between interest and profit, and it was here that the Marxian analysis came to the rescue. Not that it attacked this confusion directly. On the contrary, it involved a more fundamental muddle. But, as sometimes happens in controversy, "the collision of two muddles ultimately brought the truth out clear and unmistakable." It came to be seen, on the one hand, that while a socialist state would have to exercise abstinence, it would not have to be paid for it; but, on the other hand, that there would still be need of "invention," including improved instruments, processes, and business organisation; and that any system of socialism hitherto expounded was likely to founder on its inability to furnish the requisite motives to its exercise.

Approaching the same subject from the side of "practical socialism" in the eighth essay, the author finds the line that separates it from the orthodox economy in the tendency, firstly, to interfere with contracts on the ground of the incapacity of particular classes (*e.g.* agricultural tenants) to protect their own business interests; and, secondly, to regulate the share of particular classes in the product of industry, as by legal restrictions on wages and rents. The objection to all such interferences is that they are "an attempt to introduce into a social order constructed on a competitive basis a fundamentally incompatible principle." In such cases the *onus probandi* rests with anyone who advocates them—a burden which, in recent legislation, he thinks has been very inadequately taken up. At the same time he keeps an open mind, and is ready to admit that socialism may have something yet to teach political economy on these

subjects. He thinks, however, that its arguments are now exhausted, and that any further light it brings will be by way of experiment. That he is not very sanguine is clear from his opinion that we should probably agree to yield the post of honour to Germany in this respect. It is an interesting comment on this suggestion, written in 1895, that the most important experiments since that date have been in our own colonies of Australia and New Zealand. On the general controversy it is somewhat a surprise to find a utilitarian writer appealing to the "competitive basis" of economic society as an argument against socialistic changes, when it is just the "utility" of the competitive basis that is in question. The same feeling of somehow having failed to touch bottom remains on reverting to the more fundamental discussion of Essay VII. Admitting the relevance of the criticism there directed against the historical economists, we yet feel that the real danger to orthodox political economy comes not from a foreign school, but from the home-grown criticism contained in such writers as Carlyle and Ruskin, and that no defence of its method can be satisfactory which is not based on a more embracing theory of human society assigning to it at once its place and its limits than is here provided.

The nearest approach to such a theory is reached in the latest of these essays, which brings to a point the comments on the position and prospects of the science of sociology which run through several of them. So early as the review of *de Tocqueville*, published in 1861, and here reprinted as a supplement, Sidgwick had his suspicions aroused with regard to "a body of thinkers who, for hastiness of generalisation and audacity of assertion, may be compared to the well-known Greek philosopher who held that all things were made of water." Closer acquaintance with their work deepened this impression. Discussing in 1885 (Essay VII.) the relation of the new science to political economy, he dissents from the view that it is likely to absorb it, on the ground of fundamental differences among its leading representatives in France, England, and Germany on such crucial questions as to the future of religion and of industrial organisation. He finds in it little more than "a mixture of vague and variously applied physiological analogies, imperfectly verified historical generalisations, and unwarranted political predictions" which would be a poor substitute for the definite and, on the whole, verifiable reasonings of political economy. The publication of Mr Kidd's *Social Evolution* was not likely to alter this estimate, and he took the opportunity of the vogue it enjoyed to bring home (Essay IX. on *Political Prophecy and Sociology*), from a recital of its manifold historical shortcomings, the conclusion that in the present state of our knowledge it is wise to take short views of the life of civilised societies. "Not, indeed, quite so short as that of the ordinary politician, who cannot be described as a being of large discourse, except in the popular sense of the term; yet short as compared with the construction of social dynamics."

In the eleventh essay, on the *Relation of Ethics to Sociology*, he takes a

more sympathetic view. While refusing it an authoritative voice in the interpretation and direction of the course of civilisation, he looks forward to a time when in particular departments our social sentiments and activities will have to yield to the guidance of a form of its teaching which will bear the same relation to our charity and our justice that medical science bears to temperance and self-control. On the other hand, so long as sociology remains within its proper field as an account of facts, it can expect to supersede ethics as little as history and political economy. And this for two reasons. In the first place, moral consciousness will never accept the mere survival of the social organism as the paramount end and standard of right. It is not simply life, but good life, which is the ethical end, and the nature of this cannot be gathered from a study of mere historic fact. Secondly, while the struggle for existence throws important light on the origin of morality in primitive society, it cannot be taken as the main explanation of it even there seeing that it is certainly not the cause of the most important developments of the moral consciousness which, like that represented by Christianity, have taken place in historical times. And this he holds to be true, not only of morality, but of science and art as well—of all, in a word, which we most deeply value in the progress of civilisation.

It would be an ungrateful task to make the republication of these essays an opportunity for a general criticism of Professor Sidgwick's contribution to philosophy. Indeed, the material for such an estimate will not be before us until the publication of the philosophical papers and lectures which we are glad to notice are promised in the preface. What they give us is a series of side-lights on the development of a mind of singular openness to contemporary influences. What they suggest is that, had the author been spared, he would probably have been brought by his habit of constructive criticism, the *ars bene dubitandi* of which he was a master, to a position more in harmony with the main line of recent philosophy than his more systematic treatises represent.

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*The Pathway to Reality: Stage the Second.* Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St Andrews in the Session 1903-4.—By the Right Hon. Richard Burdon Haldane, M.P., LL.D., K.C.—London: John Murray, 1904.

THESE Gifford Lectures, given by Mr Haldane at St Andrews last winter, are the sequel to the course he delivered there on the same Foundation during the previous session. Like their predecessors, the lectures were delivered extempore, and are edited chiefly from shorthand notes. Despite a few digressions and a slight tendency to repetition, the main march of the thought is always discernible, steadied up at difficult points by

quotations from the great idealistic thinkers, and constantly relieved by illustration. Mr Haldane, moreover, brings his whole discussion to bear directly upon Lord Gifford's problem, and he conducts it upon avowedly Hegelian lines.

In the previous course he had treated his subject under two heads, "The Meaning of Reality" and "The Criticism of Categories." This series is also divided into two. The first part (Book III. of the complete course) consists of six lectures, and is entitled "Absolute Mind." It deals chiefly with the nature of God regarded as "Self-conscious Mind completely self-comprehensive," and investigates the "dialectical" process which such a conception of God implies. The second part (Book IV.) deals in four lectures with "Finite Mind," its relation to the Infinite, and some of the problems of Art and Religion which arise out of that relation.

The opening lecture gives a retrospect and a forecast. The main result of the previous course was to establish the conception that God is not less than all Reality, and that Reality is Mind. The design of the present course is to show more fully what is implied by "Mind" in this interpretation of God. At the first, one great difficulty had seemed to stand in the way of our interpreting Reality as Mind—the fact that the world seemed to stand "hard-and-fast" out there over against us. This was overcome, however, when we found the source whence the whole character of the world arose. That source was this: We who interpret the world realise ends, and our world takes its character from the ends we realise; at a certain "level," the level of everyday life and common sense, our ends demand that the world should be regarded in this light—as having this fixed and impenetrable character; and this view is no more final than those ends are final. Change them, supersede them by deeper purposes or shallower, and you change Reality. Hence the whole nature of Reality depends upon and falls within self-consciousness (see Lectures III. and IV. of Book I. in the previous volume). From this it follows that the various aspects of both the world of knowledge and the world of practice have "degrees" of reality, higher or lower according to the range of the ends which govern them (cp. pp. 31-35). "With the ends the aspects vary"; "Every aspect of the world is real, if and so far as the end which is realised in it is real" (p. 24). And the "degree" assignable to any particular phase of reality must be determined by a "criticism" of the categories which dominate it.

The next two lectures, working upon this general basis, set forth the various aspects of Mind—the distinctions which fall within it, the source of these distinctions, and the dialectical movement in which they are overcome. The result of the discussion is to show that if we take in earnest the doctrine that Reality is Mind, then the everyday categories, Time and Space, Body and Soul, Thought and Sense, infinite series and completed whole, are but moments within the process by which Mind comes to complete self-comprehension. It is of the nature of these

distinctions to be subordinate moments in a higher Reality. In themselves, they are incompletely real. But if so, why should incomplete reality ever appear? What, in other words, "is the *why* of the process of finitude"? How should the Perfect Mind appear at all in this form? This is Mr Haldane's question in Lecture IV. of this book. His answer is substantially this: Mind could not be perfect without at the same time being finite; unless Infinite Reason retained the distinctions of understanding within itself, it would lose some of the richness of its own self-comprehension.

This result, stated in a slightly different form, is applied in the two following lectures (V. and VI. of Book III.) to the problem of God's relation to man. God's nature is described as "completely realising the highest ends," in distinction from Human Nature as realising finite ends. But between our finite ends and God's completeness there is, in the Hegelian sense of the word, a logical connection. Because of the "dialectical activity" which is man's inmost nature, he is conscious of being at once at his own low level and beyond it. This means that man "is at once in union with and alienated from God." And it is this dialectical activity, this projection of himself beyond himself, that keeps him conscious of both goodness and evil (pp. 127-130). The consideration that this same activity constitutes the life of the Supreme Mind leads Mr Haldane, still following Hegel, to an interpretation of the Trinity. God too must have an object, and since God is all Reality, that object can only be Himself "in the form of otherness" (p. 156). Thus we have the three phases, first the Absolute in itself, then the Absolute plunged into the otherness of our finite existence, and thirdly, "the Absolute in Synthesis" returning enriched upon itself. This is the sense in which the finitude of man is necessary to God; and this truth—the truth that in the redemption of man you have the return of God to Himself through otherness—is what is bodied forth in pictorial form in our great creeds. This completes the account of "Absolute Mind." The remaining four lectures deal chiefly with the modes in which "Finite Mind" approaches the Absolute in Art and Religion. Finally, we are led up in the last three lectures to a discussion of various aspects of the problem of Immortality.

Such, in outline, is the "Pathway" which Mr Haldane's thought essays to follow. He does not, however, by any means always keep to the high road. He escapes down many a side-path, and turns over many an ancient controversy. The apparent futility of philosophy, the problems of time and space and of series, the function of Art, the relation of body and soul, even the disclosures of "psychic research," are all touched upon, and to some of them he returns several times at different stages of the discussion.

The general criticism one would wish to express upon the whole work, might be put by saying that there underlies a great deal of it a certain subjective attitude which seems at times to bring one dangerously near to the solipsism which Mr Haldane is so anxious to guard against (p. 60). Re-

peatedly we find that inadequate interpretations of reality are traced to the "limited ends" which our conceptions subserve (see especially in the former series, Book I., Lecture III.), and the author lays great stress on the fact that "it is in ends and not in causes" that the true explanation of the Universe is to be sought. Now, even at the risk of seeming to strain a phrase, one cannot help feeling that "causes" are here dissociated from "ends." If so, then ends, *our* ends, constitute the nature of the Universe; and from this to Berkeleyanism seems but a short step. So far, an error of tendency; but besides this, and beneath it, there seems to be a positive confusion of thought. We are never distinctly told whether the "ends" are themselves the categories, or whether they stand, so to speak, apart from the categories and govern them. At many points, however, the latter view seems inevitable. Phrases like "the dominating influence upon knowledge, of ends and purposes of a limited character" (p. 4), "Human thought, dominated . . . by human purposes" (p. 85), "Forms of finitude" having "their origin in finite ends" (p. 117), man's "categories which his ends call into use" (p. 118), seem hardly able to bear any other interpretation. The view, in fact, works itself out to the conclusion that we have on the one hand ends to serve, and on the other hand categories with which to serve them. This conclusion begins to look serious when we think of its bearing upon the Hegelian dialectic on which Mr Haldane founds so largely. Each successive category, in that scheme, breaks down and becomes "sublated." Why? On one side, because of its own contradictoriness; on another side, because the end it served has been superseded. Now, the contradictory category must, by logical necessity, move into the higher category; but (if end and category are not the same) we cannot say similarly that the one end *must* give place to the other. In such a case any end may supersede any other, and thought, serving such ends, may go anywhere. This, of course, is the last thing to which Mr Haldane wishes to lend countenance. Nevertheless, by speaking of end and category as if they were different, he is really doing so, and he is encouraging the modern tendency which he laments on page 8—the tendency to let thought become anthropomorphic, "to fall back upon feeling" and "to limit theological inquiry to the ordinary metaphors of everyday life."

By reason of this subjectivity, too, the difficult question of the nature of time—discussed by Mr Haldane with much intrepidity in the third and fourth lectures of Book III.—seems to gain comparatively little elucidation from his treatment. In these two lectures Mr Haldane shows, on the lines of Royce's theory of series, that within each member of a succession the whole succession is implied (p. 112 ff.). In this way, the self which comprehends one member of a series, comprehends the entire succession-in-time which gives to that one its significance. This may be quite true, but it does not seem to take us far. So long as we deal in this way with the mere psychological act of comprehension, there always remains a difficulty in conceiving a self which in any sense "is out of time" or "belongs

to eternity." For, however true it be that the members of the succession are co-present to the knowing mind, still this mind itself surely *lasts*; and in so far as it does so it is surely in time. It would almost seem that the only hope of coming to a workable conception of time as a subordinate moment in a higher reality lies not so much in clinging to the fact (which is quite true) that for our minds the members of a succession may be co-present, but rather, approaching the whole matter from the ontological side, to realise what it is that happens in any one temporal event. It takes the whole history of the Universe to tell completely what is happening at any given moment—it takes all space and all time to give one moment its meaning; and therefore (however difficult it may be for us to picture such a thing) the real world is the perpetual concluded sum of all the moments of time. If we deal with the entire object-world, we cannot turn and say of it, as we would say of a particular subject, that it lasts through time; for there is nothing outside it by reference to which it could have duration.

These points do not nearly exhaust the interest of Mr Haldane's presentation of Idealism. In Book IV. he assigns to Art and Religion a function in the revelation of Reality equally important with that of knowledge; though the subjectivism comes out here again, in his assigning Religion pre-eminently to the sphere of will. Once more (but we cannot discuss it), regarding Immortality: the ordinary "eternal life" is superseded by a conception which may, indeed, escape the contradiction of "mere endlessness," but which does not seem after all to be more than the mere subjective assurance that death is quite natural (p. 235). On the whole, however, we have in Mr Haldane's work a bold and luminous outline of the Idealism which he gathers from Aristotle and Hegel; and throughout the book, in the later lectures especially, his own allegiance to the general idealistic position is made quite clear. He holds frankly to the unity of Reality, and to the "objectivity" of Truth in all its forms—Art, Ethics, and Religion; though, as we think, he lends unconscious countenance to a view essentially different from this.

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*Autobiography, Memories, and Experiences of Moncure D. Conway.*—  
2 vols.—London: Cassell & Co., 1904.

IN a vivid and picturesque manner, in his newly published *Autobiography*, Mr Moncure D. Conway tells the story of a strenuous life. He was a native of Virginia, born in 1832. His father, Walker Peyton Conway, was a slave-owner, a man of standing locally, conscientious and humane, esteemed by his neighbours, and loved by his slaves. If all American slavery had been of the type which prevailed on the Conway estate, in Stafford County, Virginia, the argument against it, based on its cruelty,

could never have been sustained. Its abolition would, no doubt, have been deferred indefinitely, until those profounder principles of human freedom had been recognised, which claim that to make men and women happy by a liberal supply of creature comforts is not enough, but that there should be room for the faculties to grow, and that each should be able to live his own life, even although it be at some sacrifice of comfort. Doubtless, the slaves of the elder Mr Conway were happier, in an unthinking and irresponsible fashion, in slavery, than they could have been in a state of freedom—happier perhaps than their owners, upon whom responsibility for the well-being of these personally helpless, grown-up children was cast. Conscientious owners were painfully conscious of the burden. Mr Conway quotes from a letter written by his mother in 1856, in which she says: "I am the greatest slave here at any season to the servants of our household, who are raised in such a state of dependence of thought and action that they will not even make an effort to make their own clothing,—indeed are too stupid to know how unless I direct them. Oh, what a thralldom to me, the white slave! . . . If any abolitionist could know exactly what I have endured from over-pressure of work for thirty negroes for the last month, and the worry I have had to get them to do any work for themselves, they would look upon me with greater pity than on them" (vol. i. pp. 220-221). What could compensate for that "arrested development" of nature which caused this childish dependence? Any effort to modify it was illegal. The Conways tried to teach their slaves to read, but the instruction was conducted in secret in a cellar, and when the suspicions of neighbours were aroused it had to be stopped. Mr Conway's early training, in the midst of slavery at its best, was not calculated to impress him fully with the evils of the system. Nevertheless, in after time he did valiant service in the cause of emancipation, and, for the sake of the negroes, sacrificed social position and endangered his life.

On the religious side, young Conway was cradled in Methodism. At fifteen years of age he underwent "conversion," and on his nineteenth birthday he was appointed to the Methodist ministry. Already, however, the influence of Emerson had been at work. Mr Conway declares that, even when he elected to join the Methodist ministry, "Emerson was at the bottom of it." A casual quotation found in a magazine had attracted him to Emerson some time before, and he discerned in this "to what depth a teacher's word might strike in an open heart." A teacher he became, and a teacher, from pulpit, platform, and press, he has continued to be, of one gospel or another. Methodism soon ceased to suffice him. He formed an acquaintance with some Hicksite Quakers, and speedily made his way to Unitarianism, first in its "transcendental" and afterwards in its theistic and its more distinctly ethical phases. In 1863 he came to London, and was installed as the minister of the South Place Chapel, Finsbury, which had been made famous by William Johnson Fox. For many years he continued to exercise a wide influence as a religious and social reformer. He and his congregation together drifted farther and farther

away from the recognised Unitarian body in the direction of rationalism, until the historic meeting-place (a "chapel" no longer) became an important centre for the diffusion of that type of purely ethical religion which has its foundations in the principles of Evolution as expounded by Herbert Spencer. Mr Conway finally retired from his public ministry in London in 1897, on account of the serious illness of his wife. He returned with her to New York, where she died, an irreparable loss to him whose steadfast co-worker she had been in every humane service for thirty-nine years.

Mr Conway has little sympathy with people who insist that it is an act of wisdom to "make the best of both worlds," and none at all with those who

"feign a bliss  
Of doubtful future date,  
And, while they dream on this,  
Lose all their present state,  
And relegate to worlds yet distant their repose."

As a preacher he has consistently occupied himself with "the living present." He wrote a book called *The Earthward Pilgrimage*, in which he described how his pilgrim "left the world to come for that which is." He is tolerant as a rule, but with supernaturalism, especially when it is tintured with Calvinism, he has no patience. His hall-mark of merit is that a man or woman is what he terms a freethinker. He does not see that with persons of a certain temperament a perfectly free play of thought may lead to the acceptance of one form or another of Christian faith. Domestic bereavement and, in public affairs, the "floods of Jingoism and militarism" which have overtaken the nations, West and East, have produced in Mr Conway a profound disappointment bordering on despair. His faith in the future, even of "the world that now is," is eclipsed. Mr Herbert Spencer saw the same things, but did not grow hopeless. In 1898 he wrote to Mr Conway:—"Now that the white savages of Europe are overrunning the dark savages everywhere; now that the European nations are vying with one another in political burglaries; now that we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism, in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker; now that national interests, national prestige, pluck, and so forth, are alone thought of, and equity has utterly dropped out of thought, while rectitude is scorned as 'unctuous'; it is useless to resist the wave of barbarism. There is a bad time coming, and civilised mankind will (morally) be uncivilised before civilisation can again advance" (vol. ii. pp. 407-408). But Mr Conway will not be comforted. Instead, he detects in this innocent reference to the principle of action and reaction in human progress "some unconscious 'survival' of that ancient faith which developed the devil into a being at once the enemy and the ally of God." Why, he asks, "should partial freedom emerge again from military despotism 'after many generations,' or ever"? Why, we may ask, should

the tide, when it has ebbed, flow again? Why indeed, in either case, excepting that a similar process has occurred before!

Mr Conway is, and long has been, a fervid apostle of Peace—even of peace at any price. Apparently he holds that of all evils war is the very greatest, so that no other wrong, howsoever grievous, which it might remove could justify it. In his opinion even “the evils of slavery as a domestic institution were mere pimples compared with the evils of war.” At the close of his narrative he writes: “A declaration of war is the most terrible of sentences; it sentences people to be slain and mutilated, their women to be widowed, their children orphaned, their cities burned, their commerce destroyed.” Implore peace, is his final injunction, “implore peace, not of deified thunder-clouds, but of every man, woman, and child thou shalt meet. Do not merely offer the prayer, ‘Give peace in our time,’ but do thy part to answer it! Then, at least, though the world be at strife, there shall be peace in thee” (vol. ii. p. 412).

Readers may find much in these fascinating volumes to which they cannot give assent. But they can hardly fail to recognise the courage, integrity, and singleness of purpose which have actuated the author during his eventful life, or the modesty with which he sets forth his own achievements, while he freely magnifies the services of others.

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*Ecclesiæ Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris Antiquissima; Canonum et Conciliorum Græcorum Interpretationes Latinæ: post Christophorum Iustel, Paschasium Quesnel, Petrum et Hieronymum Ballerini, Ioannem Dominicum Mansi, Franciscum Antonium Gonzalez, Fridericum Maassen edidit Cuthbertus Hamilton Turner, A.M. Fasciculi Primi Pars Altera* (pp. viii+97-280). Nicæni Concilii Præfationes Capitula Symbolum Canones.—Oxonii: e Typographeo Clarendoniano, MDCCCIV.

AFTER the lapse of five years—none too long an interval, if the importance and accuracy of the work be considered—the second part of Mr C. H. Turner's truly “monumental” work appeared on the 30th of November last year.

Mr Turner's scheme is to edit the Latin versions of the canons of all the early councils, and this he can be trusted to complete in a definitive way, if life and health be granted him. In the first part he edited the lists of bishops who were present at the great Council of Nicæa. These lists are of the greatest interest to the geographer and historian, and have been of much value, for example, to Professor W. M. Ramsay in settling problems of Anatolian topography. The present volume is one of much more general interest, as a brief account of its contents will show.

He begins by giving us two more lists of bishops, which he has

recovered from a Paris and a Roman manuscript respectively. This is followed by a synopsis of the manuscript material available for editing four different translations of the prefaces, creed, and canons of the Council of Nicæa. There is the "Interpretatio Cæciliani" (at least as early as 419), the "Interpretatio Attici" (of the year 419), the so-called "Old Translation," which was really made in the fifth or sixth century out of the translation of Atticus and that in the codex of Ingilramus, and fourth, the translation in the codex of Ingilramus, of Roman, or at least Italian, origin, and probably as early as the fourth century. He has also edited the epitome of this last version. He next provides three lists of chapters, two of which are attached to the "Old Translation," and the text of four supposititious canons, which are found in some MSS., and are numbered 20 to 23. After another appendix containing the text of the sixth and seventh canons of Nicæa as brought forward at the Council of Chalcedon, there follow some of those comprehensive notes which are too long for the *apparatus criticus* proper. Historians, grammarians, lexicographers, and others will neglect these at their peril. There is much in them that cannot be got elsewhere. The second half of the book contains other four translations: the "Gallica" (probably of the fourth century); the "Gallo-Hispana," produced by a combination of the "Gallica" and the translations of Rufinus, in the fifth century; the translation of Rufinus of the beginning of the fifth century, for which Mr Turner has for the first time used both the manuscripts of canons and the manuscripts of Rufinus' *Ecclesiastical History*; and lastly, the translation falsely attributed to Isidore, which was really composed at Rome between 419 and 451. This portion is followed by more notes of the kind described, some of which are of the greatest importance and interest to students of the Latin versions of the Bible as well as others. There are exhaustive accounts of the traditions as to the deaths of Peter and Paul, of the early bishops of Rome, etc. Two further translations of the Canons of Nicæa are appended, making ten in all. These are the two translations of Dionysius Exiguus, and they are followed by a fragment of an eleventh version.

There are many reasons why these versions should be edited with the care that has been bestowed on them. It would be superfluous to dwell on the importance of the Council of Nicæa. Its effects have been far-reaching, and in order to understand them, we must know not merely the exact Greek text, for the reconstruction of which the Latin versions, surviving as they do in manuscripts of very ancient date and exceeding accuracy, are indispensable, but we must also have clearly before us the different versions, in order that we may trace their use in the writings of the Western Church during the Middle Ages. These versions are of importance to students of Church polity and students of theological terms. But there are other classes for whom Mr Turner's work is indispensable, students of palæography, orthography, and grammar. When classical scholars come to realise how valuable biblical, patristic, and conciliar manuscripts are

for them, the study of Latin grammar and the textual criticism of all Latin texts will get a new lease of life. No work will then be more useful than that of Mr Turner, for he has taken the greatest trouble to preserve the very orthography of his manuscripts, which often has a forbidding appearance, but is nevertheless of the greatest value for classical and Romance philologists.

A word of praise is due to the perfectly clear arrangement of the copious evidence, in which Mr Turner has been ably seconded by the Press. It is doubtful if any other press in the world could achieve such typographical variety and beauty. The Delegates are also to be thanked for another evidence of the noble conception which they have of their duty.

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*The Problem of Suffering in the Old Testament.*—By A. S. Peake, M.A., Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester, Tutor in the Primitive Methodist College, sometime Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.—London: Bryant, Aldersgate Street, and Kelly, City Road, 1904.

THIS is a book of many merits, and the present writer, after careful and repeated perusal, is almost afraid to express an estimate which may seem extravagant. Yet a reviewer has to utter his deliberate conviction, and in this case the opinion formed is at least decided and clear. Professor Peake has chosen a subject which goes to the very heart of religious belief. Again, no problem is discussed in the later literature of the Hebrews with deeper insight or greater width of view: so that an intelligent appreciation of the Old Testament teaching is of capital moment to the theologian, and indeed to every educated man who is, or desires to be, religious. In dealing with it Professor Peake has first of all edited and translated some of the chief texts which touch the problem in question. He has, for example, done into English the "Songs of the Lord's Servant" in Second Isaiah and the seventy-third Psalm, besides supplying incidentally translations of many notable passages found elsewhere in the pages of the Hebrew Scriptures. He admits frankly that the text is often corrupt, and sometimes hopelessly uncertain; but he never indulges in arbitrary change or wild conjecture. His criticism is eminently sane and judicious. Moreover, having mastered pretty well what has been written by commentators since the rise of criticism, he preserves independence of judgment, giving his own opinion and the reasons for it with admirable lucidity and force. With the same candour and fulness he considers the questions of higher criticism, such, *e.g.*, as the date and integrity of Habakkuk's prophecies, as well as that of the Second and Third Isaiahs, the composition of Ecclesiastes, and the like. The whole evidence, which really counts for much, is stated with a con-

ciseness which never degenerates into obscurity, and the student has an opportunity of learning the real method of critical inquiry, the manner in which arguments are to be tested and weighed. Nor does Professor Peake let his learning run away with his common sense. He has a literary perception, and, it may be added, a knowledge of human nature, often absent in distinguished scholars who bend fact to theory and are enamoured of "vigour and rigour." Thus, to critics who attribute some parts of Ecclesiastes to a Stoic, and others to an Epicurean writer, Professor Peake replies, and rightly, that the same man may very well have been Stoic in one mood, Epicurean in another. In the same spirit he frankly admits that the Second Isaiah, despite his lofty universalism, has also an element of Jewish narrowness inconsistent with the nobler element in his teaching. So, too, he refuses to admit that the famous prediction of the "New Covenant" in Jeremiah must be treated as an interpolation and assigned to the period of the Exile, on the ground that the former covenant, the covenant of Deuteronomy, had to be abrogated by national ruin before the idea of a new covenant could arise. After all, Jeremiah, whatever view we take of his inspiration, was surely capable of looking forward, and was by no means destitute of imagination. As yet, however, we have not reached the highest qualities of the book before us. Our author enters with profound sympathy into the history of Israel's religion, and traces its momentous progress with a penetration and an eloquence which would have been otherwise impossible. A scholar writing with fulness of knowledge, he is also a religious man writing of religion. Not for one moment does the interest flag, and the book is one which may give real help to many who are ignorant of Hebrew, and strangers to the method of critical inquiry.

What are the chief impressions which the marvellous evolution here described makes upon the reader? Briefly these. First, we are enabled to see how the problem of suffering patent to all men was felt with unique acuteness by the pious Israelite. The reason is not far to seek. The Hebrew prophets, though at first they took no pains to formulate this creed in dogmatic form, believed heart and soul in one righteous and almighty God who had guided the fortunes of Israel, ever since He had revealed Himself to the nation in the birth-throes of the Exodus. All that happened to Israel, all, in the view of later writers, which happened to the individual, was ordered by God. "Shall there be evil in the city," says Amos, "and the Lord hath not done it?" Centuries after Amos, the author of the Book of Job assumes that it is the hand of the Supreme which has fallen so heavily on the afflicted hero. Hence the bitterness of the anguish which wrung the heart of Israelite saints when they looked out on the confusion and apparent injustice of the world. "To be wroth with one we love, doth work like madness in the brain." Now, it was just that God whom the sufferer adored and loved who looked on while the righteous were trodden down and the wicked flourished. Æschylus or Euripides might lay the responsibility of wrong upon one divine being out of many.

It is, for example, Artemis alone who prompts Agamemnon to sacrifice his daughter; and again, Hippolytus was undone solely by Aphrodite. Artemis, whom he loved and served, had not forgotten him, but she shrank from crossing the path of Aphrodite, the rival goddess whom Hippolytus had offended.

Secondly, the disappointment of religious hope in Israel was the very means by which religion was in the end purified, widened, and deepened. It was not simply that Israel's saints held fast to God in spite of their affliction and blighted hopes: these were the very instruments by which God drew the nation and individuals closer to Himself, revealing His character more and more completely, "in many portions and in many ways." There is no parallel elsewhere to this continuous and progressive revelation, and still less to the fact that it was effected by a course of events which would have been fatal to the very being of other religions. The early prophets taught that national prosperity was the reward of national righteousness. So indeed it is, but not always, at least in that crude form according to which these prophets expounded the rule of divine providence. Precisely when the Deuteronomical reform had, with whatever defects, raised the religion of the people to a height previously unknown, Josiah, a good king and an ardent reformer, was defeated and slain by Pharaoh Necho, bequeathing a legacy of impending ruin to his successors. Yet in the crash of political disaster Ezekiel became a pastor of souls among the exiles, and proclaimed the eternal truth that God deals individually with the souls He has made, and renders to every man according to his works. Here again we have a sound principle, true anyhow on the whole, true always if spiritually apprehended, but subject to palpable exceptions if taken in its literal and most obvious sense. Just at this point the difficulty and trial emerge, which appear in the mental history of Jeremiah, in some of the Psalms, in the sublime poetry of Job. Little by little light rose out of the darkness, and fellowship with God was seen to be in itself the perfect bliss, our beings' end, in which the soul rests and is satisfied. "Though my heart and my flesh fall away, God is for ever the rock of my heart and my portion." Simultaneously, the hope of immortality rose above the horizon. Divine communion partakes of the divine eternity, so that death cannot sever it. Meanwhile, as individual religion is thus perfected, the thought of Israel's mission as a nation still survives, but glorified and transfigured. Israel is to be "the light of the nations": "There is one God, and Israel is His prophet." Still more strange is the mode in which this mission is to be accomplished. Israel must die to live, die to its national existence, die to the narrowness and exclusive pride of its religion that it may rise to a larger and nobler influence. The law of vicarious sacrifice which runs through all nature is to be exemplified in, and willingly accepted by, the servant of Jehovah. There is also a generous recognition of the fact that God has been preparing the Gentiles for the knowledge of Himself. "Souls [among the heathen] are stirred with a strange disquiet, a dim sense of higher truth,

a longing for an authentic voice to change the soaring wish into a luminous certainty." "For His teaching the far lands do wait." Therefore the servant of the Lord deals gently with those whom he might naturally have regarded as God's enemies and his own. "A bruised reed will he not break, and a glimmering wick he will not quench."

The third point remains, and that the chief of all, viz. the consummation of Hebrew hope in the plenitude of Christian experience. Here, however, we can but refer our readers to Professor Peake's concluding chapter, entitled "Solution or Escape." It is a masterly discussion of the historical facts and doctrines which constitute the Christian revelation. These are considered in relation to the problem of suffering as it stands before us in the Old Testament and occupies thoughtful men here and now. The chapter is a short one, perhaps too short, but it is singularly weighty and impressive, for it is the work of a man whose convictions are clear and definite, and who is far too much in earnest to take refuge in rhetoric or exaggeration.

WM. ADDIS.

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*The Yogi and His Message.*—By Swami Dharmananda Mahavarati.—  
Calcutta: J. J. Bharati, 1904.

THIS pamphlet contains the substance of two lectures delivered by a learned and high-caste Hindu, who, after a quarter of a century, during which Christ has been an object of his study, proclaims Him to his fellow-countrymen as "the Ideal Yogi," "God in Man and Man in God," an "Avâtar of the Supreme," the sovereign of an "Empire" which "is everywhere."

The lectures are, and were intended to be, somewhat discursive. They cover a great deal of ground, and suggest a variety of questions which it is beyond the scope of the discourses to answer. Incidentally, some extraordinary statements are made, for which circumstantial evidence would be reasonably required before they could be accepted as accredited facts. That the learned Yogi is himself satisfied on these points is evident, but his personal conviction alone is not sufficient to win, in a critical age, the conviction of his readers. These, however, are side-issues. The main interest of the discourses remains, whatever view the reader may take concerning these incidental questions. The lectures present us, not only with a Hindu view of Christ, but with the view of a man held in high repute in Bengal—one, moreover, whose horizon has not been limited by the boundaries of Hindustan, but who has travelled far and experienced much, without on that account becoming less enthusiastically devoted to his own country, or less proud to call himself "a Hindu of Hindus," and a "Yogi."

It is of interest to learn what answer a man of this description is ready to give to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" It is significant

that he finds in Christ the fulfilment of Hindu ideals, as expressed in their sacred books and in the lives of their great saints and teachers. It is also instructive to observe that the homage he pays to Jesus Christ and the claim which he considers that Christ has on the attention and reverence of his countrymen are based on the principle which is apparent throughout the Gospels. His appeal is solely to the witness of His character, as manifested in His own life on earth, and in its effects on the lives of those who sincerely follow Him. His appeal may be paralleled by the exclamation, "Come and see," of the Apostle, by the testimony, "Behold, I find no fault in Him," of the observant judge, by the assertion, "Certainly this was a Son of God," of the man who watched Him suffer unto death. The Swami claims to have seen as effectually, and to be equally confident as to the significance of what he has seen. Christ's "sway extending over the vast dominions of human thought" is the logical outcome, in his view, of the personality of Christ, of the spiritual force He exhibited and still exhibits.

Our author's testimony to the beauty of Christian character, as he has seen and known it, is balanced by a scathing indictment of the conduct of vast numbers of professing Christians in India and elsewhere. Even whilst we recognise that allowance must be made for a very distinct difference in racial ideals, which must affect the manner of applying Christian ethics to life, and involves the entrance of what may be called a *racial equation* into the determining of what is, and what is not, consistent with Christian ethics in the customs of each nation, yet enough remains which, by common consent, all followers of Christ must acknowledge with shame and sorrow is a disgraceful blot upon European Christianity, and the main hindrance to the acceptance of faith in Christ by other races.

As an erudite scholar familiar with many of the languages of both hemispheres, our author's views on the historical connection between Syria and Hindustan merit attention. It would be interesting to know on what evidence he grounds his conviction that Jesus visited India. This he does not tell us; but he briefly traces the Magi of Persia to a Hindu origin in the following way:—The leader of the Hindu sect called the Jains, by name Mahajaina, became a teacher of the Iranians, his disciples among the Persians were nicknamed Mahajains, and this became corrupted into Mage. The Mage or Magi, of Hindu descent, were well known for their proficiency in astronomical and astrological sciences, and the author holds that it was probably in search of Him who should be the fulfilment of one of their predicted Avatars that they journeyed to Judea, at the time of the birth of Christ.

He also traces the early preaching of Christianity on the Malabar coast to Hindu teachers from Syria, which country he regards as identical with "the ancient 'Suryadesh' (Land of the Sun) of the Hindu kings." A short history of this "Surya," he tells us, may be read in Sanskrit works. He suggests that these Hindu missionaries were subjects of Argharus (Argha is a Sanskrit word meaning the sun), and that Argharus

is the king known in Christian tradition as Abgarus. It is to be hoped that the learned Swami will publish in detail, if he has not already done so elsewhere, the reasons which have led him to these conclusions; for if these alleged facts can be established, or can be shown to be probably correct, they may throw much light on a problem which has perplexed many students, namely, the similarities which exist between the Krishna legends and some incidents in the Gospels, more particularly in the narrative of the 2nd chapter of St Matthew's Gospel; and also perhaps they may give us a clue to the points of agreement between the Buddhistic and Christian traditions. With regard to the latter Max Müller wrote in 1896, "I must confess that for years I have been very much perplexed myself; and even now, though I cannot resist the impression that there must have been historical contact between Christianity and Buddhism, I cannot explain how it came about, I cannot point out the exact historical channel through which the communication took place."

With regard to the Krishna legends, the points at which they are strikingly like the Christian narrative are not numerous, but perhaps the closest resemblance is in the account of how Krishna was removed on the night of his birth beyond the reach of his uncle, King Kamsa. Kamsa is said to have been warned that a son born to his house would destroy him, and therefore to have ordered that young infants should be put to death. It is also stated that at the time of Krishna's birth his foster-father went with his wife to pay taxes.

Assuming that this similarity is due to something besides coincidence, the question arises as to priority. Are there any means of tracing the date at which the Krishna legend probably took this shape? There are three sources of the Krishna legends: (1) the Mahabharata, (2) the Bhagavad Gita, and (3) the Puranas. The latter were apparently not written earlier than the eighth or ninth century A.D., so that priority cannot be claimed for the legends found only in them. My authority for this is Mr John Robertson, a writer who certainly cannot be accused of having a Christian bias. I merely refer to these legends here in order to point out how important, from the historical point of view, it may be to verify the theory adduced by the Swami.

If there was such intercourse between Syria and Hindustan as he supposes, and if the Gospel was thus early preached by Hindus to Hindus, it ceases to be unlikely that some of the incidents related in the New Testament should have crept into the legends concerning Krishna. The reverse is perhaps possible also, namely, that at some early date a Krishna legend should have been added by a copyist to the Gospels. It is for experts to decide which hypothesis is most probable. Perhaps it is difficult to judge the question without bias, but the latter alternative seems improbable on the face of it, in view of the fact that these legends would be borrowed from a wholly foreign source, as no one supposes that Hindu missionaries preached Krishna-worship among Christians.

I ought not to conclude without some reference to the undoubtedly rather contemptuous allusions of the Swami to the converts of low caste who constitute the native congregations of Christians in India. His invective is directed mainly against what he calls "pice-Christians and rice-Christians," converts who have much to gain socially, and little to lose, by being baptised, and who, he says, do little credit to the cause of Christianity by their conversion, whilst "everywhere these miserable creatures are looked upon with utmost contempt, dislike, and mistrust." Although, however, there is no doubt much justification for his severe condemnation of such as these, it is impossible to disguise from oneself the fact that the feeling he expresses is probably sharpened and accentuated by the natural and hereditary prejudice of a high-caste Hindu against the levelling tendency of Christianity. The Sikh prophet Nānak taught that in heaven there is no caste. But as yet we are not there; and caste feeling (we must honestly face the fact) is a feeling which dies hard in any race. To suppose that it is exclusively a Hindu prejudice is to be blind to facts. We have, perhaps, nearly as much caste feeling in England to-day as there is in India. When the late Mr Keshub Chunder Sen visited England in 1870, he was amazed to find "caste" so powerful in this country. "I was pained," he says, "to find an institution which I certainly did not expect to find in this country—I mean caste. Your rich people are really Brahmins, and your poor people are Sudras. I thought caste was peculiar to India; certainly in a religious sense it is, but as a social institution it perpetrates prodigious havoc in this country."

If our social conditions in this so-called Christian country thus impress our Hindu visitors, what right have we to be surprised if we find caste feeling colours the views of Hindu students of Christianity? Unfortunately, some of our methods in India have offered much excuse for the charge made against our converts among the lower castes, namely, that the results are unsatisfactory, and that they are often no credit to the religion they profess to have adopted. That this is not universally true, however, the Swami frankly acknowledges, for he admits that, in spite of much that he deprecates, the religion of Christ has on the whole "marvellously elevated the lower class of people, and humanised them to a great extent. . . . It has moralised, educationised, and civilised the Pariahs, etc., and other numerous low castes."

We close the pamphlet with a larger hope for the future of that great country, concerning which Mr Keshub Chunder Sen once said, "None but Jesus ever deserved this bright, this precious diadem, India; and Jesus shall have it."

H. A. DALLAS.

HAMPSTEAD.

*Die Pseudoklementinen Homilien und Rekognitionen.*—Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung von Lic. Hans Waitz, Pfarrer in Darmstadt.—Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1904.—viii. 396. Texte und Untersuchungen, xxv. 4.

It is, as Harnack remarks (*Chronologie*, ii. 518), fifty years since such a complete and thorough study as this of the problem of the pseudo-Clementine writings has appeared, Uhlhorn having published his work in 1854. The writer thus sums up his results: "The document which underlies (*Grundschrift*) the pseudo-Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, which, together with the letter of Clement attached to it, originated between 220 and 230 A.D. in Rome, in Catholic circles with a syncretistic tendency, wove into its romantic narrative a variety of diverse sources, viz.: (1) ten books of *Κηρύγματα Πέτρου*; (2) *Πράξεις Πέτρου*; (3) the so-called dialogue of Clement and Appion; (4) Bardaisan's tract *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*." He goes on to maintain that the *Κηρύγματα* first underwent an anti-Marcionite "working over" before they were incorporated in the Clementine romance; that in their original form, before the anti-Marcionite element was added, they, together with the letter of Peter to James, and the attestation which accompanies it, were composed in Cæsarea soon after 135 A.D. by a Jewish Christian and Gnostic writer of pronounced Elkesaite and anti-Pauline views. The *Πράξεις Πέτρου*, which the writer of the *Grundschrift* used, were composed about 210 A.D. in Catholic circles in Antioch. It was from this work that the idea of introducing Simon Magus in all the other parts of the romance was derived. What in the *Κηρύγματα* had been written of Paul or Marcion was by the writer of the Clementine romance transferred to Simon Magus. The object of the *Πράξεις Πέτρου* was to condemn Gnosticism, and the idea of the work was derived from still older "Acts of Peter," which were amongst the sources of the canonical Acts.

Waitz has rendered a valuable service to the criticism of the Clementines, in demonstrating that the anti-Gnostic "Acts of Peter" were not anti-Pauline. The undoubted instances of Simon Magus being a mask for St Paul are to be found in the *Κηρύγματα* only. The story of Clement and his recognition of his lost parents and brothers was not introduced till the *Grundschrift* (c. 220–230 A.D.) combined the earlier apocryphs and disputations together, and used this romantic tale as the connecting link between the various sources, which he weaves into one whole. The two epitomes have no value for the criticism of the sources, since they are mere reproductions of the Homilies, with a good deal of post-Nicene theology introduced. Langen's attempt to find in them an earlier form of the text is shown by Waitz, with whom Harnack agrees, to be entirely mistaken.

It is a striking fact that the Arianising section "De ingenito Deo genitoque" (Hom. xvi. 15, 6) is omitted by Rufinus in his Latin translation of the Recognitions, but is found in the Syriac version, the MS. of

which is dated *c.* 411 A.D. Unfortunately, we do not possess the original Greek of the Recognitions, but the presence of this section in the Syriac version would seem to indicate that it was contained in the *Grundschrift*. Harnack supposes it to have originated in the Lucian school of theology, and finds in this a slight indication of the date of the *Grundschrift*. He places the existing texts of the Homilies and Recognitions in the ante-Nicene period, and the *Grundschrift* between 225 and 300. The supposed quotation of the *Grundschrift* by Origen has been shown by various scholars to rest on insecure evidence.

Much more interesting and important is the question of the date of the sources of the *Grundschrift*. And here Harnack's criticism seems to me eminently sound. Speaking of the *Κηρύγματα*, he observes: "The question of date is much controverted. Here is the point on which the new discussion by Waitz (pp. 78-169) evokes the strongest dissent. . . . When Waitz tries to prove (pp. 151 ff.) that these *Κηρύγματα* were composed in Cæsarea, he has not succeeded in adducing even probable grounds for such a conclusion. . . . And, as regards the date, it is striking how quickly he gives up the only sure points, . . . Symmachus, Alcibiades, and the Ebionites of Epiphanius. . . . What right have we to put the polemic against the Elkesaites *c.* 135 A.D.? It may be right to say that they originated *c.* 100 A.D., but we only hear of their having any public importance after the beginning of the third century." Harnack goes on, in my opinion justly, to demur to the necessity of complicating matters by supposing the existence of an anti-Marcionite "working-over" of the *Κηρύγματα*. Why should not their original author have been an anti-Marcionite himself? To support his view, Waitz is obliged to suppose that two books, the fourth and the seventh, in the list of the books of the *Κηρύγματα* given in Rec. iii. 75 were interpolated by the anti-Marcionite redactor. This is purely arbitrary, and why should one of these books be referred to old Catholic "Acts of Thomas"? The writer of the *Κηρύγματα* seems rather to have based himself on old "Acts of Peter." In the letter of Peter to James, and the accompanying attestation, which Waitz rightly treats as the introduction to the *Κηρύγματα*, reference is made to the fact that spurious additions to, and perversions of, Petrine writings had been perpetrated by certain audacious people who favoured the teaching of "the enemy" (*i.e.* St Paul). Is not this most simply interpreted, if we suppose the author of the anti-Gnostic Acts to have suppressed an anti-Pauline element in his source, the old Encratite "Acts of Peter"? In these original "Acts of Peter," St Paul would appear to have been openly, and in his own person, treated as "the enemy," for the origin of which expression Schmiedel rightly points to Gal. iv. 16 and St Matt. xiii. 28.

One cannot too highly admire the extraordinary patience and skill with which our author divides the sources. In general one can trust the sureness of his judgment. The whole subject is so complex and intricate, that only a long, painstaking, and detailed study of the question can yield

satisfactory results. Our own English scholars have done good work in this direction, which is recognised by Waitz, who has not only studied the problem himself, but seems to have conscientiously read every work on the subject by English, Dutch, and German writers.

J. H. WILKINSON.

DORCHESTER.

*The Golden Age of Classic Christian Art.*—By Jean Paul Richter and A. Cameron Taylor.—London: Duckworth.

THIS volume contains the fruit of several years of patient study devoted to the mosaics of S. Maria Maggiore at Rome. The authors were permitted, by means of scaffoldings or cages suspended from the ceiling, to make a closer examination of the mosaics than has been possible for any other archæologist, and were thus enabled to distinguish from the restorations of many different periods the work of the original artists. Specimens of this work have been reproduced with admirable fidelity after water-colour drawings by Sig. Tabanelli, to whom we also owe the splendid illustrations of Mgr. Wilpert's book on the paintings of the Catacombs; and to those who have seen the mosaics only from the floor of the church these reproductions will be a surprising revelation. It is not too much to say that for the technical study of Christian mosaics adequate material is here afforded for the first time; for the illustrations of De Rossi's *Mosaici Cristiani* contain many serious inaccuracies (in S. Maria Maggiore a figure of Rome seated between floral ornaments appears in De Rossi's plate as an enthroned Christ between medallions of St Peter and St Paul!), fail to distinguish between antique work and restorations, and give no idea of the technique of the originals. Dr Richter has, it is true, allowed himself some freedom in the matter of background. Thus in the frontispiece aerial blue has been substituted for the gold which, as he has shown, is due to interpolation, and in another case (pl. xviii., Massacre of the Innocents) gold has been replaced by graduated atmospheric tints copied from genuine examples (v. pl. xxiv.). Such restorations are, however, noted in each case. It is perhaps more to be regretted that coloured reproductions have been given of some portions which are probably post-Renaissance in execution, such as the Simeon of the Presentation (pl. xxxvii.), which we would gladly exchange for a plate of the Passage of the Jordan, where Dr Richter considers the background "antique and inimitable in the rendering of tender atmospheric effects . . . the *ne plus ultra* of the expression in mosaic of the subtleties of vaporous landscape."

Dr Richter, then, has rendered a signal service to the study of Christian Art in revealing the true beauty of the mosaics of S. Maria Maggiore. He has also made out what seems a strong case for regarding all the mosaics of the church as part of a single scheme of decoration executed at the same time. The view which has found most favour in recent years is that the panels of the nave belong to the fourth century A.D., and those of

the triumphal arch to the pontificate of Sixtus III. (432-440 A.D.), who rededicated the basilica to the Virgin in memory of the Council of Ephesus (431), which bestowed on her the title *Θεοτόκος*. Dr Richter points out, however, that the inscription of Sixtus III.—XYSTVS EPISCOPVS PLEBI DEI—cuts off the right foot of the figure of St Peter and the left foot of that of St Paul, and that, though scenes from the infancy of Christ are rendered, there is no representation of the Nativity, while the Divine Child is seen enthroned, not on his mother's knee, but between two allegorical figures.

This, however, is but a small part of what Dr Richter seeks to prove. He believes that the basilica existed from about 200 A.D. (at which time the mosaics were executed) as part of the private residence of a wealthy Christian named Sicininus, and that with its decoration it survived the period of persecution and was restored to Christian worship in the fourth century, when Liberius (352-366) added the apse. This conclusion, were we to adopt it, would, of course, be of supreme importance, not merely for the history of Christian antiquity, but for that of Art in general; and as such it is rightly regarded by the authors of this volume. But the arguments which they adduce seem wholly inadequate to sustain it.

In favour of the antiquity of the basilica it is argued that the *Liber Pontificalis*, which uses the expression *fecit basilicam* both of Sixtus III. (432-440) and of Liberius (352-366), furnishes, therefore, no proof of original construction in the second case. This is true, but we must remember that in the fourth century the church was called *Basilica Liberiana*. Dr Richter replies that the *Gesta Liberii* (a legendary compilation) says:—*In eius [Liberii] tempora fabricata est absis in urbe Roma in regione quinta*. This, however, is surely a compendious reference to the great building to which Liberius gave his name, *absis* being equivalent to *basilica absidata*. Dr Richter also lays great stress on the passages where the church is called *Basilica Sicinini*. These passages, however, all occur in accounts of the disturbances which followed the election of S. Damasus to the papacy after the death of Liberius, and only prove that besides the name derived from its builder the fabric also bore a topographical designation; for *Sicinini* is not, as Dr Richter supposes, the genitive of *Sicininus*, but of *Sicininum*, a name denoting a part of the Esquiline; in the edict of Tarracius Bassus, *praefectus urbi* about 368, we hear of an *Aeliocrates tabernarius* “*de Sicinino*,” and in the *Liber Pontificalis* (i. 233, 10, Duchesne) of a *domus Claudi in Sicininum*.

But Dr Richter further maintains that the antiquity of the basilica is shown by the materials and methods of its construction. It will be best to give the argument in his own words (p. 26 f.):—

“Researches made by Mons. Crostarosa into the condition and history of the tiled roof of the church have brought to light facts which illuminate the question of the date of the original basilica. He discovered that of the 110 diversely stamped antique tiles still *in situ* no less than 76 are of the first four centuries, and that of these more than half the

number belong to the second century, the reign of Septimius Severus (193–202). Strangely enough, Mons. Crostarosa did not conclude that the basilica is older than the time of Liberius, but put forward the curious hypothesis that the tiles were material which had been stored in warehouses for some 160 years.

“The beautiful brickwork of the nave, with its unbroken series of arched windows, clearly seen from the outside of the building, recalls the fine masonry of the time of Hadrian, but may be some fifty years later. The evidence of the brickwork, therefore, points to the same date as that indicated by the stamped tiles, namely, the end of the second century.

“The columns, moreover, which decorate the interior of the church are connected by an architrave—a structural peculiarity of early buildings, which was replaced in the fourth century by rounded arches.”

These arguments are fundamentally unsound. The stamped tiles number 275, not 110 (which is the number of different stamps used), and of these 66 bear the same stamp (which belongs to the fourth century), while of the great majority one specimen alone is found. The reign of Septimius Severus (had he reigned 193–202, which is not the case) would not coincide with the second century; as a matter of fact, 16 tiles bearing the stamp of 13 *different* fabrics are found belonging to his reign, while the whole period from Trajan to Caracalla is represented by 95 tiles of 68 different types. In spite of what Dr Richter says, there is no question whatever that later buildings were built and roofed with whatever bricks of any period came to hand. Bricks dated from the first century downwards are found, not only in S. Maria Maggiore, but in the Baths of Diocletian, S. Costanza, S. Agnese, and, above all, in S. Martino ai Monti, which belongs in its present shape to the reign of Symmachus (498–514), and it is significant that an analysis of Mgr. Crostarosa’s list of stamped tiles from that church shows almost exactly the same proportions for the tiles of each period as is found at S. Maria Maggiore.

As regards the brickwork, it must be observed that a visit to the Palatine will furnish a careful observer with the means of distinguishing the work of Hadrian from that of Septimius Severus, between whose reigns Dr Richter hesitates (on p. 41 we are told that the brickwork is “of the end of the second century (117–138)”); and that the arched windows (reproduced on pl. iv. from an inaccurate sketch in Grisar’s *Geschichte Roms und der Päpste*) prove, on examination at close quarters, to be of the fourth century at earliest, as a comparison with dated examples shows. Nor is it true that the architrave is a “peculiarity” of early buildings. Old S. Peter’s, S. Lorenzo fuori, and S. Martino ai Monti are instances to the contrary; and we are surprised to read (p. 42) that the architrave “is absent from Constantinian churches such as S. Paolo, S. Sabina, S. Pudenziana, S. Apollinare, and other churches of Rome, Ravenna, and elsewhere”; for *none of the churches named are Constantinian*.

The case for the antiquity of the fabric, therefore, breaks down; nor do the style and spirit of the mosaics furnish any more conclusive proofs

of their early origin. It is easy, no doubt, to trace classical reminiscences in these compositions: De Rossi and others have called attention to the persistence of types drawn from Roman historical art of the second century, represented by the Columns of Trajan and M. Aurelius (which latter Dr Richter more than once dates 161-168, although neither the erection of the column nor the scenes represented are of that date) and the Arch of Septimius Severus. But it is certain that the artistic schools of the fourth century were still inspired by classical models. The extant mosaics of S. Costanza, though merely decorative, give proof of this; and had it not been for the wanton destruction in modern times of the mosaics of the dome of S. Costanza and the wall-decorations of the basilica of Junius Bassus, I do not doubt that it would be evident that the mosaics of S. Maria Maggiore did not stand alone in their period. The carved door of S. Sabina (which Dr Richter treats unfairly, selecting only the inferior panels for mention), shows to what extent classical feeling was alive in the fifth century. The unrestored female figure to the spectator's left in S. Pudenziana and even the *ecclesiæ* of S. Sabina are quite worthy to be put beside the matrons of S. Maria Maggiore; and in Ugonio's description of the Susanna on the dome of S. Costanza evidently wearing the dalmatic with *clavi* "*leonati coloris*," I seem to recognise a figure which has many parallels amongst these mosaics.

Dr Richter, however, lays even more stress on theological than on artistic considerations. The art of these mosaics is, he says, didactic rather than historical, and the dogmatic conceptions which it embodies are those of the second century, and particularly of Justin Martyr, hostility to the Jews being especially marked. This last point is not clearly proven. In the Scene of the Presentation on the Arch a number of Jews, mostly priests, look on. It is true that they are modern in execution; but Dr Richter holds that the antique spirit has been caught, and that their faces express horror. This, I think, is open to grave doubt. He also holds that the opposition of Synagogue and Church is typified by that of Leah and Rachel. But it is very doubtful if the matron whom he regards as Leah is really so to be named; in the only scene where Leah is clearly shown her dress is *not* the same in its arrangement. But the typological interpretation of the Old Testament—as many of Dr Richter's own quotations show—was very common in the theology of the fourth and fifth centuries, and (which is far more important) in the art-conventions of that period the *Concordantia Veteris ac Novi Testamenti* holds a pre-eminent importance, as is shown by the descriptions of S. Paulinus of Nola, and by the door of S. Sabina (to go no further). It is highly significant that Wiegand, commenting on this fact, says of Christian art in these centuries, "*Diese war in hervorragender Weise didaktisch*" (*Das christliche Hauptportal von S. Sabina*, p. 127).

Nor can we attach great weight to the fact that the triumphal arch is decorated with scenes drawn from the apocryphal Gospels, condemned by the Council of 382; for it is a well-known fact that in the typology of

Christian art these scenes held their ground firmly, and even became increasingly popular in the centuries succeeding the condemnation referred to; it will be sufficient to refer to the *Cathedra Maximiani* at Ravenna.

We are thus compelled to dissent from Dr Richter's view as to the antiquity of the basilica and its mosaics, which must be regarded as a splendid monument of Christian art in the fourth century, still informed by the classical spirit.

We must enter a protest against such forms of expression as "Jesus Nave" (= Ἰησοῦς ὁ τοῦ Ναοῦ), and "Basilica Felix" for the Basilica of S. Felix at Nola.

H. STUART JONES.

ROME.

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*Die Syrische Didaskalia*, übersetzt und erklärt von Hans Achelis und J. Flemming [Texte u. Unter. N.F. x. 2].—Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1904. Pp. viii + 388.

THIS is a sequel to Achelis' really epoch-making contribution to what he calls "the Earliest Sources of Oriental Church Law," in his edition of the Canons of Hippolytus (1890). Various causes delayed this second instalment; among others, the enrichment of the material through Hauler's publication of parts of the parallel Latin version, from much the same Greek text, in the Verona palimpsest (1900), a version which shows that the work enjoyed at least some limited honour in the West, at any rate in N. Italy. Even now the edition is only preliminary to the one which the same editors are preparing for the Berlin Corpus of the Greek Fathers. Yet it is executed with great care, and with it this most valuable document passes out of the region of obscurity and neglect into the full light of general Church History. To say this, is not to forget Mrs Gibson's beautiful edition of the Syriac, with an English translation published separately (*Horæ Semiticæ*, Nos. 1 and 2, London, 1903), which was carried out on different lines, and with no attempt to assign the work, in the light of its contents, to its setting in the life of the ancient Church. Flemming, to whom falls the linguistic side of this joint-edition, recognises the help derived from Mrs Gibson's work, with its fresh Syriac MSS., though he rightly emphasises the superiority of the older MS. (Sangermanensis), already used by Lagarde for his Syriac edition in 1854.

The contents are as follows:—First, an accurate German rendering of the Syriac from the oldest MS.; next, critical textual notes, with use of the other sources, followed by a list of variants from Lagarde's edition and a list of quotations, biblical and otherwise. The second part consists of four essays: on (1) the text, with special reference to its purity and integrity; (2) the nature of the Christian community pictured in it; (3) the New Testament as known to its author; (4) the origin and date of the work. All textual matters proper are handled by Flemming; all matters of contents by Achelis, who is sole author of the last three essays. Where

the sources of our knowledge of the original Greek, lying behind all existing witnesses, are so varied and disparate as regards the conditions making for change, much depends on the scholarship and sagacity of the textual editor; and Flemming's work reaches a high standard, so far as the present writer is capable of testing it. But naturally the main interest for most readers lies in Achelis' contributions; and we shall devote the rest of our space to stating his conclusions.

Our *Didaskalia* is practically in its original state, apart from a few possible touches of little moment; and it gives us far the fullest account we have of the various sides of the life of an ante-Nicene community. Not that the community specially in view was exactly typical of those within the bounds of the Roman empire. But allowing for the peculiar features yet to be referred to, the picture is at least highly suggestive, especially as regards other Eastern communities. To begin with, it shows us a marked stage in the transition from the primitive to the Catholic order, in a fairly large church, numbering, it may be, some thousand members, mainly of Gentile origin. Stress is laid on the Episcopal office as of central importance, much on the lines of the Ignatian ideal and similarly valued for reasons of unity. Here, however, we observe a greater tendency to overlook the concurrent responsibility of the presbyteral college, while still no doctrine of apostolic succession is implied as the theoretic basis of a divine vicegerency on earth. Answering to such jealousy of the presbyterate, there is a marked polemic against the claims of the female presbyterate, *i.e.* the official order of Widows, in contrast to mere women who had claims on the Church's charity as bereft of their natural protectors. This order meets us elsewhere, notably in the *Testamentum Domini*—representing much the same region as the *Didaskalia*, only more than a century later—while its presence can be inferred yet more widely from slight traces which become clear in the light of the explicit witnesses. Generally speaking, they tended, with the growth of Catholicism as a sacramental system, to be degraded from the presbyteral rank—as it became sacerdotally conceived—to that of female deacons, understood in a rather menial sense of the term. Where their more spiritual functions survived at all, it was mainly as special organs of revelation through constant prayer that they were regarded. Here the originally "charismatic" basis of their ministry survived longest—long, in fact, after they had been extruded from real share in that ministry of the sacraments, as well as of the Word, which had once been theirs in certain parts of Christendom (see, *e.g.*, the *Ecclesiastical Canons*, xxi., xxii.). It is in respect to this process of transformation of Widows into Deaconesses, with the strict subordination to the Bishop in all things which now made Deacons mere episcopal assistants, that the *Didaskalia* most clearly appears as a transitional document. It also casts interesting light on the Eucharist and the Agape (no longer an act of the Church as such), both retaining much of their older associations; on the undogmatic theology, of Modalist rather than *Logos* type, which prevailed in Syria during the third century (pp. 290 f., 378 f., though Achelis does

not go to the bottom of this matter, textually in particular); and very specially on Church discipline (churchly rather than clerical in form), and the more or less "pure" ideals touching it entertained within the local church. The ascetic ideal had as yet made little impression in this quarter, which was in general old-fashioned rather than sensitive to the movements abroad in the Church at large. This comes out again in its author's naïve attitude to New Testament writings: for he has no notion of a limited New Testament canon. He uses all our gospels, chiefly Matthew, but quotes also from non-canonical Gospels and Acts, such as the Gospel according to the Hebrews, the Peter-Gospel, and some *Acta Petri* (also *Pauli*), while he explicitly cites the Sibylline Oracles.

These phenomena, especially the conjoint use of two apocryphal Gospels whose homes were Southern and Northern Syria respectively, help to fix the place of writing, which may well be looked for in one of the cities in the region south-east of Antioch (compare the traces of the Ignatian Epistles). The community in question cannot have been in close touch with the larger world of Greek culture and theological development, and so was not on or near the coast. The Syrian Berœa would suit well enough (Jerome found the Hebrew gospel there); or one might look even as far south as Decapolis and think of a city like Gadara. Achelis considers this latter region, which we may call Batanea, or yet more generally Cœle-Syria in the stricter sense, with special favour. Yet there is much to say for a locality nearer Antioch, especially if we hold, as the present writer does, that the Judaistic errors specially denounced are Elkesaite in nature. For Apamea, a centre of this semi-gnostic Judaism early in the third century (it was the home of Alcibiades, who brought the Book of Elkesai to Rome in Hippolytus' day; see *Philos.*, ix. 13 ff.), was not so far from Berœa that its influence might not easily create anxiety in a Berœan bishop. If so, it might stir him to write against Judaising tendencies in general, and this highly heretical Elkesaite type in particular, specially as we know from Origen (*ap. Euseb. H.E. vi. 38*) that it was carrying on an active propaganda about the middle of the third century. May it not be that our *Didaskalia* was a counterblast to this aggressive movement, and that it belongs to about 250 A.D.? Achelis is inclined on the whole, though with much hesitation, to prefer the latter part of this century to the earlier as the probable date of the work. With this our theory would square quite readily, even in view of the phenomena of recent persecution (which, by the by, the Elkesaites avoided even by formal denial) and martyrdom, and certain peculiar church usages, like the reckoning of Easter and its six days' fast, for which our author argues. Indeed, one cannot put the whole case better than by naming the age of Dionysius of Alexandria (247-264) as that within which the *Didaskalia* most probably fell.

As to the personality of its author, who was certainly a Catholic bishop, Achelis has some interesting observations. He was no theologian, and set little store by theological precision, though he had a good command

of the Sacred Scriptures as known in his region. His aims in writing were highly practical, though he used the strangely bold method—rendered the more natural to him by the example of the *Didache*, and the idea that the Church's truths and usages were "Apostolic"—of putting all he had to teach into the lips of the Apostles, met for the Conference on the Judaistic issue as recorded in Acts xv. This issue, in more developed forms, was still the burning question within his experience, as Achelis is at great pains to show. Indeed, he argues with much plausibility that our author's twofold attitude to Judaism—unusual personal sympathy towards Jews in their unbelief and sorrows, along with sharp rejection of Judaism on principle—suggests his own Jewish origin. On this assumption, one is inclined to suggest that he reached the Catholic Church through the milder "Nazaræan" type of Judæo-Christianity, finally breaking away from the latter through the principle which he so often lays down in his writing, that the ceremonial law was a δευτέρωσις or secondary addition to the Ethical Law, the Decalogue, and was imposed on Israel as an afterthought "for the hardness of their hearts," and for the doing away of which Christ largely came. If this were his personal history, it would be the more natural for him to think of writing such a warning against being beguiled under the old yoke in any degree—let alone going astray into deadly Elkesaite error; and more possible for him to execute his design with that knowledge of Jewish thought and usage which is so conspicuous a feature of the *Didaskalia*. But the renewed study of his work which this edition is sure to stimulate will doubtless clear up this and many other things.

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*Das Evangelium Lucae, übersetzt und erklärt.*—Von Julius Wellhausen.—  
Berlin: G. Reimer, 1904.

THIS small admirable volume runs upon the lines of its predecessor (see *Hibbert Journal*, October 1904, pp. 192-194). Its contour and basis are the same. Wellhausen, however, passes significantly over the birth-narratives and begins at chapter iii., regarding *ὡς ἐνομίζετο* in verse 23 as a later insertion. He posits an Aramaic source for iv. 25-27, and finds interpolations, sometimes in rather an arbitrary fashion, in passages like xiii. 32-33, xvii. 33 (misplaced), xxii. 19-20, 43-44, xxiii. 10-12, 34, and xxiv. 10, 12, 22-24. In xix. 11-27 he ingeniously traces a combination of two sources, but on the other hand he refuses, rightly I think, to follow Jülicher in detaching xvi. 7 from the preceding verse. Another notable feature is the writer's warning against all attempts to read Paulinism hastily into Luke. He is severe on Pfeiderer for this, though he admits of course a trace of Pauline influence in such a passage as vii. 50. The

weakness of the book is perhaps most conspicuous in expository sections like that upon the parable of the prodigal son, where the somewhat prosaic nature of the comments is disappointing. Upon the other hand, the pregnant, incisive character of the textual and literary notes is a constant source of stimulus. As one editor of Juvenal has said of a predecessor's work, "the personal and subjective character of" the "edition seems at first obtrusive; in time his manliness becomes attractive; at last his independence becomes suggestive." Which is no more than saying that the book has more light than heat. Even its light does not take one very far into the heart of Luke's writing as a gospel. But it is vital in every line, and that is much to be thankful for in any commentary.

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- 17 *Brook (R.)* Miracles. I. Their Possibility. II. Their Credibility. Interpreter, Jan. and Feb. 1905.
- Lamb (F. J.)* Miracle-Testimony of God. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1905. [Miracle is the necessary authentication of divine revelation. Otherwise subjective caprice is taken to be revelation.]
- 20 *Hyde (W. De W.)* From Epicurus to Christ: A Study in the Principles of Personality. 296p. Macmillan, 1904.
- 26 *Ragg (L.)* Aspects of the Atonement: the Atoning Sacrifice illustrated from the various Sacrificial Types of the Old Testament, and from the successive Ages of Christian Thought. Preface by Bishop of Lincoln. 146p. Rivingtons, 1904.
- Sabatier (A.)* Doctrine of the Atonement and its historical evolution; Religion and Modern Culture tr. from Fr. by V. Leuliette. (Crown Theo. Libr.) 228p. Williams & N., 1904.
- 33 *Gore (Bishop)* The Permanent Creed and the Christian Idea of Sin. 45p. Murray, 1905. [Two sermons preached before the University of Oxford.]
- Kirchner (Viktor)* Subjekt und Wesen der Sündenvergebung besonders auf der frühesten Religionsstufe Israels. Th. St. u. Krit., Jan. 1905.
- 62 *Vawdrey (J. C.)* Meaning of Doctrine of Communion of Saints; remarks as to its hist., and on praying for the departed. 94p. Jarrold, 1905.
- Purves (David)* The Life Everlasting. 265p. Clark, 1905.
- 65 *Royce (J.)* The Conception of Immortality. 174p. Constable, 1905. [The only solution of the problem of individuality lies in conceiving every man as so related to the world and to the very life of God, that in order to be an individual at all a man has to be very much nearer to the Eternal than in our present life we are accustomed to observe.]
- 30 *Robinson (J. Armistage)* Some thoughts on the Athanasian Creed. 74p. Longmans, 1905. [Three lectures delivered in Westminster Abbey in Advent, 1903, together with a sermon before the University of Cambridge. Author advocates the omission of the "warning" clauses.]
- 90 *Anon.* A New Way in Apologetic. Church Q. R., Jan 1905. [An attempt to fix the leading conceptions of the philosophy of the Christian religion.]
- Henson (Hensley H., Canon)* Notes on Popular Rationalism. 221p. Isbister, 1904.
- E ETHICS** 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics, 10 Theories, 20 Applied Ethics, Sociology, 23 Economics, 27 Education.*
- 2 Character and Conduct. Book of helpful thoughts by great writers, select. and arr. for daily reading by author of "Being and Doing" 384p. Simpkin, 1904.
- Watson (J.)* Isaiah, the Type of Quietness. Exp., Feb. 1905.
- 6 *Brann (H. A.)* The Spirit of Christian Beneficence. Catholic World, Feb. 1905.
- Hoffet (E.)* Le ministère de la charité exercé par la femme dans l'Eglise chrétienne. R. du christianisme social, Nov. 1904.
- Randin (P.)* La dogmatique chrétienne-sociale. Rev. chrétienne, Feb. 1905.
- Troeltsch (E.)* Politische Ethik und Christentum. Hoeck u. Ruprecht, 1904.
- 7 *Leuba (James H.)* On the Psychology of a Group of Christian Mystics. Mind, Jan. 1905. [From the psychological point of view the most characteristic trait of the Christian Mystics is what may be called their "inward-mindedness," i.e. the preponderance in their consciousness of the sensations, ideas, and feelings of subjective origin, to the detriment of the sensations, ideas, and feelings determined more or less directly by, or referring to, the outside world.]
- Montmorand (Brenier de)* Les mystiques en dehors de l'Extase. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1905. [Emotions of mystics do not perfectly accord with the James-Lange theory. Joy is often accompanied with the physiological expressions of grief.]
- 8 *Anon.* Books of Devotion. Church Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- 10 *Spiller (G.)* De la méthode dans les recherches des lois de l'Éthique. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1905. [Plea for scientific method in the study of ethical laws. Experimental work, no less varied in kind than in the physical sciences, is capable of being done in the moral sciences.]
- Belot (G.)* Enquête d'une morale positive. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1905. [Criticism of the metaphysical theory of morality as set forth by Dunan. Author also argues against the formalism of Kant.]
- Fouillée (A.)* La raison pure pratique doit-elle être critiquée. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1905. [Kant has failed to establish the categorical character of the moral law. His "pure reason" resolves itself on analysis into a pure impossibility.]
- Stern (Bruno)* Gerechtigkeit. Arch. f. system. Phil., x. 4, Nov. 1904. [Justice consists (1) in the cessation of harmful encroachments upon the psychical life of other men and of the animals; and (2) in the cessation of harmful encroachments upon one's own psychical life.]
- Staeps (Hermann)* Das Problem der Willensfreiheit vom Standpunkt des Sollens. Arch. f. system. Phil., x. 4, Nov. 1904. [Besides the purely theoretical and deterministic point of view, human actions are to be considered from the point of view of the moral judgment, of judgments of value, of norms. Then freedom appears as a moral life problem. Act according to the norm, as it comes in conscience to consciousness—such is the imperative of Freedom.]
- Callaway (Charles)* Does Determinism destroy Responsibility? (Reprinted from "The Agnostic Annual" for 1905.) 15p. Watts.
- Goodwin (C. J.)* Carlyle's Ethics. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.
- 20 *Goldscheid (Rudolf)* Jahresbericht ueber Erscheinungen der Soziologie in den Jahren 1899-1904. Arch. f. system. Phil., x. 4, Nov. 1904.
- Bryce James and others.* Sociological Papers. 292p. Macmillan, 1905. [Papers read before the Sociological Society in its first session. The subjects covered may be grouped under three heads:—(1) History and Methodology of Sociology, papers by Prof. Durkheim and Mr Branford; (2) Pioneer Researches in Borderland Problems, papers by Dr Wester mark and Mr H. H. Mann; (3) Applied Sociology

—"Eugenics," by Mr Galton; and "Civics," by Prof. Geddes.]

*Delvaile (J.)* La vie sociale.

Rev. Phil., Dec. 1904.

[Extreme complexity of society renders Spencer's theory of a social organism inadequate; if society be an organism, it is an "organism of ideas." Social development starts from exceptional individuals, no less than from the influence of environment.]

*Schmidkunz (Hans)* Ethik des Mitleids.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxv. 1, 1905.

*Depasse (H.)* Le jeu et le travail.

R. du christianisme social, Nov. 1904.

*Hamilton (Dr Anna)* Les ambulancières japonaises.

R. du christianisme social, Dec. 1904.

[Their organisation under the Red Cross for the present war.]

*Kerby (W. J.)* Principles in Social Reform. Catholic World, Feb. 1905.

*Hobhouse (L. T.)* Democracy and Reaction. 252p. Unwin, 1904.

*Alden (Percy)* The Unemployed: A National Question. With Pref. by Sir J. Gorst. 190p. King, 1905.

*Geddes (Patrick)* Civic Education and City Development. Cont. R., Mar. 1905.

*Henderson (C. R.)* Modern Methods of Charity. Macmillan, 1905.

21 *Harvey (C. H.)* The Biology of British Politics. 172p. Sonnenschein, 1905.

24 *Richet (Ch.)* La paix et la guerre. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1905.

[It is not the triumph of the best, as Hegel maintains, that results from war, but the triumph of the strongest. Neither in times of peace, nor during conflict, does the warlike spirit advance the morality of citizens.]

27 *Barth (Paul)* Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, iv.

Vierteljahrs. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 4, Dec. 1904.

[Treats of the public organisation of a new form of culture—the "encyclopædic"—after Aristotle, and of its adoption by the Romans.]

*Bauch (Bruno)* Sittlichkeit und Kultur.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxv. 1, 1905.

[The organisation of culture is of supreme ethical value, but it is not to be judged from an ethical point of view. The striving for culture is due to æsthetic motives.]

*Davidson (Thomas)* The Education of the Wage-Earners. 256p. Ginn & Co., 1904.

*Alibert (C.)* Valeur éducative de la discipline scolastique.

Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1904.

*Gardner (Alice)* Sound Learning and Religious Education. Lecture delivered at King's College, London, Women's Department, Oct. 1904. 29p. Clay, 1904.

[The notion that the Bible should lose influence through critical examination seems to show not only a distrust of the Bible itself, but a poor opinion of the whole character of modern scholarship.]

*Pijper (F.)* De grondslag van de faculteit der godgeleerdheid aan de openbare universiteiten. Th. Tijds., Jan. 1905.

[Contribution from the liberal side to the present controversy in regard to a faculty of Theology in the Universities.]

*Ottley (Edward Bickersteth)* Religious Instruction in Primary Schools.

Mont. R., Feb. 1905.

[Suggests solution of the question.]

*Anon.* Eton and Education.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1905.

[The blot on the system is that it leaves the average boy densely ignorant. Suggestions are made as to how this may be remedied.]

*Berkowitz (Henry)* The Moral Training of the Young among the Jews.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

*Black (Hugh)* The Practice of Self-culture. 370p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.

*Knox (Bishop)* Pastors and Teachers. Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology. Introd. by Bishop Gore. New ed. 200p.

Longmans, 1904.

*Super (C. W.)* What is it to be educated? Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1905.

*Miles (Eustace)* A Boy's Control and Self-Expression. Ill. 572p. Pub. by author at Cambridge. 1904.

[The object of this book is to make a boy far more independent by the practice of plain little things, plain little physical and mental habits. The boy is to learn the habit of self-control and self-expression and self-respect, chiefly by apparently alien things, including physical exercises.]

30 *Oliphant (J.)* The Marriage of Convenience in France. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

75 *Ghent (W. J.)* Mass and Class; survey of social divisions. Macmillan, 1904.

80 *Pereira (H. H., Bp.)* Intemperance. (Handbooks for Clergy.) 180p.

Longmans, 1905.

94 *Leffingwell (A.)* The Vivisection Problem. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

[Reply to Dr C. S. Myer's art. in April 1904.]

98 *Dennis (A. P.)* The Political and Ethical Aspects of Lynching.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

*Hobson (J. A.)* The Ethics of Gambling.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

## F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons

*Anon.* The Science of Pastoral Theology.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1905.

[A proposal for wide co-operation in organising the scientific classification and study of the various methods of pastoral work.]

2 *Burton (E.),* ed. Sermons preached in St Edmund's College Chapel on Various Occasions (by various preachers). Pref. by Archb. Bourne. 262p. Burns & Oates, 1904.

*Davidson (R. T., Archbishop of Canterbury)* The Christian Opportunity: Sermons and Speeches Delivered in America. 228p.

Macmillan, 1904.

*Ingram (A. F. W., Bp.)* Faith of Church and Nation. 226p. Gardner, 1904.

*Ealand (F.)* Sermons from Browning. 2nd ed. 180p. Brown, Langham, 1905.

*Herford (Brooke)* Anchors of the Soul. With a biographical sketch by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. 303p. Green, 1905.

*Hutton (A. W.)* Ecclesia Discens. Occasional Sermons and Addresses. 166p.

Griffiths, 1904.

*Robinson (Forbes)* College and Ordination Addresses. Ed. by C. H. Robinson. 175p.

Longmans, 1905.

*Smith (G. Adam)* Forgiveness of Sins; other sermons. 278p. Hodder, 1904.

*Campbell (R. J.)* Sermons addressed to individuals. 336p. Hodder, 1904.

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- 1 *Francis (St)* Life, by St Bonaventura. (Temple Classics.) Dent, 1904.
- 2 *Wall (J. C.)* Shrines of British Saints. Illus. 264p. Methuen, 1905.
- Russell (G. W. E.)* Sydney Smith. (English Men of Letters.) 241p. Macmillan, 1905.
- V *Anon.* William Stubbs, Churchman and Historian. Quar. R., Jan. 1905.
- Anon.* Bishop Creighton. Edinb. R., Jan. 1905.
- Lathbury (D. C.)* Henry Parry Liddon. 19th Cent., Feb. 1905.
- Rashdall (Hastings)* The Life of Liddon. Indep. R., Feb. 1905.
- Sichel (Edith)* Canon Ainger. Quar. R., Jan. 1905.
- Holyoake (George Jacob)* Bygones worth Remembering. 2 vols. 295-312p. Unwin, 1905.
- Hughes (D. P.)* The Life of Hugh Price Hughes. 692p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.
- Porter (Mrs Horace)* Secret of a Great Influence: Notes on Bp. Westcott's teaching, and chap. on his comm., by Arthur Westcott. 248p. Macmillan, 1905.
- Moulton (J. H.)* A Cambridge Oriental Scholar. Lond. Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- Salt (H. S.)* The Life of James Thomson ("B. V.," author of "The City of Dreadful Night.") Cheaper ed., with portrait. 206p. Fifeild, 1905.
- 4 *Anon.* Souvenirs de Louis Bonnet (avec portrait). La Liberté chrétienne, Jan. 1905.
- Allier (R.)* L'évolution religieuse de Bernardin de Saint-Pierre. Rev. chrétienne, Feb. 1905.
- Bonet-Maury (G.)* Abraham Duquesne, patriote et chrétien protestant (1610-1658). Rev. chrétienne, Jan. 1905.
- Gounelle (G.)* T. Fallot: un prophète au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. R. du christianisme social, Nov. and Dec. 1904.
- Vienot (J.)* Sainte-Beuve et les protestants vaudois. Rev. chrétienne, Feb. 1905.
- 5 *Walsh (J. J.)* Silvio Pellico. Catholic World, Feb. 1905.

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- Firth (C. H.)* A Plea for the Historical Teaching of History. Inaugural Lecture at Oxford. 32p. Clarendon Press, 1904.
- Lamprecht (Karl)* Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft. 130p. Heyfelder, 1905. [Five lectures delivered at the St Louis Congress. The author, who is Professor of History at Leipzig, emphasises social psychology as the mark of recent historical science, and assigns art and the activity of the imagination generally as the most appropriate field of historical investigation.]
- Lory (Carl)* Nietzsche als Geschichtsphilosoph. Eine Quellenstudie. 54p. Kohler, 1904. [A sympathetic treatment, dedicated to Prof. Lamprecht.]
- Rauschenbusch (W.)* The Zurich Anabaptists and Thomas Münzer. Amer. J. of Th., Jan. 1905.

- w *Hamilton (C. H.), ed.* Ecclesiae occidentalis monumenta Juris antiquissima. Fasc. 1, Pt. 2. Frowde, 1904.
- C *Dill (S.)* Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius. 664p. Macmillan. [The period here dealt with opens with the self-destruction of lawless and intoxicated power; it closes with the realisation of Plato's dream of a reign of philosophers. The object of this book is to show how the later Stoicism and the new Platonism, working in eclectic harmony, strove to supply a rule of conduct and a higher vision of the Divine world. The account of the old Roman religion is especially full and exhaustive.]
- Harnack (A.)* Expansion of Christianity in first three centuries. V. i., tr. and ed. by J. Moffatt. 510p. Williams & N., 1904.
- Labouri (J.)* Le Christianisme dans l'empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide. 387p. Lecoffre, 1904.
- M *Dräseke (J.)* Zu Basileios von Achrida (c. 1145-1169, Abp. of Thessalonica). Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 1, 1905.
- Duchesne (Mgr.)* Sur la translation de S. Austremoine. Anal. Bolland., Tom. 24, fasc. 1.
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- R *Anon.* The Reformation in England. Edinb. R., Jan. 1905. [Deals with Cambridge History, Vol. ii.]
- Berbig (G.)* Akten zur Reformationsgeschichte in Coburg (continuation). Th. St. u. Krit., Jan. 1905.
- Arthur (Sir George)* The Bishops and the Reformation Settlement. 19th Cent., Feb. 1905.
- Ward (A. W.) and others, eds.* The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. iii. The Wars of Religion. 942p. Clay, 1904. [Covers the century from 1525-1621. Contains, *inter alia*, chapters on "The Wars of Religion in France," by A. J. Butler; "French Humanism and Montaigne," by A. A. Tilley; "The Catholic Reaction," by E. Nisbet Bain; "The Revolt of the Netherlands," by G. Edmundson; "The Elizabethan Age of English Literature," by Sidney Lee; and "Political Thought in 16th Century," by J. N. Figgis.]
- 2 *Trevelyan (G. M.)* England under the Stuarts. 582p. Methuen, 1904.
- 2V *Walpole (Sir Spencer)* The History of Twenty-five Years. Vol. i., 1856-65; vol. ii., 1865-70. 548p. + 540p. Longmans, 1904.
- 70 *M'Elroy (R. M.)* The American Revolution from the Standpoint of an English Scholar. Princeton Theo. R., Jan. 1905. [Refers to Part II. of "American Revolution," by Sir Geo. Otto Trevelyan.]

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R. C. Church 3 Anglican.

- Winstedt (E. O.)* Notes from Cosmas Indicopleustes. J. Th. St., Jan. 1905.
- C *Bardenhever (O.)* Neue Exegetische Schriften des hl. Hippolytus. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1905.

[Found in a Georgian MS., and treating of the blessing of Jacob, the blessing of Moses, and the story of David and Goliath.]

*Horner (G.)* The Statutes of the Apostles, or Canones Ecclesiastici. Ed. with translation and collation from Ethiopic and Arabic MSS.; also a translation of the Saïdic and collation of the Bohairic versions and Saïdic fragments. 480p.

Williams & Norgate, 1904.

*D'Alès (Adhémar)* La Théologie de Tertullien (Bibliothèque de Théologie Historique). 535p. Beauchesne, 1905.

*Pohlenz (M.)* Philosophische Nachklänge in altchristlichen Predigten.

Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 1, 1905.

*Riedel (Wilhelm)* and *Crum (W. E.)* The Canons of Athanasius of Alexandria, The Arabic and Coptic Versions edited and trans. 189p. (Text and Trans. Soc.)

Williams & Norgate, 1904.

*Turner (C. H.)* Prolegomena to the Testimonia of St Cyprian.

J. Th. St., Jan. 1905.

F Basil the Great, St. Eighth letter in Greek and English, tr. by Blomfield Jackson. Parker, 1905.

H Isidore of Pelusium; Further Notes on the MSS. of. By K. Lake. J. Th. St., Jan. 1905.

2 *Burn (A. E.)* Niceta of Remesiana. His Life and Works. 303p. Clay, 1905.

*Chérot (Henri)* Les seize Carmélites de Compiègne, Martyres sous la Révolution, d'après les documents originaux.

Études, Feb. 1905.

*Warfield (E. B.)* Augustine and his "Confessions."

Princeton Theo. R., Jan. 1905.

*Roey (E. Van)* La monnaie d'après Saint Thomas D'Aquin, I.

Rev. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1905.

*Sabatier (Paul)* Examen de quelques travaux récents sur les Opuscules de Saint François. 164p. Fischbacher, 1905.

*Coulton (G. G.)* Side Lights on the Franciscans. Indep. R., Feb. 1905.

*Leroux (A.)* Un programme de restauration du catholicisme en 1795 d'après le "Manuel des missionnaires" de l'abbé Jean-Noël Coste.

Rev. chrétienne, Dec. 1904 and Feb. 1904.

3 *Acland (J. E.)* A Layman's Life in the days of the Tractarian Movement. In Memoriam, Arthur (Acland) Troyte. 236p. Parker, 1905.

*Pollard (A. F.)* Thomas Cranmer and the English Reformation, 1489-1556. (Heroes of the Reformation, ed. by S. M. Jackson.) 399p. Putnam, 1905.

*Moffatt (J.)* The Golden Book of John Owen. Passages from the Writings of the Rev. John Owen, Dean of Christ Church. 266p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.

4 *Cordery (H.)* Les devoirs des Églises indépendantes de l'État à la veille de la séparation des Églises et l'État.

Rev. chrétienne, Nov. 1904.

*D'Arvey (J.)* et *Lods (A.)* Lettres à un député sur la séparation.

Rev. chrétienne, Dec. 1904.

[Protesting against provisions in M. Combes bill limiting religious associations to single departments and practically confiscating church property. These proposals, if carried, would destroy the whole organisation of the Protestant Churches, and probably extinguish them altogether.]

*Dieterlen (P.)* Le réveil des Églises par le moyen des pasteurs.

Rev. chrétienne, Dec. 1904.

*Lods (Armand)* Les biens des pauvres.

Rev. chrétienne, Jan. 1905.

[A protest against the proposal, in the bill for Church and State separation in France, to transfer the charitable funds of the Churches to the public charitable bodies of the communes.]

*Martin (A.)* La séparation des Églises et de l'État. Rev. chrétienne, Dec. 1904.

[Deprecates separation, which would throw pastors entirely upon their congregations for maintenance, to the injury of their honesty and independence.]

*Garvie (A. E.)* The Religious Condition of Germany. Lond. Q. R., Jan. 1905.

5 *Lindsay (T. M.)* John Knox. Lond. Q. R., Jan. 1905.

*Anon.* The Ecclesiastical Crisis in Scotland. Church Q. R., Jan. 1905.

[The Lords' decision shows there cannot be a church spiritually independent. Establishment is only one particular set among others of legal relations. Recognising this, cannot the Scottish Churches seek parliamentary sanction for union among themselves—as a first step towards a wider one?]

*Lindsay (J.)* The Ecclesiastical Situation in Scotland. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1905.

*Macpherson (C.)* The Church Crisis in Scotland. 19th Cent., Jan. 1905.

*Henderson (H. F.)* Religious Controversies of Scotland. Religion in lit. and life. 280p. T. & T. Clark, 1905.

*Beardsley (F. Grenville)* History of American Revivals. 324p.

Amer. Tract. Soc., 1904.

## L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

*Seth (James)* The Relation of the Ethical to the Aesthetical Element in Literature. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

[Plato's criticism of the poets on account of the demoralising influence of their representations of moral badness, and his demand that they shall be allowed to represent only the good, would mean not merely the limitation, but the annihilation, of literature. To restrain the poet or the novelist from the representation of evil as well as good would be to make impossible the representation of goodness itself.]

2 *Hunt (T. W.)* Indebtedness of Later English Literature to Earlier.

Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1905.

*Wendell (B.)* The Temper of the 17th Century in English Literature. Clark Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, 1902-3. 370p. Macmillan, 1904.

*Bradley (A. C.)* Shakesperian Tragedy. Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth. 510p. Macmillan, 1904.

[Review will follow.]

*Maeterlinck (Maurice)* "King Lear" in Paris. Fort. R., Feb. 1905.

["Were Shakespeare to come back to us on earth, he could no longer write Hamlet or Mac-

# RECENT LITERATURE—BIBLIOGRAPHY 645

- beth*, he would feel that the august and gloomy main ideas upon which those poems rest would no longer carry them, whereas he would not have to modify a situation or a line in *King Lear*."] V
- Warren (T. Herbert)** Matthew Arnold. Quar. R., Jan. 1905.  
[Much of the prophet Arnold undoubtedly possessed, yet he was not quite a prophet. He has not the prophet's intensity or abstraction. He did not retire enough either into the wilderness or into himself. Like his own Goethe, he occupied a middle place.]
- Ruskin (J.)** Letters to Charles Eliot Norton. 2 vols., 261-243p. Mifflin, 1905.
- Griffin (W. Hall)** Early Friends of Robert Browning. Cont. R., Mar. 1905.
- Japp (A. H.)** Robert Louis Stevenson, a Record, an Estimate, and a Memorial. 308p. Werner Lawrie, 1905.
- Salt (H. S.)** Richard Jeffries; his Life and his Ideals. Cheaper ed., with new pref. 119p. Fifield, 1905.
- Anon.** Mr Stanley Weyman's Novels. Church Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- W Balfour (A. J.)** Essays and addresses. 3rd and enlarged ed. 443p. Douglas, 1905.  
[Includes Address to British Association at Cambridge, and Letter on Dr Clifford's treatment of the educational controversy.]
- Watson (William)** Poems. Intro. by J. A. Spender. 2 vols. 226-212p. Lane, 1904.
- Keller (Ludwig)** Johann Gottfried Herder und die Kulturgesellschaften des Humanismus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Maurerbundes. 106p. Weidmann, 1904.
- Nietzsche (Elisabeth Förster)** Correspondence between Frederick Nietzsche and George Brandes. Nat. R., Jan. 1905.
- Wicksteed (P. H.)** The Early Lives of Dante. (The King's Classics.) 182p. De La More Press, 1904.
- Calvert (A. F.)** The Life of Cervantes. 139p. Lane, 1905.
- Whibley (L.), ed.** A Companion to Greek Studies. 672p. Clay, 1905.  
[Presents in one volume such information, apart from that contained in Histories and Grammars, as will be most useful to the student of Greek Literature. The "Literature" is dealt with by Sir Richard Jebb, "Philosophy" by Dr Jackson and Mr E. D. Hicks, "Mythology and Religion" by Prof. E. A. Gardner.]
- Butcher (S. H.)** Harvard Lectures on Greek Subjects. 276p. Macmillan, 1904.  
[A companion volume to *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*. Author attempts to bring out something of the originality of Greece. The contrast is drawn between Greece and the two older civilisations—that of Israel, dominated by a great religious idea, and that of Phœnicia, given over to the pursuit of material well-being. Other chapters deal with the Greek Love of Knowledge and Greek Literary Criticism.]
- Croiset (A.) and Croiset (M.)** An Abridged History of Greek Literature. Trans. by G. F. Heffebower. 569p. Macmillan, 1904.
- Anon.** Homer and his Commentators. A Review of Modern Researches in the Pre-historic Mediterranean. Edin. R., Jan. 1905.
- Wyse (W.)** The Speeches of Isæus. With Critical and Explanatory Notes. 735p. Clay, 1905.
- M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4**
- Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.*
- 2 Stewart (J. A.)** The Myths of Plato. Translated with introductory and other observations. 532p. Macmillan, 1905.  
[Furnishes the material for estimating the characteristics and influence of Plato, the mythologist, as distinguished from Plato, the philosopher. Review will follow.]
- 4 Mitchell (J. Murray)** The Great Religions of India. 287p. Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1905.
- Robson (J.)** Hinduism and Christianity. 228p. 3rd ed. Oliphant, 1905.
- 5 Rhys Davids (C. A. F.)** "Seeing Things as they really are." Buddhism, i. 3, March 1904.
- Carus (Paul)** The Philosophy of Buddhism. Buddhism, i. 4, Nov. 1904.
- 7 Adler (M. N.)** The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela (*continued*). Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.  
[Text and translation.]
- Fraenkel (S.)** Jüdisch-arabisches. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.  
[Critical notes on the Genizah texts from Cairo.]
- Ginzberg (L.)** Genizah Studies (IV.). Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- Henriques (H. S. Q.)** The Jews and English Law. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.  
[From Charles II. to the present.]
- Hirschfeld (H.)** The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge (*eighth article*). Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- Krauss (S.)** Die jüdischen Apostel. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.  
[Agrees with Harnack that the Jews had "apostles," and gives an account of same.]
- Margoliouth (G.)** An ancient illuminated Hebrew MS. at the British Museum (*with facsimile*). Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- Phillipson (D.)** The Reform Movement in Judaism (*fourth article*). Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.  
[Describing the Frankfort Movement.]
- Steinschneider (M.)** Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1905.
- Service of the Synagogue. A new edition of the Festival Prayers, with an English Trans. in Prose and Verse. Day of Atonement. Part I. Evening Service. 81p. Routledge, 1904.
- Maimonides (Moses)** The Guide for the Perplexed. Trans. from the original Arabic text by M. Friedländer. 2nd ed. 414p. Routledge, 1904.
- 9 Meyboom (H. U.)** Magiërs. Th. Tijds., Jan. 1905.  
[A study of the practice of magic in the first two centuries.]
- 12 Besant (Annie)** A Study in Consciousness. A contribution to the science of psychology. 443p. Theosophical Pub. Soc., 1904.
- Denis (Leon)** Christianity and Spiritualism. Trans. from the French by Helen Draper Speakman. 286p. Welby, 1904.
- Drum (W. M.)** Is Christian Science Christian? Catholic World, Feb. 1905.

*Grandmaison (L. de)* Le Lotus Bleu. Les Théosophes et la Théosophie.

Études, Feb. 1905.

*Wadia (P. A.)* An Inquiry into the Principles of Modern Theosophy, with an Appendix containing a Paper on Pantheism. 232p.

Bombay: Anklesaria.  
52 *Albrecht (G. E.)* The Religious Life of Modern Japan. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1905.

**P PHILOSOPHY** 10 · *Metaphysics*, 21  
*Epistemology*, 33 · *Psychical Research*, 40 ·  
*Psychology*, 60 · *Logic*, 70 · *Systems*, 90 ·  
*Philosophers*.

*Dutoit (E.)* Bericht ueber die Erscheinungen der französischen philosophischen Litteratur der Jahre 1900 bis 1901.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxv. 1, 1905.  
[Deals chiefly with *La Logique de Leibnitz*, by Louis Couturat, and with *Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique pure*, by Charles Renouvier.]

*Pflaum (C. D.)* Bericht ueber die italienische philosophische Litteratur des Jahres 1902. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxv. 2, 1905.

*Vaschide (N.)* La philosophie et la psychologie au Congrès de Cambridge.

Rev. Phil., Dec. 1904.  
[Deals with papers by M'Dougall, Rivers and Hicks.]

*Höfding (Harald)* A Philosophical Confession. J. of Phil., ii. 4, Feb. 1905.

[As a critical monist author would say:—If we cannot carry out our monistic ideal the reason would be that reality is not completed, is not finished, is yet in full development. It is the reality of time which makes the world irrational for us. There is at least one thing which is not completed—our thinking, our knowledge; and this is also an element in reality.]

*Gomperz (Theodor)* Essays und Erinnerungen. 253p.

Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1905.

Philosophische Aufsätze, herausgegeben von der Philosophischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin zur Feier ihres sechzigjährigen Bestehens. 27Cp. Weidmann, 1904.

[Contains papers on Kant by Lasson, on the nature of Philosophy by Döring, on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion by Schubert, etc.]

*Vailati (G.)* Le rôle des paradoxes dans la philosophie. Rev. de Phil., Feb. 1905.

10 *Fullerton (G. S.)* A System of Metaphysics. 627p. Macmillan, 1905.

*Hovison (G. H.)* The Limits of Evolution, and other Essays. Illustrating the metaphysical theory of Personal Idealism. 2nd revised ed. 450p. Macmillan, 1905.  
[Review will follow.]

*James (William)* The Pragmatic Method. J. of Phil., i. 25, Dec. 1904.

[The great English way of investigating a conception is to ask, "What is it known as? In what facts does it result? What is its cash-value in terms of particular experience? and what special difference would come into the world according as it were true or false?"]

*James (William)* The Thing and its Relations. J. of Phil., ii. 2, Jan. 1905.

[Radical empiricism takes conjunctive relations at their face value, holding them to be as real as the terms united by them. Author criticises Bradley's contention that none of these relations, as we actually experience them, can be real.]

*Leighton (J. A.)* On the Metaphysical Significance of Relations.

J. of Phil., i. 26, Dec. 1904.

[The unity of a society of selves affords us a genuine example of relations that are at once transeunt and immanent. The fundamental type of relation is furnished by the reciprocity of influence exerted and felt by the living centres in a spiritual community of conscious beings.]

*Petronievics (B.)* Principien der Metaphysik. Bd. i., Th. i. 475p. Winter, 1904.

*Vignon (P.)* L'atmosphère métaphysique des sciences naturelles.

Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1904.

13 *Davison (W. T.)* The New Theory of Matter. Lond. Q. R., Jan. 1905.

*Ramsay (Sir William)* What is an Element? Mont. R., Feb. 1905.

[At least one so-called element can no longer be regarded as ultimate matter, but is itself undergoing change into a simpler form of matter.]

*Turner (H. Hall)* Astronomical Discovery. 225p. Arnold, 1904.

*Weber (J.)* Les théories biologiques de M. René Quinton.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1905.

*Weismann (August)* The Evolution Theory. Trans. with the author's co-operation by J. A. Thomson and Margaret R. Thomson. 416-405p. Arnold, 1905.

*Wright (H. W.)* Natural Selection and self-conscious Development.

Phil. R., Jan. 1905.

[Argues in favour of the view of the adjustment of the environment to the needs of the conscious self.]

*Jacoby (Paul)* Études sur la sélection chez l'homme. 637p. Alcan, 1904.

*Wegg-Prosser (F. R.)* Man's Place in the Universe. (Part ii.) Dub. R., Jan. 1905.

14 *Moisant (X.)* La pensée philosophique et la pensée mathématique.

Rev. de Phil., Jan., Feb. 1905.

15 *Rogers (R. A. P.)* The Meaning of the Time-Direction. Mind, Jan. 1905.

[Since the Time-Direction has a psychical meaning only—and in the individual it is given by Will—the objectivity of the Time-direction necessarily implies objective Will. The assumption of a Supreme Spirit immanent in Nature delivers us from the solipsism which arises from the conception that any individual human will can guide the processes of Nature.]

19 *Duhem (P.)* La théorie physique, son objet, et sa structure;—ii, La Structure de la Théorie physique.

Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1904 and Jan. 1905.

21 *Joachim (H. H.)* "Absolute" and "Relative" Truth. Mind, Jan. 1905.

["Absolute Truth" remains for us an Ideal which, just because in *one sense* we realise it, we know cannot be completely realised in discursive thinking, i.e. in knowledge which proceeds by judgment and inference. Any truth is final for human knowledge, the alteration of which would render human knowledge impossible.]

*Kleinpeter (H.)* Die Erkenntnistheorie der Naturforschung der Gegenwart. 168p. Barth, 1905.

27 *Joseph (H. W. B.)* Prof. James on "Humanism and Truth." Mind, Jan. 1905.

[The question whether knowledge is good is one thing: the question what it is, is another. Pragmatism seems to have passed from saying that there are better relations than knowledge to saying that relations which bring good are knowledge.]

- 28 *Huit (Ch.)* Les Notions d'infini et de parfait. Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1904, Jan. 1905.
- 40 *Calkins (Mary Whiton)* The Limits of Genetic and of Comparative Psychology. Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1905.
- Meinong (A.), ed.* Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie. 644p. Barth, 1904.
- [Contains series of papers on psychological subjects by Meinong and his pupils. Meinong himself writes "Ueber Gegenstandstheorie," and Dr Frankl has a valuable contribution, "Ueber Oekonomie des Denkens."
- Bergman (Julius)* Das Verhältnis des Fühlens, des Begehrens und des Wollens zum Vorstellen und Bewusstsein, i. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxv. 2, 1905.
- [The first part of a very elaborate investigation by the late lamented author of the "System des objectiven Idealismus."]
- Solomon (J.)* The Paradox of Psychology. Mind, Jan. 1905.
- [If our attention to the object is baffled and unsuccessful, we are then thrown back upon and become intensely aware of our own sensations, and clearly discriminate them from the external object.]
- Strunz (Franz)* Die Psychologie des Johann Baptista van Helmont. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxv. 1, 1905.
- [Helmont, 1577-1644, was a contemporary of Paracelsus, and a personality of considerable philosophical interest.]
- 50 *Wundt (W.)* Principles of physiological psychology, tr. from fifth Ger. edit. by E. B. Titchener. Vol. I. Illus. 364p. Sonnenschein, 1904.
- [Translation of the Introduction, and Part I,—On the Bodily Substrate of the Mental Life, of Wundt's great work. An index of names and subjects is added.]
- 53 *Hales (F. N.)* Materials for the Psychogenetic Theory of Comparison. Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1905.
- [Attempt to collect and classify the material required to construct an adequate theory of the development of the comparison-process. This material consists of the recorded expressions of comparison-judgments by speech and gesture, employed by civilised and primitive man, by normal persons and by deaf-mutes.]
- Smith (Norman)* Malebranche's Theory of the Perception of Distance and Magnitude. Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1905.
- [An account of Malebranche's theory of natural judgment, and of his anticipation of the later theory of Berkeley in his appreciation of the inferential character of our judgments of visual magnitude.]
- Spearman (C.)* Analysis of "Localisation," illustrated by a Brown-Séquard Case. Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1905.
- 57 *Washburn (Margaret F.)* Wundtian Feeling Analysis and the Genetio Significance of Feeling. Phil. R., Jan. 1905.
- [The root of the difficulty presented by the problem of feeling is the failure to recognise that sensation and feeling are not separated by an impassable gulf, and that transitional forms between the two are conceivable.]
- 59 *Goldscheid (Rudolf)* Grundlinien zu einer Kritik der Willenskraft. 193p. Braumüller, 1905.
- Noël (L.)* Le principe du Déterminisme, i. Rev. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1905.
- 60 *Wolf (A.)* The Existential Import of Categorical Predication. Studies in Logic. 176p. Clay, 1905.
- [A dissertation submitted to the Special Board for Moral Sciences at Cambridge, and certified to be an "original contribution to learning." Author arrives at the conclusion that, using the expression Existence in its strict sense of actual existence in the world of reality, existential implication cannot be permanently associated with any of the four propositional forms.]
- Kreibitz (J. K.)* Ueber ein Paradoxon in der Logik Bolzanos. Vierteljahrss. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 4, Dec. 1904.
- [The paradox consists in the contention of Bolzano that the extension and intension of notions do not vary inversely. Author criticises Bolzano.]
- Sidgwick (Alfred)* Applied Axioms. Mind, Jan. 1905.
- [Objects to the assumption that a contradiction is an infallible mark of error. A contradiction the author regards as in itself a mere fault in expression—a purely verbal affair. The undeniability of the abstract rule may be admitted, and yet a distinction be drawn between undeniability and truth, since a meaningless statement is just as undeniable as a true one.]
- 64 *MacColl (Hugh)* Symbolic Reasoning, vi. Mind, Jan. 1905.
- [Discusses the question of the Existential Import of Propositions.]
- 72 *Kant (Immanuel)* Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Erste Abtheilung. Bd. ii., Vorkritische Schriften, ii., 1757-1777. 525p. Reimer, 1905.
- [Contains much new material.]
- Barth (Paul)* Zu Kants und Lockes Gedächtnis. Vierteljahrss. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 4, Dec. 1904.
- [Both Locke and Kant are characterised by their relinquishment of any claim to know a supersensuous world inaccessible to empirical cognition.]
- Drexler (H.)* Die doppelte Affektion des erkennenden Subjekts durch Dinge an sich und durch Erscheinungen im Kantischen System. 61p. Beuthen, 1904.
- Delbos (M. V.)* Sur la théorie kantienne de la liberté. Bulletin de la Soc. Française de Philosophie, Jan. 1905.
- Évellin (F.)* La raison et les antinomies. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1905.
- [Author continues his examination of the third antinomy of Kant.]
- 80 *Gomperz (Theodor)* Greek Thinkers; A History of Ancient Philosophy. Vols. ii. and iii. Trans. by G. G. Berry. 397-386p. Murray, 1905.
- [These two vols. deal with Socrates, the minor Socratic Schools, and Plato. A large quantity of new material is collected by the author. The treatment of Plato is very full and exhaustive, although the account of the Platonic metaphysics is somewhat disappointing.]
- Horn (F.)* Platonstudien. Neue Folge: Kratylos, Parmenides, Theätetos, Sophist, Staatsmann. 426p. Holder, 1904.
- Gaye (R. K.)* The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas. (Hare Prize, 1903.) 270p. Clay, 1904.
- [Based upon Jackson and Archer-Hind. Author holds that *mutatis mutandis* very much the same differences are to be found in Plato's later as compared with his earlier theory of the soul as those discovered in the later as compared with the earlier theory of ideas.]
- 90 *Abbott (A. H.)* Psychologische und erkenntnistheoretische Probleme bei Hobbes. 138p. Bonitas-Bauer, 1904.

*Hoffman (A.)* Zur geschichtlichen Bedeutung der Naturphilosophie Spinozas.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxv. 2, 1905.  
[Emphasises the influence of Hobbes upon Spinoza's philosophy of Nature.]

*Jacobi (Max)* Das Weltgebäude des Kardinals Nikolaus von Cusa. 54p.

Kohler, 1904.

[A sympathetic presentation of the cosmology of a much-neglected thinker.]

- 91 *Leibniz.* Trois dialogues mystiques inédits. Fragments publiés avec une introduction par Jean Baruzi.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1905.

*Montague (W. P.)* A Neglected Point in Hume's Philosophy. Phil. R., Jan. 1905.

[From Hume's point of view it is as irrational to regard any sensible object as having its *esse* in its *percipi*, as to regard a pebble as coming into existence, or going out of existence, when joined to, or separated from, other pebbles. If permanence and substantiality be denied to mind, then there is no point in speaking of perceived objects as mental states.]

- 92V *Juvalla (V. Erminio)* La dottrina delle due etiche di H. Spencer. 82p.

Bizzoni, 1904.

*Béart (H.)* Nietzsche's Metaphysik. 126p. Wunder, 1904.

## V ART 83 Sacred Music.

*Marshall (H. Rutgers)* The Relation of Aesthetics to Psychology and Philosophy. Phil. R., Jan. 1905.

[Insists upon keeping clear the distinction between the experience of one who appreciates beauty and the experience of the creative artist.]

*Volkelt (Joh.)* System der Aesthetik. Bd. i. 609p. Beck, 1904.

*Pflaum (C. D.)* Die Aufgabe wissenschaftlicher Aesthetik.

Archiv f. system. Phil., x. 4, Nov. 1904.

[An elaborate essay leading up to the definition of scientific Aesthetics as the knowledge of the pure intensive valuations of mental contents.]

*Lee (Vernon)* Essais d'esthétique empirique : l'individu devant l'œuvre d'art.

Rev. Phil., Jan. and Feb. 1905.

[A series of notes on the attitude of the individual to masterpieces of painting or sculpture, grounded on author's own observations and those of two pupils during 1901-4.]

*Skala (R.)* Ueber die Verwechslung des sinnlich Angenehmen mit den Kunst-eindrücken und einige andere Folgen der sogenannten empirischen Aesthetik.

Arch. f. system. Phil., x. 4, Nov. 1904.

*Tumarkin (Anna)* Die Idealität der ästhetischen Gefühle.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxv. 1, 1905.

*Carman (Bliss)* The Friendship of Art. 303p. Murray, 1905.

*Rebec (George)* Pleasure, Idealism, and Truth in Art. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1905.

[Art is an expression in terms of sense and feeling, but of and for reason through these.]

*Paulhan (F.)* L'Immoralité de l'Art.

Rev. Phil., Dec. 1904.

[Morality implies a perfect systematisation of all our activities. Art does not remake reality, but turns from it to a system of illusions, thus paralysing practical activity by means of unhealthy satisfaction in what is fictitious and imaginary.]

*Bell (Mrs Arthur)* *Introd.* Tintoretto (Art Library). 78p. Newnes, 1905.

- 2 *Anon.* Burne-Jones. Edinb. R., Jan. 1905.

- 33 *Burton-Brown (E.)* Recent Excavations in the Roman Forum, 1898-1905. A Handbook. 227p. Murray, 1905.

*Platner (S. Ball)* The Topography and Monuments of Ancient Rome. 528p.

Allyn & Bacon, 1904.

[Intended to serve as an introduction to the study of the topography of ancient Rome for students of Roman antiquities and history, and incidentally as a book of reference for those who have any special interest in the monuments which still remain.]

- 83 *Wiseman (F. L.)* Church Song. Lond. Q. R., Jan. 1905.

G. D. H.; G. H.; and J. H. W.

# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## IMPRESSIONS OF CHRISTIANITY FROM THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS.<sup>1</sup>

### I.—THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS AND THE JEWISH CONSCIOUSNESS.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

My purpose in this paper is to give some hints and suggestions towards an answer to the question: How does, or how should, the ethical and religious teaching of Jesus, as recorded in the three Synoptic Gospels, strike, or appeal to, the Jewish consciousness? In dealing with this question, I admit that I am creating two abstractions or unrealities. For, in the first place, I must confine myself to the *words* attributed to Jesus, and even of them I must take no account of those which relate to his own person. Now, I am well aware that the words of Jesus must be brought into connection with the life of Jesus. The life, to the Christian believer, perhaps even to

<sup>1</sup> A series of articles, of which Mr Montefiore's is the first, though not originally written for its present place, will appear in the *Hibbert Journal* under the above heading. In the October issue the point of view of Japanese Buddhism will be represented by Professor M. Anesaki, Professor of Religious Philosophy in the Imperial University of Japan: that of Mohammedanism in the January (1906) issue by Syed Ameer Ali. Other articles in the series will be announced in due course. Writers will put their own meaning on the term "Christianity," and may, as in the present instance, deal only with selected aspects.—EDITOR.

the outsider, lights up the words and glorifies them. The life gives to the teaching its true significance and highest value. Divorced from the life, the words are shorn of half of their reality. Here is my first abstraction. And my second is the peculiar, unsatisfying and awkward term, "the Jewish consciousness." There is no such thing exactly as the Jewish consciousness. There are the myriad consciousnesses of living individual Jews in England or Russia or Persia, and there were the consciousnesses of past individual Jews right back to the days of Jesus. And between, or among, all these consciousnesses, there were and are grave and large differences. And perhaps I ought to admit that I use the vague abstraction "the Jewish consciousness" in order to hop and jump about, as I please, and as I find convenient, from one consciousness to another, from the consciousness of others to that of myself, and from the consciousness of Jews in England and of the twentieth century to the consciousness of Jews in other lands and of past ages.

The sort of Jew to whom my question could most interestingly be put, hardly exists upon the earth. To begin with, he should be quite unprejudiced; well versed in Jewish and Rabbinical literature, but unaffected by Christian civilisation, and ignorant of Christian literature; he should be religious, but not superstitious; alert in mind, though, except in purely Jewish literature, quite unlearned. Such a Jew is to read the Synoptic Gospels; he is not to become a Christian by reading them, for that would spoil all. But he is to say how the teaching strikes his mind. Does it seem to him old or new; familiar or strange; Jewish or un-Jewish; good or bad? What relation does it bear to the religious and ethical teachings which he regards as Jewish; is it their fulfilment and completion; does it sum them up, and even carry them further; or is it opposed to them and off the line?

To such a Jew the present writer is a complete contrast. He is doubtless prejudiced, and he is certainly unlearned in Jewish and Rabbinical literature. He has lived amid a

Christian civilisation, and has been soaked with products of Christian thought ; he has numerous Christian friends, and has read many Christian books. Of such a one it may be argued that, unaware to himself, he has imbibed and appropriated much of the religious and ethical teaching of the Gospels, and that, though he might call a great part of that teaching Jewish and familiar, such evidence is of no value. Unconsciously, he may put New Testament interpretation and colour upon Old Testament words ; he may Christianise his Judaism without being aware of the process or the result.

Having spoken of my own false abstractions and special dangers, I want for a moment to speak also of the false abstraction which some Christians create when they contrast Judaism with Christianity. I do not merely mean that they often take the attacks upon the Pharisees and the Scribes in the New Testament as literally true and historically accurate ; I do not merely mean that they often suppose that the bad religion of these bad people was the Judaism of the time of Christ and of Paul, and was the Judaism of all after ages. This is false abstraction enough ; but there is something more. The Judaism which is put in contrast with Christianity is, too often, a sort of special Old Testament Judaism with a few disagreeable, half-real and half-fictitious Talmudical addenda. It is an Old Testament Judaism made up of the book of Esther, the 109th Psalm, the ritual laws of Leviticus and Numbers, and a few other choice excerpts of that description. This Judaism is a complete abstraction ; it has never existed, and it does not exist.

The Old Testament is an important part of Judaism, but it is not to be identified with Judaism ; still less must bits and portions of it be so identified. It is often supposed, and sometimes by Jews themselves, that the best religious and ethical teaching which the Jew has produced and possesses is the Old Testament, and that all which those dreadful Scribes and Rabbis could produce was limited to laws, casuistry and nonsense. But this is by no means true. In one sense, indeed,

it is true that there are things in the Old Testament which cannot be beaten and surpassed. You cannot beat Deut. vi. 5, or Lev. xix. 18, or Hosea vi. 6, or Micah vi. 8, or Psalm li. 17, and so on. They are unsurpassable. Yet, in another sense, it is equally true to say—only Jews are often too timid to say it—that there are many fine and great things in the Rabbinical literature which cannot be beaten or even paralleled in the Old Testament, and that many religious and ethical doctrines of the Old Testament were developed, purified and deepened by the Rabbis. And the same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, might probably be said with equal truth of the later Jewish literature.

Nevertheless, it would have to be considered how far two facts have tended, and still tend, to weaken the effect of the best Rabbinic sayings and teachings upon the average Jewish consciousness. The first fact is, that these nobler sayings and teachings are buried in a mass of greatly inferior matter, so that they are difficult to unearth. They are not collected together in a lovely setting; united and illumined by the story of a noble life. Even when a selection is made of the great sayings and teachings of the Talmud and the Midrash, they cannot produce the same powerful, driving and emotional effect as the sayings and teachings of the Gospels. For they then partake of the weakness of all those books which are not really books, but snippets. Elegant extracts cannot possess the same potency for good as a first-class book, a book of genius. With this fact, to which I may have to recur, the second fact is partly related. To the average, modern, Western Jew, the Old Testament is his only sacred book, the one religious work, except his prayer-book, with which he is familiar. And this limitation must have applied to an enormous number of average Jews in the past, and still more to a gigantic number of average Jewesses. The higher sayings and deeper developments of the Rabbinic literature are not familiar and sanctified to the average Jew as the higher sayings and deeper developments of the

New Testament are familiar and sanctified to the average Christian.<sup>1</sup>

Yet the deductions from this fact must not be pushed too far. For if it can be argued, with some show of reason and truth, that the average, modern, English Jew has imbibed something of New Testament teachings without having read the New Testament, it is also true, and even truer, to say that he has imbibed something of the finer and native Jewish developments without having read the books in which they are recorded or contained. He is the heir of the Jewish past and its product. The religion of the average Jew is, and has for ever so long been, a more developed, and in some respects a better, religion than what we may very roughly call "the religion of the Old Testament." His religion is, and has for long largely been, the higher parts of the Old Testament joined together, with the lower parts either omitted and ignored, or glorified and explained away. And the cause of this is mainly due to the fact that there was and has been a Jewish religious development, parallel with, but independent of Christianity. To prove and safeguard the originality of the teaching of Jesus, it is reasonable enough that Christian scholars should be anxious to show that all the innumerable Rabbinic parallels to the sayings recorded in the Synoptic Gospels are later than the first century after Christ. But these parallels, if critically used, are perfectly legitimate to show the tenour and development of Rabbinic teaching and Rabbinic religion upon their own independent lines. For though most of them are later than the Gospels, they are not borrowed from the Gospels. They are independent creations and developments. And the same thing may be said, and is true, of the higher ideas and religious conceptions. These, too, are Jewish and original. They are not borrowed or adapted from Christianity. Indeed, in one very important respect, the

<sup>1</sup> An exception should be made for the so-called "Sayings" or "Ethics of the Fathers," a short ethical tractate of the Mishnah, which forms a constituent portion of the Jewish Prayer-Book.

Rabbinic parallels to the sayings and teachings of Jesus are, many of them, intensely and specifically Jewish. They are not the creation of one great genius, lifted above his contemporaries in religious insight and power, but they are the products of a great number of minds, of doubtless more than ordinary religious capacity, but yet not too widely removed from the average religious consciousness of their age and environment. They, therefore, represent the best religious conceptions, not merely of the men who said them, but of the entire society in which these men lived and moved. And so, too, many of them became intensely popular among the contemporaries and descendants of their authors. They were the product of the best thought and life of a whole community, and in their turn they entered into its thought and life, strengthened them and carried them forward. They are bone of the Jewish bone, and spirit of its spirit.

Hence it is that many excellences of the Synoptic teaching do not strike the Jewish consciousness as anything novel or unfamiliar. They would indeed appeal to the Jew more if it were not so often dinned into his ears that they are excellences which are new, un-Jewish and super-Jewish. This assertion puts him on the defensive or the offensive: instead of yielding himself up to the beauty of the Synoptic story and to the nobility of its teachings, he tries all the time either to pick holes in them, or to find parallels to every excellence from the Old Testament or the Rabbinical literature. Originality and novelty being claimed for too much, for every part as well as for the whole, they are often denied or unperceived where they really exist.

It may be desirable to indicate some of those excellences which rightly do not impress the Jewish reader of the Synoptics with unfamiliarity. Conspicuous among these is the doctrine of the fatherhood of God, in relation not merely to the race but also to the individual. The Jew has called God "our Father" as long as the Christian; on this point he feels quite convinced that he has nothing to learn. Again, it

is often said in the lower polemics, or in those silly little tracts with which every Jewish household is so painfully familiar, that the God of the Gospels is a God of mercy and love; the God of the Old Testament is a God of severity and justice. The one God is loved; the other God is feared. Perhaps a God of severity and justice may be the right description for the God of *parts* of the Old Testament; it is certainly a wrong description for the God of other parts, and it is still more certainly a wrong description of the God of the Rabbis and of the Jews. The Jewish reader of the Synoptics is apt to attempt a rejoinder to any such false contrast between the Jewish and the Christian God: he will dwell upon the wailing and the gnashing of teeth, upon the big gate and the many which enter it, and upon the fire of hell. The truth is that the Synoptic conception of the Fatherhood of God and of His loving-kindness was so novel to the great mass of the heathen when they adopted it that it has been falsely supposed that it must have been equally novel to the Jew; whereas to the Rabbinic, mediæval and modern Jew it was and is the A B C of his religion.

The same misconception often exists as regards some more specifically *ethical* teachings in the Synoptics. For instance, that reconciliation with one's neighbour must precede reconciliation with God, or that the best alms are those given in secret, or that impure thoughts are evil as well as impure deeds, or that there is peculiar joy in heaven over the repentant—these doctrines and several others are not only Rabbinic commonplaces, but familiar Jewish maxims. That story in Mark about the widow's mite, which Wellhausen says "goes more to one's heart than all the miracles of which the first part of Mark is full," might have come straight out of the Midrash. It is characteristically Rabbinic and Jewish. In all these points the Synoptics do but recall and confirm the best teaching of the Rabbis. There is neither contrast nor supplement.

It may be asked: Does, then, the average Jew go a big step further, and declare that the entire moral and religious

teaching of the Synoptic Gospels is wholly familiar to him? Does he say that, at most and best, it only confirms, by striking phrase or picturesque parable, what he already cherishes and knows? Or does he put it even less favourably to the Gospels, and hold not only that what is true in their teaching is not new, but that what is new is not true? Both these opinions have been held by Jews, and are, I believe, still held to-day.

Quite apart from all Christology, the objections commonly made or felt by Jews to the religious and moral teaching of the Synoptics are, I believe, the following. Some of the teaching is said to be unpractical and overstrained. The ideal is too high, and therefore incapable of realisation. If some maxims were literally obeyed there would be a subversion of law and order, and universal confusion. Again, mere inwardness is not enough for human weakness. For, as Bishop Creighton said, "Without outward helps to spiritualise life, I am afraid that I, for one, am too feeble to get on." On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that the tendency of the teaching is to make a man take a too selfish interest in the saving of his own soul. Or the tendency is said to point towards an ascetic morality, which flees the world and depreciates family life and family love. Judaism, it is said, condemns and repudiates asceticism. The teaching of the Synoptics is said to be in keeping with a fundamental belief of its hero, that the world and its society, in the ordinary sense, were coming to a rapid end, and that a wholly new order of things was about to be ushered in. The teaching is, therefore, not fully suited to a society which expects to continue, which hopes indeed for gradual improvement, but not for sudden and proximate transformation. Lastly, in quite modern days, the teaching has been objected to for its cruel pitilessness in apparently condemning so many unfortunate human children of God to an eternity of punishment and woe. And if it be retorted that the Talmud and Midrash do not in this respect show a different teaching, the rejoinder is speedy, that to these

harsh speculations and fancies of the Rabbis no sacred character and binding force are assigned.<sup>1</sup>

I do not propose to consider whether there is any truth in these criticisms. I would rather make a tentative and diffident venture to indicate the chief points wherein, as it seems to me, the Judaism of the average Jew has something fresh to learn and add from the teaching of the Synoptics. I, therefore, start from the hypothesis that the three Gospels do contain teaching which, when compared with ordinary and average Judaism, is both valuable and original, new and true.

In the first place, reverting to a point which has been just touched upon before, it seems accurate to say that the bringing together of so many excellent ethical and religious doctrines within the compass of a single volume constitutes an originality by itself. The originality is all the greater if these doctrines are united together and illuminated by a few predominant principles, and put into the mouth, as well as exemplified by the life, of a single illustrious Teacher. A doctrine of the Gospels may be paralleled by a quotation from the Talmud, but the question is whether in the Gospels this doctrine occupies a salient place; whether much stress is laid upon it, and much deduction is made from it; or whether, on the other hand, in the Talmud the quotation occurs quite casually, and the particular passage is little noticed and seldom cited and commented on elsewhere. To be able to answer this question as regards the Talmud and the Rabbinic literature demands large knowledge, considerable insight, delicate tact and, above all, a complete freedom from prejudice. He who merely wants to glorify either Judaism or Christianity is quite out of court. It is, however, not difficult to give examples of the right and wrong use of the Rabbinical literature in this respect. Thus the saying, "whether a man offers much or little is

<sup>1</sup> The two passages about eternal punishment in the Old Testament (Isaiah lxvi. 24 and Daniel xii. 2) are little known, or hardly realised to mean what they mean, among average Jews.

all one, if only his heart be directed towards God," is constantly quoted, and the principle which underlies it is characteristically Rabbinic. So, too, the saying in *Abot*, "Be not as servants who minister to their master upon the condition of receiving a reward," is also constantly quoted and as familiar as possible, so that when Professor Schürer says that it is an isolated utterance, totally opposed to the usual Rabbinic conception, he simply makes a prejudiced blunder.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, when Jewish apologists quote the sentence, "The righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come," and use it as an illustration of the prevailing Rabbinic attitude as to the chances of the heathen in the future life, they are committing precisely the same prejudiced blunder as Professor Schürer.<sup>2</sup> Somewhere between these two extremes might lie the Rabbinic parallel to the saying of Jesus, "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it." "What should a man do that he may live? Let him kill himself! And what should a man do that he may die? Let him keep himself alive!" This adage, with its parallels, is, I believe, fairly often used and quoted in Rabbinic literature, but it occupies, and the principle which underlies it fills, a much smaller and less conspicuous place in the religious teaching of the Rabbis than in the religious teaching of the Synoptic Gospels. The entire body of Gospel doctrine would have to be closely examined and tested from this special point of view.

Again, the luminous juxtaposition of even familiar Old Testament doctrines may be novel and stimulating. The combination of Deut. vi. 4 and 5 with Lev. xix. 18—the love of God with the love of man—in Mark xii. 29–31 was surely a brilliant flash of the highest religious genius.

In one of his most biting sarcasms, Wellhausen has hit

<sup>1</sup> E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, vol. ii. p. 391 (3rd ed.).

<sup>2</sup> In later Jewish literature (notably in Maimonides and after him) this isolated saying plays a great and important rôle.

the nail upon the head as regards one aspect at least of the originality of the Gospels. He refers to the allegation of Jewish scholars that everything which Jesus is reported to have said is found in the Talmud. "Yes," says Wellhausen, "everything, and a great deal more. Πλέον ἡμῖσιν παντός. The originality of Jesus lies in this, that he felt and picked out what was true and eternal amid the chaos and the rubbish, and that he enunciated and emphasised it with the greatest possible insistence and stress."<sup>1</sup> Yet Wellhausen also exaggerates in his turn. For if he says that the book of Esther shows the measure of the distance which separates Jesus from Judaism, it must not be forgotten, on the one hand, how the book of Esther was interpreted by the Rabbis and by Judaism—and of all this Wellhausen is naturally ignorant; and on the other hand, that the same mouth which spoke Mark xii. is also reported to have called his opponents serpents and vipers and children of hell, and to have anticipated, at least without regret, and apparently with satisfaction, their everlasting destruction and pain. About all this Wellhausen is discreetly silent. Neither Jews nor Christians, even in their highest teachers, seem free from the reproach of having identified their own enemies with the enemies of God, of having darkened their characters, and of having condemned them, with curious equanimity, to the eternal punishment of a loving and righteous God.<sup>2</sup>

But this is perhaps a dangerous digression, and I return to the question of the originality of the Synoptic teaching. It seems to me that what we may call the genius, the first-classness of the Synoptics, also constitutes a portion of their newness and originality. For a thought is not merely great and new by its substance, but also by its form. Not merely what is said, but how it is said, gives to a particular teaching

<sup>1</sup> Wellhausen, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte* (5th ed., p. 390).

<sup>2</sup> One would like to think that Luke xxiii. 34 was said by the real historic Jesus, and that the passages alluded to above belie him. But may we do this?

its vast stimulus for good, its illumination and haunting power. A Jewish friend of mine has urged that the superiority of the parables of the Synoptics over the parables of the Rabbis lay far less in their substance than in their style. Even supposing that this criticism be true, it does not follow that the Synoptic parables would not contain newness and originality. For of them and of their style, in contrast with the parables of the Midrash, it might be said, "O the little more, and how much it is, and the little less, and what worlds away."

Next, coming a little closer to the substance of the books, the unprejudiced Jewish consciousness would, or should, I think, be impressed by the lofty fervour of the Synoptics, by their enthusiasm and passion. These qualities seem to strike a new note, which has hardly been struck in the same way a second time. Here we have religion and morality joined together at a white heat of intensity. The teaching often glows with light and fire. Nothing is to interfere with the pursuit of the highest moral and religious ideal; nothing is to come before it. All lower claims, however justified and excellent in themselves, when they do not clash with higher demands, must give way before the imperious dictates of the Ideal. "He who loves father or mother more than me." "What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" "Let the dead bury their dead." "No man having put his hand to the plough." I do not say that it would not be possible to discover parallels to these sayings in the Rabbinical literature, but their cumulative effect in the Gospels, together with the effect of the whole atmosphere which, as it were, sustains and confirms them, is exceedingly great.

Connected with this fervour and passion, comes the impression of originality made by the great paradoxes of the Gospels, which are mainly contained in the Sermon on the Mount. "Happy are ye when men persecute you for my sake." "Resist not evil." "Love your enemies." It has indeed been argued, as I have already stated, that some of

these injunctions or statements are either beyond the power of human nature, or undesirable even as ideals. Nevertheless, even the strangest of them leave the suspicion that if, as M. Loisy says, they are not suited to a society "qui doit vivre et se perpétuer dans l'ordre," this is rather the society's fault than theirs. They seem to occupy their place in an ideal morality of which the apex reaches unto heaven, but which ultimately may be realised upon earth. They seem to point to a higher law than can as yet be put into practice, but which is not, for that reason, to be ridiculed as unpractical and absurd.

So far I have spoken of excellences which, though, in many respects, novel and original, do not really conflict even with Rabbinic or traditional Judaism. But for those Jews who do not humbly, sincerely, and devoutly believe that every ritual law in the Pentateuch is the inspired, perfect, and immutable word of God, one of the noblest features of the Synoptic Gospels is that its hero, like a new Amos or Hosea, preaches the great doctrine of Inward above Outward, righteousness above burnt-offerings. Nothing is more striking and characteristic about him than that (without, as it would seem, observing the inconsistency between the prophetic teaching and the divine inspiration of the ritual law), after a long interval of silence, he once more takes up the old prophetic burden and proclaims, with even increased emphasis, the old prophetic truths. "Nothing from without a man," he says, "entering into him can defile him." "Clean what is within, and the outside is clean also."<sup>1</sup> The Rabbis saw clearly enough that if the Pentateuch was the undiluted and absolute word of God, the doctrine of the inward defilement, in the form given to it by Jesus, could not be true. In this respect their logical and dialectical insight was greater, as it seems to me, than that of their illustrious opponent. But for those Jews who accept more modern and more critical views

<sup>1</sup> See Matthew xxiii. 26, and also Luke xi. 41, with Wellhausen's reading and note.

about the origin and composition of the Pentateuch, the teaching of the Synoptics is full of power and suggestion. What Amos said before the Law was, Jesus repeated and deepened when the Law had already existed for four hundred years. And if the originality of Amos is greater in that he said it first, the originality of Jesus is greater in that he said it when he did, that in spite of the accepted doctrine of the perfect and divine law, he could yet perceive the higher perfection and the deeper divineness of the prophetic teaching.

I will now touch upon a few points in which, while I doubt whether it would be accurate to say that the Synoptics are in direct conflict with Rabbinic and Jewish doctrine, they yet seem to supplement and correct it. The first of these is connected with the principle of retribution, or tit for tat. I can merely indicate, in the briefest and roughest way, what I fancy learning could show at length. The Rabbinic religion followed the prevailing doctrine of the Old Testament in holding that, on the whole, the right principle of human conduct, and the great principle of divine conduct, was that of proportionate requital, or tit for tat. I do not mean to say that other principles, such as that of the divine forgiveness, did not frequently cross the principle of tit for tat, but still it seems true to say that tit for tat occupies a very large place in Jewish ethics and religion, a larger place than the facts of life or our highest ethical and religious conceptions can fully justify and approve. Now the teaching of the Synoptic Gospels seems to traverse that doctrine in many different ways. As between man and man we have, for instance, the teaching, "If ye love them which love you, what thank have ye," and the reception of the prodigal son, and as between God and man the teaching seems more emphatic still. Not only that the sun rises on the evil as well as the good, but also, in the vineyard, "I will give unto this last even as unto thee."

German Protestant scholars exaggerate the place and importance of the doctrine of "merit" in Rabbinic theology,

just as they exaggerate the place and importance of "Good Works." One of the oldest Rabbinic prayers, recited daily by every orthodox Jew, begins with a quotation from Daniel ix. 18 and continues with emphasis in the same strain, "Sovereign of all the World! Not because of (or relying on) our righteous acts do we lay our supplications before thee, but because of (or relying on) thine abundant mercies." Yet the Synoptic teaching seems to urge that "merit lives from man to man, and not from man, O Lord, to thee," with especial insistence and force. Moreover, it usually avoids statements inconsistent with this teaching. "Does he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? So ye too, when ye have done what is commanded you, say, We are servants; what we were bound to do, we have done."<sup>1</sup> The law of requital is by no means abandoned in the three Gospels, but it seems used for higher purposes, and looked at in its higher aspects. "Give and it shall be given you. With the same measure that ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." "He that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath." "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required."

The Rabbis were well aware that the kingdom of heaven is, on the one hand, not merely won by effort, and that, on the other hand, the effort of an hour may equal the effort of a lifetime. Frequent is the adage, "Some acquire the world to come after many years, and some acquire it in an hour." And from another point of view we have the often quoted paradox: "The world is judged by grace, yet all is according to the amount of the work." Yet it may be questioned whether the principle laid down in that most exquisite of stories, "Much is forgiven her, for she loved much," and the principle, "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child," are not to be rightly considered as novel creations of the Gospel. For the principle of the little child

<sup>1</sup> Luke xvii. 10. For the omission of the adjective "unprofitable," see Wellhausen, *ad loc.*

occupies as prominent a place in Mark as the principle "How hard it is to enter into the kingdom." Wellhausen has pointed out that the two stories which embody them are purposely made to follow one another, and that Shakespeare's Richard II., in his famous final soliloquy, has rightly perceived the strange antinomy between them.<sup>1</sup> In any case, however, "poetic justice," which would sometimes seem to be the ideal of the Rabbis, is shown by the Gospels to be neither the highest justice of earth nor the supremest justice of heaven.

Perhaps one reason, though not the deepest, why the doctrine of tit for tat is less thought of in the Gospels, is their rather pronounced antagonism to earthly good fortune, their strong sympathy with, or even partiality for, the weak, the miserable, and the poor. The only treasures of any value are the treasures to be attained in heaven. The treasures of earth are transitory from a double reason; the individual dies, and the old order is rapidly nearing its close. The same thoughts meet us not infrequently in the Rabbinic literature, but we note in the Gospels a kind of passionate glorification of renunciation and adversity as marks of true discipleship, and as the one sure passport to heaven. This note goes beyond—how far rightly is another question—the Rabbinic "chastisements of love." The soul is all. "Adversity is the blessing of the New Testament." With incomparable eloquence and power the Gospels disclose to us one aspect of the ultimate truth, one facet of reality, to which we can never again be blind, even though we realise that it is by no means the complete reality, by no means the only truth through which we must work and live, the truth, I mean, which Professor Bradley, with such splendid insight, has lately shown us to be exhibited

<sup>1</sup> ". . . No thought is contented. The better sort,  
As thoughts of things divine are intermix'd  
With scruples, and do set the word itself  
Against the word:  
As thus, 'Come, little ones'; and then again,—  
'It is as hard to come as for a camel  
To thread the postern of a needle's eye.'"

by King Lear, that "the judgment of this world is a lie; (that) its goods which we covet corrupt us; (that) its ills, which wreck our bodies, set our souls free," "the conviction that our whole attitude in asking or expecting that goodness should be prosperous is wrong; that, if only we could see things as they are, we should see that the outward is nothing, and the inward is all."<sup>1</sup>

But—and this is my last point—the renunciation, the self-denial, and that *daily* carrying of the cross, whereby Luke, as Wellhausen notes,<sup>2</sup> changes mere martyrdom into a general way of life, are not in the Gospels urged and intended solely to save one's own soul, but also to save others. The endurance, the self-sacrifice are not to be merely passive, but active. They are to be helpful and redemptive; through loving service and sympathy to awaken in the sinner the dormant capacities of righteousness and love.

Lowly, active service for the benefit of the humblest is an essential feature of the Synoptic religion. "He who would be great among you, let him be your servant." "It is not the will of my father that one of these little ones should perish." The teaching of the Synoptics in this matter seems to cluster round those three great sayings: "The son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister." "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners." "The son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost."

And here, once more, we seem to be cognisant of fresh and original teaching, which has produced fruit to be ever reckoned among the distinctive glories of Christianity. It has two aspects: first, the yearning and eager activity to save and to redeem; secondly, the special attitude of the Master towards sinners and towards sin. The Rabbis and the Rabbinic religion are keen on repentance, which in their eyes is second only to the law; but we do not, I think, find the same passionate eagerness to *cause* repentance, to save the lost, to

<sup>1</sup> A. C. Bradley, *Shakespearian Tragedy*, pp. 326, 327.

<sup>2</sup> See Wellhausen's note on Luke ix. 23.

redeem the sinner. The refusal to allow that any human soul is not capable of emancipation from the bondage of sin, the labour of pity and love among the outcast and the fallen, go back to the Synoptic Gospels and their hero. They were hardly known before his time. And the redemptive method which he inaugurated was new likewise. It was the method of pity and love. There is no paltering with sin; it is not made less odious; but instead of mere threats and condemnations, the chance is given for hope, admiration and love to work their wonders within the sinner's soul. The sinner is afforded the opportunity for doing good instead of evil, and his kindly services are encouraged and praised. Jesus seems to have had a special insight into the nature of certain kinds of sin, and into the redeemable capacity of certain kinds of sinners. He perceived that there was a certain untainted humility of soul which some sins in some sinners had not yet destroyed, just as he also believed and realised that there was a certain cold, formal, negative virtue which was practically equivalent to sin, and far less capable of reformation. Overzealous scrupulosity, and the pride which, dwelling with smug satisfaction upon its own excellence, draws away the skirt from any contact with impurity, were specially repugnant to him. Whether with *this* sin and with its sinners he showed adequate patience may perhaps be doubted, but it does seem to me that his denunciation of formalism and pride, his contrasted pictures of the lowly Publican and the scrupulous Pharisee, were new and permanent contributions to morality and religion. As the Jewish reader meets them in the Synoptic Gospels, he recognises this new contribution; and if he is adequately open-minded, he does it homage and is grateful.

I have but made some rough suggestions towards a difficult subject. There are two other points of great importance about which, through lack of space, and from as yet inadequate study, I cannot say a word. The first concerns the question of divorce and the position of women; the second concerns the doctrine of Faith. As regards the second, a

thorough treatment of the Rabbinic conception of faith and of its relation to the theory of faith in the Synoptics is still, so far as I am aware, a great desideratum. Leaving the originality and excellence of the Gospel teaching on these two big subjects in suspense, I would only desire to say two things in conclusion. First, that if the Rabbinic religion and the mediæval Jewish religious teaching have something to learn from the Gospels, the reader of the Gospels would have also something to learn from them. Secondly, that none of the original excellences of the Synoptics which I have enumerated are inconsistent with prophetic and liberal Judaism, and that only one of them is inconsistent with Rabbinic, traditional, and orthodox Judaism. There is no necessary or essential connection of formalism and hypocrisy with a legal religion.<sup>1</sup> It is possible, as Jesus himself implies, to perform in humble fidelity the "weightier matters" of the Law, and yet "not to leave the other matters undone." It is possible to cleanse that which is within the cup, and yet also to make clean the outside. In other words, it is possible to follow the letter of the Law in the spirit of the Gospel.

<sup>1</sup> Pascal wrote more truly than he himself knew when he said "whoever judges of the Jewish religion by its coarser forms will misunderstand it."

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## SHOULD AGNOSTICS BE MISERABLE ?

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IN the controversies of the present day touching the truth of the old religions, many people take less interest in examining the evidence for beliefs than in discussing their practical value. The question commonly asked is not what is the maximum that is proved, or that is probable, but what is the minimum that is necessary for human welfare. There are many to-day, to whom faith no longer consists either of inherited assumptions or of logical conviction, but rather of hope treated as belief, for practical reasons.

This tendency has a bad side if it lowers the ethical standard as regards truth, and renders fashionable a mental atmosphere where that which a man wants to believe is held *ipso facto* to be true—at least for him. But it is by no means entirely bad. By this change of ground we shall be led into new and perhaps surprisingly fruitful fields of thought. It will, in fact, be an excellent thing if the coming generation sets itself seriously to consider what is the minimum belief on which human nature can thrive.

This question, which has never yet been fairly or fully considered, differs in its nature from the question, "What is the truth about the Universe?" The latter is objective (at least so it seems to me), and should be treated objectively, while the former is subjective. The answer to the question, "What is the truth?" cannot be in the slightest degree affected by the answer to the question, "What belief is

valuable?" On the other hand, a belief is more valuable, *ceteris paribus*, if it is true. The answer to the question, "What is the truth?" must be the same for all persons and for all ages, if only it were known. But to the question, "What belief is valuable to men?" there must be thousands of true answers—in a sense, there would be as many true answers as men and women. But because different people thrive upon different religions, it does not therefore follow that everyone has in fact got the religion on which he could best thrive. Fuller inquiry might remove many individual errors on this point, and would explode some false generalisations to which those errors are in large part due.

As regards such false generalisations, I do not know whether any agnostics still think that everyone would be better if he at once abandoned Christianity; but I do know that, on the other side, people of very varying degrees of orthodoxy often declare that it is not reasonable to be happy or energetic without holding by the old religions, at least in a modified form. Though orthodox beliefs are no doubt desirable for some people, the statement, as a generalisation, is false. But it is so frequently and confidently made that it deceives many, especially as the negative side of the unorthodox position has been more put to the front by its defenders, in the heat of battle, than the goods which it shares with the old religions, and the goods which are peculiarly its own.

The assertion is often made that disbelief in a personal God and disbelief in the individual immortality of each human being implies a materialism that reduces our conception of the world to a "war of jarring atoms," and a pessimism that must destroy all joy and enthusiasm, and must render it irrational and even cruel to "save or produce life."

Now, in the first place, any such proposition runs counter to the experience of history. A pessimistic temperament towards the things of this world has never been so active among large masses of people as during the ages of faith.

The "Christians of the desert," of whom the Egyptian hermits and monks are the prototype, were essentially pessimists. They thought they saw the earth given over to the powers of evil; its natural joys of every kind were snares of the devil; and as to the next world, hell was at least as prominent in their thoughts as heaven. The idea of abandoning this world as hopeless lies at the back, not only of mediæval, but of twentieth century monasticism; it is the inspirer of all the worst influences and negations of the Puritans; and a dark strain of this pessimism underlies the thought of Pascal. It is largely because the leaders of Christianity have for so many centuries preached the badness of this world, and taught mankind to lay up all their treasure in heaven, that so many people to-day, inheriting, consciously or unconsciously, the traditions of St Augustine and Calvin, cannot understand how it is possible to take any but a pessimistic attitude towards the actualities and possibilities of this life. For nearly two thousand years a large part of the noblest poetry and theology has been teaching us, first, to expect perfection as our right; and secondly, to think that this world has in it hardly anything good except the hope of the next.

"Long fed on boundless hope, O race of man,  
How angrily thou spurn'st all simpler fare!"<sup>1</sup>

After such long misguidance, it will be some time before poetry and philosophy can accommodate themselves to the real conditions of existence, can see that this world contains at once both much good and much bad, and that joy in the good is none the less possible because perfection is not to be attained.

Yet I should be the last to deny that in fact many Christians are optimistic in their view of this life as well as in their hope of the next. Optimism and pessimism are by no means wholly and in all cases due to individual beliefs; they are due largely to individual circumstances, and still more to personal temperament. It is not, there-

<sup>1</sup> Matthew Arnold, *The Better Part*.

fore, surprising to find that in all ages examples of both attitudes have been very common among believers and sceptics alike. Fortunately the saner middle position, which recognises to the full both the good and evil of this world, has never been wanting in either camp. England contains many men of the professional, the business, and the labouring classes who, varying widely from each other in their beliefs or disbeliefs, about which they are generally silent, and often extremely uncertain, have a common temperamental attitude towards the Universe. It is the better sort of "common man" who preserves society as the starting-ground for the thought of idealists by his patience and his labour, by the stoical regard with which he meets the great mass of evil without trying to explain it away, without supposing that it will vanish at cockcrow; by his steady attempt to realise for himself, for his family, and for his neighbour a portion of the love, the joy, and the well-being obtainable in greater or less measure by those who work for these things, and whose souls are open to receive them when they come. No creed and no agnosticism will ever make him at heart an optimist or a pessimist. It is useless to exhort him either to think the world perfect or to despair. But he is not to be confused with the thoughtless vulgar, "who what they are would be." He is the strong arm, and the idealists are the wings of the world's aspiration.

Optimism and pessimism are each derived from an overpowering vision of one-half the truth. Either can lead to violent misconduct in thought and practice, or else to besotted resignation. Yet either can produce the most inspired masterpieces both of poetry and of active life. They are a madness, sometimes diabolic, but sometimes divine. Often both enter together and inhabit the soul of one man, such as Dante; or both are found in one creed, as in that of his *Paradiso* and *Inferno*. The temperament of "Shelley the atheist" alternated no less violently from the one pole to the other. In short, neither Christianity

nor agnosticism can be truly charged with the crime (or merit) of producing either optimism or pessimism. It is an affair of temperament, as history indicates, and as the observation of men and women in our own day confirms. If the peoples of the East are indeed more generally pessimistic than we are, it is because they are by temperament more inclined to pessimism than either the pagans or the Christians, the believers or the sceptics of the West.

I shall return, below, to this alleged necessity for pessimism, but at this point it will be convenient to deal with the analogous assertion that materialism is rendered inevitable by disbelief in a personal God and a future life. It is indeed historically inevitable that this confusion should exist in some minds to-day, because the battle against orthodoxy in the last generation was fought by physical scientists, whose professional habits coloured their methods of thought and expression. Huxley, though he sometimes exposed the absurdities of pure materialism with the heartiness usual to him in all controversy, on one occasion defined "the Divine government as the sum of the customs of matter";<sup>1</sup> but it would have been equally true, and more, perhaps, in accordance with his declaration that "our one certainty is the existence of the mental world," if he had defined his God as "the sum of the customs of spirit." This is the only way in which some of us can conceive of God, and it is a conception differing radically both from a "personal God" on the one hand, and from pure materialism on the other. There is no reason why, because we have rejected the supernatural, we should always use materialistic terminology about a Universe whose "nature" includes both matter and mind. Yet the worst traditions of physical science, which Huxley repudiated, and the worst traditions of Christianity, unite to draw men into necessary servitude to this

<sup>1</sup> Life of Huxley, ed. 1903, i. p. 316. See his essay *Science and Morals* for his complete repudiation of materialism, especially p. 130 of *Evolution and Ethics*.

bad custom. Materialism, as a complete explanation of the Universe, is a natural but unfortunate outcome of centuries of wrongheaded religious thinking. The Christian doctrines, like the Levantine religions from which they sprang, taught men to dissociate the body from the soul, which is its flower, and the soul from the body, which is its root.

For long centuries the body was condemned as the "flesh," and nature vilified as "earth." The spiritual life was divorced from the material life and banished to unknown regions. When, therefore, after some two thousand years of such teaching, physical science rose into the region of philosophy, some of its advocates could not, any better than the priests, conceive of matter as the abode of spirit.

It does not exhaust the subject to call man a "collection of atoms"; he is also a mind—a soul. Once we have clearly perceived the one-sided character of the purely materialist position, we have no need to fall back on a personal God and a future life in order to see the Universe as a playground of spiritual forces. When, for instance, we speak of evolution, we advocate no "dreary doctrine." If it is a "war of jarring atoms," it is also an unending struggle of myriads of beautiful souls into a glorious existence. The poetical conception of the evolutionary process is found in Watts' picture of *Chaos* in the Tate Gallery. The Titans struggling up from under their overwhelming prisons of rock, the mysterious but joyful dance of the newborn spirits, round and over the piled volcanoes, render, with something like allegorical dignity, the eternal drama of the growth of mind in matter, the action ever recurring in new forms throughout endless time and space, of which our planet is now witnessing one little scene. To have an adequate conception of the Universe, we must think of the facts of science in poetical terms.

Pessimism is not, any more than materialism, a necessary consequence of refusing assent to the proposition that there is a personal God and an individual life beyond the grave.

Neither the truth nor the falsehood of these beliefs has been established by any convincing testimony ; but some people are so constituted that they cannot help believing them to be untrue, while others cannot help believing them to be true. And here we ought to be content to leave the matter until science or philosophy shows the way to some solid conclusion ; but it is impossible to leave the subject alone so long as those who believe continue to tell the agnostics<sup>1</sup> that they ought to be pessimists. It is only with this latter proposition that I am concerned.

It will make the discussion somewhat more definite if I use the term "personal God," because the word "God" by itself is sometimes used to denote the pantheistic view, or views even more unorthodox than those of the pantheist. If "God" means merely the "sum of the customs of spirit," if it is merely a poetical name for the laws of mind and matter, or, again, if it designates whatever good elements there are in the Universe both inside and outside man, then very few of us need confess to atheism. But a "personal God," I suppose, may be roughly defined as a being of much more than human power and goodness, whose thoughts are His own and feelings His own, in the sense in which each of us is conscious that his thoughts and feelings are his own and not shared by another ; a being to whom we can reasonably offer addresses and petitions, as to a person who is not ourselves. Such a being is not merely the sum of other beings, or the sum of their better qualities.

Now, even if such a God is in His heaven, it is clearly *not* all right with the world. And we shall want more reassuring information about His intentions than any that can be gleaned from His action or inaction in the past, before we can assume an optimistic attitude with regard to the future. Yet it is optimism which some theists proclaim as the special advantage

<sup>1</sup> I use the word "agnostic" in the sense in which Huxley used it, viz., one who "refuses assent, with willingness to reopen the question on cause shown." *Science and Christian Traditions*, preface, pp. xxx-i.

of their creed. A God, however good and just and pitiful, who has allowed, or been unable to prevent, the extinction of the Albigenses and the history of Ireland, is not only no guarantee of the hopes of optimism; He is not even a guarantee against the fears of pessimism. Evil might preponderate over good in a Universe which was presided over by such a God. On the other hand, good might preponderate over evil in a Universe in which there was no personal God, but in which the laws of mind and matter and the influences of good had produced Shakespeare and Shelley, and the development of civil and religious freedom. Or, again, good might be equally and eternally matched against evil, either in a Universe where there was a God, or in a Universe where there were certain laws of nature. Personal experience of religion often produces a conviction that all will be well, but the supposed existence of a personal God does not prove it logically. For the belief in a God who is *all* powerful and *all* good is rendered impossible by the present imperfect arrangements of this world. And if logic is no test in this matter, and only "experience" is to count, then it is well to remember that the instinctive optimistic conviction is experienced not by theists alone, but by pantheists and naturalist mystics. To sum up, the ultimate relative strength of good and evil in the Universe is quite unknown to us; and though each of us may have his hopes, his fears, or his expectation of a drawn battle, the unsolved problem of evil is very little affected one way or the other way by belief or disbelief in a personal God. The statement that a Universe in which there is no personal God must therefore be bad, upon the whole, will not bear a dispassionate examination.

In order to understand why this fallacy is to-day so commonly accepted as self-evident, we must look to history. For thousands of years the idea of a personal God was to men the symbol of their hope in the Universe, and their devotion to the ideal. So long as the belief in a personal God was unshaken this was both natural and right. The framework of all

organised religions, and of the greater part of poetry and literature, has been cast in this mould. It would scarcely be to the credit of mankind if it would part without a wrench from the symbols of so glorious a past. Nevertheless, the question now urges whether the immortal longings, the spiritual valour, the poetry that is the better part of man, can be preserved in their old depth and their old sincerity if we continue to ask all men to treat the old symbol as a living fact. "In the depths of the years, in the changes of things," the time has come when the supposed proofs of God's existence are held by increasing numbers to be no proofs. Therefore, unless we would indeed bid a great part of the coming generations despair and die, it is of vital importance that we should no longer preach the doctrine that atheism implies pessimism. Only those who wish to spread pessimism, and to spread it by unsound arguments, should employ such tactics as these.

At this point it is only fair, even if it is straying beyond the logical boundaries of the subject, to acknowledge the immense influence that a sense of supposed personal contact with God, or with Christ regarded as God, has often exerted over the life of the soul. No one could deny this influence and its merits who has read such a book as the *Diary of John Woolman the Quaker*. But if this sense of personal contact is based on a delusion, it is not wholly good; and it is not unlikely more and more to pass away in the coming centuries. In any case, if a man is not very firmly convinced of the personal existence of a Deity, it is useless for him to try and erect out of his doubts and hopes a personal relation of any great value with an unknown God. It will be—

" the glimmer of twilight,  
Never glad confident morning again !"

On the other hand, the sense of oneness with all that is good in the Universe, with the joy of life, with the beauty and vitality of nature, with the aspiration of the good in all ages after virtue, affords to many the most ecstatic or the most

solemn visions.<sup>1</sup> In their intensity and depth, these emotions are not inferior to the old sense of communion with God or with Christ; although they lose something very considerable through the absence of the personal element, they are better if they contain smaller elements of delusion. The spirit of man has in him something that is divine, and the Universe around him is still, as ever, a mystery, a play of good and evil. And therefore no change of creed will ever prevent the spirit of man from communing as of old with this mystery, in ecstasies sometimes of defiance, more often of joy and love.

Communion with a personal God, of whose existence no doubt is entertained, is best for some people, and will for long centuries continue to produce some of the finest fruits of our civilisation. But for others, it is only when they shall have ceased to look in that direction for their spiritual food that their whole heart and soul can be given to the realisation of the joys and virtues that lie to their hand—the discovery and reception of those material and spiritual goods which have for them a more undoubted reality. There are other sainthoods larger in scope than that of St Augustine, other ecstasies no less intense and more sane than that unending conversation with God to which the author of the African confessions reduced his view of life. In spite of Rousseau, there may be societies that will hold together without the banishment of those who do not believe in a Supreme Being and a future life;<sup>2</sup> and if, as I cannot help suspecting, there will seldom be a better man than John Woolman, there may some day arise men in whom character no less perfect than his may be informed by more intellectual insight, and set to face moral problems harder and more complex than those over which he secured a victory so calm and so triumphant.

<sup>1</sup> To others, who are by mood or by conviction more pessimistic, worship of the good ideals that man has created for himself, and death-defiance like that of Teufelsdröckh in the streets of Paris, are feelings as deep and noble as the noblest Christian defiance of the Devil.

<sup>2</sup> *Contrat social*, livre iv. chap. vii.

The prolongation of separate existence beyond the grave, like the being of a personal God, is a doctrine that has not yet been proved or disproved. Yet, on this question, too, exactly opposite opinions are held by different people as to its probable truth. And here, too, an attempt is being made by one party to attach the penalties of pessimism to those who are not so constituted as to be able to believe in personal immortality. Here I am again constrained to protest against the exhortation to despair and die.

But in this case I should begin by marking one important difference. Whereas disbelief in a personal God does not, in itself, preclude the wildest dreams of the optimist, seeing that nature might just as well as God have great beneficent changes in store, on the other hand, I am quite prepared to grant the contention so eloquently made by Mr Dickinson in the *Hibbert Journal* some two years ago,<sup>1</sup> that the denial of personal immortality goes a long way towards destroying optimism. If there is no life beyond the grave, much injustice to unlucky individuals must remain without individual compensation; this is indeed a very grave evil. But, having granted that, I can see no reason to follow Mr Dickinson in his flying leap to the conclusion that life would not in that case be worth living to the human race, and that enthusiasm and joy would disappear. Some of us cannot understand why enthusiasm and joy should be possible only in a perfectly good Universe, any more than why rage and sorrow should be possible only in a perfectly bad Universe. Nor can we see why, even if evil things are to remain with us always, good things are therefore any less real.

Neither, because there is no individual compensation for misery, does it follow that the Universe is bad upon the whole. The imperfect and uncertain knowledge possessed by man of the infinitely little piece of space and time within his ken—a knowledge which Carlyle compared to the knowledge that a

<sup>1</sup> April 1903. *Optimism and Immortality.*

minnow has of his creek — is quite insufficient to tell us whether good or evil preponderates in the infinite ocean of space and the infinite year of time. And even if it were known (by some process that I cannot conceive) that evil did predominate upon the whole, I cannot see that that would make good less good, or life less worth living. The “rights of the minority” would still remain. Even if evil were to good as 3 : 1 (an utterly unfounded assumption, which there is no cause to make us believe, except temperamental pessimism), even then the 1 good would be no less real, and there would be no cause voluntarily to reduce it to  $\frac{1}{2}$ , or to annihilate it altogether. Yet such is the course that some optimists and religious enthusiasts presume to dictate to pessimists as being a rational consequence of pessimism. Even Mr Dickinson (*Hibbert*, April 1903, vol. i. pp. 435-6) comes dangerously near it. Yet such a course would be both immoral and irrational, even for a pessimist. If the good elements in the Universe committed suicide or desisted from propagating their species, the bad would still remain. It is not in anyone’s power to destroy the principle of life in the Universe; all that can be done is to destroy oneself, and to prevent certain possible children from coming into existence. Such a course, if adopted by a good person, only leaves the Universe worse than it would otherwise be. It is dictated by individualism and egotism, which consider only how to prevent the unhappiness of self and family, and not the best that can be done for the world as a whole. This school of pessimism, which we may call the suicidal or egotistic school, is to a large degree a bugbear invented by the religious, is strongly reprobated by some pessimists, and in so far as it exists, is immoral and irrational. The suicidal school of pessimism is made to argue that, even if we consent to live, energy and activity are irrational if we think the Universe bad on the whole. But even if the Universe is a prison, and this planet one of the worst wards, that does not make prison-reform any the less a real duty. The sum of good can be increased, whatever its pro-

portion to the whole ; and the essence of morality is, under all conditions, to increase that sum.

I have now tried to show that the suicidal pessimists, in so far as they have a real existence outside the minds of apologists for dogma, make an absolutely unwarranted theoretical assumption that the Universe is bad as a whole, and then make from it unwarrantable deductions in practice.

I cannot, therefore, admit that agnosticism as to a future life is logically, still less actually, an enervating doctrine. Rather, indeed, a person who confidently expects, like Browning, to enjoy an endless series of lives in which to perfect his nature, might with good reason take very little trouble as to what he does with himself in this one. For all must come right in the end. We shall each of us, like the British army, "muddle through somehow." So, too, as regards our conduct towards others, it is not pessimism, but the comfortable belief that everyone is going to be well treated in the next world, that offers the best theoretic basis for undue conservatism. A person can easily say to himself, in more or less covert language, "If you know that the needlewoman is going in the next world to be rewarded in proportion to her sufferings here, it does not very much matter if she is oppressed in this life." But fortunately people are guided less often by logic than by temperament : the Calvinists, who of all sects believed in predestination most strongly, and thought most often about it, were the most active and wilful people of their time. In practice, no theory is necessarily enervating except when it is assumed as a philosophic or religious cloak for a naturally idle temperament.

But, indeed, in so far as cosmological theory has logical influence upon conduct, the man who thinks that he has in his personal capacity only one chance, may be expected to be particularly zealous to make the most of it before his identity is for ever resumed by the great whole whence it came. "Hath man no second life? Pitch this one high!" was a remark in which Matthew Arnold showed the healthy

common-sense that in him underlay a slightly pessimistic temperament. Or again, in the words of his great predecessor, who long before had looked with much the same thoughts on a different scene,—“Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” (Ecc. ix. 10).

But to a still larger number of people the instinct to work for and to enjoy the goods of life, and to sacrifice themselves in the cause of good, comes perfectly naturally, irrespective of all considerations of what will happen after death. To these, I think, another word of the author of Ecclesiastes appeals more strongly,—“He that observeth the wind shall not sow: and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap. In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thy hand: for thou knowest not whether shall prosper, either this or that, or whether they both shall be alike good” (Ecc. xi. 4 and 6).

Such agnostics, in all ages, whatever the beliefs of the Churches to which some of them were nominally attached, have never been able, any more than Hamlet in the graveyard, to treat the prospects of life beyond the tomb as a matter seriously affecting their attitude towards life and death, or towards right and wrong action. The last cry of one part of humanity at the deathbed-side is always *in aeternum, frater, ave atque vale*. Nor is it uttered by the pessimist alone.

Now, although I fully admit that life after death, for a limited period at least, would be necessary in order to give individual compensation for the undeserved and crushing misery to which so many people are subjected, I cannot agree that the desire for personal immortality is a wish implanted in the whole human race. But Mr Dickinson, in the admirable article to which I have already alluded, maintains this thesis. “On this point,” he said, “I can, of course, only speak my own conviction—the conviction that, at the bottom

of every human soul, even of those that deny it, there lurks the insatiate hunger for eternity" (meaning, as the context shows, the eternity of the *ego*, as distinct from the eternity of the whole). Now, why should my friend be convinced that we all feel as he does on this point? It would be just as reasonable for me to deny that he has this insatiate hunger, as it is for him to state that I have it. If I cannot claim to be believed, the least I can do is to affirm, that though I have felt an insatiate hunger for many things, personal as well as universal, I have never felt the slightest desire to be condemned to my own company through eternal æons. I am very fond of my own company in this life, but I agree with nature in thinking that it would, in a few centuries, "begin to be a bore to me." If I had reason to suppose that good would cease out of the Universe I should certainly feel despair, but I am unable to see that the cessation of my personal identity will constitute an "irreparable loss" to the whole.

Though I may be allowed to speak lightly of what appears to me to be an unthinkable notion in my own case, I should not attempt to ridicule in others the "insatiate hunger" which I know they feel for personal immortality. But what reason is there to suppose that men, differing in so much else, should all be at one on this point? And if we were so foolish as to try and decide which was right by counting heads, I should then point out the undue historical advantages which the individual and egotistic (though not necessarily selfish) view of the Universe at present enjoys. For nearly two thousand years Christianity has centred religious energies predominantly on the salvation of self, and made other hopes give place to the hope of personal immortality. And yet, in spite of these teachings and this tradition, so long without open rival, we find to-day many people still unable to conceive of personal identity as anything but finite. What we call the division between self and the rest of the Universe seems to such persons to have had a beginning—somewhere about the period of birth (since heredity offers grave difficulties to a

ready acceptance of the theory of ante-natal existence); and therefore it seems most probable that this division of self from the whole will also have an end—probably at the hour of death. What had a beginning in time will have an end in time. Certainly this is not philosophical proof, but it does, as a matter of fact, convince many people, in the absence of certain evidence one way or the other. The analogy of the physical decay of the body appeals strongly to some minds. It seems to them to be a law of nature that the new only comes by replacing the old—that the generations succeed one to another. So deeply convinced are they of this (more, I admit, by instinct than by reason), that it is hardly possible for them to consider whether they would “prefer” any other arrangement. Mr Meredith put it, the other day, in very blunt fashion:—

“As to death, anyone who understands Nature at all, thinks nothing of it. Her whole concern is perpetually to produce nourishment for all her offspring. We go that others may come—and better, if we rear them in the right way. In talking of these deep things, men too often make the error of imagining that the world was made for themselves.”—*Westminster Gazette*, 9th February 1905.

Or, as he once put it more tenderly, in his *Faith on Trial*:—

“By Death, as by Life, are we fed :  
The two are one spring ; our bond  
With the numbers.”

Death should be met with

“Fortitude quiet as Earth’s  
At the shedding of leaves.”

Again :

“I bowed as a leaf in rain ;  
As a tree when the leaf is shed  
To winds in the season at wane :  
And when from my soul I said,  
‘May the worm be trampled : smite  
Sacred Reality !’ power  
Filled me to front it aright.  
I had come to my faith’s ordeal.”

*Poems*, ii. pp. 155, 141, 156.

Now, although this view is not consistent with complete optimism, it does not involve pessimism. It leaves quite untouched the question whether there is more good or evil in the Universe as a whole, though it involves a belief in the reality and continuance of both evil and good. It affords, as it seems to me, a more secure and peaceful basis for the enjoyment of what is good in this world, than the uncertain and agonised yearning for goods which may not exist at all.

In the last of these quotations from Mr Meredith's poetry some readers may have noted with suspicion a tendency to a pantheistic view of nature, which is no more proved than orthodox theism. It is hard to say how far their suspicion is just, for poets use a privilege of allegorical vagueness in the form of their philosophy. But if these words contain an underlying "faith," they only help to illustrate one of my points, namely, that there are various "faiths"—that is, unproven assumptions as to the relations of good and bad—outside the pale of theology. On the other hand, there is also the purely agnostic position as to the ultimate relation of good and evil: this some of us find to be a more secure basis than any "faith"; for the good that is known to be in the world is a more certain justification for virtue and for joy than hope of any kind. Hope, some think, should be an ornament rather than a foundation. But, be that as it may, there is not the least reason why enthusiasm and joy should not have as much influence over those who hold by an unorthodox faith or by agnosticism, as over those who believe in a personal God or individual immortality. Why agnosticism should, as Mr Dickinson says (*Hibbert*, vol. i. p. 433), be "devoid of enthusiasm, of delight," I cannot conceive. Let us not sit crying for the moon, while "the wonder and wealth of the mine" lies unopened at our feet. While each person has more opportunity for joy, or less, according to individual circumstances, the ability to use those opportunities is an affair of temperament. The ability to enjoy good in spite of evil is one of the most precious

possessions of the human race. No less than other parts of virtue, it stands in need of cultivation. The swan song over humanity, ever about to die of sorrow, which one section of idealists raise in every age in some new form, is beautiful poetically, but in so far as it affects temperament is merely an evil. There are, indeed, other things of value in the Universe besides happiness and joy, and these things are often forgotten by those who argue for suicidal pessimism on purely hedonistic grounds. But one part of virtue itself is the temperament by the strength of which a man accepts the inevitable, and takes warmly to heart that part of the inevitable which is good, and therewith feeds the springs of joy in himself, rejoicing, sometimes with homely peace of mind, sometimes in high states of exaltation, at life and light, "and this delightful world."

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## MR MEREDITH ON RELIGION.

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FORBIDDING as the vestibule may seem, there are two passages from the writings of contemporary scientists which, I think often, might be employed to usher the reader into the significance of the religious ideas that surround one with such a wealth of colour and music in the innermost verse and prose of this great writer. I do not cite these passages, of course, as lonely utterances. They are rather characteristic summaries of tendencies in the age which have exercised a profound influence upon Mr Meredith's intellectual standpoint. The first is a footnote to Huxley's Romanes lecture, in which he states that, "strictly speaking, social life and the ethical process in virtue of which it advances towards perfection are part and parcel of the general process of evolution," "the general cosmic process" of natural self-assertion being from the outset "checked by a rudimentary ethical process" of renunciation and mutual service "which is, strictly speaking, part of the former, just as the 'governor' in a steam-engine is part of the mechanism of the engine." The other passage relates to method rather than to principle. It occurs in Dr Maudsley's *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seeming*. "Not," he avers, "by standing out of nature in the ecstasy of a rapt and overstrained idealism of any sort, but by large and close and faithful converse with nature and human nature, in all their moods, aspects, and relations, is the solid basis of fruitful ideals and the soundest mental development laid." Nearly all that Mr Meredith has written upon the

topics cognate to religion might be described, without serious inaccuracy, as an anthology of bright, bracing variations upon the ideas underlying these two passages. A cosmic enthusiasm is his keynote. After a perusal of his novels and of those lyrical, argumentative poems, where his deeper thought gleams like sunlight in a mist, one is inclined at first to describe his teaching as evolutionary Stoicism, equipped with a semi-religious vocabulary; that is, if one exempts features like the Stoic permission of suicide, and dwells mainly on the grave elation, the sense of cosmic harmony, and the conscience of social cohesion which swell out most impressively in the pages of Marcus Aurelius. Yet the plainest item of affinity would always be that conception of Nature as the expression and embodiment of divine wisdom for the life of man, which is shared by the Roman emperor and the English writer. Only, the latter's focus is modern and scientific. Nature is for him the heroine of the cosmic story. She is not the rich background from which Wordsworth saw influences streaming down into man's responsiveness, nor is she the Nature "red in tooth and claw" from which Tennyson recoiled. Her note is not the calm and balm which Matthew Arnold loved to set over against the fretful days of man. Much less is she the sum of things and events, or the rounded order of the universe, which Whitman hailed. To Meredith her presence is at once more intimate and august. His Nature is living, radiant, and vital. The stimulus of discipline rather than tranquillity is her vocation, for man is part of her, and man's growth is her end. *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* was published in the same year as *The Origin of Species*, and one distinctive feature of Meredith's work is that it has been carried out in full view of the contemporary scientific movement which has not only broken with the earlier individualism, but sought in nature the ethical standards as well as the physical origin of man. Meredith's undisguised sympathy with the principles of that movement and his assimilation of its main results, as these affect the duty and the destiny of men, put into his ethical idealism a

flavour of its own ; besides, they render it convincing, when we recollect how it is based upon an exact, incisive recognition of Nature as a living organism, and of human life as unintelligible apart from its relationship to natural facts and forces. Meredith, in a word, enlightens as he awakens ; he thrills as he interprets. Years ago Professor Tyndall praised Wordsworth for giving, in his lines on Tintern Abbey, "a forecast and religious vitalisation of the latest and deepest scientific truth." But in a wider sense it might be claimed that Meredith, while far too original to be the mere rhapsodist of popularised science, has lived to rank as the foremost literary exponent, or rather pioneer, of a lusty, honest optimism, under what most of his contemporaries gladly or sadly hailed as the lowering horizon of evolutionary science. And this optimism, which in his hands becomes both light and heat, is the product of such a view of Nature as Huxley, in the passage I have quoted, propounds. Nature has a moral order and a moral law.

I shall pass by, therefore, the allusions to the church and the clergy which are scattered up and down his novels. The severe verdicts on the Anglican communion, the incidental notes of sympathy with dissent, and the very caustic analysis of English puritanism and Roman catholicism — these were almost inevitable in any searching transcript of the earlier Victorian age. But it does not appear needful at present to dwell on them. For one thing, their interest is historical in the main. For another thing, religion luckily is not identical with the church or the churches, any more than a religious writer is the same as a writer on religion. And, above all, such allusions do not furnish proper materials for an estimate of Meredith's distinctive contributions to modern thought upon religion. They are characteristic of his period rather than of himself. It would be as futile to cull Matthew Arnold's opinions on religion from his sonnet on *East London*, or Browning's from *Ned Bratts* and verses of that order, as to deduce Meredith's religious convictions from the incidental clerical or theological refer-

ences in his novels, or even from studies in verse like *Martin's Puzzle* (the suffering of the innocent), *Queen Theodolinda* (the subtler phases of spiritual pride and ecstasy), and *Jump to Glory Jane*. Such pieces merely evince the insight of the author into his religious environment, and we must look elsewhere for the ripple-marks of his own convictions and beliefs. Fortunately, we have not far to look. The beach is open and the tides run clear. For while Meredith, unlike his own enamoured sage, never passes the honest reader "through the sermon's dull defile," he is profoundly alive to the trend of the religious current in man's nature, nor is he slow either to recognise the validity of devotion or explicitly to state his eager mind upon its true and false expressions. Justice is done to the historic function of belief, to sacrifice, and to man's aspiration after God:—

"The Great Unseen, nowise the Dark Unknown,  
To whom unwittingly did he aspire  
In wilderness, where bitter was his need:  
To whom in blindness, as an earthy seed  
For light and air, he struck through crimson mire."

Stanzas and sentences of this quality abound. They outline the curve taken by the writer's genius as it moves through the hemisphere of religious problems and beliefs. The lineal successor of George Eliot in English fiction, he carries forward her great, grave tradition along a bright line of his own which sweeps away from the contemporary resuscitation of mediæval ideals as well as from expositions of intellectual fatigue, from the business of casting enchantments upon instinct and passion, and from the outpouring of cynical, timid, or defiant observations on this long-suffering universe.<sup>1</sup> Such an orbit implies some driving force of thought. And this emerges into view whenever Meredith reflects upon his age, instead of reflecting it. To spy for the philosopher between the lines of

<sup>1</sup> *A Reading of Life*, p. 94. His theory and vindication of novels may be found in the sixth chapter of *The Tragic Comedians*, and towards the close of the first chapter of *Diana of the Crossways*, especially.

a poet or the paragraphs of a novelist may seem an ungraciously pedantic enterprise. Delicate in any case, it is rendered more perilous here by the element of tortuous brilliance in the writer's style. But Meredith himself invites treatment of this kind, though his poetry is not straitly laced upon science, nor do his novels hinge on questions of belief. One reassurance is that we have to do, not with a literary genius who gracefully restates one or two sporadic ideas of his period, but with a thinker of sterling quality and imaginative force. And his salient conceptions are not simply thrown out in forms of high artistic merit, but woven together in a coherent and comprehensive vision. This of itself is something. "Any reasoned appreciation of life is bound to be a religion, even if no conventionally religious elements are imported into the problem." Perhaps. But, more generously than Mr Santayana, Meredith recognises that religion demands bread of its own instead of the somewhat stony fare suggested in this definition. The religious elements which he imports are neither conventional nor conventionally treated. But they are there.

You pluck out his meaning in this line, or at any rate you lay hands on its rather elusive form, if you can grasp the sense in which he uses "Nature." That is his central word. It dominates the entire field of his judgments upon ethics and religion. But it denotes far more than mere scenery, or even the sum of phenomena. For its definition as the living force of the world, the creative and controlling principle of the universe, demanding not severe meditation or admiration so much as obedience and understanding, we must hark back to Aristotle, or better still, to Lucretius. Meredith differs from the Roman poet on the question of the senses. He is at issue with him, as with Aurelius himself, over the isolation of the wise man who looks down elegantly, in pity or contempt, upon the crowd from his superior, carved balcony of culture. Nor is he the avowed expositor of some theory of the universe. But, like Lucretius, he believes in the practical ends of poetry and song. Like him, in part, he

would define true piety.<sup>1</sup> And, above all, a similar cosmic emotion thrills both writers, an emotion which exalts Nature almost to theistic functions. Consent to her spirit is the first and last commandment. At the same time, one must bear in mind that Meredith, like Spinoza and Goethe, would refuse to view Nature as an essentially incalculable and merciless Power; she is kin and kind to man, for all her sternness, worthy to be trusted down to death; and she repays such trust and knowledge with a disclosure of man's portion in herself, and of her own living purpose in and for humanity. The conception of Nature, in fact, determines the method of her study. Read by man's brain, instead of emotionally, she is seen at her best and at our side.

"I say but that this love of earth reveals  
A soul beside our own to quicken, quell,  
Irradiate, and through ruinous floods uplift."

Such, as Meredith avows, is his great theme, and in the preaching of it his prose and verse actually flush with ardour. Curtly he rules out of court all that is known in the religious world as Revelation or the Supernatural. Doctrines of this caste are in his dialect "the Legends" or "fables of the Above," superfluous and misleading efforts of the human soul to get behind and above that natural order which alone renders it intelligible. It is a moot point, I think, whether he identifies Nature and God, not unlike his friends Mr John Morley and the late Sir Leslie Stephen. For almost every passage which seems to suggest a negative answer, one might quote another pointing in the opposite direction. And it is only fair to add that the latter series, in which the consciousness of men and the order of Nature are drawn so close together as practically to exclude a higher Power, would be found to be expressed more definitely and frankly than their rivals, even when one allows for the exigencies of dramatic statement or poetic metaphor. In any case, however, the writer is preoccupied with Nature. Veracity and courage in the study of her

<sup>1</sup> *Pacata posse omnia mente tueri* (*De Rerum Natura*, v. 1203).

are his radical counsels. To him she is practically all and in all;<sup>1</sup> she is majestic, sane, and adequate. She is never irrelevant to man, even in his griefs, but with a word, *the* word, for him at every turn.

“Let but the rational prevail,  
Our footing is on ground though all else fail:  
Our kiss of Earth is then a plight  
To walk within her Laws and have her light.”

Were it fair to crush a poet's meaning into this or that grey formula of philosophic terminology, one might describe such a resolute intellectual attitude towards the universe as either naturalism with a halo over it, or ethical idealism robed in realistic brocade. The cardinal principle, at all events, is the trustworthiness of the moral instincts. These Meredith assumes to be valid, and even supreme. In the spirit of Huxley's footnote, he blithely accepts the ethical impulses and ends of human experience as axiomatic, upon the witness of Nature alone. What further sanction is required? *Scimus, et haec nobis non altius inseret Ammon*: no god can tell us better than we know ourselves. He would underscore this sturdy cry of Lucan's Cato, pleading that the light of Nature is enough for man if it be sought sincerely and followed manfully. Yet it has to be remembered that in his view Nature becomes almost as transcendental amid her realism as Goethe's Earth-Spirit. Read the lyric *Meditation under Stars*. Or take a verse like this:—

“Shall man into the mystery of breath,  
From his quick beating pulse a pathway spy?  
Or learn the secret of the shrouded death  
By lifting up the lid of a white eye?”

I trow not, is his answer. The physics of the brain are not the last oracle of his Nature. She is like a stained-glass window; the truth of her beauty is visible only from within, and within means the sphere of spirit, brain, and soul.

For Meredith's pen is a lance couched gallantly against

<sup>1</sup> Compare Walt Whitman's lines, *When the Full-grown Poet came*.

the black knights of materialism, whether practical or theoretic, and one cannot help admiring gratefully his brilliant onset. "The gloomy wherefore of our battle-field" is solved, he reiterates, "in the spirit," not in any reduction of spiritual phenomena to their physical accompaniments. Man's relationship to Nature is all the more strenuously to be emphasised and welcomed because it does not reduce him to the level of the beasts that perish. For what is Nature? Neither dust and chance, nor do-as-you-please, but an upward process of evolution for humanity. A worship of passion and mere instinct? Never! Life according to Nature is for man a good, glad fight—

" A warfare but begun ;  
 Unending ; with no power to interpose ;  
 No prayer, save for strength to keep his ground,  
 Heard of the Highest ; never battle's close,  
 The victory complete and victor crowned . . . .  
 In manhood must he find his competence ;  
 In his clear mind the spiritual food :  
 God being there while he his fight maintains :  
 Throughout his mind the Master Mind being there,  
 While he rejects the suicide despair ;  
 Obedient to Nature, not her slave :  
 Her lord, if to her rigid laws he bows ;  
 Her dust, if with his conscience he plays knave,  
 And bids the Passions on the Pleasures browse." <sup>1</sup>

Through flesh to mind, through mind to soul and spirit—such is the appointed course, such is

" The lesson writ in red since first Time ran,  
 A hunter hunting down the beast in man :  
 That till the chasing out of its last vice  
 The flesh was fashioned but for sacrifice."

So far from being neutral, Nature exhibits an organic process comprising an ethical progress in which to be "at war with ourselves means the best happiness we can have."

The danger is that man swerves either into sensuality or into sentimental asceticism, exaggerating or underrating the

<sup>1</sup> See also *Odes in Contribution to the Song of French History* (1898), p. 7, and *Hard Weather*.

value of the flesh. In the zigzag of his moral course he tends to worship or to flout the senses. It is the latter error which Meredith seems to regard as the greater peril, partly because it is subtler and less obvious, partly because it is especially native to the higher forms of civilisation. True, the garden of Epicurus cannot be our goal. It would be, with its sedate philosophy—

“Were the long drawing of an equal breath  
 Healthful for Wisdom’s head, her heart, her aims.  
 Our world which for its Babels wants a scourge,  
 And for its wilds a husbandman, acclaims  
 The crucifix that came of Nazareth.”

And so forth, in a host of scourging sentences upon the materialism and vainglory of last century. Yet one great service of Meredith’s ethic is its even keener analysis of the opposite mistake, which leads men to the pleached garden of the sentimentalist. The saint, he is seldom weary of reiterating, must smack of the good brown earth. Nature’s ideal is not St Simeon Stylites any more than Caliban. Read *The World’s Advance*, the familiar discussion of “the world” in *The Egoist*, stanzas viii., xxix., and xlii. of that arduous poem, *The Earth and Man*, and *The Vital Choice*. Plainly Meredith, like Dr Johnson, is “for knowledge and claret.” From all sides of his work the echo comes: *first that which is natural, then that which is spiritual*. A coarse and violent asceticism defeats its own object, and only results in a sallow pietism.<sup>1</sup> He is quite clear that any transcendental aim is false, any so-called spiritual reach is insecure, if it implies the neglect or depreciation of human nature, since to check the juices poured into our blood by Nature is ultimately to bring drought upon the soul. “We do not get to any heaven by renouncing the Mother we spring from; and when there is an eternal secret for us, it is best to believe that Earth knows, to keep near her, even in our utmost aspirations.” The natural and physical

<sup>1</sup> This is passionately urged, for similar reasons, by Meredith’s younger contemporary Richard Jefferies, especially in his *Story of My Heart* (chapter ix.). Compare, too, Sir Leslie Stephen’s address on “What is Materialism?”

form the basis of the human mind ; only the basis, but still the basis. So that man must bow to learn

“ How the wits and passions wed,  
To build that temple of the credible God.”

Such is his plain psychology, taking full and frank account of the material endowments of the race.

“ And are we the children of Heaven and Earth ?  
We'll be true to the Mother with whom we are,  
So to be worthy of Him who, afar,  
Beckons us on to a higher birth.”

These sins against the flesh, sins of contempt no less than of subservience, belong to Meredith's ethic, however, rather than to his religion, and I therefore pass on<sup>1</sup> to note that the union and communion with mother Nature, which he desiderates, is something wider than the mystic, lonely outlook upon sunsets and fine scenery. The latter is suspect with Meredith. He fears that the search for impulses from vernal woods too often shrouds an egotistic spirit. Sensitive as he is to earth's magic significance and various beauty, he feels that man's wisdom, which means a knowledge of Nature, is won mainly amid the rubs and struggles of social existence, in cities rather than in the country. His Nature is no more rustic than mechanical ; at least the country is by no means the sole or even the special origin of human wisdom. This note of the corporate and social element in true religion, struck loudly in the sonnets on *Earth's Secret* and *The Discipline of Wisdom*, sounds like a bell in *Foresight and Patience*,<sup>2</sup> *Outer and Inner*, *Forest History*, *The Thrush in February*, and *The Burden of Strength*. Social intercourse or city life may not be able of itself to produce unselfishness. But it reduces the odds in favour of egotism. And that is much.

<sup>1</sup> Passing over even his unsparing exposure of fashionable religion in ch. xix. of the earlier editions of *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*, the well-known analysis of sowing to the flesh, in the same novel (ch. xviii.), the passage on the fear of God in *Lord Ormont and his Aminta* (ch. iii.), and the trenchant paragraph upon the creeds and Christ in *Beauchamp's Career* (ch. xxix.).

<sup>2</sup> Partially a monologue on the idea of Comte's sentence : “ L'univers doit être étudié non pour lui-même, mais pour l'homme, ou plutôt pour l'humanité.”

“ For be sure the bravest wing  
 Prens it in the common spring,  
 Thence along the vault to soar,  
 You with others, gathering more,  
 Glad of more, till you reject  
 Your proud title of elect.”

Readers of Mark Rutherford will understand this cry of protest against the exaggerated worship of the country. But Meredith's passionate recoil from anything like luxurious individualism, and his stress on human fellowship as the true sphere of Nature's revelation, spring from his reading of her primary law—the law of mutual sacrifice and service. This reading takes the form of a lyric rapture over a sort of personified *jus naturale*. To live with others is to live for them. Indifference to the claims of men is the supreme impiety, because it strikes at the very heart of Nature, which has fashioned man, as Aurelius was never tired of writing, for the discharge of love's debt to his fellows. Nature's crown and flower is man, but man conscious that personality means kinship and service.

“ This breath, her gift, has only choice  
 Of service, breathe we in or out.”

Thus Christ is “ the man-loving Nazarene ”; social ends and sympathies are the excellent conditions of existence; and the supreme end of Nature is to promote in the race and in the individual, self-sacrifice, brotherliness, and unselfishness. Isolation here means moral desolation, as *The Cageing of Ares* is meant to illustrate.

This is not, of course, a new note. What is fresh in Meredith's statement of the idea, e.g. in *With the Persuader* and *The Test of Manhood*, is twofold: the sanctions and motives for service which he draws deliberately from Nature, and the astonishing brilliance with which every facet of the truth is presented. These qualities leap out upon a reader from almost every page of his poetry and from many chapters of his prose, till the reader comes to appreciate the almost undeviating use of metaphors and similes from sowing

and ploughing,<sup>1</sup> when human life has to be illustrated upon its highest plane. What we see, when the eye is purged of egotism, is not the vintage but the vineyard—

“The sower’s bed, but not the reaper’s rest :  
An Earth alive with meanings, wherein meet  
Buried, and breathing, and to be.”

It is substantially the moral of some passages in Comte, and notably of the sixty-ninth chapter in *Romola*. Meaning and intensity flood into human life, and a quenchless light of hope is flung over both this world and the next, whatever the next may be, when people think more of putting their hand to the plough than of shouting at the harvest-tide, and when the duties and claims of our contemporaries and of posterity bulk more prominently in the mind than a weak desire to rest apart from the pressure of other lives. Nature’s function is to recall her children from their moods of indulgence and egotism to this nobler discipline. *Ephraim is as an heifer that loveth to tread out the corn ; but I have passed upon her fair neck. Judah shall plow, and Jacob shall break his clods.*

Both as an aid in the discharge of our duties towards one another and as a genuine food for our personal needs, Meredith at this point turns briskly round to press on men the habit of prayer. His eagerness in this counsel is quite notable. Let us add, it is not unreasonable from his point of view. Prayer, to him, is the genuine expression of a man’s belief in the living spirit of the universe.<sup>2</sup> It is the logical outcome of his ethical idealism, this overflow of the soul, this lift of heart and conscience, this supreme resignation of the heart. Meredith’s language is neither clear nor full upon what most religious people would agree to term the personality of God.

<sup>1</sup> Compare, for example, the fine application of it to a teacher’s work, in *Lord Ormont and his Aminta* (ch. v.). See also *The Main Regret, Solon, Seed-Time*, and the *French Odes*, p. 66. As Nesta Radnor puts it : “The very meaning of having a heart is to suffer through others or for them.”

<sup>2</sup> This relationship to Nature differentiates Meredith from the transfigured paganism of a poet like Mr Roden Noel, and even from Mr Watts-Dunton’s *Natura Benigna*.

But this does not deter him from recognising and enforcing prayer as communion with the Divine Spirit in us and over us, as the surge of human thought and feeling which throws itself out upon some higher purpose in the universe, and as the exercise of an intense aspiration for the good that lies beyond the senses, and yet within the limits of our power. "Prayer is power within us to communicate with the desired beyond our thirsts." Or, in Mrs Berry's words of homely counsel to Sir Austin Feverel, "I think it's al'ays the plan in a dielemmer to pray God and walk forward." With Meredith, this habit of simple prayer is one condition of right movement and sane conduct. For prayer as the expression of selfishness or panic he has naturally no place at all. "There is nothing so indicative of fevered or of bad blood as the tendency to counsel the Almighty how he shall deal with his creatures."<sup>1</sup> *The Lord is in his holy temple*, says the Hebrew prophet; He is full of vitality and resource, able to manage all earth's affairs and ready to interpose at the right moment. Therefore *let all the earth keep silence*, silence from nervous interfering advice, disguising doubt as prayer. The very next verse of the same prophecy opens an oracle which illustrates the conception of prayer in Meredith. For "the earnest direction of the poet's mind towards God, and its absorption and loss of itself in the thought of him and his operations, is a prayer."<sup>2</sup> This is admirably brought out in *Beauchamp's Career*, a novel into which one feels that the author has put perhaps more of his deeper mind than into almost any other. He makes Dr Shrapnel write:—"In our prayers we dedicate the world to God, not calling him great for a title, no—showing him we know him great in a limitless world, Lord of a truth we tend to, have not grasped. I say prayer is good. I counsel it to you again and again: in joy, in sickness of heart. . . . We make prayer a part of us,

<sup>1</sup> *Rhoda Fleming*, ch. xliv.

<sup>2</sup> The late Prof. A. B. Davidson on Habakkuk iii. 1; he points to further Semitic instances of this wider aspect of prayer in 1 Sam. ii. 1, Ps. lxxii. 20, and the title of Ps. xc.

praying for no gifts, no interventions; through the faith in prayer opening the soul to the undiscerned. And take this for the good in prayer, that it makes us repose on the unknown with confidence, makes us flexible to change, makes us ready for revolution—for life, then! He who has the fountain of prayer in him will not complain of hazards. Prayer is the recognition of laws; the soul's exercise and source of strength; its thread of conjunction with them. Prayer for an object is the cajolery of an idol; the resource of superstition. . . . We that fight the living world must have the universal for succour of the truth in it. Cast forth the soul in prayer, you meet the effluence of the outer truth, you join with the creative elements giving breath to you," escaping by this discipline of the soul's faith from monotonous habit, pride, and fear.

"If courage should falter, 'tis wholesome to kneel.  
Remember that well, for the secret with some,  
Who pray for no gift, but have cleansing in prayer,  
And free from impurities tower-like stand."

This line of thought, religious if not Christian, reminds us that we are dealing with one who is not simply a master of our English, but sensitive to the deeper vibrations of the human spirit.

Yet if Meredith is positive upon prayer, upon the other phase of religious belief which preoccupies his pen he is curiously negative. When he passes on to the problem of immortality, his attitude becomes one of repression and of warning; his speech, when it is not limping and hesitating, traverses the gamut of dissuasion. - Here, too, no doubt, there is a positive side to his message.

"Earth your haven, earth your helm,  
You command a double realm :  
Labouring here to pay your debt,  
Till your little sun shall set ;  
Leaving her the future task :  
Loving her too well to ask."

His poetry is studded with such clean, manly, bracing counsels, from *The Question Whither* and *Woodland Peace* to *A Ballad of Past Meridian* and *A Faith on Trial*, which,

together with the somewhat intricate *Earth and Man*, and the agitated, elliptic stanzas of *The Test of Manhood*, may be held to sum up his conception of death. Life and death, he insists, are one. Both form aspects or phases of Nature, our living Mother, and man's business is not to ask "questions that sow not nor spin," but to learn, without raving or writhing,

"The meaning of either in turn,

What issue may come of the two:—

A morn beyond mornings, beyond all reach

Of emotional arms at the stretch to enfold :

A firmament passing our visible blue.

To those having nought to reflect it, 'tis nought ;

To those who are misty, 'tis mist on the beach

From the billow withdrawing ; to those who see

Earth, our Mother, in thought,

Her spirit it is, the key."

Or, better still, in the fourth stanza of the magnificent *Hymn to Colour* :

"Love took my hand when hidden stood the sun

To fling his robe on shoulder-heights of snow.

Then said : There lie they, Life and Death in one.

Whichever is, the other is : but know,

It is thy craving self that thou dost see,

Not in them seeing me."

Since death must thus be interpreted as an essential phase of that Nature whose meaning,<sup>1</sup> printed all over life, is mutual service, it must be held in some mysterious but unerring way to promote the interests of the race upon this breathing earth. This, it need hardly be pointed out, is the ethical application of the biological proof of death's beneficent rôle, *Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu*, as Lucretius put it. Or in Vittoria's ringing stanza at Milan:—

"Our life is but a little holding, lent

To do a mighty labour : we are one

With heaven and the stars when it is spent

To serve God's aim : else die we with the sun."

Better for the pitcher to be broken at the fountain than

<sup>1</sup> As Cicero prettily urges in the *De Amicitia*, in the *De Officiis*, iii. 6, and elsewhere. *Melampus* and *The Day of the Daughter of Hades* are Meredith's most genial songs, in classical tune, upon the same idea.

cracked upon a dusty shelf. The sole death to be feared is that of charity and pity. As for the death of the body,<sup>1</sup> it is like the fall of the leaf in autumn, part of Nature's preparation for a spring to come. Like the activities of life, it becomes intelligible and endurable in the light of its bearing upon the collective welfare of the species. Is it, then, a worthy thing to stain it with grief and terror?

This is the rhythm of Meredith's prose and verse, sung in high spirits for the high end of delivering man from fears which are the mists drawn up by the low anxiety and thirst of his "craving self." Unlike the poets, from Homer to Rossetti, he will admit no touch of grief, no pang of sentimental melancholy, at human transience. Such an emotion, as he reiterates with cheery faith in a *Dirge in the Woods*<sup>2</sup> and *Woodland and Echo*, marks a lack of disinterestedness. It means disloyalty to Nature and the race. Annihilation of the good life he will not hear of; and if he fails to explain very lucidly the exact function of the soul after death, or to distinguish his view of the future from an unconscious impersonality, he gallantly asserts the persistence of the spirit in relation to the cosmic plan.

Plainly, this does not represent much of an advance beyond George Eliot. The ideas of *The Choir Invisible* and *Jubal* are only re-cut in such lines as those *To a Friend Lost* or on *The State of Age*. The bright, vague intuition is allied to no arguments which explain how such a fate of the individual spirit can be reasonable or influential. All we get is a comment like that upon Matthew Weyburn's grief beside his dead mother:—"The goodness of the dear good mother gone was in him for assurance of a breast of goodness to receive her,

<sup>1</sup> Shelley, too, repudiates any idea of the human spirit being extinguished, but he does not view death from the scientific standpoint of Nature and its ethical content. To him death seems usually to denote some mode of ethereal re-union for the spirit with a higher phase of being in the universe.

<sup>2</sup> A versified paraphrase of the aphorism which Diana Warwick stamps in gold: "A brown cone drops from the fir-tree before my window, a nibbled green from the squirrel. Service is our destiny in life or in death. Then let it be my choice living to serve the living, and be fretted uncomplainingly. If I can assure myself of doing service I have my home within."

whatever the nature of the eternal secret may be. The good life gone lives on in the mind; the bad has but a life in the body, and that not lasting,—it extends, dispreads, it worms away, it perishes.” If one is content to enjoy the thought, without inquisitively digging for its roots in theory, one may say that Meredith’s aim is to concentrate the mind upon the thought of the next generation, whose health and welfare spring from our self-sacrifice.

“The young generation! ah, there is the child  
Of our souls down the Ages! to bleed for it, proof  
That souls we have.”

And again, in the same ode on *The Empty Purse*—

“Thou under stress of the strife,  
Shalt hear for sustainment supreme,  
The cry of the conscience of Life:  
*Keep the young generations in hail,  
And bequeath them no tumbled house!*  
There hast thou the sacred theme,  
Therein the inveterate spur,  
Of the Innermost!”

The italics are his own, and the idea recurs at the close of *Youth in Memory*,<sup>1</sup> in one of those passages which ring metallic and urgent as the singing of a taut bow. If you cannot tell whence life comes, he insists, why trouble about where it goes? Such preoccupation is not only a waste of time and tissue, but apt to detach you from the sole concern of life—dutifulness here and now, the maintenance of cohesion and charity in human intercourse. Think of your contemporaries, he cries to those who peer out into the silence and the darkness of the last stream. Think of posterity. Think of anything and anyone except yourself. How or

<sup>1</sup> An even nobler expression of the truth that death’s meaning is to be deciphered neither within us nor before us, neither in introspection nor in revelation, but around us, in the ties that limit the individual to the race, may be seen in *A Faith on Trial*—the lines beginning, “It is not to stand on a tower,” or in *Youth in Memory*—the lines beginning, “But deepest at her springs, most filial, is an eye to love her young.”

where you may land on the further bank is a small business compared to your shapely conduct on this bank.

“The end is one, we do but wax  
For service over land and sea.”

As a counteractive against selfish and indolent religion, his teaching on this point has permanent value, and the heartening force of its grave passion is felt by every reader who has patience enough to decipher meanings amid jets of brilliant bewildering rhyme. There is nothing morbid or meretricious in his treatment of the future. He has no sympathy with that terror and weirdness of death which Maeterlinck has bent his genius to call up before the modern mind. An agnostic optimism pervades every sentence he has written on this topic. “Wistful” is not in his vocabulary. If he does not hail “lovely and soothing death” with Whitman’s exultation, he accepts it manfully as working in somehow to the moral progress of the race, whatever be its bearing on the individual.

Such is Meredith’s religious outlook. It is definitely indefinite. Not that he himself feels that any drawback.

“And oh, green bounteous earth !  
Death shall I shrink from, loving thee ?  
Into the breast that gives the rose  
Shall I with shuddering fall ?”

The same Stoic ecstasy thrills not less grandly from the closing lines of *A Faith on Trial*. “The breast that gives the rose” becomes on the opposite shore “a breast of goodness” upon which the unselfish life is safe to fall ; and that is Meredith’s complete bare thesis of the future—a thesis which he evidently regards as beyond the reach or the necessity of any proof, except the obvious proof that, when vitality is identified with service to the race, death, which is but one part and phase of Nature’s vital energy, cannot be supposed to interfere with man’s use to the universe. Equally with life, it must have its cosmic justification.

While Meredith has thus no place for the idea of probation which Browning found so fruitful in the argument for

immortality, he resembles that poet in the sturdy front which he inculcates as the one duty of man towards death. Fortunately, however, the spirit of his intrepid sentences can be enjoyed apart from any acceptance of their scientific letter. For his theory lies open to one just reproach, to the insurgent heave of human passion, which swells out, *e.g.*, in Mr Frederic Myers's poem on *The Implicit Promise of Immortality*. Take this arresting, august protest, for example:—

“ Oh dreadful thought ! if all our sires and we  
 Are but foundations of a race to be,—  
 Stones which one thrusts in earth, and builds thereon  
 A white delight, a Parian Parthenon.  
 And thither, long hereafter, youth and maid  
 Seek with glad brows the alabaster shade,  
 And in procession's pomp together bent  
 Still interchange their sweet words innocent,—  
 Not caring that those mighty columns rest  
 Each on the ruin of a human breast,—  
 That to the shrine the victor's chariot rolls  
 Across the anguish of ten thousand souls.”

To Meredith this does not seem a dreadful thought at all. There is, I grant, in the closing words of *Vittoria* and elsewhere, a slight advance upon some of his earlier utterances, but the passionate assertion of man's future as part of the cosmic progress is never supplemented by any positive or hearty word upon the deathlessness of personality. Such outcries and yearnings indeed he can hardly bear with patience or treat as reasonable. Insensibly, I imagine, he is swayed by the semi-pantheistic temper into an undue disparagement of the human personality, as if it necessarily involved some taint or alloy of individualism. So eager is he, as in *The Lesson of Grief* and *The Question Whither*, to thwart and erase the lurking selfishness of man, a selfishness which can worm its way into the holiest phases of his being, into love and grief, that he is apt to take too stunted a view of self; with the result that he fails now and then to do any sort of justice to that longing for personal immortality which is as far above any thirsty expectation of reward or fame as it lies remote from

any nervous revolt of the senses. It is a longing which tenaciously refuses to admit that human personality, which, on Meredith's own showing, forms so vital and supreme an expression of Nature's being, so perfect an organ of her spirit, can be treated as mere material to be eventually used up for greater issues—issues that involve a disintegration of personality and a decline from the level of its consciousness. The general heart will be up in protest. And some will prefer to quote Meredith against himself. They will venture to read humanity in the far future by the ruddy faith of the lines which he devotes to modern France—daring to hope that mankind too

“ Like a brave vessel under press of steam,  
 Abreast the winds and tides, on angry seas,  
 Plucked by the heavens forlorn of present sun,  
 Will drive through darkness, and with faith supreme  
 Have sight of haven and the crowded quays.”

Read “heaven” for “haven,” they will plead; take the vessel as the purified soul or ego; and then the voyage will satisfy the just, keen intuitions of the human soul. Not otherwise. No lesser freight than personality is worth the passage. When Meredith invites them to launch out with “the rapture of the forward view,” that is, with an ardent hope for the ultimate, collective welfare of the race; when he exults, in lines of chiselled strength and grace,

“ With *that* I bear my senses fraught  
 Till what I am fast shoreward drives.  
 They are the vessel of the Thought,  
 The vessel splits, the Thought survives—”

then they will be dimly conscious that, while it is wise for them to understand, and well for them to assimilate, much else in this great writer's teaching, here he is putting them off with a mist of coloured, gleaming words. For beyond the bar which he summons the soul thus cheerily to cross, it is doubtful if any Pilot is to be met face to face, and more than doubtful if any haven lies for what men learn upon these shores of time and space to prize above all price.

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# THE GOD OF SPINOZA AS INTERPRETED BY HERDER.

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THE immanence of God has been called with some truth the characteristic religious conception of the nineteenth century. Certainly, when we compare the religious thinking of recent decades with the religious thinking of the greater part of the eighteenth century, nothing is more striking than the contrast between the transcendent, supramundane, strictly individualistic, and sharply defined God of the Deists and of their opponents, and the immanent God, the universal more or less vaguely conceived spirit pervading the world, of which we nowadays hear so much.

The causes of this great change of view were of course many and various and lay deeper than any system of philosophy; but contributing largely to the result, while itself due in part to the general tendency of the age, was a newly awakened interest in Spinoza, resulting in the rapidly growing influence of his thought.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century—for a hundred years and more after his death in 1677—the Jewish Sage of Amsterdam had found no favour. The dominant spirit of the age was radically opposed to his spirit. With its extreme individualism and with its controlling interest in the free and independent development of separate human units, it felt little sympathy with and was quite at a loss to understand

Spinoza's massive monism and thoroughgoing determinism. Everywhere his philosophy was either neglected or repudiated. He was condemned alike by orthodox believers, by rationalists, by deists, and by atheists. He first came to his rights in the revolt against the one-sided rationalism and individualism of the eighteenth century which began in Germany under the lead of such men as Lessing, Herder, and Goethe. Lessing was perhaps the first man of the century to feel drawn toward him. With his impatience at the shallowness and narrowness of the illuminism of his day; with his historical spirit and his sympathetic appreciation of other ages and tendencies; and with his constitutional interest in the unpopular cause—which led him to write his numerous "Vindications"—he turned his attention to the despised and hated Spinoza, and found his system the most satisfying of all philosophies. He never publicly avowed his sympathy with Spinoza's teaching, but in conversation with Jacobi the year before his death<sup>1</sup> he frankly declared his liking for the system, and passages in some of his posthumous writings contain possible hints of the same tendency.<sup>2</sup>

Jacobi, at his first meeting with Lessing, gave him Goethe's poem "Prometheus" to read. Lessing remarked, after reading it: "The point of view from which the poem is written is my own point of view. The orthodox conceptions of the deity are no longer mine; I cannot accept them. 'Εν καὶ Παν! I know nothing else" (p. 54). Jacobi asserted that he must then be in agreement with Spinoza, and Lessing answered: "If I were to name myself after anybody, I know no one else whom I should choose." "Spinoza is good enough," replied Jacobi, "but it's a poor salvation we find in his name." "Yes, if you will," retorted Lessing; "and yet do you know anything better?" Later Lessing remarked: "There

<sup>1</sup> The conversations are recorded in Jacobi's *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, published in 1785. See *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Werke*, Leipzig, 1817, Bd. iv.

<sup>2</sup> See Lessing's *Leben und Nachlass*, Theil ii., p. 164 sq.

is no other philosophy than the philosophy of Spinoza" (p. 55). And on another occasion, in reply to a protest of Jacobi, he said: "I covet no free will; what you have said does not alarm me in the least. It is one of our human prejudices to regard thought as first and most excellent, and to strive to deduce everything from it; while, as a matter of fact, everything, including our ideas, depends upon higher principles. Extension, movement, thought, are evidently grounded in a higher power, which is far from being exhausted by them. It must be endlessly more excellent than this or that activity, and so it can have a kind of enjoyment which not only surpasses all conception but lies in an altogether different sphere. That we cannot picture it to ourselves does not make it impossible" (p. 61). "You go further than Spinoza," said Jacobi; "for he puts insight above everything." "For man," rejoined Lessing; "but Spinoza was very far from regarding our miserable method of acting in accordance with ends as the highest method, and from placing thought at the head" (p. 62). Finally Jacobi informs us that Lessing was inclined to think of God as the soul of the world, and of the universe after the analogy of an organic body (p. 75).

We have, unfortunately, no account of Lessing's attitude toward Spinoza from his own pen, and the conversations with Jacobi are too brief and fragmentary to afford us very much light; but his general tendency and his sympathy with Spinoza's spirit and point of view seem clear enough.

His conversations with Lessing led Jacobi into a discussion with Lessing's old and intimate friend Moses Mendelssohn—the famous illuminist—who was unwilling to believe that Lessing held the views attributed to him by Jacobi.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence of this discussion, Jacobi published his work on Spinoza, from

<sup>1</sup> Mendelssohn came to the defence of Lessing's memory, which he believed unjustly impugned by Jacobi, in his work *An die Freunde Lessings*, in which he maintained that Lessing had spoken only in jest. See his *Sämmtliche Werke* (ed. of 1819), Bd. xi.

which the above quotations have been taken. In this book he gives not only his conversations with Lessing, but also his own interpretation of Spinoza. In summing up his conclusions touching Spinoza's system, he declares that Spinozism is atheism (p. 216); and explains his meaning as follows: "Since I myself, as I have repeatedly confessed, am kept from denying the existence of a God only because I feel myself compelled by my conscience and my deepest and innermost consciousness to deny the existence of a universal and absolute mechanism in nature, it is impossible for me to admit that the man, whose supreme being is a blind even though living Fate, believes and teaches a God. Fate necessarily destroys God; God only destroys fate. And so I maintain my opinion that Spinozism is atheism" (p. 220).

His position becomes clearer when we learn that he regards not simply Spinozism, but all demonstrative philosophy, as atheistic and fatalistic; that in fact, according to him, every kind of demonstration results in fatalism and atheism; and that religion can exist only where faith takes the place of reason.<sup>1</sup> It was because Spinozism was the most complete and consistent rational philosophy of the universe, and because he could show by it better than by any other system to what rational demonstration led, that Jacobi studied the system thoroughly and made it the chief object of his attack.

In 1785, shortly before the publication of Jacobi's work, appeared Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes*<sup>2</sup>—two chapters of which are devoted to a discussion of Pantheism in general and of Spinozism in particular. Mendelssohn does not condemn Spinozism as atheistical as Jacobi does. On the contrary, he recognises Spinoza as a theist; but he finds his system very defective and unsatisfactory, because while his emphasis upon God as

<sup>1</sup> This is Jacobi's famous faith philosophy to which Coleridge owed so much. Later he called the faculty by which we apprehend God and divine things *Vernunft* instead of *Glaube*, distinguishing it sharply from *Verstand*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Bd. vi.

immanent and not extraneous cause represents an advance, he really has no true infinite, for his deity is nothing but the sum of the countless extensions and thoughts of the phenomenal universe.<sup>1</sup>

That Mendelssohn entirely misunderstood Spinoza at this point is perfectly clear; but as it was impossible for a genuine eighteenth century illuminist, such as he was, to take himself or to appreciate any other starting-point than the individual, it was quite out of the question that he should understand Spinoza's system. His misunderstanding of it was shared by others, and is of some historic interest, but it need not detain us longer, for illuminism was a movement of the past not of the future, and illuministic or individualistic interpretations of Spinoza could not give direction to the thought of the new age that was just dawning.<sup>2</sup>

In 1787 appeared the most important work of the period on Spinoza—a work which I am inclined to think did more than any other to bring Spinoza into favour with the thinkers of the day, and to prepare the way for the tremendous influence which he exerted in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century. I refer to Herder's *Gott*, to which I wish to devote the greater part of this paper. Herder—disciple of Lessing and friend of Jacobi, and closely related on different sides of his nature to both of them—had become interested in Spinoza a number of years before, and, though originally sharing the common opinion of him as an atheist and blasphemer, had gradually come to realise—as his historical studies broadened his sympathies and sharpened his insight—that serious injustice had been done the great philosopher. The influence of Shaftesbury's writings, with which he became acquainted while still only a youth, seems to have given him

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 186 *sq.*, 195 *sq.*; also the work *An die Freunde Lessings*, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> It is interesting to notice that Mendelssohn himself, toward the end of his life, realised that he belonged to a past age, and that his philosophy, which was the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy of the eighteenth century, was already more or less out of date. See the somewhat pathetic passage in the preface to his *Morgenstunden*, p. xi.

an early leaning toward a more or less pantheistic interpretation of the universe, but it was his study of Spinoza which confirmed and clarified the tendency, and led him finally to the general view of God and the world which finds its fullest expression in his *Gott*. As early as 1775 he formed the plan of writing a work on Spinoza, Shaftesbury, and Leibnitz, but his plan was never carried out. The discussion between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, in which it seemed to him that neither understood or did justice to Spinoza, led him to take up the study of Spinoza's writings more earnestly, and having finally come to conclusions radically different from those of his day he felt constrained to give them to the world. This he did in the work entitled *Gott, einige Gespräche*, to which I have just referred.<sup>1</sup> In this work Herder defends the system of Spinoza—showing that it was commonly misunderstood, and at the same time he sets forth his own religious philosophy in the form of an interpretation of Spinoza's teaching. While Herder's interpretation of Spinozism is in many ways a misinterpretation, it is nevertheless of very great interest and significance. For it had enough plausibility to appeal to many of the leading thinkers among his contemporaries, and it served to give wide currency to a modified form of Spinozism, in which, in my opinion, is to be found one of the most important roots of the nineteenth century emphasis upon the divine immanence. I have, in fact, found nowhere else in eighteenth-century literature a form of theism so completely in harmony with certain forms that have prevailed very widely in recent days—forms which have in common a controlling emphasis upon the divine immanence while lacking almost altogether the essential features of the modern idealistic philosophy. I hope that a somewhat detailed presentation of the positions of the book,

<sup>1</sup> Printed in vol. xvi. pp. 401-582 of the Suphan edition of Herder's works. The first edition of the book, with the title *Gott, einige Gespräche*, was printed in 1787; the second, with the title *Gott, einige Gespräche über Spinoza's System, nebst Shaftesbury's Naturhymnus*, in 1800.

in view of its historical significance, may not prove altogether devoid of interest.

The work is in the form of a dialogue between Philolaus and Theophron—the former at the start an opponent, the latter a champion of Spinoza. Philolaus shares in the beginning the common prejudices against Spinoza. Though he has never read his works, he has heard from others that he was an atheist and pantheist; a teacher of blind necessity; an enemy of revelation; a mocker of religion; a destroyer of the state and of all civil society; in short, an enemy of the human race who deserves the hatred and abhorrence of all friends of humanity and true philosophers (p. 412). Theophron assures him that Spinoza has been entirely misunderstood, and finally induces him to read his works for himself, giving him some very instructive hints as to the best way to go about it—hints which help us to understand how Herder came to reach his own interpretation of Spinoza. Philolaus is to acquire an understanding of Spinoza's terminology and of his geometrical method—in order to be able to discount both—by reading the principal works of Descartes and Spinoza's *Critique of Cartesianism*; and then he is to study Spinoza's *Ethics* in the light of his letters, the latter everywhere being used to interpret the former, which was not put into its final form by Spinoza, and contains much, as Herder asserts, that is bound to be misunderstood if the work is read by itself (p. 431 *sq.*).

In defending and interpreting Spinoza, Herder first undertakes to show that he was not an atheist. This he finds it easy to do, and he spends very little time upon the proof. The second conversation is opened by Philolaus in the following words: "I come with my Spinoza, but almost more uncertain than I was before. That he is no atheist appears on every page. The idea of God is to him the first and last—I might say the only idea,—inasmuch as he bases upon it knowledge of the world and of nature; consciousness of himself and of all other things; ethics and politics. Without the conception of God, he can think nothing, not even himself, and it is almost

inconceivable to him how men can make God only a consequence of other truths and even of sense perceptions, since all truth or all existence follows only from the eternal truth—from the endless eternal existence of God. This conception had become so present to him, so immediate and interior, that I could better regard him as an enthusiast for the existence of God than a doubter or denier of it. In the knowledge and love of God he places all perfection, virtue, and blessedness of man; and that this is no pretence, but his innermost conviction, is shown by his letters; indeed I might say by every part of his philosophical system, by every line of his writings. He may have erred in a thousand ways in his idea of God, but how readers of his works could ever say that he denies the idea of God and demonstrates atheism is inconceivable to me" (pp. 438-439).

In a letter to Jacobi, written in 1784, Herder had already defended Spinoza against the charge of atheism in much the same way, and had informed Jacobi that he was confirmed in his interpretation by the fact that Goethe, who had been recently reading Spinoza, entirely agreed with him in the matter. A little later Goethe himself, in a letter to Jacobi, wrote: "Spinoza does not prove the existence of God—existence is God—and while others find fault with him as an atheist, I should prefer to celebrate him as *theissimum et christianissimum*." A few years later Schleiermacher could say: "Offer with me reverently a tribute to the manes of the holy, rejected Spinoza. The high-world spirit pervaded him; the Infinite was his beginning and end; the universe was his only and everlasting love." "He was full of religion, full of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore he stands there alone and unequalled; master in his art, yet without disciples and without citizenship, sublime above the profane tribe." While Novalis could speak of him as a "God-intoxicated" man, and Hegel could make his famous remark that Spinoza's system might more justly be called acosmism than atheism. From the time of Herder on it was commonly recognised that the

traditional and hitherto practically universal accusation of atheism was entirely unjustified.<sup>1</sup>

In this part of his work Herder does not answer the special point made against Spinoza by Jacobi, but later, when he defends Spinozism against the charge of fatalism, both counts in Jacobi's indictment are met.

In the second place, Herder undertakes to prove that Spinoza was not a pantheist. In order to show this he maintains that Spinoza makes force the essence of substance, and so the essence of God. Thus, when Philolaus objects to Spinoza's conception, that there is but one substance, of which all things are only the modifications, Theophron replies: "Do not be troubled by the word substance. Spinoza took it in its purest sense, and was obliged to take it thus if he would write geometrically, and put a primary conception at the basis of his system. What does substance mean but a thing that exists for itself, that has the cause of its existence in itself?" (p. 440). And a little farther on: "The substances of the world are all preserved by divine power, as they came into existence only through divine power. They therefore constitute—if one will—modified appearances of divine powers (*phaenomena substantiata*), each according to the place, the time, the organs in and with which it appears. Spinoza, therefore, in his Single Substance adopted a short formula which gives his system indeed great unity, but sounds strange to our ears" (p. 441). "We do not know what power is, or how power works; much less do we know how the divine power has produced anything, and how it imparts itself to everything after its fashion. But that all must depend upon a self-existing being, as well in its existence as in its relations, and so in every exercise of its powers, no thoroughgoing thinker can doubt" (p. 442).

Philolaus having admitted this, Theophron continues:

<sup>1</sup> In the preface to the second edition of his work, Herder speaks of the widespread popularity into which the hitherto hated Spinoza had come since the publication of the first edition.

“You will then not regard it as blasphemy when Spinoza calls the self-existent being not a transient but the abiding immanent first cause of all things?” (p. 443). Philolaus replies: “How could I, when, on the contrary, it is impossible in connection with God to think of a transient first cause of things?”

But Philolaus, though finding no difficulty in the conception of an immanent first cause or creator, is troubled by Spinoza’s inconsistency in making extension an attribute of God, extension being irreconcilable with his conception of indivisible substance (p. 446). Theophron recognises the inconsistency, but claims that it was due wholly to Descartes’ distinction of thinking and extended substances—in which, by the way, I think he was right in spite of another, namely, the psychological interpretation of its origin given by some historians. “Descartes explained matter by extension, and one might explain it equally well by time, for both the one and the other are external conditions of its existence in spatial and temporal relations. Both, therefore, are necessary postulates for every thinker who is himself limited by space and time, but they are not the essence of matter. Spinoza struggled a long time against this Cartesian explanation. He was not content with his doctrine of a sharp distinction between matter and spirit, but what could he do, since an intermediate conception was wanting? Unfortunately, therefore, even in his *Ethics*, he took matter for extension, that is, for space, put it over against thought—an entirely different thing—and so fell into serious confusion. For what have thought and extension to do with one another? . . . What reality is there in extension even if it be endlessly extended? Without essence, without active forces, extension is nothing; it is only the condition of a world, of the simultaneous existence of various creatures” (p. 448). “Spinoza’s times were the infancy of natural science, without which metaphysics builds air castles or gropes in the dark. The more men have investigated scientifically the material of bodies, the more they have discovered acting and

reacting forces, and have abandoned the empty definition of extension" (p. 450). "Do you know, then, what to call the intermediate conception between spirit and matter, which Spinoza vainly sought in his endeavour to escape the Cartesian dualism?"

Philolaus: "Substantial forces.<sup>1</sup> Nothing is clearer than this, and nothing gives the Spinozistic system a more beautiful unity. If his deity embraces endless attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and endless being, we have no longer two attributes of thought and extension, which have nothing in common, and so we can give up altogether the objectionable and inappropriate word *attribute*, and substitute for it the statement that the deity reveals himself in endless forces in an endless number of ways" (p. 451). "In the world which we know the power of thought stands first, but it is followed by a million other feeling and acting powers, and the self-dependent is in the highest and truest sense of the word force, that is, the primary force of all forces, the soul of all souls" (p. 452). "Matter is not dead; it lives, for in it work in accordance with its inner and outer organs a thousand living, multiform forces. The better we know matter, the more such forces do we discover in it, so that the empty conception of a dead extension vanishes entirely. In recent times how many different forces have been discovered in the air! How many forces of attraction, union, dissolution, repulsion the newer chemistry has found in all bodies! Before magnetism and electricity were discovered, who could have suspected their presence in bodies? And how many other forces may still be concealed in them! It is a pity that such a thinker as Spinoza was taken away so soon, and could not live to witness the immense progress of science which would also have added beauty to his system" (pp. 453, 454). "In matter, which we call dead, work at every point as many and as great divine powers. We are surrounded with omnipotence; we swim in an ocean of omnipotence; so that the old figure is always

<sup>1</sup> *Substantielle Kräfte*. In the second edition, *Organische Kräfte*.

true : Deity is a circle whose centre is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere, for neither in space nor in time as mere figures of our imagination does the imagination find an end. It seems to me, therefore, that the expression of Spinoza is a very happy one, that time is only a symbolic picture of eternity. I wish, as you do, that he had also regarded space in the same way in relation to the absolute endlessness of the indivisible" (p. 456).

Philolaus : " I am afraid that few will comprehend this distinction between that which is endless in itself and that which is pictured by the imagination as endless in space and time, a distinction which is nevertheless true and necessary.<sup>1</sup> If men had recognised this distinction, they would not have talked so much about the mundane and extramundane God ; still less would they have accused Spinoza of including God in the world and identifying him with it. His endless, most real being is as little the world itself as the infinite of the reason and the endless of the imagination are one. No part of the world therefore can be also a part of God, for the simple supreme being has no parts. . . . I see clearly now that men have done as wrongly in calling our philosopher a pantheist as in calling him an atheist " (p. 457).

So Herder proves, as he thinks, that Spinoza was not a pantheist. He does it by interpreting him in the light of the philosophy of Leibnitz. His justification for doing so he found especially in a couple of Spinoza's letters, where it is said : " From extension, as Descartes conceives it, to wit, a quiescent mass, it is not only difficult, as you say, but absolutely impossible to prove the existence of bodies. For matter at rest, as it is in itself, will continue at rest, and will only be determined to motion by some more powerful external cause ; for this reason I have not hesitated on a former occasion to affirm that the Cartesian principles of natural things are absurd." And again : " With regard to your question as to

<sup>1</sup> In the second edition Herder adds, " Upon which Spinoza's whole system rests."

whether the variety of the universe can be deduced *a priori* from the conception of extension only, I believe I have shown clearly enough already that it can not; and that, therefore, matter has been ill-defined by Descartes as extension; it must necessarily be explained through an attribute, which expresses eternal and infinite essence. But, perhaps, some day, if my life be prolonged, I may discuss the subject with you more clearly. For, hitherto, I have not been able to put any of these matters into due form"<sup>1</sup>—and so far as we know he never did.

That Herder, by interpreting Spinoza as he did at this point, brought him into better accord with the thought of his own and subsequent days is clear; but that he was reading ideas into Spinoza of which Spinoza himself had not dreamed is equally clear. The fact, however, that he interpreted Spinoza thus, and, while freeing his system from a serious inconsistency, made it possible at the same time to understand him as teaching divine immanence instead of pantheism, is historically of the greatest importance.

In the third place, Herder undertakes to show that Spinoza taught that God is supreme intelligence and will, and that the necessity by which he is governed is not blind and physical but moral only. Philolaus complains in the third conversation of the severity with which Spinoza attacks the idea of divine purpose in creation, and of the thoroughgoing way in which he denies understanding and will to God (p. 473). Herder evidently has in mind here such passages as the following from Spinoza's *Ethics*: "Neither intellect nor will appertains to God's nature" (Pt. I. prop. 17, scholium). "Nature has no end in view; all final causes are inventions of men" (prop. 36, app.). "All things are determined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power" (*Ibid.*).

Theophron replies to Philolaus' complaint: "I can clearly prove on the one hand that Spinoza in these statements did

<sup>1</sup> *Letters*, 69 sq.

not fully understand himself, because they were the result of the unfortunate Cartesian explanation, which he introduced and was compelled to introduce into his system in accordance with the spirit of his times; on the other hand, that he has been much more grossly misunderstood than his obscurity warrants. If we remove the errors of Descartes, and interpret Spinoza's statements in conformity with the fundamental idea upon which his own system is based, they become quite clear, the mists disappear, and Spinoza is seen, it seems to me, to be even in advance of Leibnitz, who followed him carefully, but in this matter perhaps too carefully" (474). "I deny, in the first place, that Spinoza made God an unintelligent being. It is difficult to conceive an error more contrary to his system than this. The being of God is, according to Spinoza, through and through reality. . . . His supreme being, therefore, who possesses all perfections in the most perfect manner, can not lack the most excellent of perfections, namely, that of thought, for how then could thoughts and ideas exist in limited thinking creatures, all of whom, according to Spinoza's system, are only presentations and real consequences of that most real being, which alone deserves the name of self-existent? In God, therefore, as he clearly says, exists, among endless attributes, the perfection of an endless thinking, which Spinoza distinguishes from the understanding and imagination of limited beings only in order to characterise it as unique of its kind, and entirely incomparable with them" (pp. 474, 475).

In this connection Herder refers in his second edition to such passages in Spinoza's works as the following: "The more reality or actuality a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes" (*Ethics*, Pt. i. prop. 9). "From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all things of which an infinite intellect is capable" (prop. 16). "Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect" (*ibid.*, cor. i.). "God's intellect is the sole

cause of things—of their existence as well as of their nature—and so it is essentially different from the intellect of all things” (prop. 17, scholium). “Thought is an attribute of God: one of his endless attributes which expresses his eternal unending nature” (Pt. ii. prop. 1).<sup>1</sup>

Philolaus rejoins: “But is not Spinoza’s eternally thinking being simply a name for all the intellectual powers which are real and active only in individual creatures?” (p. 476).

Theophron: “God a collective name? The most real being a nothing, the mere shadow of the intellectual processes of individual men? Or rather a mere word, the echo of a name? Philolaus, if you attribute such an idea to Spinoza of your own motion, and make of his system exactly its opposite, I am sorry that I gave you his book and talked with you at all about him. . . . But you probably mean to voice the opinion of some opponent of the last century”<sup>2</sup> (p. 477).

Philolaus protests that his question does not represent his own interpretation. For since reading the *Ethics*, it is quite clear to him that Spinoza is utterly opposed to those who make God an abstraction from the world instead of making him the real ground of all being and thinking, and that it is impossible that his God, who is the origin and ground of all knowledge, can be mere blind substance or force (p. 477). “According to eternal laws of his nature God works and is the most perfect in every way possible to him, that is, in the most perfect way. His thoughts are not wise, but wisdom; his activities not good alone, but goodness; and all not from compulsion nor arbitrarily, as if the opposite could exist, but from his inner, eternal, essential nature; from original and most perfect goodness and truth. Now I understand why Spinoza is so opposed to final causes. . . . They seem to him to involve arbitrariness and chance. . . . What God does he

<sup>1</sup> I have given the quotations here according to Herder’s version, which differs somewhat from the original.

<sup>2</sup> This was Mendelssohn’s interpretation of Spinoza, and Herder, doubtless, had him here in mind.

does not first reflect about and choose; his activity flows from the nature of the most perfect being, and nothing else is possible" (p. 481). "God did not sit like a labouring artist—experimenting, comparing, reflecting, choosing. He did not play with worlds as a child plays with soap-bubbles, until one pleased him and he selected it. If a thousand other worlds besides this were possible, then a greater God could have made them, and the weaker, laboriously reflecting God would be no God" (p. 482).

"How is the moral necessity of Leibnitz's system different from this sort of necessity which I will call the essential inner divine necessity? God must perfectly see and work that which is best, not from weak arbitrariness, but in accordance with his nature, without laboriously comparing it with the worse, which without him is nothing. In Spinoza's system there is no hint of a physical necessity, so far as this means a blind external compulsion. Such an idea he opposes with all his might (p. 485). The activity of the supreme intellect which works according to necessary internal laws of its nature, and so according to the most perfect goodness and wisdom, is not contingent any more than the understanding of God is contingently wise and contingently good" (p. 488).

But still further, Herder interprets the intelligence which he ascribes to Spinoza's God as involving self-consciousness. Thus Theophron says in the fourth conversation: "The highest power must know itself; otherwise it is only blind force, inferior to power endowed with thought, and so not deity itself" (p. 503). And after Philolaus has quoted from Lessing the remark that "Spinoza was far from regarding our miserable method of acting in accordance with aims and ends as the best, and from putting thought above everything else," Theophron continues: "After existence, as the ground of all powers, Spinoza puts thought. But he is far from ascribing to the infinite limited presentation forms, knowledge *a posteriori*, fallible conclusions, arbitrary ends—in fact, this is the great virtue of his system" (p. 503).

But though Spinoza's God is thus endowed with intellect and will and is in possession of self-consciousness, Herder nevertheless denies personality to him, the denial being suggested by words of Lessing in his conversation with Jacobi. It is clear that Spinoza's God—as interpreted by Herder—is in possession of all that is commonly understood by personality, but Herder takes the word in its etymological sense as implying unreality—the theatrical mask put on by an actor to hide his real character—and so claims that the word cannot justly be used of the supreme reality.<sup>1</sup> He denies explicitly that “unity of self-consciousness,” such as he has ascribed to God, necessarily involves personality, for the term personality properly applies only to the phenomenal not to the real, and should be used only of men in their relations one with another (p. 498).

In a later passage (both first and second editions, p. 508) he suggests that the word personality carries with it the implication of locality, that it involves the idea that God is supra- or extra-mundane, and though, according to Herder, “God is not world and world is not God,” still such extra- or supra-mundaneness cannot be accepted for a moment—God cannot be brought within the categories of either space or time.

It would seem, then, that it is the anthropomorphism of the word which leads Herder to reject it. But its rejection is historically significant, for it makes it possible to accept a vague and undefined conception of divine immanence while still asserting the possession by deity in supreme measure of all the highest qualities of humanity.

There can be no doubt, it seems to me, that Herder's interpretation of Spinoza which I have been sketching under the third head, ascribing to God intelligence and will, moral determinism and self-consciousness, is much more nearly correct than the current interpretation of the day which re-

<sup>1</sup> See especially the second edition, p. 497 *sq.*, where the matter is discussed at considerable length.

presented him as denying all intelligence to God and subjecting Him to blind fate. Spinoza himself repeatedly rejects the latter position. So far as the question of divine intelligence goes, commentators have found themselves in difficulty. The true explanation of Spinoza's seemingly flat contradiction, that God has neither intellect nor will and yet is a thinking being, it is not easy to discover. Many historians have, strangely, passed over the inconsistency, simply asserting that Spinoza denies intellect and will to God, and taking no account of the other class of passages in which intelligence is just as explicitly attributed to Him. It has been held that he intended to ascribe reason to God, but not consciousness—and so anticipated Leibnitz's distinction between perception and apperception. But I can find no hint of this in his writings. As a matter of fact, if God has intelligence—if He is a thinking being—He must, on Spinoza's own principles, think Himself, for He is all; and so Spinoza actually talks about God's infinite love for Himself (see the close of his *Ethics*), and in at least one passage in his letters (*Ep.* 23) seems to imply his acceptance of divine self-consciousness: "I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way as it is conceived that it follows from God's nature that God understands himself."

In order to comprehend Spinoza in this matter, the fact should be noticed that he declares that God has neither intellect nor will in a passage in which he is concerned to show that God does not act as we do, from a consideration of ends and with a will balanced and hesitating; and what he is concerned to deny to God, therefore, is not intellect and will in general (which by the way he identifies), but an intellect and will acting as ours does. And so I think the true distinction is rather the old one between intuitive and experimental knowledge. God is by His very nature rational and has knowledge of Himself, which involves knowledge of the universe, but this knowledge He has by the very necessity

of His nature, and not upon the basis of phenomena. As Herder puts it in his second edition (pp. 498, 499): "We have seen that Spinoza distinguished the understanding, so far as it belongs to derived nature, from that primitive power of thought which is the ground of the things themselves. The finite understanding can understand only what lies before or in it—only what is given to it. To the original power of thought nothing is given except itself; from it everything follows. In this sense the highest, that is, the primitive understanding knows only itself, and in itself every possible thing as consequence."

Finally, Herder presents briefly at the close of the second edition of his work, published in 1800, what he regards as the Spinozistic solution of the problem of individuation. Philolaus complains that the Gordian knot in Spinoza's system still remains. According to Spinoza, there is but one substance and we are only modifications of it. How, then, can these modifications have any reality? Theophron replies: "Modifications of what? Of existence in the supreme intellect. The one party complains that Spinoza gives us too much; the other that he gives us too little. But the two can perhaps hardly be combined in a more fitting expression than his. We are modes of existence; these we call individualities. Everyone has and is a particular mode, that is, a particular individuality."

Philolaus: "Exactly the opposite is commonly believed, that Spinoza, namely, has deprived us of our individuality, and from this side his system is most open to attack."

Theophron: "Just as it is believed that he has deprived the supreme being of his existence and his self-consciousness. . . . Modifications without being? Radii without a centre? On the other hand, the most real centre without radii, the most real being without expressions of its reality? Can you think such self-contradictory nonsense?" (p. 573).

Theophron then turns to Theano—a woman who has been taking part in their fifth and last conversation—and appealing to

her to come to the rescue, he asks her: "What are you yourself, Theano?" Theano replies that she is not her form, her fancy, her taste, or her affections; they are only garments which are continually changing. But with all the changes—with growth from childhood to maturity—in sickness and health—sleeping or waking—not only do others call her the same, but she feels herself to be the same. "That I have remained the same in spite of the fact that my body and spirit have both changed does not depend on my reason—awake I reason very little, asleep not at all" (p. 474). "And so," Theophron replies, "the conviction of our selfhood, the principle of our individuality, lies deeper than our understanding, our reason, our fancy reaches." "Self-consciousness, self-activity make up our reality—our existence. Do you believe, Theano, that this principle of individuality—we may call it realisation of self, self-consciousness, or what you will—is active and efficient in the same degree in all things?"

Theano: "By no means. A living rose and this picture of it, the rose-bush and the nightingale . . . cannot possess either the same kind or the same grade of self-consciousness, and so of existence."

Theophron: "And we men! Do you believe that all men have an equally deep realisation of self, an equally active self-consciousness, and so an equally real existence?"

Theano: "Far from it. In the case of many men we may fairly doubt whether they possess the individuality of the flower, of the bird, or even of the wild beast."

Theophron: "Which, then, do you think is the highest, purest, most beautiful individuality?"

Theano: "The form of all forms; that which embraces all; whose reality pervades all. The more it can embrace—the more it can impart—so much the more must it have, that is, *be*."

"No more, my friends," interrupts Philolaus. "Further words would be too much. The single and eternal principle of individuality I see, in the system of our philosopher, developed

along a path which leads into our innermost self. The more life and reality, that is, the more intelligent, mighty, perfect energy a being has for the preservation of a whole which he feels belongs to him, and to which he commits himself inwardly and entirely, the more he is an individual, a self." "And so," concludes Theophron, "instead of fighting with words, let us awake our true self and strengthen the principle of individuality within us. The more spirit and truth, that is, the more active reality, knowledge, and love of the all for the all is in us, so much the more do we—as active, immortal, indivisible individuals—possess and enjoy God. Only He in whom is all, who holds and sustains all, can say I am the self—apart from me there is no one." (pp. 474-476.)

Whatever we may think of this rhapsody with which the dialogue is brought to a close, the significance of it cannot be mistaken. Quite independently of the philosophical idealism of Schelling and Hegel—which owed so much to Spinoza—through this kind of poetical deification of the universe and this emphasis upon the universal aspects of the individual spirit, both of which voiced themselves not only in Herder, but also in Goethe and the Romanticists in Germany, and in Coleridge and the Lake Poets in England, there has entered into modern thought a conception of divine immanence which exists in all degrees from the most absolute pantheism to the most orthodox theism. In Herder's *Gott* we find, so far as I am aware, the earliest clear, definite, and elaborate expression of the tendency; and as such the work—as I said in the beginning—is of the very greatest historical interest.

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## IS THE AGE OF FAITH RETURNING ?

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IT is Mr Balfour, among those who in recent years have published their reflections upon the present situation, who observes that the great movements which history records have in every case been "irrational." They have come to life, not as the result of intellectual statement or appeal, but always in obedience to forces at first so obscure and in the day of their power so complicated and diverse, that it is impossible to isolate or name them or to relate them to man's average behaviour.

We may accept Mr Balfour's generalisation as giving the impression which history makes upon a spectator, and, remembering the limitations of a spectator, as accurate,—that the more remarkable episodes and crises in human affairs have ever been "irrational." That, however, must not be held to mean that they occurred without reason ; but only that they occurred in obedience to some force which was a new element in the particular age ; a force therefore which, because it was new, did violence to the mental habits of the observers of that time. The fact is, there is something *irrational* in everything that *moves*. It moves, not for reasons that may be given, but in obedience to something more primitive and elementary. In the last analysis the force behind any movement is something which is "there." The movement is the expression of it, the sign of it, the opposition of

life's ancient circumstances to it; but it itself is original, irrational, free. It is therefore no disparagement of a movement that it is irrational; for that is only to say that it is spontaneous, living—a new contribution to the sum of energy in the world. Great movements are irrational in the precise sense that every act of life is irrational; for every act of life is the expression of something which, in itself, has nothing to do with man's reasoning powers. "Rationality," in the restricted sense of the word, is as little the impulse or vital element in human affairs on any scale, as the rudder is the power which drives a ship through the water.

We shall return later to this point. Meanwhile, let us consider some signs, as they seem to me to be, that a very great change is already beginning to take place in the public mind, one of those changes so obscure in its beginnings, so diverse in its fruits, so contemptuous of maxims, which until yesterday appeared to be incontrovertible, that it may yet come to be included amongst movements which have that quality of "irrationality" which is the proof of a certain inevitableness and authenticity.

On the principle of the swing of the pendulum, we ought to anticipate a reaction against the mood which has dominated men during, to speak roughly, the last generation. It is possible, no doubt, to give an airy and cynical interpretation of this pendulum principle,—that it is due to the incurable levity of the public mind. But a more serious and honourable explanation is also competent. Any reaction which is widespread, and has the note of spontaneity, will be found to be the protest of man's entire nature against the arrogance and tyranny of one aspect or faculty of that nature. We have the instinct for freedom, for self-assertion; but—it may be a reminiscence in our blood, or it may be the calling and election of God—we have also the instinct to deal severely with ourselves,—the instinct of obedience, of bondage. We *will* wander making our experiments in living; but we *will* tire of our freedom, and become reverent, or even panic-

stricken. There are signs, it seems to me, that men, in certain matters, are beginning to have misgivings, beginning to fear they have gone far enough ; signs of a certain timidity which will be condemned as weakness by some still strenuous minds, but which will be regarded by others as belonging equally to man's true nature, as the sign of his inevitable need of some shelter for his spirit. But, not to dwell longer upon the principle of the swing of the pendulum, though it is not to be neglected in any forecast of the public mood, it is possible to name certain misgivings and grounds of anxiety which supply the very condition for a total change in men's attitude towards life and affairs.

Take, for example, the political situation at this moment, and for my purpose it is not necessary to deal with it controversially. There is present to-day in the public mind, and very notably in the minds of the middle classes (to use the term), a body of scruples and misgivings as to how things have been going, and as to how, if the ancient wisdom which they were taught still holds, things are likely to end. They have been asked to support measures, and to adopt policies concerning which this at least is undeniable, that if they had been presented to them twenty years ago, they would have recoiled from them in the name of an instinct, and by the whole habit of their minds. They know, of course, that times have changed ; but they are not convinced that certain things—laws, maxims, ideals—have lost their authority for men. As a result, there is a widespread sense of division ; a conflict of ancient habits and instincts on the one hand, with policies which at least seem hostile. Men still hold to certain moral and social ideals as theoretically the only just ones, yet not with any vital or triumphant force. They consent to political courses with a profound uneasiness, resenting it that things should have come to such a pass that it is necessary thus to do violence to themselves. There is the feeling, too, that in our day, any course may find arguments for itself ; that there is no invincible standard in the public mind, before the very

face of which certain purposes would die. There is no supreme social or personal consideration, no "thus saith the Lord," by whose sole announcement policies shall stand or fall. And that, I say, is a condition of unstable equilibrium, of inner discord and unhappiness, which will not continue. It is the condition which gives men the hearing ear.

Another circumstance which weighs upon the minds of serious observers who look forward, is one to which I shall barely, and even that with difficulty, allude. I refer to it at the present moment, because it also is a symptom of the absence in the general mind of some powerful and unquestioned rule or standard, which might help us in the lonely business of life. If statistics are to be trusted, and certain ominous words spoken from time to time by those who are qualified to know, society to-day, almost from top to bottom, is trifling with certain natural duties and responsibilities in ways which we usually associate with the decadent days of Imperial Rome. If this be as is alleged, it means that with all our knowledge we are on the threshold of unworthy and threatening days. For my own part, I do not believe that a view of family life, which must always seem hideous to wholesome and unsophisticated minds, is about to take up a permanent place amongst us. But simply because this abandonment of natural life has its root and defence in personal selfishness, in love of ease and vanity; and because, in such an atmosphere, vice of that kind seems not right indeed, but yet not terrible, I have no hope that it will be swept out of lives, except by the recovery of an instinct, in a wave of horror and indignation and revenge, such as is let loose by the vision of God. It is one of Pater's deep and beautiful insights, that the religion of Jesus, when it came home to the hearts of Roman ladies of patrician rank, brought with it a new reverence for the elementary conditions of life.

It would be an easy matter to name additional symptoms in the life and expression of our people, to show that we are living from hand to mouth, without the moral order and peace

which come of obedience to some faith or vision. Education has brought no moral motive; and we are beginning to see that it was idle to look for such motive in mere knowledge. The social question, likewise, is now beginning to be apprehended, even by those who at one time dreamed dreams of wholesale amelioration, as, when all is said, a moral question; that without the socially regenerate man, the best conceived scheme will fail.

This same feeling—that meanwhile there is something awanting, something which in better days we and our fathers knew, something without which we are at a disadvantage—has become a real discovery in the Church. In the various denominations, this consciousness of inability, this sense at the same time of a completeness which nevertheless is possible, manifests itself in various ways. Ultimately there are only two attitudes which are possible to men in real distress—the Roman Catholic and the Reformed; the one to give up the world, the other to call upon God. Every Church just now is living too much by its wits. Never did men in office in the Church work harder. Never were they more willing to learn. Never were church buildings so constantly in use. Never were appeals more insistent. Yet at the best, “having done all, we stand.” Such success as the Churches may claim is not of the highest possible quality; it is too much fretted with anxiety and labour. It wants certain notes of peace, of fulness, of that confidence in God which has the victory over the world. It is not pregnant, overflowing. It has a basis of worry and strain. It has enough to do with itself.

I note these signs, not in order to disparage them, for, indeed, it may be that they were inevitable. I note them because there once again we encounter, and this, in the case of the most sensitive and potent people in our community, a condition of unstable equilibrium, of discord and uneasiness, of insecurity through which the secret yearning rises for that state of soul in which the strife is past. But what I wish to say about this present-day temper and outlook in the Churches

is, that it is a condition of things which will not continue. It is a condition of things out of which an entirely new attitude and settlement may very suddenly take place. After all, the community is the individual writ large. We know how, in the case of a man, there is a limit to the amount of worry and harassment which he will endure. A point is reached when he can worry no more. At that point he flings up his hands, in faith or in despair. Just so, the Church which has been subjected for many years to a strain in every region of its life comes to a point where it either loses heart and becomes a tame accessory to the general situation, or appeals from its own confessed failure and inability to the right hand of God.

Enough has been said to show that at this present time we have reached as a community that temper of unrest and misgiving,—having ideals which we will not abandon, which nevertheless we cannot fulfil; depressed by the failure of mere knowledge to increase or even to sustain our moral energy; suspicious of words and ideas which have had their turn and have failed; and in all this the vague confidence that there is a more excellent way—the temper, in short, which itself is the invitation and prelude to a total change of attitude.

Certain as I am that as a community we shall get out of this condition of strain and confusion somehow, I hold that already there are many signs that we are about to emerge on the honourable side of the morass.

It is one way of stating the terms of the controversy of the last fifty years, to say that it has been a battle between man and the universe, between man with his instinctive and traditional ideas of himself—his dignity, his significance on the one hand, and, on the other, the infinite world—nature, history, all things. Or, to use the familiar antithesis, it has been a conflict between faith and reason, between the heart and the head.

During the greater part of the struggle, the advantage lay with those forces which we gather together under the name of "science." This is not to be wondered at. Science was

fresh, and much on the other side was indefensible. So far, no sensible or just man was alarmed. But the engagement proceeded. "Faith" seemed to be driven to her last ditch. But now, that is to say yesterday, when science, as it seemed, was about to deal the *coup de grâce*, her arm has grown heavy, and a look of anxiety has come into her hitherto bold countenance. Meanwhile "faith," taking advantage it may be of the signs of weakness on the other side, or, it may be, summoning her last reserves, is manifesting such vitality that it is quite credible she may win back many a position; indeed, may win back more than she can safely hold. For every mood is absolute so long as it lasts; and, in such a conflict as we are speaking of, the situation at the last ditch is apt to decide the question everywhere. Without metaphor, it seems to me that man's "personality," which in reality was being threatened by the formulas and deductions of materialistic science, is showing signs of recovery; and, because the sense of personality once confirmed will proceed to claim its inherent rights, and at the further stage to take up its duties and responsibilities, the survival and reinforcement of personality is a conclusion which must be hailed with satisfaction by all who would not despair of the human enterprise.

In what remains of this paper, let me indicate some features in the mental situation, more or less public and apparent, which seem to me to mean that after a long period of depression, of low spirits, of a kind of shamefacedness and apology, the soul of man—man, *i.e.*, contrasted with his natural circumstances—is about to stand up; is already, indeed, upon his feet, with something of the ancient daring in his eyes.

That the Christian Science propaganda should begin and should find such a welcome in an age and amongst habits of thought diametrically opposed to its ideas, is a shining illustration of how extremes meet. Sympathetically considered, also, it gives the rationale, the inner reasonableness, of that long established maxim. Extremes meet for the same reason as tyrannies are overthrown. The latter extreme is the passion-

ate reaction, often unjust and disastrous but inevitable, against the former. To the *ipse dixit* of materialism, becoming more and more strident and cock-sure, that there is nothing but matter in the world, Christian science with equal self-confidence replies that there is nothing but spirit. Now, it is not the purpose of this paper to enter into proofs, or to justify the general movement, signs of which are here alleged. My purpose is simply to name some signs, as they seem to me, that, whether rightly or wrongly in an absolute sense, the general mind to-day is steadily inclining towards a certain considerateness and attitude of attention with regard to the spiritual view of man and the world.

The same interpretation may legitimately be given of the remarkable revival of the "occult" in our time. It is idle, it is simply not true, to say that this dabbling in the black arts is confined to those few queer people whom we shall always have with us, and that it is without significance. One has only to walk up and down a street in the busier part of any of our cities to see what a trade must be going on in the unseen and the diabolical. It may not be a comfortable sign; indeed, it points to a real peril which will accompany any wholesale return to faith, as it has accompanied every such instinctive and elementary movement in past times. But it is the sign, I believe, of a kind of wild revenge which the spiritual side of our human nature is celebrating as a protest against its long neglect. As such, it gives an insight into the necessities of human nature; that in the absence of the prophet from the soul, in the absence of some honourable faith, which will control the fluid and haunting faculties of man, there may take place, even in the most enlightened society, a kind of stampede into dark and dubious and imbecile things. By themselves, these things are disheartening and deplorable enough, but they are not by themselves. They are rather like pieces of paper and bits of straw and clouds of dust blown about by a wind which, nevertheless, is a good enough wind, bearing ships out to sea and home.

I have already alluded, in a phrase, to the note of relenting, of misgiving and insecurity, which has come into the testimony of science on its speculative, or, so to call it, its metaphysical side. I think this much may be claimed by the so long hard-pressed camp of idealists, that science has been taught her place. To speak fairly, science has become sober and judicial, as is the way of youth always, not in deference to the advice of those who were alarmed by her recklessness, but by her own discoveries as she proceeded. Time is on the side of all the facts. It has become evident that when science leaves her sphere of criticism and observation, and presumes to unveil the last source or final purpose of things, she can only guess or talk nonsense. And it is very wonderful how widely that essential limitation of science has come to be known and understood by average people. Wonderful, too, is it, how commonly it is now understood that science, not one whit less than revelation, needs postulates, needs to create an atmosphere of hypothesis, needs to make demands upon faith, in order to get even under way. That all her processes rest upon a credulity with regard to fundamental things, as thorough-going as is required by the twin-postulates of God and the soul. The serious banter of such books, to name but one, as Dr Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, in which science will seem to fair-minded people to be hoist with its own petard, has found its way, and now serves as a caution in minds which formerly rioted in negative proofs. And such a state of things, because it raises a subtle barrier of scepticism against science whenever science seems to invade some ancient safeguard of man's peace, is a result which is already of great consequence for faith, and, in the event of any notable movement towards belief, will throw wide open many a door. It is an immense relief for some people to know, on the authority of university men, that one may believe in God, without being intellectually an ass.

You see symptoms of the same subtle difference of temper in contemporary philosophical writing. Here, very abundantly,

you have signs that *man* is fast coming into his own again. Even a worm must turn if he would have his wrongs observed. To a philosophy which had come to regard man as a mere article in the Inventory of the Universe, there has arisen amongst us a philosophy prepared to wait upon man, hoping to attain to wisdom by observing patiently and with reverence man's habitual and instinctive life. "Pragmatism," "soft determinism," "personal idealism" are but names for a new mood, a new point of view; the one thing about which I desire at this time to note being, that it puts the accent and emphasis upon *man*. When one contrasts the idealistic philosophy of even twenty years ago with the writing which to-day on the whole occupies the same place in the intellectual field, one notes, I think above all other differences, a new robustness, a spirit of confidence, a certain glow and intoxication even, a zest for the battle, which were wanting from the earlier phase. Idealists to-day are very cheery persons. Rightly or wrongly, they feel that they have the ball at their foot. They are not ashamed at times to reply to an argument with a laugh or by telling a good story. When a controversialist on the other side has circumstantially demonstrated the intellectual impossibility of "believing," they will answer, as one did the other day, by protesting that, at the time of writing, he is simply prancing with belief. In short, able men to-day have the hardihood to appeal from the sophistry of pure reason to the generous intimations of a healthy temperament. It may be very Philistine; but it is very human. It is the true and only useful positivism. One thing is certain, it is there, cheerful and unashamed. It is one of those "irrational" movements, one of those "offences" against the pure reason "which must needs come," in which some elementary instinct or function, long denied, finds at length its voice, and utters its uncontrollable joy. For, as Caponsacchi said:—"A man grows drunk with truth, stagnant within him." This latest movement in philosophy, though doubtless it had its impulse in the essential nature of man, and denotes a protest by one

long thwarted element of our life against the tyranny of the pure reason, has already made some valuable contributions to the apologetic for faith, over and above that sense of cheerfulness with which it has infected a great company of thinking people. It may be that not one of those contributions would convince a man who was disinclined to believe; but coming as they do at a time when, I contend, a great mass of people are waiting for a decent excuse to believe, they have the decisive effect of turning the scale. For it is one of the positions which this new philosophic tendency is not ashamed to occupy,—that no pure reason can ever be given for any act of personal life, that we seldom act on reason, that the deepest things cannot be proved, that every step we take here in this world is a leap in the dark, that the evidence always stops short, and that there is no way of filling up the gap except by putting yourself into it; in short, that we live by faith, in obedience to a profound and unconquerable instinct that, to put it variously, a cosmos cannot have chaos for its crown, that there is a final correspondence between man and the Universe, or, in the language of piety, that “this is none other than the house of God and the gate of Heaven.”

Along that line of insight rather than of argument, it is not difficult to show that there are certain high postulates, prejudices, beliefs, without which man will never be able to accomplish the long task of life, to overcome its disheartening details; without which, most certainly, he will never bring into play the most precious qualities of his mysterious nature. Indeed, so utterly do we live at the bidding of these intangible and potent instincts, that if it could be brought home to mankind that these were not true, that they did not represent realities, it is fair to predict that life would come to a standstill, and this suicide and despair would begin with the best first. From that position, it is a leap which competent men who see the consequences of the other view are prepared to-day to take, that such prejudices and postulates, such beliefs and intuitions and instincts as lie at the root of man's normal and

healthy life, have in that very circumstance sufficient proof and defence. "Securus judicat orbis terrarum."

Already this recovery of personality has led to a new sense of human responsibility in the teachings of the most recent philosophy. Idealism, twenty years ago, was for the most part rabbinical. It contented itself with proving that the idealistic view was rationally tenable. It seems to me that to-day the note is nothing short of this, that the idealistic view is humanly necessary. Formerly, idealists were content to go on, registering the state of the barometer, telling us from time to time the condition of the weather; to-day, the philosophers have begun to preach. It is not putting the situation unfairly to say, that from declaring unweariedly, using the terminology of Hegelianism, that all is well, and bound to turn out well, philosophy to-day has begun to declare that everything may yet be well; but that for that very reason, everything is bound to go wrong, unless we, actual living men, see to it!

Further, the disabling and morbid idea that we act with human propriety only when we act for reasons apprehended, that therefore we ought to hold ourselves in suspense on such a momentous matter as our personal faith and not commit ourselves, lest through further knowledge we should learn that we had decided wrongly, that morbid idea, which really would keep us in bed all day, has largely given way under this new access of health and energy. We see now that those who ask us to withhold our assent to faith, and to restrain ourselves from faithful actions, until the evidence is complete, lest further knowledge should show us that we had chosen wrongly, are asking of us something which we are not in the habit of conceding in any other department of our life. We live and learn; not learn and live.

To the whole contention of this paper it may be opposed, that since the time of the last great reinforcement of religious faculty and personal idealism—since, in short, those days when last "the sea of faith was at the full"—discoveries have been made as to the processes of nature, and criticisms

of the historic documents of spiritual belief have been established, with the effect of disturbing all accepted ideas. That, in consequence, never again can we have a return to faith as faith has hitherto been conceived. But that is just what I deny. Admitting that science and criticism have in their several regions changed many things, this will never withstand a genuine outbreak of temperament, a genuine return of spring and summer to the soul of man. If such a movement is really due, it will soon find new reasons—a new intellectual statement and defence. But at first it will need none of these things. Thomas Paine's criticisms of Biblical literature have perhaps never been answered; but when the Spirit moved, when men were searched anew by some elementary moral disquietude which led them to cry out in despair and faith, the things that Paine had said seemed far away. "*Simulat que increpuit suspitio tumultus, ilico nostræ artes conticescunt.*" A drowning man is not aware that he is wet.

The faith to which, as it seems to me, we are about to return, will not be the same in many particulars as that of any previous time; but it will have the same background, the same fundamental attitude. It will be a newly recovered confidence in life, in that body of personal facts, of moral misgivings, flashes of the ideal and the holy, reminiscences of some previous condition of private integrity and peace, with the corroborations of these which, to the hearing ear and the understanding heart, seem to rise up so fittingly out of life's ordinary events. The new faith will be a return, a kind of homecoming, to a sufficiently solid confidence, that in trusting those elements of our nature which urge us and help us on towards what seems best, we are not deceived; that rather, in those so personal intimations and contacts, we are dealing with Reality, and with that kind of reality which, for beings such as we are, and placed as we are, is our proper and abiding concern; that though it is at best but relative proof that we have attained, this is no disparagement, but means only that

it is absolute—for us and so far. “If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars.”

Nathaniel Hawthorne tells the story of a child who had a mark—a birthmark—on her face. She grew to be a beautiful woman—beautiful, though the mark remained. Her husband, vain and ambitious, set himself to have the mark wiped out. He summoned science to deal with nature. Under the treatment, the birthmark began to recede, though meanwhile the victim languished. An hour came when the mark was gone, but in that hour the sweet woman died.

There is no explanation of things which accounts for so many of the facts, as simply to say, that on the soul of man there is an ineradicable birthmark which, at times, *stands out*.

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## SIR OLIVER LODGE ON HAECKEL.

JOSEPH M<sup>c</sup>CABE.

ONE of the most arresting passages in Sir Oliver Lodge's criticism of Professor Haeckel is that in which he speaks of him as "one crying in the wilderness," and "a surviving voice from the middle of the nineteenth century." No one who has followed the remarkable progress of the *Riddle of the Universe* can fail to have been struck by this statement. Issued, both in Germany and England, with only the slenderest anticipation of an audience, it has advanced from edition to edition with the speed of a romance. Of the thirteen countries in which it circulates, it has sold 150,000 copies in Germany, and 100,000 in England alone. It has been crowned by a learned institution (the Academy of Turin) as the finest work published in the last four years of the nineteenth century, and has been taken by influential writers in many countries as the most important recent contribution to the controversy with which it deals. Yet up to the present it has met no opposition from a man of science of anything like equal weight. Historians like Loofs and metaphysicians like Paulsen have dealt vigorously with its incidental statements. Its main lines have been wholly unchallenged until, four years after its publication, and at a period when it is quite impossible for a critic to reach more than a fraction of the vast circle it has travelled, Sir Oliver Lodge comes forward to traverse them.

However, the ethical question of this suggested silence of our scientific leaders while the work was exercising an

unparalleled and irrecoverable influence, as well as the arithmetical question of the number of the respective supporters of Professor Haeckel and his critic, are of minor interest. The more attractive circumstance is that we are now presented with antagonistic pronouncements on religion from two very distinguished men of science. Infinitely remote in temperament and cast of mind, Professor Haeckel and his critic both come before the public as high representatives of scientific method and as lucid and engaging exponents of scientific results. Both, from very different points of view, are known to have devoted years to the particular study of religion. The antithetic presentment of their conclusions has naturally excited considerable interest, and is bound to aid materially in reaching whatever issue there be to the present controversy. In the meantime, however, Professor Haeckel has published two new works which it is important to take account of in appreciating his position. One of these is a much enlarged edition of his *Anthropogenie*, and the other a supplementary volume to the *Riddle, Die Lebenswunder*. These give a fuller expression to Haeckel's philosophy, and enable one to contrast it more sharply and more accurately with that of his opponent.

The difficulty is, indeed, to determine on what precise points of material import Sir Oliver Lodge differs from Haeckel's system, when properly presented. There are very substantial differences, it is true; but a great deal of loose phrasing on both sides has to be adjusted before the antithesis becomes usefully clear. Thus, in the brief paragraph of his essay in which Sir Oliver Lodge deals with Haeckel's view of the monism of the physical world, we have a most perplexing statement. Here, at least, the critic speaks with an authority beyond question, yet the result is curious. It is, of course, quite immaterial to Professor Haeckel what theory of matter physicists may ultimately adopt. It is a question that does not enter the essential cadre of Monism. The fundamental unity of matter and force is all that he postulates, and the first glance at the literature

of physics assures him that there is no serious opposition to this. But he has spoken of the indestructibility of matter and force, and Sir Oliver Lodge demurs to the certainty he attaches to this.<sup>1</sup> "It is singular," he says, "that even during Haeckel's lifetime the atom shows signs of breaking up into stuff which is not ordinary matter"; and a little later he hints that ether may prove "the material substratum and most fundamental known entity on that side."

The correction which is implied in this passage has been widely quoted to the discredit of Haeckel. Loofs had chastised his excursion into history, Paulsen his observations on metaphysics, and now, here was one of our chief physicists censuring his statements in regard to physics. It would, of course, be extraordinary if a biologist had penned a whole chapter on physics in which Sir Oliver Lodge could find no defect, especially if that chapter was written before the discovery of radium and the revolution it entailed. But as a fact Sir Oliver Lodge's actual criticism on this side is most improper and unwarranted. So far is Haeckel from having staked his monistic fortunes on "the atom," that he actually describes the up-building of the atom from a more attenuated matter (as it was vaguely foreshadowed ten years ago), and confidently identifies this "prothyl" with ether! In this there was no mysterious anticipation of recent physical developments. For long years such a dissolution of the "solid atom" has been confidently expected. But it is unfortunate that Sir Oliver Lodge should convey the wholly misleading impression that Haeckel's philosophy depended, in the slightest degree, on the integrity of the atom. It rather depended on the reverse.

And when we pass from the inorganic to the organic world we again meet a statement that tends to confuse the issue. Sir Oliver Lodge affirms that the "spontaneous

<sup>1</sup> Though only a few months before (April 23, 1903) he had written in *Nature* that "natural philosophers will not be prepared to tolerate any the least departure from the law of the conservation of energy."

generation" of life is "contrary to, or at least quite unsupported by, the facts of science." It has been pointed out by biologists time after time that the famous Pasteur experiments, to which Sir Oliver clearly refers, do not affect one way or the other the question of the original appearance of life on this planet. They do not even prove, as Nägeli and Haeckel have pointed out, that spontaneous generation does not take place to-day. The only "fact of science" in the matter is that we do not actually know of any present instance of abiogenesis. Seeing that the lowest organisms we know (the Chromacea) are of an enormous molecular complexity, this is natural enough. Whether an extension of the range of the microscope may yet discover simpler forms of organic matter no man of science can tell. We must wait. Meantime, it is wholly wrong to represent the facts of biology as contrary to, or giving no support to, the *hypothesis* of abiogenesis; and it is expressly as a hypothesis that Haeckel formulates his conjecture as to the manner of the origin of life. The recent very suggestive theory of Pflüger shows more clearly than ever how little bearing the "facts of biogenesis" have on the problem of what Haeckel calls "archigony." On this theory the chief element of organic matter is cyanogen, and cyanogen is only formed at incandescent heat. The theory illustrates at least how some past condition of our planet (its incandescent stage), which has now passed away for ever, may have favoured the natural production of plasm in enormous quantities. If a critic of the theory of the unity of matter had said before the recent discoveries that it was "contrary to, or quite unsupported by, the facts of science," because all attempts to produce a chemical element, or to find one *in statu nascente*, had entirely failed, Sir Oliver Lodge would have dissented very vigorously. But the facts of biogenesis have precisely the same relation to the question of archigony.

Nor is Sir Oliver Lodge very clear in expressing his opposition to Haeckel with regard to the nature of life. It would, in fact, be impossible for him to be clear on this point

as long as he relies, even partially, on the crude popular description of Haeckel's system as materialism. A distinguished physicist may very well be expected to realise the difference between a system that builds on matter alone (if any modern thinker ever did) and a system that affirms, as Haeckel does, that there can be no matter without spirit. Haeckel does not teach—never did teach—that the spiritual universe is an aspect of the material universe, as his critic makes him say. It is his fundamental and most distinctive idea that both are attributes or aspects of a deeper reality. He does not say that life is “knocked out of existence” when the material organism decays. He says that the vital energy no longer exists *as such*, but is resolved into the inorganic energies associated with the gases and relics of the decaying body. Thus the matter looks a little different when Sir Oliver comes to “challenge him to say by what right he gives that answer.” He gives it on this plain right, that science always finds these inorganic energies to reappear on the dissolution of life, and has never in a single instance found the slightest reason to suspect (if we make an exception for the moment of psychical research) that the vital force as such has continued to exist. There were philosophers in the Middle Ages who speculated as to the persistence of the souls of animals. To ask us to render a solemn *ignoramus* on the matter at this hour of the day is a little strained. When science fails to discover a case of spontaneous generation, Sir Oliver is much impressed by its negative result. When it gives a far more imposing negative answer to the present question, he earnestly warns it that negative results prove nothing.

When Sir Oliver Lodge represents Haeckel's monistic view of the origin and nature of life as a survival from the middle of the nineteenth century, he seems, like his distinguished colleague, Lord Kelvin, to be strangely misinformed as to the state of biology. Professor Ward (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 9) says that “the old theory of a special vital force . . . has for the most part been abandoned as

superfluous." Two other colleagues of Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir A. Rücker and Professor Dewar, have spoken with impatience from the chair of the British Association of the current whispers of a resuscitation of the "vital force"; and the proper authorities on the matter in this country—especially Professor Ray-Lankester, Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, and Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson—have recently resented with some warmth the suggestion that it was finding favour amongst them. Professor Beale represents himself as the solitary devotee of Vitalism in this country. On all sides we hear the echo of Professor Le Conte's words: "Vital force may now be regarded as so much force withdrawn from the general fund of chemical and physical forces." It is, therefore, most seriously misleading to suggest that in this section of his Monism Haeckel goes beyond the limits of science and, under the deceptive cover of his scientific authority, plunges into philosophical speculation. Within the last year or two Professor Ray-Lankester has declared that "the whole order of Nature, including living and lifeless matter—man, animal, and gas—is a network of mechanism"; Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer has confessed that "the materialistic conception of the universe" seems to him "probably a true view"; Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson has spoken of science as having given "the death-blow to the previously prevalent vitalistic doctrine"; and Professor Beale has admitted that "purely mechanical views of life are again becoming very popular." It is a pity that Sir Oliver Lodge did not make it clear in what precise respects Haeckel has been left "belated and stranded by the tide of opinion, which has now begun to flow in another direction."

The plain truth is that—when we collate, for greater fulness, other observations of his on the subject—Sir Oliver Lodge's own conception of life may, with a far greater show of reason, be described as a modified survival of an older doctrine. Only a small group of German biologists can be quoted as favouring that conception. From the side both

of physics (Rücker, Dewar, Dolbear) and of biology (Ray-Lankester, Weismann, Thiselton-Dyer, Burdon-Sanderson, Halliburton, Le Conte, etc.) the confident expectation is announced that the mechanical conception of the living organism will prove adequate. Sir Oliver seems to admit, indeed, that the vital force is not in its nature distinct from physical force, but holds that it needs "guidance." If he suggests that the tide of opinion has set in this direction, he will find it very difficult to establish.

Thus, as far as purely scientific teaching is concerned, Haeckel is quite in line with the chief scientists of our time. If he goes beyond some of them in attempting to sketch a theory of the actual origin of life (and no one is better equipped than he for doing so), we must remember that he is careful to state his idea hypothetically, and base it closely on the known facts. "Science," Professor Dewar said, "is not debarred from speculating on the mode in which life may have originated." If Haeckel attempts to determine steps in the evolution of life from which more cautious biologists refrain, we may remember that the author of the *Systematische Phylogenie* has weighty credentials for that task. It is greatly to be deplored that the critic does not reserve his severely-worded strictures for the really contested sections of Haeckel's philosophy, instead of creating an impression on the mind of the unscientific reader that in regard to his general system Haeckel is "abandoned by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in a fresh direction."

Sir Oliver Lodge insists so much on the isolation of Haeckel that I have felt it necessary to speak largely in quotations. This phenomenon of "his comrades" marching in "a fresh direction" is not so obvious that Sir Oliver Lodge was justified in refraining from that course. To sum up thus far, there is no serious scientific demur to Haeckel's assumption of a monism of the physical world and his identification of vital force with ordinary physical and chemical forces. He is,

on the contrary, supported by an imposing chorus of expert authorities of the highest standing. It would surely be well to have made this perfectly clear, and concentrated attention on the remaining issues. These are the two real differences between Sir Oliver Lodge and Haeckel—the two residual problems for any serious thinker to-day. It is mere pettiness to carp at incidental statements on matters on which Haeckel is known to have or to exercise no peculiar authority, or to labour in determining the precise degree of evidence for the monism of the inorganic or the organic world. The tide of scientific opinion has most certainly reached this point, and shows no sign of receding from it. Religious thinkers like Ward and Royce, Fiske and Le Conte, recognise this. There remain the great questions whether this mechanical evolution of the universe needed intelligent control, and whether the mind of man stands out as imperishable amidst the wreck of worlds. These constitute the serious controversy of our time in the region of cosmic philosophy or science. These are the rocks that will divide the stream of higher scientific thought for long years to come. To many of us it seems that a concentration on these issues is as much to be desired as sympathy and mutual appreciation.

Haeckel's position, if expressed at times with some harshness, and not always with perfect consistency, is well enough known. He rejects the idea of intelligent and benevolent guidance, chiefly on the ground of the facts of dysteleology, and he fails to see any evidence for exempting the human mind from the general law of dissolution. As Sir Oliver Lodge does not deal at any length with the former issue in this paper, I need not linger over it. It is interesting to recall that these facts of dysteleology have impressed him also, to such an extent that he hesitates to admit the omnipotence of the Deity; but to him they do not blot out the accompanying evidence of design. On this he offers one or two considerations that are worth noting. "I will not believe that it is given to man," he says, "to think out a clear and consistent system

higher and nobler than the real truth." Haeckel, with his abiding and keen consciousness of the darker side of the world-process, would probably reply that this teleological system is neither clear nor consistent, nor obviously higher and nobler than the mechanical system. The impartial onlooker will probably observe that Sir Oliver Lodge's criterion of truth is even weaker than the famous Cartesian criterion which it recalls. One has only to look out on our social system, with all its misery and ugliness, or our moral world, to realise at once how infinitely far our ideals may transcend reality. And when Sir Oliver asks us if we are quite sure we have exhausted the whole truth of things when we have reduced the moonlight rippling on the lake or the glorious sunset to chemical and physical forces, we can only ask him in turn whether, when he has exhausted all the possibilities of his science on a moonlight scene at Venice or a sunrise on the Alps, there is any element that eludes explanation. His further observation—that Professor Haeckel must "laugh to scorn" a man who talks of a path guiding him—is incomprehensible. Haeckel has frequently explained the sense in which he admits purpose in the universe. It is worth mentioning that I was over and over again confronted with the difficulty of translating his liberal use of the term "zweckmässig" without representing him as a teleologist.

But from the nature of his task Sir Oliver Lodge cannot deal fully with the theistic issue in the present paper. His chief concern is with the idea of the immateriality and spirituality of the human mind. Here again, however, we notice at the outset a lack of precision both in the formulation of his own conception and the presentment of that of Professor Haeckel. "It is probably true," he says, "that our life and that of the animals are branches of one fundamental vitality." "Branches" is a curious and awkward term for a physicist to use. We would prefer, perhaps, his other term—"incarnations" or embodiments. Expressed thus, Sir Oliver Lodge's position offers him two alternatives: either all vital force is capable of existing

apart from matter, or he will be reduced, with Le Conte and Fiske and Upton, to desperate straits in proving an exception in favour of man. He clearly chooses the former alternative, and favours the idea that life generally is "something immaterial and itself fundamental, something which uses collocations of matter in order to display itself amid material surroundings, but is otherwise essentially independent of them." As far as all infra-human vitality is concerned, there is not a single fact of experience to support this, and the negative evidence is imposing; nor is the "tide of opinion" by any means turned at present in such a direction. It is a speculation far more aerial than any that Haeckel ever penned, and comes strangely from one who speaks of Haeckel as "a voice in the wilderness."

Sir Oliver Lodge would probably not wish to emphasise this side of his theory. His chief concern is with the human mind. In the present paper he joins issue only on the question whether mind is "limited to its material manifestation." It is necessary to remind him again that in this belief Haeckel is by no means so isolated as he represents. In face of those very facts that are marshalled by Haeckel, another man of science, Münsterberg, was moved to declare that "science opposes to any doctrine of individual immortality an unbroken and impregnable barrier"; Professor Royce (so says Le Conte) "gives up the question of immortality as insoluble by philosophy"—and Le Conte himself adds that "perhaps it is." Moreover, Sir Oliver Lodge does not seem to realise the full force of the scientific difficulty alleged by Haeckel. It is not merely that the facts of psycho-physics, pathology, physiology, and child-psychology reveal a perfect parallel between mind and brain-activity. The story of the evolution of the mind drives home this parallelism with peculiar force. When we rise from the general sensitiveness of the monera and amœbæ to the more specialised sentience of the lower vermaliens, and then to the differentiated sense-activities and growing consciousness of the higher animals, and find

that the advance is rigidly proportioned to the formation and distribution of neural cells, we have a mass of evidence of clear scientific import. When we find the digestive force or the respiratory force advancing with the growth of its organ, we do not suppose that it lay, ready formed, behind the material screen from the first, and only awaited the opportunity to "manifest" itself. We do not speculate as to whether it may perish when the organ has broken up. On ordinary scientific principles and methods we assume that the growing complexity of the material structure has been accompanied by a corresponding elaborateness of the plexus of forces associated with its elements. We are not surprised that a "new force" appears; we should be surprised if it did not; and we naturally assume that the composite force will dissolve into its elemental energies when the organ breaks up. Haeckel insists that the same scientific procedure must be followed (unless we admit non-scientific considerations into science) in dealing with mental force. Neuroplasm is far more complex than ordinary plasm: the neural cell is far more intricate than the muscular or glandular cell: the brain is infinitely more elaborate than any other organ of the body. We shall expect the resultant or plexus of the forces associated with cerebral matter to be far different from any other vital function.

Further, Haeckel would say, when we observe the sensitiveness of a swarm of infusoria to an electric current, we do not dream of postulating some independent force behind their simple organism, that takes this opportunity of manifesting itself. The act does not seem to be beyond the range of their physical or chemical properties. When we ascend to the more specialised sensitiveness of the worms, it does not seem necessary to seek any other explanation than the concentration of the neural, irritable matter into definite centres. As we pass to the higher articulates and the lower vertebrates, and observe the gradual dawn of consciousness in rigid proportion to the centralisation and advance of the neural

machinery, we see no clear reason for thinking that this is other than an evolution of the general psychic force. The unconscious passes into the conscious in every child that develops. And, given the first glimmer of consciousness, the ascent to the advanced mental life of the higher apes is clearly not beyond the range of evolution. Further (though we have certainly not descended from any existing ape), we have only to put in a row the skulls of intelligent anthropoids, of the pithecanthropus of Java, of the earliest prehistoric men, and of the lowest existing savages, to conceive plausibly enough the continued development of the general psychic force into the human mind. It is interesting to note that in his latest work Haeckel regards sensation (or unconscious sentience) as an ultimate and irreducible attribute of substance, like matter (or extension) and force (or spirit).

As every student knows, there is a marked tendency among religious thinkers with scientific attainments to admit the whole of this evolutionary process (with the provision that it was intelligently controlled). The older idea of claiming a "difference in kind" between the mind of man and that of the lower animals is fading away in the increasing light of comparative psychology. Men of science now point out that there is more difference between the mind of the orang and the lower lemurs than between that of the orang and the Australian native. If the latter is claimed to be a "distinction in kind," what shall we say of the profound gulf between the mind of the ape and that of the primitive fish, or the mind of the ant or dog and that of the lower worms? Yet in these cases evolution is now generally admitted. It has even been suggested of late by men of scientific eminence that the mere release of the hand from the rough function of locomotion or climbing, and its adaptation to finer prehensile and tactual uses, may have been enough of itself to provoke that initial human departure in higher brain-development for which Dr Wallace would claim the infusion of a new soul. Given the initial advance in mental power, it is

easy to see how natural selection would fasten on it and promote it.

It seems, therefore, a singularly unhappy venture of Sir Oliver Lodge's to say that Haeckel is unscientific or extra-scientific in his theory of mind and brain. If he had said that Haeckel was *too* scientific—too exclusively scientific—in his view of the matter, and did not sufficiently take account of philosophical considerations, we could understand him. Curiously enough, Professor Lloyd-Morgan, a high authority on comparative psychology, had only shortly before stated in the *Contemporary Review* that there was no possibility of rebutting Haeckel's conclusions from the scientific side, and had advised religious thinkers to look to metaphysics for support. It is, in fact, impossible to deny that Haeckel's procedure is strictly scientific. His position is often mis-stated. He does not say that mind is a product of matter, of the brain. He says that mind is a phase or "mode" of the fundamental cosmic energy, which manifests itself as crystalline force, or digestive force, or magnetic force, or conscious force, according to the form and complexity of the matter with which it is associated. This is the increasing belief even of religious scientific thinkers. Science—that is to say, trained and systematic observation—has now studied living nature for several centuries with searching scrutiny. It has found no reason to suspect that the mind-force is differently related to matter from any other manifestation of cosmic energy. Using every inductive test, it has found the mind-force as intimately and invariably dependent on nerve-structure as the crystalline force is on crystal-structure and the digestive force on stomach-structure. It has found structure and function to be like the convex and concave sides of a curved line in mind just as in all other functions. The inductive methods of science point only to one conclusion.

What are the considerations with which Sir Oliver Lodge would rebut this conclusion? In the first place, he suggests

one or two scientific references that cannot be sustained. He recalls the quaint old idea of the cosmic system possibly forming the brain of some larger intelligence. He forgets that science finds mind invariably associated, not with structure in general, but with a very specific kind of structure—nerve-structure; and we have no reason whatever to see this in the loose aggregation of cosmic bodies. He says that the Monist must restrict the term matter “to the chemical elements and their manifestations,” and must “exclude ethereal and other generalisations.” I have explained above that this is a really incomprehensible misstatement of Haeckel’s plain position. He says that we cannot say without improper dogmatism that brain is “the only conceivable machinery” that mind can use. Well, not only has no one ever suggested any other comprehensible type of machinery, but science would be wantonly disregarding its own massive induction (of the invariable connection of mind with brain) if it went on to any such speculation. Haeckel is concerned with facts rather than possibilities—especially possibilities that seem to be strangely remote from the facts.

The other general considerations which Sir Oliver Lodge adduces tend to show that the invariable connection of mind and matter in our experience does not involve a necessary connection outside of our experience. He points out that if all musical instruments and acoustic organs were blotted out of existence to-morrow, “music” would continue to be. Surely this is a strange *fallacia in adjecto*! Music in the sense of the artist’s ideas is a wholly different thing from musical sound. It is the same with the allegory of light and the eye. The ethereal ripples (the *object* of sight) remain when the eye is blind or dead, but the faculty of vision has gone, and it is *this* that forms the real parallel to the mind. No one (except the idealist) suggests that the objects of knowledge or the material embodiments of mind (works of art, etc.) decay when the brain breaks up. These metaphors entirely confirm Haeckel’s position.

We shall need stronger philosophic considerations than these to break down the massive (and legitimate) scientific presumption of the necessary connection between mind and brain. Undoubtedly it is an error for any scientific man to cling too narrowly to actual experience. We experience a thousand things that our fathers never knew; our children will assuredly do the same. I can just conceive that the ponderable and visible structure of the brain may have a counterpart in ether. Who will say positively that this must decay when the visible brain does? The attitude of many scientific men towards psychical research is regrettable; but it is not unintelligible when one realises the solidity of the inductive proof of the connection of mind with ponderable nerve-structure, and when one appreciates the potencies of such a force as telepathy and the repellent story of fraud and hallucination unfolded by Mr Podmore.

As a plea for candour and willingness to learn Sir Oliver Lodge's paper is entitled to respect. We cannot but remind him, however, that it does not bring us nearer the final peace to speak of the system of a sincere and proved humanitarian as a "miserable and degraded Monism," to dissipate attention with a score of petty criticisms instead of bringing it to a focus on the only serious issues for cultured people, and to exaggerate the differences between Haeckel and his colleagues. Haeckel's onslaught was upon the official creeds of the Churches and the popular beliefs they reflect. His language is at times harsh and sarcastic, because he knows that the cultured thought of the world has gone far beyond those creeds. Would Sir Oliver Lodge subscribe *literally* to a single article of the simplest of the official creeds? Every student of his admirable essays and speeches knows that he could not. He is really separated from Haeckel only by a teleological view of the world-process and an empirical conviction of the persistence of mind. He is separated from the Churches by a mountain-range of obsolete dogmas.

JOSEPH M<sup>C</sup>CABE.

## THE BIRTH OF A SOUL.

(*Oscar Wilde: the Closing Phase.*)

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FORTY years ago Robert Browning declared that, besides "the incidents in the development of a soul," there was little that was worth study; and all his poetry proves that he not only said it with his lips but believed it in his heart. If he was right, how supereminent must be the interest of an incident, or a group of incidents, the effect of which is so great that it is best described, not as the development of a soul, but as its re-birth! Such is the supreme interest which belongs to the two books, *De Profundis* and *A Ballad of Reading Gaol*, written by Oscar Wilde after the awful overthrow of his disgrace, condemnation and imprisonment. Whoever compares these books with any of Wilde's earlier writings, whether in prose or in verse, must surely be driven to the conclusion that their author was the child of a second birth in a sense far deeper than that which is usually attached to the glibly-repeated phrases of traditional theology. He may even be led to question the propriety of speaking about the "ruin" of Wilde, though Wilde applies the word to himself. "I must," he says, "say to myself that I ruined myself, and that nobody great or small can be ruined except by his own hand." Yet the question suggested by the two books above named is whether the apparent ruin was not in reality salvation; and whether, in the eye of infinite wisdom, the whole

process of sin, and degradation, and suffering, might not be just the process most to be desired for such a man as Wilde. His condemnation smirched Wilde for ever with the "bar sinister" of the prison, made his name a name of reproach, and himself an outcast from society; but it led to the production of two works which, in their moral depth and permanent significance, dwarf all he had before written, all that he gave promise of writing. The tree is known by its fruit. Could such a tree have borne such fruit unless it had been watered by the bloody sweat of those appalling sufferings? Would anything but the utter disgrace and infamy of the sentence have wrung from Wilde the indispensable bloody sweat? But if the sufferings were necessary, then the sins from which they sprang were necessary too; and in that case it would seem that we must modify the ordinary conception of the nature of sin and suffering. Carlyle in a noble figure reminds us that the rose is none the less a rose although it springs from a dungheap. The metaphor is flung at that realism which belittles the higher elements of humanity because they are inseparably associated with the animal part. We accept it as a fine expression of the truth; but we probably shrink from asking ourselves what may be the components of that heap from which the rose draws its life. Neither, fortunately, is there the least necessity of descending to details; but *De Profundis* irresistibly impels us to ask the question whether there is any form of evil which is absolutely, irredeemably and immutably evil. We are accustomed to think of certain forms of evil as being capable of transformation into good. The suffering which is brought upon us by the action of others, or that which is due to our own inadvertent transgression, may be matter for thanksgiving. The baser passions are, we know, no more identical with the family affections, which are the glory of humanity, than is the festering corruption at the roots identical with the beautiful flower. Both have undergone a transformation "into something rich and strange." But dare we apply this same conception to the

sins which we are conscious of committing against our own higher nature, which we feel have degraded us? Is there any moral alchemy which can alter the character of lying, and slander, and covetousness, and the thousand forms of impurity? This is the question which *De Profundis* forces us to raise. Wilde was neither the first to ask it nor the first to answer it; but probably no one else has so vividly illustrated the answer by his own life and work.

We need not lift the curtain from Wilde's history farther than he has lifted it himself in *De Profundis*. There he tells us, sufficiently for the purpose, what he was before his life was cleft in twain by the closing of the prison doors behind him. "The gods had given me almost everything," he says. "But I let myself be lured into long spells of senseless and sensual ease. I amused myself with being a *flâneur*, a dandy, a man of fashion. I surrounded myself with the smaller and the meaner minds. I became the spendthrift of my own genius, and to waste an eternal youth gave me a curious joy. Tired of being on the heights, I deliberately went to the depths in the search for new sensation." . . . "It was always springtime once in my heart. My temperament was akin to joy. I filled my life to the very brim with pleasure, as one might fill a cup to the very brim with wine." Nor must it be supposed that Wilde ever, even doing his imprisonment, turned his back completely upon his old life, or wholly renounced the principles which governed it. The new conception which filled his mind in prison was that they were, not so much false, as partial and one-sided. "I don't," he says, "regret for a single moment having lived for pleasure. I did it to the full, as one should do everything that one does. There was no pleasure I did not experience. I threw the pearl of my soul into a cup of wine. I went down the primrose path to the sound of flutes. I lived on honeycomb. But to have continued the same life would have been wrong, because it would have been limiting. I had to pass on."

The mistake, then, in Wilde's opinion, was, not in living

for pleasure, but in living for that *alone*. He had been unfaithful to his own resolution, "to eat of the fruit of all the trees in the garden of the world": he had confined himself to those which grew on "the sunlit side of the garden." Richly endowed with genius, and with that charm which does not always accompany genius, even in his youth the apostle of a school, master of epigram and paradox, "the glass of fashion," he could say with truth that the gods had given him almost everything; and his friends might well think that he had but to go on with the same almost god-like ease, in order to make his life one triumphal procession. Yet they were certainly wrong. Wilde stood in a false relation to life. The elegancies would have palled, the pleasures would have cloyed, one ray of nature's sun would have revealed the theatrical falsity of the light. Artistically, even,—the one thing which Wilde cared for—he would have become intolerable. The phrase-monger speedily wears himself out, the man who is always in a pose ends by becoming ridiculous. When he spoke condescendingly of the Atlantic Ocean, Wilde revealed to the discerning the goal towards which he was travelling. He had to learn something which was yet concealed from him.

Wilde learnt the indispensable lesson not voluntarily, but by the sternest of necessities. He had been told the truth, but he refused to believe it. "My mother," he says, "who knew life as a whole, used often to quote to me Goethe's lines, written by Carlyle in a book he had given her years ago, and translated by him, I fancy, also:—

' Who never ate his bread in sorrow,  
Who never spent the midnight hours  
Weeping and waiting for the morrow,—  
He knows you not, ye heavenly powers.'

Wilde "absolutely declined to accept or admit the enormous truth hidden" in these lines. He "could not understand it." That his eyes might be opened, he had to pass within the prison doors,—to stand at Clapham Junction, manacled, in a

garb of shame, the loadstone of all eyes as if he were some cynosure of the nether pit,—to think the dreadful thoughts of “the man who had to swing,” and to realise the horror of the doom with a vividness far beyond the reach of the criminal’s own mind. What such experiences must have meant to a bundle of nerves like Wilde, even his own words can but very imperfectly tell: no one else can attempt to tell it at all. Not often have such experiences been narrated by the man to whom they have come; where, except in these books, are they to be found narrated by such a “lord of language” as Wilde? No words can exaggerate, few minds can comprehend, the intensity of the mental sufferings of such a man in such a position. *De Profundis* and the *Ballad of Reading Gaol* show, as perhaps no other books have ever shown, the immensity of the difference which may divide punishments nominally the same. They illustrate in a startling fashion the crudity of human justice. And yet perhaps their effect upon Wilde may be the best vindication of its methods. The stolid criminal would certainly not have suffered as Wilde did; but neither would he have found Wilde’s redemption.

It is the revelation of the effect of such a discipline of sin and punishment and suffering that gives Wilde’s last two books their unique value; and it is herein too that we find their deepest agreement. In more ways than one *De Profundis* is widely different from the *Ballad of Reading Gaol*. The fact that the former is in prose and the latter in verse is not important; for in conception both are poetical and tragic. But the spirit is different, as the circumstances of composition were different. *De Profundis*, written in prison, is more submissive. It does indeed condemn the system of punishment: “The prison style is absolutely and entirely wrong.” But Wilde adds that “the spirit of the Christ who is not in the churches, may make it, if not right, at least possible to be borne without too much bitterness of heart.” *Reading Gaol*, written after the prisoner’s release, indicates a reaction. The picture of the warders “strutting up and down,” keeping

“their herd of brutes,” and of their mockery of “the swollen purple throat,” is full charged with bitterness; and it is doubtful whether anyone would infer from the ballad that sense of obligation to the prison officials, or at least to the Governor, which Wilde expresses in the letter prefixed to *De Profundis*. The reader perceives that, notwithstanding his condemnation of the prison system, the author of the ballad was profoundly indebted to that system; but he does not perceive that the poet himself was conscious of the debt. The chief purpose of *De Profundis*, on the other hand, is to proclaim it. Society is wrong in its treatment of the offender, the prison system is wrong,—yet in spite of the wrong there comes to him, through the treatment and through the system, the boon of a deeper and a larger life.

In some ways, therefore, the *Ballad of Reading Gaol* seems to show that Wilde was reverting towards something less alien from his former self than were his thoughts in prison; and on that account it may be held to justify the suspicion that the change in his character was less complete and profound than it would be judged from *De Profundis* to be. In at least one respect, however, and that the most vital, the *Ballad* shows continued progress along the same line. It is the most sincere of all Wilde's writings. *De Profundis* is incomparably more sincere than any of his earlier works; but the greatest flaw in it is the suggestion conveyed by some passages that perhaps after all the writer is only posing. That this is so is no matter for wonder; it would be marvellous, rather, if even such a tremendous catastrophe as his had all at once revolutionised the inborn disposition or the acquired character of the man. Wilde had breathed the breath of artifice and affectation; and even the prison could not all at once sweep it away and replace it with an atmosphere of simple truth and sincerity. But in the ballad every line bears its own guarantee of sincerity. The thoughts which the author expresses or suggests may be wrong; but it is impossible to doubt that they are the thoughts of a man

deeply in earnest. Here, then, *De Profundis* is inferior ; yet not so inferior as to be tainted in its essence. As the *Ballad of Reading Gaol* carries a guarantee in its tone, so does *De Profundis* in its substance. The thoughts in it are beyond, immeasurably beyond, Wilde's former range ; the reader is forced to believe in their sincerity, because he feels certain that they would never have occurred to such a man by the mere exercise of imagination. He had to die to society, and almost to himself, in order that he might live again with alien powers and with thoughts hitherto inconceivable by him. It is significant that he believed his central conception to have been expressed only once before, and even then to have been misunderstood ; yet he must have read it in one of the great poets of his own day. He read it ; but only the prison experience gave him the key to its meaning.

To expect in Wilde an ordinary reformation, even as the result of such an experience, would be to misunderstand the man ; and he leaves us in no doubt about the futility of such an expectation. "I need not tell you," he says, "that to me reformations in morals are as meaningless and vulgar as Reformations in theology. But while to propose to be a better man is a piece of unscientific cant, to have become a deeper man is the privilege of those who have suffered. And such I think I have become." Such, indeed, he had become. The worshipper of beauty who had turned away from sorrow and suffering of all kinds as modes of imperfection, now declares that pain is the indispensable condition of the highest beauty of all. He who had said that there was "enough suffering in one narrow London lane to show that God did not love man," now writes : "It seems to me that love of some kind is the only possible explanation of the extraordinary amount of suffering that there is in the world. I cannot conceive of any other explanation. I am convinced that there is no other, and that if the world has indeed, as I have said, been built of sorrow, it has been built by the hands of love, because in no other way could the soul of man, for whom the

world was made, reach the full stature of its perfection. Pleasure for the beautiful body, but pain for the beautiful soul."

Part of Wilde's doctrine is, as has been already said, commonly accepted; and he himself was, in the earlier part of his life, exceptional in denying it. Theologians would have no difficulty in accepting Wilde's words in the passage quoted above: they would consider them admirably orthodox. They have taught the moral value of suffering, and their recognition of it is the most vital difference between their ethical teaching and that of the Greek philosophers. It is likewise the most vital difference between the teaching of Christianity and that of Judaism: "prosperity," says Bacon, "is the blessing of the Old Testament; adversity is the blessing of the New." But while they have taught this, theologians have, at the same time, drawn the broadest of lines between suffering and sin. They conceive of the former as something which is, somehow, necessary for the moral good of humanity, though they cannot understand it. "Clergymen," says Wilde, "and people who use phrases without wisdom sometimes talk of suffering as a mystery. It is really a revelation." But while they regard suffering as, though mysterious, necessary, and in some uncomprehended way right, towards sin their attitude is altogether negative. It would be right to court suffering for a good cause; but many have taught that to commit the most venial sin, were it even to secure the most transcendent good, would be to deserve damnation. And probably many more, who are unable to banish all sense of proportion in face of the word "sin," would feel themselves holier men if they only could do so. To them sin is evil, absolute and immitigable. The ecclesiastical conception of saintship rests almost wholly on the conviction that it is a higher thing to have committed no sin than, in achieving great results, to have gathered also the spots and stains of a world where evil is plentifully mingled with good. The view is negative rather than positive; innocence is set above a life of strenuous but not immaculate virtue.

Now, it is important to notice that Wilde recognises no such absolute distinction between, on the one hand, a form of evil called sin, which is always and incurably evil, and which has to be simply blotted out by a special act of divine grace; and, on the other hand, forms of evil called pain and suffering, which are even essential to the highest good. Not only so, but he justifies his own view by a reference to the teaching of Christ. "The world had always loved the saint as being the nearest possible approach to the perfection of God. Christ, through some divine instinct in him, seems to have always loved the sinner as being the nearest possible approach to the perfection of man. His primary desire was not to reform people, any more than his primary desire was to relieve suffering. To turn an interesting thief into a tedious honest man was not his aim. . . . In a manner not yet understood of the world, he regarded sin and suffering as being in themselves beautiful holy things and modes of perfection."

There is a suggestion of phrase-making in the sentence about the interesting thief and the tedious honest man. There can be no doubt that Christ did aim at turning the thief, although he might be interesting, into an honest man, even if in the process he became tedious; and Wilde must have been perfectly well aware of the fact. The sentence is one of the lingering traces of insincerity which mar the book. But the main thought expressed was deeply and seriously felt. Wilde had indeed come to regard "sin and suffering as being . . . beautiful holy things and modes of perfection"; and he believed that Christ so regarded them.

"It seems a very dangerous idea," he goes on. "It is—all great ideas are dangerous. That it was Christ's creed admits of no doubt. That it is the true creed I do not doubt myself.

"Of course the sinner must repent. But why? Simply because otherwise he would be unable to realise what he had done. The moment of repentance is the moment of

initiation. More than that: it is the means by which one alters one's past. The Greeks thought that impossible. They often say in their Gnostic aphorisms, 'Even the Gods cannot alter the past.' Christ showed that the commonest sinner could do it, that it was the one thing he could do. Christ, had he been asked, would have said—I feel quite certain about it—that the moment the prodigal son fell on his knees and wept, he made his having wasted his substance on harlots, his swine-herding and hungering for the husks they ate, beautiful and holy moments in his life. It is difficult for most people to grasp the idea. I daresay one has to go to prison to understand it. If so, it may be worth while going to prison."

It should be noticed that there is in the former of these passages an apparent oversight of expression. Wilde speaks of Christ as having regarded "sin and suffering as being *in themselves* beautiful and holy things." When he comes to illustrate, what he says is that when the prodigal son fell on his knees and wept, he made his sins beautiful and holy moments in his life. The difference is important: the sins are no longer beautiful and holy *in themselves*, but in their results. The repentant prodigal is a better man—or, if Wilde prefers it, a deeper man—than many just men which need no repentance; but his sins alone, without the repentance, would not make him better or deeper.

These paragraphs are the core of *De Profundis*. Out of the depths to which he had sunk, or from the heights towards which he was rising, Wilde proclaimed this startling gospel, that sin and suffering are beautiful holy things and modes of perfection. That is what one of the most appalling of all imaginable experiences had taught him. He appears to have believed that this doctrine was original with him, or rather that it was original with Christ, and that he was the first who had taken it from the teaching of Christ. He was not altogether right: it was not absolutely necessary—for all men, though probably it was for him—to go to prison in order to learn it. The doctrine is closely akin to that of

Hegel, who likewise taught that good is evolved out of evil; and though Wilde, who tells us that metaphysics interested him very little and morality not at all, may well have neglected the philosopher, it is more strange that he had not detected the same teaching in the verse of Browning. One of the most frequently recurrent thoughts in Browning's poetry is that of the necessity of evil to progress. It runs through his work from beginning to end, appearing at least as early as *Sordello*, and finding perhaps its clearest and fullest expression in the last volume he ever published. It is the whole meaning of the poem *Rephan*, where the sentence pronounced upon the aspiring soul is, "Thou art past Rephan, thy place be Earth." And Browning as well as Wilde refuses to take shelter behind the distinction between suffering and sin. Both are necessary. The soul must be "by hate taught love." The Earth to which the growing spirit is sent is earth with all her innumerable forms of evil:—

"Diseased in the body, sick in soul,  
Pinched poverty, satiate wealth,—your whole  
Array of despairs."

Doubtless Wilde read Browning at a time when such teaching was wholly alien from his mind, and for that reason missed the poet's meaning. He is less original than he believed himself to be; but he is even more interesting than he knew. For in one respect he is unique. He not only taught this doctrine, but he affords in his own person the most striking illustration of it. To him it came, not from books, but fresh stamped with the impress of truth from the mint of experience. From him it passes to the reader, not a mere theory, but a life. There, on the one hand, is Oscar Wilde, *flâneur* and dandy, treading the primrose path to the sound of flutes, sporting upon the surface of life, beautiful as a floating bubble played upon by the sunlight, and almost as evanescent, —here, on the other, is a new Oscar Wilde, branded with infamy, worn with suffering, but forced by that very infamy and suffering to work down towards the depths, where he finds

and makes his own, as no one else had ever done, the thought of the greatest European philosopher and the most philosophic English poet of the nineteenth century. By that achievement he has probably made his fame permanent; and he has certainly made it impossible for any contemporary to ignore him.

A catastrophe more utter and apparently irretrievable than Wilde's can hardly be conceived. His very fame made it the more hopeless. Other prisoners might retire into obscurity, they could easily hide themselves from the few who knew them. But for him the whole earth was "shrivelled to a handsbreadth," and he must wear the brand of infamy in the face of day. It was just from the completeness of the ruin, in the worldly sense, that the new soul took its birth. With penetrating insight Wilde perceived that he must not attempt to deny his imprisonment, or to pretend that such an incident had never occurred in his life. Not only would the pretence in his case have been hopeless, but it would have been a blunder even if he could have succeeded in deceiving men. "I want," he says, "to get to the point when I shall be able to say quite simply, and without affectation, that the two great turning-points in my life were when my father sent me to Oxford, and when society sent me to prison." . . . "To deny one's own experiences is to put a lie into the lips of one's own life. It is no less than a denial of the soul."

It is pathetic to observe this pleasure-loving spirit bent by an iron necessity to a fate as hard as the worst which mediæval asceticism ever contrived for itself. But the justification of the suffering comes from the extraordinary change which it produced. "Most people," says he, "are other people. Their thoughts are someone else's opinions, their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation." It is profoundly true; and, though to the end he did not suspect the fact, it is true of Wilde himself till the period of his imprisonment. He was, indeed, the leader of a fashion; but the fashion itself was an unconscious plagiarism from a highly artificial society. Until his terrible disaster Wilde had never been forced to dive into

the depths of his own spirit ; he had delighted to play on the surface. By compulsion he learnt wisdom.

The change worked in Wilde is so enormous that it may fairly be described as the birth of a soul. The new soul was begotten by sin and born of agony. Its life was short ; and there is sad reason to fear that even before the close Wilde had slid far back towards the gulf from which he had emerged. Probably he had by his early career too completely sapped and undermined his own character to be capable of standing firm upon the height which he had gained. Yet even so the change was sufficient reward for the throes of birth ; it was worth while to have trodden even such a wine-press of the wrath of God. The prodigal had fallen on his knees and wept, his soul had had one glimpse of the immortal sea, he had stood for a moment upon the peak in Darien ; and however long had been his life, however stained with errors, weaknesses and vices, it must have been influenced by that transmuting experience. It had changed Wilde's whole view of life ; and though he might have sinned deeply against himself, he could never have forgotten the "revelation" of suffering.

The most momentous question suggested by the amazing result is : Could the reformation have been brought about at a cheaper price ? Could the new soul have been born of any other parentage ? Would anything but that terrible suffering have given the apostle of æstheticism the depth and the earnestness necessary to conceive the *Ballad of Reading Gaol* and *De Profundis* ? If not, for him it may have been worth while, not only to go to prison, but even to sin as deeply as he did. The idea may be, as he says, a dangerous one ; but what if it be true ? Have all the churches, in nineteen centuries, thrown such light upon the problem of evil as is shed by these two books in contrast with their author's earlier writings ?

HUGH WALKER.

## WHAT WAS THE LOST END OF MARK'S GOSPEL?

*A New View of the Gospel Evidence for the Resurrection.*

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IN the following article, my aim is to point out how little historical basis there is for the attacks which modern criticism has made on the truth of the account of the Resurrection in the Gospels. To be sure, there are some very difficult contradictions in the Gospels, but, by resorting to the critical method itself, all of them may be overcome.

The attacks of criticism centre round the following points:—

1. Mark provides no room for any appearance in Judea, while Matthew expressly tells us that the Eleven met Christ for the first time in Galilee.

2. Luke, on the other hand, deliberately omits all appearances in Galilee. He alters the words of the angel (Mark xvi. 7) to this very different form: "Remember how He spake unto you when He was yet in Galilee" (Luke xxiv. 6). Moreover, he places Christ's command, that the disciples shall "tarry in the city" until Pentecost (Luke xxiv. 49), on the evening of Easter Day, and supposes that the Ascension took place the very same day.

3. There are many unmeaning details, *e.g.* the appearance of Christ in Matt. xxviii. 9 ff. The women are running to bring the disciples the angel's tidings (that Christ would be

seen in Galilee) when Christ appears, not to tell something new, but merely to repeat the angel's words.

4. Finally, the account in the Fourth Gospel is absolutely irreconcilable with the synoptic. Only Mary Magdalene comes to the tomb. An appearance to Thomas takes place in Jerusalem eight days after Easter, in spite of the express promises in Mark xvi. 7, etc., etc.

When modern criticism takes up the question, What is the historical kernel of the Resurrection stories? the answer sometimes is, "An appearance in Galilee." Its general tendency, however, is to an absolute negative.<sup>1</sup> I shall now try to solve these problems; but I will premise that I take it as an incontestable fact that Luke and the Matthew editor both used a written Mark.

Two problems arise:—(1) Why does not Luke mention any appearance in Galilee? and (2) What were the contents of the lost end of Mark's Gospel?

1. *Why does St Luke not mention any appearance in Galilee?*

I shall first show that Luke xxiii. 55–xxiv. 11 mainly represents a non-Marcan source. In examining this passage, we find it mentioned that women who had followed Christ from Galilee witnessed His burial, and that they then prepared ointments and spices in order to anoint His body after the sabbath. Mark tells that only two of the Galilean women (Mary Magdalene and Mary, mother of James) were present, and that they, as they came to the grave on Sunday morning, brought with them spices they had bought after the sabbath. But after this the Marcan and Lucan accounts diverge widely. The source of Luke xxiii. 55–xxiv. 11, on the whole, therefore, is non-Marcan, though in the first verses, especially in verse 55, the account seems influenced from Luke's Marcan source.

<sup>1</sup> We here, of course, set aside Mark xvi. 9–20, which, as is well known, is an old addition, added presumably by a certain Ariston.

But to this source Luke clearly added two items of information. The first is verse 7; for it points back to the Marcan passage in Luke xviii. 33, as the words to which the angel, according to the opinion of Luke, was referring. The second addition is verse 10. That this, at any rate in its present form, does not belong to the original account can be proved (1) by the fact that *αὐτῶν* (verse 11) and *δύο ἐξ αὐτῶν* (verse 13) cannot refer to "the apostles" in verse 10, but only to "the eleven and all the others" (verse 9). Otherwise it would only be the apostles who doubted, and the two disciples from Emmaus would be apostles (against verses 18 and 33). I also mention verse 13 here, as it, as I shall prove later on, belongs to the same source. (2) Verse 10 refers, through xxiii. 55, to the account peculiar to Luke (viii. 1-3), in a way which shows that the verse here is an interpolation of Luke. He presupposes his own Gospel account.<sup>1</sup>

After separating the interpolation, xxiv. 7 and 10, we find left a fragment of a Resurrection story with marked hebraistic (LXX.) language. (This is especially clear in the later verses; the first may have been a little influenced from Luke's Marcan account.) Moreover, we are able to show that this source continues through the whole chapter.

1. xxiv. 13-43 is based on the account, xxiii. 55-xxiv. 11. (a) Verse 13 refers to verse 9. Moreover, it is clear that this reference to verse 9 is not made by Luke, for the continuation, verse 13, presupposes that there was *not* an editorial note, verse 10. (b) The account, verse 23, presupposes the account

<sup>1</sup> Judging by the list, verse 10, Sanday supposes the account, xxiii. 55-xxiv. 11, to belong in the main to the same source as Luke viii. 1-3. Verse 10 is, however, simply Luke's editorial interpretation of the vague expression, "Galilean women who had followed Christ," which seems used in the non-Markan source. Verse 10 is based on Luke viii. 1-3 and Luke's Marcan source, which told that Mary Magdalene and Mary, mother of James, were present at the burial, and also—in all likelihood—that only these two women came to the grave; cf. Matthew's account, xxvii. 56, 61, and xxviii. 1. Mark's account seems to be correct. For Mark also knew that a number of Galilean women were present at the Cross.

from verse 4, that the women saw *two* angels. (c) Verse 33, that the apostles are together with some others, as told in verse 9. (d) 21 and 23 tell indirectly what was told directly, verse 11, that nobody believed.

2. The same hebraistic language is found in both passages. (a) *καί* is preferred for *δέ* in the hebraistic way. (b) The expression *ἐνώπιον*, the Hebrew *נֶפֶשׁ*, is found, verses 11 and 43. (c) The expression *καὶ ἐγένετο* is used hebraistically, verses 4, 15, and 30. Moreover, the expression is in all the places followed by the infinitive preceded by *ἐν τῷ*, a construction formed after the LXX., after the model of the Hebrew *אֶת* with infinitive. This expression is only used "inside" the narrative (as something belonging to its style), here in chapter xxiv., and in the Jewish Christian source, Luke i.–ii. Else it is merely used by Luke as a convenient introduction to his Gospel narratives, which, owing to its Septuagint tone, seemed to him—the fine stylist—to be especially adapted for these sacred narratives. In the only two exceptions (ix. 33 and xix. 15), the expression might have been found in Luke's source, or the subsection may have seemed to him especially marked.

3. Other connections in style. The rare adjective *ὀρθρινός*, corresponding to the rare substantive *ὄρθρος* (verse 1) is used in verse 22, where the disciples are referring to the incident in verse 1.<sup>1</sup>

We have shown that xxiii. 55–xxiv. 43 is one source. But the rest of the chapter also belongs to the same. (1) *καὶ ἐγένετο* followed by the infinitive preceded by *ἐν τῷ* is found, verse 51 (*cf.* verses 4, 15, and 30). (2) *διανοίγειν* is

<sup>1</sup> The expression *κύριος* is used in verses 3 and 34. In verse 3 it is missing in the best MSS. But also in verse 34 it cannot be original. For *κύριος* is first used instead of *Jesus* in a somewhat later time, whereas in the account we find elements which point back to the earliest Christian stage, *e.g.* verses 19 and 21. Very likely Luke himself altered *Jesus* to *κύριος*, verse 34, as it was used in a context where his time always used "*κύριος*" (in the sense, *Jesus as the Risen*). Harnack has set forth the opinion that verse 34 is a separate source; but his argument on the expression *κύριος* is based on the presupposition that the appearance to Peter took place, according to Mark, in Galilee,—a supposition which, as I hope to prove later on, is wrong.

used in the same spiritual way, verses 31, 32, and 45. (3) 44 is a natural continuation of verse 43. (4) A striking similarity in thought is found in 25-27 and 44-46. It is a genuine Jewish Christian train of ideas, where the prophecies are looked upon as a sort of predetermination of history ( $\delta\epsilon\iota$ ). (5) One gets a clear impression that the whole chapter has a Jewish Christian source by reading xxiii. 56, xxiv. 4, 11, 19, 21, 26, 43, 44-45, 47, 49 ("ἡ πόλις"), and 53 (the emphasis on the Temple).

Our result therefore is, that Luke xxiii. (55) 56-xxiv. 53 is one source (save verses 7 and 10). But now Harnack, Schmiedel, and others have supposed that the words "Remember how He spake unto you when He was yet in Galilee" (xxiv. 6) are a later alteration, and that the words originally ran just as in Mark xvi. 7: "Behold, He will go before you into Galilee." Luke, they suppose, must then have altered the account, most likely because the following source (xxiv. 13-53) not only did not mention, but directly excluded, appearances in Galilee (*cf.* xxiv. 49).

Now, that *Luke* altered this seems impossible, for he has got the whole chapter as one source; the continuation of the account (verse 13) seems, as shown, clearly older than the editorial note, verse 10. I hope, moreover, to have proved that verse 6 does not belong to the Marcan source, but that the whole chapter represents one special source. But still there is doubtless a great truth in Harnack's theory; for the striking similarity in the form of Luke xxiv. 6 and Mark xvi. 7 gives the impression that this is a garbled tradition of the words which we find in their original form in Mark xvi. 7.

This, however, does not contradict our result, that the whole chapter is one source, for it is possible to show quite conclusively that an omission has taken place after verse 46, just in the place where we should expect the account of the Galilean appearance. We can further show how the omission took place, and why there came appearances in Jerusalem in spite of the original words, xxiv. 6.

In reading the last part of Luke xxiv., we get the impression that the Ascension took place in the evening of Easter Day. By a closer view we shall, however, find that there is an inner contradiction in this indication of the time. Verse 29 tells how Christ came to Emmaus towards evening. He then had supper together with the two disciples, for the disciples knew Him as He broke the bread. Jewish supper was between 6 and 7 p.m. The disciples may then be supposed to have joined the apostles in Jerusalem between 8 and 9 p.m. (Emmaus was 60 *stadioi* (7 miles) from Jerusalem, and uphill.) Subsequently Christ appeared to the apostles, and opened the Scripture at length (the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms) (Luke xxiv. 44), and proved that He was the true fulfilment. Lastly, He went to Bethany together with the disciples, and here He ascended from them. This would then have taken place at 12, perhaps 1, in the night. The account, xxiv. 51, gives, however, the impression that the event was conceived as happening in the daytime. (That there is such a contradiction is admitted by Sanday in his article "Jesus Christ" in Hastings' *Bib. Dict.*) This contradiction would be fully explained on the supposition that an account of an appearance in Galilee, which took place between the appearance in Jerusalem in the evening of Easter Day and the Ascension, was omitted. For then it will be easy to understand how a combination between those two Jerusalem appearances could take place, and bring about this meaningless indication of the time.

But how could this omission of the Galilean appearance come about? We cannot suppose that Luke himself made the omission, as he then would have to diverge, not only from this source, but also from the account in Mark, which he doubtless knew, and which also contained an appearance in Galilee. Rather it is clear that he received the source in its present form. For then we easily understand that he thought it necessary to omit the Marcan account. For the words, xxiv. 49 ("Tarry ye in the city," etc.),

would seem to him to rule out any possibility of Mark being correct.

The omission is therefore doubtless to be explained from the fact that the source was an original Jerusalem tradition. For it is clear that the congregation in Jerusalem from the first would prefer to relate the Jerusalem appearances in giving their account of the Resurrection. The appearances in Galilee would therefore soon be omitted, or at any rate not very well known in Jerusalem. Hence the "forty days" which elapsed between the first and the last Jerusalem appearance would not be emphasised, and would soon disappear altogether. The two events being thus narrated as immediately successive, would leave the general impression that they happened on the same day. Owing to this, the words in xxiv. 49, though words of farewell, and therefore clearly spoken at the Ascension, will seem to be spoken in the evening of Easter Day, and this will prevent the appearance in Galilee from again finding a place in the narrative.

That our theory is correct seems to be fully proved from the Acts. The fact that the tradition of Mark should contain some apocryphal accounts of Galilean appearances had seemed to Luke absolutely incredible. He therefore continued his investigations, and the result we find in the Acts i. 1-12. It seems that he got this new information directly from Jerusalem, for the geographical designation of the Mount of Olives is expressed in Jewish reckoning; *cf.* Acts i. 12, "The Mount of Olives was a sabbath day's journey from Jerusalem." He as Gentile would scarcely else use this reckoning. The source in the Gospel of Luke seems, as shown, also to be an original Jerusalem tradition, but is not so correct as the account in the Acts, which was the latest result of the investigations of Luke. May not the Gospel account be a Jerusalem tradition found in Greek among the Jewish Diaspora? It is at any rate a noteworthy fact that it uses Greek reckoning; *cf.* xxiv. 13, "Emmaus was 60 *stadioi* from Jerusalem."

From the Acts we learn that : (1) There were "forty" days (a Jewish expression for a fairly long period) between the first appearance in Jerusalem and the Ascension (Acts i. 3). (2) That the words, Luke xxiv. 47-49*a*, which in the Gospel seem spoken in the evening of Easter Day, in reality were spoken at the Ascension, "forty" days later ; for the words, Luke xxiv. 47-48 correspond to Acts i. 8*b*, and Luke xxiv. 49*a* to Acts i. 8*a*. (3) With regard to the words, Luke xxiv. 49*b* ("Tarry ye in the city, etc."), he seems, however, to have got no new information ; for we observe that he places them (in Acts i. 4) in a somewhat uncertain manner, merely saying that they were spoken "when Christ was assembled together with them." But at the same time he clearly felt that they were words of farewell. Therefore he shows, by his arrangement, that he himself thought them spoken at the Ascension. This is evident when we notice that the expression *συναλιζόμενος* (Acts i. 4) is taken up by the particle *οὕτως* (i. 6) and by the word *συνελθόντες*, which corresponds exactly to the word *συναλιζόμενος*. Moreover, it is very obvious that the words cannot be taken as spoken on the evening of Easter Day, according to the Acts.

Luke, therefore, did not get any absolute proof against the plain words, Luke xxiv. 49*b*. He dares not contradict his Gospel account in reporting the Galilean appearance in Mark, though he seems inclined to think it quite true, for he now tells that there were more appearances than he previously thought (Acts i. 3).

Our conclusion from the Acts is that both words and facts, mentioned Luke xxiv. 47-53, took place "forty" days later. Consequently we may be sure that a combination really has taken place between the first and the last Jerusalem appearances in the Gospel. Now, remembering (1) that the whole chapter (xxiv.) seems to be one source, and (2) that it seems extremely likely that xxiv. 6 originally predicted an appearance in Galilee, it is a reasonable supposition that an account of a Galilean appearance is omitted after verse 46, and that this naturally

caused the combination. But of course, as both the omission and the combination took place in the *oral* Jerusalem tradition, it is clear that verse 47 in its present form is a natural continuation of verse 46.

The history of the source of Luke xxiv. may therefore be supposed to be something like this:—(1) The congregation in Jerusalem, being especially interested in the Jerusalem appearances, related them in preference, neglecting the Galilean. The words corresponding to the present xxiv. 6 naturally took, therefore, their present vaguer form after the aim of the narrator. (2) The consequence of the omission of the appearance in Galilee was the combination of the two Jerusalem appearances. The combination naturally caused the ending of the first and the beginning of the last Jerusalem appearance to drop out. As the Jerusalem appearance was to the smaller circle of the disciples, it is reasonable to think that the omitted appearance in Galilee was to the larger—most likely the appearance to the five hundred brethren mentioned by St Paul (1 Cor. xv. 6). (3) Owing to the combination, xxiv. 49<sup>b</sup> would seem directly to exclude appearances in Galilee. And as it was just this combined source which Luke received, this further caused him to omit the ending of Mark. (4) Finally, Luke added to the source the verses 7–8 and 10.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The way in which the two disciples in Luke xxiv. 23–24 relate the events to Christ has become, perhaps, a little altered in the later oral tradition after the omission of the Galilean appearance and the alteration of the words, xxiv. 6. It seems quite possible, though not necessary, that before this the disciples mentioned the women's indication of the Galilean appearance to Christ.

Still more likely is it that the appearance of Christ to the women, which was related in the lost Marcan conclusion as caused by the women's doubt of the angel's words, was known in the early Jerusalem tradition. The omission is easily explained. For this appearance was only a new indication of that in Galilee, the relation of which was not desired; and further, the account was thought a scandal by many pious Christians (see p. 785). Traces of this omission will hardly be expected in xxiv. 1–11, as it took place in the *oral* tradition, but might perhaps be found in verse 24 ("Himself they saw not"). For it was expressly said that He first would go to see the disciples in Galilee. The disciples would hardly expect to find Him at the grave, if the women had not related that they saw Him there. The disciples' visit to the empty grave,

But how could there be appearances in Jerusalem? It seems quite contrary to the logic of the situation, as well as to the words of the original command, xxiv. 6. This apparently insoluble difficulty is, however, very easily explained. We learn, xxiv. 11 and 24, that nobody believed the women's tale, and even those who had listened most to their words returned disappointed after having seen the empty grave. This fully explains why appearances followed in Jerusalem. For that such sceptics would not go to Galilee to meet Christ, is obvious. Therefore, just as the original story was that Christ appeared to the women, because they doubted the *angel's* words, so the narrative goes on to relate how Christ had to appear to the apostles and the disciples together with them, as they did not believe the *women's* words. We therefore find:—(1) An appearance to Peter, xxiv. 33; *cf.* 1 Cor. xv. 5. (2) An appearance to the two disciples from Emmaus. (3) The appearance to the apostles and some few disciples, Luke xxiv. 35 ff.; *cf.* 1 Cor. xv. 5. (4) The omitted Galilean appearance, doubtless corresponding to 1 Cor. xv. 6. (5) The apostles' return to Jerusalem, where the last appearance takes place; *cf.* Luke xxiv. 46 ff., Acts i. 4 ff., 1 Cor. xv. 7.<sup>1</sup>

It is a strange fact that in the succession of events the source seems to have agreed entirely with the apostolic tradition which we get directly from St Paul. The old Jewish ideas which are found in it (for instance, verses 19 and 21) seem also to prove that the source has its origin from the oldest apostolic tradition. But what more than anything else confirms this is what I am now going to show, *that this*

mentioned in verse 24, though not in the preceding account, also proves that some omissions have taken place in the earliest oral tradition.

In accordance with this, it seems likely that, in order to get the original form of the disciples' account, xxiv. 23–24, we have to insert after verse 23 something like this: "and that He would go to meet us in Galilee. And they said that as they doubted and hesitated in bringing the command Christ *Himself* appeared to them."

<sup>1</sup> The appearance to the women and to the two disciples is reasonably enough not mentioned in 1 Cor., as such unknown persons would carry no weight with the Corinthians.

source and the lost Marcan conclusion, though clearly distinct, seem to have agreed in all main points.

This will carry us to our second principal question :

2. *What were the contents of the lost conclusion of St Mark's Gospel?*

As Matthew and Luke both used Mark, we have *a priori* reason to expect in them traces of the lost Marcan conclusion. Luke is, however, not satisfactory, having, as shown, simply omitted Mark's account; but Matthew gives us a most important clue.

Mark xvi. 6-7 and Matthew xxviii. 6-7 are almost literally parallel. Then, Mark xvi. 8 concludes by saying that the women fled away from the tomb, and did not tell anyone what they had heard, ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ. This is, without doubt, an unfinished sentence, as the word γάρ can scarcely terminate a period, and still less the whole Gospel. We can produce a similar effect by translating, "For they were afraid that——"

For what were they afraid? It can scarcely be for the angel, for why should the fact that the vision had produced a shock prevent them from respecting the command? But let us for a moment picture to ourselves the feelings of the women, and we shall easily solve the problem. We can realise how they began to reflect on the news and its truth, as they continued their flight, after the first shock of terror had passed. Who could know for certain whether the incredible news were true? It might be that it was only a vision! And then to run the risk of being ridiculed by all Jerusalem as credulous women! There can be little doubt the sentence must have continued in some fashion like this: For they were afraid "that it might not be true."

But now no reasonable being can believe that Mark would represent the fright as causing the disciples to get no information of the Resurrection at all. On the contrary, we

have *a priori* reason to expect that, as the tidings of the angel were not sufficient, the narrative went on to show how Jesus therefore was obliged to appear to them *Himself*, thus appeasing their fear and doubts, and repeating the angel's command.

This assumption is corroborated by Matthew in the most extraordinary way. Here, as in Mark, there is first the statement, almost in the same words, that the angel gave the Easter tidings to the women, and bade them "tell His disciples ("and Peter" is missing in Matthew) that Christ will go before them into Galilee." But now comes an important variation. The editor of Matthew evidently could not understand that doubt and fear of men's opinion should prevent anybody from telling what an angel said. He therefore alters Mark's account of the fear to "with fear *and great joy*," and adds—just contrary to Mark—that they "*did run to bring the disciples word.*"<sup>1</sup>

The alteration in Matthew caused the following appearance of Christ to seem purposeless. The women are hurrying away to bring the news; nevertheless, Christ appears not to tell something new, but simply repeating the angel's command. Still, it is a proof of the superficiality of the critic when on this account he summarily dismisses the appearance as unhistorical. For it is clear that we here find the continuation of the account in Mark. Mark and Matthew first correspond in the account of the angel's Easter tidings. Then comes in Matthew a very explicable and quite evident alteration of the Marcan account. But why should he alter the continuation? This proceeds by narrating that Jesus then appeared *Himself*, saying, "Be not afraid," and repeating the command from Mark xvi. 7 and Matthew xxviii. 7. And that this appearance is Marcan is evident, for it is the natural consequence of the account in Mark, but

<sup>1</sup> Such obliterations can sometimes be traced in Matthew. A similar one, clearly caused by the influence from the popular oral tradition, seems to have taken place in Matthew xiv. 33; cf. Mark vi. 52. Such things show that our Gospel of Matthew is later than Mark, and in its present form not from an eye-witness.

moved by the above-mentioned alteration out of its place in Matthew.

But we can trace still more of the ending of Mark. The special indication of Peter (Mark xvi. 7) clearly implies that the lost conclusion mentioned a special appearance to him. And we might expect that this appearance, like that to the disciples, would be represented as taking place in Galilee. As, however, we shall show, it seems that the Marcan account, as the original Lucan source, went on to relate that the doubt and unbelief of the disciples caused the place to be changed from Galilee to Jerusalem.

First I must refute the assertion of P. W. Schmiedel and others, that the disciples were supposed by Mark himself to have fled to Galilee. And this is an easy task, for when Mark makes the angel say, "Tell His disciples, He will go *before ye into Galilee,*" *he clearly implies that the disciples were not then in Galilee but in Jerusalem.*

But to proceed. In examining Matthew's account, we find a narrative of a meeting with the "eleven" disciples in Galilee. We have strong reason to suppose that this passage also is originally Marcan. For it is not likely that Matthew would have the account in Mark, which indicated that there had to be an appearance in Galilee, and not the continuation of the account, containing the appearance itself.<sup>1</sup>

In examining the passage, it is possible to prove that we here have a somewhat corrupted Marcan account. The most important proof is, of course, that Matthew himself thought it to be the continuation of the account, Mark xvi. 7 ff.; for Matthew xviii. 16 is his account of the fulfilment of the angel's words, Matthew xxviii. 7 = Mark xvi. 7. But this proof is variously corroborated. (1) The evangelisation of all the nations (*πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*), Matthew xxviii. 19, was, according

<sup>1</sup> After having written this, I am glad to find that such a specialist in the Synoptic problem as Mr Arthur Wright already in his *Synopsis of the Gospels*, p. 170, has put forth the opinion that Matthew xxviii. 9-10 and 16-20, without doubt, are Marcan.

to Mark, the main task of the disciples before the second coming of Christ; *cf.* Mark xiii. 10. (2) The style of the narrative is typically Marcan. Nothing is exaggerated or overdrawn. *Cf.* verse 17, "some doubted." Matthew's other source has the opposite character, its style bearing marks of the legendary; *cf.*, for instance, Matthew xxviii. 2-4, with the corresponding account in Mark xvi. 5. (3) Finally, the expression τὸ ὄρος will prove the same, and, as we shall see, give us a new and important clue.

τὸ ὄρος, "that mountain," is generally explained as follows:—The Eleven went to the mountain, where, according to what the angel said, they were to meet Jesus. Here, however, we are met with the difficulty, that the command to the women did not contain a single word about a meeting-place, though there had been a good opportunity for mentioning it, the command being repeated twice. Others, therefore, will explain it as a mountain Christ might have appointed to the apostles before the Crucifixion; but why is it then not mentioned in Matthew xxvi. 32 (Mark xiv. 28)? The evangelist would not have overlooked such a wonderful regard for detail in the prophecy. Is it not therefore more reasonable, considering the Marcan character of the narrative, to find the explanation in the assumption that Mark contained an account to the effect that Jesus appeared to the Eleven in Jerusalem, and appointed to them a certain mountain for a meeting in Galilee? "Yes," the answer may be; "but it is plainly said that the Eleven went to the mountain in Galilee where Jesus had appointed them, and in consequence we cannot imagine that Jesus in the original Mark was represented as having appeared to the Eleven in Jerusalem, telling them that He would appear to them in Galilee. This therefore just confirms the view that, if Matthew xxviii. 16-20 is original Marcan, then the conclusion of Mark *cannot* have contained an appearance to the Eleven in Jerusalem."

This conclusion would without doubt be just, if the

Galilean appearance in the original Mark had been only to the Eleven. But we can prove that the editor of Matthew has mixed up the Marcan account of an appearance to the Eleven in Jerusalem, which was caused by the general disbelief, where Jesus once more indicated a general Galilean meeting, with the account of all the disciples going to this meeting, and the general meeting itself.

The following three points will show this :—(1) The expression “some doubted” (verse 17) is incomprehensible, if said of the apostles; for the impression is, that this was the final result of the appearance, in which case the opinion of the evangelist would have been that several of the apostles never believed—a conclusion both absurd and in utter conflict with the actual facts (*cf.* Acts ii., etc.). (2) If the expression “that mountain” indicates, as it apparently does, that previous to this appearance there had been another in Jerusalem, to the Eleven, where the meeting-place for an appearance in Galilee was fixed, it would seem almost certain that this last would be meant for a wider circle. Otherwise this extra appearance would seem futile. (3) Mark xvi. 7 already indicates a general meeting of disciples in Galilee. He makes the angels say, “Tell His disciples and Peter,” etc.; and it is in that case impossible to take “disciples” in the narrow sense “apostles,” for then the command should have run, “Peter and the other disciples,” or “the apostles and Peter.” This becomes still clearer the second time (Matthew xxviii. 10), where Christ, speaking Himself, uses the expression “My brethren” instead of “disciples.” For the only place where Christ before has used this expression (Mark iii. 35, Matthew xii. 50), He uses it about His followers generally.

That the women understood the command in this sense is both psychologically clear, and, moreover, expressly mentioned, Luke xxiv. 9 and 22. This is most convincing, as this source seems originally to have contained a command to the women of the same intent as Mark xvi. 7. Matthew, who knew the

lost conclusion, also clearly takes the command, Mark xvi. 7, as given to the disciples generally. For he altered the expression καθὼς εἶπεν ὑμῖν (in Mark xvi. 7) into ἰδοὺ εἶπον ὑμῖν (in Matthew xxviii. 7). And this is clearly because he found the expression in Mark not quite correct, as he knew that the command was to all the disciples. But the words, Mark xiv. 28, were said to the apostles *only*.

It therefore seems clear that our Mark indicates a general meeting of Christ's followers in Galilee.<sup>1</sup> "But," one might object, "how can Mark have reported an appearance to the apostles in *Jerusalem*? The message, Mark xvi. 7 and Matthew xxviii. 7, stated that Christ, *clearly for the first time*, would meet the disciples in Galilee. And the reference is not to the common disciples only, but *also to the apostles*. For Peter, one of the Eleven, is expressly mentioned in the message (*cf.* Mark xvi. 7)."

The answer to this objection is easy, owing to the strange fact that we have to deal with events from real life, and not logically constructed accounts. The key is, that human nature is always the same. The women doubted the angel's word. Therefore Christ appeared Himself to the women and removed their doubts. The women then told the tidings to the disciples—apostles included—but none of them believed. Therefore Christ appeared to the Eleven (and, according to Luke, also to some others together with them), removing their doubt and indicating a certain mountain in Galilee as the place for the general meeting predicted by the women. This is just the appearance we were able to trace in the blending of the two accounts, Matthew xxviii. 16 ff.; and our result agrees with the original Lucan source.

The consequence of this "illogical" appearance to the Eleven was, of course, that the appearance to Peter also had

<sup>1</sup> Why should Christ appear in Galilee? The reason was, without doubt, that the main part of His disciples were from Galilee, and He wished as many as possible to bear testimony of His Resurrection. If He would appear only to the Eleven, why then take this roundabout way? For they were in Jerusalem (*cf.* Matthew xxviii. 7 and 16).

to be removed to Jerusalem, as it naturally had to take place before the appearance to the apostles, including Peter. The account, Luke xxiv. 33 and 1 Cor. xv. 5, is therefore only apparently contradicted in our Mark.

But why should the editor of Matthew omit these two very important Jerusalem appearances? He omitted them for the same reason which made him alter the original account of the women's doubt. Just as he was scandalised by the women's doubt, he felt it, of course, a still greater scandal that even the apostles did not believe, especially because this doubt entailed that the words of Christ, Matthew xxvi. 32 (Mark xiv. 28), were not literally fulfilled. He therefore preferred not to mention the Jerusalem appearance, which took place contrary to the original command, caused by the disbelief (*cf.* the very noteworthy fact that there is no report in Matthew of the women's coming to the Eleven). He only hints it when relating the general appearance in Galilee. That it really is a "hint," and not a pointing back to something said to the women, but for shortness' sake not mentioned there, might perhaps be seen from verse 16 itself. For if Matthew meant, "the mountain, which Christ appointed to the *women*," why then say that it was appointed to the apostles, which would be the more remarkable, because the command to the women, as we have shown, was *not* to the apostles exclusively? It seems, therefore, to hint an appearance to the Eleven in Jerusalem. This "hinting," however, leaves one with the impression that some of the *apostles* doubted, and that their doubt did not vanish at all (verse 17), though the narrator clearly meant to say that the apostles *adored*, but some of the *other disciples* doubted. Note that *οἱ δὲ* (verse 17) is without any subject expressed.

That not only the appearance to the Eleven, but also the appearance to Peter, was moved to Jerusalem, is confirmed by the fact that the special message to Peter, Mark xvi. 7, is omitted in Matthew xxviii. 7 and 10. For if he would not

report the account of the appearance to the Eleven, which, caused by their disbelief, took place in Jerusalem, neither would he, of course, report the Jerusalem appearance to Peter, which, owing to the same doubt, was moved to Jerusalem, in spite of the original command, Mark xvi. 7. But then it was necessary not only to omit the Jerusalem appearance to Peter, but also the angel's indication of the special appearance to Peter in Galilee, which was found in Mark xvi. 7, as this, owing to the doubt, was moved to Jerusalem. And this is just the case (*cf.* Matthew xxviii. 7 and 10). If Mark really had mentioned an appearance to Peter in *Galilee*, why should the Matthew editor then omit this?

Even if one assumes that "that mountain," in Matthew xxviii. 16, refers to a certain mountain appointed by the angel or by Christ before His death, it is difficult to doubt that Mark originally reported the two above-mentioned Jerusalem appearances. For if we have not a deliberate omission made by the Matthew editor, it seems quite inexplicable why not a word should be said as to how the disciples received the women's message; for one would expect this to be an especially tempting subject for tradition. Therefore, even if we had only the dogmatic alteration of Matthew xxviii. 8, which shows that the editor did not like to mention the disciples' doubt, the meaningless "some doubted" (verse 17), and the omission of the special message to Peter from Mark xvi. 7,—the proofs would seem quite conclusive. But the two suppositions, especially the latter (the appointing of the mountain before the Crucifixion) appear to me unlikely. Not only would it be against all prophetic analogy, but it would be inexplicable that the Evangelist, if he had heard this, should pass it by in silence. For doubtless it was for him of the greatest importance to give prominence to the exact details of Christ's predictions of His death and resurrection. Nay, one is sometimes tempted to think that the exactness has grown still clearer *post eventum* (*cf.* Mark x. 33). If, therefore, the Evangelist had been able to say that Christ before His death

appointed an exact place for an appearance, he would certainly make the statement explicitly.<sup>1</sup>

It would at the first sight seem as if the women's work was fruitless; but this is not the case. Though apparently fruitless, their message became of the greatest importance. For they spread the news all over Jerusalem, and, though people thought their words to be idle talk (Luke xxiv. 11), the consequence may have been, that during the following days a great number of disciples came to the Eleven to get information as to the startling news. The Eleven, having now themselves seen the risen Lord, could confirm the women's statement and indicate the place Christ had appointed to them for the great meeting. The consequence was, of course, that the Eleven had to stay somewhat longer in Jerusalem, and thus is explained the fact that we—according to John xx. 26—still can find them eight days later, when the appearance to Thomas—who, according to John, was not present at the first meeting—took place.

The result, therefore, seems to be, that the conclusion of Mark contained three appearances in Jerusalem: (1) to the women, (2) to Peter, and (3) to the apostles. First then followed (4) the Galilean appearance to the disciples, generally, doubtless, corresponding to that to the five hundred

<sup>1</sup> With regard to the section Matthew xxviii. 16–20 itself, it seems to me most likely that the words *συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος* (verse 20) are not originally Marcan, but added by the Matthew editor as a sort of solemn conclusion to his Gospel. For this expression is otherwise peculiar to St Matthew's Gospel, but seems in all places to be editorial. It is only found in the interpretations of the parables of Jesus (Matthew xiii.), which, though of course based upon the records of Jesus, doubtless have taken colour from the understanding and language of the editor, and in Matthew xxiv. 3, where it clearly is a later addition to the Marcan passage.

It would be of interest, if it could be proved that the words "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" were to be found in the original Marcan text. With reference to the fact that Eusebius (in *Demonst. Evang.* iii. 6, 1, 32) quotes the passage *βαπτίζοντες ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι μου*, Mr Conybeare has supposed them to be an addition from the later liturgy. This is of course a strong argument. But, on the other hand, it seems to me that the way in which the three great names often follow each other in the Epistles, as produced by a sort of association of ideas, is hard to explain if a trinomial baptism formula was not in use already in the apostolic time.

brethren (1 Cor. xv. 6), and to the omitted Galilean appearance which we traced in the original Luke. It is a very noteworthy fact that the order of the appearances quite agrees with the order in 1 Cor. xv., though the result is found quite independently of this account. It also agrees with the original Luke.

But I am inclined to think that Mark still originally contained a report of the same parting appearance which is found in Luke xxiv. 47-53, Acts i. 4-12, 1 Cor. xv. 7. For both the original source of Luke xxiv. and 1 Cor. xv. show that this account belongs to the apostolic tradition; and that Mark is based on apostolic tradition seems undeniable. It is therefore likely that he should know it. But why the Matthew editor should omit the appearance would seem incomprehensible. Here my theory is, that it was lost already in the copy used by the Matthew editor. For is it not likely that the wear and tear of the MSS., which later on caused the whole ending of Mark to be lost, already began to take place in an early period, and that therefore the extreme end, containing the Ascension, was torn away when the Matthew editor received it? And this theory is more than a mere conjecture, for the abruptness with which St Matthew ends, without a hint given of the parting of Christ, seems in any other way quite inexplicable; and this abruptness will be still more perceptible, if my supposition, that the words *συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος* are an addition of the Matthew editor, is correct (see the note, p. 787).<sup>1</sup>

We pass over to *the appearances in the Fourth Gospel, and their relation to the synoptic account.*

1. *The appearance to Mary Magdalene.*—This seems to be the same event as mentioned Mark xvi. 1 ff. and Luke xxiv. 1 ff., handed down in a somewhat different tradition. The

<sup>1</sup> Matthew's account of the guard and the earthquake (Matthew xxvii. 62-66) may perhaps be an account from the *Acta Pilati*. At any rate, we must positively maintain that, if the account is historical, the earthquake must have taken place, and the guards consequently fled, *before* the women came to the grave. With regard to the alleged contradiction in time, see A. Wright, *New Testament Problems*.

differences are, however, far from being so important as one would think at the first sight. Here also Mary Magdalene is not supposed to come to the grave alone; *cf.* her words, "They have taken the Lord out of the grave, and *we do not know* where they have laid Him" (John xx. 2).

The other differences from the synoptic account are of course partly to be explained as variations of tradition. Partly they are supplements from a first-hand source, *e.g.* the empty grave. That this tradition, in spite of the differences in its main points, corroborates the truth of the synoptic account, in proving that Mary Magdalene and at least one other woman came to the grave in the morning and found the stone rolled back, that an angel vision took place at the grave, and that after this Christ Himself appeared, need scarcely be pointed out.

2. The Fourth Gospel also mentions *the appearance to the apostles in the evening of Easter Day* mentioned in Luke and the original Mark (*cf.* 1 Cor. xv.).

3. *The appearance to Thomas.*—I have already pointed out how this account fits into the frame of the synoptists, though, of course, it is not known to them. For me the difficulty here is not its "fitting in," but much more its somewhat naïve, childlike character. I believe, however, that one of the first requirements for the understanding of revelation is to remember that, in order to be as clear as possible, it is always accommodated to the power of apprehension of the various ages. The period to which the narrative refers did require tangibility and strong external proofs—nay, even thought external proofs necessary. And that there really was accommodation can be seen by the apparently contradictory fact that though Christ appeared through closed doors, He still seems to have had the attributes of a material body.

4. *The appearance to Peter and the other disciples* (John xxi. 1 ff.).—The Fourth Gospel does not mention the appearance to Peter in Jerusalem, as the aim of the author here, as always, is to supplement the current tradition, not to tell all that he knows. *Cf.* xx. 31, and the fact that he does not

mention the Ascension, though he hints at the fact (*cf.* vi. 62). The appearance, John xxi., is clearly a supplement to the synoptic account. Nay, it may be that it expressly *is said* to be a supplement; *cf.* xxi. 14 (ἡδῆ). I hope to have proved that it is not the continuation of the account, Mark xvi. 7, as Harnack supposes.

The historic view of the Gospels teaches that it is the great facts reported, and not the truth of their authors' names, which is the proof of Christianity. From this point of view our result is a striking one. We have found two ancient and quite independent sources, the original Luke xxiv. and the original Mark, in all main points agreeing, and confirming the list given by St Paul in 1 Cor. xv. Further, we have seen that the report in John, in the really essential points, seems to have agreed with the synoptic tradition, and that the account peculiar to this Gospel fits into the frame of the synoptists.

The fact of the Resurrection itself can, of course, never be proved demonstratively, and unbelief will to the last day try to explain the facts, either by saying, as the Jews did, that the disciples had stolen Christ's body, or by regarding the appearances as the outcome of an epidemic of hysteria. But would it not be more than incomprehensible, if the fact which has brought the greatest blessing to all mankind, and without which the humanity of to-day actually could not be imagined, were proved to be based upon a fraud? The fact that those who are said to have committed the fraud courageously died for its truth, seems at any rate not to recommend this explanation. The narrative of the doubt among the women and the apostles, which the early Church thought such a scandal and tried to obliterate, is, moreover, a proof of their candour. But it might be a case of religious hallucination. Yet a strange power of elevating the life of man issues from this epidemic of hysteria. He who has felt the power of the Resurrection in his own life will hardly believe that it is the result of nothing but neuro-hysterical phenomena.

TORKILD SKAT RÖRDAM.

# THE TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A PLEA FOR REFORM.

MRS BEVERLEY USSHER.

It is neither a new complaint, nor an accusation made only by embittered freethinkers, that the faith of our forefathers is ceasing to command the respect of our children. Half a century ago Ruskin wrote some terrible words concerning the influence of our received, established religion on English boyhood: "This religion seems to him discreditable—discredited—not believing in itself; putting forth its authority in a cowardly way, watching how far it might be tolerated, continually shrinking, disclaiming, fencing, finessing; divided against itself, not by stormy rents, but by thin fissures and splittings of plaster from the walls. Not to be either obeyed or combated by an ignorant yet clear-sighted youth; only to be scorned." And so "pass away the first reflective hours of life, with such conclusion as they can reach."<sup>1</sup> And so passed away (and apparently must for a time continue to pass away) many a bright young promise—adrift on the sea of a truly Anglo-Saxon apathy.

At last, however, the depths are beginning to stir—a few teachers, a few mothers, are taking the situation to heart. But, as is usual for long enough before reform, the trouble wails rather than acts. Laments have recently been uttered by Canon Lyttelton and other eminent persons in the *Spectator*;

<sup>1</sup> *Modern Painters*, vol. v. p. 297.

but the discussion<sup>1</sup> is allowed to conclude with words not altogether helpful—"Let the boys be." Are we indeed to let them be? Listen to some words which were spoken by Mr Weisse in May last year,<sup>2</sup> on the strength of his experience in "four great public schools, one preparatory school of great repute, and two considerable day-schools." Here is the awful indictment which nobody except a single brave but naturally unself-conscious schoolboy<sup>3</sup> has taken the trouble to publicly dispute: "*The average boy at school is as little influenced by the religion whose forms he is encouraged to observe, as if God lived on Sundays only, within the chapel only, in theory only.*"<sup>4</sup> Ten temperate and closely reasoned pages justify the contention, but suggest no concrete remedy.

In the same spring when Mr Weisse wrote we visited the scene of a bold and helpful experiment, of which I shall introduce the description by quotations from a sermon which was singularly apposite. It was delivered in the chapel of a school that attracts ever-increasing attention, and which, even by its least well-wisher, is allowed to succeed beyond praise in the moral training of its boys. The headmaster was preaching to a congregation composed of some old boys, friends and parents (the boys themselves being away for holidays). He sought to justify his chapel services to those who depend on the associations of custom for religious suggestion. While conceding that religion and the tradition of set service are inextricably one in the minds of some cultured elders, he asked us to transport ourselves within the limited horizon of boys, whose linguistic imagination is necessarily as undeveloped as is their range of associations. To them the Prayer-Book English of Edward VI. sometimes conveys as little as that particular sequence of worship which has so grafted itself upon the

<sup>1</sup> "The Modern Parent."

<sup>2</sup> "The Religion of the Schoolboy," *Contemp. Review*, 1904.

<sup>3</sup> "The Religion of the Schoolboy," by a Schoolboy, *Contemp. Review*, 1904.

<sup>4</sup> Since this was written, Dr J. Lewis Paton has attempted a reply (*Daily Chronicle*, March 4 of this year). It is an able article, but hardly touches the roots of the matter.

habits of our conservative generations. The very expressions of the Bible itself are apt to become like "fluff in the mouth," "paternosters"—"incantations" even—partly from want of familiarity with their meaning, and partly from far too great a familiarity with their form. Compare Mr Weisse's anecdote of the choir-boy to whom the Lord's Prayer (of all prayers!) conveyed no meaning—it fitted no need—he could not *say* it, *but* he could sing it! And then picture the mental effort required to realise that the words were something more than the enhancement of a tune!

To return further to Mr Weisse, apropos of Sunday *versus* week-day religion: "'Be ye pure even as He is pure,' has no meaning for the large majority of schoolboys in the time of the acceptance or rejection of a prevailing tone." "'Love thy neighbour as thyself' is absolutely beautiful when read in chapel or in the dear old parish church with holly on the pulpit and artificial snowflakes on the Christmas decorations of the pews. But in a boy's dealings with his fellows, does it often amount to much more than 'honour among thieves'?" Our doctor unconsciously followed up Mr Weisse by another illustration from the Sermon on the Mount. "The meek shall inherit the earth." What meaning do these words convey, he asked, to lads who habitually despise the meek as softies, and who are not conscious of any ambition to inherit the earth—if they even know what "inheriting earth" means. An effort to render Christ's meaning in modern phraseology, however unbiblical, is surely the most practical respect we can pay the great Author. Did *He* talk like a scribe to the children? Are we to lull their young minds with mere opiates of beautiful phrase or song, and thus court the inevitable shock of later doubt and often consequent reaction?

A week-day discussion of the sermon with a few chosen boys promotes intelligence, it is found, during this part of the service; but we will now bring forward considerations which apply to the service as a whole.

We often hear it said that the minister has a unique power,

which he seldom knows how to use, of driving home just what he wants to say. But it is not realised to what an extent his freedom of speech, and even of conception, must be fettered by a service over which he has no control, and of which his own thoughts are often a very forced consequence. On the other hand, even in the total absence of a sermon, what a powerful thought-producing engine may be framed by the mere grouping of a wide selection, in prayer, song, and reading, around some central theme of very present or great historical weight!<sup>1</sup> The thought behind the selection need not even be expressed: we are left to discover the moral of a good lesson for ourselves.

The doctor whose sermon I have tried to render has achieved his success by understanding and wielding this engine. The "Old Boys" when they return to their yearly gatherings, would be sorry if the services which made and inspired their youth were omitted. I will describe a few of them, although the almost bald programme which I am kindly permitted to give may hardly convey (to quote the words of a London M.D.) "the truly religious atmosphere which obtains, . . . which no stranger could fail to remark, and which is produced by every part of the service having a real and living meaning to the congregation, this result having, of course, been arrived at by discarding the traditional forms of church service."<sup>2</sup>

I like, however, to "limit my expressions to pure fact, and leave the hearer to gather what he can from it" (Ruskin). Adjectives are apt to appear overcharged when it is impossible, without art, music, and human presences,<sup>3</sup> completely to share the impressions which prompt them.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 41, 42, in the *Diary of a Churchgoer*. The author argues on precisely similar lines, illustrating with the gain to particular occasions which already exists in the free choice of hymns.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the orthodox view thus well expressed by a modern writer:—"They (the collects in question) are like stones in an old wall, each fitting its own place. A good stone anywhere, but best in its own place."

<sup>3</sup> Read in *Sartor Resartus*, under the heading of "Church Clothes," how necessary we are to each other's divinest life, how we "blaze and reverberate" on each other (p. 148).

I proceed to give the order of service for Good Friday :—

*Good Friday. Early Morning Service, 8.0 to 8.20.*

1. An exhortation. "Many evils would be shunned if they were unmasked," etc.
2. Scripture reading in The "seven woes." *Ex.* "Watch therefore and modern English. see, for even now I am sending you seers and wise men and teachers; and some ye will torture and crucify, and some ye will denounce in your meetings and drive from town to town; that upon your heads may fall every drop of innocent blood spilt upon earth."
3. Psalm 51 is chanted,<sup>1</sup> God loves sincerity rather than sacrifice. May all kneeling. we be delivered from blood-guiltiness.

We are thus furnished with a clue to the prevailing idea of the day. The "proper psalms," when other than those cries of agony (and often of vengeance) which are selected in the Book of Common Prayer, are always those which describe the good man as encompassed by deceit and guile, reproached by his equal, his guide, him with whom he had taken sweet counsel, and especially by his neighbours. In the new context the thought passes on to that respectable and educated disapprobation which in all time has been harder to face than battlefields.

4. A collect.
5. Reading from *Sartor Resartus*, pp. 153-155. Carlyle tells us how we may read for ourselves— if we can for tears—the confluence of Time with Eternity in the death of the Just.
6. "Proper psalm."
7. Prayer.
8. Benediction.

*Mid-day Chapel, 10.30-11.30 a.m.*

1. The Beatitudes in modern English.
2. "Proper psalm."
3. Reading from Plato Sokrates defines the principle which does not (*Phædo*, part i.) admit of death, and the hopes which enable him to bid his friends a brave farewell.
4. "Proper psalm."
5. Reading from Plato. Sokrates drinks the poison cup.
6. "Proper psalm."
7. Prayer of thanks for all men.

<sup>1</sup> The last verse is omitted, which runs on the old idea of animal sacrifice.

Evening Chapel, 7-8.30 p.m.

1. Hymn No. 309 (from "Faith alone, though sight forsaketh, Shows true hearts the mystery." Compare the previous reading from *Sartor* :—" Let but the God-like manifest itself to Sense ; let but Eternity look, more or less visibly, through the Time Figure !")  
*Hymns Ancient and Modern* in each case).
2. Collect.
3. " Proper psalm."
4. Reading from the Bible, as arranged in Dr Wyld's *Life and Teachings of the Lord Jesus Christ*, comprising the sections dealing with the Last Talk, the Last Supper, the Agony in the Garden, and the Betrayal. It is as nearly in the accustomed language as is compatible with inclusion of all the incidents which lie scattered through our four gospels.
5. Hymn 117, " At the Cross her station keeping."
6. Bible-reading (Dr Wyld), comprising the Fivefold Trial.
7. Psalm 88.
8. Bible-reading (Dr Wyld). The Crucifixion.
9. Hymn 111, " Oh, sacred Head," sung in the original and very effective German.
10. Prayers for all those suffering persecution in the cause of truth and virtue.
11. Benediction in favour of the persecuted.
12. The congregation quietly disperses to the melody of the hymn, " Now the labourer's task is o'er," or some other music.

But a service which is probably only equalled by the play at Ober Ammergau in its realistic impressiveness, hardly needs music to ensure "a quiet dispersion." This is evident to all who are familiar, not only with the items of the actual service under discussion, but with those of the preceding services, which enhance the climax.

Further, a carefully achieved mental result is not allowed to pass away without still further emphasis. This is the programme for Easter Even :—

1. The first anthem is sung from the order for the Burial of the Dead.
2. Either a psalm of the Burial Service or one which lauds the ultimate triumph of good causes.
3. Reading from Dr Wyld concerning the Sealing of Christ's Sepulchre.
4. As 2.
5. Reading from Carlyle's *Oliver Cromwell*, bk. v. pp. 153-155 (extracts).  
Cromwell on his death-bed forgets not only self but family in his pre-occupation for his country's good.
6. Prayers for the faithful dead.
7. A blessing on the suffering.

I will conclude these programmes by that which winds up the term:—

1. The Psalm of Exile (137) and for Age (71).
2. The Confession.
3. "The Old Boys' Psalm" (91). God's special protection of his own.
4. "The School Psalm" (144). Life for our future generations.
5. A reading varying according to circumstances, or it may be something specially familiar and appealing to the old boys.
6. The hymn 577, "for school and college use."
7. Final prayers for the whole school ("that it may be knit together by pure affection in one holy communion"), and for boys who are leaving.
8. "Our Father" in Latin<sup>1</sup> to Gregorian plain-song. More forcible than the English.
9. Benediction.
10. Parting words of headmaster to the school, and particularly to any boys who are leaving.
11. The school song, entitled "The Love of Comrades."
12. Farewells.

The daily evening services are similarly brought to bear in varying degree, according to circumstances, on the events of school life, so that it must be impossible for a boy's beliefs not to become interwoven with his actions, or his religious emotions with the various enthusiasms which constitute youth.

Even the free outdoor life which every true English lad loves is thrown by the secular curriculum into intelligent relation with nature; and nature, in its turn, is brought into relation with religious thought. We once heard one of Huxley's Lay Sermons delivered as a lesson—it concerned the reverence we owe to science as an aspect of Divinity—and the boys (most of them, and *all* who were old enough to grasp the argument) listened with a rapt attention.

We need to draw on the minds of our greatest men to explain and emphasise the meaning of our seers. Increased repetition of words and increased study of chapel environments will not avail to shield young people from the age's tidal wave. Science rolls in on every hand—our schools are already beneath its surge: either religion must stand aside and say

<sup>1</sup> Remember the boys *understand* the Latin!

she belongs to another world, or she must mingle her waters with the great sea *which is here already*.

Parents and teachers were once monopolists of influence. It is pitiful to what an extent most of them ignore the meddling of an unusually active *Zeitgeist*. He finds his way even into text-books for infants. A catechism of the eighteenth century was able to ask: "For what end did God make the lark and the dove?" Answer: "To teach us what we ought to be." Question: "Why did He make owls, bats, and swine?" Answer: "To teach us what we ought not to be." Later on the pathetic fallacy brought the teaching generation into increased sympathy with nature, but only because she reflected moods and taught moralities. We find a water-lily hymned as "a pure heart," "a spirit meekly brave," "gentle and firm," "feminine yet free"! In Miss Dodds' recent *Nature Studies and Fairy Tales* for the kindergarten, there are also verses about a personified lily. But they are not meant to deceive so much as a baby: only to teach him botany! The lily is thirsty; then the rain comes—it is cool because its veins are full:

"Little white lily  
Is happy again."

Man has ceased to be the pivot of revolving worlds.

"A busy time is this fresh, sweet spring,  
For birdie and bee and for flowers;  
There's work for each in *its own little world*,  
And joy just the same as in ours."

In such swaddling-clothes as these are nursed both vegetarian and evolutionist, and thus are we gradually maturing into spiritual apprehension of a scheme which is wider and deeper than man's life or his understanding of it. "If I did not 'believe,'" said a clergyman, "the face of nature would become that of a corpse." Many an unorthodox naturalist could not find a better expression for his own belief.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Have not these beliefs after all much which is in common and independent of dogma? See Mr Pickard-Cambridge's article in the *Hibbert Journal* of January 1905.

Of this constructive aspect of modern thought how much less has been heard than of the purely critical and destructive aspect to which we vainly try to blind our children!<sup>1</sup> We do not know *how* early observant youth notes the partial or complete nonconformity which is now often the attitude of relative or neighbour. Open dissent is even unnecessary. Indifference to established practice is almost as effectual as opposition in causing the impression that gravely taught dogmas and duties are after all mere matters of opinion.

But the intuitions of science are not really out of harmony with the noblest elements of human thought in the past; and if we do not wish to discredit our greatest teachers, we must set their phrases to new music, and even reject those interpretations of their utterances which are out of harmony with the New Revelation. This is naturally wider than any that mankind has yet known, and if theologians set it in opposition to the comparatively cramped thought of a darker age, that cramped thought must perish, rusted to the fetters which they themselves have forged. Fathers already realise the logic of science, and it is complained they do not ground their boys in religion.<sup>2</sup> As a mother, I contend that, when more mothers realise the spiritual significance of science, then pastors and masters will have lost such home support as remains to them. It is of no use urging Canon Lyttelton "to stand in the old ways," and, at the same time, "to make it easier for the young minds he trains to walk with profit down the new ways."<sup>3</sup> A much-to-be-desired caricature would bring home to all minds the acrobatic difficulty. We do but mock daring souls when we caution them against fads and eccentricity, and warn them off dreaded experiments. Religion was not mentioned as part of the Canon's "opportunity"; but if it does not precede the scientific progress advocated, it must certainly

<sup>1</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge, however, is conspicuous on the constructive side of the argument.

<sup>2</sup> See "The Modern Parent"—a correspondence in the *Spectator* already referred to.

<sup>3</sup> The *Spectator* on "Canon Lyttelton's opportunity," 8th April 1905.

follow, unless our boys are to continue living in a divided world of thought and action, Sundays and week-days.

This distinction between science and religion, week-days and Sundays, is largely one that lies between practice and emotion. "Our chapel services," says our pioneer headmaster, "must have all those artistic and poetical adjuncts which satisfy the heart. We must praise the Living Spirit of the Universe, pray to Him. But, on the other hand, in our sermons or readings, we must give definite maxims of conduct that will satisfy the reason and afford us a definite chart to steer by. . . . It appears to me that we have to organise our life so that from beginning to end all parts shall fit harmoniously together, and be in very truth one long, continuous religious service. At one time we may appeal more to the bodily needs, at other times to the cravings of the intellect, at other times to the aspirations, the emotions, the affections. Each part of the day may suitably have its particular duties, and all, properly understood, are but parts of one great religious service. But in our chapel we should endeavour to bring all this to a head, and dwell upon the most comprehensive thoughts of the mind and the most comprehensive passions of the soul." Let, then, the dead men who have *prefelt* Harmony speak again; let us hear them in our school chapels; whether they call themselves Christian or pagan, let them unite their voice with Christ's to bid our boys and girls look at life *consistently* and "see it whole."

"Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find me;  
Cleave the wood, and there am I,"<sup>1</sup>

is Christ's new message to our age. Compare Blake's words, written up in gold in our school chapel:—

"To see the world in a grain of sand  
And heaven in a wild flower;  
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand  
And eternity in an hour."

EMILY USSHER.

SHREWSBURY.

<sup>1</sup> *The New Sayings of Jesus from Oxyrhynchus.* Grenfel and Hunt.

## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### THE HISTORICAL JESUS AND THE CHRIST OF EXPERIENCE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1905, p. 253, and April 1905, p. 574.)

APPRECIATION of these remarkable papers may, it is thought, be developed by noticing their common standpoint; their concurrent acceptance of the simple, natural Jesus of experience, instead of the artificial, metaphysical Christ of dogma; and the advanced corollary which that acceptance seems to imply.

Both writers seem to be equally loyal to the supremacy of reason, and equally anxious—while searching for "the calm, thinkable truth" by the light of the latest and most scientific criticism—"to show that the Gospel has lost nothing of its ancient power." Their adoption of the same critical standpoint and quest of the same object lead naturally to a concurrent rejection of outworn, unscientific dogma. Unable to bridge the gulf that divides the transcendent, metaphysical Christ of the Fourth Gospel and of the Churches from the simple, human-hearted Jesus of the Synoptics, they choose the second of these irreconcilable conceptions, and give up the first. To them, as to all whose faith and life are grounded on the conviction that Truth is *one*—to be felt after and found by the heart, while proved and held fast by the intellect—mind and heart pronounce the same verdict. To such hearts and minds the Higher Criticism comes not to destroy but to fulfil. It takes from faith's fainting shoulders a burden too heavy to be borne. It lifts the flight of reason out of the sickly atmosphere of apologetics into a freer, nobler sky. It removes the last impediment to the marriage of the true minds of philosophy and religion. It casts from its crucible nothing but that which has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. It enhances the imperishable purity of the diamond by detaching the clay that has obscured it.

The seed sown by Edwin Hatch seventeen years ago is bearing good fruit. The growing dislike of the Athanasian Creed concretely illustrates the gradual sloughing away of "the chief bequest of Greece to religious

thought," the *damnosa hereditas* of that part of later Christianity which, in his memorable words, "is doomed to perish, and which yet, while it lives, holds the key of the prison-house of many souls."<sup>1</sup> We have to choose to-day between the metaphysical speculations of the un-Christian Christianity of the fourth century, "rooted in Hellenism," with their ghastly legacies of sophistication, unreason, and unnaturalness, and the pure, natural morality of the Sermon on the Mount, taught lovingly and tenderly to Syrian peasants by Him whose yoke was easy and burden light.

In the invaluable Hibbert Lectures for 1888, Hatch stood at this fateful parting of the ways, pointing with no uncertain hand along the path marked out by his masterly analysis of "the relations of the Greek elements in Christianity to the nature of Christianity itself," and showing how that path leads straight to the inspiring conviction that "Christianity, which began without them—which grew on a soil whereon metaphysics never throve—which won its first victories over the world by the simple moral force of the Sermon on the Mount, and by the sublime influence of the life and death of Jesus Christ, may throw off Hellenism and be none the loser, but rather stand out again before the world in the uncoloured majesty of the Gospels."<sup>2</sup>

Among the pioneers of this hopeful path of reconstruction "Romanus" and Mr Pickard-Cambridge have taken their place, by stating the rational, scientific grounds of their deliberate choice of the simple, natural Jesus of religious experience in preference to the metaphysical conception of Greek speculation, the Christ of ecclesiastical dogma, portrayed and formulated in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.

As regards the advanced corollary which seems to be necessarily deducible from this choice, there is in both papers so much reserve, almost obscurity, of expression that there is considerable risk of misinterpreting their precise significance, and overstating their divergence from traditional orthodoxy. But I hope to make my reading of them so plain that the writers will have no difficulty in correcting any misapprehension of their meaning.

To my mind, then, the special value of these articles lies in their apparent acceptance of the philosophy of non-idealistic monism, and, by implication, of its necessary corollary, the religion of pantheism; and in Mr Pickard-Cambridge's pantheistic interpretation of the essential teaching of Jesus Himself. This reading of his paper is chiefly based on these three facts:—

1. The emphasis laid on the simple realism and non-metaphysical character of the teaching, specially noticeable in the reference to "the studied avoidance of metaphysical terms." "He uses sublime metaphor rather than clear definition: He expresses throughout the poetry rather than the philosophy of life. That Jesus' consciousness of God's presence

<sup>1</sup> *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church.* Eighth edition, 1901, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 351.

and the reality of goodness were vivid in a quite unique manner, is a proposition scarcely to be denied. . . . ” (p. 259). “To Him, as to no one else, reality and goodness were one. . . . ” (p. 264).

2. The plain affirmation of monism. “To cut apart divinity and humanity, spiritual and natural, is to reduce the former terms to negative abstractions, of which nothing can be said except that they are not the latter” (p. 269).

3. The definite implication in the following passage that in the teaching of Jesus on the relation between God and man there is this same inability “to cut apart divinity and humanity, spiritual and natural,” which is the very essence and marrow of the monistic and pantheistic opposition to dualism:—“If it is true to say that through Jesus humanity became divine, it is likewise true that it was because He first revealed, and so called out, the divinity which is implicit in human nature. Jesus speaks of God as already ‘your Father which is in Heaven’ in the same discourse in which He invites men to be the children of God: the spiritual relation to which He calls them is already an established fact. The way in which He vindicates His own claim to divinity is still more striking: it is to appeal to a principle which makes a like claim for all men: ‘I have said, Ye are gods: ye are all children of the Most High’” (p. 267).

More than thirty years ago Mr Allanson Picton used this reference by Jesus to the 82nd Psalm, as showing that whoever wrote the Fourth Gospel “must have understood Christ to teach a doctrine, which it would require not only extreme subtlety, but a determined perversion of language on the part of interpreters, to distinguish in some places from spiritual pantheism. . . . And, indeed, it is notorious that the Jewish Kabbalah has handed down, from remote antiquity, pantheistic conceptions of the universe which would have made such an interpretation in the highest degree natural. . . . The argument in the Gospel, therefore, is plainly this: that Christ’s claim to a mysterious kinship with God was nothing abnormal or even novel; that long ago sympathetic susceptibility to a living Divine word had been regarded as the token of a nature akin to God; and that His own nature and mission were but a clearer and more glorious manifestation of the same mysterious truth at which the psalmist had hinted.”<sup>1</sup>

In a note at p. 429 he says:—“Perhaps if it could be shown to be probable that Christ had any associations with the Jewish mysticism which makes man’s essential being divine, a starting-point would be given for a more really rational life of Christ than has ever yet been written.”

Mr Picton does not, however, go so far as to say that Jesus consciously and directly taught pantheism. He remarks (p. 437):—“I do not presume . . . to represent the Saviour of mankind as distinctly entertaining, or directly teaching, any pantheistic philosophy. His consciousness dwelt beyond the range of any mere philosophy; was too rich in the

<sup>1</sup> *The Mystery of Matter, and other Essays* (1873), p. 350, *Christian Pantheism*.

possession of God to need it." And in his latest book he says:—"Not that Jesus taught Pantheism. But this does not in the least matter. For Pantheism is only the ultimate intellectual basis of religion, not religion itself."<sup>1</sup>

It would be more accurate to say that pantheism is the religion of which monism is the ultimate intellectual basis. In this view it may be held, consistently with Mr Picton's belief in the unconscious pantheism of the teaching, that the heart of Jesus thrilled with the religion of pantheism, though his mind was not informed with a knowledge of its philosophic foundation in monism.

The greater brevity and reserve of "Romanus'" paper make his adoption of the monistic standpoint less obviously apparent. But that it is equally real seems to be shown by his uncompromising rejection (p. 583) of the traditional dualism which makes God the Judge, not the Father, of man; which converts "the cosmological Christ" of St Augustine, immanent and incarnate in the world from the beginning, into the Christ, "late in time," of the first century, and "substitutes an arbitrary dualism for the divine harmony of the universe." It may be seen, also, in the emphasis placed by him on the long and wide departure from the teaching by which Jesus sought to redeem mankind by convincing it of its "common heritage" in a share of the divine universal being. "It is," he says (p. 580), "scarcely an exaggeration to say that the history of Christianity is the history of a long, though happily only partially successful, endeavour to get away from the teaching of Christ." And he pronounces that the essential idea conveyed in the teaching "is the same yesterday and to-day and for ever: the manifestation of God in Christ" (p. 579). If, then, his philosophy is monism, and his religion a pantheism based on the essential teaching of Jesus, it seems to follow that "Romanus" believes that that teaching is pantheistic.

The present strange combination of a growing intensity of adoration of the Person of Jesus with an increasing "endeavour to get away from" His teaching is condemned by the whole spirit and tone of His life and words, as reflected in the Synoptic Gospels. It is, distinctly, a monstrous perversion of His selfless, impersonal worship of the Father of all, converting it into a personal idolatry of Himself which He would have sternly denounced. For the religion of His life and teaching was not any metaphysical yet anthropomorphic mystery such as that of the Three Persons, nor any personal cult either of a Transcendent Deity outside the world, or of Himself, but that impersonal, pantheistic realisation of oneness between God and man and God and Nature which is the "natural piety" of sympathetic temperaments, so sensitively attuned to the rhythmic vibrations of the cosmic order that its beauty, strength, and harmony are instinctively felt to be sensible, immediate manifestations of the strength and beauty and harmony of God. To Him the divine

<sup>1</sup> *The Religion of the Universe* (1904), p. 246.

loveliness of the world was not the gate of heaven, but heaven itself, an earthly yet spiritual paradise, a celestial kingdom to be found and entered here and now by those blessed ones, the true Galahads, who, pure in heart from the stain of self-seeking and the sordid service of Mammon, see and feel and worship the Divine Immanence.

I may, of course, be reading into these papers a direction and significance which their writers will disclaim, but as they stand they seem to me to give strong support to a pantheistic interpretation of the real teaching of Jesus—an interpretation which will, as I believe, be found to be a master-key for unlocking Christological difficulties, and to supply a conception which the modern mind can accept as equally satisfying to the philosophy of religion and to the religion of philosophy. The modern mind is at last beginning to see that theism, on one whole side of its hybrid, anomalous structure, is not theism at all, but pure pantheism. Orthodoxy will presently be constrained to convert its belated, grudging acceptance of "what is good in pantheism" into a thorough-going assimilation of the principle—"What is best in Christianity is its pantheistic doctrine of the Divine Immanence"—and to cast off as outgrown, outworn, and impossible its Greek, metaphysical dogma of the Divine Transcendence.

In accelerating this irresistible process Canon Illingworth and the late Aubrey Moore have done invaluable service, partly by the force and candour of their restatement of the forgotten doctrine of the Divine Immanence, but chiefly by the utter failure of their earnest efforts to show that it can be combined with the absolutely opposed doctrine of the Divine Transcendence. When the hopelessness of reconciling these conflicting dogmas has at last been fully recognised, when dualism has been finally cast out and monism finally accepted by religion as well as by philosophy, then Christianity will for the first time become Christian. For it will be based on that revised conception of its Founder's religion which is suggested by Mr Pickard-Cambridge's remark that, "while philosophy sets up a wider ideal of knowledge than we have reason to suppose that He attained, yet of the intuitional, immediate experience of present unity with God and with a perfect world, which is the characteristic ideal of the religious mind, His was the supreme type."

In the meantime, although monistic pantheism can claim this close affinity to the doctrine lived and taught by Jesus Himself, it is still unceasingly denounced by many theologians, with misrepresentation of its principles and abuse of the most eminent expounder of its scientific foundation. To such persons it should be a restraint to remember that pantheism is a religion of the heart, though based on a philosophy of the intellect, and that, under modern standards of toleration and refinement, such persecution and insult are relics of barbarism almost as out of date and revolting as the fires of Smithfield and the baiting of Jews. And this restraint will be strongly reinforced if they remember, also, that to many of those whom they denounce the brightest of the irradiations that illumine

the philosophy of non-idealistic monism and the religion of naturalistic pantheism are those magnetic *auroræ* that flash and tremble in the distant Syrian sky, impartially lightening the darkness of the evil and the good alike, of the sinner and the saint, of pantheistic rationalists and the champions of "conservative orthodoxy," with gleams of the kindly "Light which lighteth every man"—the Light of the World.

ARTHUR H. HARINGTON.

WESTMEATH.

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### THE CRUX OF THEISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1905, p. 496.)

#### I.

I BELIEVE that God is all-good and almighty, not in spite of the evil and suffering that abound everywhere, but because of their existence. To me these very facts are the supreme proofs of His love and omnipotence. The Gospel, according to fiction or science or Mr Mallock, would make an ideal God in an ideal world without sin, and such a Deity would be obviously and painfully artificial—perfectly imperfect and faultlessly faulty. Nobody would have any use for such a God. A cosmos that presented no obstacles, no barriers, no difficulties, might suit a superficial logic, with its cheap and vulgar demonstrations, but not the spirit of man conscious of his divinity, and acknowledging no limitations but those of love. The contradictions which I find and admit, I accept as signs of my heavenly birthright, and I take them and all the evil with them as the raw material out of which my faith has to evolve (by overcoming) a new and larger synthesis, and not an idle syllogism. Mr Mallock's God would be my devil, and his heaven my hell. I reject both his premisses and his conclusions, and I give him the full benefit of all his alleged facts, and all the cold comfort they carry with them. Give me the moral sense of a man, from the spiritual standpoint, and not the ethics of an amœba. The day for Christian apologetics has passed. *Si argumentum quæris, circumspice.* I find sufficient proof of Christianity in the triumph of the Cross and a transfigured world. And I know that if you robbed me of these, you would rob me and the world also of everything that makes life worth living. I see before and around me a civilisation inter-fused and glorified by Christian ideals and not Greek ideals, by Christian virtues and not Gothic virtues—the honour of the world that is dishonour, and the chivalry of the world that destroys and does not save life. Mr Mallock says (p. 491), with airy confidence, "How can evils such as these be reconciled with the Goodness of God, for whom the sanctity of each single soul is the main purpose of evolution?"

If he cannot answer his own question, from the evidences that confront him everywhere, I do not envy him his beliefs. For it is just in cases like these that God justifies Himself most fully. And as for mystics, Mr Mallock's difficulties are the very breath of their being, and they only wish sometimes they were greater and not less, because they feel, without the healthy bracing of perpetual antagonism, their faith and love would quickly lose their grip of Christ. They love the fight, and they bless their enemies. And *nulla crux, o quanta crux.*

F. W. ORDE-WARD.

EASTBOURNE.

## II.

To some the character of the Divine Will (and of this fact Mr Mallock takes no account) is revealed vividly and convincingly in the secret place of their own spiritual consciousness. It is this personal revelation which is recognised in the profound "Saying" of Jesus, recently discovered: "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you; and whoever shall know himself shall find it. [Strive therefore] to know yourselves, and ye shall be aware that ye are the sons of the [Almighty] Father."

But the character of God may also be discovered by patient study of the drama of the world's history, whether from the point of view of a scientist, such as the late Mr John Fiske, or of a historian, or of both. The important thing is to take a sufficiently large grasp of the great process of evolution, and to hold fast to the recognition that the theological significance of the process can only be understood when interpreted by the later stages, which reveal glimpses of the goal in view. "What comes first in science comes last in metaphysics. It is in the higher or subsequent that the explanation of the lower and anterior is to be sought" (*Riddle of the Sphinx: a Study in the Philosophy of Evolution*, pp. 205, 206, by A Troglodyte).

That the process, when patiently studied through many years, may lead to convinced assurance of the trustworthiness and moral character of God, is proved by Sir Henry Thompson's confession of faith in his pamphlet, *The Unknown God?* (published 1903). He writes: "I commenced my task solely for the purpose of seeking the truth for my own personal needs and enlightenment. . . . I am now approaching the end, and find myself compelled to arrive at a conclusion, contrary, I gladly confess, to that which I entertained when engaged with the former part of the inquiry, and depressed by mentally realising the miseries and hardships to which man was exposed during the tardy development for unknown ages of what may be deemed the infancy and childhood of the race. . . . I was now assured by evidence I could not resist that all which man—with his limited knowledge or experience—has learned to regard as due to Supreme "Power" and "Wisdom," although immeasurably beyond his comprehension, is also associated with the exercise of an absolutely beneficent influence over all living things, of every grade, which exist within its range."

On p. 495, the argument used is only applicable on the assumption that for those "winnowed out" of this life, as spiritually unfit, the Infinite Spirit has no further use and no further resources, in other states of being. If the horizon is enlarged, and it is admitted that this stage of existence is but a fragment of an infinitely larger order of existence, then the argument here used falls to the ground. Professor William James takes this larger view of existence in his essay on *Human Immortality*; he says, God's scale is "infinite in all things. . . . The Heart of Being can have no exclusions akin to those which our little hearts set up. The inner significance of other lives exceeds all our powers of sympathy and insight."

Perhaps Mr Mallock himself argues for the plaintiff merely that he may elicit the opposing force which may invalidate his argument. He hints that something like this is his intention in his concluding paragraph, and I venture to think that he is really more in sympathy with the faith that prompts my criticism than the general tenor of his article would at first suggest. Personally, I recognise that I am indebted to him. One is never more conscious of the reasonableness and impregnable position of the optimist's faith than when the arguments against it have been fairly faced, and when weighed in the balance are found wanting.

H. A. DALLAS.

LONDON.

### III.

MR MALLOCK, in his article, "The Crux of Theism," says that the argument used by the Church on the gradualness of God's methods in the spiritual evolution of man would be reasonable if the human race were one single and continuous individual, but that, this not being the case, the argument is irrational.

May I suggest that the theory of reincarnation supplies us with the "one continuous individual life," and so far is the only theory ever promulgated that can justify God in the eyes of man's conscience for His supposed favouritisms and tyranny. I take it that God can only reveal Himself, as it were, on sensitised plates, and that we are those plates, whose business and happiness lies in becoming more and more spiritually sensitive throughout the ages. This is probably effected and assisted by incarnation and reincarnation in this world, and possibly afterwards in other worlds. The limited free-will of man not only enables him to thus spiritually evolve, but gives him control of the degree of that evolution during the little span out of eternity that his present earth-life affords; and thus lifts him above the level of a mere machine, and to a certain extent places his actual capacity for happiness in his own hands.

M. JOHNSON.

BECKENHAM.

## CHRISTIAN, GREEK, OR GOTH ?

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1905, p. 510.)

## I.

MR GARROD begins his essay under the above heading by quoting some classifications which violate the rules of logical division. He does not appear to observe that his title exemplifies the very same fallacy. No doubt, our list of the types of ethical ideas might, with apparent justice, be said to require expansion ; but he has given us a cross-division.

Mr Garrod has omitted to give us his definition of Christianity. There are not, I think, many in our day who see Christianity with his eyes. One gathers that he practically identifies it with a mild Plebeianism, and with an asceticism which is alien to the spirit of its Founder, who came eating and drinking.

To a more sympathetic view it is surely something greater and wider than Mr Garrod seems to allow. The division is not, "Christian, Greek, and Goth": the last two are on a different horizon from the first. In classifying ethical types, we have Christian as the *summum genus* of which what is good in the others are species. We must not slump them together like the novelist's "men, women, and Italians." Yet the essay ought to be of real value in calling attention to the Gothic elements embodied in our working ideals, and it would be ungracious to find fault with a discoverer for magnifying his discovery. Only, we must try to give the discovery the place and the attention which are its due, but to give no more.

What we must put to Mr Garrod's credit—and it is no small matter—is that he has made explicit certain tendencies which are latent in Christianity. The modern movement in theology is in that direction. Mr Garrod has done much to make this clear, and has provided us with a new name—new in this application.

Yet we must feel that in Christianity there is implicit in profounder form the best that the North can give. One would say this not at all as an implacable obscurantist seeking to uphold an accepted system, but merely as an interested student. The Gothic spirit *has* its influence on everyday ethics, but it has that influence through the Gospel, which has given it by its touch a vitality it might otherwise have lacked.

Mr Garrod has stepped into a corner of the great battlefield in which an age-long conflict is raging—the conflict between God-man and man-God. The elements of such "Gothicism" appeared a very long time ago. (1) Take first the sense of honour. It informs the utterances of Job, a man as hotly impatient and as jealous of his honour as any wild northern chief of them all. The Deity may stoop to share the life of man, but we demand more—that man shall be able to rise, however little, toward Him. We want, like Ezekiel, to stand on our feet when God would speak to us. This temper has a very distinct place in the New Testament. The prodigal does not spend himself in mean entreaties

that the father would come for him. He arises like a man and goes home, and, when he arrives, he is ready to confess his wrong-doing like a gentleman. All through, Christianity is supreme in this, that, in the best sense, it puts us on our honour. This is most scrupulously considered. Again and again Christ defends it for Himself, from the time when, in Cana, He asked, "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" and He is as careful to defend it for others, whenever He can do so, without leaving moral deadness untroubled.

St Paul conceives the matter in the same spirit: "We are not under law, but under grace." We are free, and the proximate motive to righteousness is within us.

The best modern thought is on the same lines. The conception of Christianity as a "religion" is falling into discredit; it is character, life. As Auguste Sabatier (*Esquisse*, chap. i.) says, the word comes to us from the least religious nation on earth. "The human families which have shown themselves most truly original and creative in the religious sphere" knew nothing of it. It is a purely Roman idea. "Au lieu de marquer le côté intérieur et subjectif de la religion et de la signaler comme un phénomène de la vie de l'âme, il la définissait par le dehors, comme une tradition de rites et comme une institution sociale léguée par les ancêtres. . . . Pour le plus grand nombre, encore aujourd'hui la religion n'est guère qu'un ensemble de rites traditionnels, de croyances surnaturelles, d'institutions politiques; c'est une église en possession de sacrements divins, constituée par une hiérarchie sacerdotale, pour discipliner et gouverner les âmes."

Again, quibble as we may over "objective" and "subjective genitive," the New Testament does make much of the thought that there is a faith of God in man—faith that man can and will respond to the appeal of the divine love. What is that if not, in the highest degree, an appeal to honour, and to more than honour?

Or yet again, the conception of the Almighty as "a kind of beautiful enemy untameable," which does not seem particularly characteristic of honour, is wiped out and transcended in the ideals of sonship and fellowship. To come within sight of the New Testament ideal of the Christian is to have small place in one for what is pusillanimous or mean. Believing that "our wills are ours to make them Thine," the Christian still believes that they *are* ours. He is, however, gentleman enough to acknowledge his superiors, and to look forward with expectation to a time when, in the words of the *De Imitatione*, "Thy will and our will shall be one, the fruit of obedience shall be manifest, and lowly subjection shall gloriously be crowned." Chaucer's squire was not less gentleman, but more, because—

"Curteys he was, lowly and servysable,  
And carf byforn his fader at the table."

(2) Let us look now at the other "Gothic" excellence, chivalry. Where is what is worthy in its ideals so set forth as in the Sermon on the Mount?

Where is its influence on one's whole mode of thought and conduct exemplified, as in many passages in the third Gospel or in the *Pericope adulteræ*?

If Christianity be unnatural and impossible, it is certainly not that it fails to build on the best that is in human nature: it would seem rather to be that it demands this in superlative degree, and we have not enough manhood to rise to the arduous heights to which it calls. "The ideal Christian type of man is the saint," surely, but as surely *not* the saint of the dark ages whose life was a long debauch of self-torture. Christianity frankly recognises the flesh (apart from St Paul's technical use of the term): it asks only that it be kept in place. It requires care of the body; it demands that we cultivate the soul, *i.e.* the mental powers; and that we foster the spirit. The Christian may very truly make his own the vaunt on the shield of the Isle of Man, *Quocunque ieceris, stabit*. The ideal city pictured in the Apocalypse has the length and the breadth and the height, all equal—every quality in fulness, no one in excess.

Hebraism, Hellenism, Gothicism have all their influence on Christianity, but it is an influence interpretative rather than formative. Each of the temperaments which these represent comes to Christianity to find there its best ideals in all their grandeur.

A sympathetic knowledge of Christianity ought to ensure that Gothicism will, at last, make its confession in the words attributed to the dying champion of Hellenism, *Vicisti Galilæe!*

J. A. STOKES LITTLE.

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## II.

THERE are many, no doubt, who will completely fail to understand Mr H. M. Garrod's separation of the moral universe into two hemispheres. A Christian is surely one who believes that all things moral, spiritual, and physical are emanations from God and teachings of Christ.

To make a distinction between two classes of ethics seems as foolish as to divide up a sunbeam, and say that the red, or the green, or the blue rays are the most important parts of light.

Then, again, the hard things which Mr Garrod says regarding Duty are surely unmerited.

Let it be granted at once, that to do right, merely from a sense of Duty, shows a low standard of spirituality.

But this is a necessary step, a rung of the ladder, a piece of scaffolding without which the beautiful temple of the soul could never have been built. In the earlier stages of the soul's growth we do right from a hope of reward, avoid wrong from fear of punishment—that is the first step.

As the soul expands the idea of Duty is evolved; we will struggle hard to do the right, the noble, because it is our Duty to do it: as Browning

says, we "pledge our souls to endless duty many a time and oft," but it goes against the grain, we find it uphill work; in a word, our struggles bring us no sense of a union with God. Then the onward march of the soul continues, the barriers break down, and presently we find ourselves sworn followers of Virtue from pure love; we first love the True, the Beautiful, the Good, and then we love God.

When we find ourselves willing to live and die for Virtue, then we may know that we are dwelling in God, and God in us.

No doubt we often meet with an arrested development, the growth of an individual soul is checked, and never passes beyond one or other of the initial stages.

And now as to prayer, it would seem that the evolution of the idea of prayer keeps pace with the progressive march of the soul. First we pray just for the things which we want, crude, selfish prayers, but they mark the first conscious approach of the soul to God; presently we cease to pray in this spirit, we feel the limitation of such petitions, the poverty of them; we are not so ready to beg of God, but we feel Him, then He seems to draw so close to us, to be so near to our souls that any spoken words put a distance between Him and ourselves.

Then it is that we realise that peace which passes all understanding, and we can "bear that everlasting face to face with God."

Then, again, Mr Garrod says, "Morality may be said to be an attempt to realise certain types of men."

That may be true of "morality," but to hold that the aim of a Christian is to mould himself into a certain type would be an astonishing limitation of the Christian ideal; nothing short of "virtue" in its entirety will content him; he does not wish to become a Saint, if by Sainthood is meant meekness run to seed. Many lives have been ruined by the undue cultivation of one aspect or one ingredient of "virtue." An excess of meekness, of courage, of patience, or even of honour, becomes a vice; once the "golden mean" is passed the special attribute ceases to be a part of virtue.

To be a man "in heart, soul and mind, four square, wrought to a noble purpose," is the Christian's ideal, with all the parts of virtue held in due proportion.

Then, again, Mr Garrod's description of a born Christian is surely a mistaken one, unless, of course, he merely means a man born in a Christian country, and not one who has been "born again."

Is it likely that a man possessing the qualities of chivalry and honour—be it noted that he is distinctly stated to possess those "qualities" and not merely the "ideals" of them—is it likely that such a man would come to the "hour of disgrace" and "moral disaster"? A man of honour is one who does honourable deeds, not one who merely masquerades under the tinsel trappings of that fetish "honour" on whose behalf so many extravagant deeds have been wrought.

In this disastrous separation of the moral universe we find the real

cause why a large proportion of men are shy of declaring themselves Christians, or followers of Christ.

They are not shy if called upon to declare themselves "men of honour," "men of courage," or "men of chivalry," but they fear that if they call themselves "men of Christ" they must become soft or "saintly."

Grievous mischief has been done by leaving to Christianity only the softer attributes of "virtue."

That Christ gave prominence to love, patience, meekness, and long-suffering is true, but it was because the more robust attributes had already taken root in the hearts of men. Honour, courage, and chivalry divorced from the special Christian graces will never turn out a "four square man."

To maintain that honour, courage and chivalry are not to be found in Christ's life and teaching is indeed to condemn Christianity as the religion of the weak and feeble-minded.

All virtue, all knowledge, all the arts and sciences, everything the world contains belongs to the Christian: he knows no ethics of the West, the East, the South, or the North, no divisions, no departments, no limitations, for "there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all." . . . We are all one "in Christ Jesus."

EMILIA DIGBY.

BEAUFORT, CO. KERRY.

### III.

WHILE I agree with the writer of "Christian, Greek, or Goth?" that chivalry and honour are of priceless value, I cannot support his view that they are foreign or opposed to Christianity. Honour in the Christian may spring from a different source from honour in the Goth, but it is surely as worthy of respect, as great a factor in the development of a man, in the first case as in the second. Nay, more so, because more enlightened. If we consider the tendency of mankind as a whole, from the earliest times to the present, we find an increasing sense that its end is a spiritual one, and that nothing short of the spiritual can ultimately satisfy it. The opposition in which Mr Garrod places the natural and spiritual life is surely a false one. Is not the spiritual, in the highest sense, natural? It is not merely the outcome of our imaginations, nor yet something forced upon us from above, but that which is the deepest necessity of our nature, and by which alone we can realise our true selves by bringing our consciousness into relation to that higher consciousness which is the end, as it was the beginning, of our life.

That there have been centuries in the Christian era which have contributed little to the fulfilment of this Christian ideal I readily grant, but that it is fundamentally opposed to chivalry and honour I deny. The essence of chivalry is courtesy, the protection of the weak by the

strong, and the idealisation of that which is best and holiest in womanhood. Christianity, by its golden rule, would teach the same thing, and never has woman had a champion like the Christ.

The desire for honour for himself may find no place in the heart of a Christian, yet his sense of honour, instead of being destroyed by his faith, is rendered more sensitive than before. He feels that to act dishonourably should be as hateful to him as it was to Christ, and he sees that all which turns him from the straight path to the perfect goal is dishonouring. "Moral corruption" is to him wholly incompatible with true chivalry and honour; his soul and body must be rendered entire and pure from within. Nothing which happens to the outside of him can dishonour him—to be beaten and spat upon, cursed and reviled do not affect himself—but to act in a way opposed to the highest ideal that is in him dishonours him. If Christ had turned on His persecutors with retaliation, we should have lost that lesson of the eternal love of God and His suffering for sin which is contained in the prayer, "Father, forgive them"; if He had left unsaid those words of scathing rebuke to the "hypocrites" and "whited sepulchres," and to those who would have made of His Father's house a den of robbers, we might have misunderstood (as Mr Garrod seems to do) the nature of Christian meekness and the kind of honour which it vindicates. A Christian's honour should make him the enemy of hypocrisy, incapable of acting meanly or of revenging himself on those who persecute him because their ideals are not his own. It should incite him to active work for the upraising of mankind, and should make him live his life in such a way that it brings the Kingdom of Righteousness nearer for all men.

There is a sense in which one's own honour is touched by every wrong that is done, and this feeling is a potent factor in reforms such as the abolition of slavery, for it realises that perfect honour cannot belong to an isolated individual till it has become the possession of all mankind.

What exactly does Mr Garrod mean when he says that "the instincts of the natural man are healthy and even holy"? Is it possible for a self-conscious being to possess mere instincts? He reflects on his past actions and lays up a store of reasoned experience from them, and, whether he be conscious of it or no, all he does is influenced by this.

His unconscious acts could only be holy in so far as their foundation was in reasoned choice of good, for holiness implies a moral agent as surely as instinct implies one who acts without reason. Now, if man has reason, he cannot, as it were, turn it off at the main, and go on acting without it, but it is present in all he does.

Mr Garrod's biblical illustrations are not very happy. He chooses from the early literature of an undeveloped people three examples—Rahab, Jael, and David (at his worst)—from which he reasons that the Jew had no idea of honour and chivalry. Is this fair? The latter virtue woman is hardly supposed to possess, and yet Ruth's refusal to forsake her lonely mother-in-law, who had lost her all in a foreign land, comes surely near it, and the conduct of Joseph in the house of Potiphar is an example of

honour too rarely followed. That the Christian's relation to God is often a cowardly one, springs, I think, not from Judaism, still less from the teaching of Christ, who would have us to be friends and fellow-workers with God, but from the lamentable fog of subsequent dogmatism and traditionalism by which Christ's meaning is obscured. If we consider that in God we have our being, it is surely absurd for us to treat Him as one to whom we must cringe and grovel for favours, or as a "beautiful enemy untameable."

The true attitude seems to me to be that of the brave man who realises the vital nature of his relationship to God, and loyally accepts the responsibilities which that relationship involves. He will not lose his honour and self-respect in self-abasement, but will find them enriched in the only possible self-realisation for a spiritual being—oneness with God Himself.

W. E. PUMPHBEY.

WATFORD.

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## THE RESURRECTION OF OUR LORD.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1905, p. 529.)

### I.

IF "the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the Christian religion," Christianity, as a moral and spiritual force, will compare very unfavourably with the more ancient religions of mankind, inasmuch as a religion based on signs and wonders cannot help its devotees to the higher life of self-sacrifice and disinterested love.

If Jesus Christ was actual omnipotent God, as Mr Nolloth says, of course He could die or live, be a man or any other creature, but what does such a manifestation do for poor human souls who want to achieve the spiritual blessings set forth by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount?

Do we want to put "the Father," in whom Jesus so surely believed, on a level with Jupiter or any of the old Pagan gods?

If "the spiritual is the real *par excellence*," what do we gain by accepting the legend of the resurrection of the body of Jesus? The legend is only one among many others of the same sort, and is of the earth earthy, as St Paul teaches (1 Cor. xv. 48, 49). "To rise again, to live after death," does not require "a body" with the marks of martyrdom still to be seen, as our New Testament legend declares.

If Jesus Christ still lives, and if the rest of mankind who have lived on earth still live in some condition, somewhere in the great universe of God, is it reasonable to imagine that they all appear in bodies such as our souls now inhabit—bodies liable to age and decay? The doctrine of immortality on such a theory becomes not only impossible, but undesirable. We must

estimate the "resurrection records" as we estimate the poetic records of the creation in Genesis, as among the things accepted in an age somewhat childish and credulous.

We want "the Christian consciousness to assert its saneness," not by the acceptance of mythical traditions, but by a definite acceptance of the eternal principles of right as indicated in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, and a genuine endeavour to live up to the level of those principles in our daily common life as He did. Then, if there be for us a continuity of being beyond what we call death, we may leave it to "our Father" to provide us with all that is needed for our progress and our further guidance. Most of us by the time we reach the age of seventy or eighty begin to feel that bodies are more a burden than a help, and we no more desire a resurrection of the body as it is than we desire to go back to the ignorance of childhood and the folly of youth.

And if "the resurrection" is to teach us anything, surely it should teach us to rise from the death of sin to the life of righteousness, to put off the old man with his deeds, and to put on the new man in all our daily life here, and then we may cease to debate such curious questions as "the resurrection of Jesus Christ," and leave our own future in the hands of perfect wisdom and perfect love. "St Paul, Augustine, and Francis" became "saints" because the same Holy Spirit dwelt in them as was given to Jesus Christ without measure. None of these men were free from human weaknesses, and they overcame their animalism not because they believed in the bodily resurrection of Jesus, but because they tried to live the same life of devout and lowly self-sacrifice as Jesus lived on earth.

Dogma never yet made saints of men, although it has often made them cruel and uncharitable. When we can leave the childish legends as we have left the idols, to the moles and bats, and can walk on into "the light which lighteth every man," we may not become entirely free from delusion, but we shall be free from pretending to believe anything, because we find it petrified in some ancient creed, and we shall rejoice in the liberty known to those who have the Spirit of Christ.

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## II.

THE article by the Rev. C. F. Nolloth will not appear satisfactory to those who have any sympathy with the position of Dr Schmiedel and others, except in so far as it must negatively confirm their view.

The real issue is confused by a loose use of terms. The antithesis of natural and supernatural is surely out of date. According to modern thinking, to say that an event is natural is not to deny that it is divine; indeed, we are becoming accustomed to think that what *is* natural is thereby declared to be divine. The artificial and the unreal are the true antitheses to the natural.

Again, the *fact* of Resurrection is nowhere in dispute amongst serious thinkers. Canon Henson's question whether the Resurrection is really inconceivable apart from the materialistic notions contributed by current Judaism will only be answered in the affirmative by those who give materialistic notions a permanent value. The real question at issue is concerned with evidence. To say that for valid testimony of the fact of the Lord's being "alive" we are to go back to the recorded experiences of the first disciples is practically to deny Him as a present and abiding fact. To feel the present warmth of the sun is the only sure personal evidence of the sun's existence.

Confusion is further made in this article by the restricted use of "subjective" and "objective." The impression left on one's mind is that the writer confines the use of "objective" to that which is phenomenally apparent, in contact with the external senses. He seems to say that unless we are sure that Jesus after His death ate and drank in the presence of His disciples, we have no sure evidence of His Resurrection. Can anything be less satisfactory than this? Are physical things that are physically discerned more real than spiritual things that are spiritually discerned? Is objective truth not "objective" to spiritual vision?

As a matter of fact the illusiveness of the phenomenal is proverbial; the objective reality of the spiritual is sure and trustworthy to those in whom spiritual faculties are evolved.

There is a further consideration of great moment in regard to belief, which the writer of the article does indeed suggest in the last paragraph, but which all who search in the phenomenal for evidences of vital truth seem to ignore.

It may be put shortly in this way—dogmatically, for brevity's sake—signs do not create belief, but follow them that (already) believe (Mark xvi. 17).

The real historical evidences of the Resurrection lie in the lives of those who identify themselves with its power, knowing that Christ lives in them. Truth brings its own evidence. Belief is not a result, but a recognition of what eternally *is*. Wherever Truth is, there also are the signs of its presence.

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## CHRIST AND KRISHNA.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1905, p. 624.)

A COMPLETE solution may, I think, now be offered of the long-standing problem regarding the Gospel narrative and the Krishna myth. Miss H. A. Dallas, who again raises the question in an acute form, asks if there

are any means of tracing the date at which the Indian legend took shape, and gives three sources—the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Puranas, rightly rejecting the Puranas as late, and, she might have added, worthless. She then leaves the whole question in the hands of “experts,” and such an expert is certainly Mr J. N. Farquhar, who shows (*East and West*, September 1904) that the Mahabharata proper is also useless for the purpose, so that nothing remains except the Gita, itself an episode of that unwieldy compilation. She further points out that Krishna as a full-blown deity (Brahma incarnate) first appears in the relatively recent Atharvan Upanishads composed in the fifth (Dharmashastra) period of Hindu literature, say about 300 to 500 A.D. To the same period is also referred the Gita itself, which is written not in the archaic (vedic) but in the late (classic) Sanskrit of Kalidasa, who flourished about 400–450 A.D., and is the first writer that mentions the Gita.

Lastly, the genesis of the Krishna myth—that is, of Krishna as an avatar of Brahma—is clearly traced from the Chandogya Upanishad (fourth or Sutra period), where Krishna Devakiputra figures only as a man, a pupil of the rishi (sage, seer) Ghora Angirasa, through the early parts of the Mahabharata, where he is a great king and warrior, but still only a man, to Patanjali’s Mahabhasya, where he first assumes a semi-divine character (a demi-god), and at last to the Gita, the central idea of which is that Krishna is Brahma. Even the demi-god stage appears not to have been reached till about 300 B.C., when Megasthenes, the Greek envoy at the Court of Sandrocottos (Chandragupta) tells us that Herakles was worshipped at Methora and Kleisobora. These places are generally identified with Mathura and Krishnapur, where homage was paid to Krishna, who at that time would seem to have been a sort of Indian Herakles, whose full apotheosis was finally attained in the Gita, “one of a considerable group of poems which were composed in the fifth period of the literature for the advancement of the worship of Krishna” (Farquhar).

From all this it clearly follows that the Gospel narrative could not have been influenced by the Krishna myth, though it is just possible that the latter may have been coloured by the former. It is obviously a question of priority which must now be decided in favour of the Christian avatar.

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## REVIEWS

*John Knox and the Reformation.*—By Andrew Lang.—  
Longmans, Green & Co.

THE four hundredth anniversary—though dates are disputed—of the birth of John Knox, which is being celebrated this year in Scotland, has called forth more than one new biography. Mr Lang's position in the world of letters, though it hardly requires him to write a *Life of Knox*, is likely to attract attention to his words regarding the chief actor in the drama of the Scottish reformation. A *Life* has been written by him, in which admissions are made regarding Knox's private virtues; and even geniality and amiability are ascribed to the private character of the man whom Browning called "sour John Knox." Beyond these admissions there is no resort to incidents to demonstrate the domestic or clerical virtues; and the *Life*, to the detriment of literary art and the violation of historical propriety, is concerned almost altogether with the misdeeds of the historian and the tricks, schemes, enterprises—whatever the proper word may be—of the politician. Mr Lang suggests that Knox as a politician and an historian resembled Charles I. in "sailing as near the wind" as he could. An example of the misdeeds may be noted. In his *History* Knox declared that the destruction of ecclesiastical buildings in Perth in 1559 was done by "the rascal multitude"; while in one of his letters, in which the details given in the *History* are lacking, he wrote that it was "the brethren" who put their hands to reformation. Mr Lang wishes us to believe that Knox had one version of the affair for "contemporary foreign as well as domestic readers," and another, the true one, for the person to whom the letter was addressed. The versions may contradict each other; but it is not necessary to accept Mr Lang's statement, that according to the letter "the brethren" levelled monasteries and burned monuments of idolatry, since Knox wrote that "they put to their hands to reformation in Sanct Johnstoun (Perth), where the places of idolatry . . . were made equal with the ground." The letter, indeed, does not mention "the rascal multitude," but it states that punishment of death was pronounced, not against "the brethren," but against man, woman and child, "indwellers there." This charge against Knox as an historian may have the benefit of the Scottish verdict, "not proven."

From the historian we pass to the theologian, and find that Knox's conception of the mass as idolatry is an unchristian idea, and that "the sudden denunciation of a Christian ceremony, even what may be deemed a perverted Christian ceremony, as sheer 'idolatry,' equivalent to the worship of serpents, bulls, or of a foreign Baal in ancient Israel—was a step calculated to confuse the real issues, and to provoke a religious war of massacre." To Knox the mass was the essence of Romanism; and as the destruction of the mass, doctrine and ceremony alike, was the real issue, he did not trouble himself about some diplomatic form of condemnation to take the place of sudden denunciation, or about a war of massacre which never occurred. Mr Lang takes pains with the idea of the mass as idolatry, and reaches the conclusion, peculiarly his own, that as Christianity arose out of Judaism, and retained "the same God and the same scriptures," so "Protestantism arose out of mediæval Catholicism, retaining the same God and the same scriptures."

In the critical examination to which Knox as a politician is subjected, Mr Lang deals with the question of obedience to authority, and with the special point of Queen Mary's right to have in her private chapel the celebration of the mass, which was forbidden in Scotland by a law or resolution of 1560. It is declared that "Knox wanted to prevent Mary Stuart from enjoying her hereditary crown"; and for justification of this declaration a letter from Knox to Sir W. Cecil is cited. The letter, which is in a fashion an apology for the treatise on the "Regiment" of women, in so far as it bears on the authority of Elizabeth, contains the words, "We ought to take heed, lest that we in establishing one judged godly and profitable to her country, make entrance and title to many, by whom not only shall the truth be impugned, but also shall the country be brought to bondage and slavery. God give unto you, and other favourers of your country, eyes to foresee, and wisdom to avoid, the dangers appearing." The blowing of the trumpet about the rule of women had not affected the stability of thrones, but he who blew the "Blast" was not in remorse; and, apart from the case of Elizabeth, he did not change regarding the rule of women. Mr Lang knows, however, that Knox was writing to Cecil against Mary Stuart. We are told that the position of the reformers was "that of rebels"; and it is asked "if the menace against the priests and the ruin of monasteries were not seditions, what is sedition"? Effort, too, is made to show that Knox was not in harmony with Calvin and other reformers in regard to obedience to existing authority. Rebellion and sedition may be very grave offences. Knox, however, who knew how to make serious charges against enemies, and to find for them ingenious names from the Old Testament, was able to bear with equanimity the abuse which relieved opponents. But he was anxious to show that what was called rebellion was not a political attack on authority. For him the interests of religion were supreme; and, if these interests required political revolutions, kings and rulers must be subjected to the authority of those to whom was given the guardianship of the truth revealed by God. Knox, as much

as Calvin, recognised the danger of Anabaptist anarchy; but he had a very definite theory regarding the rights and duties of a religious community, and the theory did not yield to every fanatic or visionary the claim to be a law unto himself. Knox had been the pupil of John Major, and Major, though by some conservative restraint a scholastic and a Romanist, was, as a political thinker, sufficiently advanced to allow him to say:—"Now I am not prepared to deny that, in case of necessity, it is within the rights of the people to transfer from one race to another the kingly power; but let that be always done after weighing carefully all the circumstances and with deliberation." Influenced or uninfluenced by Major, Knox left passive obedience and passive resistance alike behind him. In a discussion with Lethington, fully set forth in the *History*, he used these words:—"But my argument has one other ground; for I speak of the people assembled together in one body of a (ane) commonwealth, unto whom God has given sufficient force, not only to resist, but also to suppress all kind of open idolatry; and such a people, yet again I affirm, are bound to keep their land clean and unpolluted." Arguments drawn from records of Jewish history may be fanciful to some of us in these days, but they had supreme authority for Knox; and his contemporaries did not smile at appeals to the Old Testament. Whether Israel had a right to speak to Scotland may be disputed, and the examples chosen from the Old Testament may fail to strengthen Knox's theory; but the theory is definite, and saves its author from the guilt of individualism, and saves him as a man of action from the charge of rebellion and sedition, which may or may not be crimes. It may be possible to show that some of Knox's words seem to contradict his idea of a commonwealth with the duty assigned and the power granted by God to suppress idolatry; and it is perfectly easy to criticise the definition of idolatry. But Knox had a clear principle to educate his thought and guide his action. The Bible, for him, was the word of God, and doctrine or ceremony was false which had no authority or justification derived from that word. Those who accepted the Scriptures were called to obey the commands therein; and action was to be taken, not by this man or that, but by "the people assembled together in one body of a commonwealth." Knox attained to the conception of a religious commonwealth having definite duties and powers; and for him the Reformation in Scotland was effected by the true religious commonwealth. Years before the discussion with Lethington he had sent a message to the people of Scotland, calling on them to recognise themselves as citizens and to do their duty to religion. In 1558 he wrote "A letter addressed to the commonalty of Scotland"; and that communication had far-reaching consequences, inasmuch as it helped to create the commons as a body within, or as a part of, the State. "Neither would I," he said, "that ye should esteem the reformation and care of religion less to appertain to you, because ye are no kings, rulers, judges, nobles, nor in authority. Beloved brethren, ye are God's creatures, created and formed to His own image and similitude, for whose redemption was shed the most precious blood of the only beloved

Son of God, to whom He hath commanded His Gospel and glad tidings to be preached, and for whom He hath prepared the heavenly inheritance." He continued:—"I say that it doth not less appertain to you, beloved brethren, to be assured that your faith and religion be grounded and established upon the true and undoubted Word of God, than to your princes and rulers." Froude, who had understanding of the influence of the Reformation on the Scottish character, has written that when the nobles were eager to support Mary in her scheme to reach the English throne, and when the road to it was through a Catholic revolution, "John Knox alone, and the commons, whom Knox had raised into a political power, remained true." The religious community became a political power, as in the middle of the sixteenth century the concerns of religion and politics, of Church and State, were intermingled; but to the Reformer the affairs of religion were paramount. It is not of the slightest importance that anyone in the twentieth century should call Knox a rebel or charge him with sedition. But for his good name in history it should be understood that he was in no sense an anarchist, but was a thinker and statesman who recognised and declared that with the people assembled together in a commonwealth lay the authority "to keep their land clean and unpolluted."

In the Scottish Reformation movement it was given to Knox to pull down and to raise up. The spiritual fabric of the ancient Church was destroyed; and, whether he was altogether responsible or not, methods of barbarism were on occasion employed. It is impossible, indeed, to picture the building of the Reformed or Protestant Church in Scotland without looking at the Old Church and its removal. Yet to appreciate the permanent service rendered by Knox to his country, and to understand the man himself, it is to his constructive work we must turn. Carlyle wrote of him:—"He is the one Scotchman to whom, of all others, his country and the world owe a debt"; while Mr Lang, contemplating the work in which Knox took the chief part, says:—"Mob violence, oppression by Protestant landlords, kirk censure, imprisonment, fine and exile, did their work in suppressing idolatry and promoting hypocrisy."

The Confession of Faith, compiled in four days, and mainly by Knox, continued from 1560 in the Scottish Church, till, by the irony of fate, the Westminster Confession, made in England, took its place. Knox was a Calvinist, and the Confession bears the impress of the mind of Calvin; but Calvinism for the Scottish Reformer was not merely a theology by adoption. It became a part of the very man himself; and its attraction for him is revealed in his words:—"Then only is our salvation in assurance, when we find the cause of the same in the bosom and counsel of God."

While the theology of the Confession is in no sense distinctively Scottish, the structure and definitions are the handwork of Knox and his associates, and his style is manifest in parts. No Scotsman of his time was a master of prose as he was, and the epic stature of the man was reflected in his style. "And so was born the just seed of David, the angel of the great counsel of God," will serve as an example of his style, as will these

words :—" In the general judgment there shall be given to every man and woman resurrection of the flesh ; for the sea shall give her dead, the earth those that therein be enclosed ; yea, the Eternal, our God, shall stretch out His hand upon the dust, and the dead shall arise incorruptible."

In the First Book of Discipline Knox's ecclesiastical polity was detailed ; but the nobles would not accept it, as it left them nothing of the patrimony of the ancient church. In Knox's scheme the government was not to be episcopal, but was to be essentially democratic, as was fitting in a commonwealth organised as a church. Local congregations were to elect the ministers who were to be ordained, but not by the laying on of hands ; and associated with the ministers were lay elders. The lay elder, who continued after Presbyterianism was established according to the plan of the Second Book of Discipline, made the church, by his presence in the courts or councils, in a very special sense the church of the nation. Mr Lang, showing in his book that he is not a Presbyterian, says :—" As the difference between the Genevan and Anglican models contributed so greatly to the Civil War under Charles I., the results may be regretted " ; but, it need not be forgotten, Scotland had in the sixteenth century neither political nor ecclesiastical connection with England. The most notable point in Knox's polity was the education scheme. Before him there were educationists who wished schools to be instituted over the land, and there was a plan for compelling the nobles to have their sons educated ; but Knox, true to his idea of the commonwealth, modelled a scheme of primary, secondary, and university education, and proposed compulsory education for the people. Dealing with the subjects to be taken by pupils, he spoke of the time to be devoted " to that study in which they intend chiefly to travail for the profit of the commonwealth." The nobles rejected the Book of Discipline, and seized and kept a large part of the patrimony of the ancient church which Knox intended for the " ministers of the word, the poor, and the teachers of the youth." Regarding the poor he said :—" We are not patrons for stubborn and idle beggars, who, running from place to place, make a craft of their begging, whom the civil magistrate ought to punish ; but for the widow and fatherless, the aged, impotent, or lamed, who neither can nor may travail for their sustentation."

In a life of Knox his blunders as an historian and his vagaries as a politician must have a place, but that must be at least a little lower than the place set apart for his work as a reformer and his policy as an ecclesiastical statesman. And, when his words and actions are subjected to criticism, the toleration of history demands that these should be seen in light of the sixteenth century.

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*The International Critical Commentary: Amos and Hosea.*—By William Rainey Harper, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1905.

THE history of the origin and progress of prophetic religion is admittedly included in the history of the origin of early Christianity. Not only, therefore, for its own sake, but also for that of the history of Christianity, we are bound to assure ourselves that our view of the history of Hebrew prophecy is as full and accurate as under the circumstances it can be made. This is why I venture to review at some length the best existing summary both of old and of recent work on those two eminent prophets and astonishing personalities, Amos and Hosea. The author is President Harper, well known in former days as an enthusiastic and successful organiser of the teaching of Hebrew. I think it fairest to judge his book first of all from his point of view, and afterwards more from my own, protecting myself at the close from the accusation of arrogance by showing how an expanded point of view would perhaps have enabled the author to do still more for his subject. For I am of opinion that we both need and shall in course of time possess two Old Testaments—the one handed down to us by the scholars of the Synagogue, and most important from a strictly Church point of view; the other underlying this, and slowly being brought to light by a succession of workers, primarily to the benefit of history, but also, in the second degree, of religion. The peace of the Church and the efficiency of the critics depend on this fact being thoroughly recognised, and Dr Harper might, as I think, have been still more efficient as a commentator, if he had put it in the foreground.

It must be the author's wide experience as a teacher which has induced him to devote much space to a *résumé*, in the first part of the Introduction, of what he calls the pre-prophetic activity. I wish myself that this comprehensive sketch had been published separately, especially as Dr Harper states that he has much felt the scantiness of his space. Having regard to the plan of the series, the so-called minor prophets ought not, surely, to have had three volumes allotted to them; and if this and some other economies (the notes are sometimes lengthy) had been practised, these prophets could have been brought, without serious loss, into two volumes. For the sake of unity of subject, I shall confine my appreciation of the Introduction to that portion of it which relates to Amos and Hosea.

With regard to Amos, our author holds, with the majority, that his home was at a place in the desert of Judah, where he was at once a shepherd and a dresser of sycomores, a kind of tree which produces a small insipid fig. Hence arise several hard problems. (1) How came there to be sycomores, which love warmth, at Tekoa, which stands high? (2) How came Amos, in his ministry, to neglect Judah, and transfer himself to N. Israel? Were there not sufficiently able prophets in that country, which is generally regarded as the cradle of the higher prophecy? (3) How

came he by his wide knowledge, not only of N. Israel (this indeed is surprising enough), but also of the world outside? Dr Harper even goes so far as to call him an "ethnologist." (4) How did he obtain such a mastery of the poetical and literary arts? Had he predecessors, such as the writer of Isa. xv.-xvi. 12? or is he the Columbus of prophecy?

These problems are, from the author's point of view, carefully treated. Besides, we have a valuable exposition of Amos's conception of God, and of the nature of worship or religion. Dr Harper insists on basing his account of both prophets solely on the original elements of the books, apart from interpolations and additions, and he makes no attempt to dilute results which may to some appear disappointing. I find myself largely in agreement with him, though my own picture of the two prophets might no doubt differ in some historical points from that given in this volume. Dr Harper does full justice to the moral grandeur of Amos, who needs, however, it is remarked, a Hosea to supplement him. And here we are confronted by two fresh problems: (1) How can we account, from a historical point of view, for the sudden appearance of this grand but austere type of religion? And (2), seeing that the burden of the preaching of Amos was ruin and annihilation, how can we understand his using artistic and literary methods in the elaboration of his prophecies? A modern preacher may indeed do the like, but can we realise such a course when taken by Amos? Dr Harper refers incidentally to the editorial activity of the prophet's disciples. May this be admitted as at least a partial and subordinate explanation?

We encounter a somewhat different set of problems in Hosea. This prophet inveighs against the priesthood with an emotional intensity which suggests that he may have been a priest himself. At any rate it has not been doubted that he was a member of the people whose sad destiny he reveals. With regard to his style, Professor G. A. Smith is of opinion that much of his work was not formally addressed to an audience, and Professor Marti, that his utterances in general are poems improvised at a white heat of passion, and circulated among the N. Israelitish people. Dr Harper, however (p. clvii.), holds a different view, and reminds us that "poetry was the most popular form of address before an Oriental audience." Our author differs in part from Professor Marti on a much more important point, viz. the right view of what looks like an account of a tragedy in the domestic life of Hosea, brought about by an initial command of Yahwè to "take a wife of whoredom and children of whoredom" as symbols of the land and people of Israel in their apostasy from their God. That the whole narrative (cc. i. and iii.) is allegorical, Professor Marti would not assert, but his arguments and those of Paul Volz are, if Dr Harper will excuse me for saying so, very effective for the allegorical view of ch. iii. I am afraid that I must admit that Dr Harper's view, formerly my own, which is that Hosea's adulterous wife at length went away from her husband, and became another man's slave-concubine, till Hosea himself redeemed her at the price of a slave, seems to me to depend too much upon imaginative

supplementing of the text. Dr Harper's treatment of the subject, however, is full and instructive, and I mention my own adverse view thus prominently because the author, in his courtesy, refers to my former opinion.

Certainly the love of Hosea for the people of Israel pervades his prophecies; there is nothing like it in Amos. May we infer from this that Amos is, properly speaking, an outsider? The question may have to be reconsidered. But at any rate we get a much fuller and warmer picture of Israelitish life in the true Book of Hosea (*i.e.* apart from interpolations). The immorality which prevailed in Israel is depicted to the life by this prophet, and yet his denunciations are more sympathetic to us than those of Amos, because he sees that in the character of Yahwè love and righteousness are combined, as they ought also to be combined, but are not, in the character of Israel. But he further sees, not less clearly than Amos, that if there is nothing analogous to the righteousness of the true Yahwè in the character of Israel, the divine love will have to stand by with averted eyes, while the divine righteousness executes the nation's doom, and he knows but too well that the probability of such a repentance on Israel's part as the divine lovingkindness can accept, is small indeed.

Dr Harper's special contribution to the study of these writings is mainly concerned with their poetical form. Much has been done of late years to show that the structure of Hebrew poetry is metrical and strophic. Our author claims (p. clxix.) that these researches have given a new impetus to textual criticism, and consequently to exegesis. I have myself long been a friend, though not a devotee, of Hebrew metre, and can allow the claim, though, as it appears to me, the results of this new impetus have not, thus far, been wholly beneficial. A more thorough textual criticism, involving some changes in the prevalent literary criticism, seems to me a necessary preliminary to a more fruitful study of Hebrew metre, and I cannot see that, putting aside Duhm and Marti, there are many brilliant textual critics among our recent metrists. But from all honest and intelligent work it is possible to learn, and I am sure that all will thank Dr Harper both for his own suggestions and for his useful notices of other work done in the same field.

The commentary proper is so full that I must regretfully pass over much that is of interest. But the all-important subject of textual criticism must not be allowed to come short. Judged from his own point of view, Dr Harper has succeeded fairly well. He has not the initiative of Marti, but when he selects from the emendations of others, he may count on the approval of most liberal-conservative scholars. And yet I cannot but ask, are not too many of us like those careless and confident ones of whom the prophet Amos speaks (vi. 1)? We are very busy constructing summaries and surveys and dictionaries, but is their textual basis at all satisfactory? Is liberal-conservatism any longer tenable? If we examine the textual criticism of even its best representatives, we shall be compelled to ask a number of importunate questions which I am afraid that those who adhere to it will find it difficult to answer.

I can, of course, only mention a few of the questions I have myself been led to ask. Take Amos i. 9, of which this is a literal rendering: "Thus saith Yahwè: For three transgressions of Şör, yea, for four, I will not revoke it; because they delivered up a complete captivity to Edom, and remembered not the covenant of brethren." If Şör means Tyre (so Harper), how comes it to be introduced between Philistia and Edom? Next, when was there a covenant of brethren between Israel and Tyre? And does "a complete captivity" make sense? The first problem is not mentioned. Yet, even if *vv.* 9-12 are a later insertion, the editor must have had some view on the subject, if by Şör he meant Tyre. The second receives a very poor solution, and the third baffles Dr Harper. Then comes Amos ii. 6, where Israel is doomed to destruction because they "sell the needy for a pair of shoes." Explanations of this continue to flow in, but even the best of them show more learning than judgment. If a deeper textual criticism is necessary anywhere, it is so here. But Dr Harper, alas! does not give it. The passage continues, "that pant after (or, that crush) the dust of the earth on the head of the poor." Again, no real explanation is given. The next line—"and the way of the humble they turn aside"—is clear enough, but too conventional for Amos; must there not be something better underneath? The question is not even asked. As a consequence, the next line, which is plain-spoken enough, has to be altered ("girl" becomes "agreement"). Then we have the sin of "spreading out garments taken in pledge beside every altar," which is said to be a violation of Ex. xxii. 26, which requires the return of such garments overnight; but what an odd use is said to be made of these pledges! After this, as a parallel, comes the sin of "drinking the wine of the fined in the house of their god" (or, "houses of their gods"). Is all this a great success, or—a great critical failure?

Just referring to the unfortunate retention of "Ashdod" in Amos iii. 9, I ask leave to pause for a moment at Amos iii. 12. The old English Bible makes Amos say here that, "as the shepherd taketh out of the mouth of the lion two legs, or a piece of an ear, so shall the children of Israel be taken out that dwell in Samaria in the corner of a bed, and in Damascus in a couch." Nowhere else in Hebrew poetry can such a phrase be found as "two legs or a piece of an ear," nor is it probable that BDL means "piece," or even possible that DMŠK means "damask." Nor can Dr Harper do much for the truly extraordinary phrase, "who sit (dwell?) in Samaria on the corner of a couch." Is there no remedy?

In Amos iv. 10, imbedded in a passage which could well dispense with it, is the nonsensical phrase, "together with the taking captive of your horses." Dr Harper relegates this to the margin; but it is a critic's duty to account for the existence of the words. Soon after (*v.* 13) comes a fine poetic description of the divine power over nature, and in the middle of it a line which is rendered, "and he tells man what is his thought (?)." Now, references to the divine omniscience are of special interest. But is there such a reference here? Dr Harper himself is uncertain. Can we get

no further than a doubt? Our author takes a bolder course with Amos v. 25. The question is, not as to the text, but as to the interpretation. Is the prophet absolutely hostile to sacrifices? In the *Enc. Biblica* (col. 158) I felt obliged to answer in the affirmative, and I find that I have the valuable support of Professor Marti. President Harper, however, takes the other side. Following Professor D. B. Macdonald, he renders, "Was it (only) sacrifices and offerings that ye brought me in the wilderness," etc., explaining that, in the golden age of Israel's religion, Israel gave his God not only sacrifices, but something better, viz. moral obedience. I must confess that I do not agree with him. Ingenious as Professor Macdonald's exegetical argument is (*Journ. of Biblical Literature*, 1899, pp. 214 f.), it is not conclusive, and makes Amos's otherwise simple position undesirably complicated. It is a poor thing for a prophet to say, "Your sacrifices are bad, but amend them by superadding something better." Practical church reformers might well adopt this course, but radical men like Amos and Hosea—how could they venture on the slippery path of compromise?

Not less difficult and unusual is our author's reading of v. 26, which he gives thus, "But now ye lift up the shrine of your king, and the image of your god which ye have made for yourselves." Dr Harper is an excellent grammarian, but "now" is as questionable here as "only" in v. 25. And how can one imagine that Amos would have omitted the names of the gods in the procession? It may perhaps be answered that nowhere does he give the name of any divine rival of Yahwè, but the statement will not be endorsed by a keen critic of the text.

I will only mention three more testing passages in Amos. One is viii. 14, which announces the hard fate in store for the adherents of false worships. They are described as those "who swear by Samaria's guilt, and say, As liveth thy god, O Dan; and, As liveth the way of Beer-sheba." These formulæ are given by Dr Harper as the oaths of the deluded people. But is this conservatism justified? The second passage is ix. 7, which begins, "Are ye not as the sons of the Cushites to me?" "Israel," so our author expounds this, "is no more to me than the far-distant, uncivilised, and despised black race of the Ethiopians." These epithets, however, are not favoured by the context, unless indeed the Philistines and Aram were also far-distant, uncivilised, and despised. Moreover, is it true that the Ethiopians were an uncivilised and despised race? Winckler and Hommel would not agree with this. Certainly the problem of ix. 7 ought to have been solved better.

The third is in that closing passage which almost all critics refer to a later age. Can the author of this somewhat conventional but quite clearly written epilogue have used such an obscure expression (ix. 11) as "the booth of David that is fallen down"? According to Professor G. A. Smith (*Twelve Prophets*, i. 192), it means the kingdom of Judah; according to Harper and Marti, the old Davidic kingdom, while, according to G. Hoffmann (*Z.A.T.W.*, 1883, pp. 125 f.), the "booths" or "huts"

(*sukkoth*) of David are the poor, weak houses of which in David's time the cities of Israel and Judah consisted, and which gave place to the palatial buildings of later days. Surely Hoffmann is right negatively. But why does not some critic suggest a better positive solution? Professor Driver's note, which points out that the "breaches" referred to are those of a wall or fortress, ought to put a keen scholar on the track.

I now pass on to Hosea. It is a fascinating subject, but beset with difficulties. Will President Harper rise to the increased demand upon his resources? Among the many hard passages are certainly i. 3 and iii. 1. "Gomer" and "Diblain" ought surely to have some significance; are the readings right? And in iii. 1, can we acquiesce in the vague description, "a woman, beloved of (or, pointing differently, loving) a paramour, and an adulteress"? In the same passage we get the strange statement that the Israelites "turn to other gods, and are lovers of raisin-cakes." Can archæology be said to have justified this? Where is the parallelism? Still more unfortunate for the current criticism is its inability to account for "lethek" in v. 2. Must there not be some recognisable word underneath it? Have we no insight?

The darkness deepens outside the two short narratives, though even these offer some scarcely solved problems. Dr Harper's ingenuity in dealing with iv. 4, 5 may be admitted, but the last line—"and by night I will destroy thy mother"—being clearly corrupt, throws doubt on what precedes. It is a poor makeshift to give "mother" the sense of "caste" or "clan." Hos. v. 7 (latter part) is equally trying. Dr Harper gives, "the (next) new moon may destroy them with their portions"; but this is not half clear enough; and by what right is "next" inserted? The version given of Hos. v. 11b is also too vague—"because he has determined to go after vanity." That is how a late editor might have written, not Hosea. "Vanity" is a very poor emendation indeed, though as old as the LXX. In Hos. v. 13 there is the time-honoured riddle about "king Jareb." Dr Harper quotes eleven explanations, and acquiesces after all in "king Jareb," which, however, even if it were more defensible, could hardly be parallel to "Asshur." In Hos. vi. 5 Yahwè is made to say that he has "hewn them by the prophets," and "slain them by the words of his mouth," and in vi. 7 that "they, like men, have transgressed the covenant," after which we read, "there they have betrayed me." Where is the critic with a clear eye, and free from a superstitious regard to tradition, who will restore the true text? I am afraid that vi. 9—"hopelessly corrupt" and yet emended—still waits for such a critic.

Perhaps the most striking defect of the text as we have it is the scantiness of the local colouring. A critic of insight should be able to restore some of this colouring. Underneath the present text a stronger and more coloured phraseology ought often to be discernible. Thus, in vii. 12 "I will chastise them by the abundance of their corrections" is too poor and too pale to be the true correction. In vii. 16 it is a mercy that "they turn to Baal" is given for "they turn—not upwards." I do not

mean to say that this is enough. In viii. 5 the supposed pious ejaculation is doubtful Hebrew. Can nothing be seen underneath? In viii. 9 can "a wild ass taking his way by himself" be justified to zoologists? In viii. 10 cannot Dr Harper give us something better? In viii. 12 Pentateuch critics have been accustomed to see a reference to collections of written laws. But the writing of laws is not a subject that one expects to find referred to here. The whole passage (*vv.* 11-13) is very doubtful. Can critics do nothing more than Dr Harper records?

Among other nests of ill-solved problems is Hos. x. 9: can "there they stood," and "for their two sins," possibly be right? The Shalman-passage, too, and its context (*vv.* 14, 15), need firmer treatment. And what shall I say of chap. xi.? I cannot copy it all out. But if I did so, it would be plain that nothing much short of a revolution in criticism is required. Are children taught to walk by being carried, and drawn with the "cords of a man"? And fancy comparing Israel's God to one who lifts up the yoke, etc.! Professor Marti is at any rate bolder; but how can Yahwè be compared to "a slayer of men"? There is much more that might be said, especially on *v.* 7; but I forbear.

Chap. xii. is equally exacting. Surely some fine things ought to be brought to light by a keener criticism. Dr Harper analyses the section, but is it not a more primary duty to restore the true text? Not to dwell on the problem of the Judah-passage (xii. 1*b*, but xi. 12*b* in E.V.), I maintain that the whole passage relative to Jacob is miserably disfigured; neither Harper nor Marti gives any appreciable help. And what shall one say of *v.* 12, even as corrected by these critics? Worse things, however, await us in xiii. 2. How can Dr Harper have satisfied himself with the reading, "To such they say, [O God!] | With a people sacrificing to demons; | With men kissing calves!"

I wish I had room to consider the botanical passages in Hos. xiii. 15, and chap. xiv. It would be my duty to speak appreciatively of Dr Harper's work, though there are riddles even here of which he does not seem fully to realise the existence.

The reader has now had my estimate of this important work from a twofold point of view. I have endeavoured to give a sympathetic sketch of those general conclusions of the author which are on the whole firmly established. I have also not withheld my opinion that he and scholars like him are deficient in cognisance of the harder critical problems, and in the power of grappling with them, and also in what I may call catholicity of method. The last of these deficiencies is really fatal. If the old methods are as inadequate as I think that I have proved them to be, the only scientific course, surely, is to develop new ones, as the result of a more thorough study of the textual phenomena. To be incomplete is not unscientific, but not to correct faults when they are pointed out is unscientific. Progress in natural science has always gone hand in hand with the application of new methods, and so it will be found to be in the case of our study. It is therefore urgently necessary that we Old Testament

scholars should seek for a deeper and wider knowledge of the textual facts, and either adopt or strike out for ourselves new critical methods.

In the use of new methods we have now a most valuable source of suggestion and control in the so-called N. Arabian theory, and it is with deep regret that I say that Dr Harper's references to this theory (for which see *Hibbert Journal*, July 1903, p. 755; April 1904, pp. 571 ff.; and my own *Bible Problems*, 1904, pp. 160-185, 262-271) are entirely inadequate to the wants of the student, and sometimes positively misleading. Thus, in p. lxxxv., note, the "Muşri hypothesis" is barely alluded to, and in p. liv. the "Jerahmeelite hypothesis in *EB*, *CB*, and elsewhere." In p. 334 it is said that four N. Arabian districts have been "found" in Hos. ix. 6 (*EB* should be *CB*) by means of free (should be, methodical) emendation. In pp. xxxiii. and 365 "Jerahmeel" is called "all-pervading"; in p. ci., however, the Jerahmeelites are only the leaders of the N. Arabian races, and it is added that they "were the occasion of all (!) ancient Israelitish life and activity," the absurdity of which lies in the circumstance that when the application of Assyriology to the exegesis of the Old Testament is referred to, the present reviewer's name is bound to be somewhat prominent. The student will also be surprised to find that in p. lvi. an inconvenient correction of the text is called "groundless," simply because it is founded on facts not yet recorded in handbooks and referred to by examiners (see *Hibbert Journal*, July 1903, pp. 760 f.).

It only remains to justify myself, as a reviewer, against a possible charge of captiousness by mentioning a very few of the new and approximately true things which Dr Harper, if he had had greater courage, might have found out. Of course, I assume the reality of certain often-repeated names of N. Arabian regions and cities, also the existence of recurrent types of textual corruption, the evidence for which is now very large indeed. I must further assume that my readers have flexibility enough to adapt themselves to a new point of view, and will not be so unfair as to call a name or a style of writing grotesque, simply because it is unfamiliar to devotees of the traditional text. The underlying text was, of course, very different from the "revised version" of the later editors.

It is probable, then, that Amos iii. 12 ran at first nearly thus: ". . . as the shepherd rescues | Out of the lion's mouth two legs [*gloss* on "lion," that is, Bir-dadda], | So shall the benê Israel be rescued | Who dwell in Shimron [*gloss*, in Ephrath of Maacath] and in Aram-ashaḥ (*gloss*, Asshur)." Bir-dadda was an Arabian king.

Amos vi. 1-7 may once have stood thus: "Woe to the careless in Şiyyōn, | To the confident on the mount of Shimron, | Who have conquered Ashtar of the Gileadites, | And swallowed up for themselves Beth-ishmael, | Who have gone to war with Jerahmeel of Arâb, | And rule over Şephath of Aram-ashaḥ, | Who vaunt themselves because of Beth-jerahmeel, | Who have subdued to themselves all Asshur. | Therefore at this time shall they go into exile, | From Asshur of the Gileadites shall they be expelled (?)." To save space, I have passed over some glosses, also

v. 4a and v. 5b, which introduce a reference to feasting, and the line in v. 6 about the ruin of Joseph; these appear to be insertions of the later editor. For the whole passage cp. vi. 13a, where read, "who rejoice in Gilead-arâb and Raḳman," and 2 Kings xiv. 28 (*Crit. Bib.*). The famous reference to "David" (v. 5) occurs in a gloss; the word is corrupt.

Lastly, Amos vii. 14, which contains the prophet's answer to the priest of Bethel, probably ran thus: "And Amos answered and said to Amaziah, No prophet am I, no member of a prophets' guild am I, but a (plain) son of Ashḥur (*gloss*, a son of Ishmael, of Shakram). And Yahwè took me from Ashḥur of Ishmael, and Yahwè said to me, Go, prophesy against my people Israel." Amos was, in fact, a native of the Israelitish territory in the N. Arabian borderland, often called Ashḥur of Jerahmul (or Ishmael).

Gladly would I show how much more intelligible the companion-prophet becomes, when new methods are applied to his seemingly dark prophecies. I have, in fact, a large amount of fresh material. Suffice it, however, to have shown that following the new methods leads to many not unimportant results. Ought these things to be kept back from students? I think not. Far be it from me to undervalue old methods. The student must be trained first of all in the use of them, but to restrict education to this is to condemn students to be for ever ploughing the sand, and is only too likely to react most injuriously on the teachers. Dr Harper will, I think, understand and excuse these criticisms; they are based on facts which cannot, as I venture to hold, be explained away.

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*Grundriss der Ritschlschen Dogmatik.*—Von Constantin von Kügelgen.—  
Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: Richard Wöpke, 1903.

IF Ritschl drew to himself many devoted disciples, he raised against himself far more numerous determined opponents. In his introduction the writer of this sketch of Ritschl's theology brings together a number of the varied charges which have been heaped upon him; and so inconsistent and contradictory do these accusations prove, that even from the disagreement of the witnesses against him one might conjecture that he cannot be quite as black as he has been painted. The intention of the author of this book is to offer such an exposition of the dogmatics of Ritschl as will also serve as a defence, and the matters dealt with, as well as the method adopted, are throughout determined by this apologetic purpose.

In answer to the charge that Ritschlianism is Neo-Kantianism, it is shown that it was Ritschl's constant effort "to preserve the religion of revelation from illegitimate mixture with non-Christian metaphysics"; that he sought "to make the content of the Bible, in so far as it is concerned

with Christ, the exclusive source of evangelical dogmatics," although it is admitted "that he did not always fully succeed in his intention, and that he did not always quite follow his principle"; that in the structure of his theological system out of this material "he accepted the Lutheran confession as his standard." His distinctive characteristic, however, is found in his theory of value-judgments, in which "the value of the revelation of God and the value of the Holy Scriptures as the record of this revelation for us Christians" is recognised. "It belongs to Ritschl's way of handling the Bible that he so concentrates all in it on Christ, that one learns to see in Him in every feature the Bringer of Salvation." In contrast to Schleiermacher, he does not treat "the Holy Scripture, the revelation, as only a standard of judgment for the contents of 'the Christian self-consciousness,' but as the source of it." While on the one hand he insists that we must recognise "the forgiveness of sin as the necessary foundation of the Christian religion," yet on the other he so attaches the forgiveness of sins to membership in the Kingdom of God that he maintains "the conception of the kingdom of God as the fundamental principle of dogmatics." The position is positive, evangelical, scriptural.

As Kant had affirmed God, immortality, liberty as postulates of the practical reason, so Ritschl relates all religious knowledge to the practical end of religion. In it is expressed, not the essence of things in themselves, but only their worth for us, and their worth depends on their relation to man's vocation to blessedness in the kingdom of God in dominion over the world. Ritschl, however, departs from Kant in affirming that we do *really* know things, even although we know them only in relation to ourselves; our *relative* knowledge is a *real* knowledge. The writer, while insisting that in his theory of knowledge Ritschl advances beyond Kant to the position of Lotze, acknowledges "that Ritschl has expressed himself inaccurately and indistinctly," as he was lacking "in the necessary philosophical culture for the construction of a theory of knowledge." Of the subjectivism and even scepticism which some critics find in Ritschl, the writer discovers no sufficient evidence.

As regards freedom, Ritschl deals with it only from the standpoint of Christian experience. Freedom consists in "not only the ability to determine one's action according to one's own final purpose in dominion over one's individual impulses, but in the direction of the will to the most universal good purpose, which is expressed in the kingdom of God." The Christian ideal of freedom "embraces two functions, the religious and the moral, confidence in God, which raises one above the world, and action from love to one's neighbour, to bring about the community, which as the highest good represents the perfectly good." The opposite of this is sin; it is primarily distrust of and irreverence towards God; it is neither necessary from man's constitution or for his development; it is not intended by God. "The possibility and the probability of sinning rests in this, that the human

will, which ought to determine itself according to the recognised good, is an ever-growing reality, with the activity of which the full knowledge of the good is not bound up from the beginning." Rejecting the doctrine of original sin very energetically, he maintains that "the conviction that we are sinners, as individuals and in connection with all other men, forms a necessary part of the Christian view of the world and of life." This universal sinfulness is explicable experimentally by the fact that "the impulse of unbounded use of freedom with which every man steps into the world meets the manifold allurements to self-will which spring out of the sin of society." As sin is to be judged by its opposite, the good, and as the good in the Christian sense is the kingdom of God, the kingdom of God is the standard to be applied to the sin of the world. There is a kingdom of sin opposed to the kingdom of God, as the sin of each man is partly the result and partly the cause of the sin of the race, each individual contributing to and being influenced by the racial evil, the full extent of which can be seen only by comparison with the aim of the kingdom of God. While God, from the standpoint of His purpose to redeem, reckons sin as ignorance, yet there may be a growing antagonism to God, which, as a permanent refusal of His redemption, may ultimately involve His wrath, which will eternally destroy all who shut themselves out of His kingdom. As a present reality, Ritschl altogether denies the wrath of God. He does not expel the sense of sin from the Christian consciousness, but he does pronounce the sense of guilt, which represents the evils of life as divine penalties, to be un-Christian, since it implies a lack of filial confidence in God. Accordingly, he maintains that the Christian must not regard death as a consequence of the sin of Adam, but as an ordinance of nature which has lost its sting. The forgiveness of sin is for him but a means towards an end. God forgives sins in order that He may establish His kingdom. The reason for forgiveness is God's purpose to bring sinful men into fellowship with Himself in His kingdom. It is not his intention to minimise the evil of sin when he describes it as ignorance, since it is so regarded only *a parte dei*, whereas *a parte hominis* it is described as distrust and lack of reverence towards God, and its roots are found in self-will and impious delight in the world. Even the sense of guilt, if it misinterprets the evils of life as penalties, is prophetic of the wrath of God, which will be directed against all who refuse the forgiveness of sin in the membership of the kingdom of God.

Conceiving God as spiritual personality, as Love, he regards the kingdom of God as the correlate of the divine will of love and of God's end for Himself. Because God is by nature love, "the kingdom which is for us is also for Himself; consequently for Ritschl out of this conception of holy love are to be derived all the divine attributes, as eternity, wisdom, justice, grace, faithfulness, etc., only as special forms of His revealed activity of love, if the unity of the divine essence is not to be set

aside." In affirming the kingdom of God as the correlate of the divine will, he does not mean to represent God as dependent on the world, but to assert the immanence of the divine essence in the world. His emphasis on value-judgments as the form of our knowledge of God is exaggerated, as from Kant even he might have learned that the practical reason also can yield theoretical knowledge. The knowledge that attaches itself to man's religious consciousness and to his moral conscience is not merely subjective, but can claim to be objective. Ritschl's theory of value-judgments obscures this truth; but he does claim a real knowledge of God for the Christian mind. In emphasising the immanence of God he has undoubtedly done less than justice to the transcendence, which, however, he did not mean to deny. His distinctive merit is the energy with which he has insisted on the historical revelation of God in the person of Jesus.

Ritschl's Christology has its basis altogether in Christian faith. Only in the membership of the Christian community can the full compass of the historical reality of Christ be apprehended. While Ritschl lays stress on the immanence of Christ in human history, he does not deny the transcendence. As the writer of this book goes further than I have ventured to do in my book on the *Ritschlian Theology* in defending Ritschl against the charge that he denies altogether the pre-existence of Christ, or at most affirms only an ideal pre-existence, I gladly give his full statement, with which I am now inclined to express my cordial concurrence. "Ritschl by no means denies that Christ is pre-existent, but only affirms that He as pre-existent is concealed from us. But that does not in any way prevent Christ's existing eternally for God as the person who (*als derjenige als der*) is revealed to us in temporal limitations." This does not mean only an ideal pre-existence as the object of the divine volition. "For since, according to Ritschl, the difference between willing and fulfilling must, for God in contrast to us, be set aside, it appears to us that Ritschl assumes a pre-existence of Christ which is indeed hidden from us, but is revealed to God, as not only willed, but also consequently realised." As the relation of Christ to God is primary, and of His community secondary, as dependent on His, His pre-existence is the presupposition of the kingdom of God as God's end for Himself. Ritschl, however, demands that Christian theology shall concern itself not with this concealed pre-existence, but with the revealed historical reality of Jesus Christ in its moral significance and religious value. In affirming Christ's divinity in a value-judgment, it is remote from his intention to deny its reality in any other sense. From the worth of the work of Christ as Saviour and Lord, he infers the truth of His Person as the Son of God possessing and exercising a unique relation to God. He regards the Resurrection of Christ as altogether corresponding with the worth of His Person, and as the appropriate completion of the divine revelation in Him. As the pre-existence of Christ is hidden from us, so also the exaltation to the right hand of God; but the reality of that exaltation is revealed

in the operations of Christ in His community, for He is still the perfect revealer of God.

According to Ritschl, Christ's work is *reconciliation*. In dealing with his teaching on this subject, the following considerations must not be lost sight of. For him there is no present wrath of God resting on humanity; it is altogether a future possibility, an eschatological conception. Reconciliation is viewed not in its Godward, but in its manward aspect, as removing man's mistrust of God due to his sense of guilt. As God regards sin as ignorance, it cannot prevent that community with God which, on higher grounds (the fulfilment of His purpose in the kingdom of God), He desires. The death of Christ has the significance of a sacrifice in which He completes His priestly vocation. It is not the reason for the gracious disposition of God, but, as its result expresses summarily the perfect unity of Christ with God, which He proved in His humility, patience, and fidelity unto death. It was thus that "Christ experienced the complete dominion over the world, which must be reproduced by the members of the kingdom of God." It has been objected that, if His divinity is thus transferable, it is not unique. But Ritschl does not teach that this dominion is imitable by man, but that it is communicable by Christ as the representative of a new spiritual life. This dominion over the world is not less an evidence of a unique divinity, because Christ not only possesses it, but also can confer it on others; in Him it is original, in others derived. As representative of the community of the kingdom of God, He in His priestly act dedicates Himself and it "unto God in humility, patience, and fidelity, unto an obedience proved to the uttermost." Although this sacrifice is not the cause, but the result of God's gracious disposition towards men, yet it may be regarded as a gift or offering or priestly service to God, as it can be derived not only from God's command, but also from Christ's willing obedience in His vocation. He thus leads His community back to God in this fulfilment of His life-work. He does not, as man's substitute, suffer for man, but as man's representative He leads man to fulfil his own vocation. His death has a direct reference both to God's love and man's sin. "As the sacrificial act of the fulfilment of His priestly vocation, His death is a means of equipping the new community with the divine forgiveness of sin, in so far as Christ, as its intentional representative, transforms that separation of humanity from God into the community of the same with God as its Father." As Christ reveals God and reconciles man in order to establish the kingdom of God in dominion over the world, His prophetic and His priestly functions are by Ritschl subordinated to the kingly.

Justification is not for Ritschl, as for the pietists, an analytic judgment regarding the value of faith; but a synthetic judgment of the gracious, merciful will of God in granting sinners access to Himself; but this gift is appropriated by faith, the confidence which is evoked by grace instead of the distrust hitherto connected with the sense of guilt. It is not

faith that justifies, but God, not on account of but through faith. Faith has no merit, but it is the indispensable condition of the realisation of the justification wrought by God. Not the moral character is first changed, but the religious disposition, and from this change of distrust to confidence towards God the moral change results. Ritschl has been charged with a Catholicising tendency in attaching justification to the community, and not the individual, as the Protestant reformers had done. But he recognises that justification is experienced by the individual, while he insists that it is only in the Christian community that the knowledge of the forgiveness of sin comes to him, as even Luther had affirmed. The mediation of the Christian society in stimulating and sustaining the individual experience may be freely and fully recognised by Protestantism.

As Ritschl's view of the kingdom of God has often been represented as predominantly, if not exclusively, ethical, the writer of this book lays stress on the consideration that it is for Ritschl in the first place a religious conception. As in dealing with this topic I was myself led to the assumption that the ethical tended to throw into the shade the religious aspect of the kingdom of God in Ritschl's theology, I very gladly present this other side of the question without committing myself to an unreserved acceptance of this writer's representations. God's dominion for Ritschl means an operation of "God directed towards men. But this combines two things. The kingdom of God is *the highest good* which God realises in men, and at the same time their common *task*, as the dominion of God only exists in the rendering of obedience by men." But as membership in the kingdom depends on attachment to Jesus Christ, the highest good is not secured by the discharge of the task of the kingdom, for the divine bounty exceeds the human duty in the kingdom. The divine gift imposes the human task; the human task does not secure the divine gift. That Ritschl desires to assert the religious good of grace, as well as the moral task of duty in his idea of the kingdom, must be conceded. That he has not quite succeeded in unifying his conception he himself confesses, when he likens Christianity, not to a circle with one centre, but to an ellipse with two foci. There is no ground, however, for the charge that the idea of God led Ritschl away from Christianity as a religion into the bypaths of Socialism, as personally for him the divine grace in the forgiveness of sin was the highest good. Some justification for the charge that in the kingdom of God Ritschl gives greater prominence to the moral than to the religious is, however, afforded by the distinction Ritschl makes between the Church and the kingdom. The writer of this book expounds this distinction without noticing that this is involved. As worshipping believers form the Church, as acting from the motive of love the kingdom. The Church appropriates the divine gifts, which the kingdom of God carries to completion in the human services of love.

The Christian community is one in the Spirit. As the knowledge of God in the Christian community the Spirit is identical with the

knowledge God has of Himself. As the motive of the common love of this society, it is the eternal object of the love of God. The Spirit is, therefore, the power flowing from the eternal self-consciousness and eternal will of love of God, "which enables the community to appropriate His revelation as Father through His Son." With the Holy Spirit Ritschl connects most closely regeneration and the moral and religious fruits of the new life; while he refuses to separate this operation of the Spirit from the Christian community, he does not identify the Spirit so operating with the community. He lays stress on the revealed existence of the Spirit in the community, and declines to speculate about "the personal subsistence of the Spirit." The religious value-judgment is concerned not with the immanent, but the economic trinity. As regards the fruits of the Spirit, Ritschl regards penitence as the result of faith; but he fails to recognise the grief for sin, which may prepare and incline to Christian faith. Belief in the fatherly providence of God he emphasises as "one of the results of reconciliation, and denies that it is, as has generally been assumed, one of the articles of natural religion, as he concentrates his attention exclusively on the revealed religion. With this belief he connects the question of miracles. As the Christian regards all natural events as at God's disposal, when He wishes to help men, for him miracles are any events which are special signs of God's readiness to be gracious, and the scientific conception of an order of nature cannot invalidate this confidence in a fatherly providence. But this is a religious value-judgment, and not a theoretical judgment, that would offer any explanation to science. Among the Christian virtues Ritschl reckons humility, patience, fidelity in one's vocation, and especially prayer as thanksgiving rather than as petition. By this exercise of the Christian perfection, growing out of his filial relation to God, the Christian attains more and more to dominion over the world, a spiritual dominion, in which even its manifold evils prove means of moral development and religious discipline, become subservient to the kingdom of God, secure the superiority of the personality to the order of nature and the course of the world. Ritschl has been charged with ignoring altogether all that belongs to the Christian hope; but desirous as he is of not going beyond the bounds of experience, averse as he is to all flights of speculation, he affirms that faith is supported by "the hope that the completion of the kingdom of God as the highest good is to be realised under conditions which lie beyond the world-order of our experience." For Christians, in his view, "death is only an appearance of their existence as attached to the earthly body, while their spirit is life, which is not touched thereby."

In the exposition of the Ritschlian theology in this volume, much controversial matter is introduced; but as most of this has a local and temporary interest, I have as far as possible avoided any reference to it in the summary of the contents I have attempted. I have found myself generally in cordial agreement with the writer. At several points I have already ventured to indicate my own opinions. Further study of the subject

since the publication of my own book has led me nearer to the more favourable judgment on many points which is offered by this writer. Not that I incline to be at all satisfied with all Ritschl's solutions of the great theological problems, but that I am more convinced than ever that Ritschl has contributed much to recent theological progress. The advance of many of the members of his school to stronger and safer positions than he at first sight appears to hold, compels one carefully to revise one's judgment. To mention only one matter, the theory of value-judgments has been so developed by Reischle, that many of the objections hitherto made to it are seen to be misconceptions. As a pioneer Ritschl made mistakes, which fidelity to his guiding principles has enabled his own disciples to correct. His standpoint was so new, that any judgments from the older standpoints were bound to be unjust to him. And it must be frankly added that he has suffered much injustice at the hands of his critics. Without any partisanship one may rejoice that more strenuous efforts are now being made to understand him, and so to deal justly with him. As such an endeavour, most competent and sympathetic, this book is to be warmly commended. Without committing myself to the rash judgment that the author is always correct in every explanation, and successful in every defence, yet nowhere have I felt constrained strongly to dissent from him; and the work as a whole I believe to be one of the most trustworthy and helpful guides to the study of one of the greatest theological thinkers given to the Christian Church during last century.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

LONDON.

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*The Myths of Plato*: translated, with introductory and other observations, by J. A. Stewart, M.A.—Pp. xii+532.—London: Macmillan & Co.

THERE is Plato the dialectician and Plato the mythologist. The former is elusive enough. He is all the characters of the dialogue at once. Besides, the hard-and-fast, the literal, the one-sided, are foreign to his spirit. Even when the feet are on the ground, the wings remain half open. Much more, however, is Plato found baffling when, of deliberate intent, he soars up into the empyrean, "an eagle flight, bold and forth on, leaving no tract behind." There cannot, then, be any question of "explaining" him. A poem or a prophecy, or, for the matter of that, a jest—and sometimes the Platonic myth *σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται*—does not address itself to the explanatory faculty, the mere "Yes-No consciousness." Professor Stewart fully realizes this. His one concern, therefore, is to promote, not analysis, but insight, not criticism, but sympathetic appreciation. The methods of the commentator on the *Ethics* are laid aside. Thoughts are

not matched or supplemented with thoughts, but feelings with feelings. Feel with Dante the mystic, is the advice repeatedly given, and you will be very near to feeling with Plato the mystic, however much the sceneries of the *Myth of Er* and of the *Paradiso* be unlike in the painting. Hence an exposition unacademically warm and intimate in tone. There may be noticed a certain purism and delicacy of language, a certain abandon of associative fancy that flies to the far-fetched parallel, a certain naïveté and candour of personal confession. And their common justification is that the writer who would move the feelings must himself be moved. We pause in our reading, troubled with dreams, and then read on that we may again be troubled. It is the difference, one might say metaphorically, between a book of religion and a book of theology. The book of religion in the making absorbs, and in the being read gives out, the larger measure of humanity, and is so far the more real thing. So too, then, this book is likely to prove more stirring, and more lasting, in its appeal, than many a piece of scholar's work, no less learned, perhaps, but with less of the whole man in it.

To the question, "Why did Plato resort to myth?" Professor Stewart in effect replies, "Because when he was in a certain mood myth came to him." No exterior reason is to be sought. No prior resolve was there to amuse, or to mystify, or to compete with the tales of the poets ὄσοι θεῖοι εἶσι. The form and matter of the Platonic myth are born—not made but born—together. To have dressed up dogma in figurative garb, to have poetized didactically, would have been allegory, not myth. The nerve of Professor Stewart's contention consists precisely in this, that he will not have us confound myth with allegory, the adorning of a tale with the pointing of a moral. For him the differentia of the Platonic myth is its spontaneity. It is the spontaneous self-expression of a mood. What mood? Professor Stewart names it "transcendental feeling," and renders his own personal experience of its efficacy thus:—"I hold that it is in Transcendental Feeling, manifested normally as Faith in the Value of Life, and ecstatically as sense of Timeless Being, and not in Thought proceeding by way of speculative construction, that Consciousness comes nearest to the object of Metaphysics, Ultimate Reality. It is in Transcendental Feeling, not in Thought, that Consciousness comes nearest to Ultimate Reality, because without that Faith in the Value of Life, which is the normal manifestation of Transcendental Feeling, Thought could not stir. It is in Transcendental Feeling that Consciousness is aware of 'The Good'—of the Universe as a place in which it is good to be. Transcendental Feeling is thus the *beginning* of Metaphysics, for Metaphysics cannot make a start without assuming 'The Good, or the Universe as a place in which it is good to be'; but it is also the *end* of Metaphysics, for Speculative Thought does not really carry us further than the Feeling, which inspired it from the first, has already brought us: we end, as we began, with the Feeling that it is good to be here. To the question, 'Why is it good to be here?' the answers elaborated by Thought are no

more really answers than those supplied by the Mythopœic Fancy interpreting Transcendental Feeling."

It will be noticed that Professor Stewart here brings together under one notion two things at first sight having little in common, namely, our normal conviction that life is good, and "an abnormal experience of our conscious life," that ecstatic sense of timeless being which, according to our author, it is the essence of great poetry to be able to induce. The reason for this conjunction is to be found in a novel piece of genetic psychology. It is argued that, whilst transcendental feeling appears in "our ordinary object-distinguishing time-marking consciousness," it does not originate in it, but in a deeper-lying "vegetative part of the soul." This part "without sense of past or future or self silently holds on to life." Its hold on life is reflected in our "value-feeling" that life is good, its timeless sleep in the intimation of timeless being whispered by the mythopœic fancy. For long before man had begun to think about the values which he felt (and "however high he may rise as 'thinker,' it is only of 'values' that he genuinely thinks") "feeling had taken into its service his imagination with its whole apparatus of phantasms—waking dreams and sleep dreams—and made them its exponents." So then the Platonic myths "come as dreams and must be received as dreams, without thought of doctrinal interpretation. Their ultimate meaning is the 'feeling' which fills us in beholding them; and when we wake from them, we see our daily concerns and all things temporal with purged eyes."

So far we seem to have got no more than an explanation of how poetry in general, or myth in general, becomes instinct with the promise of "something rich and strange." But there are certain specific features of the Platonic myth to be accounted for. For instance, in his myths Plato's dream is of a personal God and of a personal immortality for man. Are these the natural products of the mythopœic fancy as such, or do the alien conceptual constructions of the philosopher obtrude upon the vision? For it is possible to dream, not only of "another and a better world," but also of the workshop. 'There is the gate of horn as well as the gate of ivory—a fact that Professor Stewart, in his constant association of dream-consciousness with mystic ecstasy, perhaps tends to overlook.

Now, as regards the idea of a personal God, Professor Stewart lays it down that, whereas the *Deus sive Natura* of logical or scientific thinking cannot be a person, the verdict of the religious consciousness is no less bound to go the other way. "To the religious consciousness, whether showing itself in the faith which 'non-religious people' sometimes find privately and cling to in time of trouble, or expressed to the world in the creeds and mythologies of the various religions, the Idea of God is the idea of a Personal God, or, it may be, of personal Gods. The God of the religious consciousness, whatever else he may be, is first of all a separate individual—one among other individuals, human and, it may be, superhuman, to whom he stands in relations by which he is determined or limited." Or again, the idea of a personal immortality of the soul is the "correlate"

of that of a personal God. Equally is it for religion vital, for science false. Well, but can Professor Stewart show reason why "transcendental feeling"—for presumably this is to be identified with such "religious consciousness" as expresses itself in the Platonic myth—should of itself generate these two ideas? For the vegetative part of the soul in which this kind of feeling is rooted is expressly said to be "without sense of self"; and "timeless being" is suggestive less of personality than of pantheism and (in the popular sense of the word) *nirvana*. Thus, when the poet's "sad serenity of soul," to wit, his transcendental feeling, made him crave

"That general life, which does not cease,  
Whose secret is not joy, but peace;  
That life, whose dumb wish is not miss'd  
If birth proceeds, if things subsist,"

his sense of personal selfhood was in process of being dissipated rather than enhanced, whilst the issue of his "purgation" was not that "sweet hope" of which Professor Stewart writes, but, on the poet's own showing, resignation.

Failing, then, any clear proof that the idea of personality, human and divine, is the child of transcendental feeling, it might seem to follow, by "method of residues," that Plato's dreaming was decisively conditioned by the conceptual thinking of his workaday life. "But conceptual thinking can make nothing of the idea of personality, and Plato knew it," Professor Stewart would say. Are, then, the elaborate arguments of the *Phædo* myth? Perhaps Professor Stewart would defend this paradox; for in one passage he seems to suggest that the doctrine of Ideas itself is largely myth—so largely that Aristotle's whole criticism of it as dogma is on that very account a *coup manqué*. However, besides poetry and conceptual thinking, there is a third interest at the back of Plato's philosophy, and that is *πρακτική*. Now, Plato constantly tells us that practical considerations justify the making of myths to order. "The legislator," says the *Laws*, "must venture to tell useful lies to the young for their good. Mankind are easily persuaded to believe. See how they swallowed the myth of Cadmus, and numberless other like inventions." May it not be, then, that Plato mythologizes with an eye to direct edification? Sometimes the didactic purpose positively interferes with the story-telling. Thus in the *Myth of Er* God's irresponsibility in the matter of human misery appears as dogma scarcely disguised, the tale of the lots as a tale producing no æsthetic conviction. On this view, however, the distinction drawn by Professor Stewart between myth and allegory must be modified. Perhaps he does not allow sufficiently for the way a poet's allegories have of bolting with him into the open country, where the free myths range at will.

R. R. MARETT.

*Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe*.—The Curetonian Version of the Four Gospels, with the readings of the Sinai Palimpsest and the early Syriac Patristic evidence, edited, collected and arranged by F. Crawford Burkitt, M.A., Lecturer in Palæography in the University of Cambridge. Vol. i. (text), xiii+556; vol. ii. (introduction and notes), viii+322. Cambridge University Press.

IN this book Mr Burkitt has given textual students an edition of the greatest importance. In vol. i. he has brought together all the known fragments of the Old Syriac version, whether contained in the Curetonian MS., the Sinaitic Palimpsest, or the quotations of early writers, together with a literal translation into English, so that, for the first time, the textual critic has at his disposal in a convenient form the whole of the available evidence as to the Old Syriac. The only criticism—I think a just one—which is likely to be made, is that Mr Burkitt has not adopted the best arrangement in making the Curetonian rather than the Sinaitic MS. the basis of his text. In all editions the best MS. ought to be used for this purpose, and the inferior MSS. should be quoted in the *apparatus criticus*. The explanation, no doubt, as Mr Burkitt says, is that the original plan was to edit the Curetonian, and that the project grew. We may be thankful that it did, for, in spite of the slight drawback entailed by the method of its growth, the *Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe* is a magnificent piece of work, worthy of being ranked with the best books sent out from that friendly home of textual criticism—the Cambridge Press.

In vol. ii. Mr Burkitt gives us his views on the history and importance of the Old Syriac, and has succeeded in making interesting and intelligible a subject which seems to most people dull and difficult.

Mr Burkitt's reconstruction of the history is this:—1. Towards the end of the second century, Tatian, the pupil of Justin Martyr, brought with him to Edessa the Diatessaron, a harmony of the gospels based on the type of text which was in use in the West, probably in Rome. Translated into Syriac, this was the earliest Syriac New Testament. Mr Burkitt thinks it is doubtful whether the Church of Edessa previously possessed any New Testament at all. No Syriac copy of the Diatessaron has come down to us, but an Arabic version gives its contents, and the quotations of Syriac writers enable us to form some idea of its text.

2. A little later, perhaps in connection with the consecration of Palût by Serapion, bishop of Antioch, at the beginning of the third century, an edition of the gospels in Syriac, based on the Greek text then in use at Antioch, but strongly influenced by the wording of the already existing Syriac of the Diatessaron, was introduced. This is the *Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe*. Together with it came the extension of the Syriac canon by the addition of the Acts and Pauline Epistles. An exact parallel to its relation to the Diatessaron would be the way in which the Revised Version is based on  $\text{NB}$  so far as text is concerned, but on

the Authorised Version in rendering; and perhaps one might even go far further, and say that, just as even in textual matters the Authorised Version has influenced the Revised Version, so the Diatessaron has influenced the text as well as the renderings in the Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe. No perfect copy of this text has come down to us, but the Sinaitic and the Curetonian MSS. are representatives of it, though neither is free from corruption.

3. The last stage was introduced by Rabbula in the fourth century. Up to his time the Diatessaron had never been completely supplanted by the Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe, and he introduced a new Syriac version of the New Testament based on the Greek MSS. of the day at Antioch, but indebted to the Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe for many of its renderings, at the same time extending the Syriac canon by the introduction of the three Catholic epistles of James, 1 John, and 1 Peter. This is the Peshitta version and canon of the New Testament, and, although the canon has grown, the version has remained the standard text in the Syriac Church ever since.

The most important point in this reconstruction is the way in which Mr Burkitt solves the riddle of the relations between the Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe and the Diatessaron. No doubt his solution will not pass unchallenged, and we shall look especially anxiously for Dr Hjelt's verdict. I shall not, however, attempt at present to imagine what this will be, but wish rather to draw attention to the general importance of the contribution which Mr Burkitt's theory makes towards the problem of the history of what Westcott and Hort called the Western text.

It is well known that Westcott and Hort regarded this as an integral text, to which the leading witnesses are the Old Latin and the Old Syriac versions. The keystone of the Hortian position was that the Western text really is a *text*, i.e. that the Old Syriac and the Old Latin agree in many places because they represent a common ancestor which had been corrupted already. The weak spot in their argument was the absence of any historical explanation why the Old Latin and the Old Syriac should have this common corrupted ancestor. Dr Chase some years ago tried to remedy this weak spot by propounding the theory that the Latin version had been assimilated to the Syriac, and by adopting a suggestion of Dr Sanday (made originally in a review in the *Guardian*, 18th and 25th May 1892) that Antioch is the true home of the Old Latin version. That conclusion has not been very widely accepted, and other scholars, notably Mr Burkitt himself, have preferred to believe that in many of the readings under discussion the Old Latin and the Old Syriac agree because they represent the true text. What has prevented this difference of opinion from really being resolved is that either side has one argument to which the other can offer no satisfactory answer.

On the one hand, there are certainly some readings shared by the Latin and Syriac texts which on intrinsic grounds have little or no claim to support. They must surely be corrupt, and due to some bond of connec-

tion between the two versions: it is the strong point of the Sanday-Chase hypothesis that it explains this fact.

On the other hand, it is historically improbable that the earliest Latin version should have been made in the East, and there are a considerable number of readings in which intrinsic probability seems to be at least not against the reading found in the Old Latin and the Old Syriac; the strong point of the hypothesis that in these cases the same reading is found in the two versions because it is the true reading, is that it explains the existence of such readings without doing violence to historical probability. It would probably be generally accepted if it could also offer an explanation of the cases where the Old Latin and the Old Syriac agree in readings which are *not* intrinsically defensible.

Mr Burkitt has now provided such an explanation. He suggests that the Diatessaron was really a Western text in the geographical sense; that the Greek underlying the Old Syriac was purely Eastern in the same sense; that the corrupt readings supported by both the Latin and the Old Syriac are due to the influence of the Diatessaron, while in readings which can be shown to be independent of the Diatessaron the Old Syriac is a wholly independent witness from the Old Latin.

If this theory hold good, the statement that the Western text (in the sense of a single corrupt type) is supported by the Old Latin and the Old Syriac must be finally abandoned, and so also must the attempt made by Dr Kenyon and others to call Hort's "Western" text the  $\delta$  text (or the  $\beta$  text, as German writers prefer), because the objection to the phrase "Western text" is not merely that it is not *Western*, but also that it is not a *text*. "Western" may quite well be kept as a name for the text which is supported by the Old Latin and the Diatessaron element of the Old Syriac, for it is probably geographically correct; but we must learn, with Mr Burkitt, to use "Eastern" text for the name of the non-Diatessaron parts of the Old Syriac.

It is obvious, therefore, that Mr Burkitt has given textual critics material for arguments of no little importance. It is impossible to consider the minutiae of his arguments in the space of a short notice—and the whole matter turns largely on the cumulative evidence of minutiae; but enough has perhaps been said to show that the main points which will have to be discussed at length and in detail before the subject is really cleared up are:—

1. The differentiation between Diatessaronic and non-Diatessaronic readings in the Old Syriac.
2. The consideration in detail of non-Diatessaronic readings shared by the Old Latin and the Old Syriac, with a view to asking whether intrinsic probability gives an adverse verdict to any considerable number of them.
3. The consideration of Diatessaronic readings, with a view to asking whether their comparison with other witnesses really points to a Roman origin.

I do not venture to pre-judge these questions: I will only say that Mr Burkitt has, in my opinion, made out a *prima facie* case. If further investigations should confirm this *prima facie* case, then it is surely a matter of great interest, not merely to the textual critic as such, but to all who desire to base their study of the New Testament on a relatively pure form of the text.

The matter stands thus:—If the Sanday-Chase hypothesis be right, readings in which the Old Latin and the Old Syriac agree have no greater claim to acceptance than the readings of  $\aleph B$ ; in each case we have the agreement of two witnesses from the same place and more or less the same time, and this is obviously very little better than the evidence of only one witness. The evidence of the Old Latin, added to that of the Old Syriac, only adds the same amount of weight as the addition of  $\aleph$  does to  $B$ —very little; and if this be so, we can go on calling Westcott and Hort's text the *Original Greek* of the gospels with a fairly clear conscience.

But, if Mr Burkitt be right, the Old Syriac, apart from Diatessaronic readings, and the Old Latin are two wholly separate authorities; their agreement can only be explained as accidental, or as due to the preservation in both of the true reading. It is true that the Diatessaronic element in our existing MSS. of the Old Syriac renders it difficult to say exactly what is the Old Syriac text in any given place; but theoretically at least the Old Syriac and the Old Latin are two distinct witnesses to the text, and there is no reason to suppose that they are in collusion. Each of them is as good as the  $\aleph B$  witness, and their combination against it means two to one against the latter.

This is not to deny that  $\aleph B$  may represent a tradition more carefully preserved, especially in small things, than either the Old Syriac or the Old Latin, so that it may often be the best witness when all three differ; but it is to assert that anyone who accepts Mr Burkitt's theory of the separate origin of the Old Latin and the Old Syriac, and yet maintains that their combination is not a better witness than  $\aleph B$ , shows himself unacquainted with the laws of evidence, for he maintains that it is probable that two witnesses, who have had no chance of comparing notes outside, can come into court and tell the same story *falsely*. To condemn non- $\aleph B$  readings in such a way is to make them the Adolf Beck of criticism.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

LEIDEN.

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*A New Morality: An Explanatory Treatise, Logical and Philosophic, of the Problem of Evil.*—By Arthur Tidsall Turner.—London: Grant Richards, 1904.

SOME books are remarkable for their goodness, others for their badness. The one before us is quite small, but, like the informer in the *Acharnians*, it may be recommended as "all bad." The preface, which is dated from

Christ Church, New Zealand, will give the reader a taste of the author's quality. It runs as follows:—"The present work is the net result of seven years' concentrated thought, and is written solely from the standpoint of reason, logic, and philosophy; with the elements of emotion, sentiment, and religion rigidly excluded. All, therefore, who still retain a partiality for any particular creed, dogma, or belief, are warned that their religious susceptibilities will be in danger of receiving a very severe shock; only those possessing the most robust intellectual constitutions being suitable to assimilate the strong, concentrated mental food contained in the following pages."

I propose to compress still further this highly concentrated food, while administering it, as far as possible, in the author's own words. I daresay Mr Turner's intellectual bovril will not injure the reader even then. Let us see, therefore—

*Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatus?*

Man from the first has been acquainted with agreeable and disagreeable sensations. The former he called "good," the latter "evil." And these names were extended to what caused these sensations, so that they came to cover ethical qualities, then abstract principles, which in time became deified and demonised respectively. In this way God and the Devil came into being. But the natural tendency to exaggerate the importance of that which we like over that which we dislike led to the creation of an absolute personal God of pure goodness, a conception impossible to reconcile with the counter-principle of evil. All attempts to resolve this contradiction have been futile. Milton imagined envy to have crept into the quiet breast of an archangel. Others tell us that evil is a purifying process, which will cease when its work is done: but good and evil are coeternal, and each necessary to the existence of the other. Christian science simply denies the existence of evil, whereas it would be just as reasonable to deny the existence of good.

What, then, is the solution of this mystery of evil which has perplexed the ages? It is so simple as hitherto to have escaped notice. The fact is that good and evil are mere matters of opinion. They are purely relative to the individual. Hence there is no absolute right and no absolute morality. This is the great secret. One man's opinion is as good as another's. Indeed, it seems in our author's view to be a great deal better. For he tells us that, if the whole of humanity, with one exception, unanimously agreed that certain qualities constituted the good, that one exception would destroy the value of the consensus of opinion on the other side.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mr Turner at this point talks confusedly of "the one weak link in the chain of human opinion" destroying utterly "the whole accumulated value of opinion to prove the contrary," as if the "chain" argument and the "heap" argument had anything to do with one another. But he adds truly enough that "in the realm of abstract thought majorities count for nothing." Certainly the one opinion of the wise man may outweigh all the folly of fools, if that one opinion coincides with the truth. But, if there is no truth for it to coincide with, what test of superiority is left but that of numbers?

A cause which has contributed towards keeping the great secret hidden so long is a failure to recognise the difference between abstract and concrete nouns. Abstract nouns, such as good, evil, love, etc., are always relative, depending as they do upon the mood of the individual; whereas concrete nouns, such as man, fire, cold, etc., are invariably absolute, because they can be brought to the test of our senses, the reliability of which we have no reason to doubt.

Let us suppose that we have before us a concrete thing—a man. Now let us take another concrete thing—a knife, and with the knife let us—or rather let Mr Turner—perform upon the man what he calls the “concrete action”<sup>1</sup> of killing him. So long as we are confined to the concrete, there is no room for difference of opinion. Mr Turner has killed his man. That is an absolute fact. But when we come to the ethical construction to be put upon this act, differences of opinion begin to arise. Mr Turner considers that, if the act is for his own benefit, he has a right to do it, and his opinion, he assures us, is as good as ours. Killing is no evil, if it benefits the individual who kills. “My illustration,” he says, “may be cavilled at by a certain class of pinchbeck philosophers who are afraid to look logic in the face, if it is not (in their opinion) pretty to look at; and they may ask, what kind of morality is this that I have inculcated, which advocates crime if beneficial to the doer? I answer, my morality! and morality (abstract noun) being of necessity relative, my definition is of equal weight with theirs.”

That abstract nouns are relative is a statement which Mr Turner challenges every school of logic and philosophy in the world to disprove. If this can be done in a single instance, he is willing to renounce his truculent philosophy.

So far Mr Turner believes that he has advanced no statement which cannot be logically proved. The rest of the treatise, dealing as it does with abstractions, is put forward only as his opinion, while yet he himself is convinced that it stands for a great deal more.

The purpose of evolution is commonly conceived of as being to develop altruism, whereas its real purpose is to develop “self-consciousness,” which is explained to mean “a perfect knowledge of self.” To attain this you must practise egoism. And for the practice of egoism you have more than one life. Reincarnation must not be confounded with metempsychosis. The latter means passing into a lower kingdom, whereas evolution is a continuous advance. Such an idea as that of metempsychosis is “an insult to our intellect.” “The developed ego, with the experience gained by its many lives, learns at last that self-abnegation, altruism, and humanitarianism were but blinds utilized to train and develop its incipient intellect.” “Altruism and humanitarianism are useful in their place, even as the orthodox conception of an absolute good and evil; they keep

<sup>1</sup> “Concrete action,” in the writer’s opinion, is a contradiction in terms, an action being a relation between substances, *i.e.* a kind of attribute, the name of which must be an abstract term.

the weak, the unevolved, the unindividualized, in their sphere, that the strong, the evolved, the individualized, may benefit thereby." They are the counters in the game of life by means of which the intellectually strong gull, govern, and control their dupes and slaves. The strong men of the world "who have gone straight to their goal, though they had to trample on the heaped-up corpses of millions—these men, strong in the consciousness of their own individuality and perfect right to obtain what they desired, treated with profound contempt the conventional ideas of humanity. Their names stand out as beacons to light the world to its ultimate—the possession of full unqualified power. Rameses, Alexander, Cæsar, Richelieu, and Napoleon—these are the men who have recognised the liberating truth, that man's desire is his only good, and that which he desires not his only evil."

Such, then, is the new morality which is to be practised by the aristocracy of intellectual evolution (let us hope, on one another). Its golden rule is—"Whatever you desire to do, that do; and, whatever you do, do it without regret." For, "if you regret your act, and fear that sometime, somehow, somewhere, you will yet suffer for the so-called wrongdoing, then you, yourself, are producing the very effect which you fear." "As you think, so you become." But your becoming is made manifest in your future physical life on earth, in which fear felt over past actions will surely issue in degrading disabilities.

Now, with the exception of this curious adaptation to Protagoreanism of the Buddhist doctrine of *Kharma*, we have heard all this before. But the interesting thing is that we should hear it again. Here surely is our dear old friend *Thrasymachus* come to life once more, and in his very next incarnation too, if we may judge from the little that he has learnt since his last appearance. There is the same pride of novelty in propounding the same doctrines, the same assumption of superiority, the same mistaking of coarseness of moral fibre for intellectual strength. Readers of Plato have been inclined to imagine that the character of *Thrasymachus* must have been overdrawn, that no man could have held such sentiments, or that, if he did, he would never have ventured to avow them. Here, however, is a living proof to the contrary—*Thrasymachus Redivivus* in the person of Mr Arthur Tidsdall Turner.

The "new morality," it is plain, does not differ at all from the old immorality. It is simply the morality of the criminal classes. In saying this, it must be clearly understood, we are saying nothing personal with regard to Mr Turner. We are dealing with him, not as he is, of which we know nothing, but as he wishes to appear. This would-be Napoleon of the Antipodes, who is ready utterly to destroy a continent, if it should be inimical to his interests, may be in himself the mildest of men. Of Nietzsche, "the great immoralist," it was said by his biographer that, if there was a flaw in his character, it was goody-goodness, and that his philosophy is a protest against the principle of his own nature. Possibly the same may be the case with Mr Turner. But that is beside the point.

We are concerned with him only as representing a type of thought, with the recrudescence of which we may be threatened in these days of the decay of an established system of belief. Some remarks, then, on the "new morality" may not be without interest to the reader.

"Sentiment and emotion," says Mr Turner, "have no part in my philosophy." But here he makes a mistake, which others have made before him. Morality necessarily rests upon sentiment. What our author has done is to divest himself of all social sentiments, retaining only the self-regarding. But the social sentiments are as much a part of man's nature as the self-regarding. Any philosophy, therefore, which would see life steadily and see it whole must take account of them. There is such a thing as love for others as well as for oneself, and a disinterested desire for their happiness as well as for one's own. It is a fallacy to reduce benevolence to selfishness, simply because of the undeniable fact that any feeling which I feel must be felt by me. What differentiates one feeling from another is the object of it, not the subject, which must, from the nature of the case, be the same in all feelings entertained by the same person. When then Mr Turner says, "I have a perfect right to think and do as I like, providing that I have reached the strength of understanding to have become a law unto myself," he betrays a misunderstanding of the whole matter. A man becomes a law to himself only when his desires prompt him to do that to which otherwise the law would justly compel him. The question then is not one of strength of understanding, but of development of the social instincts. The perfect man might safely direct all his actions by self-love, but he is *ex hypothesi* the man who would not, since the welfare of others would be to him an object of solicitude no less than his own. Feeling, we have said, cannot be eliminated from morality. Any action, good or bad, must come from desire, that is, from a sentiment of some sort. Reason will not give you an end; it will only show you how to attain it. The moral question is, what desires should be preferred in case of conflict. But into this question Thrasymachus does not enter. He has ruled it out beforehand by his conception of good as being purely relative to himself.

We now come to our author's challenge to disprove his statement that *abstract* nouns are always *relative*. It is an old idea that there is such a thing as absolute Good, absolute Beauty, and, above all, absolute Truth. The first of these conceptions alone concerns us now. What meaning can be assigned to the term "*absolute good*"? If by that term be meant a good which is good for nothing and nobody, it would be rash to take up the challenge. But that is not what Thrasymachus means. He means a good which is good for somebody independently of that person's opinion. Before discussing whether there be such a good as this, it is necessary to distinguish between two meanings of the term "good." Things are good as ends and also as means. Now, an end is what you desire, and means are the things which conduce to your attaining it. But are there things which are worth desiring—let us say wisdom and virtue—whether you

do desire them or not? That is the question as to an absolutely good end.

And the question of an absolute good considered as means is this. Granted the desirability of an end, are there certain things which conduce to its attainment, whether you think so or not? That there is an absolute good in this sense perhaps even Thrasymachus himself might concede. His welfare is of supreme importance to himself. But, that being granted, is it not just conceivable, since men are liable to err, that what he thinks the best means of securing it are not really, not *absolutely* the best, but only the best in his opinion, while in the nature of things there are other means which are better than those he adopts?

The question of good as end is more difficult; for an end as such cannot be reasoned about, it can only be desired. But every other end may be regarded as a means to happiness, and in this way become subject-matter for reasoning. From this point of view, then, we may ply Thrasymachus with the same question as before. Granting the value of his welfare as an end, may it not be that in the nature of things this end may be better attained by the desire for wisdom and virtue than by the lust for unlimited power, which we know to have often turned our world into a hell? "As you think, so you become." If this be true of another life, it is presumably true of this, and, if a man dwells on the thought of self-gratification unchecked by conscience, he is likely to become, not perhaps an Alexander or a Napoleon, but a Jonathan Wild the Great.

On one point we must certainly allow to Thrasymachus Redivivus the questionable credit of originality. Theologians, from Plato downwards, have been in the habit of appealing to the prospect of a future life as a reason for respecting the rights of others. But two, it appears, can play at that game, and the new Thrasymachus, with an amusing impudence, appeals to the same source as a sanction for utter selfishness.

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- 13 *Bryan (W. J.)* Hush Money. Homiletic R., May 1905. [The ex-candidate for the Presidency thus regards gifts such as that recently offered by Mr Rockefeller to the American Board of Foreign Missions.]
- Henson (Hensley H., Canon)* Moral Discipline in the Christian Church. 266p. Longmans, 1905. [Popular Lectures delivered during season of Lent last year in Westminster Abbey. In the Preface author deals with the "Confessional."]
- 14 *Birt (H. N.)* Religious Influences in London. Dub. R., April 1905. [Discussion of Booth's *Life and Labour of the People in London.*]
- Hall (C. C.)* The Mission of Christianity to the World. Homiletic R., April 1905. [It is to connect Religion and Citizenship—a citizenship not only of the nation, but of the world.]
- 15 *Beach (D. N.)* The Net Result. Biblio. Sacra, April 1905. [An estimate of the gains and losses resulting from "the enlargement of knowledge respecting religious truth," and from the consequent shifting of the religious point of view.]
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- 30 *Schürer (E.)* Die Siebentägige Woche im Gebrauche der christlichen Kirche der Ersten Jahrhunderte. Ztschr. f. d. neuest. Wiss., Heft 1, 1905. [The seven-day week was taken over from Judaism, and the several days (except the first) were at first described, as in Jewish fashion, by number. How they came to be called by their planetary names is discussed.]
- 31 *Otley (R. L.)* Sunday Observance. Interpreter, May 1905.
- 36 Old English Ascensiontide Customs. Interpreter, May 1905.
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- 50 *Knox (Alex.)* The Grace of Sacraments; being Treatises on Baptism and the Eucharist. Ed. with pref. by the Archbishop of York. Longmans.
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- Perry (A. T.)* The Decline in the Number of Students for the Ministry. Homiletic R., April 1905.
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- 60 *Moore (H.)* Japanese Patriotism and Christianity. Interpreter, March 1905.

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- 80 *M'Kinney (A. H.)* The Pastor leading his Teachers in the Study of Religious Pedagogy. Bap. Rev. and Expos., Apr. 1905. *Jeff's (H.)* The Welsh Revival and After. Prim. Method. Q., Apr. 1905. *Goodrich (A.)* Evan Roberts and the Welsh Revival. Homiletic R., Mar. 1905. *Roberts (Evan)* A Message to the Church. Homiletic R., Mar. 1905.
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- [Tries to vindicate a "wise and gentle minimalism" as a true and adequate presentation of the Christian faith.]
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- [Dissents from the limitation of "Catholic" to six centuries, on the ground time is not a factor in Catholicity.]
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- [Lectures on Practical Apologetics delivered during the last five years to ordination candidates at St David's College, Lampeter. The writer's own sympathies are with the school of "Personal Idealism."]
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- [The correlation of physical structure and psychical function is an assumption underlying the whole of this Essay. Author treats of Implicit Character, Personal Character, Practical Character, Social Character, Individual Character, and Universal Character.]
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- [The moral life is to be found, and is to get its expression within the phenomenal series, and any absolute view of it must be peculiarly ineffectual in attempting to complete the series in facts of experience.]
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- [Friendship is essentially individualistic; hence it is opposed to sociality or solidarity, which tends to conformity and levelling down.]
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- [Author attempts to deal in a detailed way with the political, economic, intellectual, and social aspects of American culture, and to interpret systematically the democratic ideals of America.]
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- [The laws of economics and ethics are fundamentally one; and it is the practical neglect of this truth that leads to industrial strife.]
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- [Does the fact of belonging to a superior civilization create rights in regard to inferior races? Under the excuse that a nation has neither the telephone, nor analytic geometry, nor obligatory vaccination, is it lawful to inculcate these benefits by cannon shots?]
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- [A study of the whole problem of moral culture: its purpose in relation to our society and all the means through which that purpose can be attained.]
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Catholic World, April 1905.

[Directly challenges Mr John Morley's recent statement, that though the U.S. common schools were practically confined to secular instruction, yet nowhere was religion more genuine and religious knowledge more general. Quite contrary testimony is adduced from representative public men in the U.S.]

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F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons

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- C *Bonarjee (Pitt)* Out of the Depths. Romance of the Early Church. 250p. Thacker, 1905.
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- A *Bigg (C.)* Notes on the Didache III. J. Th. St., April 1905. [Dr Bigg summarises his views of the composition of the Didache, which he regards as a compilation dating from the beginning of the 4th century.]
- C *Barnes (W. E.)* Athanasius of Alexandria. Interpreter, April 1905.
- Caulfield (S. F. A.)* The Voice of the Fathers. Their Erudition and Unanimity. 198p. Brown, 1905. [Intended for those who "want to know what was the teaching of the Fathers, and of the early writers of the Church, on the great truths of the Christian Religion."] *Preuschen (E.)* Zur Lebensgeschichte des Origenes. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 3, 1905. [Describing chief episodes of Origen's life, and discussing the chronology. The following dates are given:—Birth, 182; journey to Caesarea, 215-217; settlement at Caesarea, 231; death, 251.]
- Souler (A.)* Texts and Studies, Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature. Vol. vii., No. 4. A Study of Ambrosiaster. 267p. Clay, 1905.
- Souler (A.)* Notes on the *De lapsu Virginis* of Nicetas. J. Th. St., April 1905.
- 2 *Castellane (Comte de)* The Separation of Church and State in France. 19th Cent., May 1905. *Scudder (Vida D.), ed. and trans.* Saint Catherine of Siena, as seen in her Letters. With Introd. 352p. Dent, 1905.
- Coulton (G. G.)* The Autobiography of a Wandering Friar. 19th Cent., June 1905. [Deals with the Chronicle of Brother Salimbeue of Parma.]
- 4 *Draussin (H.)* Fédération protestante et Union réformée. Rev. chrétienne, Apr. 1905. [Pleading for the closing up of the ranks in French Protestantism, without regard to the liberalism or orthodoxy of the different branches.]
- 5 *Macphail (A.)* Essays in Puritanism. 266p. Unwin, 1905.
- Orr (J.)* The Scottish Church Case. Bap. Rev. and Expos., April 1905.
- Cunningham (W.)* Some differences between Scotch and English Christianity. Nat. R., June 1905.
- Lang (Andrew)* The Scottish Religious Revolution (History versus Tradition). Blackwood, April 1905.
- Wanliss (T. D.)* Scotland and Presbyterianism Vindicated. Being a Critical Review of the 3rd Vol. of Mr Andrew Lang's History of Scotland. 100p. Hay, 1905.
- 6 *Johnson (E. H.)* The Baptist Position for to-day. Bap. Rev. and Expos., Apr. 1905.
- Carpenter (J. Estlin)* James Martineau, Theologian and Teacher. A Study of his Life and Thought. 610p. P. Green, 1905. [Review will follow.]
- L LITERATURE.** 2 *English* 3 *German* 5 *Italian* 9 *Classical*.
- 2 *Collins (J. C.)* The Works of Lord Byron. Quar. R., April 1905. [As Goethe and Wordsworth were the Olympians, so Byron was the Titan of the age in which he lived; on the literature of every nation in Europe

he has exercised an influence to which no other British writer, except Shakespeare, has even approximated.]

*Gerthwohl (Maurice)* The Ethics of Don Juan. Fort. R., June 1905.

*Symons (Arthur)* The Poetry of Thomas Moore. Fort. R., April 1905.

2T *Brégy (K.)* Richard Crashaw. Catholic World, March 1905.

U *Anon.* Cowper's Letters. Church Q. R., April 1905.

V *Brantles (George)* Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature. In six vols. Vol IV., Naturalism in England. 366p. Heinemann, 1905.

*Bond (R. Warwick)* Ruskin's View of Literature. 19 Cent., June 1905.

*Douglas (James)* Theodore Watts-Dunton, Poet, Novelist, Critic. 497p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.

*Vaughan (Percy)* Early Shelley Pamphlets. 32p. Watts, 1905.

*Lead (W. E.)* Recent Books on Robert Browning. Prim. Method. Q., Apr. 1905.

*Pigou (A. G.)* The Optimism of Browning and Meredith. Indep. R., May 1905.

*Herford (C. H.)* Robert Browning. (Modern English Writers.) 314p.

*Browning (Robert)* Easter Day. (Heart and Life Booklets.) 48p. Allenson.

*Moore (John Murray)* Three Aspects of the Late Alfred Lord Tennyson. 144p.

*Dhaleine (L.)* A Study on Tennyson's "Idyls of the King." 112p.

*Eccles (W.)* "Mark Rutherford." Prim. Method. Q., Apr. 1905.

W *Anon.* Michael. The Man Child. 94p. Elliot Stock, 1905.

*Anon.* The Plays of Mr Bernard Shaw. Edin. R., April 1905.

*Wodehouse (E. A.)* A Valuation of Mr Stephen Phillips. Fort. R., May 1905.

3 *Robertson (John G.)* Schiller. After a Century. 164p. Blackwood, 1905.

4 *Dodwell (H. H.)* Hippolyte Taine, Philosopher and Critic. Quar. R., Apr. 1905.

*Johnson (M.)* Maeterlinck's Dramas and Essays. Prim. Method. Q., Apr. 1905.

5 *Sandys (John Edwin)* Harvard Lectures on the Revival of Learning. 212p.

*Beatty (H. M.)* Dante and Virgil. 99p. Blackie, 1905.

*Everett (W.)* The Italian Poets since Dante, accompanied by verse translations. 251p. Duckworth, 1905.

9 *Murray (Gilbert)* The Wanderings of Odysseus. Quar. R., April 1905.

[An Appreciation and Criticism of Victor Bérard's Les Phéniciens et l'Odysée.]

73 *Dhaleine (L.)* N. Hawthorne sa vie et son Œuvre. 510p. Hachette, 1905.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4

*Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*

*Monseur (E.)* L'âme pupilline. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Jan.-Feb. 1905.

[Discusses the significance in primitive religion of the reflected image to be seen in the pupil of the eye. This "little man" of the eye was taken to be its soul, and to control all its functions.]

*Oldham (C. F.)* Sun and the Serpent. Contribution to history of Serpent Worship. 208p. Constable, 1905.

*Reinach (S.)* Cultes, mythes et religions. 48 ill. 483p. Leroux, 1905.

1 *Dussaud (R.)* Questions mycéniennes. R. de l'Hist. des Bel., Jan.-Feb. 1905.

4 *Oakley (E. S.)* Holy Himalaya. Religion, traditions and scenery. (Kumaon and Garwhal.) 320p. Oliphant, 1905.

5 *Kennedy (J.)* The Tendencies of Modern Hinduism. II. Hinduism and Christianity. East and West, April 1905.

7 *Abrahams (I.)* An Eighth Century Genizah Document (*with facsimile*).

Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

*Adler (M. N.)* The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela (*con.*). Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

[Text and translation.]

*Bacher (W.)* The Talmudical Particle הוּלֵיק. Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

*Bäck (L.)* Das Wesen des Judentums. 167p. Lamm, 1905.

*Eschelbacher (J.)* Das Judentum und das Wesen des Christentums. 180p.

Pöppelauer, 1905.

*Fromer (J.)* Das Wesen des Judentums. 191p. Hüpeden u. Merzyn, 1905.

*Gaster (M.)* Day of Atonement Service. Vol. iii. of "The Book of Prayer and Order of Service according to the custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews." Hebrew and English. 559p. Frowde, 1904.

*Henriques (H. S. Q.)* The Return of the Jews to England. A chapter in the History of English Law. 132p. Macmillan, 1905.

*Hirsch (S. A.)* A Book of Essays. (Pub. for the Jewish Historical Soc. of England.) 336p. Macmillan, 1905.

*Hirschfeld (H.)* The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge (*ninth article*).

Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

*Lévy (L. G.)* La Famille dans l'antiquité israélite. 296p. Alcan, 1905.

*Lévy (L. G.)* La Métaphysique de Maimonide. 141p. Barbier-Marillier, 1905.

*Lewis (H. S.)* Maimonides on Superstition. Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

*Loewe (H.)* Some Talmudic Fragments from the Cairo Genizah in the British Museum. Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

*Margolis (Max L.)* The Mendelssohnian Programme. Jewish Q. R., April 1905.

[The policy and assimilation has been destructive of Judaism. It is time to bring back, in home and synagogue, the Jewish life which has almost disappeared.]

*Mendes (H. Pereira)* The Jewish Religion ethically presented. For School Use. 188p. Pool, 1905.

*Petuchowski (M.)* Mischnaiot. Lieferung xxxvi. Portions of Mishnah Nedarim and Nazir. This ed. (which is to include the whole Mishnah) contains punctuated Hebrew text, German trans. and notes. 32p.

Itzkowsky, 1905.

- Steinschneider (M.)* Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters (concluded). Jewish Q. R., April 1905.
- Zangwill (I.)* The Lucien Wolf on the Zionist Peril. Jewish Q. R., April 1905.
- 8 *Tisdall (W. St Clair)* The Original Sources of the Qur'an. 287p. S.P.C.K., 1905.
- Wollaston (A. N.)* The Sword of Islam. 534p. Murray, 1905.  
[A history and account of Mahomedanism by the Registrar and Superintendent of Records at the India Office.]
- 17 *Maude (Aylmer)* A Peculiar People. The Doukhobors. Ill. 338p. Constable, 1905.
- 31 *De Zwaan (J.)* The Meaning of the Leyden Græco-Demotic Papyrus Anast. 65. J. Th. St., April 1905.
- 45 *Gauthiot (R.)* Ilmarinen, dieu et héros. R. de l'Hist. des. Rel., Jan.-Feb. 1905.  
[A Study in Finnish Mythology.]
- 52 *Buckley (E.)* How a Religion grew in Japan. Biblical World, Mar. 1905.  
[The religion is Shintoism.]
- Cobbold (G. A.)* Religion in Japan: Shintoism, Buddhism, Christianity. 114p. S.P.C.K., 1905.
- P PHILOSOPHY** 10 .. *Metaphysics*, 21  
*Epistemology*, 33 .. *Psychical Research*, 40 ..  
*Psychology*, 60 .. *Logic*, 70 .. *Systems*, 90 ..  
*Philosophers*.
- Ladd (G. T.)* The Mission of Philosophy. Phil. R., March 1905.  
[Judgments of fact and judgments of value seem quite habitually to be in conflict. The task of philosophy is the perpetual readjustment of the relations between them, with a view to secure a higher and completer harmony.]
- Holmes (Edmond)* What is Philosophy? 83p. Lane, 1905.
- Aveling (F.)* Philosophy—Queen and Handmaiden. Dub. R., April 1905.  
[Philosophy has two functions: to direct and regulate all the arts and sciences which necessarily presuppose the truth of its first principles; to demonstrate the verities presupposed by revelation.]
- Prudhomme (Sully)* Définitions fondamentales (Vocabulaire logiquement ordonné des idées les plus générales et les plus abstraites).  
Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar. 1905.  
[An attempt to fix the meaning of certain terms indicating fundamental metaphysical notions.]
- Trobridge (George)* The Foundations of Philosophy. A Study of the Doctrine of Degrees and related subjects. 94p. Speirs, 1904.  
[From the point of view of the "New Church."]
- Motora (J.)* An Essay on Eastern Philosophy. 32p. Leipzig, Voigtländer, 1905.  
[A very interesting account of the treatment of some fundamental problems from the point of view of Buddhism by the Professor of Psychology in Tokyo.]
- University of California.* Publications. Vol. I. Studies in Philosophy prepared in commemoration of the 70th birthday of Prof. Howison. 262p. Berkeley Univ. Press, 1904.  
[Twelve Essays, the most important of which is the first by Prof. M'Gilvary on *The Summum Bonum*. Only from the point of view of the social nature of the individual is there a highest good.]
- 10 *Read (Carveth)* The Metaphysics of Nature. 354p. Black, 1905.  
[Review will follow.]
- Keyser (C. J.)* Some outstanding Problems for Philosophy. J. of Phil., Apr. 13, 1905.  
[The problems referred to are concerned with the theory of manifolds or aggregates, what the Germans call *Mengenlehre*.]
- Binet (M.)* Esprit et Matière. Bulletin de la Soc. Française de Philosophie, Mar. 1905.
- Gurewitsch (A.)* Bewusstsein und Wirklichkeit. Ar. f. system. Phil., xi. 1, 1905.  
[Consciousness and Reality are both identical and opposed to one another; both individual and universal; both permanent and changeable; both continuous and capable of development.]
- Geissler (Kurt)* Ueber Notwendigkeit, Wirklichkeit, Möglichkeit und die Grundlagen der Mathematik. Ar. f. system. Phil., xi. 1, 1905.  
[The necessity of nature and the necessity of mathematical truths is based upon the necessity of fact.]
- Knox (H. V.)* Mr Bradley's "Absolute Criterion." Mind, April 1905.  
[Traverses Bradley's contention that "Ultimate reality" is such that it does not contradict itself. Bradley's use of the principle of contradiction commits him to contradictions which, judged by any standard, seem real, and judged by his own are necessarily so.]
- 13 *Poincaré (Henri)* The Principles of Mathematical Physics. Monist, Jan. 1905.  
[The universe is a machine, much more complicated than all those of industry, and of which almost all the parts are profoundly hidden from us; but in observing the movements of those that we can see, we are able to draw conclusions which remain true whatever may be the details of the invisible mechanism.]
- Lemcke (B.)* De lege motus. Ar. f. system. Phil., xi. 1, 1905.  
[An investigation of the nature of movement and change.]
- Marenzi (Franz Graf)* Der energetische Mutualismus. Ar. f. system. Phil., xi. 1, 1905.
- Reid (G. Archdall)* The Principles of Heredity. 359p. Chapman, 1905.
- Boxall (George E.)* The Evolution of the World and of Man. 191p. Unwin, 1905.
- Punnett (R. C.)* Mendelism. 63p. Macmillan, 1905.  
[A short and popular study of Mendel's doctrine of heredity.]
- Moncalm (M.)* The Origin of Thought and Speech. Trans. by G. S. Whitmarsh. 306p. Kegan, Paul, 1905.
- Champeaux (M.)* Essai de Sociologie Microbienne et Cellulaire. Rev. Phil., April 1905.  
[The same biological and spiritual laws are met on the plates of the microscope as on the field of human action.]
- 16 *Hartmann.* Matière et Mouvement. Bulletin de la Soc. Française de Philosophie, April 1905.
- 19 *Duhem (P.)* Le théorie physique, son objet, et sa structure. II. La Structure de la Théorie physique. Rev. de Phil., March, April, May 1905.  
[The physicist cannot work by mere observation without any theory: the use of instruments in physics implies the acceptance of a whole group of theories. Author deals with question as to choice of hypotheses.]

21 *James (W.)* How two minds can know one thing. *J. of Phil.*, March 30, 1905.

[There is nothing absurd in the notion that a feeling can be felt in two different ways at once, as yours, namely, and as mine. It is, indeed, 'mine' only as it is felt as mine, and 'yours' only as it is felt as yours. It is, however, felt as neither by itself, but only when 'owned' as one undivided estate is owned by several heirs.]

*Oeverstreet (H. A.)* Conceptual Completeness and Abstract Truth. *Phil. R.*, May 1905.

[Opposes the view which finds expression in the assertion that there is no truth except in the light of the whole.]

*Sheldon (W. H.)* The Metaphysical Status of Universals. *Phil. R.*, March 1905. [The supposition that the universal is not concrete, and has a lower metaphysical status than concrete individual facts or events, rests on a misapprehension.]

*Royce (Josiah)* Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics.

*J. of Phil.*, April 13, 1905.

[Kant was wrong in supposing that a special form of intuition, such as that of Euclidean space, can have any other necessity than that which every individual fact in the world possesses. But in so far as he declared that constructive synthesis and observation are both necessary for mathematics, he was unquestionably right.]

*Billia (L. M.)* L'unité de la philosophie et la théorie de la connaissance.

*Rev. de Phil.*, March 1905.

[Every thinker desirous of a system betrays a belief in the fundamental oneness of reality. Knowledge is essentially systematization and its nature is the philosophic problem.]

*Perrin (Raymond St James)* The Evolution of Knowledge. A Review of Philosophy. 308p. Williams & Norgate, 1905.

[Chief systems of ancient and modern thought compared, the object being to measure the approach of each system to a principle of the ultimate unity of all things.]

25 *Erdmann (Benno)* The Content and Validity of the Causal Law.

*Phil. R.*, March and May 1905.

[Empirically conceived, cause should be defined as the immediate uniform antecedent. The concept of force is, however, indispensable for natural scientific thought. Every possible interpretation of nature is dynamic in character.]

*Kozlowski (W. M.)* La régularité universelle du devenir et les lois de la Nature.

*Rev. Phil.*, March 1905.

[Regularity in nature is a projection of our thought. Experience accords with laws because we explain exceptions by new laws.]

*Painlevé.* Les Axiomes de la Mécanique et le principe de Causalité. *Bulletin de la Soc. Française de Philosophie*, Feb. 1905.

26 *Kellogg (A. L.)* The Possibility of a psychological consideration of Freedom.

*J. of Phil.*, May 11, 1905.

27 *James (William)* Humanism and Truth once more. *Mind*, April 1905.

[An examination of Joseph's criticism in previous number.]

*James (William)* Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic? *J. of Phil.*, Apr. 27, 1905.

[Radical Empiricism accounts for self-transcendency as a process that occurs within experience, as an empirically mediated thing of which a perfectly definite description can be given.]

*James (William)* The Place of Affective Facts in a World of Pure Experience.

*J. of Phil.*, May 25, 1905.

[The popular notion that these experiences are intuitively given as purely inner facts is erroneous. To a large extent, at any rate, anger, love, and fear are affections purely of the body.]

*Judd (Charles H.)* Radical Empiricism and Wundt's Philosophy.

*J. of Phil.*, Mar. 30, 1905.

[Comparison of James' Pragmatism with the views of Wundt. Temper and tendencies of the two systems are much alike.]

*Moore (A. W.)* Pragmatism and its Critics. *Phil. R.*, May 1905.

*Taylor (A. E.)* Truth and Practice. *Phil. R.*, May 1905.

[The view that the truth of a statement is identical with, or a determinate function of, its practical utility, is largely due to a confusion between the logical question of the nature of truth and the psychological question of the way in which we arrive at it.]

33 *Richet (Charles)* La Métapsychique.

*Proc. S.P.R.*, xix. L., April 1905.

[Presidential Address for 1905. Very rare are the cases of metapsychical phenomena which are free from doubt. No theory of them at present in vogue is other than irrational and improbable. Suggestion is thrown out that greater use might be made of photography.]

*Taylor (G. L. Le M.)* Report on various Spiritualistic Phenomena.

*Proc. S.P.R.*, xix. L., April 1905.

*Dunbar (E.)* The Light thrown on Psychological Processes by the action of Drugs. *Proc. S.P.R.*, xix. L., April 1905.

*Delacroix (H.)* Myers: la théorie du subliminal.

*Rev. de Méta. et de Mor.*, Mar. 1905.

*Hyslop (J. H.)* Immortality of the Soul.

*N. Amer. R.*, March 1905.

[The facts suggesting immortality are plentiful in all ages, and have been neglected, as is usual with residual phenomena, by all who prefer conventional creeds to the truth.]

36 *Thompson (Helen B.)* The Mental Traits of Sex. 188p. *Unwin*, 1905.

40 *M'Dougall (W.)* Physiological Psychology. 172p. *Dent*, 1905.

[A sketch in broad outlines of the structure and principles of action of the nervous system, and an endeavour to show how each of the two bodies of doctrine, the physiological and the psychological, supplements the other.]

*Bergmann (Julius)* Das Verhältnis des Fühlens, des Begehrens und des Wollens zum Vorstellen und Bewusstsein (Schluss).

*Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit.*, cxxvi. 1, 1905.

*Colvin (S. S.)* Is Subjective Idealism a necessary point of view for Psychology?

*J. of Phil.*, April 27, 1905.

[Author replies in the negative. The very act of knowing affirms the extra-mental, and immediate knowledge does not exist, at least so far as human beings are concerned.]

55 *Pillaube (E.)* L'imagination: Les images motrices. *Rev. de Phil.*, May 1905.

60 *Le Roy, (ed.)* Sur la logique de l'invention. *Rev. de Méta. et de Mor.*, Mar. 1905.

[The inventive faculty is the "creative imagination." The principle of Non-contradiction is not universal, and invention is not subject to it.]

*Pitkin (W. B.)* Logical Problems, Old and New. *J. of Phil.*, Apr. 27, 1905.

[Twofold problem in judgment as an event taking place under definite conditions and as a meaning in connection with other meanings.]

*Naville (Adrien)* La Primauté Logique des Jugements Conditionnels.

*Rev. Phil.* April 1905.

69 *Höfding (H.)* On Analogy and its philosophical importance. Mind, Apr. 1905.

[As there are important differences between the domains of experience, our thinking must enlighten one domain by means of another. Hence analogy is a necessary way to understanding reality.]

71 *Müller (E. D.)* Professor Royce's Idealism. Princeton Th. R., April 1905.

[Objects to Royce's religious philosophy on the ground that it is pantheistic.]

*Strong (C. A.)* Has Mr Moore refuted Idealism? Mind, April 1905.

[Moore's whole theory rests on the proposition that our consciousness of things is to be sharply distinguished from the things themselves. But there is no such thing as consciousness in this sense. The consciousness of blue, as something over and above the actually given blue, is a pure fiction.]

*Caird (Edward)* Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge. From Proc. of Brit. Acad. 14p. Frowde, 1905.

[The greatest task of philosophy is just to consider how the constant presence of the ultimate unity modifies the contents both of the subjective and of the objective consciousness.]

72 *Hodgson (Shadworth H.)* The Centenary of Kant's Death. From Proc. of Brit. Acad. 14p. Frowde, 1905.

[Finds the most important features of the Critical Philosophy in the doctrine of Freedom and the Moral Law.]

76 *Smith (Norman)* The Naturalism of Hume, i. Mind, April 1905.

[Author holds that the establishment of a purely naturalistic conception of human nature by the thorough subordination of reason to feeling and instinct is the determining factor in Hume's philosophy. In this first article he examines Hume's position as to the existence of the external world and the self, and his theory of Belief.]

*Cantecor (G.)* Le Positivisme (édité dans la collection "Les Philosophes"). 143p. Delaplane, 1905.

*Herrick (C. L.)* The Passing of Scientific Materialism. Monist, Jan. 1905.

90 *Fraser (A. Campbell)* John Locke as a Factor in Modern Thought. From Proc. of Brit. Acad. 15p. Frowde, 1905.

[Locke fulfilled his intellectual mission of awakening modern criticism of human knowledge as such. Hume negatively and Kant constructively continued what it was his distinction to have begun.]

92V *Harrison (Frederic)* The Herbert Spencer Lecture. Delivered at Oxford, March 1905. 30p. Frowde, 1905.

[Though he sought to base the Philosophy of Evolution on a set of dogmas as purely physical as if they applied to nothing but celestial mechanics, in the end Spencer devoted his whole strength to the supreme science of society and morality.]

*Campbell (G.)* Herbert Spencer, the Apostle of Agnosticism. Biblio. Sacra, April 1905.

*Cournot (A.)* Numero Spécialement consacré A. Cournot.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1905. [Contains articles on various aspects of Cournot's work by Poincaré, Milhaud, Tarde and others.]

92W *Korwan (Anton)* Zur Verteidigung des Pantheismus Eduard von Hartmann's.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxvi. 1, 1905. [Defends Hartmann against the criticisms of Andresen in his book, *Ideen zu einer jesuzen-trischen Weltreligion.*]

*Kozlowski (W.)* Hoene-Wronski et Lamennais. Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1905.

[Bertrand's judgment of Wronski is erroneous; this is clear from Wronski's treatment of Lamennais.]

*Moisant (X.)* Dieu dans la philosophie de M. Bergson. Rev. de Phil., May 1905.

94 *Farques (P.)* H. Taine et sa philosophie. Rev. chrétienne, April 1905.

## V ART 83 Sacred Music.

*MacDougall (R.)* On the Discrimination of Critical and Creative Attitudes.

J. of Phil., May 25, 1905.

[The function of the artist is so to select and represent the single object that it shall exhibit the universal.]

*Paulhan (Fr.)* La Moralité Indirecte de l'Art. Rev. Phil., May 1905.

[Art seeks for harmony, but it can only realise it by a grave discord—the creation of a fictitious world which is opposed to the real world. It is often more moral than morality itself.]

*Péris (J.)* Réalisme et Idéalisme dans l'Art. Rev. Phil., April 1905.

*Rebec (George)* Natural versus Artistic Beauty. J. of Phil., May 11, 1905.

[Plea for natural beauty as not of necessity an inferior, inchoate form of the same thing that art renders in more perfect shape.]

*Wernær (R. M.)* Die Einföhlung und das Symbol. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxvi. 1, 1905.

*Durban (W.)* The Religious note in recent Art. Homiletic R., Mar. 1905.

*Fry (R. E.)* Watts and Whistler.

Quar. R., April 1905.

*Anon.* The Work of Whistler.

Edin. R., April 1905.

*Addison (Julia)* Classic Myths in Art. An account of Greek Myths as illustrated by Great Artists. 40 ill. 285p. Laurie, 1905.

h *Gardner (Percy)* A Grammar of Greek Art. 267p. Macmillan, 1905.

30 *Sturgis (Russell)* The Appreciation of Sculpture. 235p. Batsford, 1905.

59 *Anon.* The Masterpieces of Rembrandt. (Gowan's Art Books, No. 3.)

Brimley Johnson, 1905.

80 *Antcliffe (Herbert)* Brahms. (Miniature Series of Musicians.) 56p. Bell, 1905.

*Duncan (Edmondstoune)* Schubert. (The Master Musicians.) Ill. 281p. Dent, 1905.

*Maitland (J. A. Fuller)* Joseph Joachim. (Living Masters of Music.) 63p. Lane, 1905.

G. D. H. ; G. H. ; and J. H. W.

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