HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS

PART 19

MARCH 25 AND APRIL 6, 1954

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III
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 324, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Jenner, Watkins, Welker, and Butler.

Also present: Charles P. Grimes, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; Dr. Edna R. Fluegel and Robert C. McManus, professional staff members.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Let the record show this is a continuation of a hearing with Ambassador Braden that was started December 22, 1953, in New York, and I will ask Mr. Grimes to connect the two and to clarify the record.

Mr. Grimes. Thank you. I think that would make a more orderly record.

There will be some repetition, but simply by way of amplification.

The Chairman. Mr. Witness, do you swear the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Braden. So help me God, I do.

TESTIMONY OF SPRUILLE BRADEN, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The Chairman. State your full name.

Mr. Braden. Spruille Braden, and I live in New York, 320 East 72d Street.

The Chairman. What is your business or profession?

Mr. Braden. Presently as a consultant to various firms mostly on foreign investments and particularly in Latin America.

The Chairman. When were you with the Government of the United States?

Mr. Braden. I was with the Government of the United States more or less continuously—there were in the first couple of years a few intermissions—from the end of 1933 until June 28, 1947.

The Chairman. In what capacities did you serve?

Mr. Braden. I began first as a delegate in charge of all the economic and financial discussions at the Seventh International Conference of
American States held in Montevideo, Uruguay. Cordell Hull, as Secretary of State, was the chairman of our delegation, and was the one who placed me in charge of all that work at that time.

I then returned to the United States where I had what resulted in merely an honorary position on an advisory committee on Latin-America to the State Department because we never actually had a meeting of the committee.

I consulted Secretary Hull and others on various things individually during that period.

I returned to Latin America in early 1935 as the head of our delegation at the Pan-American Commercial Conference which was considered to be particularly important because the Argentine Foreign Minister was anxious to have a followup conference on the famous London Economic Conference which had caused such a tremendous stir in the early summer of 1933.

There were many difficult problems coming up and they felt they had to have somebody down there who knew Latin America thoroughly and knew how to get along with them.

I returned from that conference at which point I was asked whether I would go to Peru as Ambassador. I replied I would, but before that occurred we were in the midst, beginning on June 12, 1935, of the Chaco Peace Conference to settle the war between Bolivia and Paraguay.

A 90-day truce was declared, during which time they were supposed to get the final peace treaty and also to get all of the prisoners exchanged.

The 90 days had run out and nothing had been done. It was a very serious situation which might involve the two countries going back to war, and if they had, probably the adjoining nations would have become involved and we would have had a major conflict in this hemisphere with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile involved, along with Bolivia and Paraguay.

My authority for that is such people as President Ortiz, of Argentina. President Roosevelt was so concerned about developments in Europe and the menace of a coming world war that he wished to isolate this hemisphere from such a conflict and he, therefore, wished to have what was known later as the Maintenance of the Peace Conference of the 21 American Republics.

Needless to say it would be impossible to have such a conference so long as the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay was going on, or so long as they had not reached a point where at least we had the security of their not returning to war.

Ambassador Gibson, who was our American Ambassador in Chaco Peace Conference, was also Ambassador in Brazil. He had to return to his post and Cordell Hull called me in and said, "Here is a terribly urgent job. Will you please take this on? Go down as chairman of our delegation," which was somewhat of an anomaly because there was only one delegate, myself; although I had some assistants.

I agreed to do it. I was engaged for a little over 3 years in regard to that war and getting the final peace treaty between Bolivia and Paraguay.

It is the one time in my life I have ever walked the floor at night because if we didn't get that peace treaty, I think they would have
gone back to fighting and with what we saw coming in Europe we would have a major conflict in this hemisphere. That was how serious it was.

I might interpolate there, if you will forgive me, to say one of the influences which enabled me to do that job was that when I was 7 years old I first went to Mexico with my father who was a mining engineer. At that time he was the general manager of Velardenna Mining and Smelting Co.

I subsequently went to Chile for 2½ years with my father. There I went to school when I was 10 years old.

I returned to the United States to go through school and college, graduated from Yale Sheffield Scientific School in mining engineering.

When I was 20 years old, after graduating, and after a trip to Europe, I went to South America to work with my father. I was engaged in mining work of various kinds there.

I might say, before going to work in South America, I had gone out to the West and worked as a mining engineer and a mucker and timberman, so I knew the game from the ground up.

I worked as an engineer and chemist in Chile. I then became the representative, after several years there, of the Anaconda interests and my father's interests in Santiago, Chile.

My work in Chile involved the development of such important properties as the Andes Copper Mining Co., which belongs to the Anaconda Co., the Santiago Mining Co., the Cerro Verde property in Peru.

I was never connected with the Braden Copper Co., which now is part of Kennecott and which was founded by my father.

In 1919, the middle of that year, I had gotten as high up as I could down there and I realized that promotion from there on might be very slow, so I resigned from that position with my father and the Anaconda and organized a Chilean company and came to the United States and obtained the representation of the Westinghouse Electric Co.

Under my supervision this Chilean company, my associates and I, got the contract for electrifying the Chilean state railways between Valparaiso and Santiago.

At that time it was the largest electrification in the world.

Mr. Grimes. What was your role in that?

Mr. Braden. My role was a principal in that, supervising, employing the engineers we needed for it, supervising all of the contracts, obtaining the financing for both the Chilean Government and for the Chilean state railway, which I did.

Mr. Grimes. To summarize your career, you have had, then, a very extensive experience as a mining engineer, as a businessman, as a financier, as a diplomat, and later you became Assistant Secretary of State. Is that correct?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Going back, if I may, to the diplomatic career——

Mr. Grimes. We will go back to that at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that Senator Welker is now in attendance at this hearing.

Mr. Grimes. I wish you would state briefly your career as Ambassador to Colombia in 1939-42 and the conditions that you found there as regards German aviation which might become military, but was ostensibly civilian at that time.
First, you were our Ambassador to Colombia from 1939 to April of 1942: is that correct?

Mr. Braden. Yes. I arrived in Colombia in January of 1939 as the first Ambassador. Before that it had been a legation.

Before going to Colombia I was sufficiently familiar with the situation there, and I was sufficiently concerned by reason of my experience in the Chaco war—and what was happening in Europe—concerned about the Nazi-controlled airlines known as the Scadta Airlines operating in Colombia, the head of which was a German, or, really, an Austrian, by the name of Peter Paul von Bauer.

Mr. Grimes. How far were those airplanes flying to the Panama Canal, or rather, how far were their flights from the Panama Canal?

Mr. Braden. They got to the Gulf of Aruba which is 200 miles from the Panama Canal.

Mr. Grimes. What kinds of planes were they using?

Mr. Braden. At that time they were using Boeing twin-motor planes.

Mr. Grimes. Was there anything unusual about them as regards their civilian status or military?

Mr. Braden. They all had military aviators as pilots and copilots. They had 134 Nazis employed in Scadta Airlines. They had ingratiated themselves and played an important role in developing aviation in Colombia.

Mr. Grimes. What was the nature of the planes? They were ostensibly civilian planes?

Mr. Braden. Subsequently, after the taking over of the lines from them, my naval air attaché informed me that he had inspected the planes and he had found borings for both bomb racks and machine guns on those planes.

Mr. Grimes. Were you able to stop the operation of those planes under German operation?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. How?

Mr. Braden. If I may go back just a second, I was so concerned that when I arrived in Washington from the Chaco Peace Conference to take over as Ambassador to Colombia, I endeavored to find out fully about the ownership of this company.

I was able to get practically nothing in Washington. I finally did from Pan-American Airways. I got the information in New York. I then went to Colombia.

Mr. Grimes. What was the information? That they were German owned?

Mr. Braden. That Pan-American Airways had control in actuality, but the Germans had the entire operation in their hands.

Mr. Grimes. And could control the operations?

Mr. Braden. Completely. I was so concerned about it that I went to Panama on my way into Colombia in order that I could talk with the military command there—General Stone. I found that he was grievously concerned about it.

Subsequently, Colonel Dever, since General Dever, a 4-star general, spent 1 entire day showing me around the bases in Panama that we had and the antiaircraft installations, and explained to me that while these Boeings were relatively small planes we had listening devices that only carried about 15 miles and 1 group of planes
could come in at a high level from one side and another group at a low level from another side and we could not possibly defend the Canal against both groups of those planes.

Senator WELKER. At that time, Mr. Ambassador, they were not considered so small, were they? They were a twin-engine craft. They were considered a fair sized plane?

Mr. BRADEN. The DC-3's were just coming in, the bigger planes.

Senator WELKER. I think it is the Boeing 239 that was used on our domestic airways at about that time. Apparently it was considered a rather large aircraft at that time?

Mr. BRADEN. Yes, at that time.

I was so concerned about it that I decided we simply had to get the Scadta Nazi military pilots and copilots out of Colombia.

Mr. GRIMES. What did General Dever say about his concern, then Colonel Dever?

Mr. BRADEN. He was very much worried about it. He told me he considered it a very serious situation.

Mr. GRIMES. In other words, it would be very easy for them to make a surprise attack, or any type of attack, and blow up the Panama Canal locks?

Mr. BRADEN. Absolutely.

So we were in desperate straits if any trouble came.

Mr. GRIMES. Our military was worried about that?

Mr. BRADEN. Absolutely.

Mr. GRIMES. Did you get them out of there in some manner?

Mr. BRADEN. I was able, with the perfectly splendid assistance of President Santos, of Colombia, and the Minister of War, Mr. Martinez, and others, on June 10, 1940, one year and a half before Pearl Harbor, to get Scadta completely out of Colombia and all of these pilots replaced by American and Colombian pilots and copilots.

Mr. GRIMES. So that the threat to the safety of the United States was eliminated as of that time?

Mr. BRADEN. As of that date.

I may say for 6 months after that we had continuous sabotage, the actual placing of bombs in a passenger plane at one time.

Mr. GRIMES. Jumping down to October 1945, you became Assistant Secretary of State; is that correct?

Mr. BRADEN. Correct.

Mr. GRIMES. You were appointed by the President of the United States.

Mr. BRADEN. Yes, and confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. GRIMES. That was Mr. Truman?

Mr. BRADEN. Yes.

Mr. GRIMES. Did the United States at that time have bases in Panama?

Mr. BRADEN. Yes.

Mr. GRIMES. What were they?

Mr. BRADEN. We had 134 bases in the Republic of Panama because self-evidently the canal could not be defended merely from the narrow strip of the Canal Zone.

These 134 bases varied all the way from some simple observation outposts and antiaircraft posts to the huge Rio Hato Airbase, which at that time was the largest airbase in the world, I was told.
We also had a whole island where we were carrying on various experiments, which was one of our bases. We had acquired those bases as I subsequently learned—I didn’t know it at that time when I took over as Assistant Secretary and there was no need of my digging into the situation.

Mr. Grimes. Did you learn this in the course of your official duties as Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. Braden. Absolutely, from official documents and memoranda right straight down the line.

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please.

Mr. Braden. When I took over in 1945, there was no need for me to delve into it. One year after V-J Day, all of a sudden, agitation started in Panama. There was agitation by Communists. There was agitation by the students, the nationalists, the whole group, demanding that these 134 bases should be returned 1 year after V-J Day.

Mr. Grimes. What was the actual situation with reference to any agreement between the United States and Panama with reference to these bases?

Mr. Braden. On this, I have no documents whatsoever. This is all based on my memory, but it is substantially correct.

Mr. Grimes. Where are those documents, if they are still in existence?

Mr. Braden. If they are still in existence, or could be found, if they have not been destroyed or hidden away, they are in the State Department and, I assume also, the War Department and, probably, the Navy Department.

Certainly they would be in the files of the Government of the Canal Zone in Panama and of the commanding general there.

Mr. Grimes. You don’t have the documents?

Mr. Braden. I have no documents.

Mr. Grimes. But you do have a clear recollection of the contents of those documents?

Mr. Braden. I have a very clear recollection because when this agitation started—

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Butler of Maryland is now in attendance at this hearing.

Mr. Braden. Right after this agitation started, caused by these Communists and students, et cetera, it got into the Panamanian Congress and they started to raise “ned.”

Mr. Grimes. I want to ask you about the documents and provisions, since you mentioned something about a 1-year provision.

Would you tell us about that?

Mr. Braden. In view of all this agitation I called for the documents. I found that the history of the case—this is approximately right—was that Mr. Sumner Welles, as Under Secretary of State of the United States, and his assistants, had carried on negotiations here in Washington with, presumably, the Panamanian Ambassador, but also with a gentleman by the name of Fabregat, who was Foreign Minister of Panama.

The Chairman. Spell that, please.

Mr. Braden. F-a-b-r-e-g-a-t. He came up to Washington and also was in on these conversations.
As to the bases that we would take over in the Republic of Panama—

Mr. Grimes. I wish you would tell us in more detail the importance of those bases.

First, some of them were actually in the Canal Zone itself, were they not?

Mr. Braden. These 134 bases were not in the Canal Zone. We required no agreement for the Canal Zone, but to put bases out into the Republic of Panama we had to have a special agreement. That was the agreement to which I referred.

Mr. Grimes. We did have bases in the Canal Zone, but we had no special agreement?

Mr. Braden. That is right.

Mr. Grimes. These 134 were throughout the Republic of Panama?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. They were necessarily outside of the Canal Zone because in the opinion of the military they needed all of these bases and they could not all be located in the Canal Zone?

Mr. Braden. You couldn’t defend the canal without them. They were vitally important for the defense of the canal.

Mr. Grimes. Are they still, as far as you know?

Mr. Braden. I assume they still are important, although with the development, as Senator Welker has said, of the larger planes, the area for the defense now spreads much farther out, so we have the situation in Guatemala, concerning the bases we built there, being in the hands of the Government that is Communist-controlled.

That is what we are facing today.

Mr. Grimes. But they would be useful if we are to defend the Canal Zone?

Mr. Braden. Of course. I am not a military man, but I think it is obvious.

Mr. Grimes. About the agreement under which we had those bases—

Mr. Braden. We actually took over the bases, I found from these documents which I saw in the State Department, before we had concluded the agreement. There were delays on the agreement.

One of the delays in reaching an agreement that I recall from a perusal of the documents at the time was a disagreement as to the period that we would occupy those bases after the cessation of hostilities.

Mr. Grimes. Delay or not, what were the provisions with reference to our occupation?

Mr. Braden. The provision that was finally included in that agreement was that we would occupy those 134 bases until 1 year after the signature of the definitive treaty of peace. Those words stuck very much in my mind because that was the essence of the situation.

And not only did the agreement stipulate clearly that it was the definitive treaty of peace—and, of course, we haven’t got a definitive treaty of peace yet—that was the controlling factor, but there were attached to that agreement—

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Watkins is in attendance.

Senator, this is former Ambassador Spruille Braden testifying.

Senator Watkins. Thank you.
Mr. Braden. There were attached to that agreement memoranda. My recollection may be a little bit off on the exact—

Mr. Grimes. The only thing we are interested in is the exact provision.

Mr. Braden. I think you are interested in one other thing, if you will permit me. That is: There was attached to this memorandum agreement a memorandum either of a conversation of Sumner Welles with Fabregat, or with other authorities of Panama, or a simple memorandum drafted by Mr. Welles—I do not recall exactly which—stipulating that the agreement, when it said definitive treaty of peace, meant just that, and that it did not mean a truce or cease fire or an armistice, or anything other than a definite treaty of peace. That was the important part.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, it was not one of these cessation-of-hostility agreements?

Mr. Braden. Nothing of the kind.

One year after the signing of the definitive treaty of peace—that was the terminology.

Mr. Grimes. They said it twice to make sure?

Mr. Braden. When the Pentagon told me they wanted and needed those bases urgently, that was the basis on which I made the fight.

Mr. Grimes. You said there was Communist agitation, students and others. Had you learned something about Communist agitation before in the course of your experience with the State Department?

Mr. Braden. Yes. Going back to 1941, when I was in Colombia, I began sounding warnings to the State Department about the menace of communism in this hemisphere and during the war—1943 and 1944—there were repeated dispatches in which I said that this is the gravest peril we face and that after the war it is going to be most serious.

The Chairman. That was in your written reports?

Mr. Braden. Written reports and telegrams, all kinds of things.

Mr. Grimes. What was the Russian Communist Party line at that time?

Mr. Braden. More or less simultaneously with that, we had the opening that fall of the first United Nations Assembly meeting in New York. They had a San Francisco meeting and a London meeting, but here the Assembly met in New York for the first time.

Mr. Grimes. They were about to meet at the time this took place?

Mr. Braden. This all took place after V-J Day, August 6 or August 7.

Mr. Grimes. The agitation began?

Mr. Braden. It began promptly and it grew rapidly in volume.

Mr. Grimes. You knew this through reports that reached you?

Mr. Braden. I had all kinds of reports and telegrams, everything coming in from Panama. The Army had the same thing. The newspapers carried it.

Mr. Grimes. But your knowledge is based on the official reports made to you as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs; is that correct?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Mr. Grimes. That is the position you occupied, then?

Mr. Braden. That is the position.
Mr. Grimes. Will you state, please, what the Russian Communist Party line was? I think I interrupted you.

Mr. Braden. I was going to say that for the first time the Russians at that time at that Assembly in New York, made the attack on us that we had aggressive intentions—that we were aggressive and the proof of the aggressive intentions we had was our establishing bases all over the world.

Mr. Grimes. Did they at that time mention Panama bases?

Mr. Braden. Subsequently during the discussions in the Assembly they did, not at the beginning, as I recall.

Mr. Grimes. So they used the Panama bases as proof of our aggressive intentions?

Mr. Braden. Well, you say they used it. We gave them the ammunition.

Mr. Grimes. Let's get to that later, but that was the party line?

Mr. Braden. Sure.

Mr. Grimes. We were the aggressors. The proof is we have the bases, the military bases, all over the world, including Panama; is that right?

Mr. Braden. As I recall, the Russians made the point specifying Panama later.

The Chairman. They were not referring to the Canal Zone, they were referring to the Republic of Panama, 134 bases?

Mr. Braden. Yes, the 134 bases I am talking about. But the Canal Zone was brought in implicitly.

Mr. Grimes. Did you have an experience in connection with the agitation in Panama and the Communist Party line with Alger Hiss?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. What was it?

Mr. Braden. There were two instances.

Mr. Grimes. What was Hiss doing at that time?

Mr. Braden. Hiss was in charge of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

Mr. Grimes. In the State Department?

Mr. Braden. In the State Department. That office today is headed by an Assistant Secretary of State. It is the office for United Nations affairs. He was the head of that office, although he did not have the rank of Assistant Secretary of State.

The first thing that happened was that, in the routine performance of his duties, the Governor of the Canal Zone submitted his annual report.

Mr. Grimes. To whom?

Mr. Braden. On the operations of the Canal Zone. I think that is submitted to the War Department. I am not sure of that, but in any case, it was published, as it usually is.

Mr. Grimes. You say routine operations. Would you describe it, briefly, please?

Mr. Braden. I can't do a good job of describing it. I don't think I read it.

Mr. Grimes. What sort of report was it?

Mr. Braden. How many boats are going through the canal in different directions, the tonnage, et cetera: what were the operations of the stores in the canal, what was the labor operation, everything.

Mr. Grimes. Population, matters of that sort?
Mr. Braden. I think population was probably in it. I don't recall.
Mr. Grimes. This is a report by our Governor down there on operations in the Canal Zone and a report which he submits annually; is that correct?
Mr. Braden. Exactly.
Mr. Grimes. He had been submitting it to the American Government; is that right?
Mr. Braden. Since 1903, I assume.
Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please. What happened in connection with that report?
Mr. Braden. My office, represented by Mr. Cochran, Mr. William Cochran, who was in charge of that whole area in the Caribbean, and Mr. Wise, who was on the Panama desk, became involved in an argument with the Office of Political Affairs, because the latter wished to submit this report by the Governor of the Canal Zone to the United Nations.

My officers immediately got in touch with the legal adviser's office where Miss Ann O'Neill, a very competent lawyer, and a very sturdy soul, I may say— I have a great admiration for her— supported the thesis of my officers that under no circumstances should this report of the Governor of the Canal Zone be submitted to the United Nations.

Finally, Mr. Hiss himself—
Mr. Grimes. What was your reason for that?
Mr. Braden. I was going to say what Hiss' reason was first, because I think that makes it clearer.

Alger Hiss and his office claimed under article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter, it was our obligation to submit that report. I don't know whether you would like to have article 73 reviewed now, or not.

The Chairman. Let it go into the record and become a part of the record, without reading.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 357" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 357

Charter of the United Nations—Chapter XI, Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:  

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this article; and
Mr. Braden. My officers maintained that was perfectly ridiculous: that article 73 (e) anticipated self-government. That was the phraseology used in it.

The Canal Zone, so far as the Republic of Panama is concerned, is self-governing.

We had a special agreement as to the operation of the Canal Zone. There was no rhyme or reason, in my opinion, nor in the opinion of my officers, why that should be presented to the United Nations.

Moreover, we knew that if it were presented that it was just going to enrage the Panamanians. It was going to play into the hands of the Russians with their allegations about our bases scattered all over the world, and particularly in Panama.

It was going to alienate a lot of the other Latin Americans, who would say, "See what the United States is doing in the Canal Zone?"

It was a thoroughly bad move to make and particularly with the Assembly starting up in New York.

I knew that Mr. Alfaro, the former President of Panama, and Minister of Foreign Relations, a leading politician, already faced this terrific problem about the bases outside of the zone, and would be terrifically annoyed by this report being presented.

Mr. Grimes. In addition, would it complicate our relations insofar as operation is concerned by giving the United Nations a voice?

Mr. Braden. It would complicate us with the Republic of Panama. It brought the United Nations into something where they had no right to be.

Mr. Grimes. It might give them a claim to some stake in the operation of the Panama Canal?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Mr. Grimes. Was that part of the argument?

Mr. Braden. Absolutely.

The Chairman. Senator Watkins.

Senator Watkins. Is it not true we also made reports on Alaska?

Mr. Braden. That was not in my sphere, so I haven't any idea about that. I think we did. I don't know whether we did on Hawaii, or not, but I think we did, now that you mention it. But I wasn't concerned about that. I had enough troubles of my own with Panama.

Senator Watkins. The reason I call your attention to it was the fact I entered a protest about reporting from Alaska.

Mr. Braden. I vaguely remember that was true.

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I have a question?

The Chairman. Senator Welker.

Senator Welker. Mr. Ambassador, you were fortified by your counsel's opinion and the opinion of yourself and others, that you were permitted not to submit this information as requested by Mr. Hiss under the limitation of security; is that correct? That is subsection (e) of article 73.

Mr. Braden. That I can't give you an opinion on as a lawyer. I know that the procedure was totally out of order. There was no
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justification for that; aside from all of the issues that counsel has brought up in regard to our relations.

Senator Welker. Notwithstanding the fact that you did have the security defense in mind, it was still insisted by Mr. Hiss?

Mr. Braden. It was still insisted by Mr. Hiss that it had to be submitted to the United Nations.

Finally, Mr. Cochran and Mr. Murray Wise, my assistants on this matter, came to me and said, "You have got to enter this fight. We can't get any further on it."

At that point we got Mr. Hackworth, the legal adviser to the State Department, in on it.

My boys reported to me they were quite concerned. They feared Mr. Hackworth was veering over to the side of Alger Hiss, but I stormed around quite a bit on this problem and finally Mr. Hackworth would not give a decision.

At that point it was appealed to the Under Secretary of State.

The Chairman. Who was that?

Mr. Braden. Mr. Acheson.

I remember very vividly that I went in to see Mr. Acheson. I think Mr. Hiss had already been there for some time.

This was all 7 years ago, so my memory may be a bit off, but I think it is substantially accurate.

When I tried to state my case, Mr. Acheson, as a lawyer, agreed with Mr. Hiss, and I didn't even have a chance to state my case. I remember that I came out of that meeting boiling with rage at what happened.

Senator Welker. Mr. Hiss was present there?

Mr. Braden. Oh, yes. The only thing we got out of Mr. Hiss' office was an expression which today I don't understand very clearly, and he said this—he put in a phrase that this was submitted to the United Nations, this report of the Governor, on a pragmatic basis for this year, for the year 1946. What that means, I don't know, but that was supposed to take care of our objections, which needless to say, it did not.

As we predicted, the Panamanian Foreign Minister made a speech in the United Nations. I have a copy of this if you wish to have it in the record.

The Chairman. I think it should go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 358" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 358

"Panama Canal Zone Is Not Leased Territory * * *

Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro Explains Payment of $430,000 Annuity by the United States Government"

Speech by the president of the Panamanian delegation, Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, during the session of the Political Commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 14, 1946, in respect to the international status of the Panama Canal Zone.

The Panamanian Delegation has been informed that by virtue of a resolution adopted on February 9, 1946, by the United Nations Assembly, the United States has presented a report concerning the territories under its administration and has included the Panama Canal Zone among those about which it had to report to the General Secretariat, in accordance with article 73 (e) of the United Nation Charter.
The Panamanian Delegation maintains that the Canal Zone should not have been included among such territories, for the following reasons:

I. PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER IN REGARD TO NONAUTONOMOUS TERRITORIES

Article 73 of the charter reads:

The member of the United Nations that have or that assume the responsibility of administering territories whose people have not yet achieved full self-government, recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of those territories are paramount, accept as a sacred charge the obligation to promote to the greatest degree possible, within the system of peace and international security established by this charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of those territories, and they likewise obligate themselves:

(a) ***,

(b) to develop self-government, to take into due account the political aspirations of the inhabitants and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, in accordance with the special circumstances of each territory, of its people, and of its particular degree of advancement;

(c) ***,

(d) ***,

(e) to transmit with regularity to the Secretary General, for informational purposes and within the limits which security and considerations of constitutional nature require, both statistical information and any of a technical nature that deal with the economic, social and educational conditions of the territories for which they are respectively responsible, except those territories to which chapters XI and XII of this charter refer.

II

It is evident, from a reading of the article of the charter transcribed above, that the Panama Canal Zone cannot be included among the territories referred to therein and about which information must be sent to the United Nations in accordance with paragraph (e). Moreover, it is easy to show that it is a mistake to include the Canal Zone among those territories which may be generally classified as possessions of the United States; that is to say, territories acquired by purchase, conquest, cession, annexation or by any other manner of acquisition or transfer of territory, as in the case of Alaska (purchased from Russia), Hawaii, (annexed), Puerto Rico (ceded by Spain after the war of 1898), the Virgin Islands (purchased from Denmark), Guam (acquired as a result of the war between the United States and Spain), and American Samoa (first occupied and later acquired by an agreement with Great Britain and Germany).

The strip of land known as the Panama Canal Zone has been neither purchased, conquered, annexed, ceded, nor leased, nor has its sovereignty been transferred by Panama to the United States. The United States administers this strip of land by virtue of a very specific stipulation in article II of the treaty concluded between the Republic of Panama and the United States on the 15th of November 1903, which reads as follows:

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use, occupation and supervision of a zone of land and of land covered with water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said canal" ***

Article III of the same treaty concedes ample "rights, power and authority" to the United States within the zone mentioned in article II, but establishes in unequivocal terms that Panama retains its sovereignty over the canal strip. In fact, the aforementioned articles establish that the United States is granted "the rights, power, and authority" that the United States would exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory. The sentence "if it were" means clearly and unmistakably that it is not the sovereign, and consequently, that the United States acquired the power of administration and jurisdiction only, while the supreme attribute of sovereignty inheres in the original sovereign, the Republic of Panama. This interpretation of the treaty, as far as it regards the international status of the Canal Zone, is supported by the judicial authority of none less than William H. Taft, President of the United States from 1909 to 1915, and afterward Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The summary information transmitted by the United States and printed by the Secretary General (document A (73)) in the part which bears the title "Panama Canal," says on page 29: "The following is a résumé in telegraphic form of the information about the social and educational conditions contained in the report on this leased territory."
And the general report of the Secretary General (document A (74)), dated the 21st of October 1946, referring to the information transmitted by the United States on the 19th of August, says on page 5: “One may note a great variety in the status of these territories. In particular, the Panama Canal Zone is held in lease.”

The idea that the Canal Zone is a leased territory is a rather generalized error which doubtlessly stems from the fact that by the treaty of 1903 the United States agreed to pay to the Republic of Panama an annuity of 250,000 balboas in gold coin (today equivalent to approximately 450,000 devalued dollars). But it was never maintained that this annuity would be, nor has it ever been, nor it is now, the fee for a lease, and moreover, the word “lease” is not even found in the treaty with relation to the Canal Zone.

By the treaty of 1903 the Republic of Panama made many concessions to the United States, and for all these concessions the United States agreed to pay as compensation the sum of $10 million immediately and an annuity of $250,000 beginning with the year 1912, in accordance with the following stipulation, from article XIV of the treaty in question:

“As compensation for the rights, privileges and powers granted in this convention by the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Government of the United States agrees to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of $10 million in gold coin of the United States on the date of the ratification of this treaty, and also an annual payment during its life of $250,000 in the same gold coin, beginning 9 years after the date mentioned above.”

In reality, then, the annuity was not nor is it in any way a compensation. The reason for the annuity was that among the concessions made by Panama to the United States was that of the right which Panama possessed, in conformity with the contract with the Panama Railroad Company, of receiving from that private company, which the Government of the United States had absorbed, the aforementioned sum of $250,000 as a tax debt. Thus the Government of the United States, as a grantee of the right to collect this sum, would receive $250,000 from the company and would deliver exactly the same amount to the Republic of Panama. It is clear, consequently, that there is no such lease in the sense of existing international leases, for example, as in China for some time, and that the international status of the Panama Canal Zone is determined by the fact that its use, occupation, and supervision were granted for the specific purpose of constructing, maintaining, managing, sanitizing and protecting a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

III. DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE

It is evidence that non-self-governing territories which the charter has in mind, are territories inhabited by a native population, permanently attached to the land, and which for some reason has not reached full autonomy and which, if it places itself under international trusteeship administration, must be educated and prepared for self-government, in accordance with article 76 of the charter, which establishes the following as one of the basic objectives of the trustee system:

“(b) To promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of territories held in trust, and their progressive development toward self-government, or independence, keeping in mind the particular circumstances of each territory and of its people and the freely expressed wishes of the populations whose interests are at stake, and in conformity with the provisions of each agreement for trust administration.”

Well and good, the Panama Canal Zone is a strip of land without such kind of inhabitants. There is no native population. There is no permanent population. There is homogeneous population that aspires to self-government or independence or that is capable of reaching one or the other. In accordance with the purposes for which were granted the “use, occupation and supervision” of the Canal Zone, that strip of land is inhabited solely by officials, employees and workers of the Panama Canal, by the Army and Navy forces stationed in the zone and adjacent waters for the protection of the canal, and by the families of all these persons.

Of the 41,685 inhabitants who were living in the zone in 1945, 31,052 were employees and workers of the canal and of the Panama Railroad; 6,685 of the so-called “gold badge” employees and 24,347 of the so-called “silver badge” employees, names that have no relation with money, but which serve to draw a line of separation based on color among those who work on the canal.

These employees and their families do not constitute a permanent population. They live in the zone while they are working for the canal. And it has to be
thus, since the treaty between Panama and the United States signed the 2d of March 1936 establishes in article III, paragraph 2, that only those persons who directly or indirectly are occupied in the operation, maintenance, the sanitation, or the protection of the canal or those connected with these duties have the right to reside in the Canal Zone. When a person who lives in the zone has stopped working for the canal or in connection with it, he must depart from the said zone. Consequently, the population of that territory changes constantly, and as is natural, it has no interests there nor political aspirations for independence or self-government. Moreover, almost all the employees who belong to the so-called "gold badge" group are North American citizens, while the great majority of the "silver badge" employees are Antilleans of British nationality or citizens of other countries, and the Panamanians constitute a very small minority.

There was a native population in the Canal Zone when the administration of that strip of land was transferred to the United States. But in 1913 the President of the United States issued the so-called Depopulation Order, by virtue of which all the land within the zone was declared necessary for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the canal, and in consequence, the Panamanian citizens who had their lands, their farms and their homes in the zone were obliged to leave it. All the lands were expropriated and there is no private property in real estate in this strip of territory. The Canal Zone, consequently, turned into what is today strictly an administrative reservation placed under the direct authority of the War Department and devoted exclusively to the purpose of maintaining, administering and protecting the seaway that connects the Atlantic with the Pacific. The Panama Canal Zone can be only what it is today, or otherwise return to the jurisdiction and full and complete control of the Republic of Panama.

From the facts set forth above we may reach the following conclusions:

1. That the Republic of Panama is and never has ceased being, the sovereign of the strip of land known by the name of the Canal Zone;
2. That the United States has acquired through treaty only "the use, occupation and supervision" of the Canal Zone;
3. That such "use, occupation, and supervision" have been granted for the specific purposes of the construction, maintenance, and the operation, the sanitation, and the protection of the canal;
4. That the Canal Zone is not a possession nor a part of the political dominion of the United States;
5. That the Panama Canal Zone is a territory without a population which is native, permanent and homogeneous;
6. That the inhabitants of the Canal Zone have no interests bound up with the land and do not have nor can they have political aspirations for independence or self-government;
7. That the Canal Zone can be administered only as a strip of land destined exclusively for the purpose of maintaining, administering, and protecting the canal.

It follows from this that there exists no basis for including the Panama Canal Zone among the nonautonomous territories to which article 73 (e) of the charter refers. Its inclusion among the territories and possessions of the United States and among those territories concerning which there have been rendered reports as the charter stipulates, it is a manifest error which the Republic of Panama hopes will be rectified by the appropriate means to which access may be had.

Note: After the delivery of this speech by the Delegate from Panama, the North American delegation declared that the United States did not claim sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Later the Department of State informed the Panamanian Chancellery that it has abstained and would abstain in the future from including the Panama Canal Zone in the reports stipulated by article 73 of the charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Grimes. Would you state what his points were?

Mr. Braden. The substance was that here we were talking about the canal as if we had it under lease, and we did not: that it was a special agreement beginning in 1903 between Panama and the United States: that Panama had given the United States certain facilities and we had in return made certain payments in regard to—I think it was $10 million to Panama, plus an annual rental of $250,000 a year.

Subsequently we went off gold, raised it to $430,000 a year.
There were the various quid pro quos back and forth that the submission of this to the United Nations was an outrage both to Panama and to the agreement.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, it was none of the business of the United Nations that he came out very much on the side of the United States on this?

Mr. Braden. He came out very much on the side of my office, not of the United States, because we had submitted it.

Mr. Grimes. That depends on what the United States interest is.

Mr. Braden. Of the true interest of the United States, yes.

Mr. Grimes. The report was then submitted to the United Nations?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. Did another incident take place in regard to Panama?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. What was that?

Mr. Braden. At that time, and you have to get the picture of the United Nations, the Russians making their speeches about our being aggressors, and the proof being the bases, the Panama bases, 134 outside of Panama Canal Zone being brought in as proof positive of our aggressive intentions, and I desperately trying and praying that I would be able to keep the lid on everything until the Assembly was over in New York.

And that we could get Mr. Alfaro down to Washington and quietly and calmly in luncheons and in our offices work out an agreement with him about these 134 bases which the military informed me were vitally necessary for the security of the Panama Canal—therefore, of the United States.

You can, therefore, imagine my utter astonishment when one morning I picked up the Washington Post at my apartment and here on the front page was an announcement that we had reported to the United Nations on the Canal Zone as an occupied territory. When I read that, I realized that was really putting the fat in the fire in our relations with Panama in the substantiation of the Russian allegations and in our relations with all of the American Republics; it was such a nasty situation.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, our State Department had officially reported it to the U. N., that Panama was one of our occupied territories?

Mr. Braden. Yes. The only thing, my memory is a little hazy on whether that came along at about the same time as the submission of the report by the Governor, or whether it came subsequently, but my best recollection is it came subsequently.

Mr. Grimes. This was a matter under your jurisdiction as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Mr. Grimes. You learned about it for the first time in the newspapers?

Mr. Braden. I learned about it for the first time in the newspapers.

Mr. Grimes. What did you do?

Mr. Braden. I dropped the newspaper, and I tore down to the State Department. I called in the Director of the Office of American Republics Affairs, Mr. Briggs, who presently is our American Ambassador in Korea; and my first special assistant, Mr. Wright; and
Mr. Murray Wise was then called in as the officer on the Panamanian desk.

I may say I was using some pretty strong language around the place at this outrage. None of them knew any more about it than I. They also had read it in the newspapers.

We then tried to run it down, and we found that this report had been submitted and the employment of the words “occupied territory” by the Office of Special Political Affairs, that is to say, Mr. Alger Hiss. I immediately went from my office on the third floor down to the second floor to the Office of the Acting Secretary of State with fire in my eye.

The Chairman. Who was that?

Mr. Braden. Mr. Dean Acheson.

I went down to demand this report be withdrawn from the United Nations. Mr. Acheson said that “We can’t do anything about it. Where is Mr. Hiss?”

Mr. Hiss was not to be found that day in Washington. He had left his home. He had not come to his office. He was presumed to be in some meetings, but his office said that he had not come in, that they had telephoned to the places where he was presumed to be but they couldn’t find him anywhere.

That whole day went by without the appearance of Mr. Alger Hiss. In the meantime this whole thing was stymied. The delay, I may say, of course, was doing great harm because of inaction during this whole day.

We ought to have hit it and we didn’t.

Finally, that afternoon at 5 o’clock, I was engaged in an important conference in my office from which I could not leave when I received word from Mr. Acheson’s office that Mr. Hiss finally had been located. He had shown up and he was in Mr. Acheson’s office.

Mr. Briggs, therefore, as my deputy——

Mr. Grimes. Did you send somebody?

Mr. Braden. I instructed Mr. Briggs to go down and make the demand that this report be withdrawn.

Mr. Grimes. Did he do so?

Mr. Braden. He did so.

Mr. Grimes. Did he make a report to you?

Mr. Braden. He came back from Mr. Acheson’s office and reported that Mr. Acheson had sustained Mr. Hiss and Mr. Hiss had been very apologetic. He had been very charming about it. He said that he was oh, so sorry; that, of course, this should have been submitted to the Office of American Republics Affairs. We should have been consulted before this was submitted to the United Nations, but it was just one of those things that happened that slipped by, a mistake somewhere, and he was very regretful about it.

But it was there and that it would do great harm for it to be withdrawn after it was already submitted.

Mr. Acheson sustained Mr. Hiss on that. That is where the thing rested. We did subsequently get Mr. Alfaro down to Washington. We did have negotiations that were carried on for some time.

We kept the bases so long as I was Assistant Secretary of State, up until June 28, 1947, but I think it was the fall of 1947 that I read that we had to give up those basis which our military said were highly essential for the defense of the canal and of the United States.
Senator Welker. May I have a question?
The Chairman. Senator Welker.

Senator Welker. Mr. Braden, you say Alger Hiss was apologetic. He was apologetic notwithstanding the fact that he had your objections made to him and to the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, weeks prior to this decision?

Mr. Braden. Yes.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions by any member of the committee?

If not, proceed, Mr. Grimes.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Ambassador, going back just a bit, you have testified that you were Ambassador to Colombia. Following your being Ambassador to Colombia, you became Ambassador to Cuba, did you not?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Mr. Grimes. That was under commission and appointment by President Roosevelt; is that correct?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. When did you become Ambassador to Cuba?

Mr. Braden. I took my oath, I think, sometime in early May. About the middle, the 20th, somewhere around that time, I went to Cuba as Ambassador.

Mr. Grimes. Was there an interval between your being Ambassador to Colombia and your being Ambassador to Cuba?

Mr. Braden. Yes. I left Colombia, I think, toward the end of March. It might have gone into early April. I came up to Washington and to New York in order to acquaint myself with all of the various problems of my new post, a practice I have always made.

Mr. Grimes. Did you find, during the course of your acquainting yourself with your new duties, some problem relating to the banking structure of Cuba?

Mr. Braden. Yes. When I got up here to the United States, I knew I heard of it in Washington, and going through such files as I was able to get hold of, with reference to what was known as the White mission—

Mr. Grimes. The White mission?

Mr. Braden. The White mission to Cuba.

Mr. Grimes. Who was White?

Mr. Braden. Mr. White who gave the name—

Mr. Grimes. Was that Harry Dexter White?

Mr. Braden. Harry Dexter White; yes.

Mr. Grimes. Whose name was attached to the White mission: is that correct?

Mr. Braden. He was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury by that time, I believe. He had been very high up in the Treasury, and he headed this mission that went to Cuba. I don’t remember the names of the other members of the mission, but they were people from the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and financial banking experts, presumably.¹

I heard about this White mission report. I also observed from dispatches that word that was coming from Cuba that it had already gone into the Congress in Cuba for legislation to be approved.

Naturally I considered this important, and it was a document which I wished to peruse. I therefore asked for copies, and it is significant that while I was in and about Washington and New York, during this period that I have mentioned of practically a month and a half or maybe a little more, I was unable to get a copy of the White mission report during that entire period until the afternoon of the day I left for Cuba. I left by train for——

The Chairman. Whom did you ask for the report?

Mr. Braden. I tried to get it in the State Department from the Division of American Republics, from the people on the Cuba desk, and others, and kept on insisting that I, as American Ambassador, should have this report. But I was unable to get it until that afternoon.

I read the report.

Mr. Grimes. What afternoon?

Mr. Braden. The afternoon of the day I left for Cuba. I thought I just said that. I read the report on the train going to Miami. After I reached Cuba and got squared away on the very most urgent problems, I began to check on the preliminary opinion that I had formed of this report, which was a very low one.

I thought that it was a very dangerous proposition because it involved two things: One, it involved the establishment of a central bank in Cuba: 2, it established a Cuban currency, entirely separate from the dollar.

Now I am going back 12 years, so I can't remember everything.

I wrote a long dispatch which should be in the departmental files, with all of the several reasons why I opposed this White mission's report. I do remember one thing, that under the terms of this central bank the central bank could finance and use up to 15 percent of its capital to establish other banks—agricultural banks, mineral banks, all kinds of subsidiary banks, using in each case up to 15 percent.

That might be all right, excepting that there was no limitation on the number of these "15 percents" that could be used.

This central bank could use 150 or 200 percent of its capital, apparently, in this setup.

Along with that were a number of other reasons, very strong reasons, against it.

Also, under the establishment of the Cuban currency and the exclusion of the dollar, there is a Cuban currency today and there has been for years, but it has been interchangeable with the dollar.

As I wrote to Secretary Hull in a personal letter at the time, and I also said it in——

Mr. Grimes. How would that change this?

Mr. Braden. In that they would have a Cuban currency and the dollar would no longer be acceptable in Cuba. Up to recently it has been legal tender there. You use dollars the same as the Cuban peso.

Mr. Grimes. That greatly facilitated foreign trade?

Mr. Braden. We had no problem on foreign trade on this score. All over the rest of the hemisphere, for that matter, the world, we
have one of the greatest impediments to foreign trade—the exchange controls.

Tariffs are a minor incident in this whole thing. We whoop it up a lot about tariffs, but you can have an agreement on tariffs and if the country puts in exchange controls, why, your tariffs go out the window.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, there was no foreign-exchange problem with Cuba then?

Mr. Braden. We had no foreign-exchange problem with Cuba whatsoever. And by the enactment of these recommendations of the White report, there would be.

The Chairman. You started to say you wrote Cordell Hull.

Mr. Braden. I wrote him a letter in which I particularly called his attention to this. I said:

Here you have been making this fight for years in freeing trade all over the world and here is the one place where we have no such problem. Under this White report they are going to put in conditions which will, in my opinion, inevitably bring exchange controls, so you will have it here in Cuba, too.

That was one of my great objections.

After I studied this report I went to the Prime Minister, and I said, “I am very much concerned about this report.”

They have three debates in each Chamber—the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The first debate is the presentation of a project.

The second debate is the real debate, and the third debate is just to tie up the loose ends.

I understood this White report and the recommendations therein had already gone through the second debate in one of the Chambers and was likely to go through on the other side.

I said that I thought it could do a great economic and financial harm to Cuba.

Dr. Saladrigas expressed his utter astonishment because he said that the Ambassador in Washington, Ambassador Concheso, who is Ambassador today, was being called in practically every day by either the State Department or the Treasury Department and told that really this was “must” legislation. This was practically a war measure it was so important for Cuba to have her own currency and to have this central banking system as set up by Harry Dexter White.

I said, “Mr. Prime Minister, let’s go through it.”

We went through the report paragraph by paragraph. When we got through and my explanations of why I thought it was so bad for Cuba and potentially very bad for the United States, not merely from the trade point of view, but more because of the economic chaos and financial distress which would result in Cuba. As a result of this report, of course, the United States would have been blamed because here was a report based on the recommendations of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and the White mission was made up entirely of American experts, or so-called experts.

Mr. Grimes. Incidentally, a situation of great economic distress is one of the Marxian conditions for revolution?

Mr. Braden. Yes, of course.

Mr. Grimes. You knew that then?

Mr. Braden. I knew it, but I must admit I did not realize the significance of the thing at the time.
The CHAIRMAN. After you finished this report paragraph by para-
graph and explained it, what was his interpretation?

Mr. Braden. He said, "I will go right over and see the President and
we will stop this legislation. I agree with you 100 percent."

Dr. Saladrigas went to the president, President Batista, and con-
vinced the President purely from the Cuban aspect that they should
not proceed with these measures.

I might say also my predecessor, Mr. Messersmith, on instructions
from the Department—it wasn't his doing, but the Department in-
structed him to press for the Cuban Government to legislate as per
the White recommendations. When this legislation was stopped,
and the dates on that run along into the summer—I don't remember
just the terminal dates.

Subsequently Mr. Duggan, who was the political adviser on Latin
American Affairs to the Secretary—

The CHAIRMAN. Lawrence Duggan?

Mr. Braden. Yes, and he was the equivalent of Assistant Secretary
as he had a job equivalent to what I held later.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the summer af what year?

Mr. Braden. 1942.

Long afterwards, I saw some notes in the Department wherein Mr.
Duggan made the remark within the Department and to the vice
president of the Chase National Bank, that I was out of step with the
Government and the Government completely disagreed with the posi-
tion that I had taken on this matter.

I am very proud to have been out of step with Messrs. White and
Hiss, and those people. That is all right with me.

But getting back to this story of what happened in Cuba and in
Washington. As soon as this legislation was stopped by the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister of Cuba and entirely on that accomplish-
ment, I reported at great length and in full detail to the State Depart-
ment what I had done and why in a dispatch.

Mr. Grimes. May I ask you this question: Did you seek the advice
of practical bankers as to the feasibility and efficacy of the White
plan?

Mr. Barden. Not until after I had taken the action which I did.
And I am very glad I did not because in the reply that I got from the
State Department, and it was a pretty nasty reply which came back
to me and replied to this dispatch of mine——

Mr. Grimes. What was the nature of the reply that came back from
the State Department?

Mr. Braden. The nature was that I had far exceeded my authority
in taking the stand. I had because this was something that the United
States Government wanted very much; that I was intervening in the
internal affairs of Cuba, which, of course, I wasn't, in presenting it to
the Prime Minister and leaving it up to him to make the decision with
the President.

But they accused me of intervention. They implied that I must be
in the pay of the New York bank—I say New York, one was a Boston
bank—in the pay of three American banks in Cuba for me to have
taken this stand.

And that I should forthwith go to the Prime Minister, completely
reverse my position, and tell him that we want this legislation to go
through, and that I had no authority to speak to him in the terms I had.

It was a thorough dressing down.

The CHAIRMAN. Who signed this reply?

Mr. Braden. I assume that it was the usual type of signature—Hull, but signed by somebody else. That is, the Secretary signs everything, but it was a document he had never laid his eyes on, probably.

When I received this reply, fortunately after I had raised these objections and given every reason why this should not go through, only at that time did I call in the managers of the three American banks in Cuba, and fortunately also this Mr. Rosenthal, the vice president of the Chase Bank who was on a visit to Cuba. He has since died. There was Mr. Carter of the National City and Mr. Carriker of the First National of Boston. I have forgotten the name of the Chase Bank manager, but I think they all are alive and available. I called them in and said, "This is what I have done: I have a layman's experience and perhaps a bit more in finance and trade matters. I want to find out what you think about this dispatch."

They were enthusiastic. They practically got up and cheered because they had been so worried as to what would happen to Cuba, and, therefore, to their banking business in Cuba if this thing had gone through.

The CHAIRMAN. I think our records show in relation to this testimony that this Lawrence Duggan whom you have testified about committed suicide on December 20, 1948.

Mr. Braden. I don't know the date.

In any case, after receiving this communication I sent back an equally snappy message to the State Department saying that my duties as Ambassador in Cuba, my prime duty, was to promote the friendly relations between the two Republics and that if this legislation were to go through, self-evidently if trouble resulted, financial and economic trouble and chaos in Cuba, our relations would be very seriously prejudiced.

Therefore, so long as I was American Ambassador in Cuba, I said, I was going to stand my ground and protect our relations and, in fact, I refused to go back to the Prime Minister.

Fortunately my communication to Secretary Hull was what saved the day for me, I think, because the showdown finally came, but I got a short note from Mr. Duggan in which he said that he thought it best that I cease to discuss the matter any longer and they would no longer discuss it.

In other words, I had won the day.

Mr. Grimes. Prior to this incident had your relations with Mr. Lawrence Duggan been friendly?

Mr. Braden. Oh, extremely so.

Mr. Grimes. What happened after this incident?

Mr. Braden. As I testified in the hearing in New York on December 22, they were cut as if by a knife. From that day on some of his communications to me had a certain amount of the old cordiality, but whenever I saw him or had anything to do with him, he was very much off and antagonistic to me.
He had been so friendly that he had actually asked me when I returned from Colombia to go to Cuba to stay at his house rather than at the Metropolitan Club. That was how friendly he had been.

Mr. Grimes. That ceased?
Mr. Braden. That ceased as if cut by a knife.
Mr. Grimes. There is no doubt that the White mission was an official mission?
Mr. Braden. Absolutely, absolutely an official mission of the United States Government. That is what made it so dangerous.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter which I think might well be read into the record at this point as pertinent so that this story may have a continuity, a letter from Mr. Sumner Welles to Mr. Harry Dexter White, establishing this mission. It is short. I believe for the sake of continuity it should go into the record now.

The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that already in our record?
Mr. Grimes. That is already in our record. It is being reproduced here now for the reason given, because there has been a considerable amplification of the testimony on this general subject.
Mr. Sourwine. Does the record show the source of it?
Mr. Grimes. It does. This is a letter dated December 30, 1941, from the Department of State signed by Sumner Welles addressed to Harry Dexter White.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

My Dear Mr. White: It is a pleasure to inform you that the Government of Cuba has indicated to the Department its satisfaction with the naming of yourself and Messrs. Eddy and Spiegel, of the Treasury, and Messrs. Walter R. Gardner and George B. Vest, of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as a technical mission in compliance with its request for assistance in connection with monetary and banking questions. Your assignment to this mission is consequently effected in accordance with the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury of September 25, 1941.

You will act as chief of the mission and direct the work of its other members.
The Cuban Government has been informed that the mission will arrive in Habana during the first week in October. Upon your arrival there you should report to the Honorable George S. Messersmith, Ambassador of the United States to Cuba, who will introduce you to the appropriate Cuban officials. The mission will be responsible to Ambassador Messersmith, and you should obtain his approval of any informal recommendations involving questions of policy which the mission may propose to make to the Cuban officials. Formal recommendations should be prepared for transmittal to the Cuban Government through the Department of State.
I wish you a pleasant journey and every success in the mission.
Sincerely yours,

Sumner Welles.

Mr. Grimes. Insofar as you know, was that the letter on which the White mission went to Cuba prior to your arrival there and made the recommendations which you have described?
Mr. Braden. That, I can't say; however, they went there. I know they went and made an official report.
I would like to add one thing.
In my previous testimony I mentioned the fact that a Mr. Southard, who later formed a part of this mission, came to Cuba to try and dissuade me.
I argued out the question with him. He was a supposed banking expert, but he admitted on one of the counts I had in the letter that I was right in my objections to this White mission report.
So not only a member of the mission, but the top bankers having to do with Cuba fully confirmed my views.

Mr. Grimes. And did they agree with you that the plan would be disastrous?

Mr. Braden. Yes; that it would be catastrophic for Cuba.

Mr. Grimes. Did you find when you became Assistant Secretary of State, as you have testified, that there was a plan on foot to reorganize the State Department?

Mr. Braden. Yes; I did. As a matter of fact, they are too lengthy, but I think it would be worthwhile to read into the record some memoranda or the substance of memoranda that I have, because I do not have the originals in most of these cases, but I have my own notes.

For instance, one to Mr. Donald Russell, who was Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Administration.

As I testified on December 22, an attempt was made to take all of these various alphabetical agencies—OWI and BEW-FEA, and the Coordinator's office—and superimpose them on the State Department.

I was new in Washington. I had just taken over a few weeks before as Assistant Secretary of State. So I wanted to get my bearings first. So I took rather a defensive stand on that, but I took the stand that the career Foreign Service and the departmental service of the United States, by and large, were a fine organization, good or better than any organization I had seen.

Sure, they had some bad people and incompetents, but the overall was good. I said what we have got to do is to build on this firm foundation and not have this swarm of people coming in from these outside agencies who only had had to do with foreign affairs in the OWI or the OSS during the war.

They were utterly inexperienced and incompetent, from what I saw of them, and I saw several of them that came in from other offices and divisions.

We resisted having them in my office, but to build on that fine foundation of the career Foreign Service was right.

I would like to put that memorandum in the record, because I think it is important. I go into detail. It was more or less of a holding action that I proposed in that memorandum, but subsequently I have another memorandum I made in connection with the OSS.

They apparently claimed they had been of the utmost use to the Office of American Republics Affairs. Actually they hadn't been anything of the kind.

They claimed they did all kinds of work. They did very little, and the little they did was badly done for the most part.

A lot of the stuff they had sent over was material that came from us in the first place, anyway. We didn't want any part of most of their records.

We, therefore, resisted this invasion of all these swarms of people. They were mostly collectivists and "do-gooders" and what-nots, that were trying to come into the State Department. I am glad to say that my office was able to hold out on that.

We had one actual case of an FBI report that came across my desk. I imagine it is the same one that the Attorney General, Mr. Brownell, referred to with reference to White, in which there was a reference to Alger Hiss and his brother. There was one man in that report that
was mentioned as being slated to come into the Office of American
Republics Affairs.

I gave my testimony on December 22 in respect to that particular
case.

Mr. Grimes. You stopped that?

Mr. Braden. We stopped that right in its tracks.
The most serious case we had, and I found myself engaged in a
knockdown, dragout fight, was in the case of the creation of what
was known as the Office of Research and Intelligence. The first time
I heard of that project was one day—this is in the latter part of
1945. I don’t know the exact date. But I came back from luncheon
and I was informed there was to be a very top echelon meeting in
the office of the Under Secretary at 5 p. m. that afternoon, that I
was to cancel any other engagements that I might have in order to
attend this meeting.

Mr. Grimes. The Under Secretary was Dean Acheson?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

I therefore canceled an engagement that I had at 5 o’clock. I went
to that meeting. Mr. Dunn, who was the other Assistant Secretary
in charge of geographic sections in the State Department, was abroad
at the time, so he was not at the meeting.

As I remember, another Assistant Secretary, Mr. Will Clayton,
who was in charge of economic work, was not there, but he was repre-
sented by Mr. Willard Thorpe. Mr. Dunn was represented by the
three chiefs of the geographical divisions—Doc Matthews for Euro-
pean Affairs, John Carter Vincent for the Far East, and Loy Hen-
derson for the Near East.

The Assistant Secretary in Charge of Administration, Donald
Russell, also was there.

The meeting began by Mr. Acheson telling us that they were going
to establish this Office of Research and Intelligence.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Byrnes was Secretary?

Mr. Braden. Yes. He did not attend this meeting, but was in his
office at the time it was held.

Mr. Grimes. What relation, if any, did Mr. Don Russell have to
Mr. Byrnes?

Mr. Braden. Mr. Don Russell had been a law partner of Mr. Byrnes
and he was brought into the Department, as I understand, as Assistant
Secretary when Mr. Byrnes took over as Secretary of State.

Mr. Grimes. What were his duties, in general?

Mr. Braden. In charge of all of the administration of the Depart-
ment, which included security, personnel, operations, both of the
Foreign Service and of the Department.

At this meeting Mr. Acheson at some length detailed why this new
office was necessary; that we had no office in the State Department
that had the intelligence function, that had the necessary information.

I remember his citing the case that during the war the importance
of intelligence was in the office work, in which I agreed, and that the
way we had been able to pinpoint the points to be bombed in Japan
was through a magnificent setup in the Army Intelligence where
they got it out of information actually in this country, out of news-
papers and out of gathering all this information together first through
research and intelligence.
He expatiated on that, that this was a "must", an absolute "must". He had a volume there. I would say it was 6 to 8 inches thick, black covered, probably 10 to 12 inches long, and 6 or 7 inches in width. I don't know how many pages. It probably ran well over a thousand pages.

Mr. Grimes. What was the volume supposed to be?

Mr. Braden. It was supposed to be the full directive for the establishment of this Office of Research and Intelligence in the State Department.

This was resting on the corner of Mr. Acheson's desk and I was sitting at the right of it.

Mr. Grimes. That was the new plan for the State Department?

Mr. Braden. Yes. They were to bring in 1,080 people as I recall. I may be off a bit, but it was over a thousand. That 1,080 people were to be brought into the State Department to man this new office.

Mr. Grimes. In short, did the plan involve a complete reorganization of the State Department?

Mr. Braden. It meant a complete change in the whole State Department.

Mr. Acheson. I remember very vividly, said, "This is going to the Hill this afternoon."

Later on in the discussion it turned out that it wasn't to the Hill, but to the Budget Bureau. But his first remark was that it was going to the Hill and that this was a must, that if any of us had any objections to this, we could say our piece right then and there by going into the Secretary of State's office, Mr. Byrnes. We could make our protest to him.

Mr. Byrnes might or might not listen to us, but in any case, we would be thrown out.

The Chairman. In other words, you were to pass judgment upon this large document without examining it or seeing it or knowing its contents?

Mr. Braden. This was going through whether we liked it or not. If we didn't like it, we could say our piece; but we wouldn't be listened to. It was an ultimatum. That was the only word for it.

As we sat there I reached over and took this volume and naturally I turned to the Latin-American Republics. After very hurriedly looking at it, time being of the essence in this meeting, since this was going to the Hill at 6 o'clock, and by this time it was probably a quarter to 6. I thumbed through these pages.

Then I expressed my strong opposition. I said, "I protest on this proposition because I have glanced through here and there is not one single item or function I can find in these pages which is not being fully and competently performed by the Office of American Republics Affairs."

Granted, I had looked at the new directions hurriedly, but I can see the general trend. There is not one single item that the Office of American Republics Affairs is not doing today and doing competently. Therefore, I said, "this is a complete duplication. There is no need for it. It is an extravagance, an inefficiency, and I protest."

Curiously enough I was not asked to go in to the Secretary of State. Later on the meeting broke up without any conclusion at that time.

At that meeting, however, the only person who forcefully took sides with me after I made my statement, having laid the book down, was
Mr. Loy Henderson, who took it up and thumbed through it and supported me and said, "I agree with Spruille on this. This same thing applies to the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. This is a duplication. We are doing the work that is supposed to be done here. There is no rhyme or reason for it."

Also, I remember Mr. Donald Russell coming into the conversation at that time. The matter was then referred to the Secretary's staff committee where there was a group—Colonel McCormack, who had been brought into the State Department, being on this.

I may say all of this was based on a directive that came from the President about the establishment of research and intelligence. We had some knockdown, drag-out fights there.

You have in your records Mr. Panuch's testimony. Mr. Panuch was very useful in this fight. I have forgotten the number of the document or exhibit he presented to this committee, but it is included in his testimony. I remember that paper, but I also have a vivid recollection of returning from New York one afternoon before a meeting of the Secretary's staff committee scheduled for the next morning.

There was a paper on the subject of this Office of Research and Intelligence which was actually insulting in language that it used about those of us who were opposing.

Mr. Dunn returned from Europe, and at that time, mind you, it was only Loy Henderson, Donald Russell, supported by Joe Panuch as his deputy, and I, who were opposing it.

All of the others accepted and went along.

I had an hour or so with Jimmie Dunn, and we convinced Jimmie Dunn so that he came along on our side.

After a very disagreeable fight and, as I described it, a knockdown, drag-out fight, finally that project was abandoned.

An Office of Research and Intelligence was established, but on a very minor and relatively insignificant scale in the Department.

But I am appalled by what I saw happen at that time, and since then I have been told by such reliable informants as Mr. Panuch, who was right on the job at the time, that that project also emanated originally from the Office of Special Political Affairs; that is to say, Mr. Alger Hiss' office.

The Chairman. Our records show the testimony in that respect.

Mr. Grimes. After this fight what happened to the persons who opposed this plan?

Mr. Braden. Immediately thereafter, I think, thanks in large part to Donald Russell and his persuasiveness with Secretary Byrnes, we were supported by the Secretary. That is the reason we won the fight.

Immediately Secretary Byrnes left the Department at the beginning of 1947. Mr. Donald Russell left with him.

Mr. Grimes. Who succeeded Mr. Byrnes?

Mr. Braden. General Marshall. The day that General Marshall was sworn in, and I don't remember the exact timing, but I know that it was astonishing, the speed with which Mr. Panuch was thrown out of his office.

We had barely gotten General Marshall sworn in as Secretary of State when Mr. Acheson called a meeting and informed us that Joe Panuch was already out. It was sort of "the day before yesterday" he did it.
Mr. Dunn went to Italy as Ambassador. Mr. Henderson went to India later and now is in Iran.

I withdrew from the Department at the middle of 1947, approximately a year and a half later.

Mr. Grimes. While we are on that subject, will you state briefly the circumstances under which you left the Department? How did you first find out that you might be leaving the Department?

Mr. Braden. The first time when I came to Washington to become Assistant Secretary of State and I was accused, completely falsely, of having indulged in intervention in Argentina, I suggested to Secretary Byrnes I resign at that time.

He said, "No," not to resign, and I felt that I would appear to be more or less of a temperamental soprano if I did, so I stayed on.

But I was having some terrific fights. I was completely in disaccord with the lack of support for sound policies where I found the most opposition was in meeting of representatives of many different officers and divisions, and from agencies outside the Department.

We practically had young Soviets. I had the responsibility for the conduct of our affairs with Latin America, but I found that in these meetings there would be anywhere from 2 or 3 up to 20 or more people, all with the same color of authority that I had: and, wherever I tried to defend American legitimate interests, these people were all opposed to private enterprise and to our system and way of life.

I wanted to get out.

I may say I think there was a mutuality about the situation. I wanted to get out, and I guess they probably wanted to get me out.

Mr. Grimes. Did you learn that you might be leaving?

Mr. Braden. Yes. I wanted to do it as quickly as I could.

Mr. Grimes. From some other source, did you learn?

Mr. Braden. I have a clipping here Mr. Reston published in the New York Times that I no longer had the support of the President.

I have my memorandum of conversation with Mr. Reston, of the Times, in respect of his article at that time.

Mr. Grimes. Did you read in other newspapers that you might be leaving?

Mr. Braden. Mr. Bert Andrews called me, he having been a friend of mine, and told me I was on the way out and nothing could be done about it.

My special assistant and very close friend, Mr. Jim Wright, told me the same thing.2 I had to get a bit tough about it and say I was going to get out with dignity and in the right way, and I did.

But I was anxious to get out, as anxious as anybody would be to have me get out of the Department.

Mr. Grimes. The time came when you actually submitted your resignation and it was accepted by President Truman: is that correct?

Mr. Braden. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. That ended your diplomatic career of some 13 years; is that right?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

2 Extract from letter of Mrs. James Wright to Maria and Spruille Braden dated November 1, 1953: "Jim said, 'The tops are after Spruille's hide. It worries me because he's doing a grand job, but they are trying to get him. I'm afraid it will be an out-and-out firing if he isn't careful.' When I pressed him for more information he, as was his habit, said, 'I can't go into details. You wouldn't understand.'"
Mr. Grimes. I presume, having served your country for 13 years, you paid a call on President Truman to say goodbye?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. And you talked with him, did you?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. For about how long?

Mr. Braden. I would say 10 or 15 minutes.

Mr. Grimes. During the course of that conversation, did he criticize any of your actions over the period of 13 years?

Mr. Braden. No. He couldn't, because he had written a letter highly praising me for all of my service during the 13 years I had been in the Department.

Mr. Grimes. During the course of that conversation, did he thank you for your services of some 13 years?

Mr. Braden. I don't think so. I don't recall his doing so. He might have.

Mr. Grimes. What happened during this conversation?

Mr. Braden. Frankly, it was a conversation that I don't think worthy of putting in the record. It was largely the discussion of a gabardine suit I had on.

Mr. Grimes. That ended your service?

Mr. Braden. That ended my service.

Mr. Grimes. Had you, from time to time while you were American Ambassador in Cuba, sent warnings to the Department of State that there might be trouble with the Communists?

Mr. Braden. Yes; I began in 1941.

I would like, if the committee is agreeable, to just give you a little bit of what I sent in.

In 1941 from Colombia I warned the State Department that the Communists were working hand in glove with the Nazis distributing propaganda of the Nazis throughout Colombia.

Then in 1942 when I arrived in Cuba, my first conversation with Dr. Saladrigas, the Prime Minister, discloses that I told him I was very much concerned about the situation of communism. This is early 1942 in Cuba—very much concerned about communism in Cuba and throughout the hemisphere.

Then from that time on there are a long series of dispatches. I have a list of some of them that I can give you for the record, but I will read this one, dated July 22, 1944:

Attention is respectfully invited to my several dispatches commenting on the strong, intelligent, and efficient Communist organization in Cuba; their drive for Negro membership; their tie-in with the Russian Legation; the unnecessarily large staff in that mission; the Communists' employment of secret inks and ciphers; * * * No one could be more convinced than I of the imperativeness of friendly relations being built up in every way between the Russians and ourselves—

we were allies and naturally I couldn't say they were just no good, so I had to put in some reservation—

but we must be realists and the aforesaid items at least engender a suspicion that the Russians have some ulterior motive in respect of this hemisphere.

I would like to put that document in the record.
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 359" and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 359**

**Havana. July 22, 1944.**

**FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND ACTIVITIES IN CUBA**

**Russian**

Attention is respectfully invited to my several dispatches commenting on the strong, intelligent, and efficient Communist organization in Cuba; their drive for Negro membership; their tie-in with the Russian Legation; the unnecessarily large staff in that mission; the Communists' employment of secret links and ciphers; * * * No one could be more convinced than I of the imperativeness of friendly relations being built up in every way between the Russians and ourselves, but we must be realists and the aforesaid items at least engender a suspicion that the Russians have some ulterior motive in respect to this hemisphere. Whether it be a species of imperialistic policy or some other reason is, of course, pure speculation, but the fact remains that if in the postwar era differences of opinion should arise between the Russians and ourselves, the former in a matter of hours only could throw Cuba into a general strike, with such chaos resulting as to cause us serious concern.

* * * * * * *

**Spruille Braden,**

*Ambassador of the United States.*

Mr. Braden. I have another memorandum prepared at the latter part of that year, more or less going along the same lines, that I would like to put in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 360" and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 360**

I particularly wish to refer to a memorandum entitled "Examples of Failure by the Division of American Republics to Support the Embassy." This was attached to a memorandum for the Department dated July 22, 1944, and consisted of 91½ pages citing 23 distinct items. It did not include the incident of the White mission.

Items 1, 2, 5, the last half of 7, and parts of several other items treat of such delicate matters that they could only be discussed in executive session and with complete assurance of secrecy.

The other items may be summarized as follows:

Item 3: An American-owned sugar mill in Cuba which had operated on mostly a losing basis, i. e., making a profit in only 2 years out of the previous 22, burned down immediately before the cutting season began. The Prime Minister happened to tell me one evening when he was in my office at the chancery that he proposed to "intervene," i. e., take over this sugar mill, as he had found Mr. David Keiser, head of the American company, unreasonable. I pleaded with him to defer all action until I personally had talked with Mr. Keiser. This I did the next morning, thereafter bringing the Prime Minister and Mr. Keiser together and arranging a mutually satisfactory accommodation of the matter, for which both thanked me.

The problem, in essence, was to find employment or, at least, wages for the sugar-mill workers during the ensuing season. When this accommodation had been reached, I earnestly requested both the Prime Minister and Mr. Keiser, in anticipation of the sugar crop a year later, to take adequate steps to find other employment for these employees. The fieldworkers did not enter into the problem and Mr. Keiser's company owned other sugar mills which could more profitably grind this sugar. In fact, this particular sugar had been transported past 7 other mills in order to get to the 1 which had burned down.

Mr. Keiser did get a number of the employees located in other places, I believe, some even in Florida. But a year later, the Prime Minister intervened the mill anyway.

Shortly after the seizure of this American-owned mill in September 1943, Cuban Government officials as well as the company's lawyer received the im-
pression from a high official of our Government that the Department was not particularly concerned in the matter and considered that it would have been wiser had the company agreed to rebuild this unprofitable mill. This same high official expressed exactly the same sentiments to me personally. These assertions to the Cuban representatives unquestionably contributed to the subsequent difficulties which arose, convincing the Cuban Government that it was in the right and that the United States Government would not defend these property rights of its citizens. A series of recommendations in the premises by me were rejected by the Department. Warnings by me as to what action might be taken by the company similarly were not acted upon.

The result of all this was that the Embassy and I personally were placed in an extremely embarrassing situation. The situation was rendered much more difficult than it otherwise would have been and, of course, a definite precedent was set, that the Department of State would not protect the property rights of its citizens.

Fortunately, the subsequent sale of the mill to some Cuban interests solved the immediate problem, but the attitude of the Department, and its failure to support the Embassy, left the fundamental principles not only unsupported, but greatly weakened, and established the theory that a foreign government could force a United States company to operate on an unprofitable basis and to invest money in said unprofitable operation.

Item 4: This was an equally reprehensible stand by the Department which, however, did not involve loss for any American concern or individual, but rather for the United States taxpayers.

Item 6: In April 1952 the municipality appointed an intervenor and took over the operation of the branch office in that town for the purpose of paying itself out of receipts approximately 371,000 pesos which the municipality claimed was due for taxes for the years 1928 to 1942. The right of the municipality to take this step rested on flimsy legal grounds and it was clearly apparent that what was really involved was an attempted shakedown on the part of the notoriously corrupt city council.

After efforts to compose the situation through informal discussions had failed, the Embassy recommended that an official protest be made. The Department requested the Embassy to submit to it the text of this proposed note, which text was weakened and the word "protest" was deleted, the Department substituting therefor an expression of "hope" that the Government would do something about it. This contributed to the further delay experienced by the Embassy in having the seizure of funds suspended, action to that effect not being taken by the Government until January 27, 1944, by which time over 153,000 pesos of company funds had been seized by the municipality. No Cuban official has expressed the opinion that as a practical matter there is any possibility of the company's recovering these funds in the event it wins its various pending suits contesting the right of the municipality to collect the taxes in question. It may be mentioned in this connection that the case does not involve an attempt to avoid payment of taxes, but an attempt on the part of the municipality to collect taxes hitherto payable to the central Government.

Item 7: When it became apparent that heavy demand for priorities to proceed to the Dominican Republic in February 1944 was to be expected, the Embassy recommended that priorities be issued only to delegates themselves and not to their wives or to athletes. This recommendation was accepted notwithstanding which on February 14 the Embassy learned indirectly that a priority had been issued to the wife of one of the American delegates. A telegram was immediately sent to the Department pointing out the difficulties and embarrassments which this might be expected to cause. No reply was received to this message, but instead an urgent unnumbered circular was transmitted to the field authorizing the issue of priorities for the wives of all delegates. Since the circular was not sent until the day on which most of the delegates were proceeding to the Dominican Republic, the news produced irritation and ill will, whereas the denial of priorities to wives had originally been accepted in good part, as reasonable in view of wartime congestion of communications.

Item 8: "The Embassy has had numerous occasions during the past few months to recommend the withholding of passport facilities from American citizens whose business activities had tended either to interfere with the war effort or to cast discredit upon our country. In reply to the Embassy's request concerning the factors taken into consideration by the Department, a memorandum was received which indicates that there is considerable reluctance in the Department to deny passport facilities to persons in the foregoing category notwith-
standing the harm which in the Embassy’s estimation may result from their being
permitted to travel.”

**Item 9:** This involves an attack on the integrity of the President of the United
States.

**Item 10:** This involves a situation on which the Embassy had repeatedly re-
ported to the Department but was never able to elicit any interest whatsoever.
Finally, the condition became so bad that another agency of the United States
Government protested to the Department, whereupon the latter expressed to the
Embassy its great alarm over the shocking allegations made by the other
agency of the Government and demanded a report thereon from the Embassy, de-
spite the fact that the Department files were filled with protests from me.

**Item 11:** This involved a similar case of reported protests by the Embassy to
the Department, to which no response was ever made. But again, when a report
from another branch of the Government was received by the Department, al-
though it differed in no essential particular from the several protests I had sent
in, the Department then came along.

**Item 12:** This involved a situation where the Embassy, after careful investiga-
tion, recommended in the strongest possible terms certain action by the Depart-
ment in respect of vitally scarce materials needed for the war effort. Despite
this fact, the Department took a stand directly contrary to that of the Embassy.

**Item 13:** This involved the matter of just compensation to a great many
United States individuals and corporations, mounting into the millions of dollars.
The Department failed to respond to Embassy dispatches and otherwise took a
completely wishy-washy stand.

**Item 14:** This involved a strong recommendation made to the Department
on which the Department simply failed to comment or acknowledge.

**Item 15:** This concerned a proposal in a speech to be delivered on September
22, 1943, to declare that while my Government had the greatest desire to see
Cuba prosper and that her people would make wise selections in the elections,
these elections were none of our business nor that of our nationals and that,
accordingly, every United States citizen, individual or corporate, should refrain
from exercising any influence by contributions or otherwise in the Cuban elec-
tions. The Department refused its support.

**Item 16:** This involved a visa case in which the Department first endeavored
to overrule the Embassy and subsequently, when I supported my counsel in his
decision, the Department informed interested parties that it washed its hands
of the matter.

**Item 17:** No comment.

**Item 18:** This involved the leakage, from the Department, of information trans-
mitted in confidential despatches to the Department. This information was made
available, at least in substance, to the United States company involved.

**Item 19:** This involved a case where the Department quotes information
“from a confidential source within the Government” and instructed the Embassy
to take this information into account. These reports were utterly unsubstan-
tiated and ran counter to the accurate reports sent to the Department from the
Embassy under more recent date.

**Item 20:** This involved a matter wherein the Department promised to take
a forthright stand when, in point of fact, it took a weak position.

**Item 21:** This involved the item of import tax of 2 cents per package which
had been under discussion for 5 years as a violation of our trade agreement.
The Cuban Government never denied our claims that it conflicted with the
trade agreement. Despite these prolonged and multiple discussions, the De-
partment would never go further than to say it “would appreciate an indica-
tion of the Cuban Government’s position.”

**Item 22:** This represents another visa case, wherein a thoroughly disreputable
United States attorney received the support of the Department despite the Em-
bassy’s protests.

**Item 23:** “The Embassy’s attention was first drawn to the plans of an Ameri-
can group headed by Frank Cohen to construct a vegetable dehydrating plant in
Cuba early in 1943. The Embassy reported adversely on the program of the American
Dehydrating Co. and in its A-2147 of October 22, 1943, questioned
the company’s ability successfully to complete its program. As a result of
continued careful study of this program, the Embassy sent increasingly strong
suggestions to the Department with a view to having the United States Gover-
ment cease granting export assistance to the American Dehydrating Co. Nothing
was done to prevent the situation from growing worse in spite of the Embassy’s
recommendations, supported by evidence of serious mismanagement, disruption
of Cuban agricultural economy, injury to United States-Cuban relations, etc. From several sources the Embassy has now been informed that its appraisal of the situation was correct, as the affairs of the company in Cuba are now in an insoluble muddle.

"Not only did the Department fail adequately to support the Embassy's forceful recommendations, but in some way or other the contents of the Embassy's strictly confidential A-1109 of May 24, 12:30 p.m. (1944) came to the attention of a member of the company. This is only one case of a leakage in confidential information in this case among several which have come to the Embassy's attention. Needless to say, these leaks seriously compromised the Embassy's position and weakened its ability to protect the best interests of the Government.

"On the other hand, there are many cases which could be cited wherein a firm policy by the Embassy resulted in the successful adjustment of many analogous problems."

Mr. Braden. I brought that document up to Washington. I spoke about that first memorandum in the Secretary's staff committee that was presided over by Under Secretary of State Ed Stettinius in a top echelon meeting. They had war maps up and we had a briefing on what was happening on the battlefronts and what our plans were.

At that time I sounded the alarm. Then I came up 6 months later and left this memorandum entitled "Agenda for Washington".

(The memorandum was marked "Exhibit No. 361" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 361
AGENDA FOR WASHINGTON

* * * * * * * * * * * *

(b) Leftist movements

1. While fully appreciating the imperativeness of maintaining friendly relations with the U. S. S. R., nevertheless the activities of Soviet representatives and of Communists in general and the connection between the two and the common pattern which is shown by them in the different republics warrants our most careful and intelligent observation.

2. What may be the objectives pursued by the Soviet and the Communists is not yet clear, but the fact remains that for instance in Cuba, should the United States Government appear to Stalin to be too intrusive in European affairs, it would be possible through agitation, such as a general strike, to give us a headache practically on our own doorstep which might induce us to abandon our activities abroad. (My comments in various dispatches on the CTAL, CTC, and the radical Autentico groups merit consideration.)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

That is the memorandum that disappeared from the files of the State Department until a Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee forced the State Department to get it out.

This is the way I got a copy. They sent a copy to me.

Then on April 5, 1945, in a dispatch I wrote, entitled "Policy Respecting Dictatorships and Disreputable Governments," I made certain statements in this latter connection.

I suggest that that go into the record, also.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 362" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 362

HABANA, APRIL 6, 1945.

Subject: Policy respecting dictatorships and disreputable governments.

"In this latter connection, we must not ignore what, as I have frequently reported, may prove in the postwar era to be the most dangerous and insidious threat of all to the American mode of life and to democracy—communism. And it is well to bear in mind that the laws of action and reaction cause the dictators to prepare the most fertile soil for that disruptive ideology."
"** * since it may well be that in the postwar era, after we have laid down our military arms used in defense of democracy, we will be confronted with an even more dangerous attack, which our enemies may well camouflage in the spurious robes of a false democracy."

"Therefore, even implicitly to evidence an apparent approval of the dictators may not only entrench them, but may serve to spread the system elsewhere and so discourage the people as to induce the acceptance of "anything for a change, be it nazism, falangism, or communism."

Mr. Braden. When I was in Argentina as Ambassador, I sent two telegrams, dated July 5 and July 8.

Mr. Grimes. What year?

Mr. Braden. 1945, July 5 and July 8. Both of them were directed for the President and the Secretary of State. They were that important.

Mr. Grimes. Why did you send them at that time?

Mr. Braden. I sent them in anticipation of the Potsdam Conference. You can get why I sent them from these notes that I made of the July 8 telegram, and what it contained.

My notes say that—

I cabled the Department today, top secret for the President and Secretary, that Ambassador —— newly arrived from Chile discussed with his staff possible secret alliance—

I will have to put in some blanks here because it would be improper to bring out some of the names—

between —— and —— and Peron to get together with Russia against the United States. I observed that there was no concrete proof except that the last two mentioned were in touch and were willing to use the Soviet to offset our influence in Latin America.

Example: —— mission to ——. Peron declaration to Cue—

He was the owner and editor of a large Cuban paper—

and to me, that Argentina would get together with Stalin if we didn’t dance to his tune.

That is, to Peron’s tune.

Also bear in mind —— get-together with ——; old story of dictators joining anyone to retain power. Other sources report Bolivia might join such a union, plus —— militarists. All this ties in with Nazis open boasts in Argentina they may have lost the war, but would win the postwar. Recall previous Nazi-Commie alliance—

Hitler and Stalin.

In light of all this I repeated my strongest urgings of July 5 cable that Truman and Churchill discuss with Premier Stalin all aspects of Soviet activities throughout Latin America, even though the latter might not wish to jeopardize present good relations with us for the chimera of less valuable gains in Latin America, but get-together with those dictators would give Stalin fine trading card.

I recalled my repeated reports from Habana that Russia was using Communist organizations and activities in Latin America as an instrument of Soviet power politics rather than these activities being the spontaneous will of popular masses.

I went on:

Soviet power politics to be utilized if, as, and when the occasion arises.

I concluded:

We must omit no precaution.

I never got an answer from that. Secretary Byrnes told me he never saw that telegram.
I, therefore, assume that the President never saw it. What happened to it, I don’t know.

When I came to Washington on December 6, 1945, I gave a memorandum to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the counselor of the State Department, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Matthews of the European Division, that:

The Communist Party organizations are now, as prior to our entry into the war, attacking us and our policies at every opportunity. For example, Ambassador Bowers, in Santiago, reports Cuban Communist Blas Roca, one of the top ranking hemisphere Communists, et cetera.

I would like to put that memorandum into the record.

(The material referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 363” and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 363**

DECEMBER 6, 1945.

S—The Secretary.
U—The Under Secretary.
C—The Counselor.
EUR—Mr. Matthews.

The Communist Party organizations are now, as prior to our entry into the war, attacking us and our policies at every opportunity. For example, Bowers in Santiago reports Cuban Communist Blas Roca (one of topranking hemisphere Communists), while on visit to Chile, made vitriolic denunciations of us as “monopolistic, imperialistic,” and as being against “truly democratic forces and working classes.” Similar attitude is evidenced by Communists all over Latin America and by related groups within the United States.

Communist anti-United States action throughout the hemisphere is so coordinated and synchronized that there is no doubt that it is being directed from one central point. In my ——— of July 8 from Buenos Aires, I recommended that this subject be discussed by the President with Stalin at Potsdam. I still feel this general subject should be explored fully and energetically at the highest levels.

**Spruille Braden.**

A—Br: JH Wright: JW/SV.

Mr. Braden. That same day I presented a memorandum to the Secretary’s staff committee in which I said more or less the same thing.

On June 12, 1946, we received a cablegram, and I will introduce this into the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record at this point.

(A memorandum from Mr. Braden to the Under Secretary, referring to and quoting from the cablegram referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 364” and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 364**

JUNE 12, 1946.

U—The Under Secretary.

Subject: Moscow’s [communication], June 6.

The following comments appear pertinent:

The USSR is not so much “doing everything possible to ingratiate itself with Argentina” as it is attempting to exploit every move we make, good or bad, in order to embarrass us.

It must be borne in mind that economically, politically, and otherwise there is no sound enduring basis for any substantial trade or relations between Argentina and Russia.

On the contrary, mitigating against the USSR permanently “achieving dangerously influential position” are such powerful forces as the Catholic Church, the majority of the Argentine people, the Navy, important Army sectors, and finally
the adverse reaction of the other American Republics. About the only way that communism and therefore the USSR could get a real foothold in Argentina would be as a reaction from a protracted period of a demagogic-military dictatorship.

The above-mentioned cable warns that "our actions during the next few months may well determine whether USSR or USA is to win out in Argentina."

This warning seems to parallel the type of thinking which has led persons in and out of the Government to urge that we immediately come to an understanding with Peron. It suggests that the intricate, difficult, long-pull problems of relations among nations can be resolved like military engagements if forces in strength are brought into play at the right hour of the right day.

If the USA were to be "panicked" by fear of Russia into appeasement of Peron, the consequences will be disastrous—disastrous because Peron will never surrender the advantage he enjoys through playing us off against the Soviets; and the only encouragement he requires to play the game again and again and again is further evidence now of weakness or vacillation by us.

Rather than yield to such fears, we should make it clear that if Peron prefers to follow the Soviet Union, we are so strong and confident of our principles and our position as to remain unconcerned. Reports from Buenos Aires already indicate that the old line and especially the Catholic press is worried about the precipitous reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. If Peron is satisfied that we are not going to be bluffed into appeasement by his maneuvers with the Soviet Union, he will soon be deterred from actual collaboration with the Soviets by the influence mentioned in paragraph three above. In other words, there is a substantial measure of bluff in the Peron play toward the Kremlin. He unsuccessfully tried this same bluff on me a year ago in Buenos Aires.

Argentina has been one of those problems which too many people have classified as a passing headache to be cured by the powder mentioned in your recent address.

It is in fact a very deep-seated illness which began more than 50 years ago and which is more acute now than at any other time. By despatch in September 1937 I warned the Department in these particulars.

If we try the headache-powder approach, it will be due to faulty diagnosis and might create the illusion—for a brief but dangerous period—that we have cured the ailment, whereas in fact we will not even cure its minor manifestations.

Mr. Braden. A telegram had come in from our Embassy in Moscow about the relations between the Soviet and Argentina, the Peron regime there.

I gave a full sounding alarm again.

On May 12, 1947, I put out an instruction to my principal assistants—Briggs, Wright, Mann, Woodward and Barber. I would like to supply that for the record and I will read a little of it.

It says:

On the basis of first things first, we should begin by putting our own house in order. This will set an example for others to follow and so preserving and increasing our economic and financial potential that private enterprise can function effectively—

cit cetera.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 365" and is as follows.)

EXHIBIT No. 365

ARA—Mr. Briggs
A-BR—Mr. Wright, Mr. Mann
ARA—Mr. Woodward
CRB—Mr. Barber

Subject: Combating communism.

WFB’s initiative gives a good chopping block. I thoroughly agree our approach must be constructive, positive, honest and dynamic. If it is such it should be convincing and effective.

Re WFB’s memo, the following immediate comments occur to me:
1. We are already "considering steps to discourage growth of Communism" in Latin American Republics. As I outlined at meeting in my office we have in mind:

(a) Raising of living standards. This will be a long arduous undertaking, with a great many obstacles in the way. With manifest exceptions this can only be carried out by private enterprise. Unfortunately, many of the republics will have "to learn the hard way."

(b) We are proceeding with such palliatives as the IIAA.

(c) Department's OIC program perhaps is doing some good. But a detailed analysis of it should be made—as we did with IIAA. We must have the facts.

In this connection I like my suggestions to Bentley (see memos) re employment of ridicule and exposition of facts about living conditions in Communist dominated countries.

(d) A most important consideration is problem posed by Pedro Cune—how to offset the emotional appeal of Communism to the emotional Latins (including those with Negro and Indian strains?).

(c) Also we have given encouragement to the A. F. of L in its efforts to establish an anti-Communist grouping of the labor unions throughout the hemisphere. We have likewise encouraged such anti-Communist popular leaders as Ibanez of Chile and Haya de la Torre of Peru.

(f) Our approach must be firm, fair, constructive and dynamic.

(g) On the basis of "first things first," we should begin by putting our own house in order. This will set an example for others to follow and so preserve and increase our economic and financial potential that private enterprise can function effectively. Thus by investment and purchases abroad we will be able to assist the economies of other countries.

In this connection, it is pertinent to observe that the much discussed "test between democracy and communism" cannot presently be made in any nation of this hemisphere—including the United States of America—because the large measure of Government controls (statism) manacles democracy and its component, free, competitive private enterprise.

(h) Most important of all: We cannot live in the same world with this completely divergent ideology—as for "one world" talk, it is stupid. We cannot do business as individuals or as a Nation with crooks and murderers. That is what the Commies are. Let's recognize this fact and act accordingly.

To the foregoing there might be added my urgent recommendation (prior to Potsdam Conference) that we have a showdown with Moscow on what they are up to in this hemisphere.

Similarly, the line I have followed in conversations with Latin American representatives is, I believe, helpful, viz: emphatically damning every facet of communism and denouncing the Commies as dishonest and dangerous, expressing confidence that given a fair break, we can beat them hands down, but insisting on the folly of permitting a Communist to hold any public office in an American Republic, since they, themselves, confess that their first loyalty is to Russia.

2. Manifestations of communism in this hemisphere self-evidently are part of world phenomenon and should be coordinated accordingly.

I do have definite reservations (as per 1 (a) and (g) above) as to employment for this purpose of "funds and credits" with other American Republics.

3. I agree re need to analyze other leftist movements. However, I am opposed to utilizing Trotskyites, anarchists and such. Probably Socialists can be used, but always bearing in mind that they form, at best, a transition from democratic-capitalism towards communism.

4. I have always maintained that to join with Fascists and ultra-reactionaries in "common cause" against communism is against principle, foolhardy and will greatly weaken us in the struggle to defeat totalitarianism of every variety.

5. I fear the gathering at the Vatican—and the sending of Spanish instead of American priests to Latin America—will lead to more reaction or fascism, which in time will strengthen the Communists.

SPRUILLE BRANDEN.

Mr. BRADEN. I then have without date another memorandum, but I recall that it was shortly after Secretary Marshall took over as
Secretary of State. I have notes on it entitled, "Immediate policy matters."

I began that by saying that there are listed below three problems requiring the immediate attention of Secretary Marshall in connection with our relations with the other American Republics.

In each case a brief statement of the problem itself is accompanied by an amplifying memorandum.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 366" and is as follows:

**Exhibit No. 366**

**FOR THE SECRETARY: IMMEDIATE POLICY MATTERS**

There are listed below three problems requiring the immediate attention of Secretary Marshall in connection with our relations with the other American Republics. In each case, the brief statement of the problem itself is accompanied by an amplifying memorandum:

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

**COMMUNISM AND FASCISM IN LATIN AMERICA: NECESSITY FOR DEVISING COUNTER MEASURES**

Although Communists still represent only a fraction of the population in most Latin American countries, Communist strength has undeniably increased greatly since the end of the war and is a source of serious and growing concern to this Government. While each of the Latin American countries has the primary responsibility for handling this matter, this Government should give immediate thought to the formulation of measures in the political, economic, and cultural fields to stem Communist expansion.

An important related problem is the affinity between totalitarianism of the left and of the right, and the facility with which Communist totalitarianism can merge with Nazi-Fascist ideology.

The long-range solution of this problem lies in increased per capita production and increased prosperity in Latin America which will permit overall betterment of living conditions and the elimination of certain social maladjustments, the existence of which now makes Latin America so fertile a field for totalitarian penetration.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

**COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA**

Communist influence in Latin America in recent years has increased considerably. Official Communist Parties now operate openly in 13 countries in Latin America and are strongest in Chile, where the Communists participate in the Government, and in Cuba, where the Communists hold the balance of power. Communist influence in strategically important Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela is making itself felt increasingly and the majority of Latin American labor organizations are dominated by Communist sympathizers.

Fundamental economic ills, temporary maladjustments caused by the war, and the rising tide of nationalism have been important factors in facilitating the increase of communism in the other American Republics.

One of the most disturbing features of the Communist movement in Latin America at present is its consistent anti-United States propaganda line. Because of such propaganda, the Communists constitute a highly vocal group directly opposing hemispheric solidarity. Other aspects of the Communist international line in Latin America are (1) support of Soviet foreign policy, (2) advocacy of "nonintervention," (3) support of big power unity, with the understanding that the U. S. S. R. will be upheld in case of disagreement, and (4) the superiority of the Soviet economic and social system. Internally, Communist groups (1) seek to increase their power by capitalizing on economic difficulties, (2) identify Communist interests with those of the working classes, and (3) support nationalistic aims, including sponsorship of vicious attacks on all United States enterprises.

Communist propaganda in Latin America follows, with minor variations, the lead of the U. S. S. R., although it appears that there are few direct ties between
local Communist Parties and Moscow. Policy guidance is furnished by the
Soviet press and radio. Credible evidence of direct contact between Soviet
diplomatic missions and local Communist Parties is lacking and Soviet officials
in Latin America have, in general, confined their activities to the molding of
public opinion favorable to the U. S. S. R. and the promotion of Soviet political
and economic aims through foreign trade.

Mr. Braden. The third one of those problems is communism in this
hemisphere, which, I said, requires his immediate attention.

The Chairman. To whom was that sent?

Mr. Braden. To Secretary Marshall, prepared by my staff at my
direction.

The Chairman. Do you know whether or not he ever received it?

Mr. Braden. Of course he received it. I never received any ac-
knowledgement.

To the best of my knowledge and belief all of these warnings I sent
in through the years beginning in 1941, I never received any acknowl-
edgement on that I recall. If there was any, it was purely pro forma.

When I got to the State Department and I wanted to discuss these
matters, I was never able to do it. I had the sensation of walking up
the stairs in the dark and thinking there is another step, come down,
with a jolt or punching a pillow is probably a better analogy.

The Chairman. Would it be a fair statement to say that, in your
relations with the State Department during your tour of service, from
the memorandums you have received, that the United States Depart-
ment of State was pro-Communist?

Mr. Braden. I don't know that I would say that. I can speak from
my own knowledge, but I got no results. My warnings were un-
listened to.

When an important Ambassador, and, after all, as Ambassador to
Cuba and Argentina, I might be in that category, when he sounds
warnings and as Assistant Secretary of State he cannot get dis-
cussions of these matters and get any action taken, that in itself
shows a very dangerous and serious pattern.

The Chairman. If it was not pro-Communist, there was something
radically wrong?

Mr. Braden. My feeling was there were relatively few Communists,
but there were an awful lot of State interventionists, collectivists,
"do gooders," misinformed idealists and what-not that were easily led
and were in effect the puppets of an unidentified "they."

I say "unknown": we do have Hiss and White and some of those
names coming out now, but the great majority were the puppets of
those unidentified people. That very definitely is my feeling and it is
the reason why I am so alarmed today about the future of this country.

Senator Watkins. Do you not think there has been a reform since
that time?

Mr. Braden. I haven't been able to see it. I don't think so. I am
not inside Government. Therefore, perhaps it is unfair for me to
express an opinion on something that I am not intimately connected
with. But when I see what is going on, when I see the fact that we,
for some years, despite my going to Washington and begging that
something be done about the situation in Guatemala, and that nothing
was done about it until recently—then what is done is ineffective.

Senator Watkins. Have you heretofore testified about the Guate-
mala situation?
Mr. Braden. Yes. In fact, in my December 22 testimony before this committee in New York I gave a copy of a speech that I gave at Dartmouth College on March 12 last year.

As a matter of fact, a year before that I had given a speech sounding the same alarm.

To go back to the summer of 1950 after I had been in Guatemala, I told the Department what the situation was and what the danger was to us, not only about the Panama Canal, but all of the gulf ports with all of the chemical and oil industries and everything there. They were just within easy bombing range.

Senator Watkins. To whom did you talk?

Mr. Braden. To Eddie Miller and I talked to his assistants in the State Department. I have sounded off at every opportunity publicly and privately on this subject.

Senator Butler. By and large, do you still have the same people there?

Mr. Braden. I think so. That is my impression.

Senator Butler. Some of the principal characters have been changed though?

Mr. Braden. Some of the principal characters have been changed, but it is like when Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State and I talked to him about these matters. He was overburdened with the necessity for immediate decisions, decisions that he had to make, and then he was continually being called off to meetings of the foreign ministers, to United Nations meetings.

As I see it, I think they are doing the same thing with Secretary Dulles. He does not have a chance to light.

Senator Butler. The Secretary is not in a position to really run the Department?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Senator Butler. As a matter of fact, does he run it?

Mr. Braden. Secretary Byrnes was not able to, because he was away too often. When he was, it was just one decision on top of another that had to be taken immediately.

Senator Watkins. In the case of Secretary Dulles. Who runs it when he is away?

Mr. Braden. That I don't know. I assume the Under Secretary.

The Chairman. Have you any further questions, Mr. Grimes?

Mr. Grimes. No.

The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine, will you proceed with your questions?

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Braden, I have a few loose ends here and I will necessarily have to go back and come forward over the testimony you have given.

Do you remember near the outset of your testimony speaking of certain documents concerning which you said if they had not been destroyed or hidden away somewhere they are in the State Department or in some other department?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. You have in mind the particular documents to which you referred at that time?

Mr. Braden. Well, I had this experience of asking for the copy of this memorandum that I have mentioned, Agenda for Cuba, and a search was made of departmental files.
After 2 or 3 months I was told it could not be found. I said it has to be found in the Embassy files in Habana.

I am astonished we do not have it up here. I brought up several copies. They were not able to find them until I gave this lecture at Dartmouth and a Senator immediately told the Department to find that. I was told this by a friend of mine who added that the Senator was on the Foreign Relations Committee.

When he read what I said and the fact that I had not been able to get a copy of that memorandum, he raised such Ned about it that they finally found it, not in the Department central files, but in the Bureau of Inter-American files, stowed away.

Mr. Sourwine. I wondered if you had in mind any particular documents you had seen and were able to tell us where they were in the Department at the time you were there. You were talking about documents there while you were in the Department as Assistant Secretary.

Mr. Braden. We already had great difficulty in finding documents when I was Assistant Secretary of State and even before that, when I would come back from my missions. Whether that was sheer inefficiency or not, I don't know.

I asked for a dispatch that I wrote September 27, 1937, from Buenos Aires when I was Ambassador in the Chaco Peace Conference.

I am told that is now regarded as classified and that I can't have the copy.

I also asked the Department, because I thought it might be interesting in relating what has happened on this research and intelligence matter.

And I go back to the days when Cordell Hull was complaining, in fact, did complain to me in a letter that the budget had gone above $15 million for the State Department and the Foreign Service. That, he said, was just getting too high.

When I compare that $15 million with whatever the figure is today, and when I realize that the 800 good Foreign Service career officers that we have, and now I think it has been increased perhaps to a thousand or 1,300, or something of that kind—I don't know exactly.

Because I wrote to the Department and in order to make my testimony complete and bring out the fact that after those of us who opposed this research and intelligence project left the Department, beginning, I would say, in about 1948 or late 1947, or 1949—I don't know the period there—there has been a huge growth and this swarm of people come into our foreign operations either in the Department or in the other services of mutual aid or point 4, or whatever else you choose.

Those newcomers are the ones, as I said in my first testimony, that are giving the career officers the bad reputation. Sure, there are some bad ones even in the career service, but those are the ones that are doing the harm.

I wrote to the Department a few weeks ago and said: "Will you please give me the number of Foreign Service officers in 1947, 1941, and 1937?" I also asked for the present-day figure. And the same for the clerks.

Mr. Grimes. That is for 4 years?
Mr. Braden. Also the budgets on those. I get a reply from the Department which seems to me utterly ludicrous when addressed to me as a former Assistant Secretary of State, or even as just a private citizen.

It seems to me that the data could be given out. The answer on that is:

With respect to personnel and budgetary figures which you request, I am informed by the administrative staff of the Department that because of their complexity—

I don't know where the complexity is.

Mr. Grimes. You asked for 4 sets of employees for 4 years?

Mr. Braden (reading):

Because of their complexity they cannot be released to you. Many requests for similar statistics are being made by various committees of Congress and by several groups studying the personnel problems of the Department.

In answering these requests the administrative staff believes it important to have members of the Department on hand to answer questions and to follow up with respect to any further clarifying details desired.

Mr. Sourwine. May I respectfully suggest that Mr. Braden be asked to put his letter and the reply into the record?

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of it.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 367 and 368" and are as follows:)

Exhibit No. 367

February 26, 1954.

Hon. Robert F. Woodward,

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Dear Bob: Recently going through my files, I failed to find copy of my dispatch from Buenos Aires, dated September 27, 1937, entitled "The ABC Powers and the Chaco Peace Conference." Probably it has been misplaced and will show up in due course, but in the interim, if it is not too much trouble, I wonder if you could arrange to have a copy struck off and sent to me. This, of course, was written during my tour as Ambassador and chairman of our delegation in the Chaco Peace Conference. It had evidenced some prophetic ability on my part of which I am rather proud.

Under date of January 16, 1954, I sent Lou Halle a copy of my statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, in which I defended the career service. My next appearance before the committee is scheduled for 2 or 3 weeks hence. In order to be prepared for their questioning, I would deeply appreciate it if you could give me the following figures:

Number of Foreign Service career officers as of 1935, 1941, 1947, and 1953.

Number of foreign clerical staffs for 1935, 1941, 1947, and 1953.

Number of Department employees in 1935, 1941, 1947, and 1953.

Department and Foreign Service budgets for these same years.

Lastly, for the strictly confidential information of yourself and your associates, I am disposed to believe that the Brazilian delegation at Caracas, which has instructions to cooperate, as always, with our delegation, will do so with even greater enthusiasm, by reason of their being in possession of a copy of Perón's speech last December to the high-ranking military officers (major and up) in Buenos Aires.

Maria joins me in sending you both our affectionate greetings.

As ever,

Yours,
Hon. Spruille Braden,
320 East 73d Street, New York, N. Y.

Dear Spruille: In reply to your letter of February 26, I regret that it will not be possible to send you a copy of the dispatch to which you refer. The document is classified, and in reviewing it, we in the Bureau believe that it should not be declassified. Under the Department's security regulations you will appreciate that it would be a violation for me to send you a copy.

With respect to the personnel and budgetary figures which you request, I am informed by the administrative staff of the Department that, because of their complexity, they cannot be released to you. Many requests for similar statistics are being made by various committees of Congress and by the several groups studying the personnel problems of the Department. In answering these requests, the administrative staff believe it important to have members of the Department on hand to answer questions and to follow-up with respect to any further clarifying details desired.

Your hunch with respect to the cooperation of the Brazilian delegation at Caracas proved correct although I doubt that we would attribute it to the incident which you mention.

I am sorry that I cannot be more helpful to you in this reply.

With best wishes to you and Maria,

Sincerely,


Senator Watkins. To whom was that?

Mr. Braden. To a friend of mine.

Senator Watkins. I thought it was one of the officials.

Mr. Braden. Yes. This is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

The Chairman. That memorandum has been made a part of the record.

Mr. Braden. Yes.

I would suggest that this afternoon or tomorrow morning that I sit down with whomever you designate and give them all of these various things.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mandel will handle that.

Senator Butler. Is it a fair statement to make that while the top echelon has changed, the people who really make the policy are the same people that have been there for years?

Mr. Braden. That is my conviction.

Senator Watkins. How do they make the policy?

Mr. Braden. It is a complicated process, but it goes 'way down the line.' It extends up to the United Nations in my opinion.

First of all it may be merely somebody on the desk that is in a very low position. But some of these people I have described may represent a large office. In the instances of these young Soviets, or these meetings in my office, these people would come in, would have the same color of authority that I had, and insist that they had to be consulted before any decision was made. They could overrule even an Assistant Secretary of State. I learned that several times.

Then these collectivists, even though underlings, would draw up these papers proposing policies and action and with the tremendous volume of work coming on the top echelon, the Secretary of State, or even the Assistant Secretaries, frequently they cannot go over every single one of these papers. The decisions are made by these people working at the lower levels writing these papers, writing the agreements, doing all the rest of it.
They are pretty cagey about it. They can make some pretty good arguments as to why such and such a thing should be done. They take advantage of their superiors' ignorance of a given area or subject. Because of my long experience both in business and diplomacy in Latin America, I happen to know the ground so thoroughly that I could not have that pulled on me.

But I am sure that it is pulled very frequently there by these subordinates all down the line.

Until you get rid of these collectivists and their ilk, I don't think you are going to cure the situation.

Senator Watkins. Do you know how to get rid of them?

Mr. Braden. I have prepared a brief statement on what I think is the way.

No. 1. I think this committee, as I say in the statement, should continue its work in order to explore not only the Communists but all of these other people that are around.

Then I emphasize my experience as chairman of the New York City anticrime committee where we have found that it is frequently difficult to name names and pinpoint facts, but if we expose the pattern on the New York waterfront or the garment industry or the building trades or the railways, whatever it may be, then we catch up with a lot of gangsters who otherwise we wouldn't catch. Or if we do, we only get them on perjury charges, or we get them on evasion of income taxes, or something of that kind.

Therefore, I am very keen about this proposition of these various patterns. That is the reason I refer to the pattern that I have here of my continued warnings being ignored.

I have several other patterns. The pattern in these meetings in the State Department with these people coming in there was a very definite pattern in which a collectivist ideology was expressed. They were against private investment. They were against the protection of the legitimate interests of the United States.

Senator Watkins. Have you any definite information that sort of thing is occurring now in the Department?

Mr. Braden. I think that it is pretty apparent that it is occurring in the Department because our legitimate interests and our private enterprises are not being supported the way they should.

Senator Watkins. Can you give us the information as to the names of those who are influencing that?

Mr. Braden. I can't give the names, but I repeatedly see where the United States, in our business operations abroad, does not get the full support that we should have.

Mr. Grimes. Perhaps you can give Senator Watkins some examples of that type of thing that went on while you were there.

Senator Watkins. I understand that, but what I am interested in now is the question of whether we are getting any kind of service in the Department. If it is the same thing, then I think we ought to know who is responsible for it, the names of those who are working as they did in the days that you were there.

Mr. Braden. I can't tell who is responsible.

The Chairman. He cannot name names, but it is our job to look into the pattern of operation.

Senator Watkins. I certainly have the right to inquire if he knows the names.
Mr. Braden. I don't know the names today.

Senator Watkins. He said there were a lot of the same people that were there who were around today.

Mr. Braden. I see them around.

Senator Watkins. You can name them?

Mr. Braden. In this meeting I described there were over 20. One I have particularly in mind came up in connection with the Havana Tramways Co.

Mr. Grimes. Why don't you tell that and who was there. Then a check can be made as to who is still there.

Senator Watkins. He said he sees them around.

Mr. Braden. If I can go back, I have to tell what happened in connection with the Tinguaro Sugar Mill, because that sets the pattern for what happened on the tramways.

While I was American Ambassador in Cuba, this sugar mill burned down. It so happened Saladrigas' successor as Prime Minister was in my office at the Chancery one afternoon. He said, "We are going to intervene." This is the way Mr. Truman proposed to take over the steel industry.

They were going to take over the Tinguaro Sugar Mill because the owners of that company had not made provisions for the mill workers. This mill had burned down just before the crop was to start being cut.

It concerned the mill workers. I did not want intervention or the taking over of any United States enterprise. I said, "Wait a moment before you do that. What is wrong?"

The premier replied: "Mr. Keiser, the president of the company, is unreasonable."

I said, "Let me talk to him."

I got Mr. Keiser and had a talk with him; as a result I acted more or less as a mediator, but reached a settlement of that disagreement for which I was thanked by both the Prime Minister and Mr. Keiser.

At the time I said, "Look, this problem is going to arise again next year because self-evidently that mill is worse than marginal. It has operated for the last 20 years and only made a profit in 2 of the years. It would be foolish for this company to rebuild the mill. Both of you should get busy and see these millworkers are located at other jobs."

They both assured me they would do so. Mr. Keiser did. He got a number of these millworkers other jobs.

At the end of the year, however, there were these millworkers hanging around, at which point the Prime Minister proceeded to intervene and take over that mill.

When that happened, as Ambassador, I naturally felt that I had to protect the legitimate interests of the United States stockholders. I did so in a memorandum to the Cuban Government in which I said that if this seizure were tantamount in whole or in part to an expropriation, my Government expected adequate, effective, and prompt compensation to be paid for this company.

Much to my consternation, the State Department, the Office of American Republics Affairs did not agree with me. They thought the Cubans were right on this; that it was all right to take over this American property.

Not only did they tell me that, but they actually told Cuban officials that. They told the lawyer for Mr. Keiser that.
Fortunately, by being vigorous about it on the ground, I was able to make this note of mine about an expropriation without compensation stick.

The thing was finally accommodated by a group of Cubans buying the mill at a handsome price, which more than satisfied Mr. Keiser, and the whole thing was adjusted.

Senator Watkins. Are those same fellows that argued that way men that were in the State Department and are still there?

Mr. Braden. Mr. Duggan has, of course, since died. His assistant, Mr. Bonsal, is in the State Department. He is not in American Republic Affairs. I don’t know the division.

Senator Watkins. Was he one of those arguing?

Mr. Braden. He stated to me over the telephone that he agreed with the Cuban intervention; he remonstrated at my taking a vigorous stand and thought I was pretty much out of order. But I took it, anyway.

Senator Watkins. Can you name any more of them that were there?

Mr. Braden. If I can continue, we will get to the others.

Then the years went by, and I got back to the State Department. Meantime, the Cuban administration had changed. The American-owned tramway company in Habana had a strike. They had great difficulty in adjusting the strike. In fact, it wasn’t adjusted. The Cuban Government proceeded to intervene and take over the American-owned tramway company.

I immediately called my successor in Cuba, Mr. Norweb, who was Ambassador, on the telephone. I said, “Harry, get out my notes on the Tinguaro sugar mill where I used the expression ‘This is tantamount to an expropriation, in whole or in part, and we expect adequate, effective, and prompt compensation,’ and put in a note to the Cuban Government along those lines saying the same thing. That may solve the situation.”

Harry said, “All right, I will do that, but will you please confirm your instruction to me by cable?”

I was new in the Department. I didn’t know the regulations. So I immediately called in my stenographer and I dictated a cable confirming my instructions to our American Ambassador. I sent it on the way.

That afternoon at about 6:30 or a quarter to 7, I was called by one of the old career departmental service people and a very fine person for whom I have great admiration, Mrs. Blanche Halla, who is Chief of the Division of Liaison and Review, which had to check everything going out. She said, “Mr. Secretary, you have sent out this telegram?” I sent it out. She said, “There are all of these offices and divisions in the Department: also there are the Department of Labor and some other outside agencies that all have a sayso on this. You have got to get their initials on this telegram before it can be sent.”

I knew the job of getting any number of initials on a telegram. Unless you took an officer and sent him around individually to each person to argue it out, it would take days before you could get it out. Any delay in this tramway matter very likely would have lost the opportunity to get this matter settled.

So I pleaded with her. “For heaven’s sake, I have given this instruction orally. The Ambassador won’t act until he gets the confirmation. Please can’t you get it out?”
She very graciously agreed to send it out without these other initials. I suppose she was breaching the regulations, but as Assistant Secretary I took the responsibility.

Senator Watkins. Did you get reprimanded for that?

Mr. Braden. I am coming to that.

Within 24 hours, I think, or certainly 36 hours, or thereabouts, the strike was settled. The intervention ceased. The company got the tramways back. Everything was fixed.

About a week later, Mr. Briggs and Mr. Wright came in to me and said, "Good God, Spruille, you have gotten yourself into the darndest jam there is. You have completely violated regulations here."

I said, "What have I done?"

They said: "You had to have these initials. You had no right to send that telegram without all these initials. These people are up in arms and they insist on an audience with you to protest what you have done."

The harm had been done, but I said, "All right, bring them in. Make an appointment and I will explain it has been successful; that we have satisfactorily settled the intervention. I will try and put their minds at rest and express my regrets that my ignorance of regulations was the reason I did not get their initials."

So they came in. There were at least 20 of them. They had 1 principal spokesman and 2 or 3 others there to back him. You can get their names out of the record if there was one of that conference. I don't remember the names of any of them.

Senator Watkins. They were not responsible for the setting up of regulations?

Mr. Braden. They were not responsible. But they had authority because they were supposed to have initialed the telegram to Ambassador Norweb.

What saved my neck on the thing was that I began by saying: "All right, gentlemen, what is it you have on your mind?" They cut loose and they really were pretty violent about it. They said that I had interfered with the rights of labor. They made that the issue.

They alleged that this was a strike and I, by taking this action, arbitrarily, without consulting them, was intervening with the rights of Cuban labor.

In short, according to them, I was a terrible person and this interference with labor's right to strike was awful. Everything was wrong.

They went ahead.

This one man who acted as spokesman gave his little oration there and 2 or 3 others spoke. When they go through and came to a breathing spell, I asked "Is that all?" Yes, that was it. I was greatly relieved because they had me cold on the regulations, but on the defense of United States property rights I was right.

I said, "Wait a moment. As Assistant Secretary of State it is my duty to protect American property rights and I propose to do it as long as I am Assistant Secretary of State. I haven't mentioned labor. I haven't mentioned the strike, either, in my telephone conversation to Mr. Norweb, or in my telegram of confirmation, the subject never having come up. You are totally out of order and good day, gentlemen. The conference is over."

That is a typical instance of the kind of thing we had. I can read later 10 pages of instances of various kinds where as Ambassador I
completely failed to get the support to which I was entitled. I found in these meetings that there was this attitude that American property interests were not deserving of protection. These invaders of the Department play along and give reason to any foreign government which takes over either a sugar mill or tramways or other properties.

Senator Watkins. You feel now that same sort of situation exists in the Department at the present time?

Mr. Braden. I don't think offhand of any recent instance on it, but I am sure I could find it. I know that is the type of attitude that prevails.

We talk about point 4 and getting private investment abroad. If we would get back to protecting American investments and the interests of American citizens generally, there would be a better chance of getting some investment abroad.

Senator Watkins. I agree with you on that little inspection I made in Europe this last summer.

The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. Sourwine. I had asked you if you recalled the documents you had in mind when you talked about documents which might have been destroyed or hidden away. Apparently you did not recall because your answer went into something else.

Were you not talking about agreements respecting the Panama bases?

Mr. Braden. Those documents, when I called for them I was able to get them.

Mr. Sourwine. Where did you get them? Where did you call for them?

Mr. Braden. I was Assistant Secretary of State and I told my boys to get them. I suppose out of the central files.

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, they were filed in the State Department?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. That would be a starting point for the committee?

Mr. Braden. Yes. Those documents were there and they should be there today.

Mr. Sourwine. You don't have those agreements, particularly the agreement that used the words "definitive treaty of peace"?

Mr. Braden. I don't have a single document on that. As I said, I am testifying from memory and it has been several years ago. But, nevertheless, what I have said is substantially correct.

Mr. Sourwine. It is a loose end. The document is the best evidence and the committee, I am sure, will want to try to get it.  

1The agreement for the lease of defense sites in the Republic of Panama, approved by the Panamanian Government and the National Assembly of Panama, May 11, 1943, and published by the Department of State in its Executive Agreement Series 359, includes as article 1, the following:

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the temporary use for defense purposes of the lands referred to in the Memorandum attached to this Agreement and forming an integral part thereof. These lands shall be evacuated and the use thereof by the United States of America shall terminate one year after the date on which the definitive treaty of peace which brings about the end of the present war shall have entered into effect. If within that period the two Governments believe that, in spite of the cessation of hostilities, a state of international insecurity continues to exist which makes vitally necessary the continuation of the use of any of the said defense bases or areas, the two Governments shall again enter into mutual consultation and shall conclude the new agreement which the circumstances require."

The national authorities of the Republic of Panama shall have adequate facilities for access to the defense sites mentioned herein.
I know time is getting on. I have a number of questions that I would like to go over. May I respectfully ask you to keep your answers brief?

You offered for the record the speech of the Panamanian Minister. That was a published account of that speech?

Mr. Braden. It is a newspaper clipping of what he said in the assembly.

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know who translated it?

Mr. Braden. No.

Mr. Sourwine. You spoke of an incident which occurred when you met with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Hiss on the subject of the Panama report.

Do you recall that?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Where did that meeting take place?

Mr. Braden. In Mr. Acheson's office.

Mr. Sourwine. Who else was there, if anyone, besides yourself?

Mr. Braden. I don't think anyone else was there.

Mr. Sourwine. Just the three of you?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. When you left was Hiss still there?

Mr. Braden. I believe I left him there.

Mr. Sourwine. You found him there, as best you recall?

Mr. Braden. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. Sourwine. You remember you were discussing the matter of the dollar and its position in Cuba with relation to the White report. You used the phrase "The dollar was legal tender in Cuba."

Did you mean just that?

Mr. Braden. Yes, it was entirely legal tender at that time. It was the same whether you had dollars or pesos.

Since then the Cuban peso is the only legal tender.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean the Government of Cuba had provided that the dollar was legal tender in Cuba?

Mr. Braden. When you get to a strict legal interpretation of tender, I am not sure that I can answer, because I am not a lawyer, but you could pay for anything with dollars just the same as you used pesos.

You saw more dollars than pesos.

Mr. Sourwine. Were they worth more?

Mr. Braden. Just the same.

Mr. Sourwine. Were there any exchange controls?

Mr. Braden. No.

Mr. Sourwine. A dollar was worth a peso and a peso was worth a dollar?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. That has been true for a number of years in Canada.

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. At the present time?

Mr. Braden. Excepting there has been a change.

Mr. Sourwine. The dollar is not quite worth the peso.

Does the White report provide for exchange controls?

Mr. Braden. It didn't provide for exchange controls. All you have to do is look at the record of every other Republic in this hemisphere and the world to know what would have happened.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you state in your opinion if the White report had been adopted exchange controls would have been inevitable in Cuba?
Mr. Braden. That was my opinion.
Mr. Sourwine. Do they have them there?
Mr. Braden. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Is the dollar still circulating freely in Cuba?
Mr. Braden. Pretty freely, although they have a little restriction on it.
Mr. Sourwine. Is the dollar still worth a peso and vice versa?
Mr. Braden. Yes. I think strictly speaking on a large transaction that the peso is a little bit off from the dollar, but I am not even sure of that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of the White report?
Mr. Braden. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where the committee can get a copy?
Mr. Braden. I assume that the State Department and the Treasury Department must have copies of that. Of course they have.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you turn in the copy you had as Ambassador?
Mr. Braden. That was left in the files in Habana.
Mr. Sourwine. How long is the White report as a physical document?
Mr. Braden. As a physical document I remember its being about three-quarters of an inch to an inch thick; the particular copy I had. I don't remember whether it was—
Mr. Sourwine. Is it legal size?
Mr. Braden. That copy I had I don't think was legal size.
Mr. Sourwine. You know whether it was bound on the end or the side?
Mr. Braden. It was bound, and I think it was bound in a paper cover. I am not sure of that.
Mr. Sourwine. Mimeographed or typed?
Mr. Braden. I think it was typed.
Mr. Sourwine. That copy that you went over paragraph by paragraph with Dr. Saladrigas, how long did it take you to go over it?
Mr. Braden. I don't remember exactly because my method of working with Dr. Saladrigas was we would meet at his office or mine. We would usually have lunch together at the Embassy or a restaurant in a private room. I would bring along an agenda of questions and we would spend 2 or 3 hours together going over these things. It was in one of those meetings.
I would say in going over that report, and this is just recollection, we probably must have spent three-quarters of an hour to an hour. That didn't mean reading each paragraph. It meant reading the paragraphs or the phrases to which I objected, so we didn't have to read the whole report.
Mr. Sourwine. You actually did go through it page by page?
Mr. Braden. Every objection I had I went through, and stated the paragraphs and the parts to which I objected.
Mr. Sourwine. You wrote a letter to Secretary Hull about the White report. Do you have a copy of that?
Mr. Braden. No. I should clarify. I have gone through such personal files as I can get at, but I have only gotten back into 1945
and a few odd files that were not in the books that my secretaries have set apart for me of personal files.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have a copy of your dispatch to the State Department with regard to your action in the case of the White report?

Mr. Braden. I have not located a copy of that yet, and I may not have it.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of the State Department's reply which you say implied that you must be in the pay of these banks?

Mr. Braden. No. I don't find anything. The nearest I have are some notes jotted down which are very summary on the subject.

Mr. Sourwine. You were asked who signed that reply, and you said you assumed it was signed by Hull. Do you have any better recollection on who signed it? This was a document which insulted you by the implication that you must be in the pay of certain banks. I imagine you felt rather strongly.

Can't you remember who signed it?

Mr. Braden. I don't remember who signed it or whether it was signed. Sometimes these go out without signature. At the bottom "Cordell Hull" is typed in, and nothing else. To really know the story you have got to get to the departmental files and get the initials on those files in order to see who wrote it and who had to do with it.

Mr. Grimes. Hull's name may have been on it?

Mr. Braden. Yes, but I don't recall.

Mr. Grimes. You don't recall?

Mr. Braden. No. I did not take any affront at Cordell Hull because I knew well that he was not sending any such message as that.

Mr. Sourwine. After you got that reply you then did call in these bank managers?

Mr. Braden. No. The reply had not reached me when I had the meeting. I waited until I sent my dispatch because I wanted to do it all on my own. I didn't think it proper for me to call in the bank managers until I had done it, and then to check and find out whether I was right or wrong.

Mr. Sourwine. So by the time you got the reply accusing you of having talked with these bank managers—

Mr. Braden. By then I had talked with them, but I didn't talk with them before I sent the message to the Department because I made a point of it.

Mr. Sourwine. You have stated you got explicit orders to get back and change your attack on this and you refused to do that. Were you disciplined ever for that?

Mr. Braden. No, because I put it on the basis I was sent to Cuba to protect the interests of the United States and to maintain friendly relations with the Cubans. Self-evidently if this thing went through and caused chaos, it would destroy friendly relations.

Therefore, I could not, as Ambassador, do it.

Mr. Sourwine. If you had been completely in the wrong in the violation of that order, it is probable you would have been disciplined, isn't it?

Mr. Braden. I think I would have been fired. I should have been if I had been wrong on that.
Mr. Sourwine. You stated you got a copy of this White report before you left to go to Cuba?

Mr. Braden. The afternoon before I left.

Mr. Sourwine. Presumably you read it on the way?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. After you got down there you checked on your original impressions which you say were bad?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. With whom did you check?

Mr. Braden. I just made my own check of what were the conditions in Cuba, what were the various situations that I felt might be bad.

Mr. Sourwine. You didn’t talk to anybody about it?

Mr. Braden. I talked to members of my staff, Mr. Briggs, who was counselor of the Embassy, I undoubtedly talked with Mr. Nufer, who was the economic counselor of the Embassy.

Mr. Sourwine. You didn’t go outside the Embassy?

Mr. Braden. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Until after your action?

Mr. Braden. I didn’t go outside of the Embassy until I went to the Prime Minister and said, “Look, I am very much worried about this. Here is the story.”

Mr. Sourwine. Jumping forward again, were you thoroughly familiar with all of the operations of the OSS?

Mr. Braden. No. I was not at all familiar with them, because the OSS did not operate in Latin America.

Mr. Sourwine. You made some statements about the OSS—I won’t attempt to quote you, but they were generally derogatory. Were you talking about all the work of the OSS, or were you talking only about portions of it that you knew about? In what area were you criticizing the OSS?

Mr. Braden. I was criticizing them in a memorandum that I think I sent to Mr. Russell on November 30, 1945. I said that I was informed that ARA—Office of American Republics Affairs—had made only 3 or 4 requests of OSS for information or reports. Having its own analysis section, ARA requested the help of the OSS only in response to repeated proffers of assistance made by that organization which explained that it had personnel available for such work.

Because it was short handed, ARA availed itself of these offers on certain special emergency projects in order to expedite its work.

Those requests were before I became Assistant Secretary. In the memorandum to Mr. Russell, I said:

Pursuant to an early decision, OSS has never had field representatives in Latin America. Therefore, it has had to rely principally on published material or such material as the State Department or other Government agencies made available to it. No action by ARA has been induced or influenced by the aforementioned facilities supplied by OSS. It is my conviction that the establishment of a large organization such as appears to be contemplated would be tantamount to duplicating the work which ARA was established to perform.

Mr. Sourwine. Perhaps I misunderstood you. As I got the context of what you said, the OSS was inefficient and incompetent.

I wanted to know in what area you were making that comment. If I misunderstood you, I am sorry.

Mr. Grimes. Or what was the source of your opinion.
Mr. Braden. The source was my subordinates in that office, whom I called in and with whom I checked.

For instance, I say that I can find no record of any request by ARA for political studies of current developments and trends in Latin America listed as point A under assignments now in progress in the Latin American Section of OSS.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have particular complaint about some work that OSS had done? That it was inefficient?

Mr. Braden. I am looking for that. It is in here.

ARA did request a series of basic studies referred to in point C. This request having been made more than 2 years ago when the OSS volunteered its services in any research which the Department would find helpful.

So far a basic study of only one country has been received in response to our request.

Also, about 2 years ago the Department suggested to OSS that it might make a report on transportation and communication projects affecting the area of Bolivia and Paraguay.

So far as I can determine this report was never completed.

Mr. Sourwine. This is what you had reference to when you previously referred to OSS?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. May I respectfully suggest that Mr. Braden be asked to offer that memorandum for the record in full?

Mr. Braden. Yes.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 369" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 369

November 3, 1945.

A-R—Mr. Russell

Operations of the OSS in regard to Latin America

I am informed that ARA has made only 3 or 4 requests of OSS for information or reports. Having its own analysis section, ARA requested the help of the OSS only in response to repeated proffers of assistance made by that organization, which explained that it had personnel available for such work. Because it was short handed ARA availed itself of these offers on certain special emergency projects in order to expedite its work.¹

Pursuant to an early decision, OSS has never had field representatives in Latin America; therefore, it has had to rely principally upon published material or such material as the State Department or other Government agencies made available to it.

¹ With reference to that part of the Intelligence and Research Report on the functions of Latin America Division, the following is pertinent:

(1) I can find no record of any request by ARA for "political studies of current developments and trends in Latin America" listed as point (a) under assignments now in progress in the Latin American Section of OSS. Political studies are in any case already a function of ARA.

(2) ARA did request the series of basic country studies referred to in point (c), this request having been made more than 2 years ago when the OSS volunteered its services in any research which the Department would find helpful. So far a basic study of only one country has been received in response to our request.

(5) Also, about 2 years ago, the Department suggested to OSS that it might make a report on transportation and communication projects affecting the area of Bolivia and Paraguay. So far as I can determine, this report was never completed.

(4) In connection with special work in assembling and reviewing information on the Argentine question, last January the Department asked the OSS to assist in regard to certain problems, notably the pro-Nazi press in Argentina, of which that agency had complete files. At the present time the Department is also using the services of some of the personnel from the Latin American Section for an emergency project of similar character. Here again it should be noted that ARA lacks personnel to perform these special rush jobs.

(5) Other reports which the OSS has given to the State Department have been entirely voluntary. Although they have been read by desk officers with the same interest that would be attached to any report on conditions in Latin America, they are not considered to have contributed information which was not already available to the Department or to have affected the formulation of departmental policy.
No action by ARA has been induced or influenced by the aforementioned facilities supplies by OSS.

It is my conviction that the establishment of a large organization such as appears to be contemplated would be tantamount to duplicating the work which ARA was established to perform (see p. X–1 of Department Order 1301) and for which it is far better equipped since most of our officers have had actual field experience and all of them are acquainted with the reporting sources and, therefore, can far better evaluate the information received than can the proposed Office of Intelligence and Research.

To have such duplication of effort can only result in confusion for all concerned.

So long as the much needed and competent personnel is made available to ARA (conceivably a few of the OSS experts could be absorbed by ARA Research and Analysis Section) and a system is established whereby information respecting Latin America but emanating elsewhere in the world is promptly made available to this office, the need for the proposed new division is not evident.

What we do need is a competent counterespionage organization, such as has been supplied during the war by the FBI operating at all times under the direction of the Department and our respective diplomatic missions. This is a pressing problem since FBI plans a radical reduction or elimination of its activities by December 31.

SERRUILE BRADEN.

A–Br: SBraden: JW

The CHAIRMAN. The staff will sit down with Mr. Braden and go over these matters which are pertinent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You referred to the meetings and discussions in regard to the proposed Office of Research and Intelligence.

Do you recall whether any one was there besides Acheson, Thorpe, Matthews, Henderson, Russell, and yourself?

Mr. BRADEN. There were some others present. I have forgotten who. It was a big meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they officials or clerical personnel?

Mr. BRADEN. They were high officials in the Department, either Assistant Secretaries or directors of divisions or offices.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were minutes of that meeting kept?

Mr. BRADEN. I haven’t the remotest idea. I didn’t see anybody taking minutes. There surely must be a memorandum by someone, Mr. Acheson or someone.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke of meetings with 3 to 20 people with the same authority as yourself, or the same color of authority as yourself. You were at that time Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. BRADEN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can’t you tell us any of the people, these 3 to 20 people, who had the same authority as you?

Mr. BRADEN. This tramways case I just related: I don’t remember who was in on that. I remember one case. I don’t know whether it was that meeting. I think it it was the meeting on the tramways, although I can’t for the life of me understand why they should be present.

It might have been another meeting. I remember one of these big meetings in which my office was filled with people and that Ralph Bunche came in. I don’t even remember what his office was.

I think he was with Dependent Areas in 1945. It might have been some other meeting. I remember his being there because he has become famous since then.

Mr. SOURWINE. As Assistant Secretary there were not many people who had the same authority as you?
Mr. Braden. They exercised it the minute I tried to send out a tele-
gram or an instruction without having their initials on it. They im-
mmediately acquired the same authority.

Mr. Grimes. You mean the same authority in a particular matter?

Mr. Braden. Yes; they didn't have the same overall authority.

Mr. Sourwine. You have spoken of reports which you sent in from
Washington, from Cuba, and from Argentina. Are those also going to
be available?

Mr. Braden. I haven't the reports. I have this one of agenda for
Washington that I got from the State Department. I have 1 or 2
other reports that I happen to have in my files, but it is mostly my
notes and minutes.

Mr. Sourwine. You have a fairly thick file that you referred to
when talking about Colombia. Would that be made available?

Mr. Braden. Whatever I have. Everything I have said and any-
things I have is available.

Mr. Sourwine. You have referred several times to young Soviets
coming into meetings. You used the pronoun "they," "they," "they."

I wish you would try to name any of the names who were young
Soviets or who were the "they's" you referred to,

Mr. Grimes. Didn't you refer to the meeting as a Soviet?

Mr. Braden. Yes. My use of that—perhaps I misled you. I used
the expression that it was a "young Soviet" because I was so irritated
that, instead of having a chain of authority corresponding to the
responsibility and being a Presidential appointee and working as
the Assistant Secretary of State where I could carry through, I had
to have these meetings with everybody in them having a chance to
talk.

Mr. Sourwine. Then did I understand you did not mean to say
any person was a young Soviet?

Mr. Braden. No.

Mr. Sourwine. If you spoke of young Soviets coming into a meet-
ing, you misspoke yourself?

Mr. Braden. I didn't mean Communists. I don't know who were
Communists.

Mr. Grimes. A Soviet is a meeting?

Mr. Braden. Yes; that is the reason I used the expression.

Mr. Sourwine. The word has a somewhat different meaning. Do
you usually use the word to mean meeting?

Mr. Braden. No; I used that in a sense that these people were
against private enterprise, against our system and way of life gen-
erally.

Mr. Sourwine. These people? Who?

Mr. Braden. The ones who came.

Mr. Sourwine. Who were they?

Mr. Braden. I can't give you the names. In my statement that I
have asked to put in here I refer to an unidentifiable "they." That
unidentifiable "they" covers all of those people.

The Chairman. We want to thank you for your cooperation and we
feel sure your evidence has been very beneficial.

I want to instruct the staff to make a request of the State Depart-
ment for the record that has been testified about here his morning.
Further, I want the staff to sit down with Mr. Braden and go through this material and select that which is pertinent to this hearing and have it made a part of our record.

(The material follows at the end of Mr. Braden's testimony.)

Do you have anything else?

I have been informed by counsel that you have another statement that you would like to make before we recess.

You may do so.

Mr. Braden. I would be happy to make it if I may.

As set forth in my December 22, 1933, testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the very life of these United States may be destroyed by two interrelated threats:

I. The Moscow-inspired conspiracy to destroy our country by spreading communism throughout the rest of this hemisphere:

II. The fact that this undermining of our national security has been countenanced and even, at times, abetted by our own Government. This has been due largely to the invasion of Washington by shrewd and skillful individuals and groups, who hold and propagate ideas antagonistic to representative constitutional government and private property and enterprise.

The first danger is immediate and grave, increasing and spreading. The second danger is less spectacular and the threat to our security is neither so quickly nor easily accessible. Yet, in the end it is a greater danger than No. 1.

The second—i.e., the internal danger—involves what has been called the "inevitability of gradualness"—i.e., the almost imperceptible destruction, bit by bit, of the principles on which the United States of America was founded. By slow degrees those individuals and groups, whom I have described as invading the Federal Government— and in particular, our foreign operations—are corroding the Constitution and bill of rights. They would have us renounce the very cornerstone of our system of Government: That God made man in his own image and endowed him, as an individual person, with certain unalienable rights; that government is the servant and not the master of the people.

Instead, they propagate State interventionism with its corollaries of corruption and the creation of class prejudice. They spread collectivist ideologies, both in our internal and foreign affairs.

The majority of these invaders are neither Communists nor fellow travelers. But they have an affinity for extremist nostrums and are unwittingly the dupes or instruments of Soviet-directed communism, which they thus aid and abet.

Formerly, when we lived somewhat apart from the rest of the world, it was easier both to adhere to and repulse attacks on our pristine principles. Science, and especially the acceleration of transportation and communications, have erased much of the protective insulation we formerly had. As a result, we are assailed presently not only by Soviet expansionism and Moscow-directed communism, but by all manner of global collectivist theories.

The generation of these ideas, so utterly counter to our system, and so adverse to our enlightened rational self-interest, was augmented by World War II and is now facilitated by multilateral diplomacy operating through and in the numerous, uncontrollable and often obscure councils and committees of such organizations as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The latter has become sort of a combined affiliate and subsidiary of the world body.
The 72 multilateral international organizations, in which the United States participates, as they proliferate both their structures and activities—largely at the expense of United States taxpayers—are imposing superstatisms, over and above our National Government.

Superstatisms are worse than the purely national variety, which, at least, may retain some measure of patriotism and popular control. To the extent peoples come to accept superstatism and the collectivistic ideas which flow therefrom, they will be easier prey for Moscow's ambitions to impose world hegemony.

The greatest danger to the security and permanence of this Republic is that these statist and superstatist ideas, originating abroad, have been absorbed—often unconsciously—by so many United States officials, who in the aggregate exercise extraordinary influence, by reason of their employment in sensitive areas of Government, including the Department of State.

It is my impression that amongst these people, there are relatively few out-and-out Communists. But this is no reason to relax our precautions, because these few are so fanatically dedicated, and so trained in all the arts of deception, as to make them far more dangerous than mere numbers would indicate.

Moreover, they are rigidly disciplined and directed. Worst of all, they are able adroitly to inspire, guide, and impel the state-interventionists and "do-gooders," the misguided idealists and ignorant, to pursue collectivist and State-interventionist ideologies, which slowly but inevitably evolve into some form of totalitarianism.

These ideologies, given time, will destroy our representative constitutional Government, its religious and spiritual content and the general welfare built by our system of private property and individual initiative.

In my capacity as chairman of the New York City Anticrime Committee, I have observed that, in organized crime, the gangsters, even the top ones, could not themselves alone keep the "system" going. It is the politicians and authorities, labor and business leaders, and many others in different walks of life, who through cupidity or for favors, through ignorance, apathy or for other reasons, either aid and abet the hoodlums or tolerate continuance of the rackets. It is these elements of the general public, who knowingly or unknowingly sustain the "system," which otherwise would collapse.

Our local, State, and Federal Governments often have found it impossible to uncover and obtain proof, indict and convict notorious gangsters for the outrages they are known to have committed.

Sometimes, the real potentates of organized crime are not even mentioned or recognized to be what they are. Law enforcement authorities, even with full competency and integrity, are unable to name names and pinpoint facts.

Instead, they are reduced to the pathetically inadequate measures of imprisoning, for tax evasion or perjury, a few hoodlums, who, more often than not, are of minor category.

The New York City Anticrime Committee has found the most—perhaps the only—effective way to combat organized crime is to place and keep before the public the patterns of what has been or is now going on in the rackets. It is only by this procedure of exposing the patterns of the waterfront, labor pension funds, perishable foods,
building trades, harness racing, et cetera, that we are getting results in New York City.

Legislation alone will not do the job.

I believe a close analogy can be drawn in this particular between organized crime and the assault on our security through the infiltration and collectivization, bit by bit, of our Government. In either case, the patterns must be exposed before any substantial or lasting cure can be effected. So soon as the patterns are exposed and eliminated, the malefactors, be they gangsters or subversives, will be paralyzed and impotent. This will be true even if they remain unnamed and free from prosecution.

As I said on December 22, swarms of state-interventionists have been injected or absorbed into the agencies having to do with our foreign operations. Behind them, in the wings, developing and pushing plans, infiltrating not only our political structures, but education, the press, and elsewhere, exists an unidentifiable, but nonetheless effective, "they."

Here is where we may expect to find the dangerous Communists and traitors. "They" are diabolically ingenious and effective in both plans and methods. Get rid of one purportedly top echelon group—as was done in the trials before Judge Medina—and substitutes take over.

The state-interventionists and "do-gooders" often turn out to be puppets who can be juggled by "they." If the United States, and therefore civilization, are to survive, this anonymous "they" must be rendered impotent.

But how may this be done, if only on rare occasions we are able to expose and convict those who form this "they"?

To seek out and prosecute those who, knowingly or unknowingly, are merely the followers or dupes of "they," at most means getting relatively insignificant sinners and may entail our punishing some witless but innocent individuals.

If only now and again we are able to name names and pinpoint facts, how are we to block the "they" programs? How are we to defend ourselves against the insidious Communist and collectivist infiltrations and perversions?

We cannot and will not resort to totalitarian or any other practices which would deny the very principles and freedoms to which we are devoted.

The valuable and patriotic work of this subcommittee, of course, should be continued. That is imperative. But I respectfully suggest that, irrespective of how many Communists and traitors you expose and how important they may be, by reason of our aforesaided inabilities, the "system" which threatens our security will not be destroyed or even materially weakened. We must develop and employ other measures and weapons for our defense.

I urge that instead of attempting in the first instance to name names and pinpoint facts, we endeavor to expose those broad patterns within the area of foreign operations which demonstrate the existence of exotic influences and the degree to which these United States have departed from the principles laid down by the Founding Fathers.

In this latter connection, I wish parenthetically to emphasize that George Washington's Farewell Address enunciates a simple and brave foreign policy. It is as wise and valid today as when it was written. So long as we are guided by that address, no Communist, even if he penetrates our Government, will be able to harm us very much.
I wish to interpolate that in preparing for this hearing I have been able to review only a few of my personal files and none of my official ones, which are in the Department or the several embassies where I served.

Therefore, I must often depend more on memory than documents. Nevertheless, I hope my testimony may assist this distinguished subcommittee to search for and expose some of the broad patterns to which I have referred.

You will find, I am sure, that these patterns are measurably interrelated, sometimes overlapping, and converge to favor the ends sought by the Soviet.

When you gentlemen have uncovered and completed a thorough study of a number of these patterns, I believe the Congress, under your guidance, may competently prescribe such measures as will bring about a complete cure.

In my opinion, that cure will come when the American people and their Government, with a dedication equal to or surpassing that of the Communists, return to and abide by the basic principles of these United States, as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and, in foreign affairs, the Farewell Address.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

At this time the committee will stand recessed. We will reconvene again in executive session this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

(The following material was supplied by Mr. Braden after consultation with the subcommittee staff as instructed by Chairman Jenner:)

Exhibit No. 370

LIST OF DISPATCHES FROM EMBASSY AT HABANA

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<td>Proposed contribution of Cuban sugar workers to the war effort of the United Nations; transmitting copy of address to Ambassador Braden at closing session of fourth Congress of Sugar Workers of Cuba.</td>
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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT No. 371

HABANA, FEBRUARY 23, 1944.

Subject: Recent contact established between the Soviet Legation and the Cuban Army.

The honorable the Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir: I have the honor to report to the Department that the legal attaché has just informed me that last February 14 an individual connected with the official Cuban Army magazine El Cuatro de Septiembre requested Nora Chegodaeva, the Soviet Legation press attaché, to furnish him with 15 photographs and 4 or 5 articles for the Army publication. They made arrangements for a person of editorial talents to visit the Soviet Legation and choose the most suitable material.

It is the opinion of the legal attaché, in which I concur, that this arrangement offers an excellent opportunity for the U. S. S. R., through its Legation in Habana, to offer propaganda to the Cuban Army in a concealed but effective form.

Respectfully yours,

SPRUILLE BRADEN.

EXHIBIT No. 372

[Draft]

A-R: Mr. Russell.

URGENT NEED OF STRENGTHENING BOTH DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

The Department has before it at present two important projects which are receiving priority consideration—the establishment of a peacetime informational and cultural service, and the establishment of a coordinated intelligence service. Without minimizing the importance of these projects, it is submitted that there is an even more urgent need for strengthening both the Department and the Foreign Service.

The informational-cultural program and the intelligence program envisage the employment of hundreds of additional personnel and the appropriation of millions of dollars. Yet these projects can only operate successfully in the measure in which they are guided and implemented by the four geographical political offices of the State Department, and by our diplomatic missions in the field. It is hence more important and more urgent that we strengthen and develop the existing machinery than it is to establish this proposed new machinery.

During the brief period that I have been in the Department it has become apparent that our operations are very seriously hampered by personnel and space limitations at home, and by an acute shortage of personnel in the field. The present programs would superimpose the weight of added tasks and responsibilities on the present sound but underdeveloped foundation. It is my belief that this cannot and should not be done until we have repaired the foundation itself.

There is nothing the matter with our present organization that cannot be remedied if we obtain funds and personnel. I am not suggesting another reorganization of the Department. Far from it. In my opinion the present departmental organization is administratively sound, and that with respect to policy the arrangement regarding geographical offices is correct. The backbone of these policy-making offices is the "country desk officer." These officers are generally well equipped and possess sufficient detailed knowledge of the areas they handle. Give them adequate tools, including advisory and research facilities, and adequate immediate supervision as is provided for in the divisional setups by regions, and the Department has machinery fully capable of handling day-to-day problems that arise, and of furnishing policy recommendations to the respective geographic area directors, the Assistant Secretaries and other ranking officers of the Department.

The State Department and the Foreign Service have recently been subjected to renewed attack by the press, and the current Senate investigation has brought about a further impairment of public confidence in our organization. Practically everyone seems to agree that something must be done—and done promptly—but there is apparently much confusion regarding where the weaknesses lie and where to attack them. Some assert that the Department and Foreign Service must be better understood at home and our policies must be made clear abroad,
so that the most important immediate need is to establish a strong information service, supplemented by a cultural service, with counselors for public information and staffs sometimes equal in size to the present regular Foreign Service staffs to assist them. Others demand more counselors for economic affairs assisted by technicians in agriculture, labor, geology, forestry, etc. Still others recommend embarking on a worldwide intelligence service—and then undermine the prospects of success of any intelligence service by describing the kind of organization they think we should have. Still others recommend better allowances, a Foreign Service building plan, etc. Many of these suggestions are sound, but few of them have devoted sufficient attention to surveying our present equipment or estimating what that equipment means in order to function effectively.

It is time to take stock of what we already have and to determine the needs of the existing organization. It is time to strengthen that organization, to vitalize it, to centralize responsibility, and then to consider what in the way of new organization should be added to it. It is not, in my opinion, the time to set up new, or parallel, or superimposed organizations. Specifically, before we go about the employment for service at home and abroad of hundreds of additional persons to undertake additional or specialized functions, important though these may be, we should overhaul and strengthen the sound present foundation and give to its component parts authority and backing commensurate with their responsibility. This will require (1) that the line of responsibility in policy-making flow from the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries to the four political geographic offices. It should include reaffirmation of the proposition that these offices must have the final decision (subject of course to the respective Assistant Secretaries) in matters involving decisions on foreign policy. The technical divisions and offices should perform functions primarily advisory in character, (2) personnel—adequately paid—to staff both the Department and the field.

In a recent top-secret memorandum prepared for the Secretary's Staff Committee I expressed the opinion (with respect to problems facing us in our Latin American relations) that we cannot expect to cope successfully with them unless—

"1. Policy decisions in all fields affecting relations with the other American Republics are centered in ARA, equipped with the necessary personnel and integrated space.

"2. We have an enlarged and improved Foreign Service.

"3. We must have able and experienced chiefs of mission, adequately compensated.

"b. These competent ambassadors must be given policy directives and responsibility, with corresponding authority. They must exercise unquestioned control over all agents and agencies of our Government in each country. They must be fully supported by the Department.

"c. We have many able Foreign Service Officers who are discouraged by low pay, inadequate allowances, slow promotions and unwise policies during the war. The career must be made attractive, deadwood eliminated, and a drive made to get new men of the right type.

"d. Officers of the Department serving in ARA should be interchangeable with Foreign Service officers, and should be required to perform service abroad at minimum intervals. (Interchangeability would likewise be desirable between departmental and Foreign Service clerks). Technical and specialist personnel serving in nonpolitical divisions of the Department, and in other departments and agencies, should be available through flexible administrative procedure for temporary assignment to Latin America.

"e. The Foreign Service is not adequately understood either by the American people or by the Congress. Definite efforts should be made by the Department, through the press and other mediums of public opinion, to describe the work of the Foreign Service. Consideration might also be given to the assignment of a Foreign Service liaison officer to handle congressional relations."

To illustrate the type of obstacles to efficient operation encountered during my 10 weeks in the Department I may cite the following:

(1) Inadequate space for ARA. This was the subject of a recent memorandum giving specific information regarding our space needs.

(2) Return to ARA and the Latin American field of officers with broad previous experience and demonstrated capacity for service in that area. Two months ago a list of approximately — such officers was submitted to FP. It has not been possible thus far to obtain the release from service in Europe, the Near and Middle East, Asia, et cetera, of a single one of these officers. We are of course, prepared to surrender to other areas officers with similar specialized
background in those areas in Latin America; for example, an officer now in Cuba who had a fluent knowledge of Chinese.

(3) Notwithstanding abundant personnel seeking entry into the proposed informational-cultural and intelligence service, it has proved virtually impossible to bring the staff of ARA to the level already authorized or to fill new positions urgently required. I am by no means unaware of the splendid collaboration received in providing a special staff to handle the preparation of our case respecting Argentina, although it is pointed out that this required special directives and was handled on an extraordinary basis. In the case of the special work undertaken in respect to the problem of alien enemy internes brought from the other American Republics, we have not thus far been able to obtain the service of a handful of research assistants, notwithstanding the fact that innumerable persons in that category are understood to be available from OSS ranks. Moreover, our operations in ARA are somewhat harassed by the efforts of the interim ex-OSS organization to duplicate certain research and analysis functions already being carried out satisfactorily by ARA.

(4) Notwithstanding the theoretical interchangeability of ARA and field personnel, efforts over a period of weeks to send two ARA officers to the field have been altogether unsuccessful, and we are now informed that "it is regretted that it is not possible to consider such an assignment in view of the present lack of funds for that purpose." This is an intolerable situation completely defeating the purpose of legislation which has long been on the books.

**Exhibit No. 373**

**QUOTATIONS FROM THE DAILY WORKER**

**July 22, 1945:** "Imperialism"—how often have you read that word in these pages? And how often have you stopped to think of what it really means? * * * It was at Sewell, in a mine owned by the Braden Copper Co., an American corporation which I will tell you more about in a moment. * * * And what is the Braden Copper Co.? It was formed in the First World War by William Braden, an American mining engineer. His son, who is connected with the company today, is none other than Spruille Braden, the former American Ambassador to Cuba and the present American Ambassador to Argentina."

**July 25, 1945:** "Mr. Braden went as the 'appeasement of (sic) Ambassador,' as the figure who symbolized the new American policy of trying to win the Argentine Fascists over by recognizing them, coddling them at Mexico City, and putting down, red carpets for them at San Francisco."

**August 18, 1945:** "But there is no word that the United States Government or its Ambassador (Braden) is in touch with Patria Libre, the committee representing all democratic Argentine parties including the Communists * * * And Patria Libre is less enthusiastic than some groups in this country over the great achievements of Spruille Braden. It would prefer to see us get tough with Peron."

**August 28, 1945:** "While Braden is identified with opposition to the Farrell-Peron dictatorship, he is also, like Rockefeller, identified with powerful monopolist interests in Latin America. We should therefore not be surprised if our neighbors view with suspicion the type of men we appoint to supervise Latin American affairs."

The newspaper A Classe Operaria, published in Rio de Janeiro as the official news organ of the Communist Party of Brazil, in its first issue published on March 9, 1946, printed the text of the statement of the Communist Party of Brazil on the blue book. The statement reads:

"The executive committee of the Communist Party of Brazil, in a meeting held on February 16, 1946, made a detailed study of the statements contained in the so-called blue book made public by the Department of State of the United States. After a complete discussion of the subject, the executive committee concluded that the cited document is a definite indication of attempts being made by the most reactionary forces of investment capital to create an atmosphere of disorder in the continent assuming ostensibly a position of support or criticism of Latin American governments and political currents, and preaching foreign intervention against governments which they do not favor, for the purpose of protecting their interests and to stop the march of our people along the road of progress and democracy.
"2. The committee found, in addition to the above, justification for the constant warnings made by the Communist Party of Brazil against the preparation for war in Latin America by imperialist forces, as contained in the political manifesto read to the last plenary session of the national committee and other declarations made subsequently by members of this executive committee.

"3. The executive committee is firmly convinced that the document published by the Department of State of the United States is a symptom of the seriousness of the inter-imperialist fight in the continent, which is focused principally in the River Plate area, and that of the pretext of defending democracy preparations are being made for the breaking of diplomatic relations by American nations with the Argentine Republic as the first step for foreign intervention and war against that country. A war of that type, undertaken directly by agents of investment capital, such as Braden and others, would undoubtedly be an unjust war, inter-imperialist, directed mainly against democracy and the independence of the Latin American people, having as its particular objective the annihilation of the labor and popular movements in our countries.

"In addition, the problem of Argentina, raised by the Department of State outside of the United Nations Organization, constitutes an attempt to form a bloc of American nations, which is contrary to the interests of our peoples and a threat to the cause of world peace.

"4. As it applies to Brazil, the so-called blue book only confirms the well-known role of integralismo as the vanguard of the fifth column directly connected with the agents of the Axis in our land, and it is only strange that better known names, such as that of Felinto, Muller, and others, were not mentioned. The reference to the Falangist Amós also confirmed what we have consistently stated concerning the role of spies and traitors undertaken by the Ambassadors of Spain and Portugal in Brazil.

"5. The Communist Party of Brazil has always supported and will continue to support the fight of all peoples for democracy, for civil rights against reactionaries and Fascists, against the cruelties of the police and concentration camps. At the same time, however, it reaffirms its position of unalterable defender of the principle of self-determination by the peoples, a democratic victory included in the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, and strengthened by the victory over fascism, and that it is therefore ready to continue its fight to guarantee the Latin American people the right to decide for themselves all questions of domestic politics, using the weapons of democracy, such as the Argentine people already have, free from any foreign influences, since we know that the victory of democracy in a country is a result of the struggle of its own people and cannot come from the outside.

"Therefore, the Communist Party of Brazil warns all our people, as well as our brothers in other countries, that it is terribly disastrous to stimulate by any means an interventionist policy, which can be of interest only to the strongest nation in the continent, the only one capable of undertaking, economically and militarily, practical and efficient intervention."

Rio de Janeiro, February 16, 1946.

The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil.

Exhibit No. 374

Rio de Janeiro, January 24, 1946.

Unrestricted,
No. 4060.
Subject: Tribuna Popular on Braden's Speech.

The Chargé d'Affaires a. i. has the honor to transmit a clipping of an editorial in Tribuna Popular, Communist daily, on Secretary Braden's most recent speech. There follows an abstract of this editorial, in its turn quoting liberally from Luiz Carlos Prestes' speech at the closing session of the Communist Party "plenum" (See Despatch No. 4010 of January 16).

"Nothing better than Mr. Braden's latest speech shows how right Prestes is in warning us against the danger of a war with the Argentine people, in which Brazil would be involved by colonizing capital. The language of the diplomat of the Braden Baurk family is ever more threatening, in his efforts to lead local opposition once more into armed struggle, which would be an excuse for even worse. Argentina is divided into two inimical and unreconcilable factions, driven by hate, and on the side of one of them is openly placed the former and
famous Ambassador of Cuba, encouraging it, pushing it on, as if to say, 'Go ahead, friends, for here we are, the colossus, to help you. Buenos Aires is the new citadel of Nazism, since Berlin fell, and you are the new army of democracy organized to conquer it. Free the world from Nazism. Count on us and on the rest of the American countries.'

"But does this Nazi-Fascist Argentina really exist in 1946, enslaving and oppressing its people, and threatening Brazil, for example, with its armies on a war footing? Prestes made this point very clear in his closing speech at the pleno of the Communist Party. 'We see,' he said, 'that there is a strong pressure of monopolistic colonizing capital in Argentina, where there is a Government of the type called "South American," a military dictatorship. In that country, financial capital is today the most intransigent fighter against that Government—a reactionary Government, there is no doubt, but which is generally presented by Mr. Braden as a Nazi Government. Well, companions and fellow citizens, we all know that the Nazi residents in Argentina are no more widespread or dangerous than in Brazil. We know that the economic roots of Nazism survive in Argentina as in our country, perhaps deeper and more widespread here. This does not prevent our country from pacifically moving toward democracy, without benefit of any aid from Messrs. Braden and Berle, so intent upon protecting us with their belated democratic zeal.

"Mr. Braden, that most recent disciple of Ruy Barbosa, attempts to create conditions for civil war in Argentina, in short, and, by means of intrigue, a possible war between our people and the Argentine people. This war will be an imperialistic war, of struggle for raw materials, for wheat and malt markets, a war between English and American financial capital.

"Yes, there is a reactionary government in Argentina. But Chiang Kai-chek's government is many times more reactionary than the Farrell government.

"There is a factor that should not be lost sight of in the Argentine case: the old connections between Argentina and England. The Americans were always in a minority (there), thus the traditional opposition between the (Argentine) Chancellery and the State Department in Washington. In 1938, at the Lima Conference, Chancellor José María Cañizo, today an admirer of Mr. Braden's, scandalized all America, declaring that Argentina was a European nation on the continent."

Copy to Embassy at Buenos Aires.

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**Exhibit No. 375**

**Newspaper Accounts of Speeches by Prestes**

Diretrizes, Federal District, Rio, January 18, 1946: "A war is being manipulated between Argentina and Brazil."

Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, January 19, 1946: "The imperialists prepare a war between Brazil and Argentina."

Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, February 3, 1946: "Prestes submits his speech before a woman's conference."


Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, March 3, 1946: "Reactionaries and Fascists conspire against order."

Brazil-Portugal, Federal District, Rio, April 28, 1946: "Universities stirred up against communism."

(Above clippings attached to file in BA.)

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**Exhibit No. 376**

January 23, 1946.

A-Br/S—Mr. Spaeth.

BA—Mr. Mein.

**Statement of Luiz Carlos Prestes on This Government's Argentine Policy**

On January 13 Luiz Carlos Prestes, Secretary General and head of the Communist Party of Brazil, in addressing a plenary session of the Communist Party referred to the coups in Venezuela, Brazil and Haiti, and the threat of one in
Ecuador, as having been backed by “colonizing capital” attempting to prevent the democratization and “economic emancipation” of those countries. He then went on to state: “Now they are planning one more sinister maneuver. On the pretext that it is necessary to free Argentina from the claws of fascism, they are attempting to force the Brazilian people into a bloody conflict with the Argentine people. It is not purely accidental that Mr. Braden takes such an interest in the ‘fascist dictatorship’ in Argentina, while he says nothing about the situation in Portugal or about the friendly relations between his Government and that of falangist Spain. If the Government in Argentina is reactionary and is not supported by the people, it is up to the Argentine people to fight against the dictatorship and establish democracy in their country in the same way as we Brazilians are fighting for democracy in Brazil. We should not allow our people to become involved in a war as reactionary as this one into which these men plan to force us. Let us fight with all our might to avoid it, because it can be avoided. * * * Therefore, let us be on the alert so as not to be taken in by the maneuvers of the imperialists who wish to shed the blood of the Brazilian and Argentine people.”

In this connection telegram No. 52, January 22, from Managua may be of special interest.

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**Exhibit No. 377**

**January 29, 1946.**

A-Br. ARA—Mr. Briggs.

RA—Mr. Mein.

**Statement of Luiz Carlos Prestes Regarding Our Argentine Policy**

In addressing the general meeting of the Communist Party in Brazil in Rio de Janeiro on January 4, 1946, Luiz Carlos Prestes, leader of the Communists in Brazil, stated that the recent military coup in Venezuela and Brazil, the attempted coups in Panama, and the actions of the Apristas against democratic currents in Peru, were manifestations of the “aggressive spirit of the colonizing capital”. As to the Argentine problem he said: “There is nothing more serious * * * than Mr. Braden’s love for democracy, as well as his act of interest in the welfare of the Argentine people, while he says nothing about the Morinigo dictatorship or the friendly relations the American Government maintains with the falangist tyranny of France.” He added that the Communist Party was against breaking relations with Argentina, which would be “the first step toward a conflict which could easily result in war, an imperialist war which would be contrary to the interests of our peoples.”

The Tribuna Popular, the Communist newspaper in Brazil, on January 16 published a telegram which Prestes is reported to have addressed to General Morinigo, President of Paraguay, on behalf of the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil, requesting the abolition of the concentration camps, the granting of complete amnesty to political prisoners, and the permission for operation of political parties, including the Communist Party, as a guarantee of democracy and as the first step for the holding of free and honest elections which will “consolidate democratic liberties and the unity of the Paraguayan family, necessary to the defense of peace, and to the unity of the continent against the remnants of the Fascist and reactionary enemies of independence and of the liberty of nations.”

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**Exhibit No. 378**

**January 30, 1946.**

A-Br.

RA—Mr. Mein.

**Statements Made by Luiz Carlos Prestes on Our Latin American Policy**

In an interview to Diretrizes, Rio de Janeiro, on January 18, reprinted in the Tribuna Popular, the Communist paper, of January 19, Luiz Carlos Prestes is reported to have stated: “The breaking of diplomatic relations with Argentina, which would seem to me as apparently much desired by certain financial groups in Washington, would be a step toward war. From the breaking of diplomatic relations to an armed conflict—that would be the inevitable. We, however, will
not pull chestnuts out of the fire for anybody, nor will the Argentine people lend themselves to the drama now being played by the zealous and unexpected friendship of the type of Mr. Braden. We want to live in peace with Argentina as well as with the other nations. This is the determination of the Brazilian people, and we have nothing but good reasons to believe that this is the present policy of the Itamarati on this subject. We repudiate the idea of breaking diplomatic relations as unpopular and contrary to the interests of the two peoples."

Prestes did not discuss the internal situation in Argentina, which he considers to be a matter exclusively for the Argentines but he did add, "It is only necessary to observe what is now going on to reach the conclusion that the country is on the verge of having a revolution which will be provoked from the outside. The foreign enemies of Peron more than anybody else are afraid that he will win the election. Therefore, the only remedy is a coup. It is, therefore, not hard to come to the conclusion that conditions are now being created to foment a revolution before the elections which might easily result in a civil war. That is what the diplomats who are now placing pressure on the present Government want, now that the country has regained political liberty, amnesty, free press, and elections already set for the choice of representatives. Only now—it should be emphasized also in view of the Argentine situation—is it desired to intervene in the affairs of that nation."

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**Exhibit No. 379**

**EXCERPTS FROM SPEECH OF LUÍS CARLOS PRESTES DELIVERED AT SÃO PAULO, FEBRUARY 7, 1946**

"Before concluding, allow me to call your attention to the provocations of foreign colonizing capital, to the most reactionary capitalism, to the imperialism—principally English and North American imperialism—in our country** **."

"If we are to fight, principally the laborers, we must fight conscientiously, with conviction, for democracy, against high cost of living, for better salaries; you must be on guard against the provocateurs, against those who desire disorder in our country. ** **

"Constant vigilance is necessary against these men. Today they are trying to form an ideology in our land, a condition so extreme as a war against the Argentine people.

"It is one, Mr. Braden, of the Department of State. This same Department of State which maintains the best of relations with Franco's Falangist Spain, with Salazar in Portugal, with Moringo who tortures and assassinates the Para-guaraan people in concentration camps, shows itself to be an intransigent partisan of a democracy in Argentina, and in the name of an Argentine democracy is endeavoring to make our Government break relations with that country.

"We must, therefore, be alert. It is an imperialistic struggle which actually exists. Argentina is one of the only Latin American countries in which Yankee capital does not yet predominate. In Argentina, English capital predominates. Yankee capitalism intends to take advantage of the present moment to win a position in Argentina, the same as the position won in our country after the coup of 1930. Because if we were under English economic dominion until 1930, from 1930 on Yankee capitalism has predominated. It is a question, therefore, of a struggle for markets; it is a question of a dispute between imperialists. Consequently we are not the ones who should do the dirty work of these imperialistic lords.

"The Argentine Government is a dictatorship just as all the other well-known dictatorships of Latin America, ** ** the same type as the one from which we have just emerged only a few days ago. It is a South American dictatorship, but that dictatorship has already yielded a great deal on the road to democracy. In Argentina, where Mr. Braden declared that there was no democracy, there is a free press, there is freedom of reunion, of political association; and also the Communist Party exists, which publishes its newspapers freely and for the first time was registered electrolytically as a party which could participate in the coming elections. That Government, which is reactionary, is calling elections for the people, who should be the intervening force in their own country.

"Democracy in Argentina is a problem which concerns the Argentine people, and it is the Argentine people who will solve their problems.

"We have seen, here in our own country, that if we advanced on the road to democracy it was because we fought without ceding and we shouted loudly that
no Mr. Braden—nor Mr. Berle had the right to talk of the internal affairs of our country. That is why we are also against the proposals of Minister Larreta, who seeks intervention in any country in the name of democracy. * * *

"Which of the South American countries can really carry out an intervention in these terms? * * * Only the strongest—the United States of North America. They are the only ones capable of transforming this into reality. That is where they will begin; and from there on:

"For that reason the proposal of Minister Larreta is really nothing more than North American intervention in the internal affairs of our people.

"We are, therefore, against intervention of any kind. The problem of democracy in Argentina is a problem of the Argentine people. They will resolve it for themselves. In regard to the rupture of relations with Argentina, it is just the same as taking the first step toward war; and what will that war be? Will it be a just war? Will it bring about progress? Will it have some interest for our people?

"This would be an imperialistic war in which the blood of the Brazilian and Argentine people would be shed in the exclusive benefit of large foreign bankers, monopolists and colonizing capital.

"That is why we must be alert, vigilant; because the ideological preparation of that war has already been begun in our country and the bourgeois press will make use of all demagogic arguments in order to exploit the patriotic sentiments of our people to set them on the road toward this war. * * *

"You can all rest assured that we will fulfill the oath that we take here: that we, Communists, will be against a war of that nature."

Exhibit No. 380


Subject: Communist Party of Brazil; speech of Luiz Carlos Prestes, in São Paulo, February 7, 1946; attacks United States policy in the Argentine.

The honorable the Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir: With reference to the Embassy's current reports on the Brazilian Communist Party attacks on United States policy toward the Argentine, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a speech which Luiz Carlos Prestes delivered at a Communist meeting in São Paulo on the evening of February 7, 1946.

As reported by the consul in São Paulo, Prestes devoted 25 minutes to a "violently anti-American tirade." The principal points which he stressed were made in the nature of allegations (1) that the United States was promoting an Argentine-Brazilian war, and (2) that it was forbidding the sale of rubber products to the Argentine to the prejudice of Brazilian wheat imports. Passages dealing with the first of these allegations have been translated and are enclosed as an attachment to this dispatch.

In other sections of his speech, Prestes devoted considerable attention to the evils of the Vargas regime and named the Trabalhista Party of São Paulo as a traitor to its class capable of selling out to foreign capitalists.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d’Affaires:

Vinton Chapin,

First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures: (1) Copy of Prestes' speech; (2) extracts of speech in translation. VChapin/cco

File No. 800

To Department in hectograph and original.
Exhibit No. 381
March 28, 1946.

A–Br/S—Mr. Spaeth.
BA—Mr. Braddock.

The Communist Party of Brazil and the “Blue Book”

The newspaper A Classe Operaria, published in Rio de Janeiro as the official news organ of the Communist Party of Brazil, in its first issue published on March 9, 1946, printed the text of the statement of the Communist Party of Brazil on the Blue Book. The statement reads:

“The executive committee of the Communist Party of Brazil, in the meeting held on February 16, 1946, made a detailed study of the statements contained in the so-called Blue Book, made public by the Department of State of the United States. After a complete discussion of the subject, the executive committee concluded that the cited document is a definite indication of attempts being made by the most reactionary forces of investment capital to create an atmosphere of disorder in the continent assuming ostensibly a position of support or criticism of Latin American governments and political currents, and preaching foreign intervention against governments which they do not favor, for the purpose of protecting their interests and to stop the march of our people along the road of progress and democracy.

"2. The committee found, in addition to the above, justification for the constant warnings made by the Communist Party of Brazil against the preparation for war in Latin America by imperialist forces, as contained in the political manifesto read to the last plenary session of the national committee and other declarations made subsequently by members of this executive committee.

"3. The executive committee is firmly convinced that the document published by the Department of State of the United States is a symptom of the seriousness of the inter-imperialist fight in the continent, which is focused principally in River Plate area, and that on the pretext of defending democracy preparations are being made for the breaking of diplomatic relations by American nations with the Argentine Republic as the first step for foreign intervention and war against that country. A war of that type, undertaken directly by agents of investment capital, such as Braden and others, would undoubtedly be an unjust war, inter-imperialist, directed mainly against democracy and the independence of the Latin American people, having as its particular objective the annihilation of the labor and popular movements in our countries.

"In addition, the problem of Argentina, raised by the Department of State outside of the United Nations Organization, constitutes an attempt to form a bloc of American nations, which is contrary to the interests of our peoples and a threat to the cause of world peace.

"4. As it applies to Brazil, the so-called Blue Book only confirms the well-known role of integralismo as the vanguard of the fifth column directly connected with the agents of the Axis in our land, and it is only strange that better known names, such as that of Felinto, Muller, and others, were not mentioned. The reference to the Falangist Amós also confirmed what we have consistently stated concerning the role of spies and traitors undertaken by the Ambassadors of Spain and Portugal in Brazil.

"5. The Communist Party of Brazil has always supported and will continue to support the fight of all peoples for democracy, for civil rights against reactionaries and Fascists, against the cruelties of the police and concentration camps. At the same time, however, it reiterates its position of unalterable defender of the principle of self-determination by the peoples, a democratic victory included in the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, and strengthened by the victory over fascism, and that it is therefore ready to continue its fight to guarantee the Latin American people the right to decide for themselves all questions of domestic politics, using the weapons of democracy, such as the Argentine people already have, free from any foreign influences, since we know that the victory of democracy in a country is a result of the struggle of its own people and cannot come from the outside.

"Therefore, the Communist Party of Brazil warns all our people, as well as our brothers in other countries, that it is terribly disastrous to stimulate by any means an interventionist policy, which can be of interest only to the
strongest nation in the continent, the only one capable of undertaking, economically and militarily, practical and efficient intervention."

Rio de Janeiro, February 16, 1946.

The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil.

BA: JGMein: ifd
3-28-46

EXHIBIT No. 382

Office memorandum

To: ARA—Messrs. Butler, Briggs;
A-Br—Mr. Braden;
NWC—Mr. Wells.

From: BA—Mr. Mein.

Subject: Communist Party in Brazil accuses United States of interference in Bolivia.

The following statement, accusing the United States of directing the recent overthrow of the Bolivian Government, was issued by the Communist Party of Brazil on July 30, 1946:

"Actually, the telegraphic dispatches of the last days make it clear that the recent events in Bolivia were directed by North American imperialist forces. It was even disclosed, according to Renter, that among the dead in a tank there was a North American soldier, that rifles of North American manufacture were used to overthrow the government, and that a Bolivian citizen residing in the United States has stated that the position of the North American ex-Ambassador in Argentina, the famous Braden, is potentially compromised in the outcome of the Bolivian case.

"Other dispatches of North American agencies say that the steel barons planned the armed coup against Villarroel.

"It is no less revealing that there is open rejoicing in the Department in Washington over the destruction of the Villarroel government, while the Washington Post suggests the establishment of rapid transportation from the United States to Bolivia so that that country will not have to depend so much on Argentine products, but, naturally, on North American products, and speaks against the Argentine expansionist who would wish to incorporate Bolivia, etc., as though it involved a dispute between two imperialist powers for the domination of Bolivia, whereas there is actually only one imperialist power involved—the United States.

"There is also the impression that the Bolivian people not only participated, but took the initiative and control of the events in Bolivia, with the students as leaders. Some telegrams refer to the demands made by the students that the Army withdraw to its barracks and that it eliminate from its numbers the elements who opposed the movement, as if the armed forces were backing the students and not the army. We see, therefore, the effort being made to present the coup as having been initiated and controlled by the people.

"We are not discussing whether the government which succeeds that of Villarroel—who was a dictator and a reactionary—will be better for the Bolivian people. We are discussing and condemning the fact that the North American Government continues to intervene as though they were mere colonies, and that their governments should be substituted each time they do not satisfy the interests of one or another financial group of the colonizing capital, principally, as it now appears, evident, for the purpose of obtaining in Bolivia the position lost in Argentina, openly favoring the most reactionary groups of each country in which it intervenes, because these are the groups which favor the policy of submitting their country to the imperialists, as is the case among us. It is not purely accidental that at this moment there is rejoicing over the coup in Bolivia also on the part of a Fascist party such as the Partido Aprista of Peru, whose provocations against democracy are almost uninterrupted."

BA: JGMein: ifd
S/7/46
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

Exhibit No. 383

September 12, 1946.

Subject: Attempt of Communist writers to disassociate United States and Franklin D. Roosevelt in minds of Mexican people.

This is a technique used not only by the Communists but also by certain of the conservative Hispanidad journalists, the race conscious, and the otherwise discontented.

In illustration of this Laborde cites the public intervention of Ambassador Berle in the presidential succession in Brazil (where General Dutra is now the first to accept publicly for his country the hemisphere defense plan), the significant letter written recently by 50 American businessmen to the Department of State requesting intervention in Venezuela, and, most eloquent of all, the case of Bolivia, where the "demogogic, pseudo-democrat, Spruille Braden instigated directly the revolt against the Government of Villarroel." To prove this last point Laborde cites the letter addressed to Assistant Secretary Braden by Ernesto Galarza, recently resigned Bolivian delegate to the Pan-American Union. Laborde quotes Galarza as saying that the State Department consistently opposed the revolutionary regime of Villarroel, and tells, as characteristic of dollar diplomacy, how the American Ambassador in La Paz managed in 1945 to get the Bolivian Foreign Minister to propose the ousting of the General of Labor because of alleged responsibility in the bad treatment of American mining personnel, a thing which Galarza himself later determined had not existed.

Exhibit No. 384

October 21, 1946: The following is taken from the Communist news service Prensa Continental, with main offices at Habana, and ought to come in handy to counter certain silly charges about your being in cahoots with certain people:

"El aprismo ha devenido en un movimiento sometido totalmente a los dictados de los imperialistas yanquis, de los cuales su líder es el más fiel lacayo. Esta posición es muy difícil de acoplar al furibundo 'anti-imperialismo' que antes sirvió de caballo de batalla a los líderes apristas, que hoy comen en la mano de Mister Braden."

Exhibit No. 385

Office Memorandum, United States Government

January 2, 1947.

To: BA, Mr. Braddock; ARA, Mr. Briggs; A-Br, Mr. Braden.

From: BA, Mr. Mein.

Subject: Brazilian elections.

Under the title "Braden's Threats to Democracy" the Communist newspaper, Tribuna Popular, published in Rio de Janeiro, in a recent issue editorially attacks Assistant Secretary of State Braden who, the paper claims, "once again has threatened armed intervention in Latin American countries." The paper adds that the diplomacy of the "atomic bomb in one hand and the dollar in the other is doomed to complete failure" and urges the people to vote in the forthcoming elections (January 19) "for the Brazilian Communist Party candidates and against Braden and the imperialists."

John Gordon Mein.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Assistant Secretary

On 4/4/27.

Election enjargy 1919

Committee on foreign relations

inquiry, urges people to vote for the Democratic

party candidates, and against

Borden and the Imperialists.
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Jenner, Welker, and Butler.
Present also: Charles P. Grimes, chief counsel to the subcommittee; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert C. McManus, professional staff member.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Call your witness.
Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mitchell.
The Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, will you take the witness stand, please? Will you be sworn to testify?
Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Mitchell. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN P. MITCHELL, CROTON-ON-HUDSON, N. Y.

The Chairman. Will you state your full name?
The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Mitchell. Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.
The Chairman. What is your business or profession?
Mr. Mitchell. I am a writer.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Grimes, with the questioning of the witness.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mitchell, will you state your career briefly, from the time when you graduated from Amherst, first stating the year of your graduation and then what your occupation has been since that time?

Mr. Mitchell. I was a reporter and European correspondent for the New York World.
Mr. Grimes. During what years?
Mr. Mitchell. From 1922 to 1930, I believe. I was then Washington correspondent of the New Republic until 1940. I then went to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton until 1944, I believe.
I then did free-lance writing until 1950, when I was associate editor of Newsweek for something over a year, and since then I have been writing again.

Mr. Grimes. Did you have occasion in the year 1939 to undertake to write some speeches for Secretary Morgenthau?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Will you state, please, how you came to undertake to write these speeches?

Mr. Mitchell. There had been a depression or recession in 1937. Many of the officials of the administration were concerned to provide venture capital after that, and there was a great deal of talk about the need for setting up banks which would provide venture capital in the same way that money was being provided for homeowners and for farm owners and for banks which were in difficulty.

Mr. Grimes. By banks under that proposal, do you mean banks to be established and owned by the Federal Government?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. What officials, as you recall it, were making that proposal?

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry; I don't remember the exact title at the time; but Mr. Jerome Frank was one of the leaders in the effort to set up these banks.

Mr. Grimes. That is now Judge Jerome Frank?


Mr. Grimes. What other persons that you recall were making such proposals?

Mr. Mitchell. Former Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold was another official concerned with that.

Mr. Grimes. Do you recall any others at the moment?

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that Mr. Leon Henderson was in this group.

Mr. Grimes. What position did you take with respect to that proposal?

Mr. Mitchell. I took a position only once, and that was in a conversation with Secretary Morgenthau.

Mr. Grimes. Will you state what that was, please?

Mr. Mitchell. In conversation I said that the private enterprise had always provided venture capital—to a degree unknown anywhere else in the world—and if the difficulties which entrepreneurs had been faced with were removed, they would go ahead and provide venture capital without anything needing to be done by the Government.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, your view was that it could be provided from private sources rather than governmental?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. How did you happen to meet Secretary Morgenthau on that occasion?

Mr. Mitchell. I was at that time correspondent for the New Republic, and, with other newspaper and magazine writers, I made it my business to see him.

Mr. Grimes. You had known him before, had you?

Mr. Mitchell. I had known him before, yes.

Mr. Grimes. You met him on this occasion?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Mr. Grimes. Will you state the date or the time as nearly as you can, please, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. It was sometime in the spring of 1939.

Senator Welker. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Welker.

Senator Welker. Mr. Mitchell, will you define the New Republic for the committee, please? Was that a conservative magazine or a liberal magazine? What generally was its political philosophy?

Mr. Mitchell. It supported the New Deal, but I think it was critical of the New Deal for being conservative rather than otherwise.

Senator Welker. It was critical of the New Deal as being conservative?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. It wished to go further.

Senator Welker. In other words, it might be construed as being a liberal publication, quite liberal?

Mr. Mitchell. I have a difficulty about using the characterization "liberal."

Senator Welker. Yes. I do, too. So if you will define what you think the New Republic was, I would appreciate it.

Mr. Mitchell. I must say it was the focus of several different influences. Not all the editors had exactly the same opinion. There were among the editors some who greatly admired British and German socialism, I should say.

Senator Welker. I think that covers it. Thank you very much.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mitchell, will you give, please, the conversation that you had with Secretary Morgenthau on this occasion?

Mr. Mitchell. As I have just testified, I told him that I thought Americans could find their own money if the Government did not prevent them from doing it or make it difficult for them to do it; and this, I am sure, was by no means the first time Secretary Morgenthau had heard this idea. He agreed, and soon afterward asked me if I would help him prepare some speeches for delivery the following winter.

Mr. Grimes. Did you agree to do so?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Did you prepare a speech?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. What title did the speech bear?

Mr. Mitchell. The series of speeches were to have the general heading of "The Seedlings of Capitalism," and if I remember correctly—and I am not entirely sure I do—I believe this was Secretary Morgenthau's own proposal, his own choice of phrase.

Mr. Grimes. Would you say that he was enthusiastic about the idea of delivering a series of speeches under that heading?

Mr. Mitchell. Moderately so, I think.

Mr. Grimes. Were you commissioned to write the speeches or assist him in writing them?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Did you undertake to do that?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I did.

Mr. Grimes. Did you submit a draft of the speech to him?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I did.

Mr. Grimes. Do you recall whether you submitted more than one draft to him?
Mr. Mitchell. As I recall it, I submitted an outline of 6 or 8 speeches, the draft of 1 speech and a rather full outline of a second speech.

Mr. Grimes. Did he read those drafts?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Did he express himself on the subject of the drafts?

Mr. Mitchell. He did on the draft of the first speech, yes.

Mr. Grimes. What did he say about it?

Mr. Mitchell. I am not very sure I remember the exact date, but my memory is that sometime in August he called me up at my home over the weekend from his home, which was further up the Hudson River, and wanted the speeches done up at once, in a hurry, so he could deliver one of them. At that time he seemed to be committed to making these speeches.

Mr. Grimes. Did he express himself as pleased with the speech that you had written?

Mr. Mitchell. That I don't recall. He was pleased with the idea.

Mr. Grimes. He did say that he was prepared to make that speech and wanted you to finish it in a hurry, is that correct, or to submit it in a hurry?

Mr. Mitchell. He said he wanted me to finish it in a hurry, and I gathered from that that he meant that.

Mr. Grimes. What happened after that? I should ask you this: I gather it is true, but will you state for the record, please, whether or not the speech which you submitted and which he was in a hurry to give, incorporated the ideas which you described a minute or two ago, namely, that private capital should form the basis of capital in this country? Would you outline briefly the ideas that you incorporated in the speech for Secretary Morgenthau, please?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. This was a special sort of risk capital, the capital which a young man needs to have to start a business, a man who is not in a business but who has some idea of merchandising or manufacturing and gets together a few dollars from his family, and then he is a success and needs money to expand and has to go to sources other than his family or friends to get the money.

Mr. Grimes. Did you express the view that certain of our laws hampered this type of enterprise?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, that is right.

Mr. Grimes. Would you elaborate that idea, please; that is to say, as contained in the speech which you had submitted to him?

Mr. Mitchell. Sir, the criticisms of administration policy were in the vaguest possible terms. Secretary Morgenthau was a member of the administration, and when one helps a Cabinet officer with speeches he does not ordinarily ask him or suggest to him that he criticize his colleagues. So the problem was stated, and the question was asked whether some of these laws had not been of a nature to make it difficult to raise capital.

Mr. Grimes. Would you state the principal laws that you had in mind, those that prohibited—

Mr. Mitchell. Primarily the tax laws which had been enacted just prior to the 1937 recession, and which many people believed had something to do with the recession. There was also the question of the excessively low interest rate, because of which many people who
otherwise would have advanced money for business were reluctant to do so.

Mr. Grimes. Was that speech given?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.

Mr. Grimes. What were the circumstances that took place in connection with the failure to give that speech?

Mr. Mitchell. After the conversation that I have reported in August, there were many, many postponements of going ahead, and finally, I think sometime late in the year, around November or December, I was told that the Secretary wouldn't give the speeches and I was in a sense reprimanded for trying to suggest that the Secretary should ever have given them.

Mr. Grimes. When and where did you receive this information and this reprimand?

Mr. Mitchell. In the Treasury, by a number of Secretary Morgenthau's advisers, I think the chief of whom would have been Assistant Secretary Gaston, who was my former colleague on the New York World and in a sense made it a part of his duty to oversee the Secretary's public relations.

Mr. Grimes. What did Mr. Gaston, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, say to you about the speech?

Mr. Mitchell. He expressed no opinion on his own behalf of any sort, but told me, as I remember it—and I want to be quite explicit that my memory is not by any means clear on this—that a man named White in the Department wouldn't stand for it.

Mr. Grimes. A man named White wouldn't stand for it?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. Do you know what White that was?

Mr. Mitchell. At the time, I did not.

Mr. Grimes. Did you find out later?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Mr. Harry D. White.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Harry Dexter White?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. That Mr. White would not stand for it, and the speech therefore was not delivered by Secretary Morgenthau?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. That was told you by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gaston, is that correct?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Had you met Harry Dexter White up to that time?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; I had not.

Mr. Grimes. Did you meet him on a later occasion?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Would you explain, please, what that occasion was, when it was, and where it took place, and how you happened to meet him?

Mr. Mitchell. As I have said, after 1940 I went to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. A number of my colleagues—

Mr. Grimes. What subject did you take at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton? You were pursuing, of course, some field. What was that field?

Mr. Mitchell. It was a study of the Senate and how the Senate operates and what its value is, and so on.
Mr. Grimes. I gather you concluded it had some value?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I think it is a very wonderful institution.
The Chairman. We thank you for that.
Senator Welker. Would you ask him if that is an 8-year course?
Mr. Grimes. Senator Welker wants to know if that is an 8-year course.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't pretend that I have found out all there is to
know about it, although I spent a long time at it.
Mr. Grimes. While you were pursuing your studies at Princeton
at the Institute of Advanced Study, you did meet Harry Dexter
White?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Grimes. Will you tell us under what circumstances, how you
came to meet him, first?
Mr. Mitchell. A number of my colleagues were advisers of the
Treasury. They began to ask me if I knew a person named White,
and this finally came to a sort of climax in 1943, in which they said
that they had become convinced that White had influence in the
Senate far beyond public knowledge—
Mr. Grimes. In the what?
Mr. Mitchell. In the Treasury—excuse me—far beyond public
knowledge and far beyond his nominal title.
The specific grounds on which the suspicion rested were that these
colleagues of mine attended quite regularly the staff conferences of
the Secretary. There was a general meeting with perhaps 50 or 60
persons present, once a week, and the people from the institute would
very often have worked out plans for technical—they were interested
in the technique of carrying the very large war debt at that time.
They had worked out procedures, plans, and so on, with Secretary
Morgenthau; that is, they had given him their advice, and the Secretary
accepted it. At these meetings, these plans would be chewed to
pieces.
After a great deal of careful observation and comparing of notes,
they were convinced that each time the opposition came from the
same quarter; namely, Mr. White, and they took to watching him at
the meetings, and they caught him passing notes to people who then
got up and raised extraneous subjects or presented opposite views.
They found that whenever these devices didn't work, Mr. White him-
self would wait until he was certain the Secretary was about to leave,
and then rise and say, "I would like to summarize what has been said
here today," and he would summarize it without any relation to what
actually had been said.
Mr. Grimes. Then influenced action in some manner?
Mr. Mitchell. These meetings were sort of the way in which the
Secretary—
Mr. Grimes. Yes; but he would summarize what had been said quite
incorrectly and inaccurately; is that correct?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Grimes. Then what would happen?
Mr. Mitchell. Either the action would be taken in the sense that
Mr. White desired, or no action would be taken at all.
Mr. Grimes. Did your colleagues suggest that you try to look into
this matter somewhat?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right. They wanted to know who White was and what I could find out about him.

Mr. Grimes. Did they express themselves as disturbed over the situation in the Treasury?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, they presented to you, did they not, a picture of White dominating the Secretary of the Treasury and making the decisions?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think that is correct.

Mr. Grimes. What did you do in line with their request that you look into the matter and see if you could find out who White was and what he was up to?

Mr. Mitchell. I arranged to have lunch with him.

Mr. Grimes. Through whom did you make the arrangement?

Mr. Mitchell. Through Assistant Secretary Gaston.

Mr. Grimes. Did you have lunch with White?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Where did that take place?

Mr. Mitchell. In the dining rooms in the basement of the Treasury.

Mr. Grimes. Have you any way of fixing the approximate date of that lunch?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. It was August 5 or 6, and I remember it because it was just before V-J Day.

Mr. Grimes. The year, of course, would be 1945?

Mr. Mitchell. 1945, yes.

Mr. Grimes. Just before the Japanese surrender?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Will you tell what happened, please, at that luncheon, starting at the beginning?

Mr. Mitchell. Possibly I might say that the luncheon divided itself, as it turned out, into two parts. The first few minutes, the first 20 minutes or so, were taken up in a discussion of the work which Mr. White had been doing——

The Chairman. Who was present at the luncheon?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. White, Assistant Secretary Gaston, and myself. It was in one of these small dining rooms in the bottom of the Treasury. Although there were a great many tables and chairs, we were the only persons in the room.

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please. You said the first 20 minutes were taken up by a discussion of what Mr. White was doing and planned to do?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. As I remember it, the first thing I brought up was what the sterling rate was likely to be. My mission was to try to get Mr. White to tell something about himself, and I merely brought that up because I knew or at least I thought this was a matter of interest.

He pointed out that there was a——I am not absolutely sure whether the British Labor Party had taken power at that moment or not, but he at any rate believed it would, if it hadn’t. I think, as a matter of fact, that it had—and that Mr. Attlee would need a great many months to make up his mind what he wanted to do. He went into some of the considerations that would probably weigh on Mr. Attlee’s mind.
From that he went over to the International Monetary Fund, which a few weeks—I think about 3 weeks—before, had been finally approved by the Congress and was the subject of a great deal of talk at that time.

Mr. Grimes. Was it generally understood, then, that Mr. White would endeavor to head the International Monetary Fund, or do you not know?

Mr. Mitchell. I don’t know.

Mr. Grimes. You knew that he had worked a great deal on the fund, did you not?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I did.

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please, and tell the Senators what he said about the future operations of the International Monetary Fund and the future methods of doing business, both in Europe and in the United States, as he saw it.

Mr. Mitchell. As I remember it, Mr. White said that England’s position was very difficult because of the huge sterling balances owned by foreigners, by non-Britishers, by the Indians and Egyptians in London and by the Argentines, and until some of this was dealt with, which he foresaw would be extremely difficult, he doubted whether London would be eligible for the monetary fund or willing to use it.

This was a subject in which I myself was interested, and I pressed him at some length on this. I found, to my great surprise, that he had, or at least this is the conclusion that I possibly ought not to state—that he really had very little interest in the monetary fund.

Mr. Grimes. Did he express himself upon the future methods of trade in the world to you during the course of this first 20 minutes, as you have described it, of your conversation; that is to say, how inevitably Europe would do business and how the United States would do business as he saw it?

Mr. Mitchell. Not in this first part of the conversation.

Mr. Mitchell. That came later?

Mr. Mitchell. That came later; yes.

Mr. Grimes. Will you go ahead in your own way in describing the conversation that took place during this luncheon?

Mr. Mitchell. After our conversation about the monetary fund had dropped of its own weight, he then started to question me. He knew that Mr. Harold Laski——

Mr. Grimes. Laski? Harold Laski?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Was a contributing editor of the New Republic, and that I knew him. He asked me if I didn’t think he was a great man, and in particular what I thought of his then latest book which had come out about a year before, as I recall it.

Mr. Grimes. Is that the book, Faith, Reason, and Civilization?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please.

Mr. Mitchell. I didn’t wish to be controversial about anything, and I said what I thought was the universal opinion about Mr. Laski; that he was a charming teller of cockney stories, but intellectually a lightweight.

This infuriated Mr. White. He then read me a very long lecture.

Mr. Grimes. When you said “read,” you mean “gave”?

Mr. Mitchell. He gave me a very long lecture on my lack of understanding of the world I was living in, and my denseness in foreseeing
the future, and tried to spell that out by explaining to me that at that
time, which was true, all business across international frontiers was
being done by governments. Because of the failure of the monetary
fund to operate, which Mr. White foresaw, this, in the case of every
nation except the United States, would have to be the procedure in
the future.

Mr. Grimes. That is, all trade would be governmental in the future
in the case of all nations except the United States?

Mr. Mitchell. All international trade.

Mr. Grimes. All international trade.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want me to spell that out?

Mr. Grimes. Yes, please.

Mr. Mitchell. At that time, raw materials were bought by all
governments, and then were parceled out by the governments to their
national firms after they had crossed the boundaries. Nearly all
manufactured goods were being bought by governments for war pur-
poses, and then each government would distribute the machinery, or
whatever it was, to its nationals to be used in war production. So
anything which passed a boundary, frontier, was under the control of
the government of the country.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mitchell, that of course was true during the war,
which was still then on; but when Mr. White was speaking, was he
speaking of war conditions or was he speaking of the postwar
conditions?

Mr. Mitchell. He was speaking of postwar conditions. In order
for this situation to be changed, private businessmen had to be able
to get money to spend outside their countries, and it was the purpose
of the monetary fund—at least it was the purpose. I think, of Lord
Keynes for the monetary fund—to make possible the convertibility
of currency.

Senator Welker. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Welker.

Senator Welker. Mr. Mitchell, when you appeared a bit critical of
Mr. Laski, is it your testimony that Mr. White became quite angry,
vitriolic at you, and made quite a lengthy, bitter speech against your
ideas of business and the operation of future Government trade?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Senator Welker. That little speech that he delivered to you was
quite lengthy; is that true?

Mr. Mitchell. I should think so. It was. As I remember it,
we were there at lunch a little over an hour, and I think 40 minutes of
that time were spent in Mr. White's explaining to me my denseness
about this.

Senator Welker. That was brought about because of the fact that
you termed Mr. Laski a lightweight, but quite a storyteller?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

Senator Welker. That brought about the lecture that you received
from Harry Dexter White?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Senator Welker. Thank you.

Mr. Grimes. You are familiar with Mr. Laski's book, Faith,
Reason, and Civilization, are you not?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Grimes. And you were at the time of the conversation? You had read the book?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. I haven't read it since.

Mr. Grimes. Would you state, please, what the thesis of Laski's book was?

Mr. Mitchell. I think the thesis could be put as saying that the Second World War was the end of a great historic period, and that private business or capitalism had proved itself inadequate, and that the faith which underlay it, the Christian faith, no longer had any validity for the people who were living then; and that, happily, the Russians had worked out a new system of economics and a new faith which could replace capitalism and Christianity.

Mr. Grimes. Laski expressed himself as wholeheartedly in favor of the Russian system as replacing both capitalism and Christianity, did he not?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. I think that was his great pro-Russian phase.

Mr. Grimes. This was the book that White expressed himself—in what terms did White express himself about this book?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. White said that this was by all odds the most profound book which had been written in our lifetime, and that no one had foreseen with such uncanny accuracy and depth the way in which the world was going.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, his approval of Laski's views was 100 percent, would you say?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. And anyone who could not see that was stupid?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Including yourself? Was that his thesis?

Mr. Mitchell. Particularly myself.

Mr. Grimes. Particularly yourself. Did he during the course of this conversation predict the future economic system of the United States?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. He said that already at that time private business in England and on the continent of Europe was wholly under the control of the government of each country, which was true, and that that situation could not be broken because there would be no way, because none of these countries had capital enough to relax the restrictions which they put on business.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, that would be, in his opinion, the permanent economic condition of Europe?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

Mr. Grimes. Including England?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am doing Mr. White an injustice to say that it would be. His point was that it already had happened.

Mr. Grimes. And there would be no change in the postwar world?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right; but that most people didn't realize what had happened. Mr. Laski and he did know what had happened.

Mr. Grimes. What did he say with reference to the future economic condition and situation in the United States?

Mr. Mitchell. He said that we, the United States, because of its tremendous domestic market, could carry on for some time. That is, I should go back and say that his point was that so much of the business
of European companies is across international boundaries they could not continue as private business. The amount of their business which would be under government control was very large.

In America it was possible for a businessman to carry on a business wholly within American boundaries and without being under the Government. But, to his mind, it was entirely clear that with a world in which private business had disappeared, the United States system could not very long survive.

Mr. Grimes. Did he express a prediction as to time?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. In the context of his speech he was talking about between 5 and 10 years.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, our system of capitalism could not last more than 5 or 10 years, in his opinion, as he expressed himself then and there; is that correct?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Will you go ahead, please?

Mr. Mitchell. That is about the substance of what he had to say.

A little incident happened at the end——

Mr. Grimes. Before we get to that, is it fair to say that Mr. White expressed himself as 100 percent in favor of communism in his approval of Mr. Laski's book?

Mr. Mitchell. So far as I remember, he at no occasion used the word "communism." He expressed extravagant approval of Mr. Laski's book, which was a eulogy of communism.

Mr. Grimes. A eulogy of communism?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Mr. Grimes. Will you tell about the close of the luncheon, please?

Mr. Mitchell. I expressed mild dissent at Mr. White's argument, and at each dissent he became more and more upset and toward the end of the lunch, at the end of the lunch, he arose and advanced upon me with his arms swinging, and Mr. Gaston——

Mr. Grimes. Fists clinched?

Mr. Mitchell. No. I think, as a matter of fact, his hands were clutching. It wasn't exactly the way I think most people would behave in the circumstances. At any rate, Mr. Gaston arose and put his arms around White, and they waltzed back and forth for 3 or 4 minutes until Mr. White became calmer and agreed to sit down. That more or less destroyed the spirit of the lunch. We broke up soon thereafter on the worst possible terms, I think.

Mr. Grimes. Was it clear to you that he did try to make some kind of physical attack upon you?

Mr. Mitchell. I have since found out that he suffered from high blood pressure, and I think a great deal of the excessive emotion he showed was partly due to that.

The Chairman. He did advance toward you?

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, he was extremely angry.

Senator Welker. Is there any question in your mind that had Mr. Gaston not interceded, you would have had physical contact with Mr. White?

Mr. Mitchell. No, there is no question.

Senator Welker. There is no question about that?

Mr. Mitchell. No. He was in a towering rage.

Senator Welker. Mr. Mitchell, in the discussion that you have just related with White, I will ask you if it is not a fact that Mr. White was
discussing matters of government which primarily should have been in the State Department of the United States rather than in the Treasury Department?

Mr. Mitchell. In his analysis of the situation, I think he was talking primarily about economic matters, sir.

Senator Welker. At any time in future discussions with Mr. White, or from any information you have learned from his discussions, did he get into the field of diplomacy, which should be exercised by the State Department?

Mr. Mitchell. Sir, I think it was a well-known matter that Treasury did have its representatives in every capital of the world and did have an independent foreign policy, and there was constant friction with the State Department. But that, so far as I remember, did not come up directly in this conversation.

The Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, did you know at the time of this luncheon which you have just described in detail, that Harry Dexter White had been designated by the Treasury Department as the official representative to the State Department concerning all matters of foreign relations?

Mr. Mitchell. No, I did not, sir.

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am going to ask our Research Director, Mr. Mandel, to read into the record certain portions or conclusions from our own files, and certain other official documents and some communications, for the purpose of showing the importance of Mr. Harry Dexter White, not only in the Treasury Department, but to the Government of the United States in general, and also bearing further upon his beliefs.

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Butler is in attendance at this session.

Proceed, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Mandel. I have here the Department of State bulletin entitled "Developing Plans for an International Monetary Fund and a World Bank," by John Parke Young, adviser, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Grimes. In other words, that is an official Department of State document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. Released December 1950. Participating in the formulation of this document are certain individuals whom I wish to describe later very briefly. They have come up before in our hearings.

At the outset, this document says:

"During that period, the Treasury Department's Division of Monetary Research, under the leadership of Harry D. White, was giving independent study to these same questions. ** **"

Mr. White's name occurs all through the list of the committees participating in this study. Also enumerated here are V. Frank Coe—

The Chairman. Right there, Mr. Mandel, what does our record show concerning V. Frank Coe?

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Chairman, may I take up the summary of the individuals involved later, because a number of them occur together. Also Lauchlin Currie.

I wish to offer this for the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of it.
(The State Department Bulletin referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 388" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 388

[Reprint from the Department of State Bulletin]


Division of Publications. Office of Public Affairs

DEVELOPING PLANS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND A WORLD BANK

(By John Parke Young, adviser, Office of Financial and Development Policy)

FORMULATION OF UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

The studies which the United States Government undertook regarding the kind of international financial machinery that would be needed in the postwar period were commenced shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in December 1939, appointed from among the higher officers of the Department of State a committee known as the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. This committee had three subcommittees, one to deal with each of the following subjects:

- Political problems;
- Limitation and Reduction of Armaments; and
- Economic problems

The subcommittee on economic problems concerned itself, among other things, with postwar financial and monetary matters. Among the early papers it considered was one entitled "Interlocking of Commercial, Financial, Monetary, and Other Economic Problems." This committee was expanded in May 1940 to include representatives from other Departments and accordingly became the Interdepartmental Group To Consider International Economic Problems and Policies.1 This group appointed a subgroup on monetary and financial policy which held a series of meetings beginning in the fall of 1940.

During that period, the Treasury Department's Division of Monetary Research, under the leadership of Harry D. White was giving independent study to these same questions, and, in the latter part of December 1941, produced a memorandum entitled, "Proposal for a Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations." This draft proposal was submitted to the State Department early in January 1942 with the suggestion that the proposal be presented to the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics which was to convene later that month in Rio de Janeiro. The Treasury Department suggested also that the proposal be submitted simultaneously to all of the other members of the United Nations. Although the proposal was not submitted to the Conference, nor to any other nation at that time, the following resolution, presented by the United States, was adopted by the Rio de Janeiro Conference as Resolution XV:

"1. A more effective mobilization and utilization of foreign exchange resources would be of assistance in the struggle against aggression and would contribute to the realization of the economic objectives set forth at the First and Second Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Panama and Havana; and"

"2. The American Republics which are combined in a common effort to maintain their political and economic independence can cooperate in the creation of an organization to promote stability of foreign exchange rates, encourage the international movement of productive capital, facilitate the reduction of artificial and discriminatory barriers to the movement of goods, assist in the correction of the maldistribution of gold, strengthen monetary systems, and facilitate the maintenance of monetary policies that avoid serious inflation or deflation."

1 The membership of this group consisted initially of the following: State Department: Leo Passolsky (Chairman), Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Henry F. Grady, Lynn R. Emlen, Herbert Fels, Harry C. Hawkins; Treasury Department: H. Merle Cochran, Harry D. White; Commerce Department: Grosvenor M. Jones, Louis Homeratzky, Richard V. Gilbert; Department of Agriculture: Mordecai Ezekiel, James L. McCamy, Howard R. Tolley, and Leslie A. Wheeler.
The Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics

Recommends:

1. That the Governments of the American Republics participate in a special conference of Ministers of Finance or their representatives to be called for the purpose of considering the establishment of an international stabilization fund.

2. That the conference in considering the establishment of such a fund shall formulate the plan of organization, powers, and resources necessary to the proper functioning of the fund, shall determine the conditions requisite to participation in the fund, and shall propose principles to guide the fund in its operation.

The Treasury Department continued to make studies and, in March 1942, a memorandum was prepared entitled, "Preliminary Draft Proposal for United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations." This proposal dealt also with various economic problems in the field of commercial policy and commodity agreements, although it was subsequently narrowed to more strictly financial problems. Secretary Morgenthau presented the matter to President Roosevelt in May 1942 and proposed that the United States call a conference of Ministers of Finance to consider it. The President, in turn, suggested that the proposal be discussed with the Department of State and other Government agencies and that the question of such a possible conference be discussed with Secretary Hull.

Following the discussion with the President, an interdepartmental group, known as the Cabinet Committee, met, May 25, 1942, in Secretary Morgenthau's office to consider the proposals. Those present at this meeting believed it desirable that the United States proceed with its plans and endeavor to establish the necessary international financial institutions prior to the postwar period. The group agreed to establish an interdepartmental subcommittee to which the interested agencies would send representatives; this subcommittee would report to the so-called Cabinet Committee.

The interdepartmental subcommittee, known as the American Technical Committee, held its first meeting May 28, 1942. The agencies represented were Department of State, Treasury Department, Department of Commerce, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Foreign Economic Administration. This Committee, under the chairmanship of Harry D. White of the Treasury Department, gave detailed consideration to the plans for a Monetary Fund and Bank, held numerous meetings over the next few years, and was to a large extent responsible for the final form of these institutions.

The Committee in 1942 discussed the calling of a United Nations conference of technical experts to consider the Treasury proposal and so recommended to the Cabinet Committee. At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee in July 1942, Mr. Acheson said the State Department believed that no general conference should be held before preliminary discussions had taken place with the United Kingdom and other large countries. After considerable deliberation it was agreed, in January 1943, that such exploratory discussions should take place with experts from six countries.

Considerable work in the field of international financial problems was being carried on in the meantime in the State Department by the Division of Special Research under the direction of Leo Pasvolsky and, after the end of 1942, by the new Division of Economic Studies of which Leroy D. Stonebower was chief. This new Division, in addition to studying monetary matters, prepared a plan for an

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2 This meeting was attended by: Department of State: Leo Pasvolsky and Herbert Feis; Treasury Department: Henry Morgenthau, David W. Bell, Edward A. Foley, Harry D. White, Bernard Bernstein, and Frank A. Southard, Jr.; Commerce Department: Jesse H. Jones; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Marriner S. Eccles and Emanuel A. Goldenweiser; Board of Economic Warfare: Louis Bean and V. Frank Coe.

3 The individuals serving on this Committee varied from time to time, but the principal attendants were as follows: White House: Benjamin Cohen; State Department: William Adams Brown, Jr., E. G. Collado, Frederick Lívsey, Leo Pasvolsky, John Tacke Young; Treasury Department: Elting Arnold, Edward M. Bernstein, Henry J. Bittermann, Anges F. Luxford, Joseph B. North; Commerce: William L. Clayton, Hal B. Lary, August Maffry; Federal Reserve Board; Alice Bourneuf, Walter Gardner, E. A. Goldenweiser, Securities and Exchange Commission: Walter C. Louchheim; Export-Import Bank: Hawthorne Arey, Warren Lee Pierson; Foreign Economic Administration: Claude H. Angell, V. Frank Coe; National Resources Planning Board; Alvin H. Hansen.

4 The meeting was held in Mr. Morgenthau's office at the Treasury and was attended by: White House: Lauchlin Currie; State Department: Dean Acheson and Leo Pasvolsky; Commerce Department: Jesse H. Jones; Federal Reserve Board: Marriner S. Eccles and Emanuel A. Goldenweiser; Board of Economic Warfare: Louis Bean and V. Frank Coe.
International Investment Agency to make loans and facilitate the flow of capital. Assistant Secretary Berle transmitted this proposal to the American Technical Committee in 1943. The Division of Economic Studies also gave considerable attention to means of reviving private investment and to the question of a possible international organization to develop and enforce standards of investment practice and principles of equitable treatment by foreign governments. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Berle and later Mr. Pasvolsky, a series of meetings in the State Department considered fundamental problems of international finance and investment. Most of the attendants at these meetings were also members of the American Technical Committee.

**COMPARISON WITH BRITISH PROPOSALS**

During this period when the United States was considering international monetary and financial problems and was making plans for bilateral discussions of its proposals, the United Kingdom was considering the same problems. In August 1942, the British Embassy in Washington transmitted to the State and Treasury Departments copies of a plan entitled "Proposals for an International Clearing Union." A letter to Assistant Secretary Berle said that the statement was for the informal consideration of United States experts.

The proposal had been prepared by John Maynard Keynes and came to be known as the Keynes Plan; the United States proposal was popularly known as the White Plan. The United States plan was made available to the British, and a series of informal discussions took place between British and American technical experts. Under the leadership of the United Kingdom, a series of meetings also took place in London attended by representatives of the various governments in exile. The two plans remained strictly secret as far as the general public was concerned.

The British and United States proposals had many similarities but differed in several important respects. Both plans provided for the stabilization of exchange rates as a main objective and specified that changes in rates could take place, apart from changes within certain narrow limits, only with the approval of the proposed international organization. Both plans provided for an international currency unit defined in terms of gold—called bancor in the British plan and, unitas in the United States plan, and a quota to be assigned each member based upon its economic importance, the quota to determine the member's drawing privileges on the organization as well as the member's voting rights. The plans differed in the organization's resources and their availability to members.

The United States plan provided for a contributory fund, each member providing its share of the resources based on its assigned quota. Members might have access to these resources under prescribed conditions in order to meet temporary deficits in their balances of payments.

The British plan, on the other hand, was based on the overdraft principle and provided that creditor countries on current international account would accept from their debtors a credit balance on the books of the Clearing Union, the balance being in terms of the new currency unit, the bancor. The bancor was to be transferable and acceptable by all member countries in payment of international obligations. A debtor country could, in this manner, pay for imports by a debit balance against it on the books of the organization up to the amount of its quota. In the original form, the British proposal had provided almost no limit on the amount of credit to be supplied by the creditor country. The United States, a potential creditor, opposed this idea which the British eliminated in their revised proposal.

The Keynes plan also provided that a credit balance which remained unused for a certain period of time was automatically canceled. Thus, if a country continued, on total current account, to export more heavily than it imported, she would accumulate credits which she would lose unless she were to spend them prior to a certain date. The reasoning was that the burden of adjustment to bring international accounts into balance should be placed more heavily on the creditor than it had in the past. This reasoning visualized the postwar problem as one of inadequate imports by certain countries. Unless such countries imported more goods, the credits earned by their exports would be canceled according to the Keynes plan. A debtor country could, therefore, continue to import without embarrassment. The United States did not accept this provision.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred in Parliament on February 2, 1943, to the need for "an international monetary mechanism which will serve the requirements of international trade and avoid any need for unilateral action in competitive exchange depreciation * * * a system in which blocked balances and unilateral clearances would be unnecessary * * * an orderly and agreed method of determining the value of national currency units * * * we want to free the international monetary system from those arbitrary, unpredictable, and undesirable influences which have operated in the past as a result of large scale speculative movements of short-term capital."

On March 9, 1943, newspapers carried a description of the British and United States plans. Accordingly, the two Governments decided to release the plans to the public. Before releasing the United States plan on April 7, 1943, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau appeared on April 5 before a joint secret session of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Banking and Currency and the Special Committee on Post War Economic Policy and Planning to discuss a revised draft of the United States proposal. The British Government released its proposal to the public under date of April 8, 1943, pointing out that it had been discussed with the United States, the Dominions, and India but that the British Government was not committed to its principles or details. The United States had also made clear that her proposal was the work of technical experts and did not involve any official commitment.

DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

The revised draft of the United States proposal, already available to the Governments of the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., French Committee of National Liberation, and China, was sent under date of March 4, 1943, to the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Union of South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Secretary Morgenthau's covering letter said:

"The document is sent to you not as an expression of the official views of this Government but rather as an indication of the views widely held by the technical experts of this Government."

He also invited these Governments to send technical experts to Washington to make suggestions and to discuss the proposal. In April 1943, the plan was also sent to the Governments of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, and Liberia.

In addition to the discussions with British representatives, bilateral discussions with representatives of various other countries began in the spring of 1943. An informal conference was held at Washington on June 15, 16, and 17, 1943, attended by such technical representatives as were available from the above-named countries. Representatives of the following countries were present at these meetings: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, French Committee of National Liberation, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, United Kingdom, U. S. S. R., Venezuela, and the United States.

At this informal conference of 19 countries a number of proposals and memorandum were submitted. The Canadian representative presented a carefully prepared plan for an International Exchange Union. This plan provided for an organization with $8 billion dollars of resources embodying many of the features of the British and United States proposals and was intended to be a compromise plan. The Canadian plan was favorably received by many of the representatives and was the basis for considerable discussion. Other proposals and suggestions submitted by China, Ecuador, and France received extended attention, either at the conference or subsequently. The similarities of the various views embodied in all these proposals were much more marked than were the differences. The conference considered especially the problems of adjustments of exchange rates, the size of quotas, gold contributions, and voting power in the proposed organization.

Bilateral discussions between the United States and various other countries were held during the latter part of 1943 and the first of 1944. These included discussions with Soviet experts who came to Washington early in 1944 and engaged in sessions of lengthy discussions. Doubts had been expressed on how the Soviet economy could be related to the proposed organization. After asking numerous questions regarding the proposals, the Russian experts stated that they believed it would be possible for the U. S. S. R. to participate in the organization.
RECONCILIATION OF UNITED STATES AND BRITISH MONETARY PROPOSALS

At meetings between British and American representatives on June 22 and 23, 1943, the United States informed the British that the minimum conditions for United States acceptance of membership in a stabilization fund were essentially as follows:

1. The United Kingdom should not alter its exchange rate prior to the beginning of fund operations;
2. the resources of the fund must be on the contributory rather than the overdraft principle;
3. the United States financial commitment must be a limited one, perhaps 2 or 3 billion dollars; and
4. the United States must have a veto over any change in the gold value of the dollar and over any change in the gold value of the proposed new currency unit.

These minimum conditions were set forth in a letter of July 24, 1943, from Mr. White to Lord Keynes. In reply, Lord Keynes, under date of August 10, 1943, accepted in substance the conditions, stating however, that for British acceptance of the fund proposal provision must be made for greater flexibility in exchange rates and that gold subscriptions should be reduced.

In order that an international conference be successful, it was recognized that the United States and the United Kingdom must first reach agreement on all major points. Accordingly, British and American representatives held a series of informal conferences with this objective in view. Lord Keynes arrived in Washington in September 1943 at the head of a British delegation to conduct negotiations on various commercial policy and financial subjects and promptly outlined British views regarding the proposed stabilization fund. These views may be summarised as follows:

1. The United Kingdom would accept the contributory principle with a modification which Lord Keynes would introduce later.
2. The United Kingdom was agreeable to a maximum subscription by the United States of approximately 3 billion dollars but believed that aggregate quotas should be 10 to 12 billion dollars.
3. The United Kingdom was prepared to commit itself to maintenance of the present exchange rate for the pound sterling provided agreement was reached on other aspects of the fund proposal.
4. The gold contributions stipulated in the proposal would need to be reduced.
5. Greater flexibility of exchange rates should be provided for; the United Kingdom could not accept the requirement of approval by a ¾ majority vote for a change in exchange rates.
6. The provision for approval by an 85-percent majority vote for a change in the gold value of the new currency unit was unacceptable to the United Kingdom.
7. The provisions in the United States proposal for the gradual liquidation of the so-called abnormal sterling balances should be omitted since the British preferred to negotiate this matter themselves.

Lord Keynes presented a memorandum entitled "Exchange Rates" which embodied the following points:

1. Members would agree not to propose a change in exchange rates unless the change was essential to correct a fundamental disequilibrium.
2. The Fund should not withhold its approval of a proposed change if the change, inclusive of previous changes did not exceed 10 percent within any 10-year period.
3. Special consideration should be given to members which had exceeded their quota rights.
4. In the event that it was not possible to obtain the Fund's prior approval to a change in rate, a member could make the change and, if the Fund disapproved, the member could then either reverse its action or withdraw from the Fund.
5. The Fund should not disapprove a change in rate necessitated by social or political policies of the member.

In these discussions, Lord Keynes took the position that a member should have access to the resources of the Fund without limitation until it had withdrawn resources equivalent to its quota. The United States representatives, on the other hand, argued that the Fund should exercise control over all drawings on the Fund's resources and that no member should have an automatic right to utilize these resources. The British replied that, if a member were to be able to

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formulate its own policies and programs, it would need the assurance of un-
ampered access to the resources of the Fund. The United States experts be-
thieved that discretion on the part of the Fund was essential if the Fund's
resources were to be conserved for the purposes for which the Fund was estab-
lished and if the Fund were to be influential in promoting what it considered to
be appropriate financial policies.

These discussions revealed a fundamental difference in viewpoint between
the United Kingdom and United States regarding the nature of the proposed Fund
and its operations—a difference of view which has at times reappeared. The
British believed that the Fund should operate as an automatic institution with a
minimum of discretion on the part of its management, whereas the United States
believed that the Fund could be most effective in achieving its purposes if its oper-
ations were conducted on a discretionary basis. According to the United
States viewpoint, it followed that the Fund should be managed by well-paid
officers who give their full time to Fund responsibilities.

In the discussions with the British representatives in 1943, the United States
insisted that before adjustments in exchange rates could take place a member
should first consult with the Fund and obtain its approval. The British preferred
latitude for independent member actions. Other matters which were considered
at length included the following: problems which would arise in the event that
the Fund's holdings of the currency of a member were to become scarce, the
amount of each member's subscription payable in gold, voting with respect to
adjustments in exchange rates, and the amount of the aggregate quotas. It was
agreed that a joint statement should be prepared showing the points of agree-
ment and those that were as yet unresolved.

During the discussions, Lord Keynes presented a memorandum entitled "Sug-
gestions for the Monetization of Unitas" dated September 21, 1943. The objec-
tive of the proposal was to make the unitas a truly international currency rather
than merely an accounting unit. Lord Keynes' proposal provided that each mem-
ber would pay at least 12 1/2 percent of its quota in gold and the remainder in
securities carrying an interest rate of 1 1/2 percent payable in unitas. Each
member would be given a balance at the Fund in unitas, such balances to be
freely acceptable by all members in the settlement of international obligations.
Members would agree to accept unitas in exchange for their own currency up to
the point that a member's holdings of unitas reached 120 percent of its quota.
Members able to do so should redeem each year in gold or gold convertible cur-
rencies their securities in the amount of 2 percent of their quotas. Lord Keynes
urged that his proposal would provide a basis for multilateral clearing which did
not exist in the United States proposal.

The principal differences between the British and United States representatives
at the end of these discussions were on the following points:

1. The amount of gold subscription of each member; the United States pro-
posed 25 percent of the quota or 10 percent of gold and foreign exchange hold-
ings, whichever was the smaller; the British proposed 12 1/2 percent of the quota.
(Later the British accepted the United States proposal but specified that the
foreign-exchange holdings were to be net official holdings.)

2. Powers of the Fund to limit a member's access to the Fund's resources;
the United States believed that the Fund should be able to limit such access at
any time, whereas the British urged that no restrictions should be imposed prior
to the point where the Fund's holdings of a member's currency exceeded 100
percent of the member's quota.

3. Provision for an international currency unit other than a unit of an accoun-
ting nature; the United States preferred the latter.

4. Rights of a member to adjust its exchange rate; the British desired that
latitude be provided for unilateral changes.

5. Requirements regarding the repurchase by a member of its currency held
by the Fund.

Lord Keynes returned to London in the early part of October 1943, but an
exchange of views continued between British and American representatives by
correspondence, cable, and direct negotiations with British representatives in
Washington. The British transmitted in December 1943 a new draft of the
joint statement introducing a section entitled "Transitional Arrangements" the
substance of which was later embodied in the final agreement. This section
provided for a period of 3 or more years following the war during which mem-
bers would not be required to accept the obligations of the Fund regarding ex-
change restrictions.
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1439

JOINT STATEMENT

Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries was finally reached, and, on April 21, 1944, a "Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund" was released to the public, which contained the outlines of the plan finally worked out at Bretton Woods.

The statement was published simultaneously in Washington, London, Moscow, Chungking, Ottawa, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, and Havana, and in full or abbreviated form in many other countries. The Governments of the Soviet Union and China agreed to participate in a financial conference on the basis of that statement. The British decision to participate in a conference was reached, May 10, 1944, on the understanding that the United Kingdom was not committed to become a member of the proposed institution. This position was the same as that of other governments including the United States, where congressional action would be necessary for the United States to become a member. During the negotiations, the Secretary of the Treasury had kept the Congress informed of developments.

INTERNATIONAL BANK PROPOSAL

The original proposal of the Treasury Department in January 1942, noted above, concerned the establishment of an international stabilization fund. The proposal as revised in March 1942 included also the outlines of a bank and was entitled "Preliminary Draft Proposal for United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations." The proposed bank was to have a capital of 10 billion dollars subscribed by the member governments and was designed to make loans for reconstruction and development purposes. At least 25 percent of the capital was to be paid in gold. The loans were to be partly in local currencies and partly in international currency units, according to estimates of the portion of the loan to be spent at home and abroad.

In the interdepartmental discussions of the Treasury proposal for a monetary fund and bank, the possibility was considered of combining the two institutions into a single institution. This suggestion was rejected, however, in the belief that the functions of the two institutions were distinct and that they would require different types of personnel.

The interdepartmental discussions during 1942 and most of 1943 were given over practically entirely to the proposal for a stabilization fund and there was little or no discussion of the bank. This situation was due partly to the greater technical difficulties inherent in the fund proposal and also to the fact that currency and exchange difficulties during the 1930's had been so severely disruptive to world trade and to the internal economies of all countries.

Although little or no interdepartmental discussion of the bank proposal took place during this period, active study of the question was underway both in the State and Treasury Departments.

At the 3-day informal conference held at Washington in the middle of June 1943 with representatives from 19 countries, Secretary Morgenthau informed the conference that, following the consideration of the stabilization fund proposal, the next step would be consideration of the proposal for an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This was the first announcement to other countries that the United States was considering plans for an international bank.

Under date of September 4, 1943, Assistant Secretary Perle sent to Mr. White of the Treasury Department a proposal for an International Investment Agency which had been prepared in the State Department. This proposal had been prepared in the Division of Economic Studies in consultation with other divisions and officers of the Department. It proposed in some detail an international institution which would make loans to its members for approved purposes.

The Treasury and State Department proposals were fundamentally not very different. Each provided for an institution with a substantial amount of capital payable partly in gold and partly (the larger part) in national currencies. The proposed institution would cooperate with private capital and would not compete with it in financing reconstruction and development needs of subscribing countries. Loans could be made out of its own resources or it could guarantee private loans. Repayment prospects of all borrowers were to be carefully examined since the institution was intended to operate on sound financial principles.
It could issue its own obligations for sale in the private capital market in order to obtain funds for lending. The Treasury proposal provided that each loan by the bank must be guaranteed by a member government. This guaranty was not required in the State Department proposal.

The two proposals differed also in that the Treasury draft provided that the proceeds of loans could be spent only in the country of the currency loaned. The State Department proposal, on the other hand, provided that the proceeds of loans could be spent in any country the borrower chose; i.e., the proceeds were freely transferable. This matter of "tied loans" was one of considerable debate in the American Technical Committee, representatives of the Export-Import Bank urging the Treasury view. The final arrangement in the Bretton Woods document was a compromise; the proceeds of certain loans are not freely transferable into other currencies (principally loans made out of the Bank's subscribed capital), whereas the proceeds of other loans (made out of money borrowed by the Bank) are freely transferable. The Bank, however, provides borrowers with such currencies as are needed for expenditures in the territories of other members.

The British proposal for a Clearing Union referred to the need for other institutions, including a Board for International Investment, and mentioned the services which the Clearing Union might perform for such a Board. At the close of the discussions between British and American representatives in the fall of 1943, the United States representatives referred to this country's interest in a bank and gave the British representatives a draft of the bank proposal. At a meeting the following morning, this proposal was discussed, which was the only discussion of a bank during this series of British and American meetings. The Treasury Department published on November 24, 1943, "A Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations."

The bilateral conversations with representatives of various countries, including the United Kingdom, which took place late in 1943 and during the first part of 1944 dealt primarily with the fund proposal, although before these discussions were over the bank had received considerable detailed consideration. The foreign representatives showed a strong interest in the establishment of an international bank. The war-devastated countries desired a source of funds to assist in reconstruction, whereas the relatively underdeveloped countries were interested in an institution which would aid them in their plans for economic development.

The discussions between the British and United States representatives had centered around the development of the so-called Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund, as the basis for an international conference. Agreement on this statement required prolonged and difficult negotiation, and, since it was desired to hold a conference promptly, time did not permit the preparation of a similar statement with respect to the bank proposal. The discussions with the British and other representatives had, however, indicated a large measure of agreement on the provisions regarding the proposed Bank. Thus it was that when plans were made for the calling of an international conference for July 1944 the proposal for an international bank was not so far advanced as that for the Monetary Fund. Some of the United States experts believed that if the conference could agree upon a Monetary Fund that would be a significant accomplishment and was perhaps all that could be hoped for. Although the bank proposal was greatly desired, a feeling existed in some quarters that the conference might not be able to develop and agree upon plans for both a monetary fund and a bank and that a subsequent conference to consider the question of a bank and other investment problems might be necessary.

**Bretton Woods Conference**

In May 1944, the President issued invitations to the 44 united and associated nations to send representatives to a United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference to be held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. The Conference was to discuss the proposal for an International Monetary Fund within the terms of the Joint Statement and was also to consider the proposal for a Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In order to develop further some of the details of the proposals and thereby facilitate the work of the Conference, a preliminary meeting was held at Atlantic City during the latter part of June. On June 15, a group of American financial experts assembled there and were joined a few days later by experts from 16
other countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. This group worked intensively endeavoring to deal with some of the still unsettled questions and to produce a more finished document. Informal discussions were held and on June 26 a full meeting of this preliminary conference took place.

At the Atlantic City meetings, the British experts, headed by Lord Keynes, presented proposals regarding the Bank which involved rather extensive changes from the earlier plan, but which met with almost immediate approval by the experts of the other nations including the United States. According to these suggestions, embodied in the final document, only a small portion of the Banks' capital, namely 20 percent, would be paid in and be available for loans. The remaining 80 percent would constitute a guaranty fund to be used, if necessary, in connection with the Bank's guaranties of private loans or to meet other obligations of the Bank. This proposal meant that the Bank's cash resources would be considerably smaller than originally contemplated. It became clear that the proposal for a Bank was to receive major consideration at the Conference. These proposals, together with suggested changes in the Fund plan, had been prepared by the British delegates in collaboration with the delegates of several European governments in exile.

The group at Atlantic City completed its work there on June 30 and went directly to the Conference at Bretton Woods which convened on July 1, 1944. Forty-four governments were represented at the Conference. In addition, Denmark, which had no government in exile, was represented unofficially by her Minister in Washington who attended in his personal capacity upon the invitation of the Conference.

The Conference divided itself into three technical commissions as follows: Commission I, International Monetary Fund; Commission II, Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and Commission III, Other Means of International Financial Cooperation. These Commissions were broken down into committees and subcommittees which considered the various specific sections of the proposed articles of agreement for the Monetary Fund and for the Bank.

A great deal of interest centered around the determination of the quotas to be assigned the countries by the Monetary Fund agreement. A member's quota determined not only its subscription, payable partly in gold and partly in its own currency, but also was related to its drawing privileges on the Fund and established its voting rights. Countries, therefore, desired to have their quotas as large as possible, the size of the quota, as a matter of prestige, indicating the importance of the country, so that preparation of a schedule of quotas satisfactory to all countries proved to be a difficult task. The quotas were based upon economic considerations such as the size of a country's foreign trade, fluctuations in its balance of payments, and other factors indicating needs for foreign-exchange reserves. Lengthy negotiations were necessary and several of the countries were not satisfied with the final results.

A different attitude prevailed regarding the quotas, or subscriptions as they were called, for the Bank. Although the size of the subscription determined a member's voting rights, it had no relation to the amount which the member might borrow. The countries therefore desired that their Bank subscriptions be as small as possible. The United States and others urged that Bank and Fund quotas be identical for each member, but due to the opposition of certain countries, several departures from this were made, the United States and a few others accepting larger Bank subscriptions.

The United States and the United Kingdom continued their differences over the extent to which the Fund should be an automatic institution, the British believing that a member's rights of access to the Fund's resources should be predetermined and according to established rules. The United States on the other hand, believed that the Fund's operations should be on a discretionary basis. The articles of agreement as finally adopted represented somewhat of a compromise of these views.

The United States desire for a strong discretionary Fund led to the provision that the Board of Executive Directors should sit in continuous session. The United States interpreted this to mean that the Directors should devote their full time to their Fund duties. At the inaugural meeting in Savannah in March 1946, however, it developed that the British did not so interpret this provision. It was

*For proceedings and documents of the U. N. monetary and financial conference at Bretton Woods, see Department of State publication 2866.

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finally arranged that either the Director or his alternate should be in continuous attendance at Fund headquarters.

The question of charges to be imposed by the Fund on amounts drawn by members from Fund resources was the subject of considerable discussion. Some of the representatives urged that there be no charges on such drawings. The provisions agree, to provide that the charges increase progressively with the amounts drawn, and the length of time such drawings remain unpaid.

The U. S. S. R. proposed that the gold contributions of countries devastated by the war be substantially less than for other members. The Conference did not accept this provision. The U. S. S. R. also desired that the Bank grant more favorable terms on its loans to countries whose territories had been devastated. The articles of agreement of the Bank contain a concession on this score in that they provide that the Bank "shall pay special regard to lightening the financial burden" for members suffering "great devastation from enemy occupation or hostilities." The U. S. S. R. also objected to the Fund provision regarding the obligation of a member to supply information to the Fund. As a result of U. S. S. R. opposition, this provision was somewhat weakened.

The Latin American representatives feared that the Bank would be more interested in making reconstruction loans to European countries than in extending development loans to the underdeveloped areas. Provision, therefore, was inserted to the effect that the Bank's resources should be used "with equitable consideration to projects for development and projects for reconstruction alike."

Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and a few other countries feared that the Fund provisions regarding the elimination of exchange restrictions and the maintenance of stable exchange rates might be inconsistent with a domestic policy of full employment and other social objectives. Australia desired that the articles of agreement set forth that members had an obligation to maintain full employment. Such a provision was not included. The articles, however, contain a provision that the Fund "shall not object to a proposed change [in rate] because of the domestic, social or political policies of the member . . . ." 7

Considerable discussion, led particularly by the United Kingdom, centered around the language to be used in describing the postwar transitional period and the flexible arrangements and special privileges to be enjoyed by members during this period with respect to the elimination of exchange restrictions, discriminatory currency arrangements, and multiple currency practices. Most of the countries maintained exchange restrictions, and several Latin American countries had multiple currency arrangements which were inconsistent with the proposed articles of agreement. The provision adopted regarding the transitional period permitted the temporary retention of these restrictions and arrangements and their gradual elimination.

Other matters which were the source of extensive discussion had to do with a definition of monetary reserves and of convertible currencies; with voting rights weighted in favor of creditor countries as proposed by the United States and included in the final draft; with the withdrawal of a member, either forced or voluntary, and the payment to such member of its share of the assets, some of the Latin American representatives urging that a forced withdrawal would be a reflection on the honor of a country; distribution of assets, in the event of liquidation of the Fund or Bank, and the relative rights of debtors and creditors in such case; and various technical problems such as provisions regarding a possible scarcity in the Funds' holdings of a particular currency (these sections provide that if the Fund declares its holdings of a certain currency scarce, members may impose restrictions on the purchase and sale of such currency; they also provide for measures to replenish Fund holdings of such currency), and provisions regarding the repurchase by a member of its own currency held by the Fund particularly when such currency has been acquired by the Fund as a result of large drawings by the member on Fund resources.

Consideration was given to commercial policy and other economic problems, such as restrictions on the movement of goods, closely related to the objectives of

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7 The Board of Executive Directors in September 1946 interpreted the articles of agreement as follows:

The Executive Directors interpret the Articles of Agreement to mean that steps which are necessary to protect a member from unemployment of a chronic or persistent character, arising from pressure on its balance of payments, are among the measures necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium; and that in each instance in which a member proposes a change in the par value of its currency to correct a fundamental disequilibrium the Fund will be required to determine, in the light of all relevant circumstances, whether in its opinion the proposed change is necessary to correct the fundamental disequilibrium.
the Fund. It was realized that Fund objectives could not be attained through the instrumentality of the Fund alone. Accordingly, Resolution VII recommended that the governments promptly reach agreement on the reduction of obstacles to international trade and on other important matters. These problems were subsequently dealt with in the charter for an International Trade Organization.

Other resolutions included a recommendation that the Bank for International Settlements be liquidated (this recommendation was not carried out) and that further study be made of fluctuations in the value of silver, adopted at the suggestion of Mexico.

The Conference worked strenuously to reconcile the differences of viewpoint, large and small, of the 44 countries and to complete its difficult task in the short time assigned to it. On July 22, 1944, 3 weeks after the Conference began, the articles of agreement for the two institutions were complete, and the final act was signed by representatives of the 44 governments present. Provision was made for the subsequent participation of other countries in the Fund and Bank. The articles of agreement required the formal approval of the various governments in accordance with their various legal processes.

SUMMARY OF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

The articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund as finally drafted at Bretton Woods set forth what the nations represented there considered the principles and procedures which nations should follow in the field of currency and exchange and provided international machinery to help attain these objectives. The following purposes of the Fund as stated in article I are to guide the Fund in all its decisions:

(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.

(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.

(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.

(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund’s resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.

(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.

The principal provisions through which the above purposes are to be achieved are, in summary form, as follows:

i. Member countries undertake to keep their exchange rates as stable as possible, confining fluctuations to narrowly prescribed limits, and to make no change in rates unless essential to correct a fundamental disequilibrium.

ii. Any adjustment of an exchange rate must in all cases be made by consultation with the Fund. Beyond certain small changes, rates can be adjusted only with the concurrence of the Fund.

iii. Par values are to be stated in terms of gold (or U. S. dollars of the weight and fineness as of July 1, 1944), and gold is to be accepted by members in settlement of accounts.

iv. A common pool of resources contributed by the members on the basis of quotas is established and available under safeguarding conditions to meet temporary shortages of exchange. It is designed to help a member maintain the foreign exchange value of its currency until such member has had time to correct maladjustments. The total of the quotas of the countries * represented at Bretton Woods is 8,800 million dollars of which the United States quota is 2,750 million dollars. The resources of the Fund are not intended to be used to provide capital for reconstruction, investment, or for other long-term purposes but are

* Excluding Denmark; see p. 786.
available only for making payments for current transactions, which are defined in the articles of agreement.

"v. Member countries agree not to engage in discriminatory or multiple currency practices or similar devices or, except with the approval of the Fund, to impose restrictions upon payments for current international transactions. Existing restrictions and practices are to be abandoned as soon as the postwar transitional period permits. Special provisions provide flexibility in eliminating restrictions and practices during this transitional period.

"vi. Member countries agree to maintain the gold value of their currency held by the Fund so that the assets of the Fund will not depreciate in terms of gold.

"vii. The Fund may deal only with governments or their agencies and may have no direct contact with the foreign exchange market.

"viii. The Fund is governed by a Board of 12 or more Executive Directors which functions in continuous session at the Fund's headquarters. Five of these are appointed by the countries with the five largest quotas and the remainder are elected by the other members. The Board of Governors which has final authority consists of one governor appointed by each member and meets annually. Voting of members is weighted according to the size of a member's quota."

SUMMARY OF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BANK

The following purposes of the International Bank as stated in article I of the Bank articles of agreement are to guide the Bank in all its decisions:

"(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.

"(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources.

"(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territories.

"(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first.

"(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate postwar years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy."

The International Bank was given an authorized capital of 10 billion dollars of which 8.8 billion dollars was assigned to the countries represented at the Bretton Woods Conference. The United States subscription was 3,175 million dollars. Only 20 percent of the subscribed capital, however, is paid-in and available for loans by the Bank, the remainder being a guaranty fund which can be called for payment only if needed in connection with the Bank's guaranties or other obligations. Two percent of a member's subscription is payable in gold or United States dollars and the balance in its own currency.

In order to obtain funds for lending, the Bank may sell its own obligations in the private capital market. Such sale is intended to be the principal source of funds for the Bank. Loans by the Bank must be exclusively for the benefit of members and are ordinarily for specific projects of reconstruction or development. The Bank may not only make loans itself but may also guarantee private loans. Each loan whether guaranteed or made directly by the Bank must be guaranteed by the national government of a member. The Bank is not to compete with private capital and may not make a loan if private capital is available on reasonable terms.

The Bank, like the Fund, is governed by a Board of at least 12 Executive Directors which is in continuous sessions at the Bank's headquarters. The Board of Governors is the final authority. This Board which consists of one governor appointed by each member meets annually. Voting is weighted according to the size of a member's subscription. In order to become a member of the Bank, a country must first become a member of the Fund.
United States participation in the Fund and Bank was authorized by Congress in the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of July 1945. This act also created the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial problems consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (Chairman), Secretary of State, Secretary of Commerce, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, and (added later) the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration. This Council consults with the United States representatives on the Fund, and the Bank and advises them on policies to be pursued.

The articles of agreement of the Fund and of the Bank were signed at the Department of State on December 27, 1945, by representatives of 39 countries who also deposited their appropriate instruments, thereby bringing the two institutions into formal existence. Five additional countries signed the articles of agreement prior to December 31, 1945, and several others followed soon thereafter. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of each institution was held at Savannah, Georgia, in March 1946, at which time the Executive Directors were chosen. The two Boards of Executive Directors held their first meetings in May 1946 at Washington which was selected as Fund and Bank headquarters. The two institutions were thus officially underway.

Mr. Mandel. Next I have excerpts from the memoirs of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, published in 1948, volume I:

The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who ranked next to me in the Cabinet, often acted as if he were clothed with authority to project himself into the field of foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course of foreign policy in given instances. He had an excellent organization in the Treasury Department, ably headed by Harry White, but he did not stop with his work at the Treasury. Despite the fact that he was not at all fully or accurately informed on a number of questions of foreign policy with which he undertook to interfere, we found from his earliest days in the Government that he seldom lost an opportunity to take long steps across the line of State Department jurisdiction. Emotionally upset by Hitler's rise and his persecution of the Jews, he often sought to induce the President to anticipate the State Department or act contrary to our better judgment. We sometimes found him conducting negotiations with foreign governments which were the function of the State Department. His work in drawing up a catastrophic plan for the postwar treatment of Germany, and inducing the President to accept it without consultation with the State Department, was an outstanding instance of this interference (pp. 207-8).

This is from volume II of the same work:

At the same time we worked on an outline of a 10-point peace settlement to accompany the modus vivendi. In general, my associates and I had reached a stage of clutching at straws to save the situation.

Mr. Grimes. This was just before Pearl Harbor when they were working on the modus vivendi, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mandel (reading):

We groped for anything that might offer any possibility for keeping serious conversations going. The Department's Far Eastern experts had drafted a proposed outline of settlement on November 11—

that would be 1941—

which I went over word for word. This was drawn up with a view to keeping the conversations going—and thus gaining time—and also, if accepted, to serving as the basis for an eventual comprehensive settlement. Secretary Morgenthau sent me a further draft written in his Department. Although this was a further example of what seemed to me to be the Secretary of the Treasury's persistent inclination to try to function as a second Secretary of State, some of its points were good and were incorporated in our final draft (p. 1073).

* * * * * * *

At that moment the situation was almost upset entirely by a sudden move of Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and his advisers. Morgenthau often interfered in foreign affairs, and sometimes took steps directly at variance with
those of the State Department. Since there was frequently a connection between foreign and financial affairs, he had in his hands monetary weapons which he brandished in the foreign field from time to time, often without consulting the State Department. In this practice he ran a close race with Vice President Henry Wallace, formerly head of the Board of Economic Warfare.

Morgenthau was particularly avid on the subject of freezing the credits of foreign countries in the United States. Now I suddenly became aware that he was proposing to freeze Argentina’s funds in the United States, reported to amount to $7500 million. Early in May the Treasury Department sent the Board of Economic Warfare a memorandum making this proposal. When a copy of it came to my hand, I sent it to the President on May 14 with an accompanying note in which I said:

“You will readily see that this proposes a complete reversal of the good neighbor policy and a substitution of our old discredited policy of coercion and domination of South American countries by big-stick methods. Naturally, I am greatly surprised that this view would be seriously presented by any other governmental agency, for two reasons. One is that this raises purely a question of foreign policy, and the other is that it would wipe out our good neighbor policy, as stated, and substitute the big stick.”

I urged the President to intervene at the earliest practicable time, especially in view of the fact that if this proposal became public it would have terrific repercussions all over South America. And I added that, from the type of some of the persons who were dealing with it, it was liable to become public at any time.

The President did effectively intervene and prevent this drastic move. Morgenthau, however, did not give up the idea (pp. 1379–1380).

* * * * * * *

Harry Hopkins came to me on September 1, 1944, and informed me of the President’s desire to establish a “Cabinet committee on Germany.” He said the President had asked him to give his undivided attention to this matter in the next few weeks. Hopkins at this time also explained Morgenthau’s interest in the question, arising from his disagreement with certain sections of the plans for Germany which already had been prepared.

My associates at the State Department, particularly H. Freeman Matthews and James W. Riddleberger, went over with Hopkins in detail the studies concerning postwar Germany made at the State Department and by the European Advisory Commission in London. They prepared a memorandum, which I approved, explaining the work that already had been done and setting forth the State Department’s views on the treatment of Germany. This Matthews and Riddleberger presented at a meeting of representatives of the State, Treasury, and War Departments called by Hopkins in his office at the White House on September 2.

Morgenthau’s, or the Treasury’s, plan was presented at this session by Dr. Harry White. This plan proposed, among other things, that parts of Germany should be given to neighboring countries and the remainder split into three units.

Poland should get southern Silesia and that part of East Prussia which did not go to Russia. France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers. Denmark should get territories north of the Kiel Canal, between her present borders and an International Zone.

This International Zone would be one of the three units into which Germany would be partitioned.

Let me skip a portion there and go on: 1

Dr. White explained that no trade would be permitted between the International Zone and the remainder of Germany. He emphasized that the productivity of this zone would in no way be permitted to contribute to German economy.

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1 Following is the matter omitted:

“...it would contain the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas and the Kiel Canal, and would be run by the proposed United Nations organization. The remaining portion of Germany would be divided into two autonomous, independent states—a South German state, comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia, and several smaller states. There would be a customs union between the new South German state and Austria, the latter to be restored to her pre-1938 borders.

“Industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states would be removed and distributed among devastated countries. Forced German labor would be used in such countries,..."
Later the Treasury inserted in its plan this paragraph with regard to the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas:

"This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area—all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment should be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked."

The Treasury plan stated that the United States would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission might be established to carry out the German program, but that the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors, specifically Russia, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. United States troops could be withdrawn within "a relatively short time." (Pp. 1604-05.)

The CHAIRMAN. The entire document will go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 389" and are in the committee's record by reference.)

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a translation made by John Dorosh, Curator of the Slovak Room of the Library of Congress, from an article appearing in The War and the Working Class, No. 20, October 15, 1944, entitled "Meetings in America," by I. Zlobin. This magazine is published in Moscow, and it gives in part an estimate of Harry Dexter White.

* * * At Bretton Woods we became acquainted and have established business contacts with many influential financiers of America and some other countries. Among them, first of all, we should mention the chairman of the Conference and Secretary of Finance of the United States of America, Henry Morgenthau, and his assistant, Harry White, author of the American project of the International Currency Fund and the Bank of Reconstruction. Also the head of the British delegation and author of the British project of the International Clearing Union, Lord Keynes * * *

* * * Mr. Morgenthau and his immediate assistant White have displayed live interest in our country and first of all, naturally, to her economical and financial problems. We have felt that this interest of practical Americans is far from being idle; that it was dictated by a realization of the fact that in the postwar period the problems of economic collaboration with the Soviet Union would play an important role for America. Particularly Morgenthau was very much interested in the question of subscription of loans in the Soviet Union and was interested in the forms of loans, the amount of prices and also what form of a loan and whether the population preferred interest-bearing loans or lottery loans. * * *

* * * Harry White, a man of about 50 years old, of medium height, and wearing glasses, is very businesslike and sociable. When we were in Washington he has invited me and another member of our delegation, Comrade N. F. Chechulin, to his country cottage, and he and his wife came to take us over. They have also driven us back. The cottage of White is not large. It is a two-story dwelling encircled by plants. It is about 15 kilometers from Washington * * *

* * * White is a passionate sportsman. He has a special passion to volleyball and tennis. In Bretton Woods, between meetings, we have for the first time met our skill in a game with him in volleyball. He was the head of the American team, and Comrade Chechulin was the captain of the Soviet Command. At first we won, and with a substantial score. White was very much disappointed and has threatened that for the next game he will get together such a team that will literally crush us; and, sure enough, he has gathered such a command and the most important thing is that he has invited a well-known sportsman from South America and has finally succeeded in beating us. Later on, whenever there was an occasion that we had to put through some decisions of interest to us, White would always jokingly say, "All I can place at your disposal are our own votes and the votes of the 22 Latin American Republics. * * *"
I have here, Mr. Chairman, a photostat of the Russian version of the article from which I read.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 390" and is filed with the subcommittee.)

Mr. MANDEL. The next is an excerpt from the Daily Worker, the official Communist organ in this country, dated November 20, 1953, page 2. I won't bother to read the entire article; just a few paragraph references to Mr. White. I read:

For the "crimes" that White committed were all calculated to advance the interests of the American majority, the true interests of the Nation, as opposed to the interests of the handful of parasitic monopolists and bankers who tried and [are] still trying to plunder and betray the Nation.

White's No. 1 crime, it now turns out, was the fact that he reflected in his proposals and fight for them the crying needs of the American people, which the people were themselves saying in many ways. And high on the list of these needs was the demand for a program to consolidate Soviet-American economic and political cooperation.

Repeatedly before World War II White accused the State Department of failing to stem Axis aggression.

White fought for massive economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union—
to the tune of a $10 billion postwar credit—so as to enable us to obtain the raw materials we need. A brilliant proposal for advancing our national interests through the expansion of trade—as even such businessmen as Republic Steel's Ernest Weir and the Chrysler executives are now realizing as the economic consequences of our cold war policies begin to pile up here at home.

White urged Roosevelt to press Chamberlain to join the Soviet Union in an effort to check Hitler. * * *

White called for "real aid" to Latin America and to China—instead of the "aid" with political strings attached which the Wall Street bankers required. * * *

(The newspaper article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 391" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 391

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 20, 1953]

Harry D. White's Record of Service to His Country

(By John Pittman)

The "crimes" that the late Harry Dexter White committed as a Government servant under President Roosevelt and President Truman help to throw light on the ferocity with which White has been singled out for McCarthyite attack.

Of course, it is easier to heap calumnies on a dead man than on a man able to speak back and say his piece. And to date none of the New Deal officials who were White's superiors have had the courage to play the part of Marc Antony and tell the country the good that is now interred with Harry White's bones.

Wallace is silent. Morgenthau remains silent. Even Truman, while indicating his disbelief of the FBI's hodge-podge of slander and stool-pigeon testimony about White, has not seen fit to fight the issue across the boards—which is the only way it can be fought to victory over McCarthyism.

For the issue is McCarthyism versus Rooseveltism. Or to put the matter bluntly, fascism versus another Labor-Farmer-Negro people's coalition in support of a truly American program for the benefit of the majority of the people of our country. And this issue stands out conspicuously in the White case.

For the "crimes" that White committed were all calculated to advance the interests of the American majority, the true interests of the Nation, as opposed to the interests of the handful of parasitic monopolists and bankers who tried and are still trying to plunder and betray the Nation.

White's No. 1 crime, it now turns out, was the fact that he reflected in his proposals and fight for them the crying needs of the American people, which
the people were themselves saying in many ways. And high on the list of these needs was the demand for a program to consolidate Soviet-American economic and political cooperation.

In the atmosphere of McCarthyism, in which even a statement favoring negotiations with Moscow may be held up as "proof" of "communist espionage," this "crime" of White's is a greater offense than murder, rape, arson, dope-dealing, and grand larceny, not to speak of grafting at the taxpayers' expense which seems to receive a clean bill of health from J. Edgar Hoover, especially if the accused is McCarthy. And one need only read Hoover's fanatical statement about "35 years of infiltration of an alien way of life," "the godless forces of communism," and "Red Fascists," to understand that McCarthyism has reigned in the FBI headquarters since Hoover became FBI boss.

White's advocacy of measures to strengthen Soviet-American cooperation, according to a New York Times survey of his papers at Princeton (11-14), included these specific activities:

Repeatedly before World War II White accused the State Department of failing to stem Axis aggression.

Who will deny this now, in view of our policy toward Japan's seizure of Manchuria (1931), Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia (1934), the Hitler-Mussolini intervention in Spain (1936), the Munich conspiracy (1933)? And who will deny that had we intervened against the Axis, the world might have been spared World War II?

White predicted the Axis would attack Britain and France, rather than the Soviet Union. Wouldn't it have been better for everyone if all our Government servants had seen this consequence of the building up of German militarism? Wouldn't it be better today if they saw it in reference to our current policies toward West Germany?

White fought for economic and moral support of the Chinese Government against the Japanese invasion in 1938. Wouldn't that, too, have been better than continuing to ship iron and oil to Japan militarism, which later killed American boys in the Far East, and wouldn't a similar policy today be better than the policy of again building up Japan militarism?

White fought for massive economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union—to the tune of a $10 billion postwar credit—so as to enable us to obtain the raw materials we need. A brilliant proposal for advancing our national interests through the expansion of trade—as even such businessmen as Republic Steel's Ernest Weir and the Chrysler executives are now realizing as the economic consequences of our cold-war policies begin to pile up here at home.

White urged Roosevelt to press Chamberlain to join the Soviet Union in an effort to check Hitler. Had that been successfully done, there would have been no Munich.

White called for "real aid" to Latin America and to China—instead of the "aid" with political strings attached which the Wall Street bankers required. Is this not what a majority of Americans wanted?

Such is the record of Harry Dexter White—a record of devotion to the Rooseveltiean ideals.

White's major ideas were the concepts of Rooseveiian foreign policy, concepts based on the people's progressive alliance which kept Roosevelt in the Presidency despite the conspiracy of the America Firsters, the Du Ponts, the Rockefellers to replace him with Dewey.

Today, the Fascist hirdlings of the Du Ponts, Rockefellers, and backers of the "Liberty League" are having their revenge. And J. Edgar Hoover and his McCarthyite pals, exploiting the well-known fact that all States have intelligence services, are doing their utmost to link American Communists and former New Deal stalwarts with the intelligence services of foreign powers. If they are successful in this, no candidate voicing ideas even remotely New Dealish could hope for election in 1954 and 1965 [sic]. Indeed, their success in this plot might even rule elections in 1951 and 1965 [sic].

Clearly the issue is Roosevelt's foreign and domestic program versus the program of the worst plunderers and betrayers of the American people. Fought along these lines, the Brownell-Hoover-McCarthy maneuver can be smashed, and the Nation's attention returned to the real issues of jobs and liberty.

Mr. Mandel. Then I have a series of documents with a letter from the Treasury Department accrediting them. I ask that the letter be placed in the record without my reading it.
The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of
the record.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 392," and is as
follows:)

Exhibit No. 392  Treasury Department,

Hon. William E. Jenner,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Chairman: In accordance with your letter of March 26, we
are sending you herewith photostatic copies of the following documents:
1. Memorandum by White to Morgenthau, March 31, 1939.
2. Memorandum of September 7, 1944, "Is European Prosperity Dependent on
German Industry?"
3. Memorandum from White to Morgenthau, March 7, 1944, "Proposed United
States Loan to the U. S. S. R."

It is my understanding that the other three documents which you request
are now the subject of discussion between Mr. Grimes of your staff and Mr.
H. Chapman Rose.

Sincerely yours,

Catherine B. Cleary,
Assistant to the Secretary.

Mr. Mandel. I will read excerpts from the documents, all of which
come from the Treasury Department.
The first is a document dated March 7, 1944. At the foot of the
document are the following initials: "HDW," presumably Harry
Dexter White; "WHT," presumably William Henry Taylor; "ISF,"
previously Irving S. Friedman; "SG," presumably Sonia Gold.
We have checked these initials with the Treasury Department, and
those are the names they give us. Portions of this document read
as follows:

Subject: Proposed United States loan to the U. S. S. R.

The following memorandum is in reference to your request that the feasibility
of the extension of a large credit to the U. S. S. R. in exchange for needed
strategic raw materials be explored. Your opinion that such an arrangement
might well be feasible appears to us to be supported by our study of the
possibilities.

This is addressed to Secretary Morgenthau, and from Mr. White.
In regard to his proposed loan to Russia, I read at the end this
section:
The proposed financial agreement appears desirable—
he says—

because:
1. The United States will obtain access to an important source of strategic
raw materials which are expected to be in short supply in the United States
after the war.
2. The United States will also be assured an important market for its industrial
products since the U. S. S. R. represents one of the largest single sources
of demand in Europe and is ideally suited to supply us with a large and varied
backlog of orders for both producers’ and consumers’ goods. Such a sustained
demand could make an important contribution to the maintenance of full employment
during our transition to a peace economy.
3. Moreover, the United States will not only be assured a desirable market
because of the anticipated volume of demand the U. S. S. R. will exercise, but
because of its superior repayment potential compared with other foreign buyers
of American products.
4. An arrangement of this character would provide a sound basis for contin-
tined collaboration between the two governments in the postwar period.
The Chairman. The entire document will go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 393" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 393

March 7, 1944.

From: Secretary Morgenthau.

To: Mr. White.

Subject: Proposed United States loan to the U. S. S. R.

The following memorandum is in response to your request that the feasibility of the extension of a large credit to the U. S. S. R. in exchange for needed strategic raw materials be explored. Your opinion that such an arrangement might well be feasible appears to us to be supported by our study of the possibilities.

1. Recent confidential reports on our raw material resources prepared for the Under Secretary of Interior disclose an increasing dependence of the United States on foreign sources of supply for strategic raw materials because domestic reserves have been seriously diminished or virtually depleted.

2. The following table indicates the extent of United States current reserve supplies for some important strategic materials, which can be produced in quantity in the U. S. S. R., in terms of prewar and current war domestic requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve domestic supplies</th>
<th>On basis of our</th>
<th>On basis of our</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938 domestic</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>consumption</td>
<td>consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Year's supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year's supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungsten</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrome</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercury</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 No record.
2 Less than 1 year's supply.

3. It is evident from the above table that, although our domestic reserves of petroleum, tungsten, and zinc may suffice to meet consumption requirements for the next decade, they will be almost entirely dissipated by the end of that period; in the case of manganese, chrome, mercury, and lead, our reserves are too limited to satisfy even probable domestic requirements of the next 10 years. The number of strategic materials for which our reserves are very low and which can be produced in the U. S. S. R. is greater than indicated above, and includes platinum, vanadium, graphite, and mica.

4. Although our reserves of strategic materials could be somewhat expanded, given an increase in price to make possible further development of marginal resources, the necessity of growing United States dependence on foreign sources of supply in order to satisfy anticipated postwar industrial requirements and to maintain adequate security reserves is inescapable.

U. S. S. R.—UNTAPPED RAW MATERIALS RESERVOIR

1. The U. S. S. R. is richly provided with a wide range of strategic raw materials, including metals, minerals, timber, and petroleum, but the unequal degrees to which these have been developed will limit the number and volume that may be available for export in the immediate postwar years.

2. Rapid economic reconstruction and expanded resource development could greatly enhance the export surplus of the U. S. S. R. If provided with developmental facilities the U. S. S. R. could sustain large-scale exports of metal and metallic ores, petroleum, and timber at an average annual value of at least $500 million, not including exports of other materials such as furs and semimanufactures.
3. It therefore appears that a financial agreement whereby the United States would extend a credit of $5 billion to the U. S. S. R. for the purchase of industrial and agricultural products over a 5-year period, to be repaid in full over a 30-year period, chiefly in the form of raw material exports, would not only be advantageous to the United States, as well as helpful to the U. S. S. R., but would be within the limits of feasible trade between the two countries, since the amount we would wish to purchase would be in excess of the repayment which the U. S. S. R. would be required to make under the proposed loan terms.

IS THE PROPOSED FINANCIAL AGREEMENT PRACTICAL AND DESIRABLE?

The proposed financial agreement appears practical because:

1. The prewar restricted pattern of trade should not be used to define the potentials of postwar trade between the United States and U. S. S. R. since both economies have been fundamentally restructured by the war. In both the United States and the U. S. S. R. the accelerated expansion of productive capacity and national output which has been achieved during the last 3 years indicates the new and larger dimensions which foreign trade can assume in both economies in the postwar period.

2. The low level of prewar international trade relations were both a symptom and a cause of deteriorated economic and political international relations. It is realistic to assume that as compared with prewar years a decreasing proportion of expanding Soviet resources will be devoted to war industries, thereby creating an enlarged export potential through the release of resources.

3. Since the U. S. S. R. has a completely state-controlled economy, the extent and character of its surpluses and deficits (i.e., imports and exports) are largely determined by planning decisions covering the allocation of manpower, materials and equipment; it will be possible for the United States to influence the Soviet pattern of anticipated national surpluses and deficits.

4. If United States trade plans are premised on an expanded volume of trade and a correlative increase in United States import requirements, the expansion of trade between the United States and U. S. S. R. need not necessarily involve a reduction in total United States imports from other areas.

The proposed financial agreement appears desirable because:

1. The United States will obtain access to an important source of strategic raw materials which are expected to be in short supply in the United States after the war.

2. The United States will also be assured an important market for its industrial products, since the U. S. S. R. represents one of the largest single sources of demand in Europe and is ideally suited to supply us with a large and varied backlog of orders for both producers' and consumers' goods. Such a sustained demand could make an important contribution to the maintenance of full employment during our transition to a peace economy.

3. Moreover, the United States will not only be assured a desirable market because of the anticipated volume of demand the U. S. S. R. will exercise, but because of its superior repayment potential compared with other foreign buyers of American products.

4. An arrangement of this character would provide a sound basis for continued collaboration between the two Governments in the postwar period.


Mr. Mandel. Next I have a document dated September 7, 1944, "Memorandum, Subject: Is European Prosperity Dependent upon German Industry?" I will read selected portions of it:

In the postwar period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the United States, can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of Europe without German assistance.

He speaks of the need for German industry being eliminated.

This document has attached to it the names of White and Glasser, presumably Harold Glasser. The initials at the end are HDW, presumably Harry Dexter White; HG, Harold Glasser; ON, Oscar Nathan; HB, Henry Bittermann; and the stenographer's initials.
I ask that this be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire document will go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 394" and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 394**

[Handwritten] White (original document consisted of 4 pages with handwritten numbers 1—4).

**MEMORANDUM**

Subject: Is European prosperity dependent upon German industry?

1. The assumption sometimes made that Germany is an indispensable source of industrial supplies for the rest of Europe is not valid.

United States, United Kingdom and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial group could easily have supplied out of unused industrial capacity practically all that Germany supplied to Europe during the prewar period. In the postwar period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the United States, can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of Europe without German assistance.

Total German exports to the entire world in 1938 were only about $2 billion, of which machinery steel and steel products amounted to about $750 million, coal $165 million and chemicals $230 million.

These amounts are trivial in comparison with the increased industrial potential of the United States alone, or of the United Kingdom. One-fifth of our lend-lease exports of 1943 would be sufficient to replace the full exports of Germany to the whole world.

2. A claim has been made that Europe is dependent upon Ruhr coal. The French-Belgian steel industry and some of the new industrial units which will arise in Europe after the war will need imported coal supplies. However, the British coal industry which suffered from German competition before the war will be able to supply a major part if not all of these needs. Further supplies if necessary could be obtained from the United States though at a much higher price. The different quality of British coal may require some technological changes but the adjustment can be made.

Germany had a net export of coal of 32 million tons in 1937. The difference between the British coal production in a good year and a depressed year was more than the total German exports of coal. Moreover, at no time in the last 25 years has the British coal industry worked at full capacity.

3. Germany has been important to the rest of Europe as a market principally for surplus agricultural products. In 1937 Germany's food imports from the world were $800 million, of which Europe supplied $450 million. Total German purchases of raw materials from Europe in 1937 were about $350 million. The loss of the German market will be largely compensated for by the following developments:

(a) If German industry is eliminated, no doubt the bulk of the industrial raw materials which Germany used to purchase will now be bought by other European nations which will henceforth produce the industrial commodities which Germany exported before to Europe.

(b) The industrialization and the heightened standard of living of the rest of Europe will absorb a part of the food surpluses which formerly went to Germany.

(c) Those parts of Germany which will be added to other countries (the Rhineland, Silesia, East Prussia) may have as high a volume of food imports as before, perhaps higher.

(d) The remaining parts of Germany will continue to import some food, perhaps 25 to 50 percent of former food imports.

4. Germany was important to the rest of Europe as a market to the following extent:
Percentage of each country’s exports to Germany—

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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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</table>

The United Kingdom exported principally coal and textile materials to Germany and the principal French exports were iron ore and wool. The elimination of German industrial exports will provide adequate markets for these exports and more.

The loss of the German market may be important to the Balkan countries. Agricultural exports of these countries to Germany were abnormally large in 1938 because of Germany’s unscrupulous exploitation through clearing agreements and other devices. These countries will find markets for part of their food surplus through industrialization and a higher standard of living within their own country. German areas will continue to import some food from them. However, there may be a net loss of markets to Denmark, Holland, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and these countries will need to make an adjustment in their economies which should not be difficult in the period of greater adjustments which will come with liberation.

5. Under a program of imposing recurrent reparations payments on Germany, which would be the alternative to partition and reduction of her industry, the markets in which European nations can sell their surplus agricultural and industrial raw materials will be no greater than under the other program.

The reparations program would, moreover, considerably reduce export market possibilities both in Europe and the rest of the world for the industries of the United Nations.

6. In short, the statement that a healthy European economy is dependent upon German industry was never true, nor will it be true in the future. Therefore the treatment to be accorded to Germany should be decided upon without reference to the economic consequences upon the rest of Europe. At the worst, these economic consequences will involve relatively minor economic disadvantages in certain sections of Europe. At best, they will speed up the industrial development of Europe outside of Germany. But any disadvantages will be more than offset by real gains to the political objectives and the economic interests of the United Nations as a whole.

HDW: HG: ON: HB: X 9/7/44
9/8/44—Or, and copies to Mr. White.
1 copy to Mr. Pehle.
CC to Mr. DuBois.
c c filed: White; Germany—Postwar Treatment.
cr. ref.: Glasser; Bittermann; Nathan.

Mr. Mandel. The next is a document dated March 31, 1939, addressed to Secretary Morgenthau from Mr. White, which carries the initials H. D. W., presumably Harry Dexter White, and H. G., presumably Harold Glasser. I will read excerpts from this document:

In our opinion events of the past few months give clear indication that the aggressor nations plan to get their future gains, not out of Russia, but out of the British and French Empires. **

We must force the issue of real aid to Latin America. **

The time is now opportune for an arrangement with Russia which would accomplish four things:

(a) Be an important factor in helping recovery in the United States.
(b) Make substantial contributions to the solution of our surplus-cotton problem.
(c) Settle the outstanding debts between Russia and the United States and clear the decks for future economic collaboration between the two most powerful countries in the world, which, irrespective of their political differences, constitute, for the present, at least, the core of resistance against the aggressor nations.

(d) Bring pressure to bear against the Chamberlain government to seek closer military collaboration with Russia in stopping German aggression.

The Chairman. The entire document will go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 395," and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 395

To: Secretary Morgenthau.
From: Mr. White.

1. In our opinion events of the past few months give clear indication that the aggressor nations plan to get their future gains, not out of Russia, but out of the British and French Empires. We will not have long to wait before the aggressor nations will actually proceed along this path.

2. Your letter to the President of October 17, 1938, is proved by recent events to have been 100-percent accurate in its prophecies and analyses. (I am attaching a copy for your convenience.) That was 6 months ago. Since then the aggressor nations have greatly improved their position and strengthened their chances for dominating the world.

3. The need for an aggressive, bold policy on our part is greater than ever. There is nobody on the horizon who can or will successfully push that program unless you and the President do so.

Our international policy should move along three fronts at this time:

1. We must force the issue of real aid to Latin America.

Our progress in bringing Latin America into the United States orbit has yielded negligible results in the past 6 months. On the other hand, with Franco's victory in Spain, the strength of the aggressor nations in Latin America has greatly increased.

Looking at the picture as a whole it seems to us that the State Department is following its traditional policy and apparently is not interested in energetically pushing a program of assistance to Latin American countries on a scale appropriate to the problem with which we are faced. Unless this policy changes, Latin America will gradually succumb to the organized economic and ideological campaign now being waged by aggressor nations.

I am convinced that if the Latin American program is left in the control of the State Department nothing substantial will come of it, despite a great deal of fireworks. I believe that you should make one more attempt to convince the President of this fact. If results commensurate with the problem are to be attained, that portion of the program dealing with the rendering of any economic aid should be unqualifiedly under your leadership.

2. We must render further substantial aid to China.

The time is ripe to propose to Congress the extension of a $100 million 10-year credit to be used by China for the purchase of whatever American products she wishes. China is the only country that is now resisting the aggressor nations and China's fight is being carried out on such a large scale that there is a very good chance that China can seriously weaken, if not neutralize, one important nation in the aggressor bloc.

With England and France very much on the defensive, it becomes more important than ever that we support China.

A loan at this time would mean much to China's stiffened resistance and would offset the effects of the administration's neutrality legislation, which by its terms would in fact prevent China from buying any materials from the United States.

3. The time is now opportune for an arrangement with Russia which would accomplish four things:

(a) Be an important factor in helping recovery in the United States.
(b) Make substantial contributions to the solution of our surplus-cotton problem.
(c) Settle the outstanding debts between Russia and the United States and clear the decks for future economic collaboration between the two most power-
ful countries in the world, which, irrespective of their political differences, constitute, for the present at least, the core of resistance against the aggressor nations.

(d) Bring pressure to bear against the Chamberlain government to seek closer military collaboration with Russia in stopping German aggression.

The proposal in its basic outlines is as follows:

(a) Negotiate for a settlement of the intergovernmental and private debts. It is our opinion that a settlement can be reached agreeable to Russia at this time which would involve payments amounting to $15 or $20 million a year by Russia.

(b) The extension of a $250 million credit to Russia to be used exclusively for the following purposes and under the following conditions:

1. $150 million to be expended within the next 2 years on products made chiefly of cotton, which are processed in the United States. This should absorb from 1 to 2 million bales of our surplus stocks.

2. $50 million to be expended in the United States on machinery.

3. $25 million to be expended on goods consisting chiefly of leather.

4. $25 million to be expended on miscellaneous manufactured items.

5. All imports to be shipped only on United States or Russian boats.

6. Russia to agree not to reexport any of the material she purchases in the United States and not to export any raw cotton or textiles in excess of the value of exports of the 3 preceding years.

Terms of the loan: 10-year loan, amortized monthly at the rate of 10 percent a year and interest payments quarterly at 8 percent a year, and the difference between the cost to the Government of borrowing and the 8 percent to be applied toward the settlement of their public and private debt to the United States.

(1) It may be worth considering that both the Russian loan and the Chinese loan, as well as the Latin American loans, may be all financed by special Government guaranteed serial notes and hence not appear in the budget, or out of silver seigniorage at no cost. The latter might add support of the silver bloc and maybe even Borah.

The above paragraph is preceded by the handwritten characters —a.

The effects of such a loan on (a) the current business situation and (b) the international political situation, would be startling.

(a) The cotton textile industry in the United States would have the biggest boom that it has experienced in many years. (The New England and Southeastern States would benefit very substantially and their Representatives in Congress would be keenly aware of such benefits.)

(b) We would sell 1 to 2 million bales of cotton, which, I believe, is more cotton than the export subsidy scheme will dispose of. Moreover, the sale to Russia will not depress the price of the other cotton we sell, nor will it supply cotton at low prices to the aggressor nations, nor will it injure Brazil as will other plans for increasing cotton exports. Russia is probably the only market in the world where we can sell cotton goods without interfering with world markets. Russia has an adequate supply of raw cotton but has inadequate means for processing that cotton.

Likewise, machine goods and leather industries would benefit which would give some added legislative support from the cattle States and industrial States.

Such action will be notice to Germany that we intend to provide substantial economic support to the enemies of aggression.

Japan will be more hesitant to join Germany and Italy in their plans of aggression.

The people of Great Britain will be profoundly influenced by such action and it will be much more difficult for Chamberlain to avoid taking similar steps just as it was difficult for England to avoid coming to Chinese economic aid after we took the first step. In this connection, England already has a trade commission in Russia and such action on our part will make a success of their negotiations easier.

3/31/39—Original sent to Secretary in 4 o'clock pouch.

HDW: HG: lrs 3/31/39

Mr. Mandel. Finally, I have a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury which is undated. I understand that this was written on or about January 1. There was another draft, and it is addressed to the President.
My Dear Mr. President: During the last year I have discussed several times with Mr. Harriman a plan which we in the Treasury have been formulating for comprehensive aid to Russia during her reconstruction period. We are not thinking of more lend-lease or any form of relief but rather of an arrangement that will have definite and long-range benefits to the United States. Ambassador Harriman has expressed great interest and would like to see the plan advanced. I understand from him that the Russians are reluctant to take the initiative, but would welcome our presenting a constructive program.

You will recall that at Quebec Mr. Churchill showed every evidence that his greatest worry was the period immediately following V-E Day. We have now worked out the phase 2 lend-lease program with the British after 2 months' very hard work.

I am convinced that if we came forward now and presented to the Russians a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period, it would contribute a great deal toward ironing out many of the difficulties we have been having with respect to their problems and policies.

I hope that you will give me an opportunity to present to you the work which we have been doing here in the Treasury over a period of a year on this subject.

I am furnishing Mr. Stettinius with a copy of this letter for his consideration.

The Chairman. That is signed by whom?

Mr. Mandel. From the Secretary of the Treasury's office. It is not signed. It is a copy. It is undated. There was another draft later which was forwarded.

The Chairman. It may go into the record.

Mr. Mandel. The date is about January 1, 1945.

(The letter referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 396” and was read in full by Mr. Mandel.)

Mr. Mandel. Finally, I want to read what the committee has said on different occasions in its reports in reference to the individuals I have mentioned thus far:

In our report on Interlocking Subversion in Government, we quote the testimony of Miss Bentley, Elizabeth Bentley. The testimony reads as follows:

Senator Ferguson. What were your avenues for placing people in strategic positions?

Miss Bentley. I would say that two of our best ones were Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie. They had an immense amount of influence and knew people, and their word was accepted when they recommended someone.

Quoting Miss Bentley again:

In 1944, I took a group of people I called the Perlo group. One of the members of this group was a Mr. Harold Glasser in the Treasury. In the process of checking everyone's past, I found that Mr. Glasser had at one time been pulled out of that particular group and had been turned over to a person whom both Mr. Perlo and Charles Kramer refused to tell me who it was, except that he was working for the Russians (IPR hearings, pp. 441-442).

Then on Frank Coe our report said:

The Perlo memorandum of 1939 contains the names of Frank Coe and his brother, Charles Coe. In 1948, Miss Bentley publicly brought forth in testimony that Frank Coe was a member of her espionage ring (U. N., pp. 227-256).

The Chairman. Is that the Virginiius Frank Coe referred to in the documents you have read?

Mr. Mandel. Yes. The report continued:

Miss Bentley testified that Lauchlin Currie was a full-fledged member of the Silvermaster group who was used not only to bail out other members when they were in trouble, but also to steal White House secrets for the Soviets. Most of these secrets, she said, were related to America's Far Eastern affairs. Currie was President Roosevelt's adviser on these matters, having served as the President's personal emissary to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On one occasion,
according to Miss Bentley, Currie sent word through George Silverman and Harry Dexter White that the United States was about to break a Soviet code.  

May I ask that the rest of these excerpts be put into the record, dealing with the individuals mentioned in those documents.  

The CHAIRMAN. They will go into the record and become a part of the record.  

(The material follows:)

Whittaker Chambers involved both Kaplan and Weintraub as Communists. He said that Kaplan gave him, Chambers, a job with the National Research Project of WPA in the 1930's as a service to the Communist conspiracy (IPR, p. 4756).  

Elizabeth Bentley testified that Kaplan was one of the espionage ring who gave her stolen Government secrets in the 1940's.  

* * * * * *  

Kaplan used the names of Currie and Silverman again, 2 years later, when he sought a job with Foreign Economic Administration. He got the job. He used the same names, with the same success, in an application to the Treasury in 1945.  

When Kaplan went to the Treasury in June 1945, it was Frank Coe who appointed him. Coe's name was on the Berle notes and he was identified by Bentley as a Communist. He invoked the fifth amendment before us last December 1, 1952 (p. 227ff—U. N. hearings).  

* * * * * *  

Harry Dexter White, Frank Coe, Harold Glasser, Victor Perlo, Irving Kaplan, Sol Adler, Abraham George Silverman and William Ludvig Ullmann were employees of the Treasury Department during part or all of the period studied by the subcommittee.  

All these persons were named by both Miss Bentley and Chambers as participants in the Communist conspiracy. Perlo was identified also by Nathaniel Weyl. The names of Perlo, Adler, Silverman, and Ullmann turn up in the Nixon Memorandum of 1945. Several of those named were listed in the telephone finder of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, identified by Miss Bentley in 1948 as the most important person she dealt with in the Government underground.  

*  

Mr. MANDEL. On the point you mentioned about foreign affairs, I would like to read that letter to which you referred. It is dated December 15, 1941, from the Secretary of the Treasury:  

On and after this date, Mr. Harry D. White, Assistant to the Treasury, will assume full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department has to deal having a bearing on foreign relations. Mr. White will act as liaison between the Treasury Department and the State Department, will serve in the capacity of adviser to the Secretary on all Treasury foreign affairs matters, and will assume responsibility for the management and operation of the stabilization fund without change in existing procedures. Mr. White will report directly to the Secretary.  

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that signed by?  

Mr. MANDEL. Signed by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau.  

I ask that the remaining excerpts be placed in the record.  

The CHAIRMAN. They will go in the record and become a part of the record.  

(The excerpts referred to follow:)

The pertinent paragraph from a Treasury document memorandum dated February 25, 1943, and sent to White by Secretary Morgenthau:  

"Effective this date, I would like you to take supervision over and assume full responsibility for Treasury's participation in all economic and financial matters (except matters pertaining to depository facilities, transfers of funds, and war expenditures) in connection with the operations of the Army and Navy and the civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our Armed Forces are operating or

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2 IPR hearings, p. 243.  
3 Hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, pt. 14, p. 968.  
4 Ibid., p. 976.  
5 Report on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, p. 29.
are likely to operate. This will, of course, include general liaison with the State Department, Army and Navy, and other departments or agencies and representatives of foreign governments on these matters."

A compilation of the interdepartmental and international bodies on which Assistant Secretary White was the official Treasury representative:

The Interdepartmental Lend-Lease Committee
The Canadian-American Joint Economic Committee
The Executive Committee on Commercial Policy
The Executive Committee and Board of Trustees of the Export-Import Bank
The Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs
The National Resources Committee
The Price Administration Committee
The Committee on Foreign Commerce Regulations
The Interdepartmental Committee on Post-War Economic Problems
The Committee on Trade Agreements
The National Munitions Control Board
The Acheson Committee on International Relief
The Board of Economic Warfare
The Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy
The Liberated Areas Committee
The O. S. S. Advisory Committee
The U. S. Commercial Corporation
The Interdepartmental Committee on Planning for Coordinating the Economic Activities of United States Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas

White was also chief architect of the International Monetary Fund as well as its first United States executive director.

The Chairman. I want to thank you, Mr. Mitchell, for appearing here and giving us your assistance in this most important subject.

At this time the committee will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, at 11:20 a. m., the hearing was recessed.)

Exhibit No. 397

April 6, 1954.

Hon. William E. Jenner,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: For the record, in connection with my testimony before the Subcommittee on Internal Security, I enclose a document which shows that I was appointed a special consultant to the Secretary of the Treasury on January 20, 22, and 23, 1940, in connection with the work I described, preparing speeches for the Secretary.

In answer to questions, I see no objection to confirming that when I was Washington correspondent for the New Republic, between 1935 and 1941, I wrote under the initials "TRB."

Sincerely,

Jonathan Mitchell

Enclosure.

Exhibit No. 398

Treasury Department,
Washington, February 5, 1940.

Mr. Jonathan Mitchell,
Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Mitchell: There is enclosed check in the amount of $66.66 to reimburse you for services rendered the Treasury Department on January 20, 22, and 23, 1940, together with letter of appointment covering this period of employment.

Very truly yours,

W. N. Thompson,
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary.

^P. 14, hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, p. 953.
^Ibid., p. 955.
^Post War Foreign Policy Preparation, a State Department publication, p. 142.
Mr. Jonathan Mitchell,  
Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.

SIR: You are hereby appointed a consulting expert in the Office of the Secretary, with compensation at the rate of $22.22 per diem, payable from the appropriation, "Exchange Stabilization Fund," for 3 days, January 20, 22, and 23, 1940.

Very truly yours,

D. W. Bell,  
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

X
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

JULY 6, 7, AUGUST 5 AND 6, 1954

PART 20

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

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ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
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ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
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SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
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JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas

ALVA C. CARPENTER, Chief Counsel
BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research
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<th>Name</th>
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<td>C'Jiley, Richard L.</td>
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<td>Wilson, Luke Woodward</td>
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The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.
Present also: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel to the subcommittee; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert C. McManus, professional staff member.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

On March 10, 1953, Bella V. Dodd appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. She was formerly the legislative representative of the New York district of the Communist Party, and a former member of the national committee of the Communist Political Association, later known as the Communist Party.

She was asked about the conduct of Communists in the Armed Forces during the last war. I read from her testimony:

Question:
Dr. Dodd, did Communist teachers therefore accept the general directives of the Communist Party, and did they themselves go into the armed services of the United States during this period?

Answer:
Yes; they immediately began volunteering for service and cooperating with the war effort to their fullest extent.

Question:
Do you know, based on your experience with these schoolteachers, what assignments they ultimately obtained in the armed services of the United States?

Answer:
I guess it was varied, because it depends upon the branch of service. Many of our teachers did seek to go into the educational division of the Army, the indoctrination course.

Question:
How do you know that, Dr. Dodd?

Answer:
From time to time the members would come back and we would discuss the question of what their work was, and they would discuss particularly the indoctrination courses where they were very eager to make the turn for the
American soldier in a pro-Soviet fashion. Many of our soldiers were anti-Soviet, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was in the war with us. It was the question of making the turn and establishing the idea that the Soviet Union was a democracy and was, as a matter of fact, the most perfect democracy in the world.

The purpose of the Indoctrination courses was to get as much of that in as possible. Of course, in some places they got a lot in; in some places they had to take little. They were very anxious to get it in.

Question:

You know this, Dr. Dodd, because of the fact that you knew these particular Communist teachers who did come back and as a matter of fact reported to you at Communist Party headquarters how they were carrying on their own indoctrination courses in their service?

Answer:

As a matter of fact, no Communist went to the Armed Forces or came out of the Armed Forces without reporting to the party his experience, his work. No man came in on leave without reporting to the party and finding out just what the pitch was.

It is the purpose of this series of hearings to demonstrate how Communists in the Armed Forces, more particularly in the Information and Education Division, sought to indoctrinate 8 million of our GI's, who today are in civilian life. It is our purpose here to sketch the pattern of their activity in seeking to mold the minds of our fighting men through Communist propaganda so that we may have an ineradicable lesson for the future.

We will call the first witness in this series of hearings. Who is the first witness?

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Criley.

The Chairman. Richard Criley, come forward, please.

Mr. Forer. May we have the cameras turned off, Senator?

The Chairman. You may.

Do not put the cameras on the witness. You can keep them on the committee and in the room, but we will grant the witness' request.

Will you be sworn and testify, Mr. Criley? Do you swear the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Criley. I so swear.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD L. CRILEY, CHICAGO, ILL., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Chairman. Will you state your full name to the committee?

Mr. Criley. Richard L. Criley, C-r-i-l-e-y.

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Criley?

Mr. Criley. At 4107 Arlington Street, Chicago, Ill.

The Chairman. What is your business or profession?

Mr. Criley. I am a hod carrier.

The Chairman. Hod carrier.

You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter, with the examination of the witness.

Let the record show that Mr. Criley is before the committee as a witness and sworn, with his attorney, Mr. Forer.

Mr. Forer, I believe your address has been given in our record.

Mr. Forer. At the closed hearing, yes, sir, Senator. Do you want me to give it again?
The CHAIRMAN. You might give it again.

Mr. FORER. 711 14th Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Mr. CARPENTER. Where and by whom are you now employed?

Mr. CRILEY. I am employed in Wheaton, Ill., by McHugh Construction Co.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you in the service during the last war?

Mr. CRILEY. I was.

Mr. CARPENTER. Briefly tell us the branch of service and the various commissions you held, if any.

Mr. CRILEY. I was first assigned, after I was drafted, to the military police as a private. I became a private, first class, at Fort Ord, Calif. I went to officer candidate school. That was the military police school in Fort Custer, Mich., in January of 1943. I received a commission there, after the 3-month course, as a second lieutenant in the military police.

I attended a 1-month further schooling in what was called occupational military police.

I went overseas almost immediately. That was about the middle of May of 1943, landing in North Africa and entering the invasion of Sicily as an officer assigned to the First Division of the Infantry. I landed in Gela, and worked for a period of time as a civil affairs officer in the towns of Niscemi, Montechiaro, Mousormelli, and in Caltanissetta.

I was then transferred to Palermo in Sicily. I remained there until about November, I think it was, of 1943, and was transferred to Naples. I did service there as an officer in the labor division of the Allied Military Government until about January of 1944. I was shipped to England, assigned to the civil affairs center in Chippenham in England, where I remained for several months.

Then I was assigned to the mission to France, and sometime about 4 weeks after D-day I landed in France at Omaha Beach. After some delays, I was finally stationed in Paris as a staff officer of SHAEF, that is, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, mission to France. I served there in the welfare and displaced persons divisions of that staff headquarters until after the end of the war.

I came home in December of 1945. I left the Army about that time.

Mr. CARPENTER. Your basic training was military police; is that correct?

Mr. CRILEY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. When did you go into civil affairs work?

Mr. CRILEY. The special school that I went to in Fort Custer, which was called occupational military police, was a branch of civil affairs work or of military government work having to do with public safety behind the lines. However, when we landed in Sicily, the number of civil affairs officers was so few and the advance of our forces were so rapid that virtually none of us actually carried out the original assignments for which we had had training in advance. So I functioned as a general civil affairs officer starting from the time that I arrived in Sicily. I would say that is probably the beginning of my assignment in civil affairs as such.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you request assignment in the military police?

Mr. CRILEY. No. I was assigned as most people are assigned in the Army. I was simply told, "You are a military policeman." That is the way things work in the Army usually.
Mr. Carpenter. You made application to attend officer candidate school; did you not?
Mr. Criley. Yes, I did.
Mr. Carpenter. In that application you made your selection of the type of service desired; did you not?
Mr. Criley. I applied for the military police school, because that was the branch of the service that I was already in and that I had experience in, and I thought I had probably the best opportunity of being accepted in that school since I was already assigned to that branch of service.
Mr. Carpenter. Specifically, what were your duties in civil affairs?
Mr. Criley. That varied a great deal according to time and place. In the early days of the invasion in Sicily, it included virtually everything. When I arrived in Mousormelli, for example—
Mr. Forer. Could we have the cameras off?
The Chairman. The cameras are not on the witness. The cameras are directed this way.
Mr. Criley. When I was sent to Mousormelli, the town had just been taken. I was the only American officer or soldier in an area of some 7 villages with a population of about 50,000 people. The Fascist militia still had their arms. There was virtually a situation of chaos, as far as any governmental functioning was concerned, as far as food and water supplies were concerned. It was my job, the same as that of any other civil affairs officer, to attempt to establish some degree of government, of security primarily, to guarantee that the rear of our Armed Forces was safe.
In these towns it involved primarily, I would say, the solution to the economic problems of food and water in a period when railroad lines were destroyed, when pipelines were broken, when there was almost no fuel for the flour mills, and so forth.
So as a general civil affairs officer, it involved virtually everything that a person can think of in terms of trying to fill in the gaps to reestablish some sort of orderly existence in these villages.
When I was transferred to Caltanissetta, my assignment was to assist in the collection of grain. It so happens that there was a very serious food shortage in Sicily, and the Province of Caltanissetta was one of the better grain-growing provinces. We tried to follow through with somewhat the same apparatus that had existed under the former Italian Government, of collecting the grain in Government warehouses and then this grain was either issued on ration cards or, more often, ground into flour, given to bakers, and the bread was rationed at a low price to attempt to keep the standard of living from rising too precipitously.
Mr. Carpenter. What did you do when you were assigned to civil affairs in Paris, France?
Mr. Criley. When I was in France, I was in the welfare and displaced persons division. Our major problem, as far as I was concerned, was in the first instance the care of, and in a later period the repatriation of, the hundreds of thousands of people that had been rooted up from their homes by the Nazi armies as they spread all over Europe, and to try to get them back ultimately, after the war, to their homes. This included virtually every nationality in Europe, I would say.
My specific assignment was that of liaison officer, since I speak some French, and my work was with the French Government primarily, and to a somewhat lesser degree but to a considerable degree with the Allied missions of repatriation which were stationed in Paris, representing all of the Allied countries in the war.

Mr. Carpenter. What were the nationalities of these various people? You said practically every one in Europe. Were there any predominating ones?

Mr. Criley. To list the nationalities, there were quite a considerable number of Italians; there were Greeks, Belgians, Czechs, Poles, Russians. The largest numbers were Polish, Russians, Bohemians, and Italians. I would say.

Mr. Carpenter. Were any of these repatriations forced?

Mr. Criley. No; none of the repatriations were forced, and may I say that the question strikes me as a little bit strange. When a person has been uprooted from his home by force, driven into forced labor under Nazi whips, and finally has an opportunity of going home, it is an occasion for rejoicing for virtually any person, whatever his nationality.

Mr. Carpenter. When did you separate from the service?

Mr. Criley. I separated from the service in the early part of December 1945.

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank?

Mr. Criley. My rank was captain.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you now hold a Reserve commission?

Mr. Criley. I do not.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you tendered a Reserve commission when you were separated from the service?

Mr. Criley. I was offered the opportunity of signing up in the Reserve, and I did not take it.

Mr. Carpenter. You could not take it?

Mr. Criley. I did not.

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you receive your university training, if any?

Mr. Criley. I received my university training at the University of California in Berkeley and, by the way, 2 years at Stanford University, my freshman and sophomore years.

Mr. Carpenter. What degrees do you hold?

Mr. Criley. Bachelor of arts.

Mr. Carpenter. When did you receive your degree?

Mr. Criley. In 1934.

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you go to grade and high school?

Mr. Criley. I attended grade school in Carmel Grammar School, Carmel-by-the-Sea, Calif., and I went to high school in Monterey Union High School, Monterey, Calif.

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you first employed when you left the university?

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness, before responding to the question, conferred with his counsel.

Mr. Criley. I was a supervisor of a WPA project.

Mr. Carpenter. Where was this?

Mr. Criley. In northern California, Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties.

Mr. Carpenter. How long did you work there?
Mr. Criley. I think it was about a year.
Mr. Carpenter. Where were you next employed?
Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer this question on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself.

The Chairman. That is a proper refusal.
Mr. Carpenter. Can you give this committee the various places you worked after your WPA work until you joined the armed services?
Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer this question on the same basis as the previous question.

The Chairman. And that basis is that under the fifth amendment you refuse to be a witness against yourself because it might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Criley. On the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself.

The Chairman. All right. I think you should state it.
Mr. Carpenter. While you were at Berkeley, were you in fact president of the League for Industrial Democracy?
Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question as a violation of my rights under the first amendment and on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself.

The Chairman. This committee does not recognize your right to refuse to answer under the first amendment. However, your refusal under the fifth amendment is acceptable to this committee.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you in 1936 lead the so-called peace strike sponsored by the American League Against War and Fascism at Berkeley, Calif.?

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons just cited.

The Chairman. The same ruling, Mr. Reporter.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you State executive secretary of the Young Communist League of California in 1936?

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons just given.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a registered member of the Communist Party in 1938, residing at 1140 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif.?

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons previously given.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party prior to entering the Armed Forces?

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons previously given.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party while you were in the Armed Forces?

Mr. Criley. No.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you been a member of the Communist Party since you left the Armed Forces?

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons previously given.

The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist Party now?
Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question as a violation of my rights under the first amendment and on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment.
The Chairman. The committee does not recognize your right to refuse to answer under the first amendment, but we do recognize your right to refuse to answer under the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you expelled from Local 28 of the United Packinghouse Workers Union of Chicago because of your Communist record?

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness, before responding to the question, conferred with his counsel.

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons previously given.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever used any of the following aliases: Richard Foster, David Athis?

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons previously given.

Mr. Carpenter. Going back to your war service, during the war were you a speaker on the Army Hour radio program, and did you speak on that program regarding the handling of labor affairs in Sicily?

Mr. Criley. I had about three sentences. I am not even sure of what the subject matter was. The total broadcast, I believe, for our group was a 5-minute broadcast, and I think there were some 3 or 4 officers on the panel, of which I was one.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has some documents he would like to place in the record.

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a clipping, a photostat of a clipping from the New York Times of October 10, 1946, page 15, which shows that "Richard L. Criley, former head of the Young Communist League of California, and district educational director of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was expelled from Local 28 of the United Packinghouse Workers Union, CIO, today by a 59-to-16 vote of the membership."

I ask that that be placed in the record.

The Chairman. It will go in the record and become a part of the record.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostatic copy of a page of the Young Communist Review of June 1939, page 9, which shows that Richard Criley was then a member of the Young Communist League.

This gives an account of the convention of the Young Communist League.

The Chairman. That may go in the record and become a part of the record.

Mr. Mandel. The same is true of another exhibit, the Young Communist Review for July 1939, which shows Richard Criley as heading the California delegation of the Young Communist League at the convention in 1939.

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "exhibits Nos. 401, 402, and 403" and are as follows:)}
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT No. 401

[From the New York Times, October 10, 1946, p. 15]

EXPelled AS COMMUNIST

WEST COAST MAN OUSTED BY CIO PACKINGHOUSE UNION IN CHICAGO

[Special to the New York Times]

CHICAGO, October 9.—Richard L. Criley, former head of the Young Communist League of California and district educational director of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was expelled from Local 28 of the United Packinghouse Workers Union, CIO, today by a 59-to-16 vote of the membership.

Earlier, by a vote of 63 to 12, he had been found to be a Communist and guilty of violating constitutional provisions of the union and of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The principal charge against him was that “contrary to CIO policy he visited local 28 and advised its members not to become affiliated with nor send delegates to the Chicago Industrial Union Council, city central body of the CIO.”

Mr. Criley had been a member of the local and of the union only a few months, the members said.

EXHIBIT No. 402

[From the Young Communist Review, June 1939, p. 9]

* * * * *

Speeches from the various district organizations: Jim West of Seattle, Nick Sanders of Detroit, Claude Lightfoot, Chicago, Dick Criley, San Francisco, Joe Moore, of Ohio, Elwood Dean, of New Jersey, all of them biting into the hard bread of politics, placing their problems on the broad palm of the convention. Listen, they say, this is what’s been happening in our nook of the country. This is what people say and think out our way. Think it over, comrades, consider both sides of the question, turn it over in your minds; it adds up the problem of young America.

Up in the stenographers room I met a fellow I had not seen in years. Back in the beginning of the student movement, he had come in from evening high school; tall, gangling, a wizard with machinery; a demon with nuts, bolts, gears, wires, switches, pulleys. Ernie Amat was his name, and it was he that made the mimeograph machines go, the Jimmy Higgins of the student movement. That was 7 years ago. Then Ernie went to Spain, was wounded bringing in the telephone wires out of no man’s land. I met him again at the YCL convention, and what do you think he was doing? His grin smeared with ink, his long skilled fingers coaxing the mimeograph machine along, right there in the steno room; making the wheels turn, keeping the convention going. The same old Ernie Amat; mechanism, veteran of the Lincoln Brigade, delegate to the YCL convention, the same Jimmy Higgins.

Then a high note. A delegation of mothers, 30 of them. New York mothers of every nationality, Negro and white, coming up front with their arms full of flowers. Listen to Mrs. Jiggetts, mother of two children: “I bring you greetings, you builders of the world of tomorrow * * * warm greetings, from our proud hearts. You begin life with what it took us difficult years to achieve. To you, young people who take your places side by side with us in the struggle for socialism, I say: Carry on, your YCL mothers are proud of you * * * young Communists.”

Not a single hour without something to do, seemed to be the convention slogan * * * for when there weren’t panel meetings, and committee meetings, and powows of various delegations, there was a dance on Saturday night. They tell me, a whale of a dance, crowded to the eaves, swinging far into the early hours of morning.

Things were naturally a bit slow in starting on Sunday a. m. Delegates were observed to be snoozing here and there. Occasionally that day, comrades were seen the armchairs in the lobby, loafting a bit in the hallways, and now that the city streets were enjoying the relative quiet of the Sabbath, delegates idled in front of the hotel—and scurried across the street, and took pictures in groups in front of the delicatessen stores, and the theatrical scenery shops, their laughter rending the stillness, and even the cop at the doorway laughing with them, kiddling with them.
Bill Foster brought them to their feet, however, in the late morning. A guest from the Communist Party, with a speech in the classical style, in the best Foster style * * * a sturdy oak of a man, a man in whose very hearing one sees two generations of American labor history; in whom one sees the living connection between the great tradition of Debs and Haywood * * * in whose majestic brow, uplifted hands, and earnest voice, four decades of the 20th century give serene inspiration to the younger generation. * * *

Skip the panels on Sunday afternoon (you will get them all in the convention proceedings) and relax at the cultural festival on Sunday night. A musical revue, the great ballroom overcrowded with friends and visitors. The songs again and again, the puppet shows, and the skits prepared by delegations from five State organizations with Chicago carrying off the honors.

Business in the air on Monday * * * the convention is clearly coming to a close just when everybody is pretty much getting to know one another, like the last hours of an exciting weekend in the country. Reports from the panels * * * 6 minutes each, 5 minutes each * * * comrades: just 1 more word * * * now, comrades, order in the rear of the will, will the comrades be seated * * * will all ushers please report to the front. * * *

Just before adjournment for lunch, Enrico Ramirez, organizational secretary from the Mexican Confederation of Youth, in a beautiful speech, a honey, well-phrased, direct, snappy, hitting straight to the point: the good-neighbor policy, the danger of a Fascist uprising in Mexico this summer, the unity that must exist among the youth organizations in the Western Hemisphere. Dave Kashtan, leader of the Canadian YCL, the living evidence of the spirit of international fraternity which distinguishes our organization. * * *

Exhibit No. 403

[From the Young Communist Review, July 1939]

* * * * * * *

Both our districts will unquestionably learn much from the observations of the mass, popular work of the Kings County YCL and the splendid example of collective work and leadership of Comrade Saunders. The Northwest delegation particularly wishes to take this opportunity to thank the Kings County YCL for the excellent cooperation extended to our district in sending it $90 toward covering part of the expenses in bringing its delegation from the Pacific Northwest.

Both west coast districts pledge our utmost of energy and enthusiasm toward building on the coast, too, a large and popular YCL for “character building and education in the spirit of socialism.” Let’s go to town.

James West,
For the Northwest delegation.

Richard Criley,
For the California delegation.

The Chairman. Further questions? [No response.]

You may stand by.

Mr. Forer. Is the witness excused?

The Chairman. You may be excused for this morning.

Will Mr. John Kerr come forward, please?

Will you be sworn to testify? Do you swear the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Kerr. I do.

Testimony of John Kenneth Kerr, Baltimore, Md.

The Chairman. Mr. Kerr, you have no objection to photographers taking your picture or the cameras being on while you testify? You have no objection to that, do you?

Mr. Kerr. If it is necessary, all right, but otherwise I don’t care for it.
The Chairman. You are not objecting to it?
Mr. Kerr. No.
The Chairman. We will try it.
Will you state your full name for the record?
Mr. Kerr. John Kenneth Kerr.
The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Kerr?
Mr. Kerr. In Baltimore, Md.
The Chairman. What is your business or profession?
Mr. Kerr. I am in the insurance business.
The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter, to question the
witness.
Mr. Carpenter. Specifically what is the nature of your duties with
the insurance company?
Mr. Kerr. I am a claim manager for Casualty Insurance Co. in
Baltimore.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Armed Forces during
World War II?
Mr. Kerr. I was.
Mr. Carpenter. Will you please state what posts you occupied dur-
ing World War II?
Mr. Kerr. At the termination of my service, I was a captain in the
Counterintelligence Corps. I was Chief of the Investigations Branch
for the Third Service Command.
Mr. Carpenter. When did you first enter the service?
Mr. Kerr. About December 23, 1942.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you go in with a commission or as an enlisted
man?
Mr. Kerr. My previous commission was reactivated.
Mr. Carpenter. You had been a Reserve officer?
Mr. Kerr. I had, years before.
Mr. Carpenter. Reactivated, and you went into the service in 1942.
In what branch of the service?
Mr. Kerr. My commission was reactivated in the Coast Artillery.
Mr. Carpenter. Then where were you assigned?
Mr. Kerr. I was assigned to Fort Monroe.
Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of the work?
Mr. Kerr. I would say it was training status there for a period of
time, about 6 months.
Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of the training?
Mr. Kerr. In the Navy they call it boot training. In the Army it
is just—
Mr. Carpenter. Just basic?
Mr. Kerr. Basic training.
Mr. Carpenter. When did you first go into CIC work?
Mr. Kerr. About April of 1943.
Mr. Carpenter. What is CIC?
Mr. Kerr. Counterintelligence Corps.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you take any special training for your CIC
work?
Mr. Kerr. No. My insurance work for about 18 years prior to that
was that type of training, investigative work.
Mr. Carpenter. Investigative. CIC work requires investigation, is
that correct?
Mr. Kerr. Some phases.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the phase that had for its purpose investigating?

Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you assigned when you started to work, that is, after you had concluded basic training?

Mr. Kerr. In Baltimore, Md.

Mr. Carpenter. In the city of Baltimore?

Mr. Kerr. No. That was the headquarters of the Third Service Command, and I was attached to the headquarters staff of the Counterintelligence Corps.

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank at that time?

Mr. Kerr. Second lieutenant.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion at some period to investigate conditions at Camp Pickett, Va.?

Mr. Kerr. I did.

Mr. Carpenter. When was that?

Mr. Kerr. That was about August of 1945—of 1944.

Mr. Carpenter. August of 1944?

Mr. Kerr. No, pardon me. August of 1945.

Mr. Carpenter. August of 1945. What was the nature of that investigation?

Mr. Kerr. There was some activity there. It was not authorized. As the investigation will show, it should not have been occurring.

Mr. Carpenter. What was this thing that you were investigating? Something was going on there, you say, that should not have been going on. What was that?

Mr. Kerr. It was activities of a group of people, I would say indoctrinating the forces at the camp in a manner that was not approved and was unauthorized.

Mr. Carpenter. Was this in any special division at Camp Pickett?

Mr. Kerr. Yes. It was in the Information and Education Division.

Mr. Carpenter. The Information and Education Division.

Mr. Kerr. I hand you here a document entitled "Prospectus—Troop Training Orientation Program." I will ask if you will state what that is and if you have seen it before.

(Mr. Kerr examining document.)

Mr. Kerr. I have never seen this before.

Mr. Carpenter. You have never seen that document before?

Mr. Kerr. No.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever seen any document like that before?

Mr. Kerr. Not like this. This even includes a prospectus of indoctrination for the Korean war, which was after my time.

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you another document and ask if you can identify that.

(Mr. Kerr examining book.)

Mr. Kerr. I cannot identify this, but I knew of its existence.

Mr. Carpenter. You knew of its existence. Did you ever see it before?

Mr. Kerr. No.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do any investigation in connection with that?

Mr. Kerr. Not as such, no. I may have done some piecemeal investigation from time to time, not knowing that it was involved in this. We don't always in an investigation get the basic facts. In a
book we may investigate a paragraph, and that is the symbol at a higher echelon.

Mr. Carpenter. These are entitled "Army Talk." Did you have any investigation whatsoever to do with Army Talk?

Mr. Kerr. No.

Mr. Carpenter. Just a moment, please.

How were these particular documents used?

Mr. Kerr. It is my understanding that they were used in courses of the I. and E. instruction. They had quite a few package kits of different series that were used.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know who was responsible for preparing those Army Talks?

Mr. Kerr. No, but I would assume they came out of the I. and E. headquarters, which at that time I believe was at Washington and Lee University.

Mr. Carpenter. In the course of your investigation at Camp Pickett when you investigated the I. and E., did you have any occasion to inquire as to those Army Talks?

Mr. Kerr. Not that particular fact sheet, no, or series of fact sheets. I did collect a series of pamphlets there in the course of the investigation which were attached to the investigation as exhibits.

Mr. Carpenter. But they were not these Army Talks?

Mr. Kerr. No, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. I will hand you another series of documents and ask if you can recognize those?

Mr. Kerr (examining documents). I don't recognize these specific ones, but I did collect, in the library at Camp Pickett and in the classroom of instruction, similar such bulletins put out by the same people.

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please read what those documents are?


Mr. Carpenter. You say you found similar documents when you made your investigation at Camp Pickett?

Mr. Kerr. Yes, similar publications, like a weekly magazine. This happens to be May 15, 1945. The one I may have picked up might have been March of 1944.

Mr. Carpenter. But they had the same caption?

Mr. Kerr. Yes.

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you find those documents?

Mr. Kerr. I attached the documents that I found to the exhibits of my investigation. I found one in the library and several in the classrooms.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know how they happened to get in the library or the classroom?

Mr. Kerr. No.

Mr. Carpenter. Was that a part of your investigation?

Mr. Kerr. Yes, but at that time troops were moving in and out of Camp Pickett quite frequently, and it was the dead end of that particular branch of the investigation.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you make any examination of whether or not they were purchased or in any way requested by the War Department?
Mr. Kerr. No. My investigation was a fact finding investigation.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you make any investigation whether they were brought there by private individuals or how they were arriving at Camp Pickett?

Mr. Kerr. No. My investigation was a fact-finding investigation in which I collected the information that was available at the time and turned it in to headquarters.

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you another document. This is a mimeographed publication headed “The GI Plan for Postwar America,” and ask you if you have seen that document before?

Mr. Kerr (examining document). I have.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you find that document in connection with your investigation activities at Camp Pickett?

Mr. Kerr. I did, and it was this document which started my investigation.

Mr. Carpenter. What is peculiar about that document that started your investigation?

Mr. Kerr. There are some phases in there that we considered subversive.

Mr. Carpenter. You considered them subversive.

Calling your attention to page 16, the following statement:

The Office of Scientific Research and Development should become a permanent office and it shall patent all developments that were made by it in the past and will be made by it in the future. These patents should be licensed to anyone who wants to use them, and in return the Government should be paid a small percentage of the profits made from their use.

Is that passage there?

Mr. Kerr. That is right.

Mr. Carpenter. On page 21:

There should be an international control commission set up as a part of the United Nations World Organization to supervise and control the use of atomic energy. This commission should make sure that no nation is using atomic energy to prepare for war. It will also make atomic energy available to all nations on an equal basis. This is because it is impossible to keep the secret of atomic energy. Other nations will develop it themselves. A secret atomic bomb race could result in the destruction of the world.

Is that passage there?

Mr. Kerr. That is right.

Mr. Carpenter. In connection with that pamphlet, please tell the committee what it is and how it fitted into the program.

Mr. Kerr. I am not quite sure that I understand your question, how this passage—

Mr. Carpenter. Who drew up that pamphlet?

Mr. Kerr. Who drew it up, I don’t know. It is supposed to have been drawn up by this group of young soldiers listed on the frontispiece, or cover.

Mr. Carpenter. Did your investigation reveal that, or did you take it as a fact?

Mr. Kerr. They gave me affidavits that they drew it up.

Mr. Carpenter. They drew it up?

Mr. Kerr. But who “brain-childed” it, I don’t know, because in my opinion it was beyond their ability.

Mr. Carpenter. It allegedly was drawn up by a group of soldiers?

Mr. Kerr. That is correct.
Mr. Carpenter. That was part of your investigation?
Mr. Kerr. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. What did the soldiers do with this particular document?
Mr. Kerr. They tried to have the entire camp sponsor this pamphlet or brochure. They had a meeting—
Mr. Carpenter. Was that some kind of convention? Would you call it a convention?
Mr. Kerr. They were permitted to have a general meeting in the auditorium from time to time on the post. They held one of these meetings, against orders to hold it. I was not present at that meeting, but I understand that there were about a thousand troops there, in which they were to vote on whether or not this would be sponsored by the entire post or not, or just the I. and E. group, the distinction being the entire post at Camp Pickett was a large post. I think you could get two complete divisions in Camp Pickett.
Mr. Carpenter. How did that program work into the I. and E. section? You mentioned about working in the I. and E. How did it happen to be a part of the I. and E. which you were investigating?
Mr. Kerr. These soldiers who are listed as members of the GI Post-war Planning Board were also very active as members of the I. and E. section. They had a building set aside divided in two sections. The front part of the building was a recreation room, the rear part of the building was classroom, and a small space between the two, all under the same roof, which was a library. From that library and from the desks of the students attending classes is where I obtained the exhibits attached to my original investigation, this being, of course, the dominating feature of why I was there with some of my men investigating what was going on.
They had a meeting to vote on whether this would represent the entire camp or not, at a general session of the troops. The meeting was not quite honest. They padded the ballots, and the soldiers found out the ballots were being stuffed, and walked out.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you investigate how they padded the ballots?
Mr. Kerr. Yes, by statements taken from persons that are listed here. As I recall, David Sloane was one, as a leader in the group. I believe also he was from New York City.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you investigate who were the chief sponsors and who kept this idea going there at Camp Pickett?
Mr. Kerr. Yes. As I just said, David Sloane was one. I think Murray Carp was another. The officer in charge was a woman named, I believe, Alice Murray.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you talk to any of those individuals when you were investigating?
Mr. Kerr. I did, and took signed statements from them.
Mr. Carpenter. What did you elicit from them?
Mr. Kerr. All the information that I could as to the entire history of the whole episode.
Mr. Carpenter. I would like to call your attention to page 21 and the passage there which says:

Through the United Nations World Organization, the same freedom of airplanes and airports as exists for sealanes and seaports, should be guaranteed to all nations. This will prevent any one country from having a monopoly on air transportation.
Does that appear in that document?

Mr. Kerr. It does.

Mr. Carpenter. On page 22:

Therefore, Congress should gradually reduce tariff rates to encourage free trade and lead to better understanding and world prosperity. The United Nations Council should adopt this policy for all nations.

Does that appear in that document?

Mr. Kerr. It does.

Mr. Carpenter. What eventually happened as a result of this meeting where you stated the ballot box was stuffed?

Mr. Kerr. The average soldier was disgusted with the manner in which the meeting was being conducted. He didn't approve of this, and he left.

Mr. Carpenter. You state you feel that document was not written by the enlisted men. Did your investigation reveal any outside source from where it might come?

Mr. Kerr. Yes, it gave an indication that there was outside influence. The wife of one of these men listed in the frontispiece was there, and another young soldier's mother had come down from New York to help them. The privilege of the families living near the post was exercised at Pickett, and I believe in a small town there called Blackstone, Va., they had apartments.

My investigation took me to—I don't remember the address now, but we found extra copies of these in the attic and in the basement of a building out in the civilian part of town a couple of miles from camp. But these were mimeographed or printed on the post by the post press. They were assembled off the post, apparently.

Mr. Carpenter. They were printed on the post press, but were assembled off the post?

Mr. Kerr. Apparently.

Mr. Carpenter. Was any authority given to this organization to use the post press?

Mr. Kerr. I can't answer that.

Mr. Carpenter. But it was primarily operated and managed by the I. and E. section, by certain individuals in the I. and E. section?

Mr. Kerr. That is correct.

Mr. Carpenter. Were there any officers involved in the preparation of this document?

Mr. Kerr. There were five of them listed here.

The Chairman. What were their ranks?


Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to talk to these individuals you have just mentioned?

Mr. Kerr. I don't recall talking to a colonel. I did talk to two majors and Lt. Alice Murray.

Mr. Carpenter. Did they tell you what part they played in it?

Mr. Kerr. They seemed to think it was all right.

Mr. Carpenter. Did they tell you whether or not they had permission from higher headquarters to prepare this document and this program?

Mr. Kerr. They told me that they had asked for a ruling from the War Department, and I assume that meant Washington headquarters.
of the I. and E. or the War Department, and they were told they could not put this document out, but they proceeded to do it anyhow.

Mr. Carpenter. They violated instructions, then.

Did you have occasion to make any investigation at the I. and E. school at Washington and Lee University?

Mr. Kerr. I did.

Mr. Carpenter. What did you find there?

Mr. Kerr. At the time I arrived there, they were preparing to close the establishment and go to Pennsylvania. I did find—I can't say that. As a matter of fact, my investigation at Washington and Lee at that time didn't develop too much with regard to this pamphlet. It did develop, however, that some of the people in the I. and E. were receiving decorations.

The Chairman. For what?

Mr. Kerr. I can't answer that. I don't know.

The Chairman. I didn't understand you. Were receiving what?

Mr. Kerr. The Legion of Merit decoration. I can't answer for what, why they got it, although I did attend the function of receiving the medal.

Mr. Carpenter. Who received that medal?

Mr. Kerr. Lt. Col. Fred Herschberg, and there was a master sergeant.

Mr. Carpenter. Who was Lieutenant Colonel Herschberg?

Mr. Kerr. I believe he was in charge of the I. and E. school there. He was an official in the I. and E. school. Whether he was in command or not, I am not sure, because there was a full colonel in command.

Mr. Carpenter. The master sergeant—who was he?

Mr. Kerr. He seemed to be Colonel Herschberg's chief assistant.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you remember his name?

Mr. Kerr. No, but it is in my investigation.

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you on this investigation at Camp Pickett?

Mr. Kerr. Two or three weeks.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have a staff with you?

Mr. Kerr. I did.

Mr. Carpenter. How many were on your staff?

Mr. Kerr. I had the post special agent, and I took 2 or 3 men out of the Richmond office, the Richmond headquarters, to go down.

Mr. Carpenter. All right, you had a staff, you were at Pickett for about 2 weeks. What was the result of your investigation? What was the entire result? We would like to know.

Mr. Kerr. I am not quite sure that I understand that, because I made quite an extensive investigation. As I recall, the file is about that thick [indicating about 3 inches].

Mr. Carpenter. Don't you recall some of the highlights of your investigation?

Mr. Kerr. You mean you want my opinion of the result of that investigation?

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. Kerr. Now I am clear.

I thought that the investigation, in my opinion, established that these persons were left of center, or subversives; that they were attempting to indoctrinate the troops with unauthorized information
and material not beneficial to the Army or the United States or the Government.

Mr. Carpenter. How many people did your investigation show were actively engaged in this work of providing or building up this brochure?

Mr. Kerr. Some of this is what I would call, in terms of my language, a dress rehearsal. They had one colored boy here who was practically pushed onto this piece of paper, and as soon as he found out what was going on, he resigned. I believe he graduated from Columbia. He was highly educated. He objected to being a pawn in any racial issue. It was obvious to me that they only had him around there to dress it up to appeal to whatever colored troops happened to be at Pickett at the time.

The Chairman. After your investigation was completed, I presume that you forwarded the information that you obtained, through channels, on to higher echelons; is that correct?

Mr. Kerr. That is correct.

The Chairman. You of course do not know what happened to that information?

Mr. Kerr. No.

Mr. Carpenter. About how many people that you feel were subversive were in this organization?

Mr. Kerr. That is a little difficult to answer, under the conditions. That is about 8 years ago, and I haven’t been connected with it since. It would be an injustice to name names without seeing the faces of the persons.

The Chairman. We would not want names. Just an estimate, if you can recall.

Mr. Kerr. I would say possibly 6 to 10.

The Chairman. That is all, Mr. Kerr. You may stand aside. We thank you for appearing.

Will Ralph de Toledano come forward, please?

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. de Toledano. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF RALPH DE TOLEDANO, NEW YORK, N. Y.**

The Chairman. Will you state your full name?

Mr. de Toledano. Ralph de Toledano.

The Chairman. Where do you reside?

Mr. de Toledano. New York City.

The Chairman. What is your business or profession?

Mr. de Toledano. I am a newspaperman.

Mr. Carpenter. Where are you presently employed?

Mr. de Toledano. I am associate editor of Newsweek magazine.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you with the armed services during World War II?

Mr. de Toledano. I was.

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed?

Mr. de Toledano. I took my basic training at Fort Eustis, Va., in antiaircraft artillery. I was transferred to the area and language program of the Army specialized training program.
After that I was stationed at Pine Camp, N. Y., in the intelligence office, handling Italian prisoners.

From there I was transferred to Camp Lee, Va., for retraining. I was transferred to New York to put out an Army weekly newspaper. I was subsequently assigned to OSS.

I was brought from OSS, as I learned later, for being too anti-Communist, and sent back to Camp Lee, Va., and then I served for close to a year at Fort Brock, P. R., in the information and education program.

Mr. Carpenter. You had considerable experience in the information and education program?

Mr. de Toledano. I did.

Mr. Carpenter. At some time were you stationed at Cornell University?

Mr. de Toledano. I was.

Mr. Carpenter. Can you tell this committee your experiences in Cornell University, and especially with subversive activities?

Mr. de Toledano. I was sent up to Cornell University under the area and language program to study Italian. There were four language study groups at Cornell—Italian, German, Chinese, and Russian. It was the practice to have the entire unit, all four language groups, hear one lecture by the head of each language group on the geography and customs of that particular area. We were called in to hear a speech on Russian geography and customs, and so on, by the head of the Russian program, whose name was Vladimir Kazakevich.

Kazakevich was known to me then as a Soviet propagandist. I believe, although I am not certain, that he had registered with the State Department as a Soviet propagandist. He had been on the staff of Signs and Society, a Communist theoretical organ. I knew his record.

So when he began to speak, I took notes. Instead of talking about Russian geography and Russian customs, he delivered a political speech. It was a riproaring speech, in part attacking the United States Army, praising the Soviet Union, criticizing the military record of the United States Army.

This was a sector in the second front agitation period. He said that the Red Army would determine the fate of Europe; that we would have to deal with Russia or else—a speech of that sort.

It is some years now since I heard it, but it stayed within my mind.

There was also at Cornell—and this has nothing to do with the Army program—a large Russian section which had been and, as I remember, still was quite heavily infiltrated. It included, among other people, Corliss Lamont.

As a result of this speech and of the notes I took, certain stories appeared in the newspapers. I guess I was responsible for those stories, since I wrote to Fred Woltman, of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, and the World Telegram, and gave him a copy of my notes. I wrote to another friend, and I wrote to Mr. Mandel of your staff.

The stories in the newspapers led to an investigation by the House Military Affairs Committee. In the course of that investigation the investigator for the committee very indiscreetly mentioned that I was the source of the information. I was called in by the civilian head of the entire program and was threatened with reprisals for having passed on this information. He also made it very clear and fairly
explicit that nothing would happen to me if I put all the responsibility, all the blame for having written these letters, on one instructor in the Russian section of ASTP, who was an anti-Communist and was the target of attack by the pro-Communist group at Cornell.

I of course refused, and since I was strictly within my rights in writing those letters, nothing happened to me.

Mr. Carpenter. You have had some other experiences in this I. and E. program, I believe, in Puerto Rico?

Mr. de Toledano. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please tell the committee about those experiences?

Mr. de Toledano. I think I should describe how the information and education program operated down there. At the end of my service in Puerto Rico, I was the enlisted chief of section of the I. and E. section at Fort Brook, in Puerto Rico. I had a variety of jobs. I put out the post daily and the post weekly. From the information and education point of view, my most important job was to brief the orientation noncoms and officers once a week on what was called the orientation line. The material for this briefing was prepared in part by I. and E. in Washington, and was the Army Talks which were mentioned earlier in the testimony, and then it was sort of fattened up by the information and education branch of the Antilles Department, which was right above Fort Brook.

I read the material very thoroughly each week and prepared my briefing on the basis of it. The incident that comes to mind concerns a briefing on the Chinese Communists. Material had come from Washington on the Chinese Communists and, as I said, it had been fattened by the Antilles Department, I. and E. I received the material, read it very carefully, and it was very clear that this material followed the Communist Party line completely. It described the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers. It said they were not really Communists. It said that we should get along with them; that they were friends of the United States.

The material also supplied a bibliography which I usually used in preparing my briefings, and on that bibliography were the standard Army texts on China, namely Owen and Eleanor Lattimore's The Making of Modern China, and a pamphlet by Maxwell Stewart on China, and Maxwell Stewart was known to me then as at least a fellow traveler, and he has since been identified before this committee as a party member by several witnesses.

I read the material and realized exactly what it was, and I called up the colonel in charge, whose name I don't remember. He was a perfectly loyal American. He had been a Vermont schoolteacher, and he just wasn't "hep" when it came to propaganda. I explained to him precisely what I was supposed to pass on to orientation noncoms and officers. We had quite a hassle over it, and I refused categorically to pass it on. He made it very clear that I had four stripes, and that I could be court-martialed for this, but I still refused to pass it on.

After considerable discussion, he agreed to let me read the material as it was prepared, and then answer it. That is precisely what was done.
Mr. Carpenter. I hand you here a pamphlet and ask you if that is one of the pamphlets that you received in Puerto Rico to disseminate to the troops?

Mr. de Toledano. Yes, sir. This is called Our Chinese Ally, War Department Education Manual EM-42, G. I. Round Table series. That is one of them; yes.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel would like to read into the record something concerning the existing military situation in the Far East.

The Chairman. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. I read from a report on the military situation in the Far East, the report of certain members of the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate with reference to the pamphlet which is here exhibited. It says as follows:

Further evidence that the administration did not support the Government of the Republic of China is shown in the orientation fact sheet Army Talk. This was an official War Department publication used in World War II to indoctrinate our soldiers. The issue, dated April 7, 1945, was entitled Our Ally China and the role of the Communists was discussed.

Throughout the article "Communist" was in quotation marks and it was pointed out that when we speak of the Chinese "Communist," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of Chinese farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves but rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese Communists are not like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese.

I read that in part, and ask that it be placed in the record.

The Chairman. The whole article may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 404" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No 404

[From Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet, 66, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., April 7, 1945]

Our Ally China

There is no need to tell you that great numbers of American soldiers are fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. Many of them are fighting alongside our Chinese ally—on the soil of China. And many more—perhaps some of you—will eventually get there.

This is certainly not the first time you have talked about China—you have undoubtedly read articles about the Chinese people and their heroic struggle with the Japanese since as far back as September 18, 1931.

Today we will spend our hour in an attempt to get at several important points that we ought to know about China—there is a lot more to talk about but this will not be our only opportunity.

Newspaper stories, magazine articles, and books have been written about what is supposed to be going on within China. Sometimes authors tell conflicting stories. Often enough it is hard to tell whether the conflicting reports are the result of individual bias or inadequate information.

One hears a lot of phrases that seem to have special meaning: The Nationalist Government, the Chinese "Communists," guerrilla fighters, lack of unity, war lords, Japanese puppets, and so on. Later, we will try to get a clearer picture. Right now let us remember that China is big—China is poor—China has about
450 million people—people like yourself and myself—all of whom very likely want the same things that you and I do: peace, a chance to make a decent living, and a chance to have some fun out of life. There isn’t a GI in our Army who doesn’t want these things—and that is about the same for the Chinese GI.

China, like the United States—like any nation—has her problems. Some are Internal, others are related to the war. We can’t begin to consider all of them. But it is important for us to know how some of her major problems affect the United Nations war effort and how they will affect the peace to come.

We are vitally concerned in the affairs of our Chinese ally. We each need each other in the battle against Japan. And when the war has been won—we will still need each other. America and the world need a strong, forward-looking, democratic China ready to give leadership to the people of the Far East and prepared to function as a leading member of the United Nations.

(The foregoing may be useful as a brief introduction to the topic for discussion.)

**WHY IS CHINA BACKWARD?**

(Question: Why does China, by American standards, seem poverty-stricken and backward?)

Many reasons might be given for China’s poverty and economic backwardness. Here are a few of the most important.

1. China has an enormous population. Even with all her dependencies, she is not a great deal larger than the United States, yet she has between 3 and 4 times as many people—about 450 million, as compared with the 150 million of the United States. Much of her land is either mountainous or so dry that it cannot support agriculture without artificial irrigation. As a result, most of her people are crowded upon a comparatively small part of the land. Forty-six Chinese farm families have to get a living out of the land that one American farm family of the same size would have.

As things now stand, the overcrowding of land means poverty for most people. About 80 percent of China’s population are farmers. And it also means that in the past, the existence of an almost limitless supply of cheap manpower has acted as a definite check upon such a development of labor-saving machinery as we have had in the West.

2. China is an old country. Considerable parts of China have been under continuous and intensive cultivation for more than 3,000 years, yet they still produce large crops today. This is only possible because of the infinite pains-taking toil that has been put into the soil by generation after generation of Chinese farmers. In the United States we have had quite a different situation. But that would happen if we were as crowded as the Chinese, or if we had been forced to stay settled on the same land for two or three thousand years. Taking these factors into account, perhaps it will be easier for us to realize what the Chinese are up against.

3. China is poor in natural resources. Coal is the only basic resource that is plentiful, except for large deposits of a few of the rarer metals, such as tungsten. But in iron her known reserves would last only 9 years at the annual United States rate of consumption. Her situation as to oil is even worse. This helps to explain why the Chinese are so far behind us in industrialization. They do not have our almost limitless and easily accessible natural resources. The annual output of iron in China is only 3 pounds per capita (as compared with 550 pounds in the United States, and even in coal she annually produces only 100 pounds per capita (as compared with 10,000 pounds in the United States).

Much of China has never been properly surveyed for minerals, and future explorations, especially in China’s little-known western regions, will undoubtedly reveal many hitherto unknown resources. As things stand today, these figures point clearly to why China is a poor country.

4. China has been fighting a war, on her own soil, for 7 years. Actually China’s war with Japan began in 1931 when the Japanese struck in Manchuria. However, after rapidly overrunning this province, the Japanese turned to the problem of exploiting its resources, and did not strike again until 1937. But between 1937 and 1939 the Chinese had lost to the enemy precisely those parts of their country which were richest and economically most developed. They were forced back into the deep interior regions that were the least modernized parts of the country. Before 1937 that part of China which is not now occupied by the Japanese possessed only about 10 percent of the industrial plants, and 20 percent of the railroads; it mined only 22 percent of China’s coal and milled less than 3 percent of her flour.
Millions of Chinese preferred to flee from Japanese rule into the interior of free China, thus complicating the problem of food and support. The entry of America and Britain into the Far Eastern war and the resulting blockade against our shipping made China’s economic position worse rather than better, because its immediate result was to cut off China almost entirely from the outside world. Is it any wonder, then, that there is a terrible scarcity of almost all kinds of goods in free China today; a resulting inflation that has raised price levels to several hundred times what they were in 1937; and that black markets and profiteering activities have sprung up on all sides? This blockade has reduced China’s normal poverty to misery and suffering. Thousands of highly cultivated Chinese people who were accustomed to some of the normal comforts of living are gradually dropping below the minimum standard of health requirements. In spite of the profiteers who are fattening on the war, and in spite of certain other inequities in the distribution of wartime burdens, the harrowing fact remains that the average Chinese is living under conditions but one step removed from starvation. But in spite of all this, the Chinese are still fighting with us today, though the battle has not been going to well.

MILITARY SITUATION CRITICAL

(Question: What is the present military situation?)

At the start of 1945, the military situation in China looked worse than it has in all her 7 years of war. The United Nations suffered a major defeat when the Japanese succeeded in joining together their forces in northern and southern China. Three major gains accrued to Japan from this move—she virtually established a continuous land corridor between her base in Manchuria and her conquests in Indochina and the East Indies; she drove us from our principal air bases in south China; she placed herself in a position to prevent the Chinese from coming to our aid should we attempt a landing on the China coast.

At present Japan is garrisoning the coast of China, in greater strength, to prepare for the threat of American landings.

These gains by the Japanese have been blamed on many things—insufficient supplies from us, corruption, and bad management in the Chinese Government, and poor leadership in the Chinese Army. We shall take a closer look at these complaints a little later.

IS GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATIC?

(Question: Why do some people find it difficult to call China a “democracy”?)

Since 1912 China has been a republic. We Americans have been told many things about China’s heroic struggle for human freedom. But there are certain things that may seem startling or even appalling—things that don’t seem to fit into the usual pattern of what we think of as a republic. A one-party form of government, for example, controlled by the Kuomintang (Gwoh-min-dahng) or National People’s Party; a president, but no popular elections; and governmental control over the press and other institutions that are run as private enterprises in our own country. In other words we find in China that the terms “republic” and “democracy” do not always necessarily mean the same thing.

Though China, by abolishing the monarchy, has become a republic, she hasn’t yet fully worked out the democratic processes that we think should go with a republican form of government.

ONE-PARTY RULE

The control of the government by a single party, the Kuomintang, is the result of historical circumstances, for it was the Kuomintang that, under Sun Yat-sen’s leadership, overthrew the monarchy in 1912. In China the men who created the revolution were a comparatively small group of ardent revolutionaries. They had to struggle against reactionary forces of all kinds. Thus the Kuomintang tends to look upon itself as a very special and select group, better qualified than others to lead China in her new path.

Sun Yat-sen and his followers believed that the introduction of representative government in China could only be done very slowly. Therefore they regarded the revolution as a gradual and continuing process that would include three different stages: the first, that of military operations, came to an end in 1928, after the Kuomintang armies, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had reunited China after the disorders that had followed the overthrow of the empire. The second stage that followed, that of political tutelage, was a period when China was being
prepared, under the leadership of the Kuomintang, for full democratic government. In 1927 it was to have been followed by the third phase, that of full constitutional government, when the Kuomintang would give up its one-party rule and hand the government over to the entire Chinese people. But, unfortunately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the same year made this last step impossible. Thus China still remains in the stage of political tutelage, and is still under the government of the Kuomintang.

During the last 100 years China has been politically weak—so weak that it has sometimes been referred to as "a loose sheet of sand." During the last 20 years the Kuomintang has done very much to change this situation, but in the process it has inevitably been led to the use of forceful and sometimes even repressive measures. Since 1937, too, its centralized control has been considerably increased. Whether China can make a smooth transition to constitutionalism at the end of the war, or whether reactionary forces win out is a question of vital importance.

ROLE OF THE "COMMUNISTS"

(Question: What is the difficulty between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists"?)

One of the most serious bars against the realization of full representative government in China is the continuing tension between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists." When we speak of the Chinese "Communists," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" are not, like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of the Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of north China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese.

The present situation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists" has a long and complex history behind it. The Chinese Communist Party got its real start when certain Soviet advisers were sent by the U. S. S. R. to China in the early 1920's to help the Kuomintang in its work of uniting the country.

In 1927, shortly before this unification was completed, a split developed between the Kuomintang and "Communist" groups, and in the years following this split led to serious civil war, in the course of which the Kuomintang armies finally drove the "Communists" into the northwest part of China. Their capital is at Yenan (Yen-ahn) in Shensi (Shen-see) province.

But late in 1936, when the threat from Japan was growing, the feeling became general that this costly internal conflict must end. This resulted in the creation of an armed truce.

During the first years of the war this truce operated very well. But as the years passed by, and China became almost completely isolated from the outside world with resulting inflation and economic suffering of incredible proportions, the old tensions and mutual suspicions reappeared. The "Communists" accused the Kuomintang of failing to send them necessary military supplies and withholding the cooperation needed for the common struggle against Japan. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, accused the "Communists" of failing to obey the orders of the Central (Kuomintang) Government, and of wanting to set up an independent state for themselves in the northwest.

The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very difficult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches to both sides. The "Communists" say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms that the Kuomintang has up till now been unable or unwilling to make. Some American and other observers who have visited the "Communists" agree that their program is a moderate one, and that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as a liberal democracy.

In the early autumn of 1944, Chinese press censorship was temporarily relaxed and American correspondents in China were able to give us a clearer picture of the Chinese situation in general, a situation which came as somewhat of a shock to the American public.
NEED UNDERSTANDING AND HELP

We Americans are accustomed to newspapers which freely express their views. We have a long heritage of political freedom. We have fought for the rights of trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech. With us the idea of a secret police run by a government is so obnoxious that no government would dare try it. But we sometimes forget that part of the reason that we have and keep these liberties is that we also have enough to eat, and a certain security in our lives which is unknown in the Orient. The years of war against Japan, the terrible malnutrition of the people and the internal conflicts have produced, in China, conditions which require both economic and political improvement. We, on our part, must try to understand China's problems and help her in solving them. All who know this patient people, cheerful under unbelievable hardships, believe they have a chance of coming through.

Recently there have been indications that internal affairs in China have been improving. Negotiations and talks between Chungking and Yenan have been continuing over the past 9 months, with Gen. Chou En-lai as the chief representative of the "Communists." Dr. T. V. Soong, whose attitude toward the "Communists" is considered moderate, has been made premier of the Central Government. Early in December 1944, the Generalissimo withdrew large numbers of troops from the armies that had been blockading the "Communists" for 6 years and rushed them south to Kweichow (Gway-joh) province where they have helped to repulse the Japanese. In March, Chiang announced a national assembly to convene on November 12, 1945, to draw up a constitution. All parties including the "Communists," are to be invited and all are to have equal status.

OUR BASIC CONCERN

(Question: How would you summarize the essential problem of China?)

In brief, our basic concern with China's problems is related to the winning of the war and the peace that will follow. China needs supplies—China needs well-trained and well-equipped troops—but perhaps most of all China needs internal unity.

The issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead of winning of the war. A strong, democratic, and united China will hasten the end of the war in the Pacific and make it possible for China to assume her important role in the Far East and among the United Nations.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to refer to Army Talk in your program there in Puerto Rico?

Mr. de Toledano. Yes. It was standard operating procedure to use Army Talks in preparing the briefing sessions, and kits were made up by my office every week consisting of the Army Talks and other material prepared by Antilles Department, Information and Education, and such supplementary material as we had on hand on the week's topic.

Mr. Carpenter. There is a volume of Army Talks, 1 through 100. Did you have any use of that particular group of Army Talks?

Mr. de Toledano. These all look familiar. I was stationed in Puerto Rico between April of 1945 and December of 1945, and the Army Talks of that period are here, so I assume that those are the ones.

May I add one other small incident which occurred in the course of my duties as Information and Education chief of section. One of my jobs, as I said before, was to put out the newspapers that we distributed to the troops. One of these papers was a weekly called the Sentry Box. I wrote the editorials. During the summer of 1945, I wrote an editorial on the Soviet Union, highly critical of the Soviet Union, and in the editorial there was one line that the world cannot exist half slave and half free.
As a result of that editorial and that line in particular, censorship of a sort was placed on the newspaper where no censorship had existed before. That is, I had to submit my editorials each week, from that point on, to Antilles Department, Information and Education, for O. K.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know who was responsible for that censorship?

Mr. de Toledano. I have a guess, and that is all. It is hearsay.

I was told in a roundabout way.

Mr. Carpenter. Thank you.

The Chairman. You may stand aside. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson, will you come forward?

Mr. Wilson. May we have the cameras off, please?

The Chairman. We will ask the cameraman not to photograph the witness.

Mr. Wilson, will you be sworn. Do you swear the testimony you will give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Wilson. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LUKE WOODWARD WILSON, WELLESLEY, MASS., ACCOMPANIED BY EUGENE GRESSMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Chairman. Be seated.

Will you state your full name, Mr. Wilson, for our record?


The Chairman. Will you sit up to the mike so we can hear you.

Where do you reside, Mr. Wilson?


The Chairman. What is your business or profession?

Mr. Wilson. Research work and writing.

The Chairman. Are you here this morning with counsel? Is this gentleman here your counsel?

Mr. Wilson. Yes.

The Chairman. Would you give us your name for the record.


The Chairman. Attorney at law?

Mr. Gressman. Yes.

The Chairman. Proceed with the questioning of Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Wilson, what has been the nature of your employment for the past 15 years?

Mr. Wilson. Shall I start with the first?

The Chairman. Surely.

Mr. Wilson. After I got out of college my first employment was in Washington in an organization called the National Institution of Public Affairs. I worked for that for a matter of several months. It was an organization that brought college students who were interested in Government service to Washington to learn something about the workings of the Government. They worked as voluntary; they were not paid. They worked as interns in various Government agencies.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you an officer in this company, or this organization?
Mr. Wilson. No.
Mr. Carpenter. What were your duties there?
Mr. Wilson. I gave a few talks to these students as I recall, based on describing the different Government agencies, basically out of the document—I don’t know whether they still publish it—the United States Government Manual. That describes the different agencies. As I recall, I went around and made some of the arrangements for these interns to work in different offices.
Mr. Carpenter. In about what year was this?
Mr. Wilson. This was from the fall of 1934 until the spring of 1935.
Mr. Carpenter. Who was the sponsor of this organization?
Mr. Wilson. Sponsor?
Mr. Carpenter. Who was the head of the organization?
Mr. Wilson. There was a former Congressman from Pennsylvania, I believe, Frederick Davenport, who was the chairman.
Mr. Carpenter. Was it an eleemosynary institution, or was it an institution for profit?
Mr. Wilson. It was not for profit.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you charge a fee to these students to come here and intern, as you call it?
Mr. Wilson. I didn’t.
Mr. Carpenter. Did the organization charge?
Mr. Wilson. I don’t believe they did, no. I think the students, as I recall—it is a long time back—I think they paid their own expenses.
Mr. Carpenter. The organization maintained an office here, did it not?
Mr. Wilson. They had an office.
Mr. Carpenter. Where was that office?
Mr. Wilson. As I recall, it was in a downtown office building at 17—not 17, at 15th and K, I believe it was.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the payroll?
Mr. Wilson. I was not paid.
Mr. Carpenter. This organization worked here and had no funds, made no charge to the students?
Mr. Wilson. I didn’t get the beginning of your question, excuse me.
Mr. Carpenter. I said, you were not on the payroll?
Mr. Wilson. No.
Mr. Carpenter. You received no money?
Mr. Wilson. No.
Mr. Carpenter. The students paid no fees to this institution?
Mr. Wilson. Not that I recall.
Mr. Carpenter. It was headed by an ex-Congressman. You don’t know whether there were any fees of any kind, or how this organization operated? Where did it get its money?
Mr. Wilson. I think they got funds from some foundation, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you know the name of the organization?
Mr. Wilson. I don’t recall now.
The Chairman. You do not recall it?
Mr. Wilson. I don’t actually recall. I think there was talk at that time about getting funds from one or the other of the big foundations. I don’t know which.
The Chairman. What do you mean one or the other?
The Chairman. One or the other?
Mr. Wilson. Whether they got them from them or not, I don't recall.
Mr. Carpenter. After leaving that organization, where did you go?
Mr. Wilson. I worked for a while in the office of the Chairman of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Crime. That was Dean Justin Miller.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the payroll?
Mr. Wilson. I was not.
Mr. Carpenter. Again you were giving your services?
Mr. Wilson. I was.
Mr. Carpenter. Following that employment, where did you go?
Mr. Wilson. I worked for the United States Senate, for the Senate investigating committee headed by Senator La Follette. It was a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the payroll there?
Mr. Wilson. I was not on the committee payroll. For part of the time that I worked for the committee I was on the payroll of, I think, two different executive departments, and on loan to the committee.
Mr. Carpenter. What executive department?
Mr. Wilson. As I recall, I was on the Public Works Administration payroll for a while, and then one of the housing agencies. Which of the housing agencies I don't recall at the time. They changed names at different times, and I don't recall which one it was.
Mr. Carpenter. At all times you were on the La Follette committee you were receiving pay?
Mr. Wilson. No.
Mr. Carpenter. Which period of the time were you not receiving pay?
Mr. Wilson. The first part.
Mr. Carpenter. How long was that?
Mr. Wilson. I don't recall exactly now. I would guess it was a year, perhaps longer.
Mr. Carpenter. How long did you work for the committee?
Mr. Wilson. Nearly 4 years.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you remember the year that you left the committee?
Mr. Wilson. I left the committee in 1940.
Mr. Carpenter. Then where did you work?
Mr. Wilson. I wasn't regularly employed until I went in the Army.
Mr. Carpenter. Where were you living after you left the committee? Where did you go to live?
Mr. Wilson. After I left the committee I was living in California.
Mr. Carpenter. What year did you go to California?
Mr. Wilson. You mean the first time?
Mr. Carpenter. No, after you left the committee.
Mr. Wilson. I was working for the committee in California. When I left the committee I stayed in California.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you recall where you lived in California?
Mr. Wilson. In San Francisco.
Mr. Carpenter. Where in San Francisco?
Mr. Wilson. 3820 Washington Street.
Mr. Carpenter. What work did you engage in there?
Mr. Wilson. I said a moment ago that I wasn't regularly employed until I went into the Army.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you have any employment there at all?
Mr. Wilson. I had for a short time, I don't recall just how long it was. I think it was a matter of 2, maybe 3 weeks, I was employed by a law firm in San Francisco.
Mr. Carpenter. What was the name of that law firm?
Mr. Wilson. I recall two names in the firm. There might have been a third. As I recall it, the firm name was Athern & Farmer.
Mr. Carpenter. Athern & Farmer.
Mr. Wilson. I think to the best of my recollection that was the firm name.
Mr. Carpenter. Is that L-e-i-g-h Athern?
Mr. Wilson. The Athern in the firm name—I believe his name was Fred Athern.
Mr. Carpenter. Was Leigh Athern in the firm, too?
Mr. Wilson. He was.
Mr. Carpenter. When did you go in the Army?
Mr. Wilson. In February 1942.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you drafted or did you enlist?
Mr. Wilson. I was drafted.
Mr. Carpenter. From California?
Mr. Wilson. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. Where were you sent to camp?
Mr. Wilson. From San Francisco I went to the Presidio of Monterey for a few days, possibly a week, and then I went to Sheppard Field, Tex.
Mr. Carpenter. Was all your service in the Army enlisted?
Mr. Wilson. You mean not as a commissioned officer?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. It was all enlisted grades.
Mr. Carpenter. Will you relate briefly your experiences or your assignments in the Army?
Mr. Wilson. My first assignment at the Presidio of Monterey was just getting uniform and that sort of thing. Then I was transferred to the Air Corps for basic training at Sheppard Field, Tex. That consisted of approximately 2 months, I believe, of basic training. At the end of that I was assigned to Chanute Field, Ill., where I took a course of training again for approximately 2 months, as I recall it, in the School for Link Trainer Instructors. The Link trainer is a mechanical device that simulates blind flying, and it is used to train pilots in night and blind instrument flying. I took this course there, learning to be an instructor to instruct pilot trainees in this instrument flying.
At the conclusion of that school I was transferred to Minter Field, Calif. Minter Field, Calif., was a basic flying school where cadets who were training to be pilots took the second of their three phases of flight training. At first I was a Link-trainer instructor there, instructing the pilot trainees in instrument flying in the Link trainer. After some time, a matter of several months—I don't recall just how long—I was transferred from the job on the Link trainer to the ground school and taught navigation, principles of cross-country flying and map reading and the use of radio aids to navigation and the use of the basic flight instruments in a simple plane to these pilot trainees. On that particular job I was approximately a year and a half, I think. During that year and a half I was transferred temporarily to
the Central Instructors School at Randolph Field, Tex. That school was one which was designed to sort of standardize the instruction in the Air Force ground schools.

Having been teaching navigation, I took the navigation instructors course there. That was about 30 days’ duration, I think. I went back to Minter Field and continued in the ground school as a navigation instructor. I continued there until approximately the first of 1944, at which time I was transferred to Washington to the Morale Services Division of the Armed Forces. My headquarters in Washington was for I don’t recall exactly how long, a period of a few months. During that time I was sent for approximately a month or 5 weeks or something like that—whatever the course was—to the Morale Services School at Lexington, Va. I was there in the information and orientation school for, as I say, approximately a month.

Then after that I was assigned to New York on a temporary basis pending an overseas assignment which came through in approximately another month. Then I went to Europe in July 1944.

I was in the Information and Education Division Headquarters, first in London and then in Paris. I remained overseas, my headquarters being in Paris, until sometime in December 1945. I was sent back to this country and discharged in January 1946.

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you stationed in Washington?

Mr. Wilson. I first came here approximately the early part of January 1944. I think it was, and Washington I think was my assignment, my headquarters until I was transferred to New York prior to the overseas shipment in June.

Mr. Carpenter. You were stationed here in Washington?

Mr. Wilson. I was. I think at that time it was called the Morale Services.

Mr. Carpenter. Which later became I. and E. while you were still there, is that right?

Mr. Wilson. I am not positive. As I recall it, the change in the name was after I left. It may have been while I was there. I don’t recall.

Mr. Carpenter. Then you were stationed in New York at an address there where Information and Education had an office?

Mr. Wilson. That is right.

Mr. Carpenter. Who was your commanding officer while you were in the I. and E.?

Mr. Wilson. In the I. and E. where?

Mr. Carpenter. In Washington.

Mr. Wilson. In Washington. The head of the Orientation Section where I was I believe was a Colonel Farlow.

Mr. Carpenter. Who?

Mr. Wilson. I think a Colonel Farlow. I can’t recall his first name. I believe he was the head of the Orientation Section. There were an awful lot of officers.

Mr. Carpenter. That was broken down into two branches, wasn’t it? The section was broken into two branches?

Mr. Wilson. Which section?

Mr. Carpenter. The Orientation Section, which Colonel Farlow was in charge of.
Mr. Wilson. Frankly, I don't remember how the different sections were. In the Pentagon where these officers were, it was a huge big space with people at desks all over. I knew some of them were in this section. I didn't know what others were. I don't recall what the T. O. was in terms of breaking down. There may have been 2 or there may have been more than 2 sections. Of course Colonel Farlow wasn't the head of this whole business. There was the whole Morale Services Section.

As I recall, there were a number of other sections than the Orientation Branch.

Mr. Carpenter. When you went into the Information and Morale Section did you request assignment to the Morale Service?

Mr. Wilson. As I recall it, I did.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know to whom you made your request?

Mr. Wilson. It is my recollection that I requested it of Major Schreiber.

Mr. Carpenter. Was he in the Morale Section at that time?

Mr. Wilson. He was.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him?

Mr. Wilson. Yes, I knew him.

Mr. Carpenter. What college did you graduate from?

Mr. Wilson. Dartmouth College.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party and the Young Communist League at the time of your graduation from Dartmouth College?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on two grounds: The first ground is that the first amendment to the Constitution fences off certain areas of association and belief from congressional legislation, and therefore inquiry, and on that ground I am not required to answer the question.

My second ground for refusing to answer the question is that I assert my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself.

The Chairman. This committee will recognize your grounds not to answer that question under the fifth amendment, but this committee does not recognize your refusing to answer under the first amendment.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were on the staff of the La Follette committee?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question. I will abbreviate my answer. If the Senator desires, I will state the ground that I have previously stated. Is that sufficient, Senator? Do you want it restated?

The Chairman. That will be sufficient.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with Al Rosenberg while you were with the La Follette committee?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I have previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with Charles Kramer when you were with the La Follette committee?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with Margaret Bennett when you were with the La Follette committee?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with John Abt when you were with the La Follette committee?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I have previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with Julius Schreiber?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. Is that the Major Schreiber you just testified about?

Mr. Wilson. Senator, I declined to answer the previous question. The Chairman. I am trying to determine if Julius Schreiber was the same Schreiber as the Major Schreiber under whose command you were and to whom you made a request in the I. and E. when you were in the Army.

Mr. Wilson. Senator, I don't want to quibble with you. I decline to answer his question and I believe your question is referring to the question that I have declined to answer. I believe that is getting behind my declination.

The Chairman. When did you first know Julius Schreiber? Let's get it that way. When did you first know Julius Schreiber?

Mr. Wilson. I don't recall exactly when it was. It was prior to my Army service.

The Chairman. Where did you meet him first?

Mr. Wilson. As I recall it, it was in Stockton, Calif.

The Chairman. You later served under his command in the Army?

Mr. Wilson. That is right.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party before you entered the Armed Forces?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party while you were in the Armed Forces?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist Party now, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that one, Senator, on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. What is your employment now?

Mr. Wilson. I am not employed now, Senator.

The Chairman. You are not employed?

Mr. Wilson. No.

The Chairman. Where are you residing now?

Mr. Wilson. I beg your pardon.

The Chairman. Where do you reside now?


The Chairman. How long has it been since you had employment?

Mr. Wilson. Several years.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work in the Information and Education Division?
Mr. Wilson. I did several different kinds of things. Most of it was research work gathering material for use in one or another of the different publications. There were different kinds of publications and I worked on material for several different ones.

Mr. Carpenter. What were the names of those publications?

Mr. Wilson. I think the first that I ever worked on was—at that time I think they were simply called Fact Sheets. I prepared some material that I believe was used in one of the Fact Sheets. I think the Fact Sheets were later—the designation of them was changed from Fact Sheet to Army Talk.

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you here a volume entitled "Army Talk," and I will ask you if you recognize those documents.

(Witness examining document.)

Mr. Wilson. They look familiar. I am not positive I saw every one of them, but I am familiar with them.

Mr. Carpenter. You participated in the drawing up of those Army Talks?

Mr. Wilson. Of these, I think only one.

Mr. Carpenter. Which one was that?

Mr. Wilson. It had to do with labor-management relations during the war.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know the number of that particular one?

Mr. Wilson. Perhaps I could find it. Would you like me to?

Mr. Carpenter. That is not necessary. You did your original work on one?

Mr. Wilson. I compiled some material. I guess you could say it was the original work. I got material on—as I recall it, a good bit of it was about the labor-management committees that were set up in war plants, where the company and the union in the plant set up a joint committee to speed up war production and expedite grievances and to avoid strikes and that sort of thing.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever work on any others in a consultive way?

Mr. Wilson. I don't recall that I ever did.

Mr. Carpenter. Is that the only work that you did all the time you were in the Army in the Information and Education?

Mr. Wilson. Oh, no. These were put out from Washington and I was over in Europe in Information and Education.

Mr. Carpenter. I am talking about while you were in Washington.

Mr. Wilson. I spent some of the time on that. That was not the only thing I did.

Mr. Carpenter. What else did you do?

Mr. Wilson. Part of the program involves—the publication of these Fact Sheets wasn't the only thing. Part of the program was to promote visual displays of material, news about the war. The Army and Navy published a lot of weekly war maps and that sort of thing.

Mr. Carpenter. What did you do in that work?

Mr. Wilson. I didn't work in the preparation of that, but while I was assigned to headquarters in Washington I went with some other Army personnel to several military installations, and on those particular trips most of what I did was putting up the so-called war-room displays of visual material, using maps, any kind of maps we could get hold of, these weekly news maps, maps to show the battlelines,
war photographs, photographs chosen with respect to the particular type of troops at the installation.

Mr. Carpenter. Then you went with Information and Education teams around the country giving lectures and visual aids to the troops in the field, is that right?

Mr. Wilson. I didn't give any lectures to troops. I was mainly concerned with putting up these visual displays.

Mr. Carpenter. When you were in Washington, how many people were on the staff, the immediate staff of Colonel Schreiber?

Mr. Wilson. As I recall it, there were around 4 or 5, something like that.

Mr. Carpenter. Major Schreiber, later Lieutenant Colonel Schreiber, was responsible for the preparation of the Army Talks, is that right?

Mr. Wilson. I am not sure how many of them. I think he had a considerable amount to do with some of them. I am actually not sure how many of them or exactly what the chain of authority was. I was a sergeant at the time, at a place where there was more brass than you could shake a stick at. I wasn't quite sure about who above me was responsible, exactly, for everything else. Major Schreiber wasn't the head of the whole orientation thing. If he was responsible for these things, I don't know it of my own personal knowledge.

Mr. Carpenter. You were in the New York office for a while?

Mr. Wilson. I believe I was assigned there for only about 30 days.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work there?

Mr. Wilson. I was doing practically nothing at that time. Half the time I was there, I was on furlough. The time I wasn't on furlough, I think, was only about 2 weeks, and I didn't have any regular duty there. I was expecting shipping orders to be shipped to Europe momentarily.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever consult with any Communist Party official regarding your work in the Information and Education Division?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you meet with and work jointly with members of the Communist Party within the Information and Education Division?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a Communist Party member together with Carl Fenichel?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer.

Mr. Carpenter. Steve Fischer?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know Steve Fischer?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. Let me read you a War Department memorandum to Colonel Farlow from Major Schreiber:

I have been advised by Sergeant Wilson that 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army Air Forces: Flexible Gunnery School, Tyndall Field, Fla., is an outstanding young officer.
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

Lieutenant Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and after completing his 25 (?) bombing missions came back to the mainland. According to Wilson "this guy's terrific—he already knows as much if not more than the instructors at the school."

In civilian life he was a newspaperman on the San Francisco Chronicle. Prior to that, Wilson believes, he completed a course in journalism at Columbia (?) University.

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for 2 weeks' temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in Materials or Field Operations Section.

You were a Sergeant Wilson, weren't you?
Mr. Wilson. I was a sergeant, that is right.

The Chairman. Do you know S. M. Fischer or Steve Fischer referred to in this memorandum signed by Major Schreiber, who you told us was your superior officer?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. You do know Colonel Farlow?
Mr. Wilson. I have met Colonel Farlow.

The Chairman. I would like this memorandum to go in the record and be made a part of the record.
(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 405" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 405
WAR DEPARTMENT—ARMY SERVICE FORCES
(W. D. A. G. O. Form No. 0115)
MEMO ROUTING SLIP

April 7, 1943.

To the following in order indicated:

1. Colonel Farlow

Stephen [handwritten]:
I have been advised by Sgt. Wilson that 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army Air Forces Flexible Gunnery School, Tyndell Field, Fla., is an outstanding young officer.
Lt. Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and after completing his 25 (?) bombing missions came back to the mainland. According to Wilson "this guy's terrific—he already knows as much if not more than the instructors at the school."

In civilian life he was a newspaperman on the San Francisco Chronicle. Prior to that, Wilson believes, he completed a course in journalism at Columbia (?) University.

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for two weeks' temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in Materials or Field Operations Section.

From:
(Name) Major Schreiber.
BUILDING AND ROOM BCB.
(DATE) 6-16-44.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were working for the National Institute of Public Affairs?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds that I have previously stated.

The Chairman. What is your wife's name, Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. Ruth.

The Chairman. Is she a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question, Senator.

The Chairman. Mr. Wilson, I want to read you an excerpt from the FBI report and one of the Nixon memorandums:
Luke Woodward Wilson was last known to be serving overseas as a morale officer in the United States Army. Confidential reliable sources have indicated that Wilson is a close friend of Louise Brausten—

Do you know Louise Brausten?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman (reading):

and that his wife, Ruth Wilson, is a Communist Party functionary in the Stockton, Cal., area. Wilson for a number of years was employed by the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee of the United States Senate investigating labor matters. A highly confidential source has advised that in May 1941 Wilson was attempting to determine how information contained in the files of the FBI might best be obtained in order to assist in the defense of Harry Bridges.

Is that a fact, Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman (reading):

It is further reliably reported that Wilson desired Charles S. Flato—

Do you know Charles S. Flato?
Mr. Wilson. I do. I know a Charles Flato.
The Chairman. Do you know Charles S. Flato?
Mr. Wilson. I know a Charles S. Flato.
The Chairman (reading):

It is further reliably reported that Wilson desired Charles S. Flato, then of the Farm Security Administration, to approach John Abt, formerly connected with the Department of Justice, and at that time counsel for Sidney Hillman, on how best to obtain such data.

Is that true, Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. When you were with the La Follette Senate committee, did you do some work in Chicago for that committee?
Mr. Wilson. I don't believe so, Senator. I have worked in many, many cities of the country for the committee. I don't recall working on an investigation in Chicago.
The Chairman. Were you in contact with the Communist Party of Michigan when you were investigating the Michigan sitdown strikes for the La Follette committee?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have previously stated.
The Chairman. You were in Michigan with the La Follette committee doing investigating work?
Mr. Wilson. I was in Michigan on an investigation of the Black Legion and the sluffings of UAW organizers by the service department men of the Ford Motor Co.
The Chairman. Did you engage in any subversive activity or espionage while you were in the Armed Forces?
Mr. Wilson. Senator, would you break that question down?
The Chairman. When you were in the Armed Forces, did you engage in any espionage activities?
Mr. Wilson. No.
The Chairman. When you were in the Armed Forces, did you engage in any subversive activities?
Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I have previously stated.
Mr. Carpenter. When you were in the Armed Forces in France, were you in contact with the Communist Party of that country?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds that I have previously stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Was it your practice to train and place students, at the Institute of Public Affairs, who were Communists, into positions with the United States Government?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. Mr. Wilson, have you engaged in any subversive activities?

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I have previously stated.

The Chairman. You say you are unemployed. Where do you get your compensation? Where do you get your money to live on?

Mr. Wilson. I have a private income, sir.

The Chairman. You have a private income. You are not paid by the Communist Party, a salary or funds?

Mr. Wilson. I have a private income, and that is my entire income, Senator.

The Chairman. You have no other income except your private income? You receive no money from any outside source?

Mr. Wilson. That is right.

Mr. Carpenter. We have three documents we would like to place in the record, Senator.

The Chairman. Identify them, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Mandel. A letter dated April 14, 1944, from Henry J. Mueller, major, assistant executive officer, Morale Services Division, in which he states that Luke W. Wilson is to be assigned temporary duty for approximately 30 days for the purpose of attending the orientation course school for special service. I ask that that be placed in the record.

Here is the enlisted record and report of separation and honorable discharge of Luke W. Wilson, which I ask be placed in the record. It notes here that he is a pistol marksman and an orientation writer.

The Chairman. Both of those will go in the record and become a part of the official record of this committee.

Mr. Mandel. A memorandum from the Army Air Forces Headquarters, Air Transport Command, dated April 10, 1944, noting a request for transfer for Luke Wilson. It says he is on T. D. with the Orientation Branch, Morale Services Division, signed by Talbot Rantoul, first lieutenant, Air Corps, assistant executive, Personnel.

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 406, 407, and 408" and are as follows):

Exhibit No. 406

War Department,
Headquarters, Army Services Forces,
Washington, D. C., April 14, 1944.

In reply refer to SPMSA 201, Wilson, Luke W. (14 Apr 44).
Memorandum for the Adjutant General, Enlisted Branch, Orders Section, Room 4215, Munitions Building.
Subject: Orders.
It is requested that orders be issued directing Sergeant Luke W. Wilson, 3900 W. Wilson, Hq & Hq Sq, 302nd Basic Flying Tag Gp, Minter Field, Bakersfield, California, now on temporary duty this office, to proceed on or about 17 April 1944, from Washington, D. C., to Lexington, Va., on further temporary duty for approximately thirty (30) days for the purpose of attending the Orientation Course, School for Special Service, reporting upon arrival to the Commandant, School for Special Service. Upon completion of this temporary duty, enlisted man to return to temporary duty station, Washington, D. C.

For the Director:

HENRY J. MUELLER,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Executive Officer,
Morale Services Division.

Exhibit No. 407

ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION

HONORABLE DISCHARGE

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1497

[Redacted]
EXHIBIT No. 403

ARMY AIR FORCES,
HEADQUARTERS, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND,
Washington, 10 April 1944.

Subject: Request for Transfer.
To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. Attn: AC/AS, Personnel—AFPMP-2-KRS.

1. Provided there are no military objections and Sgt Luke W. Wilson, ASN 39090797, Hq & Hq Sq. 302d Basic Flying Training Group, AAF Pilot School, Minter Field, California, and presently on TD with Orientation Branch, Morale Services Division, The Pentagon, is available for reassignment, it is requested that he be transferred to 559th AAF Base Unit, Ferrying Division, ATC, Municipal Airport, Nashville, Tennessee.

2. Sgt Wilson attended the Link Trainer instructor school at Chanute Field and the Central Instructors' school at Randolph Field. He has been Link Trainer instructor at Minter Field for seven (7) months, and Navigation instructor at the same Field for eight (8) months. As a civilian he was on a Senate Subcommittee on Education & Labor, as an Investigator and Economist, for four years. He spent one year on research work on crime prevention for the Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Crime. He planned and supervised the initial program of internship training in government service for the National Institute of Public Affairs. EM is a graduate of Dartmouth College with an A. B. degree. It is contemplated assigning the soldier to orientation training duties.

3. It is further requested that this Headquarters be notified of the action taken.
For the Commanding General:

TALBOT RANTOUL,
1st Lieut., Air Corps,
Asst. Executive, Personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived, this committee will stand in recess, and we will meet again at 2 o'clock in this room this afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Wilson. You are excused.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m.)
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
The first witness will be Mr. Stephen Fischer.
Will you come forward, please? Will you be sworn to testify?
Do you swear that the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Fischer. I do.
Mr. Carpenter. Will you state your full name?

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN M. FISCHER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HOWARD S. WHITESIDE, BOSTON, MASS.

Mr. Fischer. My name is Stephen Fischer.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your initial? Do you have one?
Mr. Fischer. M.
The CHAIRMAN. F-i-s-c-h-e-r?
Mr. Fischer. Correct.
The CHAIRMAN. And your address?
Mr. Fischer. 425 Riverside Drive, New York City.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your business or profession?
Mr. Fischer. I work for Scientific American Magazine and do advertising promotion.
The Chairman. Scientific American what?
Mr. Fischer. Magazine.
The Chairman. And you are present here today with your counsel?
Mr. Fischer. I am.
The Chairman. Counsel, would you give your name?
Mr. Whiteside. Howard S. Whiteside, 30 State Street, Boston.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the armed services during World War II?
Mr. Fischer. I was.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the Information and Education Service of the Armed Forces?
Mr. Fischer. I was at one point, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. What point was that?
Mr. Fischer. Well, following my return from combat duty as an aerial navigator in the Solomon Islands, I was reassigned, after some months, to Tyndall Field, Fla.
Mr. Carpenter. What year was this?
Mr. Fischer. In Florida I was grounded because of combat fatigue and did some public relations and I think some I. and E., but that was a secondary duty.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you later transferred from that field in Florida?
Mr. Fischer. I was, some time about July of 1944.
Mr. Carpenter. And where were you transferred?
Mr. Fischer. I was transferred to the I. and E. Division here in Washington, and then to New York City.
Mr. Carpenter. What was your grade or rank when you were transferred?
Mr. Fischer. First lieutenant.
Mr. Carpenter. And what division were you assigned to here in Washington?
Mr. Fischer. To the Orientation Branch.
Mr. Carpenter. Of what?
Mr. Fischer. Of the I. and E. Division.
Mr. Carpenter. Of the Information and Education Division?
Mr. Fischer. That is correct.
Mr. Carpenter. The Orientation Branch?
Mr. Fischer. Right.
Mr. Carpenter. Who was your immediate superior officer?
Mr. Fischer. Well, I would say I had 2 immediate superior officers who worked closely together, Colonel Bowker and Colonel Schreiber.
Mr. Carpenter. Bowker?
Mr. Fischer. B-o-w k-e-r, as I recall.
Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work while you were assigned in Washington under Colonel Schreiber and Colonel Bowker?
Mr. Fischer. I was engaged—
Mr. Whiteside. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that there be no pictures during the hearing?

The Chairman. All right. Your request will be respected. You may proceed.

Mr. Fischer. I was engaged in helping to prepare a series of weekly bulletins called Army Talks.

Mr. Carpenter. You were helping in the preparation of Army Talks?

Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of that work?

Mr. Fischer. Well, there was discussion with other members of the Orientation Branch, and then gathering of information and writing and rewriting and editing, not only by myself, but it was a collaborative effort with the colonels and eventually with superior officers with whom I did not come into contact, but who would approve the material and pass it back.

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, you did original work in the preparation of these Army Talks. Is that right?

Mr. Fischer. Some original, and some editing and discussion.

Mr. Carpenter. How many people were on the staff at the time you were there?

Mr. Fischer. I would say—this is an estimate, sir, after a period of some 10 years—it seems to me there were, oh, 8 or 10. We are talking now during the month of July 1944?

Mr. Carpenter. When you were here in Washington.

Mr. Fischer. When I was here in Washington. I would say about 6, 8, or 10.

Mr. Carpenter. Six, eight, or ten. How did you happen to come into the Information and Education Section here in Washington? Was it through a recommendation, or was it through something on your part, wherein you asked to come in?

Mr. Fischer. No, I did not ask to come in.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether you were recommended to come into the I. and E. Section?

Mr. Fischer. I do not know whether I was recommended. I do not recall that I was recommended.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know a Luke Wilson?

Mr. Fischer. I do.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether or not he was instrumental in your coming to Washington in the Information and Education Section?

Mr. Fischer. I don't know.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether Major Schreiber at that time, later Lieutenant Colonel Schreiber, brought you in, or did he recommend you coming into the Information and Education Section?

Mr. Fischer. I know that Major Schreiber spoke to me about coming in, and that when I reported he told me what I was going to do.

The Chairman. Where did he speak to you about coming into the I. and E.?

Mr. Fischer. He spoke to me by telephone when I was in Florida.

The Chairman. He called you up?

Mr. Fischer. Yes.

The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Carpenter. I have here a memorandum from Major Schreiber to Colonel Farlow, wherein he states:

I have been advised by Sergeant Wilson that 1st Lt. Stephen M. Fischer is an outstanding young officer. In civilian life he was a newspaperman on the San Francisco Chronicle, and prior to that Wilson believes he completed a course in journalism at Columbia University. It is recommended that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for 2 weeks' temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness.

Do you recall that?
Mr. Fischer. No, sir, I never heard that recommendation before.
Mr. Carpenter. It also states:

According to Wilson, this may is terrific. He already knows as much if not more than the instructors at the school.

Do you recall any such memorandum?
Mr. Fischer. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Carpenter. You say you knew Luke Wilson?
Mr. Fischer. I met him.
Mr. Carpenter. You knew him prior to coming into the service?
Mr. Fischer. I met him a couple of times prior to coming into the service. I do not recall ever meeting him in the service.
Mr. Carpenter. Where did you first meet him before coming into the service?
Mr. Fischer. In San Francisco.
Mr. Carpenter. On what occasion?
Mr. Fischer. I don't remember.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him in a friendly way?
Mr. Fischer. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you attend meetings with him?
Mr. Fischer. I don't remember ever attending a meeting with Luke Wilson.

Mr. Carpenter. You were employed in California for some time prior to the war?
Mr. Fischer. I was.
Mr. Carpenter. And what was the nature of your employment?
Mr. Fischer. I was a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Fischer. Yes, I was.
Mr. Carpenter. When were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Fischer. I believe I joined the Communist Party in the spring of 1940, when I was at the graduate school of journalism at Columbia. I went, to the best of my recollection, to 1 or 2 meetings when I was at Columbia. I then went to San Francisco, where I was employed, and for approximately 1 year up until some time in the early fall, as I recall, of 1941, I considered myself and was a member of the Communist Party, with a group of newspapermen, in San Francisco. And I just left in the fall of 1941.

Mr. Carpenter. You left the party in the fall of 1941? Can you state approximately what month?
Mr. Fischer. I didn't take any formal action, and I don't recall exactly the month, but I would state approximately October.

Mr. Carpenter. October of 1941?
Mr. Fischer. I believe so.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party while you were a member of the Armed Forces of the United States?

Mr. Fischer. I was not, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you later join the Communist Party after retiring from service?

Mr. Fischer. When I returned from service, 4 years after leaving San Francisco, I was asked to come to some meetings, which I am not as positive about as I am about these other dates I gave. I am not positive whether they were left-wing caucus meetings of the Newspaper Guild or whether they were open Communist Party meetings, but I did go in—may I figure my dates here? I guess it was in late 1945 or so that I did go to 2 or 3 meetings, such as I just described. And I was no longer interested in remaining as a member of the Communist Party, and I once again just left, and I have not been a member since.

Mr. Carpenter. You paid dues in the Communist Party?

Mr. Fischer. I did at one time, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever attend any Communist meeting with Luke Wilson?

Mr. Fischer. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know Major Schreiber, later Lieutenant Colonel Schreiber, prior to your induction into the service?

Mr. Fischer. I don't recall knowing him prior to induction into the service.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you not know him in California prior to your entry into the service?

Mr. Fischer. No, I do not recall ever having met him.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have occasion to talk with your sister in New York about Julius Schreiber?

Mr. Fischer. Oh, I may have talked to my sister.

Mr. Carpenter. Didn't she give you an introduction to Julius Schreiber in California before the war?

Mr. Fischer. This is belief, sir, but to the best of my knowledge I do not know that my sister knows Julius Schreiber.

Mr. Carpenter. You do not know that you ever met Julius Schreiber in California prior to the war?

Mr. Fischer. I do not remember ever having met him before the war.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you positive you did not?

Mr. Fischer. I do not recall ever having met him before the war.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever offered to cooperate with the FBI to inform the American people as to what you know about the Communist conspiracy?

Mr. Fischer. Have I ever offered to do that?

Mr. Carpenter. Yes.

Mr. Fischer. No, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever had any associations with William L. Patterson?

Mr. Fischer. I have.

Mr. Carpenter. What were those associations?

Mr. Fischer. I met William L. Patterson, to the best of my memory, as a newspaperman. I spoke with him about stories, or a story, as a matter of fact, and that is about all that I remember about him.
Mr. Carpenter. What year did you first know him?
Mr. Fischer. To the best of my recollection, 1949, I would say.
Mr. Carpenter. 1949?
Mr. Fischer. That is to the best of my recollection, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. You did not know him in 1933?
Mr. Fischer. In 1933, sir, I was 13 years old.
Mr. Carpenter. You didn’t know him in 1940?
Mr. Fischer. I don’t remember meeting him in 1940.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him as a member of the national committee of the Communist Party?
Mr. Fischer. No, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have any citations to show Patterson’s position in the Communist Party?
Mr. Mandel. The records show that in 1933 he was a Communist candidate for alderman in the 19th district of New York. He was a Communist candidate for the State assembly in the 21st assembly district in New York in 1931 and 1940; Communist candidate for Congress in Chicago in 1940; and he has later been listed as a member of the national committee of the Communist Party.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you attend a dinner in behalf of William L. Patterson on May 15, 1951, at Plaza Hall, New York City?
Mr. Fischer. I don’t believe I was in New York City in 1951.
Mr. Carpenter. Well, would you recall that?
Mr. Fischer. No; I do not recall having been to such a dinner.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him as head of the Civil Rights Congress, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General?
Mr. Fischer. It was in that position of his that I met him. When I met him he was the head of the Civil Rights Congress.
Mr. Carpenter. And in what connection did you meet him?
Mr. Fischer. I was covering a story for the Daily Compass concerned with a man—what was the name of that organization, Patterson’s organization?
Mr. Carpenter. The Civil Rights Congress.
Mr. Fischer. The Civil Rights Congress was working on his behalf. And I went to Patterson and talked to him about the story, as I was assigned to do.
Mr. Carpenter. What paper was that?
Mr. Fischer. The Daily Compass, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you know Mr. John T. McTernan?
Mr. Fischer. I do.
Mr. Carpenter. What were your associations with him?
Mr. Fischer. That of a friend.
Mr. Carpenter. A what?
Mr. Fischer. A friend.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have any business associations with him?
Mr. Fischer. As a reporter, I once at some time or other covered activities in which he was engaged as an attorney.
Mr. Carpenter. Did Mr. McTernan ever recommend you to the Armed Forces?
Mr. Fischer. I don’t remember.
Mr. Carpenter. I have a letter here, copy of a letter, signed “John T. McTernan,” to the commanding general of the Ninth Corps Area, Presidio, San Francisco, Calif.:
My Dear Sir: I am happy to recommend Mr. Stephen Fischer for an appointment as flying cadet in the United States Army. I know Mr. Fischer well both personally and socially. He is a highly intelligent and competent young man who has consistently demonstrated ability to give leadership to his associates and to perform difficult assignments with confidence and tact. As a devoted believer in the principles of our Constitution, he will, I am sure, give loyal service to his country at this hour.

Do you recall that recommendation?
Mr. Fischer. I did not recall it until you read it, and I assume he wrote it if you say so.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that Mr. McTernan, when asked about his Communist affiliations by the California Legislative Committee Investigating Communists, invoked the fifth amendment?
Mr. Fischer. I do not know that, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. What were your last dealings with Mr. McTernan?
Mr. Fischer. My last dealings?
Mr. Carpenter. Your last dealings, yes.
Mr. Fischer. I am trying to think. May I consult with my counsel for a minute?
Mr. Carpenter. You may.
(Mr. Fischer consults with counsel.)
Mr. Fischer. I last saw Mr. McTernan, I would say, about a year ago.
Mr. Carpenter. And in what connection?
Mr. Fischer. He was in New York. He called me up, and I saw him socially.
Mr. Carpenter. It was a social engagement?
Mr. Fischer. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel would like to put in a citation.
Mr. Mandel. New York Times, February 18, 1948, page 20, shows that when Mr. McTernan was questioned by the California Committee on Un-American Activities he invoked the fifth amendment; that he was one of the attorneys defending Communist cases, according to the New York Times of March 4, 1950, page 18, and June 4, 1950, page 13.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you know William Schneiderman, former secretary of the Communist Party of California?
Mr. Fischer. I once met him, sir, on a transcontinental train. I spoke to him for a couple of hours, and that is as much as I know.
Mr. Carpenter. Was that the last time you saw him?
Mr. Fischer. To the best of my recollection.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you know John Pittman?
Mr. Fischer. I did know him, yes.
Mr. Carpenter. A feature writer of the Daily Worker, official Communist organ?
Mr. Fischer. I did know him, yes.
Mr. Carpenter. And in what relation did you know him?
Mr. Fischer. I think he was a neighbor of ours.
Mr. Carpenter. Where?
Mr. Fischer. In San Francisco. And also I sometimes bumped into him on assignments as a newspaperman.
Mr. Carpenter. When was the last time you saw him?
Mr. Fischer. I would say I think before the war. I am not certain. It has been many years.¹

Mr. Carpenter. I have a copy of the recommendation for the promotion of an officer, and I would like to read to you the following:

Stephen M. Fischer, Army serial No. 0–728368.

You are the same Stephen Fischer?

Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter (reading):

Description of duties is as follows:

This officer's primary duties are editorial research and writing. He recommends and initiates subject matter, directs and conducts research work, and does actual writing of weekly Army Talk fact sheets and orientation discussion guides for distribution to all Army units in continental United States and to all overseas theaters. In addition, this officer is in charge of conducting pre-tests of discussion material by directing discussions in field units. The assignment calls for a high order of judgment, wide knowledge of world affairs and Army policy, and sympathetic understanding of troops in the field. This officer's duties carry great responsibility because of the global use to which the materials are put.

Would you say that is a fair description of the job that you filled while in the Information and Education Section?

Mr. Fischer. I would say that is a very flattering description of the job I attempted to do.

Mr. Carpenter. But you did do this?

Mr. Fischer. Well, yes; but as you see, sir, no one man could do all that in 1 day, I don't think.

Mr. Carpenter. Well, you were in the Army more than 1 day, weren't you?

Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Was Carl Fenichel a member of your group when you were in the I, and E, Section?

Mr. Fischer. He was.

Mr. Carpenter. Marian Thompson?

Mr. Fischer. I don't remember that name.

Mr. Carpenter. Hyman Forstenzer?

Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether any of those people were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. Fischer. I do not.

The Chairman. Mr. Fischer, would you be willing to appear before the FBI and give them the benefit of the information that you learned when you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Fischer. Senator, as I have told you in our other session—

The Chairman. I know you told us in executive session that you would not tell this committee your former associates. I just wondered what you thought about the FBI.

Mr. Fischer. I feel that at any time, sir, that I know of anyone who, to my knowledge, has performed any treasonous, subversive action against the United States, I would not wait to be asked to go to the FBI. I would personally and immediately get in touch with the FBI. I know of no one, sir, who, to my knowledge, has done any-

¹In a letter dated June 30, 1954, to Senator Jenner, Howard S. Whiteside, attorney for Fischer wrote: "On further thought, Fischer believes it was after the war, in 1945 or early 1946, that he last saw Pittman."
thing wrong. I know of people with whom I have disagreed. I know of people who may have thoughts which I do not share. But I would not wish to bring trouble upon anybody unless I personally knew him to be the cause of trouble.

The Chairman. In other words, you do not know, of course, what other members of the Communist Party did when you were not in their presence, and so forth and so on.

Mr. Fischer. That is right.

The Chairman. But you could tell this committee and you could tell the FBI the members of the Writers Guild and the members that you associated with when you were in the Communist Party? Would you be willing to do that? Just tell us who attended the meetings. We do not care whether they did anything treasonable or not, but we would like to know who they are.

Mr. Fischer. No, sir; I would not do that unless I thought that they had committed wrong.

The Chairman. All right. Then you are to be the judge.

Thank you very much. You are excused.

Mr. Fischer. May I make one statement, sir?

The Chairman. No.

Mr. McManus, will you take the witness stand, please?

Do you swear that the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McManus. I do.

The Chairman. You may proceed.

Mr. Carpenter. Will you give the reporter your name, please?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT C. McMANUS, STAFF MEMBER, SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. McManus. Robert C. McManus.

Mr. Carpenter. And are you a member of the staff of this committee?

Mr. McManus. I am.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you cleared for security?

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir; I am.

Mr. Carpenter. What is the nature of your work on this committee?

Mr. McManus. Well, I have general tasks. I help prepare material for hearings, and I help write reports. My title is a staff member, sort of a jack-of-all-trades.

Mr. Carpenter. In connection with preparing reports for this committee, did you come across and documents in connection with your investigation which would help this committee in its progress?

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir; in connection with this particular investigation, as a result of interviews and conversations with Captain Kerr, who was a witness this morning, I was advised by him of the existence of a file which had been put together by him and his squad of investigators after they made a survey in Camp Pickett and the I. and E. School at Lexington, Ky.

Mr. Carpenter. That was Lexington, Va.; was it not?

Mr. McManus. Lexington, Va. Yes, excuse me.

I was advised that one section of this file had exhibits in it, and I transmitted that information to Mr. Lewis Berry, Jr., Deputy Depart-
ment Counsel of the Department of the Army, and Mr. Berry undertook to get hold of that file for the committee and supplied us with some of the exhibits that were there.

Mr. Carpenter. And do you have some of those exhibits with you today?

Mr. McManus. I do, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Would you please state from those exhibits, taking them one by one, what you found?

Mr. McManus. Would you like me to identify them first and then describe them later?

Mr. Carpenter. Yes, if you will.

Mr. McManus. The first one is a War Department circular, Washington, D. C., September 5, 1944, entitled "Orientation Information Education," and that is a circular describing the authority and functions of the Information and Education Division.

The next is a prospectus entitled, "Prospectus ASF Troop Training Orientation Program," and it contains these introductory sentences:

In this kit you will find the orientation training program for the Army Service Forces. The program consists of 34 hours; subdivided into 6 weeks' basic orientation (6 hours) and 14 weeks' advanced orientation (28 hours). Of the total of 34 hours, 13 are devoted to films.

Next is War Department pamphlet No. 20–3, dated September 1944, Guide to the Use of Information Material.

The next is a series of mimeographed sheets. The originals were supplied to the subcommittee, and we have made those photostats.

"Daily News Bulletin, Post Information and Education Office, Camp Swift, Tex." And they are in chronological order, and mostly in 1944.

The Chairman. That may be incorporated into the record by reference. We will not need to make them a part of the record.

Mr. Carpenter. Now I wish you would tell us what the results of your investigation of those documents were.

Mr. McManus. In connection with this orientation information education document, here is what you might call a job description of the outfit, which says as follows:

Information: To formulate policies and provide a service for the dissemination of information to military personnel, using the media of motion pictures, printed materials, and radio, including the publication and production of Yank, News Map, Army News Service, Camp Newspaper Service, Armed Forces Radio Service, Pocket Guides to Foreign Countries, and informational posters and pamphlets; to formulate policies for, plan and initiate the production and be responsible for the content of, integration of, and final approval of information-orientation films for military personnel, including GI Movie Weekly and the Army-Navy Screen Magazine, issued periodically. * * *

And so on. It states the authority.

The Chairman. I would like for that entire document to go into the record and be a part of the record as just now identified.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 409" and is as follows:)


**ORIENTATION, INFORMATION, EDUCATION**

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**1. INTRODUCTION.**

1. **Purpose.**—The purpose of this circular is to define the mission, organization, and functions of the Information and Education Division, Army Service Forces, and of orientation, information, and education in the field.

2. **Definition of terms.**

   a. The term "information and education" embraces orientation, information, education, research on factors affecting morale, and related morale activities provided by the Information and Education Division.
   
   The term "information and education" division, branch, or section will be used to designate staff divisions or sections in the major echelons of command.
   
   b. The term "information-education officer" will be used to designate commissioned personnel in the field engaged in orientation, information, and education and related morale activities. This term will replace the title "orientation officer" previously used in Tables of Organization and other War Department directives relating to personnel engaged in these activities.
   
   c. The term "education officer" will be used to designate those officers charged exclusively with supervision or operation of the educational program available to military personnel through the services of the Information and Education Division and its branches, including the United States Armed Forces Institute and its branches. Such officers are now on duty in theater, department, service command, and similar headquarters.

**II. INFORMATION AND EDUCATION DIVISION.**

3. **Establishment.**

   The Information and Education Division was established on 10 November 1943 in the Morale Services Division and assigned to the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, for as matters pertaining to general administrative procedure and supply are concerned. Effective 9 August 1944, the title of this division was changed to Information and Education Division. For the mission and functions of the Information and Education Division, see paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. **Mission.**

   The director of the Information and Education Division is charged with the planning, production, dissemination, and supervision of materials and programs for the information, orientation, and nonmilitary education of troops and with research on troop attitudes, in order to assist commanders in maintaining a high state of morale.

5. **Functions and activities.**

   a. **General.**
      
      (1) To advise the Chief of Staff and the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, theaters, departments, and defense commands, regarding plans, policies, and programs covering morale activities.
      
      (2) To operate branch offices of the Information and Education Division, and to operate the United States Armed Forces Institute.
(8) To recommend procedures and arrange for the selection, training, and assignment of personnel, commissioned and enlisted, for orientation, information, and education duties throughout the Army, including the operation of necessary training establishments, and through on-job training.

(4) To control assignment of officers to and relief of officers from the information-education replacement pool.

b. Research.—To conduct research studies in continental United States and overseas theaters, defense commands, and departments on factors affecting morale; and to collect and analyze data for War Department agencies requesting research services. Operations include definition of problems to be studied, conduct of field operations, and tabulation and analysis of results. Reports on Army problems about which remedial action can be taken only by the War Department or by theater or department commanders are forwarded to appropriate staff officers in the War Department or to the theater or department commander immediately concerned. Studies on problems of interest to officers at all echelons of command are reported in appropriate publications, including “What the Soldier Thinks,” a monthly digest, distributed through The Adjutant General to all company and higher echelon commanders.

c. Information.—To formulate policies and provide a service for the dissemination of information to military personnel, using the media of motion picture, printed materials, and radio, including the publication and production of Yank, Newsmap, Army News Service, Camp Newspaper Service, Armed Forces Radio Service, Pocket Guides to Foreign Countries, and informational posters and pamphlets; to formulate policies for, plan, and initiate the production and be responsible for the content of, integration of, and final approval of information-orientation films for military personnel, including G. I. Movie Weekly and the Army-Navy Screen Magazine, issued periodically; to exercise staff supervision and policy control over all post, camp, station, and unit periodicals of the Army for the dissemination of news and other items of interest to the military personnel of such installation or unit.

d. Education.—To formulate policies and operate a service for appropriate educational opportunities for troops through correspondence courses, self-teaching courses, accreditation and testing service, and the provision of materials (educational manuals, educational films, educational radio programs, exhibits) for use in class instruction, off-duty discussion groups, and lectures; to supervise the conduct of the United States Armed Forces Institute and overseas branches thereof; to arrange for the use by military personnel of selected college and university extension courses; to select or prepare foreign language instructional guides, phrasebooks, and dictionaries; and to furnish necessary plans and materials for a training program, including general and vocational education, to prepare military personnel upon cessation of hostilities for return to civilian life.

e. Orientation.—To formulate policies, plan and supervise procedures for orientation of military personnel in the background, causes, and current phase of the war and current events relating thereto, and for eventual return to civilian life; to prepare and select War Department materials for these purposes, including motion picture film, recordings, pamphlets, fact sheets, books, maps, and other visual aids, and weekly reports of military and world events; and, when practicable to provide such other materials as may be requested for the
special morale purposes or programs of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces.

1. Field service.—To advise and assist commands in the field in setting up orientation, information, and education programs, and to advise in the operation of such programs, including advice on materials available from the Information and Education Division.

III. TRAINING.—In General.—All military personnel, commissioned and enlisted, on active duty, will be given training in orientation through a course to be known as the Army Orientation Course. In regiments, groups, and separate battalions, squadrons, companies, and detachments, or equivalent organizations, not less than 1 hour per week will be devoted to this training during duty hours, and such training will be conducted or supervised by regularly assigned officers of the lowest echelons of command. The objectives of the Army Orientation Course are—

a. To acquaint all recruits with factual information as to the causes and events leading to the United States becoming a combatant in a global war in December 1941.

b. To inform all military personnel on the course of military actions, particularly those in which United States forces have participated since 7 December 1941, and on other phases of the war effort of the United States.

c. To inform all military personnel of the principles for which we are fighting and of the dangers to American principles arising from Axis policies and Axis aggressions.

d. To inform all military personnel on the nature of the enemy, as a supplement to their regular training.

ea. To fix in the mind of the American soldier a sense of the importance of his personal role and responsibilities in the current struggle.

7. On transports and hospital ships.—a. Since the morale of troops is of major importance during that time spent on transports and hospital ships, and since the necessarily enforced inactivity, restriction, and other factors present on board transports and hospital ships are detrimental to morale, it is essential that a well organized and integrated Army Orientation Program be instituted on board every transport and hospital ship at the earliest practical moment after leaving the port of embarkation. This program will be the responsibility of the transport commander. The transport commander will designate an officer for orientation, information, and education activities from ships' complement personnel or from transient personnel for each trip.

b. On voyages of 48 hours or more, the time devoted to training in Army orientation while on board transports and hospital ships, weather, and other physical conditions permitting, will not be less than 1 hour per day.

c. At the earliest time consistent with necessary security measures troops destined for overseas will receive additional orientation instruction or information which will familiarize them with the area to which they are destined. Such instruction of information will include the following subjects:

(1) Geography.

(2) People—their habits, customs, language.

(3) Currency—denominations, exchange rate, etc.

(4) Communicable diseases—their importance, manner in which transmitted, and control.

(5) Other subjects peculiar to the area.
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

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the United States require special orientation to the problems confronting such separation for
2
lough or leave, and return to a third orientation, reassignment to some of.

interior, or extended hospitalization. Adequate provisions will be made through
the regular conduct of orientation programs and the fullest information available,
to assist such personnel to anticipate and prepare for continuance in military
service or adjustment to civilian life upon separation.

IV. OPERATION.—8. Personnel.—Pending publication of changes to Tables
of Organization and Equipment, units and installations will reorganize in ac-
cordance with this circular.

a. Army, corps, and division headquarters and comparable Army Air Forces
units.

(1) One staff officer in army, corps, division, and comparable unit head-
quarters (except Army Air Forces units) will be designated "assistant
G-3, Information-education officer" in the grade and with en-
listed assistants as shown in table I.

(2) For Army Air Forces units this officer will be designated as "assistant
A-1, Information-education officer."

(3) Commissioned and enlisted authorizations in appropriate Tables of
Organization and Equipment for Special Service sections will be
reduced accordingly and Special Services sections will be established
to conform with authorizations shown in table II.

(4) Commissioned and enlisted grades in excess of Table of Organization
and Equipment authorizations created by this change will be carried
as surplus in grade until absorbed by normal attrition. No officer
or enlisted man assigned to either orientation, information, and ed-
ucation duties or to special services duties will be relieved, reas-
signed, or reduced solely because his grade is in excess of current
authorization, when such excess in grade was brought about by this
change.

(b) Armored division.

(a) In armored divisions which do not organically include regi-
ments or equivalent units in their organizations, three officers
in the grade of captain and three enlisted men, technicians,
grade 5, will be included in the division headquarters to be
detailed as Information-education officers and enlisted assist-
ants to the combat commands or otherwise at the discretion
of the division commander (see table I).

(b) Tables of Organization and Equipment for Headquarters and
Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, Armored Division
(T/O & E 6-160-1), will be changed to delete the "assistant
S-3, orientation officer" now provided, and this officer will be
reassigned to division headquarters as one of the officers pro-
vided for armored division in table I. The additional officer
and enlisted man necessary to comply with the requirements
set forth in table I will be provided through an increase in
total strength of the division by one officer and one enlisted
man.
### TABLE III

#### ASSISTANT G-3, INFORMATION—EDUCATION

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*Assistant A-1 in Army Air Forces units above group level and included in the personnel section in Army Air Forces group (MOS 5004).
**Headquarters, division artillery (except armored division artillery) will be considered as equivalent to regiments.
***Assistant G-3 in units (other than AAF units) of the regimental level.

### SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

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3. Regiments, groups, and comparable units.

(1) One staff officer in the grade of captain will be included in the Tables of Organization and Equipment of each regiment or equivalent unit (except Army Air Forces group) as assistant 8-3 with notation under “Remarks” column “Assistant 8-3, information-education officer,” in lieu of “Assistant 8-3, orientation officer.”

(2) For Army Air Forces group, this officer will be a captain and included in the “Personnel section.”

(3) As provided in Tables I and II above, Tables of Organization and Equipment of each regiment or equivalent unit will be changed to include one enlisted man, technician, grade 5, as assistant to the regimental information-education officer, and Special Service section of each Table of Organization and Equipment will be reduced by one enlisted man accordingly.

(4) Groups and headquarters division artillery (except headquarters armored division artillery), will be considered as equivalent to regiments for the purpose of interpretation of this paragraph.

c. Separate battalions, squadrons, and comparable organizations. In separate battalions, squadrons, companies, detachments, and other comparable organizations whose Tables of Organization and Equipment do not authorize information-education officers, a qualified officer, other than chaplain, will be designated to perform the duties of information-education officer in addition to other duties.

d. Service commands.

(1) There will be an information and education division in the headquarters of each service command staffed with sufficient officers adequately to supervise orientation, information, and education activities within the service command.

(2) Posts, camps, and stations.

(a) Allotments for posts, camps, and stations having a troop population of 2,000 or more, not including troops for which information-education personnel are otherwise organically provided (regiments, groups, divisions, training centers, and hospital bed capacities), will include not less than one officer in the grade of captain or above who will be designated an information-education officer; and not less than one enlisted man, technician, grade 5, assistant to the information-education officer. In determining troop population of a post, camp, or station for the purpose of interpreting this circular, United States military prisoners and troops physically distant who are under the station command will be included. In case the number of troops is too large for the efficient functioning of this officer, the number will be increased with commensurate distribution of grades, on the basis of one additional officer and one additional enlisted man for each 2,000 additional troops.

(b) In posts, camps, and stations having a troop population of less than 2,000, not including troops for which information-education personnel are otherwise organically provided (regiments, groups, divisions, training centers, and hospital bed capacities), a qualified officer other than chaplain will be designated by the post commander as information-education officer, in addition to other duties.
e. Some of interior hospitals, except Army Air Forces hospitals.—The supervision of orientation, information, and education functions relating to hospital patients by service command headquarters will be performed by reconditioning divisions and reconditioning personnel. Orientation, information, and education functions for general and station hospitals, except Army Air Forces hospitals, will be conducted or directly supervised as follows:

1. In hospitals with authorized bed capacities of less than 250, those functions for hospital patients will be performed by personnel within current allotments, assigned to reconditioning duties; and for operating personnel by personnel provided in §(2) (a) and (6) above.

2. Hospitals with authorized bed capacities of 250 to 500 are authorized one officer, information-education, in addition to current allotments, who will conduct or directly supervise orientation, information, and education functions for both hospital patients and hospital operating personnel, and who will also serve as educational reconditioning officer.

3. In hospitals with authorized bed capacities in excess of 500, those functions for both hospital patients and operating personnel will be performed by the educational reconditioning officer. Where the total authorized hospital bed capacity plus the authorized strength of hospital operating personnel is in excess of 2,000, current allotments will be increased by one officer, information-education, who will conduct or directly supervise the functions of orientation, information, and education for hospitals operating personnel and who will assist the educational reconditioning officer in the conduct and/or supervision of those functions for hospital patients.

4. Enlisted personnel may be utilized in the conduct of the functions of orientation, information, and education.

f. Overseas.

1. Staff sections.—Theater, department, base, defense (including defense commands in the continental limits of the United States), and comparable overseas commanders will establish staff divisions or sections within their headquarters and assign information-education and education personnel to such staff sections within their current allotments. They will be entitled “information and education” division, branch, or section, as appropriate. The organization of information-education in the continental United States, especially as it provides orientation, information, and education channels from major echelons to the regimental level, will be followed so far as practicable for organization overseas. It is deemed of utmost importance that the chief staff officer assigned to orientation, information, and education duties have access in reporting on matters of policy and control to the commander and the chief of staff, corresponding to the relationship of the Director, Information and Education Division, to the Chief of Staff. (See par. 5a (1).)

2. Task forces and comparable commands.—In task force, defense, island, base, and similar overseas commands where miscellaneous troops of Army Ground, Air, and/or Service Forces are gathered together under one command to accomplish special missions or objectives, the commanding officer thereof is authorized to designate one information-education officer in the grade of not less than captain and one
enlisted assistant, technician, grade 6, per each 2,000 troops not
organized into regiments, equivalent or higher units. Each officer
will assume the mission, perform the duties, and, as far as practi-
cable, have the qualifications of information-education officers as
noted forth in paragraph 6.
6. Ports of Embarkation.—Port commanders are authorized to establish an
information and education branch under the director of personnel of the port
with a branch chief, in the grade of major and with assistant information-
education officers in the grade of captain, on the basis of one for each 2,000
permanently assigned troops under the port commander, and with such enlisted
and/or civilian personnel as are required to carry out the mission and functions
of the branch. This branch will be charged with the mission and functions of
orientation, information, and education as stated in paragraph 9 as far as it
pertains to operating military personnel of the port and to troops passing through
the port, including those in staging areas, casual detachments, and other installa-
tions and organizations assigned to the port. This personnel will not be charged
with overseas supply functions of the port. In addition to the duties enumerated
in paragraph 9, the port information-education branch will be charged with:
(1) Developing orientation, information, and education programs and de-
veloping material therefor specially adapted for presentation to
transient troops while under the command of the port commander.
(2) Briefing information-education officers of units passing through the
port and other such officers who will conduct or exercise supervision
over officers conducting orientation, information, and education pro-
grams; instructing them in the use of materials and advising them of
problems peculiar to ports of embarkation, staging areas, and trans-
ports with which they will be confronted; and instructing and
assisting them in the solution of such problems. (See par 7)
A. Training centers, including replacement training centers and Army Service
Forces training centers.
(1) Allotments for training centers, including replacement training
centers, Army Service Forces training centers, and officer candidate
schools will include not less than one officer who will be designated
as information-education officer and who will normally be included
in the G-3 or S-3 section of the training center headquarters. En-
listed assistants will be allotted in the number indicated in table 1
under the column for “AAF Command and Division Headquarters.”
In addition, one officer and one enlisted man will be authorized for
each 13,000 troops, or major fraction thereof, in excess of the first
13,000.
(2) Training regiments, including provisional training regiments, will in-clude
information-education officers and enlisted personnel as numbers as provided in b above.
4. Education officers.—Education officers are on duty presently in head-
dquarters, departments, service commands, and in similar headquarters.
B. Mission, duties, and qualifications of information-education officers.—
6. Mission.—To assist the commanding officer in creating and maintaining in
every officer and enlisted man a feeling of individual responsibility for participa-
tion in the war and to strengthen his efficiency as a soldier by increasing his
understanding as to why we fight, keeping him informed as to the course of the
war enabling it that he has ready access to news of the world, and giving him

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as opportunity to add to his military effectiveness and individual competence through instruction and opportunity for study.

b. Duties.

(1) General.—To study and report to the commanding officer on conditions affecting morale within the command; to exercise staff supervision over all orientation, information, and education activities and functions, including training and briefing of officers assigned to conduct programs required during duty time in lower echelons; to coordinate all orientation, information, and education programs within the command; and to arrange that facilities for orientation, information, and education are made known and available to all personnel of the command.

(2) Orientation.

(a) To organize and supervise the conduct of the Army Orientation Course, and to obtain from available military sources such definitions of the military mission as are related to orientation and the Army Orientation Course.

(b) To prepare and circulate materials for use in the Army Orientation Course and related orientation activities.

(c) To maintain a current orientation center, or centers, containing files and library materials relating to the subject matter and principles of orientation.

(d) To provide camp and unit newspapers with materials relating to orientation.

(e) To arrange for and present lectures and motion pictures showings relative to orientation and to initiate, supervise, and guide voluntary orientation activities relating to morale.

(f) To obtain materials for and to disseminate news summaries.

(g) To organize and provide for conducting orientation meetings for officers.

(3) Information

(a) To arrange that the information services and facilities made available by the War Department are used to the fullest extent.

(b) To arrange for showing of informational films in compliance with War Department directives.

(c) To arrange circulation and display of orientation, information, and education posters, and distribution of orientation, information, and education pamphlets.

(d) To arrange proper distribution of pocket guides to foreign countries to personnel of units after leaving a port of embarkation.

(e) To supervise and/or cooperate in the publication of unit newspapers and the utilization of Camp Newspaper Service, and outside the continental limits of the United States, where applicable, the Army News Service.

(f) To supervise the operation of radio, public address, and carrier installations, where furnished, utilizing, outside the continental limits of the United States, radio transcriptions of the Armed Forces Radio Service, Army News Service, and special programs.
(g) To stimulate interest in Yank, the Army weekly, and assist in its promotion and distribution.
(h) To stimulate interest in Newsmap, and assist in its application and distribution.
(i) To encourage military personnel in the field to submit to the Information-education officer ideas and materials suitable for use in information and education division publications, motion pictures, and radio scripts, and to forward these ideas and materials, where approved, through channels, to the Director, Information and Education Division, Army Service Forces.
(j) To arrange for the regular showing of "G. I. Movie Weekly."

(4) Education.

(a) To learn the educational interest and needs of military personnel of the command and plan suitable programs of class instruction; to arrange for necessary classroom space and equipment, and obtain the services of qualified instructors.
(b) To facilitate enrollment of military personnel in the program offered by the United States Armed Forces Institute, and to arrange that this program is made known to all military personnel of the command.
(c) To supervise the planning and conduct of off-duty group discussion on subjects of general interest.
(d) To make suitable arrangements for obtaining adequate supplies of discussion pamphlets, textbooks, and other instructional materials.
(e) To arrange for the recording and accrediting of educational achievements of military personnel through the United States Armed Forces Institute.

(5) Qualified.—Information-education officers will be selected on the basis of their understanding of and belief in the mission of orientation, information, and education as described in this circular; their understanding of the importance of all components of the Army including those stationed in the zone of interior; and their ability to present their views clearly and convincingly. It is particularly desirable that information-education officers, at the regimental level, have experience with troops as company, platoon, or similar organizational commanders. Officers selected for this duty should have a background of training or experience as instructors or interpretive writers, and should be able to relate the current discussion topic to the personal interest of the individual. A carefully selected information-education officer can be of invaluable assistance to the commander; a weak officer may do irreparable harm. Where practicable, information-education officers will be selected from among the officers already assigned to the unit or organization in which they will serve, and will be trained in orientation, information, and education at training establishments approved by the War Department within the continental United States or by theater or department commanders outside the continental United States.

10. Funds.—c. As the Army Orientation Course (see sec. III) is a training course authorized during duty time, applicable training funds may be expended for the construction of visual aids, displays, and exhibits.

d. Nonappropriated funds governed by AR 210-50, may properly be used for financing such orientation, information, and education functions, and activities.
will contribute to the comfort, pleasure, contentment, mental improvement, and general welfare of military personnel.

VI. SUPERVISION.—11. Responsibility.—Pending revision of AR 170-10 (Service Commands and Departments) and MB 1-40 (Enlisted), commanding generals of service commands will be responsible for supervision of orientation, information, and education activities at classes I, II, III, and VII installations, including supply of materials, except as provided in section VI.

VI. MATERIALS.—12. General.—Materials furnished by the Information and Education Division for use by operating personnel in the field are for the most part of such a nature as to require special issue and distribution.

13. Educational materials.—a. Individual instruction materials.—Individual instruction materials (correspondence courses and self-teaching courses) are available to eligible military personnel upon application for enrollment by individuals to the United States Armed Forces Institute, Madison, Wisconsin, or to the nearest branch (see d below).

b. Class instruction materials.—Text books and other instructional materials, except as noted in c below, are normally obtainable on requisition submitted through military channels to the United States Armed Forces Institute, Madison, Wisconsin, except that outside the continental United States requisitions will be submitted to the department or theater branch of the United States Armed Forces Institute in accordance with department or theater directives. In departments and theaters which do not include USAFI branches, requisitions will be forwarded through military channels to the appropriate port of embarkation, whence they will be forwarded (unfilled) to USAFI.

c. Exceptions to b above are Foreign Language Guides (TM 30-300 series) and Foreign Language Recordings which are distributed through The Adjutant General's Office, and "G. I. Movie Weekly" (see d below).

d. References.—Section VI, Circular No. 68, War Department, 1944; AR 350-8100; the United States Armed Forces Institute Catalog, Second Edition; Memorandum No. W210-23-43, 31 August 1943, subject, "G. I. Movies"—16-mm Circuit System; and Circular No. 232, War Department, 1942.

14. Orientation materials.—a. Periodic issues of collections of orientation materials and weekly Army Talk fact sheets are prepared or selected by the Information and Education Division, for use by Information-education officers in carrying out the provisions of paragraphs 7, 8, and 9. The issue of collections of materials will be announced by War Department circulars. These materials will be considered as operating and training equipment for information-education officers. (See sec. II, Cit. 251, sec. 1, Cit. 350, and sec. I, Cit. 302, WD, 1943; and sec. II, Cit. 38; sec. I, Cit. 172, and sec. I, Cit. 534, WD, 1944.)

b. Distribution of issues of orientation materials will be made by the Information and Education Division direct to the following agencies by whom further distribution will be made as indicated:

(1) To Headquarters, Army Ground Forces; to headquarters of armies, corps, and other commands of the Army Ground Forces for distribution to headquarters and headquarters company.

(2) To divisions, separate brigades, harbor defense commands, training centers, and headquarters of army and corps troops of the Army Ground Forces, for distribution to all units and organizations within the command.
(8) To headquarters Army Air Forces; to headquarters of air forces and
commands of the Army Air Forces, for distribution to headquarters
and headquarters squadron.

(4) To headquarters overseas theaters and departments. The basis for
distribution in each theater or department to be determined separ-
ately by the theater or department commander and the War
Department.

(5) To United States Military Academy, for distribution to all units,
organizations, and installations within the command.

(6) To Headquarters Army Service Forces; to posts, camps, and stations
in the continental United States—
(a) Classes I, II, and IV installations for distribution to all
units and organizations of the Army Service Forces located
thereon.
(b) Class III installations, for distribution to all units and organi-
zations of the Army Air Forces located thereon.

(2) To War Department General Staff.

15. Information materials.—Information materials are distributed by the In-
f ormation and Education Division, as prescribed from time to time by War De-
partment directives; by the Adjutant General, as stated in P M 21-6. List of
Publications For Training, and through film libraries as described in FM 21-7.
List of Training Films, Film Strips, and Film Bulletins. (See sec. IV, Cir. 388,
WD, 1942; sec. II, Cir. 55, sec. I, Cir. 247, WD, 1943; sec. IV, Cir. 20, sec. 111,
Cir. 86, WD, 1944; WD Pamphlet 20-3, Guide to the Use of Information Ma-
terials, 1943; Memo, W 310-10-43, Distribution and Promotion of Yank, the Army
Weekly, within continental United States, 25 Mar. 1943, and C 1, thereto; Memo,
W 850-238-43, Army Orientation Course, 30 Aug. 1943.)

16. Use.—Unit commanders are not restricted to the use of orienta-
tional, or educational material provided by the War Department. These
may be augmented by such additional materials as seem necessary or desirable.
The responsibility for keeping the selection and use of supplementary material
within the provision of War Department policies and directives, however, lies
solely with commanding officers.

VII. REASSERTION.—17. Previous instructions.—5. Circular No. 261 and
section I, Circular No. 300, War Department, 1943; section VII, Circular No. 29,
War Department, 1944, and Memorandum No. W 701-28, 28 Feb. 1943.

subject, Army Orientation Course, are cancelled.

b. Provisions of SM 2-10, FM 100-10, FM 101-5, TM 10-20, TM 21 and
Memorandum No. W 810-44, 26 January 1944 (limited distributions), in con-
ict with instructions contained in this circular are modified accordingly, pre-
cluding publication of changes.

[A. G. 029 (21 Aug 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.
Mr. McManus. I made an analysis of the recommended materials for reading for the indoctrination of the troops, and I found that of 39 books recommended for reading, 22 were published by the Institute of Public Relations.

On page 10, the recommendations include a pamphlet, Know Your Enemy, by Anthony Jenkinson. On page 12, Wartime China, another pamphlet, by Maxwell Stewart. The Making of Modern China, by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore.


Know Your Enemy: Japan, is again mentioned in the 15-week course.

Page 16, Pacific Islands in War and Peace, IPR, by Marie Keesing. Again, Asia’s Captive Colonies, by Lilienthal and Oakie.

Korea Looks Ahead, IPR, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev, G-r-a-j-d-a-n-z-e-v, the way I remember. Peoples of the China Sea, by Elizabeth A. Clark.

Page 17, Speaking of India, IPR, by Miriam S. Farley. Again, Peoples of the China Sea.

Twentieth Century India, IPR, by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goslar.

Our Far Eastern Record, IPR, Rockwood and Brody.

Our Job in the Pacific, by Henry A. Wallace.


Mr. Carpenter. Just a moment. Now, were these documents the reading material you just read, all IPR-recommended publications?

Mr. McManus. Yes, they were in these kits, as I described before:

In this kit you will find the orientation training program for the Army Service Forces. The program consists of—such and such a number of hours.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you state for the record the conclusions drawn by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee after 11 months of hearings with reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Mandel. The conclusions drawn by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee after its investigations are as follows:

The IPR has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda, and military intelligence.

The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources.

The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives.

Many of the persons active in and around the IPR, and in particular though not exclusively Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, Frederick V. Field, T. A. Bisson, Lawrence K. Rosinger, and Maxwell Stewart, knowingly and deliberately used the language of books and articles which they wrote or edited in an attempt to influence the American public by means of pro-Communist or pro-Soviet content of such writings.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have a purchase contract which you would like to put in the record at this time?
Mr. Mandel. I have a letter addressed to Senator Pat McCarran, dated November 26, 1951, from Frank H. Weitzel, Acting Comptroller General of the United States, showing the contracts for IPR publications published by the Armed Forces. And I ask that that be placed in the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become part of the record in full.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 410," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 410
EXHIBIT NO. 1346-L
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, November 26, 1951.

Hon. Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

My Dear Mr. Chairman: Further reference is made to your letters dated September 27 and 28, 1951, acknowledged October 2, 1951, furnishing a list of Government contracts entered into with the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and requesting the titles of the publications and the number thereof ordered under said contracts.

In accordance with your request there is submitted herewith a report compiled from the records of this Office showing the number of copies ordered under said contracts, with the exception of contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, and the titles of the publications, which are identified with the specific contract involved. With respect to contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, I have to advise that said contract covered not only the publications ordered by the Department of the Army, but, also, provided that the contract "may be utilized by any Government bureau, instrumentality or agency desiring to participate in same," and this Office has no centralized record of the titles of the publications and the number thereof ordered under the contract.

I trust that the otherwise available information contained in the enclosure will serve the purpose of your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

Frank H. Weitzel,
Acting Comptroller General of the United States.

Enclosure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract number</th>
<th>Number of copies</th>
<th>Title of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N140s-99790</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Know Your Enemy: Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-1445-QM-2230</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Far Eastern Record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Know Your Enemy.</td>
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<td>118</td>
<td>China America's Ally.</td>
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<td>118</td>
<td>Meet The Anzacs.</td>
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<td>118</td>
<td>Asia's Captive Colonies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N140s-15198A</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Alaska Comes of Age.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Changing China.</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>Land of the Soviets.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Peoples of the China Seas.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Modern Japan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N0m-41776</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bibliography of Pacific Area Maps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N140s-28522A</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Speaking of India.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N140s-40000A</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Wartime China.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N140s-60197A</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Know Your Enemy: Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N140s-72028A</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Wartime China.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Our Job in the Pacific.</td>
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<td>26,000</td>
<td>Speaking of India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Asia's Captive Colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,955</td>
<td>Pacific Islands in War and Peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>War on Japan.</td>
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</table>
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, what does the record of the IPR hearings have to say with reference to the pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, by Henry A. Wallace?

Mr. Mandel. It shows that the draft for the pamphlet, according to the testimony of Mr. Wallace, was drawn by Eleanor Lattimore, and the original plan for this project was proposed by Frederick V. Field. This is in the testimony of Mr. Dennett, a former secretary of the IPR.

Mr. Carpenter. What does the record show in the IPR hearings regarding Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. Mandel. Lawrence Rosinger invoked the fifth amendment when he was asked about his Communist associations.

Mr. Carpenter. Now we will proceed to the next document.

Mr. McManus. This is Guide to the Use of Information Materials. The foreword, under II:

This pamphlet is an outline of principle to govern the use of ideas so that they may become more effective weapons in the war.
At the top of page 7, under the caption "The Home Front," this passage appears:

Only a naive minority finds it necessary to believe that present democracy is the best of all possible worlds, and those who believe otherwise do not draw assurance from being kept in the dark.

Page 19: This is under the caption "Our Allies, the U. S. S. R."

Whether their present government is the kind of political system that is most satisfactory to the Russian people has been sufficiently answered by a war in which the political faith of the people as well as of the Armed Forces has stood the trial by fire.

The Russians are under attack: they are fighting to maintain their right to determine how they shall be governed. Though we do not agree with their political ideas (and they do not believe in ours), we believe utterly in the defense of the principle for which they are fighting.

The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the U. S. S. R.'s 1939 attack on Finland and subsequent overrunning of the Baltic provinces were barehanded aggressions motivated by greed for territory or were done to strengthen the U. S. S. R.'s western frontiers against attack by Germany. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the U. S. S. R. defense when the attack actually fell. Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U. S. S. R. not acted so, the allied cause would be weaker today.

Another paragraph:

The Moscow Pact, one of the strongest allied acts of the war, recognizes as a first condition of peace the protracted cooperation of all the allies. In view of this agreement, anything written or said that tends to alienate the U. S. S. R. from the United States may be counted as a self-inflicted wound.

Page 22, under the heading "Terminology."

Speak of the Red Army and the Red Navy, not the Russian Army. Speak of Communists, when use of the word is necessary, but of Bolsheviks only when using its historical connotation. Say the U. S. S. R. or the Soviet Union when referring to that country as it has existed since 1917. Say Russia only when taking a long view of the national history, as, for example; "Both Napoleon and Hitler have invaded Russia." It is preferable to speak of the Battle of the U. S. S. R. rather than of the Battle of Russia, though it is proper to speak of the Russian language. To use the words "Red soldier" is correct. "Russian soldier" is incorrect.

The Chairman. How do you interpret that, Mr. McManus?

Mr. McManus. Well, I think it is indoctrination, and according to my recollection—and I think Mr. Mandel has a clearer recollection of this—the Communist line at about the time this pamphlet was written was to make people think that the Russians were doing well in the war because of the Communist system.

The Chairman. It was the Red soldier, and not the Russian soldier. They wanted to leave the impression that it was communism that made them successful in the war. Is that a fair interpretation?

Mr. McManus. I think so; yes, sir.

Now I have some of this material from Camp Swift, that is pretty long. I will not read all of it. This is the Daily News Bulletin, Post Information and Education Office, Camp Swift, Tex., November 21, 1944.

Mr. Carpenter. That is a group of papers, is it not?

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. It is the Daily News mimeographed job that we all used to get.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have one dated November 25, 1944?

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find a statement there as follows:

U. S. R. land and naval forces have completed the liberation of Estonia, and Red armies are now concentrating on the liberation of Latvia.

Mr. McManus. That is what date?
Mr. Carpenter. That is November 25, 1944.
Mr. McManus. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Now, turning to April 28, 1945, do you have that?
Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find the advertisement of a “Win the Peace Rally”?
Mr. McManus. I do, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you state whether or not the “Win the Peace Conference,” has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General?

Mr. Mandel. The “Win the Peace Conference” or the “Win the Peace Rally”—as it was known by various names—has been cited by the Attorney General, and the date of such citation is June 1, 1948.

Mr. Carpenter. Now, do you have an edition of May 19, 1945?
Mr. McManus. I do.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you have a reference to “Premier Stalin Clarifies Certain Issues”?

Mr. McManus. The one I have refers to Chinese partisans.
Oh, yes. I have it.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you have one of May 1, 1945?
Mr. McManus. I do.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find a statement there devoted to “Tito Eases Tension Over Austria”?

Mr. McManus. I do.
Mr. Carpenter. And at that time Tito was in the Communist camp?
Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. On June 2, 1945—do you have that?
Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find a section devoted to “Soviets Add Peace Demands as French Reject British-U. S. Negotiations”?

Mr. McManus. I do.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you have June 18, 1945?
Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find this statement:

Two days after the opening of the second Moscow conference, where Poland’s provisional government is being broadened * * * 15 of the 16 Polish defendants have admitted charges that some of them turned state’s evidence.

Mr. McManus. I do, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find there a section devoted to “Fourteen Poles Admit Government Plots Against the Soviets”?

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Now, do you find in an undated publication from the same source, that is, from Camp Swift, the heading, “Fascism Against Communism”?

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you find this quote:

* * * almost as great as the size of the Soviet Union is our ignorance about it.

Mr. McManus. Do you have the page?
Mr. Carpenter. That is an undated memorandum.

Mr. McManus. I have it; yes.

Mr. Carpenter. Now, from your observation of those, Mr. McManus, what is your opinion relative to that newspaper that was published at Camp Swift?

Mr. McManus. Well, it would demonstrate an effort to indoctrinate along the Communist line as described by the witness this morning, Captain Kerr, it seems to me. I think these documents substantiate what he said about efforts to indoctrinate. There are other parts of this "fascism versus communism." For instance, there are extensive quotations from the Soviet constitution, and a great effort to disassociate Communist tyranny from Fascist tyranny and make one white and the other black.

Mr. Carpenter. I have here several pamphlets and ask where you received those, if you did.

Mr. McManus. These are the pamphlets supplied to the committee by Mr. Berry and Mr. Simonds and the Department of the Army.

They are the pamphlets whose names I just read. They are part of the instruction kit in the information and education course.

The Chairman. Those pamphlets may be incorporated in the record by reference.

Mr. Carpenter. Will you identify them, please?

Mr. McManus. "War-time China" by Maxwell S. Stewart.

"Pacific Islands in War and Peace,"—

Mr. Carpenter. Excuse me, but are these all IPR pamphlets?

Mr. McManus. I will look them over, and if there are any others I will take them out.

All of these are.

The Chairman. Will you identify them, so that we may have them identified and so that they may be incorporated in the record by reference?

Mr. McManus. Speaking of India, by Miriam S. Farley.

Twentieth Century India, by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshar, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Filipinos and Their Country, by Catherine Porter.

Cooperation for What?, by F. R. Scott.

Peoples of the China Seas, by Elizabeth Allerton Clark, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Asia's Captive Colonies, by Philip E. Lilienthal and John H. Oakie.

Know Your Enemy: Japan, by Anthony Jenkinson.

China's Wartime Politics, by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Korea Looks Ahead, by Andrew J. Grajdanev.

Our Far Eastern Record, A Reference Digest on American Policy.

That is a bibliography, I guess.

Pacific Islands in War and Peace, by Marie M. Keesing.

Wartime China, by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the record that I have been given access to the library of the I. and E., the Department of the Army, when I asked for these documents. They gave me access, and I have the freedom of going through the library, and they have been very cooperative with me.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McManus.
At this time we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow, at which time we will continue this series of hearings. We will have witnesses tomorrow, including the men who actually prepared the fact sheets for this orientation work, later developed into Army Talks, as I believe they called it, and also the program director. They will be witnesses tomorrow.

We will stand in recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 3 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Wednesday, July 7, 1954.)
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.
Present also: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel to the subcommittee; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert C. McManus, professional staff member.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Will Dr. Schreiber come forward, please?

Mr. Fanelli. I am his counsel. He does not desire his picture taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not hear you.

Mr. Fanelli. He does not desire his picture to be taken.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Will you be sworn to testify, Doctor?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you swear that the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Schreiber. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DR. JULIUS SCHREIBER, WASHINGTON, D. C., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH A. FANELLI, ATTORNEY AT LAW, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated here, Doctor.

Will you state your full name?

Dr. Schreiber. My name is Dr. Julius Schreiber.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you reside?

Dr. Schreiber. I live at 4418 Ellicott Street NW., Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business or profession?

Dr. Schreiber. I am a psychiatrist.

The CHAIRMAN. You are here this morning with counsel?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?
Mr. Fanelli. It is Joseph A. Fanelli. I am a member of the District of Columbia bar, with law offices at 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D. C.

The Chairman. Thank you.

You may proceed with the questioning of Dr. Schreiber.

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, were you a member of the Armed Forces during World War II?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please give the committee the dates of your service?

Dr. Schreiber. I served from April 27, 1942, until I began my terminal leave on July 4, 1945, completing my terminal leave on October 30, 1945.

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank during service?

Dr. Schreiber. I came in as a captain and I left as a lieutenant colonel.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a Reserve officer when you came on duty?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first receive a Reserve commission?

Dr. Schreiber. I think it was in the summer of 1933, in the Medical Corps.

Mr. Carpenter. Had you any prior service, prior to coming in World War II?

Dr. Schreiber. Just some Reserve officer duty, yes, sir. You mean Regular Army?

Mr. Carpenter. Any Army duty.

Dr. Schreiber. Yes. I had Reserve officer Army duty. I was with the Civilian Conservation Corps.

Mr. Carpenter. For how long?

Dr. Schreiber. From the summer of 1933 until January of 1936.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the Information and Education Division during your service?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Carpenter. What period was that?

Dr. Schreiber. You are speaking of the Information and Education Division of the War Department?

Mr. Carpenter. That is right.

Dr. Schreiber. I was there from October 25, 1943, until June 28, I believe is the date, 1945, at which time I began processing for my terminal leave which, as I said before, began on the 4th of July.

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you here a chart of the Information and Education Division, and ask you if this describes your position in the Information and Education Division?

Dr. Schreiber. This chart that you have handed me is a chart of the Orientation Branch of the Information and Education Division, and I think it represents—let me just finish it, please. [Dr. Schreiber examining document.]

I don’t understand the two blocks at the base of the chart, the Report and Analysis Unit. I don’t know what that means, nor the New York unit. We had a Pilot Programs Unit which was stationed in New York. The Division liaison with the Surgeon General’s Office is not quite accurate, because the Surgeon General’s Office had their own liaison officer to our Division. I assume it might have been implied, since I was a doctor.
Exhibit No. 411
INFORMATION & EDUCATION DIVISION, A. S. F.
ARMY ORIENTATION BRANCH

The chart referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 411," and is as follows:
Redistribution stations may have been one of my functions. The basic fact was that I was Chief of the Programs Section.

Mr. Carpenter. You were Chief of the Programs Section?
Dr. Schreiber. Yes; that is right.
Do you want this back?
Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank and duties as Chief of the Programs Section?
Dr. Schreiber. I came in as a major, and, as I told you, I left as a lieutenant colonel. The basic mission of the Programs Section was—it was a long time back—was basically to sell the idea of morale or Army orientation to commanders in the field, to help them to understand why it was essential that men who were risking their lives had some understanding of why they were fighting.

The Division itself, as you know, produced a great deal of material—films, publications, Yank Magazine, Stars and Stripes, and in our Branch, the Branch produced a publication called Army Talks.

There was a school, as I told you in executive session, at Lexington, where orientation or I. and E. officers were trained in the techniques of carrying out the I. and E. program.

My mission, at least at the beginning when I got there, was just getting acquainted. I got there the latter part of October, and I had November and December to get oriented. But in January and February of 1944, our mission was to take a pilot team to the various service commands and there demonstrate how orientation is to be conducted. My main task was to talk with the commanding officer of the post and his staff, to give them psychological reasons why conscious motivation was important in war. It was recognized that unless there is high morale, there is a danger of psychiatric casualties.

It was repeatedly shown that men who didn’t know why they were risking their lives cracked up. It was clear unless a man could feel that he had a purpose, a sense of mission.

The program itself had six categories. One was called Know Why We Fight. Second, Know Your Allies. Third, Know Your Enemies. Fourth, Know the News and Its Significance. Fifth, Have Pride in Your Outfit and Your Personal Mission. Sixth, Have Faith in the United States and Its Future.

All of our activity was directed toward the fulfillment of these six major categories.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has an exhibit here he wants to read, and I will ask you questions about it when he finishes.

Mr. Mandel. I have here “Recommendation for Promotion of Officer,” dated January 5, 1945, from the Chief of the Army Orientation Branch to the Director of Information and Education Division. It concerns Julius Schreiber. It describes his position.

A. Position vacancy now occupied and to be occupied: Lieutenant colonel, Army Orientation Branch, Information and Education Division.

B. Mission of Army Orientation Branch: The mission of the Army Orientation Branch as stated in Cfr 360 WD 1944, is “To formulate policies, plan and supervise procedures for orientation of military personnel in the background, causes, and current phase of the war and current events relating thereto, and for eventual return to civilian life; to prepare and select War Department materials for these purposes, including motion-picture film, recordings, pamphlets, Fact Sheets, books, maps, and other visual aids, and weekly reports of military and world events; and when practical to provide such other materials as may be requested for the special morale purposes or programs of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Services Forces.”
The orientation program is compulsory throughout the Army, both in the United States and in all overseas theaters. Not less than 1 undivided hour per week of normal training time is devoted to Army orientation.

Mr. Carpenter. Does that reflect your duties while you were Chief of the Programs Branch?

Dr. Schreiber. That reflects, I think quite accurately, the mission of the Orientation Branch, in which Branch I was Chief of the Programs Section. That was not the description of my duties.

Mr. Mandel. May I go on with the job description.

C. Job description: The officer has the following duties and responsibilities:

As Chief of the Programs Section, Major Schreiber plans orientation programs for such important specialized needs as those of recovered prisoners of war, AGF and ASF redistribution stations, staging areas and ports of embarkation, transports going overseas and returning, rehabilitation centers, replacement training centers, and overseas replacement depots. This involves close coordination with high-ranking officers of the WDGS, AAF, AGF, and ASF. This officer has demonstrated ability of an unusual order in establishing and maintaining sound policies of orientation in these specialized and difficult fields.

After planning the contents of these special programs, this officer directs the actual production of required materials, by a staff including 6 officers, 8 enlisted men, and 4 civilians. He has demonstrated judgment of a high order in his control and coordination of a vast amount of such production.

As liaison officer for the Information and Education Division with the Office of the Surgeon General, this officer is charged with a special set of extremely important and responsible duties in connection with the educational reconditioning and reorientation of sick and wounded personnel. This involves overall direction of a training program to instruct hospital personnel in conducting orientation for patients, directing the preparation of approximately 60 hours of material especially designed to meet hospital requirements, and the continuing coordination through service commands of the application of these programs.

As supervisor for the assignment and conduct of orientation pilot teams, this officer has the responsibility for maintaining close contact with the I. & E. Directors of AAF, AGF, and ASF, and filling the needs of various units and posts by sending out orientation instruction teams to conduct schools as required. Included in the personnel of these teams are 4 officers and 8 enlisted men.

During the frequent absence of the Chief of the Orientation Branch, this officer acts as Chief, attends conferences and handles the large number of official visitors to the Branch, handling a large variety of complex problems.

Among this officer's special duties is that of conducting 2 hours each week of orientation discussions for the 93 officers of the I. and E. Division. He also represents the I. and E. Division on a number of required speeches before large public bodies, especially those concerned with medical and psychiatric problems. In all his varied responsibilities and duties this officer makes an especially valuable contribution to the I. and E. Division by drawing upon his experience in civilian life as a professional psychiatrist.

The Chairman. That is the job description, is it not, Doctor?

Dr. Schreiber. It is certainly very complimentary. Now that I have heard this, I certainly had pretty much of this, practically everything that he has read. I was about to continue with my own job description when I was interrupted here, that the first 2 months, I told you, we did pilot teamwork. From there on out, I was in Washington for, I think, about a month, and then went on to the Pacific to assist Colonel Looker to set up his program in General Richardson's headquarters. That was April and May. We came back in June.

From there, sir, pretty much what is described here was my activity for the remaining year or more that I was in the Division.

The Chairman. That may go in the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 412" and is as follows:)}
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION OF OFFICER

FROM
Chief, Army Orientation Branch

TO
Director, Information and Education Division, Hqs. ASF

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER IS RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES:

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL
SCHREIDER, JULIUS (none)

ARMY SERIAL NUMBER
0-311100

ARM OR SERVICE
M.C.

BASIC COMPONENT
ORC

AGE
36 yrs, 4 mos.

A VACANCY IN GRADE AND ARM OR SERVICE EXISTS IN THIS COMMAND AND WILL EXIST AFTER THE PROMOTION OF ALL OTHER OFFICERS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED ON WHOSE RECOMMENDATIONS FINAL ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN.

POSITION DESCRIPTION

A. Position vacancy now occupied and to be occupied:
   Lieutenant Colonel, Army Orientation Branch, Information & Education Division.

B. Mission of Army Orientation Branch:
   The mission of the Army Orientation Branch as stated in Cir 360 WD 1944, is "To formulate policies, plan and supervise procedures for orientation of military personnel in the background, causes, and current phase of the war and current events relating thereto, and for eventual return to civilian life; to prepare and select War Department materials for these purposes, including motion picture film, recordings, pamphlets, fact sheets, books, maps, and other visual aids, and weekly reports of military and world events; and when practicable to provide such other materials as may be requested for the special morale purposes or programs of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces."
   The Orientation Program is compulsory throughout the Army, both in the U.S. and in all overseas theaters. Not less than one undivided hour per (continued on Sheet A)

FOR A PERIOD OF 15 MONTHS THIS OFFICER HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED HIS FITNESS FOR THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE POSITION AND GRADE FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED. COMPLETE FOLLOWING ITEMS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS OR SINCE E.A.D., IF LESS THAN TWO YEARS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty and Assignment</th>
<th>Unit or Station</th>
<th>Incl. Dates</th>
<th>manner of performance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward Surgeon, Neuro-Psychiatrist Neuro-Psychiatrist Orientation Officer - Chf, Programs Section, Orientation Br., I&amp;E Div.</td>
<td>SCU 1953 AARTC Cpt Callan SS Div, Hqs ASF and I&amp;E Division</td>
<td>Apr 27 to Oct 31, 1942 Nov 9, 42 to Oct 22, 43 Oct 25, 43 to date</td>
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**Military Experience Prior to Current Tour of Active Duty**

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<th>Type of Service</th>
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<th>Highest Grade</th>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>No. of Years</th>
<th>Highest Grade</th>
<th>Date of E.A.O.</th>
<th>Current Tour</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**Education**

- Graduated 1933
- 8 months B.S. & M.D.
- Degrees in Medicine, Neuro-Psychiatry, Neurology
- Maj or specialty: Neuro-Psychiatry
- Maj or specialty: Neurology

**Civilian Occupation - Title and Name of Company**

- Neuro-psychiatrist, Stockton State Hospital, Calif; full time clinda & research in nervous & mental diseases. Chief of Shock Therapy Division.
- 7 years home & board of family

**Remarks**

- There is no Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel of the appropriate arm or service on the strength returns of this Division, in pools or other assignments, who is surplus, or is otherwise available for assignment to the position for which promotion is recommended.

- LIVINGSTON WATROUS, Colonel G.S.C.
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

FROM

Director, Information & Education Div., ASF, Washington D.C.

TO

Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C.

DATE

5 January 1945

INDORSEMENTS

AR 605-12

1ST INDOREMENT

1. APPROVED

2. A VACANCY IN GRADE AND ARM OR SERVICE EXISTS IN THIS COMMAND AND WILL EXIST AFTER THE PROMOTION OF ALL OTHER OFFICERS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED ON WHOSE RECOMMENDATIONS FINAL ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN.

3. STATEMENT AS TO SURPLUS FIELD GRADE OFFICERS, IF APPLICABLE:

There is no Lt. Col., or Colonel of the appropriate arm or service on the strength returns of this Division, in pools or other assignments, who is surplus, or is otherwise available for assignment to the position for which promotion is recommended.

F. H. OSBORN

Major General

Director

Information & Education Division
Sheet A

C. Job description: The officer has the following duties and responsibilities:

As Chief of the Programs Section, Major Schreiber plans orientation programs for such important specialized needs as those of recovered prisoners of war, AGF and ASF redistribution stations, staging areas and ports of embarkation, transports going overseas and returning, rehabilitation centers, replacement training centers, and overseas replacement depots. This involves close coordination with high-ranking officers of the WDGS, AAF, AGF, and ASF. This officer has demonstrated ability of an unusual order in establishing and maintaining sound policies of orientation in these specialized and difficult fields.

After planning the contents of these special programs, this officer directs the actual production of required materials, by a staff including 6 officers, 8 enlisted men, and 4 civilians. He has demonstrated judgment of a high order in his control and coordination of a vast amount of such production.

As liaison officer for the Information and Education Division with the Office of the Surgeon General, this officer is charged with a special set of extremely important and responsible duties in connection with the educational reconditioning and reorientation of sick and wounded personnel. This involves overall direction of a training program to instruct hospital personnel in conducting orientation for patients, directing the preparation of approximately 60 hours of material especially designed to meet hospital requirements, and the continuing coordination through service commands of the application of these programs.

As supervisor for the assignment and conduct of orientation pilot teams, this officer has the responsibility for maintaining close contact with the I. and E. Directors of AAF, AGF, and ASF, and filling the needs of various units and posts by sending out orientation instruction teams to conduct schools as required. Included in the personnel of these teams are 4 officers and 8 enlisted men.

During the frequent absence of the Chief of the Orientation Branch, this officer acts as Chief, attends conferences, and handles the large number of official visitors to the branch, handling a large variety of complex problems.

Among this officer's special duties is that of conducting 2 hours each week of orientation discussions for the 93 officers of the I. and E. Division. He also represents the I. and E. Division on a number of required speeches before large public bodies, especially those concerned with medical and psychiatric problems. In all his varied responsibilities and duties this officer makes an especially valuable contribution to the I. and E. Division by drawing upon his experience in civilian life as a professional psychiatrist.

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United States?

Dr. Schreiber. I am not now a member of the Communist Party, and I have not been a member of the Communist Party since January 1, 1941. However, for the period prior to that date, I must respectfully decline, on the advice of counsel, to answer the question on the basis of the first and fifth amendments and all other constitutional rights available to me.

The Chairman. The committee, of course, does not recognize your refusal to answer under the first amendment of the Constitution. I believe you used that. But we do recognize your right to refuse to answer under the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you go to school, Doctor?

Dr. Schreiber. I went to the University of Cincinnati, both premedical and medical school.

Mr. Carpenter. You received degrees from the University of Cincinnati?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; bachelor of science, bachelor of medicine, and doctor of medicine.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America when you were a student in the University of Cincinnati?
Dr. Schreiber. Sir, I must decline to answer, respectfully, on the basis I have already cited.

The Chairman. The same ruling.

Mr. Carpenter. When did you graduate from the University of Cincinnati?

Dr. Schreiber. In 1932.

Mr. Carpenter. Then from 1932 to 1940, were you a member of the Communist Party of the United States?

Dr. Schreiber. Sir, I must respectfully decline to answer. The declining to answer goes back to the date of my birth, sir.

The Chairman. Doctor, I believe you testified earlier that in 1933 you went to work for the Government.

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. Yes; that is right.

The Chairman. In the CCC Division.

Dr. Schreiber. That is right. I was camp surgeon, as it was called. That was the terminology they employed.

The Chairman. Where were you assigned? Where was your assignment at that time?

Dr. Schreiber. It was in California. I think Camp Buck Meadow, I think it was called.

The Chairman. How long were you with the National Government in the CCC Division, the Civilian Conservation Corps?

Dr. Schreiber. From somewhere in the summer of 1933, I think July or August, something like that, to January of 1936.

The Chairman. January 1936. What did you do then?

Dr. Schreiber. I joined the staff of the Stockton State Hospital in Stockton, Calif., where I served as psychiatrist.

The Chairman. You no longer were connected with the Government in any way?

Dr. Schreiber. No.

The Chairman. Until the war?

Dr. Schreiber. I was no longer employed by the Government. I had my reserve commission.

The Chairman. I see. You no longer were active with the Government until you went into the armed services?

Dr. Schreiber. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. I believe you said you went into the armed services—

Dr. Schreiber. April 27, 1942.

The Chairman. April 27, 1942: When did you cease to be a member of the Communist Party?

Dr. Schreiber. Sir, I have stated from January 1, 1941, and there on after, I have not been a member of the Communist Party.

The Chairman. Did you resign?

Dr. Schreiber. May I ask my counsel, sir?

The Chairman. You may consult your counsel at any time, Doctor. (The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Dr. Schreiber. May I respectfully decline to answer on the same grounds stated.

The Chairman. Did you make any kind of a formal severance?

Dr. Schreiber. I am sorry, I must respectfully decline.

The Chairman. You want this committee to understand you were a Communist up to a certain time, and then you were no longer a
Communist, and yet you will not tell us how in the world you severed your connection with the Communist Party?

Dr. Schreiber. Sir, I would like this committee to understand that since January 1, 1941, I have not been a Communist; I am not now a Communist. During my entire Army career I was not a Communist. I participated in no Communist activities, I saw no Communist activities. I am thoroughly opposed to communism.

The Chairman. Doctor, don't you know it is a tactic of the Communist Party for their members to make a tactical withdrawal from the Communist Party when they go into the armed services? Don't you know that is the pattern of the Communist Party?

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know anything about the Communist Party tactics or activities, sir, at the present time.

The Chairman. You must know something about it. You decline to answer questions from the period 1933 on up to 1941.

Dr. Schreiber. I decline to answer from the moment of my birth until 1941, sir.

Will you give me the question? I am sorry. I would like to have it again.

The Chairman. Repeat the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter as follows:

Doctor, don't you know it is a tactic of the Communist Party for their members to make a tactical withdrawal from the Communist Party when they go into the armed services? Don't you know that is the pattern of the Communist Party?

The Chairman. You say you decline to answer any questions from the moment of your birth up to 1941?

Dr. Schreiber. On this question, sir.

The Chairman. All right. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you now or have you ever been connected with any organizations cited as subversive by the Attorney General or by any congressional committee?

Dr. Schreiber. The answer is "no" since January 1, 1941; and before that date, I must respectfully decline on the grounds already stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you responsible for any speech before the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, on March 25, 26, and 27, 1949?

Dr. Schreiber. As I told you in executive session, I was invited to give a talk on psychiatry or mental health and the social environment, and I brought the copy of the speech that you requested, and I would like to introduce it into the record. That was the only session that I attended. I spoke on the medical panel just once, Sunday morning, with I think three other physicians. One spoke on pediatrics, one spoke on general medicine, and I spoke on psychiatry.

The Chairman. It may go in the record by reference.

Mr. Fanelli. Mr. Chairman, this was requested.

The Chairman. It may go in the record by reference.

(The document referred to was filed with the subcommittee.)

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, would you characterize the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace?
Mr. Mandel. The Committee on Un-American Activities, in a report dated April 1949, on the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, said the following:

Parading under the imposing title of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, the gathering at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on March 25, 26, and 27, 1949, was actually a supermobilization of the inveterate wheelhorses and supporters of the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations.

The report says further:

The purpose of the Scientific and Cultural Conference can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. To provide a propagandist forum against the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Defense Pact, and American foreign policy in general.
2. To promote support for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
3. To mobilize American intellectuals in the field of arts, science, and letters behind this program even to the point of civil disobedience against the American Government.
4. To prepare the way for the coming World Peace Congress to be held in Paris on April 20 to 23, 1949, with similar aims in view on a world scale and under similar Communist auspices.
5. To discredit American culture and to extol the virtues of Soviet culture.

Dr. Schreiber. May I say, Mr. Mandel—

The Chairman. What was the date of that speech which just went into the record?

Dr. Schreiber. It was in April 1949, as Mr. Mandell read the date there.

The Chairman. You were appearing before that organization as a speaker in 1949?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yet you tell this committee that since January 1941, you had not been a member of the Communist Party?

Dr. Schreiber. I certainly do, sir, and I would like also to say that everything that he just read is certainly foreign to what I would have endorsed then, now, or from January 1, 1941. I spoke on psychiatry and social environment or mental health and social environment. I have done a great deal of research interesting to me and my colleagues in the field of the relationship between social phenomena and the emotional health of children and adults. I spoke entirely on scientific terms.

There was nothing in the thing that I spoke—I hope you take time to read it—that even under any conditions would be considered as pro-Communist, because it was a very thoroughly honest scientific paper.

Mr. Carpenter. Were there not Communists on this speakers' panel with you?

Dr. Schreiber. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have a reference?

Mr. Mandel. I have here the Daily Worker of March 30, 1949, page 9, which carries the speech of Richard Boyer at the scientific and cultural conference. In this speech Mr. Boyer openly says that he is an American Communist, that he speaks as a Communist, and he defends the Communist Party.

Dr. Schreiber. Mr. Mandel, in our executive session I pointed out to you, after you told me Mr. Boyer was a Communist, I asked you whether he was a physician. He was not a doctor. He did not par-
participate in our panel. I never heard of the guy before or since until I heard from Mr. Mandel. I never saw him. I went that Sunday morning to the health conference, whatever it was called, health panel. I went in and made my talk.

The Chairman. Who invited you to be there?

Dr. Schreiber. I don’t remember. The officials of the organization, I suppose.

The Chairman. You do not recall who invited you?

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir, I don’t.

The Chairman. In other words, Doctor, you just go to an organization on any kind of an invitation?

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir. I told Mr. Mandel and Counsel Carpenter at the time they asked me about it in the earlier session that I had been invited, and I assumed that I was invited on the basis of my interest and my work in mental health. I said at that time that I didn’t want to sound immodest, but I know I had achieved some status in my profession as somewhat an authority on the relationship between the social environment and mental health, and I welcomed the chance to talk.

I also pointed out that the then Under Secretary of State urged people to go who were not Communists, who were anti-Communists, and also to participate. This was in a telegram to Mr. Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review of Literature, who certainly spoke quite anti-Communist at that meeting.

I did not participate in any panel except the health panel Sunday morning.

The Chairman. Who was the Under Secretary of State that you have referred to?

Dr. Schreiber. I think his—it was in that official record. I think his name was—I don’t remember. I am sorry. Certainly it was in 1949.

The Chairman. The record will show that.

Mr. Carpenter. The Assistant Secretary of State didn’t ask you to attend this meeting, did he?

Dr. Schreiber. No. I didn’t even know the man. But I cite this as an example that the implication that everybody who went there was a Communist is utter nonsense and unfair.

Mr. Carpenter. But you are not able to tell this committee who invited you to speak at this meeting?

Dr. Schreiber. No. Whoever the officials were who were organizing the panel on mental health, I assume.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you attack the Communist Party at that meeting?

Dr. Schreiber. No, I had no occasion to. I gave a talk on mental health and the social environment. I was very ardently pointing out that to make our democracy work you have to insure mental health, and to insure mental health you have to make our democracy work, since the two are interdependent.

It is my view, frankly, that if our democracy works, the Communists lose any propaganda value they have through the suckers they pull in. I think we have to make our democracy work.

As a psychiatrist, I know that little kids growing up have to feel secure, have to find their way of believing in their way of life. T
think if the kids get a chance to believe, they are not susceptible to all sorts of nonsense propaganda that is pushed at them.

I believe very much that a functioning democracy and mental health are definitely interdependent.

The Chairman. We will put in the record the statement just referred to, and it will become a part of the record.

(The excerpt from the Daily Worker referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 413" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 413

[From the Daily Worker, New York, March 30, 1949]

Denounce War Plots

Excerpts from Addresses at the Cultural and Scientific Conference

(By Richard Boyer, magazine writer)

The great American writers have always held that the final court of last appeal is a man's own conscience. This is the essence of Emerson and Thoreau. Both declared that every policy, every principle, every program must be judged at least before the bar of private understanding. No man, they said, particularly the writer, can be absolved from individual responsibility. He can obtain no change of venue that takes the issues of the day—in our time, world peace or world destruction—from the court of his own conscience to some other tribunal which excuses him from the hard and painful duty of thinking for himself.

This is peculiarly true, it seems to me, of the American writer today, surrounded as he is by monopoly's press and radio, intent on convincing him that the highest patriotism rests in the destruction of Soviet socialism, apparently ready and willing to sacrifice 10 million American lives if only 20 million Russians can also be killed. No, if he would spare his country fascism and frightful war, the writer cannot safely surrender his conscience to the existentialists or T. S. Eliot, to Spellman or to Truman, to Hearst or the New York Times. Rather he must follow Emerson's dictum, "The root and seed of democracy is the doctrine, judge for yourself."

Communist View

I emphasize this Emersonian theme of individual responsibility as an American Communist. To the uniformed it may seem strange emphasis coming as it does from a Communist. While Communists fight for peace and brave Wall Street and jail for conscience's sake—and the world's sake—they are frequently described as regimented automatons bereft of free will. At the same time the obedient clerk, all aglow at Wall Street's virtues, is praised as an example of rugged individualism.

This nonsense is part of a world upside down in which plans for war become designs for peace. The fact is that Communist loyalty and Communist discipline is based on individual conscience and individual understanding. We want no other kind.

If a member of the Communist Party does not approve of our goal of peace and socialism and complete racial equality, we demand that he leave. If a member of the Communist Party does not agree, and deeply agree, that the most important issue in the world today is world peace, if he is not ready and eager to submerge all differences and cooperate with any and all forces sincerely seeking peace, we say his conscience does not place him in our ranks.

No Blind Allegiance

We ask no blind allegiance. Rather we ask that the intelligence be at its most tender and sensitive, that it transcend private interest and selfish advantage and take the peace of the world as its concern.

This is sound American ground if the words of Emerson and Thoreau still have meaning to the American ear. Both expressed the utmost scorn for that legality which included injustice. Both said, and explicitly said, that the very heart of American thought was that no act or policy of the government is binding on the individual unless it meets the requirements of his conscience. Both sought to be
citizens of the world and Thoreau declared, "I would remind my countrymen that they are to be men first and Americans only at a late and convenient hour." Both asserted it the duty of Americans to defy an American Government intent on imperialist war.

This theme of conscience, of individual responsibility apart from the engines of public opinion, was once an American truism among progressives. Thoreau phrased it trenchantly enough, after he had gone to jail for opposing an unjust war, when he said: "We should be men first and subject afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right." He wondered then that the state was so fearful of ideas that it jailed the men who had them. * * *

A FAMILIAR CHARGE

This charge of treason was a familiar one to both Emerson and Thoreau. Scare a colleague of theirs, from Whittier to Parker, from Alcott to Lowell, who had not been a target of that charge.

But there is a more basic likeness between their age and ours. Both times, theirs and ours, were stultified by the all-pervading lie that emasculates writers and paralyzes thought. Until writers of Emerson's time, not without pain and travail, broke through the all-embracing falsehood of their era, there was little creative activity. Writers then no more than now, could flourish in the climate of the widely believed and widely accepted social life. The withering falsehood that dried up the creative spring between the end of the Revolution and the rise of the Abolitionists, was the lie that chattel slavery was sacrilegious and benevolent and could only be attacked by traitors to the country.

"From 1790 to 1820," Emerson wrote in his journal, "there was not a book, a speech, a conversation, or a thought in the state." The great lie of our own age, the lie that also paralyzes and withers, the lie from which all other lies spring, the lie that turns black into white, virtue into evil and patriotism into treason, is the all-pervading, all-embracing falsehood that Communists are the possessors of some political original sin, some inherent, inbred, basic wickedness that puts them beyond the pale of honorable men.

The writers of Emerson's time not without suffering, broke through the stultifying falsehood of their day and when they did there was a golden age of American literature. American writers of our own day can do no less. * * *

Mr. Carpenter. Were you an incorporator of the National Institute of Social Relations?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you edit its magazine, Talk It Over, in 1946 and 1947?

Dr. Schreiber. I was a director of the organization. I saw every piece that the organization put out.

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you with the National Institute of Social Relations?

Dr. Schreiber. From the moment it was born until it died, so to speak. It was organized in—I think we incorporated, I am not sure of the date, late in 1945. Anyhow, we began in 1946, and then our funds ran out toward the end of 1948, I think December 1948.

Mr. Carpenter. This is a copy of the incorporation of the National Institute.

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 414" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 414

RECORdER OF DEEDS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

This is to certify that the pages attached hereto constitute a full, true, and complete copy of a certificate of incorporation of "National Institute of Social Relations, Inc.," dated the 1st day of February 1946, and recorded on the 5th day of February 1946 at 3:06 p.m., in Incorporation Liber No. 63, folio 288, as the same appears of record in this office.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of this office to be affixed, this the 5th day of May A. D. 1954.

[SEAL]

JOHN B. DUNCAN,
Recorder of Deeds, D. C.

BY ELEANOR D. WILKINS,
Deputy Recorder of Deeds, D. C.

No. 29497

Certificate of Incorporation of National Institute of Social Relations, Inc.

Know all men by these presents that we, the undersigned, all citizens of the United States, and a majority of whom are citizens and residents of the District of Columbia, do hereby associate ourselves as a body politic and corporation, pursuant to the provisions of Subchapter 6, Title 29 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia (1940), for the purpose hereinafter mentioned; and to that end we do hereby make, sign, acknowledge, and file this certificate as follows:

FIRST
The name of the corporation is “National Institute of Social Relations, Inc.”

SECOND
The duration of this corporation shall be perpetual.

THIRD
The particular business and objects of the corporation shall be:
(1) To promote a better understanding of human behavior and a fuller understanding of man's relationship to his fellow men, by the preparation of educational materials dealing with all aspects of social relations and by making available the personal services of experts in the field of adult and youth education. The materials and personal services will be made available to Churches, Schools, Civic, Business, Labor, Women, Youth, Veteran, Professional, Social, Fraternal, and similar groups, on a free and/or nonprofit basis.
(2) To do all such acts as are necessary or convenient to attain the objects and purposes herein set forth, to the same extent and as fully as any natural person could or might do, and as are not forbidden by law or by this certificate of incorporation, or by the bylaws of this corporation.
(3) As a nonprofit corporation, none of the income of which shall accrue to any member as such, to purchase, lease, sell, mortgage, hold, receive by gift, devise or bequest, or otherwise acquire or dispose of such real or personal property as may be necessary to the purposes of this corporation.
(4) To have offices and promote and carry on its objects and purposes, within or without the District of Columbia, and in the states or territories of the United States and in foreign countries.
(5) To have all powers that may be conferred upon corporations formed under subchapter 6, Title 29, of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia (1940).

FOURTH
The concerns and affairs of said corporation for the first year of its existence shall be managed by a board of not more than six trustees.

FIFTH
The corporation reserves the right to amend, alter, or change any provision contained in this certificate in any manner prescribed by law.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 1st day of February 1946.

JULIUS SCHREIBER.
MALCOLM R. HOBS.
JOHN BEECHER.
MILTON W. KING.
FRANK L. WEIL.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

I, Hazel Bauer, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that Julius Schreiber, Malcolm R. Hobbs, John Beecher, Milton W. King, and Frank L. Weil, parties to a certain Certificate of Incorporation bearing date on the 1st day of February 1946, and hereto annexed, personally appeared before me in said District, the said persons being personally well known to me to be the persons who executed the said Certificate of Incorporation and acknowledged the same to be their act and deed.

Given under my hand and seal this 5th day of February 1946.

[seal]

Hazel Bauer,
Notary Public, D. O.

COUNTY OF NEW YORK,
State of New York, ss:

I, Lillian B. Fox, a Notary Public in and for the County of New York, State of New York, do hereby certify that Frank L. Weil, a party to a certain Certificate of Incorporation bearing date on the 1st day of February 1946 and hereto annexed, personally appeared before me in said County of New York, State of New York, the said person being well known to me to be the person who executed the said Certificate of Incorporation and acknowledged the same to be his act and deed.

Given under my hand and seal this 1st day of February 1946.

[seal]

Lillian B. Fox, Notary Public.

Mr. Carpenter. When you worked for the National Institute of Social Relations, did they have a subcontract with the United States Government or the United States Army in the work of this institution?

Dr. Schreiber. I don’t understand the question. Subcontract—I don’t know what you mean.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you receive any money from the Government by way of subcontract?

Dr. Schreiber. No. The only money we ever received was the initial grant that we got from the organization, the American Jewish Committee, which was interested in combating problems of intergroup tension. Our effort here was to apply the principles of psychiatry in community education on the basis that if the people got together and understood their common problems, they would be able to resolve their problems without a lot of anti-Semitism or anti anybody else, but would in a democratic way function as good citizens in the community.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you personally under contract with the United States Government after you left the Army? Did you receive funds for your work?

Dr. Schreiber. As I told you, the only time I ever received any funds after I left the Army was for a few hours on Saturday for a period of months when I assisted as a psychiatrist in the VA clinic. The Veterans’ Administration was short of psychiatrists. I worked for a few hours every Saturday for several months. That was 1946, I believe it was.

The Chairman. After you left the Army?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes.

The Chairman. Doctor, you still hold a Reserve commission; do you not?

Dr. Schreiber. He asked me that before. The only thing I had—I have a certificate that I got in 1947, indicating the highest rank I had ever attained, and I think you have it here. I think the certificate merely states that this is not a new commission but merely an indication of the highest rank achieved.
I became a lieutenant colonel in January 1945. I am unaware of being a Reserve officer now. I have never received any communication from the Army to that effect.

Mr. Fanelli. While I am looking for that, if there is any question about the nature of the National Institute of Social Relations, we have a number of documents on the subject that we would be glad to introduce for the enlightenment of the committee.

Dr. Schreiber. May I also, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, introduce documents which show that my work in the Army was not only of a superior quality in terms of actual work, but that I was regarded by my superiors and colleagues as a very able, patriotic American citizen, and I insist that I am that and was that all throughout the war. May I introduce those documents, sir?

The Chairman. At a later time.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you tendered a Reserve commission when you left the service?

Dr. Schreiber. No. Will you explain to me how you get one?

Mr. Fanelli. Just a second. You answer his questions and don't ask any? Either you know or you don't.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ask for one?

Dr. Schreiber. I was being processed. As I told you, I left the division on June 28, I think the date was. On July 4 I completed my processing, and I never got anything, never heard anything from the young lady who was processing me. This came on June—at least is dated June 30, 1947. If you would like, may I read this to you, this two-paragraph thing?

The Chairman. In other words, that is almost 2 years after you were out of the Army?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; and it reads as follows—

The Chairman. Read it.

Dr. Schreiber. This comes from the War Department, the Adjutant General's Office, Washington, D. C., and there is a rubber stamp 3 June 47, 1947. It says:

Subject: Commission in the Army of the United States.
To: Officers who served in World War II.

Paragraph 1:

The Secretary of War has directed me to issue a commission, in the highest rank attained, to each officer relieved from active duty after serving honorably in the Army of the United States during the recent war, who has not been issued a commission subsequent to being processed for release from active duty.

2. The commission herewith does not constitute a new appointment but is formal evidence of the highest military rank you attained. It is forwarded to you with the grateful thanks and deep appreciation of the War Department for your services.

It is signed Edward F. Witsell, major general, for the Adjutant General; and this is the document. This is all I ever got from the Army.

Mr. Carpenter. That is a commission, isn't it?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, but as I understand it—do you want to look at it?

As I understand it, this was not a Reserve appointment or anything of the sort. I don't know. Is that it?
The Chairman. It is a Reserve commission signed by the Adjutant General of the United States. So you are a Reserve officer as of today; are you not?

Dr. Schreiber. If you say I am a Reserve officer and if your statement is accurate, then I am.

The Chairman. That is a commission issued.

Dr. Schreiber. All right. I don't know.

Mr. Fanelli. Mr. Chairman, as I read these documents, I can't find a Reserve commission in there. I am not an expert in this, but you ought to read this top memorandum that came with it. It appears to be proof of an earlier commission. As I say, I am not an expert in it.

Dr. Schreiber. Will you read it?

[Documents handed to the subcommittee.]

The Chairman (reading):

The Secretary of War has directed me to issue a commission, in the highest rank attained, to each officer relieved from active duty after serving honorably in the Army of the United States during the recent war, who has not been issued a commission subsequent to being processed for release from active duty.

The commission herewith does not constitute a new appointment but is formal evidence of the highest military rank you attained. It is forwarded to you with the grateful thanks and deep appreciation of the War Department for your services.

Signed by the Adjutant General.

Dr. Schreiber. That is what I interpret it to mean, that it was evidence of the fact that I achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel on January 5, 1945, and this was the only document I have that I was ever lieutenant colonel.

May I have it back, or do you want it?

The Chairman. You may have them back.

Mr. Carpenter. Were any of your Information and Education associates associated with you in the National Institute of Social Relations?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. Sergeant or Mr. Forstenzer; Mr. Fenchel; a Julian Stein; David Humphrey for a brief period. These were all people who worked with me in the Information and Education, and we brought them over into the national institute because we felt they were very skilled and good people.

For a brief time there was, I think, Hannon McClay, who was an editorial research worker.

That is all I remember.

Mr. Carpenter. John Beecher?

Dr. Schreiber. He was never in the Army with us. He worked for us in the institute.

Mr. Carpenter. You say you edited the magazine, Talk It Over. In this magazine did you recommend certain pro-Communist authors and the publications of pro-Communist organizations?

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know what you are talking about, Mr. Carpenter. All that I know is that we prepared material pro and con on any issue that we wrote on, and in the biographical sketch, or the bibliographical sketch, you were just reading, there were a lot of references on either side of any issue. I don't know what specific thing you have in mind.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you use the following articles written by Maxwell Stewart, Carey McWilliams, Susan B. Anthony II, Joseph Gaer,
Leo Huberman, Evans F. Carlson, Frederic L. Schuman, Lawrence K. Rosinger, Barrows Dunham, and recommended the Physician's Forum.

Dr. Schreiber. I don't remember whether we recommended any of their writings or not with respect to any particular issue. We might well have. The fact is, we gave pro and con on any issue, and we recommended the National Association of Manufacturers as well as the CIO or any other point of view. Whenever there was an issue by definition itself, Mr. Carpenter, there are many or usually many points of view. Our effort was to be fair and present arguments pro and con so that in discussions people could make up their own minds.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you read for the record your analysis of these various writers?

Mr. Mandel. I would like to present for the record without reading, if I may, Mr. Carpenter, an analysis of the magazine, Talk It Over, for the period 1946 and 1947, showing that these authors and other pro-Communist authors were recommended for reading by the magazine, Talk It Over.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 415" and is as follows:)

**Talk It Over**

Published by National Institute of Social Relations, Inc., 1020 17th Street NW., Washington, D. C.

(Note.—No editor or board of editors named.)

**Series Y101, 1946**

Recommended reading: Maxwell Stewart's Schools for Tomorrow's Citizens.

**Series G101, 1946**

Notes for discussion leaders on Can the Atomic Bomb Be Kept a Secret? Recommended reading: Atoms and You, by Tom O'Connor, a writer for PM and other leftwing publications. The Independent, January 1946 proceedings of a Madison Garden rally on atomic energy under the auspices of the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions.

**Series G102, 1946**

Page 5 quoting Col. Evans F. Carlson (deceased) former head of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General.

**Series G105, 1946**

Page 6, discussing Persecution of Minorities in America.

Page 9, praising the War Department publication, Prejudice—Roadblock to Progress. Also page 10.

Page 11, praising War Department publication Army Service Forces Manual M5 and quoting therefrom.

**Series G107, 1946**

Recommended reading: Out of the Kitchen Into the War, by Susan B. Anthony II and F. Daye. (See record of Susan B. Anthony in House Committee on Un-American Activities Report on Congress of American Women.)

**Series G109, 1946**

Recommended reading: For the People's Health, published by the People's Forum which has been designated as "established primarily by the Communist Party" (Bella Dodd, September 8, 1952, Subversive Influence in the Educational Process, p. 37).
Recommended reading: The First Round, the story of the CIO Political Action Committee, by Joseph Gaer.

LISTS JULIUS SCHREIBER, M. D., AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS.

Recommended reading (p. 12): The Southern Patriot, monthly publication of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, which has been cited as subversive by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Page 16, etc., discussion of Can We Get Along With Russia? quoting Molotov, Henry Wallace, Frederic L. Schuman, Henry Steele Commager, Stalin, all pro-Soviet statements with a few anti-Soviet statements.

Recommended reading: The following pro-Communist books: The Great Conspiracy Against Russia, by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn; Soviet Politics, by Frederic L. Schuman; Russia—Menace or Promise, by Vera M. Dean; and Russia, by Sir Bernard Pares. Of 6 books recommended, 4 are pro-Communist and 2 are anti.

Page 24, statement of purpose of the National Institute of Social Relations.

Page 16. Raises question, "Do we have freedom of the press?" Quotes statements for and against.

Recommended reading: Southern Exposure, by Stetson B. Kennedy, writer for PM. Race and Democratic Society, by Franz Boas (deceased) and formerly of the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, cited as subversive by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Recommended reading: The following left-wing writers: Small Farm and Big Farm, by Carey McWilliams; Some Problems of Postwar Agriculture, by James G. Patton, head of the National Farmers Union; Factories in the Field, by Carey McWilliams; page 23; The Truth About Unions, by Leo Huberman.

Page 18. Discussion of "Should we have universal military training?" Topics: Is it necessary for national defense? * * * How does it fit in with U. N.? * * * How will it affect education for citizenship?

What Hope for China, page 6. "In the areas they control, the Communists are said to have cut rents and taxes considerably and given non-Communists the major voice in local self-government. Their present program calls for the maintenance and encouragement of private enterprise and a respect for property rights."

Page 7, quoting John K. Fairbank.

Page 12, To What Extent Should We Work With Russia?

Page 14, recommended reading, the following left-wing writers: Thunder Out of China, by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby; China's Crisis by Lawrence K. Rosinger (fifth amendment case); The Challenge of Red China, by Gunther Stein (identified as a member of the Communist underground); Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore; The Making of Modern China, by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore; Far Eastern Survey, published by the American Institute of Pacific Relations; China's Madame Sun, by Nym Wales.

Page 20. Books recommended and reviewed: Thunder Out of China, by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby; Solution in Asia by Owen Lattimore; Don't be a Jerk! published by the League of Fair Play, headed by Robert Norton (fifth amendment case).
SERIES G125, 1947

Quoting pages 7 and 9, Barrows Dunham (fifth amendment case) (February 27, 1953, House Un-American Activities Committee). Page 10, Edgar Snow on Why We Don't Understand Russia.

13. Recommended reading: Man Against Myth by Barrows Dunham; and Why We Don't Understand Russia, by Edgar Snow.

SERIES G126, 1947

Discussing “How Free is Freedom of Religion?”

SERIES G127, NOVEMBER 1947


Dr. SCHREIBER. Will you also, Mr. Mandel, include those anti-Communist authors who were also recommended? I think it only fair.

Mr. FANELLI. We have some documents on this whenever it is convenient, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CARPENTER. Doctor, have you ever been responsible for the appointment of individuals with Communist records to the information and education program?

Dr. SCHREIBER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. CARPENTER. What part did you play in the securing of the appointment of the following persons in your division: Carl Fenichel?

Dr. SCHREIBER. As I told you before, I never heard of Carl Fenichel until he was appointed to our division and went to the Information and Education School. I remember that he was supposed to have done an excellent job as a training student there. I don't recall how he was appointed. But I would have been very happy to appoint him on the basis of what I heard about him at that time.

Mr. CARPENTER: Stephen Fischer?

Dr. SCHREIBER. Stephen Fischer—as I told you before, I first heard about Stephen Fischer at a dinner party in New York, I think in 1939 or 1940. I met his sister, who waxed eloquently about her younger brother, who was a journalism major or graduate at Columbia. He was on the San Francisco Chronicle. I was doing neuropathology and neuropsychiatry in Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. I met him once socially briefly. He made on me a very good impression.

As I told you, I don't remember how, but I think I recommended him after I came back from the Pacific when they were looking for writers for the Army talks. I knew that he had been in combat, had flown some thirty-odd missions. I felt he was a man who was a competent craftsman and a man who had some experience in combat.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, you knew that Stephen Fischer had been a member of the Communist Party when you appointed him; did you not?

Dr. SCHREIBER. I certainly did not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make inquiry of him whether or not he had been a member of the Communist Party?

Dr. SCHREIBER. No, sir; I did not. I pointed out to Mr. Carpenter when he asked me before, I went on the general assumption any man who was appointed by the War Department is examined by the G-2 of the War Department, and if they clear him he is O. K.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you first meet Stephen Fischer?
Dr. Schreiber. I think it was in 1940 or 1941.
The CHAIRMAN. Before the war?
Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. I am positive.
The CHAIRMAN. Where did you meet him?
Dr. Schreiber. Somewhere socially, in San Francisco. I can't remember exactly where, but I know I met him one time.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever attend any meetings with Stephen Fischer in California?
Dr. Schreiber. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Then why did you take the recommendation of his sister when you had already met him in 1940 or 1941?
Dr. Schreiber. Why did I take the recommendation?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. Schreiber. I met his sister before I met him.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you met his sister before you met him.
Dr. Schreiber. She was telling me about her kid brother in California, who was quite a crackerjack writer.
The CHAIRMAN. How many times did you meet him in California in 1940?
Dr. Schreiber. I think one time is all I met him, and I don't remember how much time I talked with him, 5 or 10 minutes, perhaps, something like that.
The CHAIRMAN. Why is it that June 16, 1944, 3 or 4 years later, a man you have met only 1 time, you recommended that he come in the Information and Education Division of the United States Army?
Dr. Schreiber. He certainly made a very excellent impression on me. I don't remember how I was reminded about him again, but I thought he was a fine man, and I recommended him. I wouldn't recommend someone I hadn't any ideas about or didn't think was a good person.

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to read this memorandum:

I have been advised by Sergeant Wilson that 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army Air Forces Flexible Gunnery School, Tyndell Field, Fla., is an outstanding young officer.

Lieutenant Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and after completing his 25 bombing missions came back to the mainland. According to Wilson "this guy's terrific—he already knows as much if not more than the instructors at the school."

In civilian life he was a newspaper man on the San Francisco Chronicle. Prior to that, Wilson believes, he completed a course in journalism at Columbia University.

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for 2 weeks temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in Materials or Field Operations Section.

That is from Major Schreiber.

Are you the author of that memorandum?

Dr. Schreiber. I imagine that must be. April 7 this is dated, is that right?
The CHAIRMAN. 1944.
Dr. Schreiber. This is dated April 7, 1943, up here. I wasn't in the War Department then.

Mr. Carpenter. This is dated the 16th of June, 1944.
Dr. Schreiber. We have 2 dates on here.
Yes. That must have been after I came back from the Pacific, and apparently Wilson was still there. I thought he had already gone overseas. He must have been the one who reminded me about it.

The Chairman. Then you knew Sergeant Wilson?
Dr. Schreiber. Oh, sure.

The Chairman. How long had you known him?
Dr. Schreiber. I met him in California in, I think it was, 1938 or 1939.

The Chairman. Did you ever attend any meetings with him?
Dr. Schreiber. No, sir.

The Chairman. Did you know him to be a member of the Communist Party?
Dr. Schreiber. No, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. You say you knew Luke Wilson in California?
Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you meet him, and how?
Dr. Schreiber. As I told you before, I think he was brought over to the hospital by Jack Burke, and I met him that way. Jack Burke was a member of the La Follette committee at that time, and I think Mr. Wilson was a colleague of his on the La Follette committee.

The Chairman. In 1938?
Dr. Schreiber. I think it was '38 or '39, something like that.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the reason for Jack Burke bringing him to you?

Dr. Schreiber. You meet a lot of people socially, and he just introduced me to him.

Mr. Carpenter. Was this a social occasion?
Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know Marian Thompson?
Dr. Schreiber. This is the young lady you asked me about several times. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do anything about bringing her into your office?

Dr. Schreiber. As I told you several times before, this is the strangest sort of a question. I don’t understand what it is all about. This young lady either worked in the division before I ever got there, or came into the division afterwards. I knew her nowhere from outside the organization. Whether she worked in the pool and was brought into my office from somewhere, I don’t know, but she worked for me as my secretary.

Mr. Carpenter. What connection did you have with the Special Service School at Lexington, Va.?

Dr. Schreiber. I had no official connection with it. I visited it once or twice to see how it goes. I was not on the staff of the school.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has a memorandum.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a War Department memorandum dated September 30, 1943, addressed to the Chief of Military Personnel, and it reads as follows:

The inauguration of a special course of instruction at the Special Service School, Lexington, Va., for the regimental orientation officers requires the services of especially qualified field personnel who have been assigned to related duties.
Through observations made by officers of this branch the following officer is highly qualified by training, knowledge of the subject matter, and method of conduct of orientation and is requested for immediate assignment to this branch for planning and for assistance to the school faculty—

and then the name of Julius Schreiber, major, M. C., is listed.

I read the letter in part, and ask that it be made a part of the record.

Dr. Schreiber. What was the date of that, Mr. Mandel?

The Chairman. That will be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 416” and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 416

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
Washington, D. C., September 30, 1943.

Memorandum for Chief, Military Personnel Section, S. S. D.
Subject: Assignment of Personnel.

1. The inauguration of a special course of instruction at the Special Service School, Lexington, Virginia, for the regimental orientation officers requires the services of especially qualified field personnel who have been assigned to related duties.

2. Through observation made by officers of this Branch the following officer is highly qualified by training, knowledge of the subject matter and method of conduct of orientation and is requested for immediate assignment to this Branch for planning and for assistance to the school faculty:

Julius Schreiber, Major, M. C., O-31100, Hq. 11th AA Tng. Grp. AARTC, Camp Callan, Calif.

3. Major Schreiber is now on duty in the capacity of a field medical officer and an informal concurrence for his release has been obtained from his commanding general. It is understood through other informal contacts that Army Ground Forces will interpose no objections provided the Surgeon General’s Office can supply a replacement. Informal contacts with the S. G. O. (Colonel Halloran, Ext. 78645) indicate that they will take immediate steps to assign a replacement officer.

4. As Major Schreiber’s services in the future will be greatly increased in value if he be available at an early date to assist in the preparation of curriculum, it is requested that he be made available on temporary duty until a permanent transfer is effected. The period of this T/D will not exceed two weeks beginning on or about 8 October 1943.

5. A vacancy in the grade of Major exists in the allotment of officers to this Branch and the job assignment is with the Training Plans and Materials Section.

6. It is desired that a formal request for this transfer and assignment be initiated and concurrences of Army Ground Forces and Surgeon General’s Office be obtained.

Arthur C. Farlow,
Lt. Colonel, AUS,
Chief, Orientation Branch,
Special Service Division.

Dr. Schreiber. Could I hear the date of that, please?

Mr. Mandel. September 30, 1943.

Dr. Schreiber. That was almost a month before I was in the War Department, and I was not assigned to the school. It may have been somebody’s plan to assign me to the school, but I was not.

I would like to say there was nothing wrong with the school.

Mr. Carpenter. You don’t challenge the accuracy of this record?

Dr. Schreiber. I don’t know the letter. That is the first time I have heard it.

The Chairman. Hand him the letter.

Examine it.

(Doctor Schreiber and his counsel examining document.)
Dr. Schreiber. Mr. Mandel, I think it would have been more useful had you read the whole letter, because it points out I was then at Camp Callan. This was a request to be transferred to the War Department for temporary duty. It was the belief of Colonel Farlow, who made this request, that my value to the Army would be enhanced if I served in the I. and E. program rather than as a psychiatrist at Camp Callan, where, among my duties—

The CHAIRMAN. The whole letter is in the record.

Dr. Schreiber. Since he didn't read the whole thing, I had no idea what he was talking about.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever assign or recommend students or instructors or courses of study at Lexington, Va.?

Dr. Schreiber. Did I ever sign—

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever assign or recommend—

Dr. Schreiber. Assign or recommend.

Mr. Carpenter. Students or instructors or did you recommend courses of study at the I. & E. school?

Dr. Schreiber. I may well have. I don't remember. I know I certainly recommended Lt. Russell Babcock to go there, because he was with me at Camp Callan. He was a very excellent teacher. I don't know anyone else I recommended as an instructor. I may have suggested that Sergeant Wilson go to the school. I don't know. I don't remember.

It would have been perfectly possible for me to recommend him. Anyone who participated in the program ought to have been trained.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of "Prospectus, ASF, Troop Training Program"?

Dr. Schreiber. What is the date of that prospectus?

The CHAIRMAN. Pass it to the witness and let him examine it.

(At this point the papers were handed to the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that, Doctor?

Dr. Schreiber. I don't see a date on it, and I don't know.

If it was while I was in the service, I might well have—I mean the War Department. If it was before that, then I couldn't have.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that refresh your memory by examining it?

Dr. Schreiber. The subject matter is the kind of material we dealt with the entire time I was in the Division, sir. As I say, it could well have been something that I had something to do with if it was after October 30 or October 25, 1943. I am just looking at it casually.

Wait a minute. Here is Army Talk No. 53. That certainly was after I was in the War Department Division. So if this was written after Army Talk 53, then I was certainly there and would have had a hand, perhaps, in this.

Mr. Carpenter. All right, Doctor.

Were you in any way responsible for the publication by the armed service forces of the pamphlet Races of Mankind, by Ruth Benedict and G. Weltfish?

Dr. Schreiber. No; I was not. I had nothing to do with that pamphlet.

Mr. Carpenter. Was it published by the Armed Forces?

Dr. Schreiber. Not to my knowledge. Isn't that a Public Affairs pamphlet?
Mr. Carpenter. Was it published by the Information and Education Division?

Dr. Schreiber. Not to my knowledge, no.

Mr. Carpenter. Not to your knowledge.

Do you have any information about this document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. The New York Times of March 6, 1944, has an article dealing with this pamphlet. The headline of the article is "Army Drops Race Equality Book," and it mentions the fact that the Army obtained copies, as it says in this statement,

After the USO banned the pamphlet, Mr. May, the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, asserted the CIO war relief committee promoted its distribution and the Army obtained 55,000 copies. Army spokesmen, he said, told the committee that distribution had been held up because some of the material was subject to misinterpretation.

Mr. Carpenter. You don’t know anything about this pamphlet?

Dr. Schreiber. Now that he has read that, I remember there was something to do about it. I had nothing to do with picking the pamphlet. I think I told you, Mr. Carpenter, in our earlier session, to the best of my recollection there was a committee of three—General McCloy, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and some other man, I think Dr. Brown, of the American Historical Society—who were appointed to select the basic orientation reference library. They were the ones, as I remember, who made the official final selection of what background material would be distributed to the orientation officers in the field.

Mr. Carpenter. Did they ever call on you for recommendation?

Dr. Schreiber. To the best of my recollection, I never met any one of them.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have something to say about this document?

Mr. Mandel. This pamphlet, which was published by the Armed Forces, on page 26 of one edition has a paragraph of which I will just read the first sentence:

The Russian nation has for generations shown what can be done to outlaw race prejudice in a country with many kinds of people. It did not wait for people’s minds to change.

In subsequent editions this passage was left out. I have asked the Library of Congress to make an analysis of the question of whether the Russians showed prejudice toward minorities or not, and they have given us a memorandum which I would like to put into the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 417" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 417

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE.
Washington, D. C.

To: Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Attention: Mr. Benjamin Mandel.

From: Joseph G. Whelan, Foreign Affairs Division.

Subject: Statements on Soviet nationality policies and practices.

On page 26 of the pamphlet, The Races of Mankind (1946 edition), the authors, Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, make the following statement concerning the policy of the Soviet Government toward the nationality groups within the Soviet Union:

32918*—54—pt. 20—7
The Russian nation has for a generation shown what can be done to outlaw race prejudice in a country with many kinds of people. They did not wait for people’s minds to change. They made racial discrimination and persecution illegal. They welcomed and honored the different dress, different customs, different arts of the many tribes and countries that live as part of their nation. The more backward groups were given special aid to help them catch up with the more advanced. Each people was helped to develop its own cultural forms, its own written language, theater, music, dance, and so on. At the same time that each people was encouraged in its national self-development, the greatest possible interchange of customs was fostered, so that each group became more distinctively itself and at the same time more a part of the whole.

“The Russians have welcomed cultural differences and they have refused to treat them as inferiorities. No part of the Russian program has had greater success than their racial program.”

In contrast to the argument set forth in this statement, there is quoted below a selection of quotations from various sources on the same subject:

“The world has seen cold-blooded massacres and mass starvation before but in almost every case these have been the result of war or plague or catastrophes of nature and the governments involved have done their best to alleviate the human suffering. In the case of the Ukrainian famine, the situation was different. The government deliberately profited by the shortage of crops to starve an unwanted portion of the population. This had not been its policy in 1921, just 10 years before, when it was trying to cement its position. Now, it was sure of itself and felt safe in resorting to any action necessary to curb a discontented population instead of meeting its demands even in part. There is no question that the Ukrainian famine was deliberately engineered to break opposition and disintegrate the population.”

“Starvation was supplemented by deportation in order to clear the land for the introduction of alien elements who would be more loyal to the central regime, while the Ukrainians were uprooted from their homes and scattered in heterogeneous groups throughout the country. Perhaps no act of the Soviet Government has been more revealing of its essentially callous attitude toward human life than the satisfaction with which it received from this famine and its accompanying arrests and executions. [The above took place during the early 1930’s.]” (Source: Manning, Clarence A. Twentieth-century Ukraine. New York, Bookman associates, 1951, pp. 93-94.)

“Russia knows well how effective a purge of this sort can be. On June 10, 1941, shortly after the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic States, a single purge, overshadowing anything Hitler ever dreamed of, took place. All the cities and villages in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were surrounded by special units of the MVD. At 2 o’clock in the morning, hundreds of thousands of intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, engineers, government officials, businessmen, and of course ‘reactionaries’ in general—even the stamp collectors, because of possible ‘international affiliations’—were awakened, ordered to dress, and led out of their homes to the nearest railway sidings where they were loaded into boxcars and shipped off to an ‘unknown destination.’ So well did the MVD operate that the job was finished in less than 2 hours; by 4 o’clock that morning, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had been stripped of 1½ million men—the natural leaders—and the 3 nations standing in the way of Russia’s domination of the Baltic were virtually wiped out. While I was in Moscow I discovered that this staggering depopulation raid had been executed by none other than my Jovial, patient, witty Russian ‘friend,’ General Merkulov!”

“As Molotov once said ‘Minorities are no problem at all, the problem is simply finding enough boxcars.’” (Source: Nyrdå, Nicholas. My Ringside Seat in Moscow. New York, Crowell, 1952, pp. 160-161.)

Lev E. Dobriansky submits the following cases of what he terms “genocide” on the part of the Soviet Union:

“The Ingrian nation, which consisted of 400,000 civilized people of Scandinavian culture and who inhabited Ingermanland, was wiped out in 1921-23, accommodating thereby the Russification of this hinterland of Leningrad;

“The Don and Kuban Cossack nations, who considered themselves separate national groups, were annihilated between 1928 and 1930;

“The Greek population of the Kerch Peninsula, an ethnic group of some 8,000 people, was deported to a forced labor camp in the Arctic in order to allow the Russification of this strategically important region; * * *.”
The following list of Soviet "autonomous" republics recently liquidated is also of interest:

"As a 'precautionary measure' the Volga German Republic was abolished by the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 1941 and its inhabitants deported. In 1943 the Chechen-Ingush and Kalmyk autonomous republics were abolished and their population exiled. In 1945 the Crimean autonomous republic inhabited by Tatars was also wiped out of existence and its population scattered throughout Siberia. The Soviet Government alleged that these peoples had failed to resist the Germans sufficiently * * *" (Source: U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Tensions within the Soviet Union. 81st Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953. p. 42.)

"Indeed, the Soviet nationality policy has proven to be a failure. Julian Towser, a specialist on Soviet Government and politics at the University of California, insists most emphatically 'that much in the Soviet nationality solution is subfuge, fiction, and fraud, that the Communist road to unity is paved with slavish subordination in controlled uniformity spelling the ultimate obliteration of nations.' The Soviets failed to eliminate growing antagonisms between the various national groups residing in the Soviet Union, and they succeeded neither in establishing them on an equal footing nor in winning the support and sympathy of these nationalities and their elite for the Communist cause. A former Soviet army officer and member of the Communist Party, who succeeded in escaping from Soviet Russia, recently testified that although local differences among the Slavic elements of the Soviet population were gradually disappearing owing to the mobility of the population and to the standardizing influence of mass communications media, the same observation did not, on the whole, apply to the non-Slavic nationalities. 'The Great Russians,' he said, 'looked upon all the other nationalities, particularly those of Asiatic origin, with a mild feeling of superiority. On their side, the non-Russians, especially the Central Asians, were hostile to the Russians.' " (Source: Ibid. p. 45.)

"An example of actual resistance to the imperialism of Moscow is to be found in the case of the Ukraine. This nation formed an independent republic in 1920 but was soon swallowed up by the Soviet Union. In spite of the fact that all Ukrainian anti-Communist parties were thoroughly liquidated in the period of 1920-23, resistance continues. Lev E. Dobriansky states that "* * * there have been, as now in the form of the efficient Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which the Kremlin classifies as a bandit force, outbursts of spirited resurgence against the planned attacks on the Ukrainian national entity as such * * * the patent fact is that the Ukrainian nation itself is intrinsically anti-Communist because it has never surrendered spiritually to the prime objective of the Kremlin to create the Soviet Nation (Sovietsky Narod) and its Soviet man, speaking only the Russian language, thinking only in terms of nonbourgeois Soviet concepts, and taught to forget his non-Russian cultural tradition, his language, his history, his church, his art and customs—all the sensitive fibers that sustain the life of a national group." (Source: Ibid. p. 46.)

"Moslem groups, however, have not responded with alacrity to the Communist appeal. Although the Kremlin has attempted to drop an extra thick Iron Curtain around the Moslem regions in the U. S. S. R. in order that the claims of fair treatment for Moslems cannot be easily checked, Moslem groups are becoming more and more aware of the fate of their coreligionists within the U. S. S. R. Despite the difficulty of getting information, the world is beginning to realize that the terms 'oppression' and 'exploitation,' associated by Soviet propaganda with 'Western imperialism,' are more applicable to the Moslem regions of the U. S. S. R.

"The picture of conditions of Moslems in the U. S. S. R., pieced together largely from Soviet sources, is highly unfavorable—Communist assertions to the contrary. Despite the solemn promises given by the Communists when they came to power in the U. S. S. R., the Kremlin has conducted an all-out war against the Moslem way of life and against the Sharia— the Moslem code of civil law. The freedom which the Communists said would be accorded to Moslem people to develop their culture and language without interference has not been realized: the Kremlin exercises a strict supervision over form and content and allows no deviations. The Moslem minority has not shared equally with the advantages of the introduction of modern machinery, canals, and irrigation systems into Moslem regions. When these developments came, the great Russians poured in, monopolizing the better-paying, higher-skilled occupations. Furthermore, thousands of Moslems have been uprooted and forced to migrate for political reasons to other regions as unskilled or semiskilled laborers.
"The granting of autonomy to Moslem peoples by establishing autonomous states under the constitution has been a meaningless gesture. The Communists through a clever system of gerrymandering have drawn the boundary lines of the various national units so that they cut across ethnic, geographic units and across irrigation systems. A centralized, monolithic Communist Party with absolute control over all phases of national life further tears down particularism and local unity. The result has been to weaken the autonomy of each national unit and reduce the influence of the Moslems in each state. In turn, this allowed the Communists to take over the political direction more easily and stand guard to stamp out any expressions of national aspirations among the Moslems. In these and many other ways Soviet Moslems are kept in subjection and ready targets for exploitation by their Kremlin masters." (Source: The Fate of Moslems Under Soviet Rule. Soviet Affairs Notes, No. 144, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 1.)

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, I show you here a document entitled "Army Talk—1 Through 100." Will you tell us what part you played in the initiation, drafting, approval, and distribution of these talks?

Dr. Schreiber. In general, my job insofar as the preparation of the finished publications is concerned, is primarily editing, along with 2 or 3 other people in the branch—my chief, whoever he was at that time, whether Colonel Farlow or Colonel Barker or Major Beech, and one other officer—the material that was written by the writers in New York. When we finished editing it, we sent the material, the chief sent it on to Colonel Watrous, who also edited it. Finally he would send it to General Osborn, who did the final editing and approval before we could publish it.

To the best of my recollection, some 9 or 10 years ago, they had policy meetings. The chiefs of each branch—and I was not the Chief of the Orientation Branch, although I would have been quite pleased to participate in it, because there was never anything wrong with this program—would sit and, based upon the research from the field that the research branch would produce, decide we ought to have an Army Talk on China or on India or Germany or France, or whatever the news of the week was. The writers would then be told to prepare material on this talk, stressing certain themes.

My participation in this primarily was the editing of it, along with, as I say, the other people.

In the special programs, the chart you first handed me, my participation would be to select finished materials already published and to organize them for use in special programs, hospitals and such.

Mr. Carpenter. What part did the following individuals play: Stephen Fischer?

Mr. Schreiber. He was a writer.

Mr. Carpenter. In your section?

Dr. Schreiber. He was a writer of Army Talks, and I was not in charge of Army Talks. He was a writer in New York under the direction of the then chief, whoever he was at that time, either Colonel Farlow or Colonel Boswell.

Mr. Carpenter. Doesn't this chart show the New York office as under your jurisdiction?

Dr. Schreiber. That chart will show you that the chief of the branch had the materials section on the right-hand side. The New York office was under him as far as material. I had the pilot teams, the people who went out and demonstrated how to conduct discussion programs, how to conduct orientation meetings.
The production of the materials—I am not a writer. I am a psychiatrist. My job deals with motivation. The professional writers were under the chief of the branch, who usually was a writer. Colonel Farlow was an advertising man. Colonel Barker was a newspaperman. The writers, also the New York unit, were under the chief of the branch.

Mr. Carpenter. Did Hyman Forstenzer work on that document?
Dr. Schreiber. No. Hyman Forstenzer, to the best of my memory, worked on the pilot teams. He was an excellent group discussion leader. He was an excellent man in that.

The Chairman. Did Stephen Fischer work on it?
Dr. Schreiber. No. Stephen Fischer was a writer, sir. I don’t remember that he went on the pilot teams.

Mr. Carpenter. How about Luke Wilson?
Dr. Schreiber. He was on the pilot teams for the 2 months he was with me in January and February, and then I thought he went over to Paris, but apparently, from this memo you handed me, he was even there when I got back. So I don’t know how he was used, except on a pilot team somewhere.

Mr. Carpenter. How about Carl Fenichel?
Dr. Schreiber. Carl Fenichel was a man who worked both as a writer and in the pilot teams.

Mr. Carpenter. What part did you play in drawing up Fact Sheet No. 70, dated May 5, 1945?
Dr. Schreiber. The same as any other Fact Sheet, Mr. Carpenter. I would edit and review whatever came down from the New York office, along with the then chief of the branch and one of the other officers.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that this talk was reprinted and distributed and sold by the International Labor Defense?
Dr. Schreiber. I never heard it until you told me about it, or Mr. Mandel did, at the last session.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know what the International Labor Defense is?
Dr. Schreiber. My counsel—since you told me it is on the Attorney General’s list, I would like to point out that many good American organizations, or at least one, reprinted that same talk, because it was interested in combatting prejudice. It was a Jewish organization, a national organization, a highly respected organization, which felt it was important to combat prejudice.

Mr. Fanelli. We have documents on this and other documents which are interesting, whenever it is convenient.

Mr. Mandel. I have here, and offer for the record, a copy of Army Talk No. 70, as reprinted by the International Labor Defense, by permission of the War Department. The International Labor Defense was cited by Attorney General Biddle as the legal arm of the Communist Party.

The Chairman. That may become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 418” and is as follows:)
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT No. 418

[Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet, No. 70, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., May 5, 1945]

(Reprinted by permission of the War Department by International Labor Defense, 112 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y.)

PREDJUDICE—RODBLOCK TO PROGRESS

Practically everyone of us has prejudices. Some of us may shudder at the idea of eating frogs and other foods we've never tasted but which other people enjoy. Or we may be prejudiced against bow ties or purple shirts. But these are meaningless prejudices which don't hurt us. There are other prejudices, however, which affect our lives very much. A prejudice against a necktie because of its color is harmless—but a prejudice against a person because of his color, race, nationality, or religion can do plenty of damage.

A prejudice is an opinion or emotional feeling which isn't based on fact or on reason. It is an attitude in a closed mind. Prejudice has been used by the Germans and the Japanese to split nations wide open with hate and confusion. Recognizing how powerful is this weapon in the Axis arsenal, ASF Manual M 5, issued October 1944, declares:

"Enemy attempts to cause confusion in the United States through the spread of racial doctrines have made it particularly necessary that there be frank and objective discussion of this subject during the present war. The doctrine of 'Aryan' superiority has become one of the dominant factors in the present world struggle. Hitler has made this doctrine the reason for untold aggression and devastation.

"Likewise, on the other side of the world," the Manual continues, "the Japanese have been trying to demonstrate their inherent superiority. * * *

The magic of race prejudice, the Japanese discovered, had performed miracles in Europe. It had enabled the Nazis to get away with murder. If Hitler could seize Germany and disrupt Europe with the help of race hate, the Japanese saw no reason why they couldn't do the same thing in Asia.

About a week after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were broadcasting: "How can America be fighting for racial equality when it does not exist in America?" During the 1943 race riots in Detroit, the Japanese propagandists had a field day broadcasting the news to hundreds of millions of nonwhites in Asia and throughout the world.

Japan's championing of the Negroes in the United States has only one purpose—to divide us. Negroes, forming as they do about one-tenth of the American population, are an important minority, and Hitler has shown how minority problems can be exploited to the advantage of fascism.

"The man who spreads rumors," ASF Manual M 5 declares, "particularly race rumors, about any group—racial, religious, or national—is doing Hitler's or Tojo's work. The Nazis assumed that in this country they would find antagonistic groups who would spend their time fighting each other instead of the German armies. Goebbels said to one of his confidants: 'Nothing will be easier than to produce a bloody revolution in America. No other country has so many social and racial tensions. We shall be able to play on many strings there.'"

Any American who "plays on these strings" by spreading prejudices against minorities—Catholics, Jews, Negroes, foreign-born, and others—is, whether he knows it or not, playing the Axis game.

(The foregoing will help you to plan a brief introductory talk in your own words.)

THE MAINSPRING OF AMERICAN LIFE

"The Founding Fathers of the United States drew up a Declaration of Independence proclaiming that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. Among these rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Once independence had been won, the framers of the Constitution secured these rights in law by incorporating them into a Bill of Rights guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and equality before the law.

"This, the mainspring of American life, is what our enemies would have us destroy even while our armies are winning victories overseas. They would have us forget our belief in the equality of man and adopt their own false standards of race supremacy. They would see us divided against ourselves,
our national strength consumed in racial and religious hatreds. The America
our troops sought to preserve would then have been destroyed by our own hands.

This attempt to bring about civil strife has met with more success than many
of us care to admit. Propaganda aimed at setting one group against another
has found its mark in many instances, and we have seen the sorry spectacle of
religious bigotry and racial hatred rise where none had existed before. Or,
where misunderstandings already existed, we have seen these misunderstandings
somehow turned into animosities bitter enough to involve an entire city. And
largely because a few hate-spreaders have accomplished their assignments.”—
Hon. Frank Murphy, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court: Race
Hate—The Enemy Bullets Can’t Stop (Liberty magazine, Jan. 6, 1945).

SCAPEGOAT CONCEPT VIOLATES CHRISTIAN CODE

“In truly civilized societies, where the rights and dignity of the individual
are respected and economic opportunity is open to all according to their ability—
in short, in a working democracy—these fears and hatreds have little to feed
upon. They are dissolved by the forces of political freedom, universal education,
and social welfare. Nothing is more undemocratic than hatred of other groups
merely because they are somewhat different from our own. To condemn a whole
class for the faults of 1 or 2 individuals is a sign of stupidity—or of knavery.

“Likewise, when the religion of the people is spiritually vital, prejudices against
minorities do not easily take root. The concept of a scapegoat selected from
weak and defenseless groups for cruel and unjust treatment violates the whole
ethical code of Christianity: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’ A religion
whose foundation stones are the universal fatherhood of God and the brother-
hood of man must inevitably contradict any scheme of things that divides man-
kind into permanently ‘superior’ groups, mutually hostile. The greatest religious
leaders of all faiths have, in fact, opposed these tendencies to set one race
or class against another. Pope Pius XII, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the heads
of the Protestant communions in America, and the chief rabbis of Judaism have
all condemned racial and religious prejudices in outspoken and strikingly similar
language.

“The scapegoats of history have suffered tragic injustice, but persecution has
never destroyed them. But the bad effects of intolerance upon the intolerant
themselves have been evident from Nero to Hitler. Mental specialists who have
studied these subjects have found that extreme intolerance has a destructive
effect on the mind, and often results in a condition similar to some forms of
insanity. It undermines the personality and even physical health; it weakens
the ability to enjoy normal life. In the long run, the latter is more to be pitied
than the hated.”—Kenneth M. Gould: They Got the Blame.

TEST OF DEMOCRATIC FAITH

“The peace, to which we now look, will further test our democratic faith. It
will not be enough to stamp out antidemocratic practices in the lands of our
enemies. The conditions which created fascism there must not pass unnoticed
here. Their first, and most dangerous symptom, is always the same every-
where—an abandonment of equal justice to all—the placing of some groups in
a preferred class of citizenship at the expense of other groups. True democracy
must continue the war on all such beliefs.

“Like most of the great values of life, the ideals of democracy and peace can
be won or maintained only by constant struggle. For democracy is a fighting
faith. No man with a conscience can be so far removed from that struggle as
not to feel the compulsion of joining in it. Each of us in our own way has a job
to do. The principles of fascism, and all that fascism stands for with its barbaric
denial of human values, must be obliterated and destroyed. To accomplish this
there must be an emphatic reassertion of democratic values and a resurgence of
democratic faith at home and throughout the world. And there will be.”—
Hon. Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.

HOW PREJUDICES DEVELOP

1. How do we get our prejudices?

All of us inherit certain characteristics such as the color of our skin and the
shape of our head. But we do not inherit our prejudices. When we are born
we have only the capacity to develop love and hate and the other human emotions.
Whom we learn to like or dislike, love or hate, depends on our experiences—in our home, in our school, in our neighborhood—and the effect these experiences have upon us. The language we learn, our religion, ideas, feelings, and attitudes, our manners and prejudices—all these come from our environment.

As children, we imitate not only activities of those around us, especially our parents, but also feelings, attitudes, and opinions. Prejudices, too, are absorbed unconsciously from our parents and other people in our environment.

By the time we have grown up we already have pictures in our mind of many people with whom we've had little or no contact. We may have a stereotyped picture of Negroes as lazy, stupid, happy-go-lucky; of Jews or Scots as stingy and money-mad; of Irishmen as hot-tempered, brawling, whisky-loving. These stereotypes are being constantly reinforced through newspapers, movies, conversations and jokes, books and radio. A single story, comic strip, or movie may not make too deep an impression. However, when time after time the Negro is presented as a crap-shooting, shiftless character; the Latin as a gangster or racketeer; the oriental as a slinking, mysterious, and crafty person—then deep and lasting impressions are made which go to form attitudes and prejudices.

**ERRORS OF GENERALIZING**

There is another way that we get false ideas about whole groups of people. As youngsters we may have played games with boys in the neighborhood, and one of them, perhaps a Pole or an Italian, may have cheated. We then conclude that all Poles or all Italians cheat, and we carry this idea with us all through life. We conclude that because one member of a group acted in a certain way, all members of that racial, religious, or national group will act the same way. We usually make these false generalizations about any group but our own. If we're Protestant and a member of our group lies, we don't condemn all Protestants. If we're Catholic and one of our members steals, we don't say all Catholics are thieves. If we're Jewish and one of our group commits a crime, we don't say all Jews are criminals.

It is only natural and human to be curious about things or people about whom we know very little. Curiosity is wholesome, and when it leads a man to investigate honestly the thing that arouses his curiosity, he often finds something new and interesting. However, when he does not make the effort to look honestly into the thing that first called forth curiosity—when, instead, he lets the matter dwell and go unanswered—he closes his mind to healthy thinking, and trouble begins: Curiosity gives way to suspicion—suspicion quickly converts itself to fear—and fear grows into hate. One fears the thing he suspects, and hates that which makes him afraid. This fear of the strange and unfamiliar is called by a high-sounding name—xenophobia. Primitive tribes usually feared and therefore hated a neighboring tribe because they didn't know them. Unenlightened people today have that same fear and suspicion of the unknown. Only when we've lived and worked with people of different races, cultures, and backgrounds, and learned to know them, can we really overcome these primitive fears.

**INSECURITY BREEDS PREJUDICE**

Prejudices develop too, from a feeling of insecurity or frustration. We may feel uncertain about our ability or prestige. We may feel insecure in our job or our social position. To strengthen our own confidence and feeling of self-importance, we often search for someone to look down upon as "inferior" or some group to blame for our failure and misfortune. That is why there is more prejudice in times of social stress and economic depression. Depression brings insecurity—and insecure people begin looking around for someone or some group on whom they can pin the blame.

Prejudices are often deliberately exploited by some people to further their own purposes. The Germans used the hate technique to divide opposition, to confuse the real issues, to blame national or international ills on innocent scapegoats, and to gain a following by a common hate. "Hate the Jews!" they yelled. "Hate the Poles!" "Hate the Russians!" "Hate the Negroes!" "Hate the Catholics!" Hate them for their color—their religion—their politics—their nationality. Hate them for any reason—or for no reason—but hate them. For hate meant power—to the Nazis.
WHAT IS A MINORITY?

2. What do we mean by a minority?

The dictionary defines a minority as less than half. But that doesn't quite explain the kind of minorities to which you and I and everyone in America belongs. If you're a Catholic, you're part of a minority, because Catholics don't number more than half of the people in this country. If you're a Negro, a foreign-born, a Jew, you're a member of a minority.

Now, if you're a Protestant, you're a member of a majority group in America—but Protestants include Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and scores of other minorities. And while a Protestant may be part of a majority group in one locality in the United States, he may be in a numerical minority in another locality.

America, like the rest of the world, is made up of minorities—religious, racial, and national. Let us remember that a minority group, like the Poles or the Negroes in America, may be a majority group elsewhere (say in Poland or Africa), and that a majority group today may become a minority group tomorrow—or vice versa.

ALL HAVE BEEN "SCAPEGOATS"

In ancient days many people believed that their guilt and sins could be transferred to some other person, animal, or object. During rituals performed by a leader of the tribe, a goat was often chosen by lot and the sins of the tribe passed on to the animal. The goat was then driven into the wilderness or destroyed.

Today, when people blame their troubles or woes on innocent people, we call this unjust persecution "scapegoating."

3. Have all minority groups been "scapegoats"?

At one time or another, every minority group has been used as a scapegoat and has suffered from prejudice and persecution. If we go back deep into history, we find powerful leaders who covered up their selfish motives by inciting people's emotions against "troublemaking" minorities. In the days of the Romans, Christians were blamed for all the troubles of the Roman Empire—including the burning of Rome—and for years they were persecuted.

Christians, in turn, have persecuted Jews. During the "Black Death" in the Middle Ages, when bubonic plague killed off one-fourth of Europe's population, responsibility was laid to the Jews who were tortured and oppressed, even though Jews were dying off as rapidly as Christians. In Spain, monarchs rode to power against the Jews. The autocratic empire of the Czars blamed the Jews for the abuses of the Russian feudal regime and massacred thousands of them. In the 18th century, a large colony of French Huguenots lived in England. They were accused of being dirty, of reducing the standard of living, of depriving Englishmen of the jobs, and of reducing their wages. A flood of pamphlets issued against these Huguenots was reprinted a hundred years later with the word "Jew" substituted for "Huguenot."

In Hitler's Germany the Nazis began by persecuting the Jews, but eventually they turned upon Catholics, Protestants, Czechs, Poles—and the entire world.

PERSECUTION IN AMERICA

4. How about America? Has our own history been free of scapegoating?

America, too, has its shameful pages of persecution of minorities. Many of our early settlers who came here to escape religious prejudices and persecution denied religious freedom to others. Massachusetts expelled dissenters like Roger Williams, while in Salem hysterical witch hunts were pursued. In one colony or another, Catholics, Quakers, Jews, Lutherans, Moravians, Presbyterians, Baptists, deists, atheists, were deprived of political and religious rights.

In the 19th century, earlier immigrant groups began to discriminate against the newer immigrants. Feeling ran high against the invasion of the Irish who arrived in large numbers after Ireland's potato famine of 1846. Riots broke out against them in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. They were accused of introducing slums, crime, and of depriving Americans of jobs.

In 1850 the Know Nothing Party was formed to fight the Irish and Catholic Immigrants, and the party remained a political force until the Civil War. They and their prejudiced successors yelled about "the flood of immigration sweeping its millions of foreign Roman Catholics over the land."
Eventually, most of this discrimination was turned against later immigrant groups—the Poles, Italians, Slavs, Jews, and Russians. When immigration was restricted to annual quotas for each nationality after World War I, preference was given to earlier immigrant groups. (Quotas were based on the census of 1910, then of 1890, then on the national origin of the white population of 1920.)

What many seem to forget is that we are all immigrants or the children of immigrants. No one has a right to complain about foreigners unless it be the American Indian. "Americanism," said our late President Roosevelt, "is not and never was a matter of race and ancestry. Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart."

TRUE DEMOCRACY GAINING

5. Are there any signs that prejudices and discrimination are decreasing in America?

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced, nevertheless, the liberties and freedoms which we share and which bind this Nation together, are one of the glorious chapters in human history. We have gone further in the direction of equality of opportunities than have the people of most other countries, and we are continuing our progress in that direction. Through the years there has been a sustained effort to abolish discriminations and prejudices which deny a person his fundamental rights as a citizen in a democracy. Discrimination and prejudices are not products of—but rather challenges to—the American way of life. And each of us has a personal responsibility to see to it that the American way of life prevails.

From the time of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation to the present time, laws have been passed to carry forward the democratic principle that all men are created equal.

When the Negroes were freed, 90 percent of them could neither read or write. In 1940, according to the Federal census, 18 of every 20 Negroes could read and write. Many States have already moved far toward equalization of educational opportunity for Negroes and whites. In a 25-year period, the registration of Negro college students showed an increase of 2,400 percent.

A great advance was made in June 1941 when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 and declared: "It is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin." The order requires that in all war contracts there is no discrimination because of race, creed, or national origin and sets up the Fair Employment Practice Committee to enforce this provision.

At the same time, many Americans are beginning to realize that racial and religious prejudices menace our war effort and our hopes for world peace. More and more Americans are becoming convinced that every person, regardless of his race, religion, or national origin, should be judged on the basis of his own merit. They are beginning to see that much straight thinking is needed on the problems of minorities and that the solution of these problems has a great deal to do with the welfare of our Nation as well as our own and our children's welfare. Many are learning that democracy cannot work for some unless it works for all.

SIX DANGERS OF PREJUDICE

6. Why is religious and racial prejudice a threat to all of us?

(Suggestion: Write on the board or read to your group the topic heads in italic below. Then get as many of the answers as possible from the group.)

A. Prejudice is contagious.—History has taught us that when we discriminate against one segment of the people we set a pattern that may be used against other groups. Hitler's persecution of the Jews, trade unionists, Communists, and Socialists was later directed against Catholics, Protestants, Liberals, and eventually the people of the world.

In 1855 Abraham Lincoln understood this when he said: "As a Nation we began by declaring all men are created equal. We now read it 'All men are created equal except Negroes.' When the Know Nothings get control it will read 'All men are created equal except Negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.'"

Consideration for the Negro, the Jew, the Catholic, the foreign born, or for any other minority group, rests not merely on the grounds of humanity and justice; it rests on the solid base of self-interest.
B. Prejudice makes all of us poorer.—We can't have an enlightened democracy with minority groups living in ignorance. We can't have a prosperous democracy with minority groups so poor that they can't afford to buy the goods America produces.

If a minority is kept at a low wage scale in the same field or area in which we work, eventually our own wages will be reduced because of a smaller demand for consumer goods and the competition of cheap labor. Conversely, a higher standard of living for any group increases the demands for consumer goods and makes for a more prosperous country. Aside from the fact that it is Christian and democratic, it is also to our own selfish interest to help secure better housing, clothing, and nutrition for all our people.

As Eric A. Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, recently declared: "Whenever we erect barriers on the grounds of race or religion, or of occupational or professional status, we hamper the fullest expansion of our economic security. Prejudice doesn't pay. Discrimination is destructive."

C. Prejudice robs us of minority talents.—Prejudice often prevents minority groups from developing their abilities and skills. It limits their achievements and deprives the Nation of their genius. We are all poorer in America today because discrimination prevents members of some minorities from rising to their greatest possible achievements, thus lessening their potential contributions to the general wealth and welfare of America.

D. Prejudice blinds us to real situation.—Prejudice makes impossible any real solution of economic, social, or personal difficulties. When we blame war or social and economic troubles on some innocent minority group, we are diverting our attention from the real causes. By blaming and hating some scapegoat for our misfortunes, we intensify rather than remove the difficulties. Social ills can only be remedied by all members of society accepting their share of responsibility and cooperating through democratic means to solve their common problems.

E. Prejudice endangers victory.—Prejudice means disunity, and disunity plays into the hands of the enemies of democracy. National unity is just as essential to victory as battle ships and flying fortresses. America can't give its maximum to the war effort unless we conquer the disrupting effects of prejudice on the fighting front and the production front.

The War Department (in ASF Manual M 5) recognizes that "discrimination on the basis of race or color * * *" is "fatal to military efficiency." And War Department pamphlet 20–3 states: "To contribute by act or word toward the increase of misunderstanding, suspicion, and tension between peoples of different racial or national origin in this country or among our allies is to help the enemy."

The Detroit race riot of June 1943 and the Philadelphia transport strike of August 1944 offer two isolated but dramatic instances of the disruptive effects of discrimination on the production front.

The walkout of 6,000 employees of the Philadelphia Transportation Co., precipitated by the assignment of 8 Negroes to jobs as streetcar operators, paralyzed the city's vast transportation system. The 6-day traffic tieup kept thousands of war workers from their jobs, and 4 million man-hours of vital war production were lost.

The 2-day Detroit race riot cut war production 15 to 50 percent in some plants, and absenteeism ranged from 20 to 90 percent. A million hours of labor were lost.

F. Prejudice endangers world peace.—Even more disastrous is the effect which news of race riots and discrimination against minorities has upon the morale of our fighting men abroad, and on the millions of people throughout the world, white and colored, whose loyalty and help are so vital to the Allied cause. It has been powerful ammunition for the propagandists of the Axis in Europe, Africa, the Near East, and particularly the Far East.

Three-fourths of the people of the world are what we call colored. These people naturally look to the treatment of our American Negroes to see what we really mean when we speak of democracy. Racial and religious prejudice alienates the confidence of the vast nonwhite populations as well as other peoples, thwarts their hopes and our hopes of peace and freedom, and ultimately creates the conditions from which future global wars can develop.

How we treat minorities is, therefore, more than a matter of mere domestic concern. Almost 13 million people in the United States were born in Europe, and 27 million have parents born in Europe. The mistreatment of some Mexicans in the United States echoes throughout North and South America; a race riot
provokes discussions and resentments in Africa, the Philippines, and among the 800 million nonwhite people in China and India.

Throughout the world there are millions of people convinced that this is a total war against fascism and fascist ideas. Their concept of peace includes the hope—even the determination—that when this war is won, there will be no such thing as superior and inferior peoples anywhere in the world.

**STORY OF AMERICA PROVES IT**

The story of America is proof that there are no superior or inferior people. Our country has been made great by people who came from every land under the sun—people with names like Carnegie, Sikorsky, Toscanini, Einstein, Osler—and thousands more. But it isn't only the big names, the hall-of-fame names, who have made America—any more than it is only the big names who are winning the war. We know that the biggest part of this war is being fought and won by the little names, by the millions of Joe Doakes who may never make tomorrow's headlines.

The men who built and are building America—who clear her forests, span her rivers, dig her coal, plow her fields, work her machines—the men who made America strong and free—and are fighting and dying to preserve that freedom on battlefields all over the world—are men of every race, color, religion, and nationality. Listen to their names at rollcall. Read their names in casualty lists—like these from the New York Times of March 29, 1945: Agostinello, Cohen, Curran, Grunwald, Hrubec, Ivanoski, Kuzlan, Marshall, Thomas, Warblanski. Were any of these inferior?

**FOUR ARMY CHAPLAINS**

Four Army chaplains—a Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, and two Protestant ministers—stood hand in hand on the deck of the sinking transport steamship Dorchester in the North Atlantic one bitter winter morning. Struck by a U-boat torpedo, the ship was doomed.

Most of the men were rescued—but not the four khaki-clad chaplains. With utter disregard for their own lives, these four had stripped off their own life-jackets and given them to soldiers who had none of their own. Then praying to God for the safety of the men abandoning the sinking ship, they remained steadfast on its deck until it plunged to the bottom.

Survivors later told of having seen the four chaplains, Lieutenant Washington, priest; Lieutenant Goode, rabbi; Lieutenant Polling and Lieutenant Fox, ministers—praying together as the ship carried them to their death.

**AIDS FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS**

The following points of information are offered with the thought that they may be helpful to you during the discussion. They have no immediate place in the discussion proper, but they may prove useful should additional questions be raised by any members of your group.

Modern science has revealed that all human blood is the same whether it be the blood of an Eskimo, Frenchman, German, Englishman, or an African pygmy—except for one basic difference. If you look at the dog tags of the men in your unit you'll notice that their are four types of blood—O, A, B, AB—and it all has to do with the matter of blood transfusions. While blood type O can be mixed successfully with the other 3, none of the other 3 can be mixed with one another without clotting.

Whites, Negroes, Mongolians—all races, religions, nationalities have every one of these blood types.

The blood and race theories of the Nazis have never been accepted by scientists and have more than been disproved by the war. It is true that years ago Germans were in the forefront in many fields of science. But today, the United States—a melting pot of all nationalities—leads the world in science. In the mid-19th century it was the British, while in the 17th century it was the Dutch who were the most scientifically inclined.

Under future historical or cultural influences, the Chinese may again be among the most advanced technological people as they were at an earlier period in world history.
In the ninth century, Scandinavians were the feared, warlike Vikings; today they are a peaceful, nonaggressive people and chief advocates of cooperatives. For centuries the Japanese had a record of uninterrupted peace and nonaggression while today Japan is one of the most warlike nations.

Immigrant groups coming to America have carried with them the special traditions, skills, and attitudes of the economic group into which they were forced. In feudal agricultural societies the Jews, excluded from agriculture, were compelled to become the merchants and craftsmen. Thus Jews in America most commonly entered commerce and certain of the skilled crafts and professions. Italians are vine growers in California for obvious geographical and historical reasons. Poles entered the coal fields because many of the first and most enterprising immigrants from Poland were miners from Silesia who established centers of Polish population in America's mining regions.

The special skills which members of a group possess and the occupations in which they engage are the result of historical conditioning and not the result of any inherent traits.

The following excerpts are from ASF Manual M 5:

"Competent scholars in the field of racial differences are almost unanimous in the opinion that race 'superiority' and 'inferiority' have not been demonstrated despite the existence of clearly defined and tested differences between individuals within every race.

"Scientific knowledge does not support the idea of the inherent superiority of any one race over another. Students of history, psychology, biology, and anthropology are in general agreement that the progress of civilization has had little or no relation to alleged inborn, biological characteristics of particular races or nationalities.

"It is agreed also that most of the differences revealed by intelligence tests and other devices can be accounted for in terms of differences in opportunity and background. The important consideration at this time, then, is how to offer increased opportunities—both physical and cultural—to all handicapped groups, regardless of race, since these variables account in large part for poor performance and achievement in every group.

"Character and personality traits unsuitable in the soldier which may exist among your men are principally the result of environment, not of race.

"The Army cannot function efficiently on the basis of theories that individual capacities are definitely fixed by a man's race.

"The Army accepts no theories of racial inferiority or superiority for American troops, but considers that its task is to utilize its men on their individual merits in the achievement of final victory. A realistic and impartial examination of the evidence on racial difference in ability supports this position."

The following are unofficial figures, compiled under the supervision of Louis I. Dublin, vice president and chief statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.:

"Jews comprise approximately 3.5 percent of the population of the United States. As of March 1, 1945, more than 500,000 Jews were in the Armed Forces. They constitute a little over 4 percent of the men and women in the service. It is estimated that on March 1, 1945, there were 35,000 Jewish casualties, approximately 7 percent of the Jews in service. Up to March 1, 1945, total casualties in the Armed Forces were 840,000, or approximately 7 percent."

For the past 100 years organizations like the "Know Nothing" Party have been asserting that a good Roman Catholic can't be, at the same time, a loyal American citizen. The Vatican, they maintain, claims absolute and unquestioning obedience in all things, and as an American citizen, a Catholic must support the church against the state.

This slander assumes the existence of a Catholic political party in the United States. Of course, there is no such thing. Catholics, like every other group, are found in all political parties.

Religious bigotry reached shameful heights in the election campaign of 1828 when the late Alfred E. Smith, a devout Catholic, was nominated for President. Anti-Catholics maintained that in the event of Smith's election, the Pope would dictate to the President, and that the interests of the United States would be subordinated to those of the church.

Alfred E. Smith stated his position clearly and unequivocally. He declared that no power in the Catholic Church could interfere with the operations of the United States Constitution or the enforcement of the laws of the land. He believed in absolute freedom of conscience for all men, and in equality of all churches, sects, and beliefs. He believed in the absolute separation of church
and state, and in the enforcement of the Constitution's provisions prohibiting Congress from enacting any law concerning an establishment of religion or preventing religion's free exercise. He believed in the common brotherhood of man and he fervently hoped that "never again in this land will any public servant be challenged because of the faith in which he has tried to walk humbly with his God."

According to an intensive study made by Fortune magazine, "there is no basis whatever for the suggestion that Jews monopolize United States business and industry. * * * The great mass of the 4,500,000 American Jews, like the great mass of American non-Jews, is made up of workers, employed and non-employed."

"First of all and very definitely," continues the Fortune survey, "they do not run banking. They play little or no part in great commercial houses like J. P. Morgan, National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Guaranty Trust Co., etc."

"Among the 93,000 bankers in the United States, the Jews constitute six-tenths of 1 percent whereas the Jewish population comprises about 3.5 percent of the total number of inhabitants. * * *"

"They have an even more inconspicuous place in basic industry * * * steel, rubber, automobiles, chemicals, coal, shipping, transportation, aviation, light and power, telephone and telegraph, engineering, lumber, mining, etc."

"In brief, Jews are so far from controlling the most characteristic of present day American activities that they are hardly represented in them at all."

"There is much Jewish participation in the textile industry as agents and jobbers, silk and cotton converters and in the manufacture of clothing. * * *"

The Fortune study concludes: "Jews do not dominate the American scene. They do not even dominate major sections of the American scene."

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

AMERICA THE HOPE OF THE OPPRESSED

"Evil doctrines of discrimination frequently imported from gangster nations plague certain areas in America. Racial and religious intolerance is being preached and practiced here by agents of our enemies, as well as by innocent victims of their propaganda. With relentless determination, our deadly opponents still seek to apply the ancient doctrine of 'divide and rule' in their drive for world domination.

"Unfortunately, propaganda poison is exceedingly difficult to remove from our national bloodstream. The aftereffects of this poison may be felt for years to come, especially if we do not recognize its danger and actively combat its spread. No nation on earth is more vulnerable to intolerance and bigotry than America, for no nation is composed of more diverse races and differing creeds than this land of the free. America became great by being a secure haven for freedom of thought and action.

"We prove conclusively that people of every race and of every creed can dwell together in harmony. In fact, America has become the hope and inspiration of all oppressed people throughout the civilized world."—President Harry S. Truman. March 17, 1945.

Dr. Schreiber. May I ask when that was reprinted, please?
(Document handed to Dr. Schreiber.)

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know anything about this, but I was curious when they reprinted it, if you know. I don't see the date on it.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that it was advertised in the Communist Daily Worker of October 21, 1945?

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know this reprint was advertised in the Communist New Masses of September 11, 1945?

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Carpenter. While you were in the service, was any action taken to prevent the sale or reprint of Army Talk by Communist organizations?
Dr. Schreiber. Look, I was so low down on the scale—first of all, I didn’t know anything about anybody doing such nonsense. Secondly, not knowing this, I wouldn’t have any authority to do anything about this sort of thing. I can’t imagine how this was done. It says “By permission of the War Department.” I don’t know who gave it to them. I never heard of it until you people told me.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that the magazine In Fact for August 27, 1945, stated:

The War Department has sent a complete set of orientation and education documents, 74 pamphlets in all, to this weekly with written permission to reprint all its restricted material.

Dr. Schreiber. I didn’t know about it until you told me in our executive session, and I pointed out to you I was not in the Army then. I was already out since June 28. Whoever gave permission I don’t know. I assume it became public property.

Mr. Carpenter. You knew nothing about this transaction at all?

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that this publication, In Fact, has been cited as subversive by congressional committees and other committees?

Dr. Schreiber. You people told me about it.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you give the citations, please?

Mr. Mandel. The publication In Fact has been cited as subversive by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. Carpenter. In Fact states in 1945 there are several thousand documented instances where a soldier in charge of orientation was called up before high officers and accused of printing subversive ideas, citing as an instance Lowry Field, Calif. Do you know anything about this statement?

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know of any other instance?

Dr. Schreiber. Incidents of what, sir?

Mr. Carpenter. Where soldiers were brought up before their commanding officers for printing subversive ideas.

Dr. Schreiber. I don’t know specifically. There is a vague recollection that people in the field, the Information and Education people in the field, were frequently accused of being subversive because they were carrying out the Information and Education program. I think there was a rumor around the division that a piece might come out, let us say, on Negro soldiers, and if some particular officer was pretty troubled about Negro soldiers, he might consider that subversive education, and things of that sort. I don’t remember anything specific.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of Army Talk No. 53?

Dr. Schreiber. I don’t know. May I look at it?

Mr. Carpenter. Our Soviet Ally.

Dr. Schreiber. No more than any other talk. I would have edited part of any Army Talk, I think. Many of them I didn’t even see. I would like to see the date on this first.

Here it is. I undoubtedly participated in the editing of this. I assume I did. It was January 6, 1945. I was in the division.

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to have that whole Talk printed in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record and become a part of the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 419," and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 419

[Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet 53, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., January 6, 1945]

CHECKING THE SCORE ON OUR SOVIET ALLY

The subject of our relations with the Soviet Union is one of the most controversial, as well as most important, that can be raised. Many deep-seated prejudices are likely to be encountered, along with confusion of ideas and lack of facts. Keep the discussion as much as possible to a realistic approach toward the central problem of whether we can get along with the U. S. S. R. after the war, and don't let it wander into lengthy side debates.

WHAT IS A SOVIET?

Consider half a dozen of the words that we casually toss around in conversation about the Russians.

Soviet: We commonly use this word to designate what was formerly called Russia. It actually means "council" in Russian. The Supreme Soviet is a legislative council, representing the group of republics officially known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Each of the republics (there are 15, not counting Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) has its own Soviet, too. Strictly, the word "Russia" now appears only in the names of the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic," which is by far the largest republic in the union.

Socialist: They are "Socialist" republics because they are organized along the lines of a system in which the means for the production (such as factories, mines, and utilities) and the distribution of wealth are the collective property of the workers. The goods which are to be consumed become the personal property of individual workers.

Communist: The Communists are the political organizers, it being their aim to spread and strengthen belief in their principles among the great majority of citizens who are not party members. They have two basic ideas. One is state ownership of factories, farms, and all other productive agencies, with distribution of the proceeds among all the workers according to their productivity. The other idea is political.

Thus, although they now have a secret police and a government-controlled press, their ultimate political ideals are directly opposite to the stated ideals of Fascist dictatorship, and their hope is to drop the appurtenances of dictatorship in the process of democratic evolution.

Red: This was the color of the Russian Revolution's flag, and thus has become identified with the whole nation in the way that "Stars and Stripes" has become a national phrase for us. In some cases, too, the word that means "red" in Russian has the further meaning of "beautiful."

END OF THE COMINTERN

Bolshevik: In the early days of the Russian Revolution, both expressions brought us a comic-strip picture of a wild-eyed individual with an unkempt beard, carrying a lighted bomb. The word in Russian has no relation to this cartoon figure; it simply means "majority," and referred to the group among the early revolutionists which believed in stronger action.

Comintern: As early as 1928, the Soviet had ousted Leon Trotsky, one of the "diehard" exponents of world revolution, who was assassinated in Mexico in 1940.

IN MANY WAYS LIKE AMERICANS

But poverty is comparative and the Russian was not suffering at the beginning of the war from such poverty as he had suffered under the czar. He was proud and reassured because the Russian state owned all the productive wealth and he no longer felt exploited by a ruling class. He is confident now that his upward march will be rapidly resumed with the end of the war, the resumption of production for civilian use, and the expansion of his great resources.
Cordial Relations in Past

After the Russian Revolution, we did not recognize the new state until 1933, partly because we disapproved of the early Soviet emphasis upon world revolution, and partly because the new regime refused to recognize debts incurred by the czar.

Avowed Stand for Peace

On its record, the Soviet policy has had a clear and realistic aim. Its avowed policy has been peace through international collective security, if possible, or strong defenses by its own efforts if collective security failed.

After Munich in September 1938, pursuing its realistic policies, the Soviet looked to its own protection. Among its actions was moving into Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and into Poland after the Nazi blitzkrieg hit the Poles in September 1939. The Soviet made a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939 which the Nazis broke, and a 5-year nonaggression pact with Japan in 1941.

Through our conferences at Moscow and Teheran, and through daily repetitions to its people through state-controlled press and radio, the Soviet has reaffirmed its aim as lasting peace through international cooperation.

Has Earned a Break

On the other hand, there are voices which automatically condemn anything the Soviet does. Their basic fear is that demonstrated success of communism might threaten their property and way of life developed under our system of free enterprise and private ownership.

Dr. Schreiber. May I point out to you, please, Mr. Carpenter, that during the war we were fighting the Axis, and the Soviets, the Chinese, the British and French were our allies. Only an Axis agent would try to cause hostility between the allies. Our task was to keep people together and to preserve national unity and allied unity, as I have outlined before.

Today, God forbid we have a war, we will not revive hostility against Japan and Germany, because we need them on our side now, and we would certainly point propaganda against the Russians.

This was done 9 or 10 years ago when every American was fighting against the common enemy. So the purposes of the division in promoting knowledge of the enemy were to preserve unity among allies, to preserve national unity; to combat prejudice, to hold people together so we could win a war, was basic psychological motivation.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you responsible for Orientation Fact Sheet No. 27, entitled “Progress and Poverty in China,” reprinted later by your division under the title “Our Chinese Ally?”

Mr. Fanelli. What number was that, counsel?

Mr. Carpenter. No. 27.

Dr. Schreiber. These were Fact Sheets before the Army Talks. I did very little of these. In fact, I think I wrote only 1 or 2. This was before Army Talks was born. I don’t remember this piece at all.

The Chairman. You do not remember it?

Dr. Schreiber. No.

The Chairman. You do not even remember editing it?

Dr. Schreiber. No. At that time I wasn’t even in the glorified position of an editor. It must have been very early in my—

The Chairman. That is an answer. Proceed.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you approve, in Fact Sheet No. 70, the following statements—

32918*—54—pt. 20—8
The Chairman. Fact Sheet No. 70. You may turn to it.
Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. What page are you talking about? I have 70. The statement he was going to read?
Mr. Carpenter (reading):

America, too, has its shameful pages of persecution of minorities.

Dr. Schreiber. What page is that, please?
Mr. Carpenter. I don’t have the page number.
Dr. Schreiber. O.K., I have the paragraph.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you approve of that statement?
Dr. Schreiber. That was an accurate statement. We have had Know Nothings; we have had persecution of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.

Mr. Carpenter (reading):

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced * * *.

Dr. Schreiber. I don’t see the statement, but would you read it again? You don’t have the original copy there? Will you read me that again? I can’t find it.

Mr. Carpenter (reading):

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced * * *

Do you approve of that?
Mr. Fanelli. It doesn’t seem to be a sentence, Counsel. There must be more to it. It is just a phrase.

Dr. Schreiber. You give me a clause out of some total of 4 or 5 or 6 pages, and I cannot find it, Counsel.

The Chairman. Did you edit that Army Talk?

Dr. Schreiber. Yes; I edited it.

The Chairman. All right; that is sufficient.

Dr. Schreiber. This was a talk devoted to combating prejudice.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have a study that you want to enter into the record?

Mr. Mandel. The Library of Congress has made a study of excerpts from Fact Sheet No. 53, comparing them with authoritative studies from other sources. I would like to have that go into the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 420,” and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 420

The Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service,

To: Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Attention: Mr. Benjamin Mandel.
From: Joseph G. Whelan, Foreign Affairs Division.
Subject: Statements on the Soviet Union.

In response to your inquiry of May 6 there are listed below selections from authoritative sources which might be contrasted with the quotations given in your inquiry:

I. Soviet Nationality Policy

A. With regard to the second and third paragraphs of your letter, selected quotations have already been given in a memorandum sent from this office on May 7, 1954.
II. SOVIET “PEACE” POLICY

A. “On its record, the Soviet policy has had a clear and realistic aim. Its avowed policy has been peace through international collective security, if possible, or strong defenses by its own efforts if collective security fails * * *

"After Munich in September 1938, pursuing its realistic policies, the Soviet looked to its own protection. Among its actions was moving into Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and into Poland after the Nazi blitzkrieg hit the Poles in September 1939. The Soviet made a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939 which the Nazis broke and a 5-year nonaggression pact with Japan in 1941.

"Through our conferences at Moscow and Tehran, and through daily repetitions to its people through state-controlled press and radio, the Soviet has reaffirmed its aim as lasting peace through international cooperation. As soldiers accustomed to facing facts, we can recognize the Soviet Union as a big accomplished fact * * * In addition, we feel that the magnificent fighting job of the Red Army against our German enemy has earned the Soviet ‘a break’ in our judgment, a new right to the benefit of the doubt * * *” (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. In contrast to this statement are the following selections:

1. “Moscow’s acceptance of a treaty with Nazi Germany, which called itself a nonaggression pact and was in fact an aggression pact directed against Poland and the Baltic States, was an act of foreign policy by the government of a great power. The Soviet Government had its reasons. One was that it had no confidence in Mr. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain. Since Munich, it had been convinced—that these two were using all the arts of diplomacy to persuade Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. When the evidence of hostility between them and Hitler became undeniable, the Soviet leaders believed—perhaps somewhat less wrongly—that if they allied themselves diplomatically with the Western Powers, and war broke out, the Soviet Union would bear the brunt of the German onslaught, while the French and British sat behind the Maginot line and watched. The second reason was that the Yezhovshchina had reduced the line armed forces and civil administration of the Soviet Union to such a pitiful condition that it could not face war. The third reason was that the Soviet leaders believed that the Anglo-French and German forces would be sufficiently well balanced to ensure a long and mutually exhausting war. While ‘the imperialists’ exhausted each other, ‘the land of socialism’ would grow stronger in peace. Later on, a chance would come to intervene in favor of world revolution, in favor, that is, of the extension of the Stalinist system to a large part of the world. Meanwhile eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia would be substantial gains.” (Source: Seton-Watson, Hugh. From Lenin to Malenkov. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953, p. 200.)

2. “Only 3 weeks later, on October 22, [1939] a typical Communist election was held in the Polish provinces seized by Russia. The purpose was to elect representatives to ‘People’s Assemblies.’ As usual, better than 90 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots, and the figures showed that better than 90 percent of the votes had gone to the candidates of various Communist-approved organizations. Within a matter of days, the newly elected People’s Assembly of the Western Ukraine in turn passed a resolution requesting that its territory be annexed to the Soviet Union, and that all large industries, banks, and land be confiscated by the state. The same process occurred in White Russia. The Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. wasted no time in recommending that the requests be granted and that the former eastern provinces of Poland be formally affixed to the Soviet Union.

“Thus the U. S. S. R. gained 76,500 [square] miles of territory and a population of 12,800,000 of whom approximately 7 million were ‘kindred’ Ukrainians, and some 3 million were ‘brother’ White Russians. The balance consisted of about a million Poles and a million Jews. In Soviet eyes the legality of the transaction was beyond question. The Socialist motherland had extended the Communist principle to more non-Soviet people in a month than it had in all of its previous 20 years history. For the records at least, 90 percent of them had expressed their gratitude at the polls. From then on, the future of Eastern Poland was to be solely a matter of internal Soviet politics.

“Strategically, the new land was not vitally important. The area provided depth, but no natural frontier barriers. Moreover, the German-controlled, wedge-shaped Suwalki District menaced Soviet defense plans in the West. Offensively, however, the new borders with Lithuania were of immediate value,
and those with the Czechoslovak Carpathian Ukraine were to prove most helpful at the end of World War II.

"In a little more than a month, the alliance with Nazi Germany had conclusively demonstrated its worth. But the dividends had just begun. There was much more to come." (Source: Carman, Ernest Day. Soviet imperialism. Russia's drive toward world domination. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1950, pp. 26-27.)

3. "Thus, the final moves of the Soviet Union in the Baltic area were quick and deadly. The Politburo waited patiently until Germany was occupied in the west with France and Britain and then carried out the Baltic coup de grace. Once again the ostensible basis for Soviet action was security. In addition, however, the Kremlin was anxious to legalize territorial seizures within its sphere of influence. The Baltic region, which a quarter of a century earlier had been Tsarist Russia's, was triumphantly restored to Soviet Russia. A 'window' on the Baltic had been opened. The U. S. S. R. achieved, as Molotov said, 'ice-free ports of which we have such great need.' Furthermore, Communist doctrine expanded with territorial acquisition. The 66,500 square miles of territory and 5,908,000 people that were affixed to the U. S. S. R. were simultaneously liberated from 'capitalist enslavement' and returned to the control of the 'toiling masses.'

"The methods employed were perhaps crude, but Soviet historians were provided with the necessary basis of legitimacy all the way through, and including a 'spontaneous' desire of the aggrandized states to become Soviet republics. Soviet history would not record, however, that the presence of the Red army made it impossible for the Baltic States to resist, or negotiate on an equal basis, that the Soviet notes had been in the form of ultimatums, that the presence of Zhadanov, Dekanozov, and Vinshinsky constituted direct interference in the internal affairs of the Baltic Republics.

"All in all, the Red army was doubtless the indispensable instrument of aggrandizement: its presence facilitated subsequent actions which otherwise could not have proceeded with such ease. Subsequently, Soviet constitutional provisions for the admittance of new states made possible the quick absorption of new Soviet regimes and added that measure of legitimacy always sought for by the Kremlin actions of this type.

"The time in which these startling acts of aggrandizement were accomplished was less than 2 weeks. When the world looked briefly away from the tragedy of June 1940, the Soviet Union presented it with a fait accompli in the Baltic. But it was not the only swift Soviet seizure of this period. With equal quickness the Politburo soon struck in the Balkans." (Source: Ibid., p. 50-51.)

III. ALLEGED DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

A. "The Supreme Soviet is a legislative council, representing the group of republics officially known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics * * * they are 'socialist' republics because they are organized along the lines of a system in which the means for the production (such as factories, mines and utilities) and distribution of wealth are the collective property of the workers. The goods which are to be consumed become the personal property of individual workers. * * * The Communists today form a political party, the only legal one in the Soviet Union. * * * the Communists are the political organizers, it being their aim to spread and strengthen belief in their principles among the great majority of citizens who are not party members. * * * Thus, although they now have a secret police and a government-controlled press, their ultimate political ideals are directly opposite to the stated ideals of Fascist dictatorship, and their hope is to drop the appurtenances of dictatorship in the process of democratic evolution." (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. In contrast to this statement are the following selections:

1. "Today the Kremlin, when discussing the state, talks about the 'collective leadership' of the central committee of the Communist Party, a group of 125 persons who are characterized as representing the best elements of the country. Not a single member of the central committee is a member of the Soviet proletariat.

"That the Soviet Union is a dictatorship over the proletariat, rather than of it, is proved by a recital of the conditions under which Soviet proletarians work. Lateness for work, playing truant from the job and similar 'economic crimes' are punishable by law. In practice, strikes are forbidden and the Soviet trade unions have as their most important function not the protection of their members but the raising of labor productivity."

* * * * * * * *
"Engles wrote in Anti-Duchring: 'The proletariat seizes the state power and transforms the means of production in the first instance into the state power. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the state. * * * The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not abolished, it withers away.'

"On this score, Soviet doctrine has explicitly repudiated the founders of socialism. Stalin, in 1929, defended the continued existence of the Soviet state as such, and called for its strengthening on the ground that it was required to defend 'socialism from foreign attack.' He heaped scorn on those who expected Marx and Engels to have foreseen all future contingencies so that 'we might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions.'

"In fact, Russia today has the most all-embracing state and the most gigantic bureaucratic apparatus the world has ever known. Where Engels had thought that with capitalism overthrown 'there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary,' the Soviet state is the most efficient repressive force known to history.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

"In the political field, the Communist Party is, and for more than three decades has been, the only political group permitted to exist. Communist ideology has the sanctity of holy writ in a theocracy. There is no sign that Stalin's successors intend to permit any real clash of political opinion to emerge in public. The recent Soviet 'elections' were the same mockery of Western forms as before. Only one candidate, approved beforehand by Moscow, was on the ballot for each seat in the Soviet Parliament." (Source: Schwartz, Harry. Communism: The Promise and the Reality. The New York Times Magazine (New York), May 2, 1954: 9, 16, 77.)

IV. ALLEGED NATIONAL UNITY IN THE SOVIET UNION

A. "Red: This was the color of the Russian revolution's flag and thus has become identified with the whole nation in the way that 'stars and stripes' has become a national phrase for us. * * * In some cases, too, the word that means 'red' in Russian has the 'furth meaning of 'beautiful.'" (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. The "New Complete Russian-English Dictionary" gives the following meaning of the word "Kapachin" "red; ruddy; fig. [figurative] serene, fine, nice, fair, beautiful, pretty, handsome; a republican, revolutionary, extremist * * *" [Source: Segal, Louis Dr. New complete Russian-English dictionary. New York, G. E. Stechert & Co., 1946. 3d ed., p. 316]. But, the suggestion of national unity in the Soviet Union might possibly be contrasted with the quotations given in the memorandum from this office of May 7. In addition, the following quotations might serve as a contrast:

1. "The Soviet Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians, and other nationalities deserted and surrendered to and welcomed the Germans—not as such, but as the enemy of the regime. The conditions created in the initial rout of the Soviet Armies were seized upon as a promise of liberation from oppression rather than as an opportunity to establish independent national minority states. The fact that the Ukrainians predominated among the defectors was principally a geographical accident of war. The same pattern of behavior on the part of the Soviet population was repeated—if more hesitantly—in other than predominantly Ukrainian areas." (Source: Nostrow, Walt Whitman. The Dynamics of Soviet Society. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1953, p. 214-215.)

2. "According to top-secret German sources 2,053,000 Soviet prisoners were taken in major battles before November 1, 1941, and a total of 3,600,000 prior to March 1, 1942. 'It is quite probable,' observes a student of anti-Soviet movements during World War II, 'that in 1941 many Soviet citizens felt only lukewarm toward their Government, and that there did exist considerable potential disaffection. But having gone this far, we can go no further with this "revolt" interpretation. It is our contention that the vastness of the early Soviet defeats cannot be satisfactorily explained without the inclusion of an entirely different concept, that of inertia.' [Sic, 'inertness?]"

"In particular, soldiers belonging to minority groups have deserted Moscow. The Central Asians, reported a wartime Soviet major, a veterinarian in private life 'had been very poor soldiers during the war * * *. They were so hostile to the Russians and to the Soviet regime that they often deserted to the Ger-
V. MEANING OF THE WORD "BOLSHEVIK"

A. "Bolshevik: In the early days of the Russian revolution, both expressions (Bolshevik, Red) brought us a comic strip picture of a wild-eyed individual with an unkempt beard, carrying a lighted bomb. The word in Russian has no relation to this cartoon figure; it simply means 'majority' * * *.” (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. Freund has given the following meaning of the word "Bolshevik":

1. "At the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (R. S. D. L. P.; see Social Democrats) held in 1903 in London, a wing of that party, led by Lenin, opposed another wing, led by Martov. Being in a majority toward the end of the congress, Lenin's party were called Bolsheviks (from the Russian word 'bolshinstvo' meaning 'majority') whereas the others were known as Mensheviks (from the Russian 'menshinstvo' meaning 'minority'). After that, Lenin formed the Bolsheviks into a separate party which, at first, continued to use the name of the R. S. D. L. P., adding, to distinguish them from the Mensheviks, a 'b' in brackets behind the abbreviation of the party name: R. S. D. L. P. (b).” (Source: Freund, Henry Alexander. Russia From A to Z, London, Angus and Robertson, Ltd., 1945, p. 45.)

With a view to demonstrating the nature of Bolshevik terrorism during the early years of the revolution which inspired the image in the above quotation A, the following is quoted:

2. "When Lady Astor, in company with Bernard Shaw and Lord Lothian, met Stalin in the summer of 1931, she blurted out the unconventional question: 'How long are you going to continue killing people?' And Stalin, possibly taken a little off his guard, shot back the retort: 'As long as it is necessary.'

"Here one has in a nutshell the philosophy of the terrorism which has always been an integral part of the Communist dictatorship. The right of the rulers to decide how long it may be necessary to go on killing people is absolute and unquestioned. The right of the individual to live does not weigh in the balance. And the absence of habeas corpus in Soviet jurisprudence has often led to the application of a sternier substitute: habeas cadaver.

"The degree of Soviet terrorism has always varied with time and circumstances. One of its fiercest outbursts was in the late summer and early autumn of 1918, when the military situation was critical and an attempt had been made on the life of Lenin. According to official reports, which certainly did not err in overexaggeration, the numbers of people who were rounded up and shot at this time ran into thousands. Another major example of Red terror occurred in the Crimea in the winter of 1920-21, after the defeat of the last White leader, Baron Wrangel. The former President of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Bela Kun, and a fanatical veteran woman Communist, Zemlyanchka, were sent to the Crimea with sweeping powers to root out counter-revolution; and under their orders there was a wholesale slaughter of former White officers and individuals of all classes who were suspected of having been in any way connected with Wrangel's regime.” (Source: Chamberlin, William Henry. Russia's Iron Age. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1934, pp. 152-153.)

VI. THE COMINTERN

A. "Comintern: As the U. S. S. R. devoted itself more and more to building up its internal economic structure and to trade with other nations, emphasis upon the Comintern lessened. On May 22, 1943, the organization was officially dissolved.” (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. In describing the seven strategies of the Communist movement, Martin Ebon wrote:

1. "The fourth strategy (1935 to 1938): United Front.—It took the Comintern more than a year to realize that Adolf Hitler, Germany's ambitious dictator, had to be taken seriously. His regime came to power on January 30, 1933. In January 1934 the Comintern finally abandoned its third strategy of extremist
revolutionary technique. It immediately pressed for a working coalition among the Communists, Socialists, and all other anti-Nazi forces. This was an abrupt change, dictated by the very real fear of Soviet leaders that Hitler's aggressive nationalist regime might translate its rantings against communism into actual military attacks on the U. S. S. R. Russia's leaders wanted the rest of the world on their side. This was no time to alienate possible allies. The Socialists, whom the Communists had only a few weeks before denounced as 'social Fascists,' as 'imposters,' as 'knaves of the bourgeoisie,' hardly had time to adjust themselves to this sudden change.

"The Popular Front Government of France was a striking illustration of Communist ability to cooperate when told to do so. There was also a shift in Comintern top leadership. The experienced and colorful Georgi Dimitrov took over as president in 1935. Dimitrov had won worldwide admiration for his courageous defense at the Reichstag trials, staged by the Nazis in 1933.

"Then, in the fall of 1936 and throughout 1937, other trials took place in Moscow. Among the defendants were Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Radek, as well as a host of other Russian officials accused of treason. For months, these Moscow trials absorbed world attention. The prosecution charged the defendants with conspiracy, linking them with Nazi Germany and Trotsky. The defendants startled the world with exceedingly frank confessions and were executed or imprisoned.

"Stalin's control and policy remained triumphant. Communist strategy was coordinated with Soviet foreign affairs, then in the hands of the moderate, westernized Maxim Litvinov. Russia joined the League of Nations and concluded alliances with France and Czechoslovakia. Everywhere, Communists cooperated actively with other leftist groups. Civil war in Spain further emphasized the split between fascism and the rest of the world. The Communists were anxious to show that they were on the side of the angels, respectable and democratic.

"The fifth strategy (1939 to 1940): Imperialist war.—The change from extremist-revolutionary protection of Russia to a popular front policy had been rapid. But it could not compare with the propagandistic somersault that followed the Soviet-German pact of August 1939. World War II began immediately afterward with the attack on Poland. The blind loyalty of Communist supporters was put to its severest test. Those who had been violently anti-Nazi were suddenly forced to help the Germans by sabotaging the war effort of the Western nations. France, where the Communist Party had enjoyed its highest prestige during the Popular Front period, was particularly affected.

"For a year and a half, the Communist press was filled with violent denunciations of British and American leaders. This worldwide spectacle of party discipline and hypocrisy ended, as abruptly as it had begun, with Germany's attacks on the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941.

"The sixth strategy (1941 to 1945): United war effort.—In many respects, the war period marked a return to the 'united front' policy. There were, however, important variations. The Comintern has suspended the class struggle. The charge of imperialism, leveled against the Western Powers during all previous strategic phases, was dropped. Strikes were no longer regarded as legitimate tools in the hands of the working class. The Communists and Soviet Russia shared with the Allied Nations the desire to defeat the Axis quickly and completely.

"Communist propaganda stressed United Nations unity: Military effectiveness in the struggle against the Axis powers became paramount. Communist units played a prominent, and often leading, role in underground movements. This was especially true in France, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.

"At the same time, the Communist parties did not fail to press special aims of the Soviet Union. When, in 1943, the Western Powers believed that establishment of a second front against the German-occupied European Continent would be militarily premature, this policy did not coincide with the wishes of the Soviet leaders. Through its diplomatic and military representatives, the U. S. S. R. pressed for a second front, while Communist groups attempted to create public pressure in the same direction.

"As victory approached, the Teheran conference among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin was used by the Communists as a symbol of Allied cooperation. Communist emphasis on this pact underlined that it assigned most of eastern Europe and the Balkans, as well as certain far eastern areas, to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.
"Throughout the War, Communist strategy played up the role of Soviet-backed military movements throughout the world. The Chinese Communist armies, the Yugoslav Liberation Movement, and the Greek National Liberation Front (EAM) were among the forces held up by the Communist press and defended against all criticism. The most celebrated case was the clash between Marshal Josip Broz-Tito of Yugoslavia and the war minister and guerrilla leader Draja Mikhailovitch, who was later executed by the Tito regime.

"Thus, the postwar policy of communism was already perceptible in outline during the war. But it remained for the seventh strategy to reveal clearly the aims of communism in a world where the Soviet Union occupies a commanding position." (Source: Eben, Martin. World Communism Today. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948, pp. 22-24.)

2. "Has the Communist International really been dissolved?

"The official Communist view, expressed by so high an authority as Joseph Stalin himself, is that it ceased to exist in 1943. But the striking similarities in policy, activities, and organizational methods that Communist parties display in every part of the world point to the existence of an international synchronization machinery.

* * * * * * 

"The precision with which the seventh strategy of world communism is being carried out permits the conclusion that the Comintern has ceased official existence while going underground." (Source: Ibid., p. 456.)

VII. NAZI PROPAGANDA

A. "Some of the people who talk so glibly about 'our future war with the Soviet' are echoing Nazi propaganda without realizing it."

B. The search for contrasting statements to this quotation was not successful.

VIII. SOVIETS VIEW POSTWAR ERA WITH OPTIMISM

A. "In many ways like Americans * * * The Russian was not suffering at the beginning of the war from such poverty as he had suffered under the Czar. He was proud and reassured because the Russian state owned all the productive wealth and he no longer felt exploited by a ruling class. He is confident now that his upward march will be rapidly resumed with the end of the war, the resumption of production for civilian use, and the expansion of his great resources. Personally, and as a nation, the Russians look to the future with confidence. In this confidence they are like Americans." (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. Contrasting views to this statement might be suggested in the selections from the memorandum of May 7 from this office. The following quotation reflects the attitude of the Soviet youth:

1. "Frederick C. Barghoorn, who for years was attached to the American Embassy and traveled widely in the Soviet Union, states:

"'Writers and poets had been given a little more freedom of expression during the war than was customary, and some of them, not realizing the temporary character of this relaxation of control, cautiously gave expression to moods which the party was not slow in denouncing as irresponsible, frivolous, and downright harmful.

"Soviet youth, particularly students, seem to have been especially hit by these moods. The Soviet press has had a good deal to say about the attitude of youth. The head of the Communist Youth League in an article written in the spring of 1946 denounced a mood of "demobilization" among a part of the young people. In some cases, their disillusionment took the form of deep discontent or even a nihilistic attitude toward Soviet life. One Soviet acquaintance told me that the regime had lost confidence in the youth, and reposed its faith in the children, who are now being subjected to intense chauvinistic indoctrination. The book "1 Want To Be Like Stalin," edited by Prof. George Counts and recently published here—a translation of parts of the Soviet handbook for teachers—indicates the flavor of this indoctrination. The skepticism of Soviet youth tends to be bitter and sardonic, though tinged with deep fatalism. It is very different from the superficial hard-boiled mood of many American young people. In part, it is the psychology of a generation which has infinitely more reason to consider itself "lost" than had its American counterpart in the 1920's. It often was told by young Soviet acquaintances that the war had taken a part of their youth and that the hard postwar period would consume the rest—if a new war didn't. Among a few of the intelligent youth, there is a feeling that the revolutionary
ideas of communism have been betrayed. I remember a conversation with a
girl student whom I met once or twice in a park in Moscow and who
denounced successful Soviet people as careerists and speculators. She said that the
NKVD men and party bosses were getting all the good things of life." (Source: Tensions in the Soviet Union. Op. cit., pp. 10-11.)

IX. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET UNION

A. "After the Russian revolution, we did not recognize the new state until
1933, partly because we disapproved of the early Soviet emphasis upon
world revolution, and partly because the new regime refused to recognize debts
incurred by the Czar." (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.)

B. There were other reasons for the [delay in] United States recognition of
the Soviet Union than the two given in the above quote A. On the subject of United
States recognition of the Soviet Union, Samuel F. Bemis, an authority on Ameri-
can diplomatic history, has written:

1. "We have already observed in a former chapter how normal relations were
restored by the United States after the First World War, with all but one great
nation, Russia, with its 168 million people in Europe and Asia. Following the
failure of the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919 to devise any solution of the
problem of Soviet Russia, the United States during 16 years refused to extend
recognition to that republic. The fundamental reason for this was the irrecon-
cilability of the revolutionary communistic theory and practice of government
with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism. The Soviet
Government strengthened this determination of the United States Government
by its refusal to sanction the loans and contracts made by previous Russian gov-
ernments with the United States and its nationals, and by its refusal to extend
recognition to American citizens in Russia the type of protection customarily extended to
aliens in the other countries of Europe. Further, the ardor of revolutionary
propaganda, not technically from the Soviet Government, in Moscow, but from
its international image, the Third Internationale, or international communistic
revolutionary society, militated against American recognition. So long as a
foreign community permitted its nationals to propagate seditious activities
within the United States and to seek to overthrow by revolution the existing
Government and Constitution of the United States, it was not difficult to under-
stand why that government should shrink so inertly from extending its own
recognition to the source of the subversive activities. The passage of time, how-
ever tended to smooth down the hitherto insuperable asperities and difficulties
and incompatibilities between the two peoples. One by one the great powers of
Europe had recognized Russia; and in 1934 Russia took its place in the League
of Nations. Even without recognition a very considerable volume of trade, more
indeed than existed after recognition, sprang up between the two republics.
Their citizens visited each other even without directly visaed passports. The
more radical features of Russian Government gave way to a slightly less rigorous
state communism. To keep in friendly relations with the states of the capital-
istic world, the Russians extended their missionary ambitions and made agree-
ments not to excite revolutionary propaganda in foreign states. Above all, the
increasing tension of Far Eastern politics, where the interests of Russia and the
United States supported each other more than they did Japanese policy, impelled
the two nations, so different in their constitutional structure and social organi-
ization to close up the gap of diplomatic irreconcilability." (Source: Bemis,
Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York, Henry
Holt & Co., 1942, pp. 734-735.)

Mr. CARPENTER. Doctor, are you now an official in any organization
known as the Washington Mental Health Association?

Dr. SCHREIBER. I am not an official. I am chairman of the Wash-
ington Mental Health Association of the district association.

Mr. CARPENTER. What is that?

Dr. SCHREIBER. It is locally an organization of people interested
in promoting mental health education by getting more clinics for the
schools, by getting more psychiatric treatment for the people. We are
short of money. We hope it will affiliate with the National Association
of Mental Health. It is one of hundreds throughout the country and
basic to the mental health needs of our country.
Mr. Carpenter. Where were you born?
Dr. Schreiber. G-o-r-d-o-k, Ukraine, Russia, on September 10, 1908, and I came to the United States when I was 4 years and 9 months old, June 19, 1913.

Mr. Carpenter. We have some documents to be placed into the record.

Mr. Mandel. I have here the Daily Worker of October 21, 1945, placing and promoting the ILD, International Labor Defense, a reprint, which I offer for the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 421" and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 421**

[From the Daily Worker, October 21, 1954] ¹

**Prejudice! Roadblock to Progress**

**The Army’s Orientation Course**

Here is part of the United States Army’s orientation course on racial, religious, and political prejudice. To give this excellent exposé of the senselessness of prejudice the widest possible distribution the International Labor Defense has reprinted the entire course. It may be obtained in single copy at 5 cents or in quantity at cheaper prices from the ILD, 112 East 10th Street, New York 3, N. Y.

**How Prejudices Develop**

All of us inherit certain characteristics such as the color of our skin and the shape of our head. But we do not inherit our prejudices. When we are born we have only the capacity to develop love and hate and the other human emotions.

Whom we learn to like or dislike, love or hate, depends on our experiences—in our home, in our school, in our neighborhood—and the effect these experiences have upon us. The language we learn, our religion, ideas, feelings, and attitudes, our manners and prejudices—all these come from our environment.

As children, we imitate not only activities of those around us, especially our parents, but also feelings, attitudes, and opinions. Prejudices, too, are absorbed unconsciously from our parents and other people in our environment.

By the time we have grown up we already have pictures in our mind of many people with whom we’ve had little or no contact. We may have a stereotyped picture of Negroes as lazy, stupid, happy-go-lucky; of Jews or Scots as stingy and money mad; of Irishmen as hot tempered, brawling, whisky loving. These stereotypes are being constantly reinforced through newspapers, movies, conversation, and jokes, books, and radio. A single story, comic strip, or movie may not make too deep an impression. However, when time after time the Negro is presented as a crap-shooting, shiftless character; the Latin as a gangster or racketeer; the oriental as a slinking, mysterious, and crafty person—then deep and lasting impressions are made which go to form attitudes and prejudices.

**Errors of Generalizing**

There is another way that we get false ideas about whole groups of people. As youngsters we may have played games with boys in the neighborhood, and one of them, perhaps a Pole or an Italian, may have cheated. We then conclude that all Poles or all Italians cheat, and we carry this idea with us all through life. We conclude that because one member of a group acted in a certain way, all members of that racial, religious, or national group will act the same way. We usually make these false generalizations about any group but our own.

¹ Text, as printed by the International Labor Defense, appears at p. 1558.
Prejudices develop, too, from a feeling of insecurity or frustration. We may feel uncertain about our ability or prestige. We may feel insecure in our job or our social position. To strengthen our own confidence and feeling of self-importance we often search for someone to look down upon as inferior or some group to blame for our failure and misfortune.

Prejudices are often deliberately exploited by some people to further their own purposes. The Germans used the hate technique to divide opposition, to confuse the real issues, to blame national or international ills on innocent scapegoats, and to gain a following by a common hate. "Hate the Jews," they yelled. "Hate the Poles." "Hate the Russians." "Hate the Catholics." "Hate them for their color, their religion, their politics, their nationality. Hate them for any reason—or for no reason—but hate them. For hate meant power to the Nazis.

WHAT IS A MINORITY?

2. What do we mean by a minority?
If you're a Catholic, you're part of a minority, because Catholics don't number more than half of the people in this country. If you are a Negro, a foreign born, a Jew, you're a member of a minority.

Now, if you're a Protestant, you're a member of a majority group in America—but Protestants include Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and scores of other minorities. And while a Protestant may be part of a majority group in one locality in the United States, he may be in numerical minority in another locality.

America, like the rest of the world, is made up of minorities—religious, racial, and national. Let us remember that a minority group, like the Poles or the Negroes in America, may be a majority group elsewhere (say in Poland or Africa), and that a majority group today may become a minority group tomorrow—or vice versa.

ALL HAVE BEEN SCAPEGOATS

3. Have all minority groups been scapegoated?
At one time or another, every minority group has been used as a scapegoat and has suffered from prejudice and persecution. If we go back into history, we find powerful leaders who covered up their own selfish motives by inciting people's emotions against troublemaking minorities.

PERSECUTION IN AMERICA

4. How about America? Has our own history been free of scapegoating?
America, too, has its shameful pages of persecution of minorities. Many of our early settlers who came here to escape religious prejudices and persecution denied religious freedom to others. Massachusetts expelled dissenters like Roger Williams, while in Salem hysterical witch hunts were pursued. In one colony or another, Catholics, Quakers, Jews, Lutheran, Moravians, Presbyterians, Baptists deists, atheists, were deprived of political and religious rights.

In the 19th century, earlier immigrant groups began to discriminate against the newer immigrants. Feeling ran high against the invasion of the Irish who arrived in large numbers after Ireland's potato famine in 1846. Riots broke out against them in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. They were accused of introducing plagues, crimes, and of depriving Americans of jobs.

In 1850, the Know Nothing Party was formed to fight the Irish and Catholic immigrants, and the party remained a political force until the Civil War. They and their prejudiced successors yelled about "the flood of immigration sweeping its millions of foreign Roman Catholics over the land."

What many seem to forget is that we are all immigrants or the children of immigrants. No one has a right to complain about foreigners unless it be the American Indian. "Americanism," said our late President Roosevelt, "is not and never was a matter of race and ancestry. Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart."
Job Discrimination

Rumors

Hate Groups

Danger Signals
4. Bad Housing
5. Police Bias
6. Juvenile Crimes
5. Are there any signs that prejudices and discrimination are decreasing in America?

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced, nevertheless, the liberties and freedoms which we share and which bind this Nation together, are one of the glorious chapters in human history.

From the time of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation to the present time, laws have been passed to carry forward the democratic principle "that all men are created equal."

A great advance was made in June 1941, when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 and declared: "It is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin." The order required that in all war contracts there was to be no discrimination "because of race, creed, or national origin" and sets up the Fair Employment Practice Committee to enforce this provision.

SIX DANGERS OF PREJUDICE

6. Why is religious and racial prejudice a threat to all of us?

A. Prejudice is contagious: History has taught us that when we discriminate against one segment of the people, we set a pattern that may be used against other groups. Hitler's persecution of the Jews, trade unionists, Communists, and Socialists was later directed against Catholics, Protestants, liberals, and eventually the people of the world.

Consideration for the Negro, the Jew, the Catholic, the foreign born, or for any other minority group, rests not merely on the grounds of humanity and justice; it rests on the solid base of self-interest.

B. Prejudice makes all of us poorer: We can't have an enlightened democracy with minority groups living in ignorance. We can't have a prosperous democracy with minority groups so poor that they can't afford to buy the goods America produces.

If a minority is kept at a low wage scale in the same field or area in which we work, eventually our own wages will be reduced because of a smaller demand for consumer goods and the competition of cheap labor. Conversely, a higher standard of living for any group increases the demand for consumer goods and makes for a more prosperous country. Aside from the fact that it is Christian and democratic, it is also to our own selfish interest to help secure better housing, clothing, and nutrition for all our people.

C. Prejudice robs us of minority talents: Prejudice often prevents minority groups from developing their abilities and skills. It limits their achievements and deprives the Nation of their genius. We are all poorer in America today because discrimination prevents members of some minorities from rising to their greatest possible achievements, thus lessening their potential contributions to the general wealth and welfare of America.

D. Prejudice blinds us to real situation: Prejudice makes impossible any real solution of economic, social, or personal difficulties. When we blame war or social and economic troubles on some innocent minority group, we are diverting our attention from the real causes. By blaming and hating some scapegoat for our misfortunes, we intensify rather than remove the difficulties. Social ills can only be remedied by all members of society accepting their share of responsibility and cooperating through democratic means to solve their common problems.

E. Prejudice endangers victory: Prejudice means disunity, and disunity plays into the hands of the enemies of democracy. National unity was just as essential to victory as battleships and flying fortresses.

The War Department (in ASF Manual M 5) recognizes that "discrimination on the basis of race or color * * *" is "fatal to military efficiency." And War Department pamphlet 20-3 states: "To contribute by act or word toward the increase of misunderstanding, suspicion and tension between peoples of different racial or national origin in this country or among our Allies is to help the enemy."

F. Prejudice endangers world peace: Even more disastrous is the effect which news of race riots and discrimination against minorities had upon the morale of millions of people throughout the world, white and colored, whose loyalty and help were so vital to the allied cause. It was powerful ammunition for
the propagandists of the Axis in Europe, Africa, the Near East, and particularly
the Far East.
Three-fourths of the people of the world are what we call "colored." These
people naturally look to the treatment of our American Negroes to see what we
really mean when we speak of democracy. Racial and religious prejudice alienates
the confidence of the vast non-white population as well as other peoples,
thwarts their hopes and our hopes of peace and freedom, and ultimately creates
the conditions upon which future global wars can develop.

How we treat minorities is, therefore, more than a matter of mere domestic
concern. Almost 13 million people in the United States were born in Europe, and
27 million have parents born in Europe. The mistreatment of some Mexicans
in the United States echoes throughout North and South America; a race riot
provokes discussions and resentments in Africa; the Philippines, and among
the 800 million non-white people in China and India.

Throughout the world there are millions of people convinced that the war was a
total war against Fascism and Fascist ideas. Their concept of peace includes the
hope—even the determination—that in peace, there will be no such things as
"superior" and "inferior" peoples anywhere in the world.

STORY OF AMERICA PROVES IT

The men who built and are building America—who clear her forests, span
her rivers, dig her coal, plough her fields, work her machines—the men who made
America strong and free—and fought and died to preserve that freedom on
battlefields all over the world—are men of every race, color, religion, and na-
tionality. Listen to their names at roll call. Read their names in casualty
lists—like these from the New York Times of March 20, 1945:

Agostinello, Cohen, Curran, Grunwald, Hrabec, Ivanoski, Kuzian, Marshall,
Thomas, Warblanski. Were any of these "inferior."

Mr. MANDEL. And an advertisement in the New Masses, a Com-
munist magazine, advertising the sale of Fact Sheet No. 70.

The CHAIRMAN. It will go into the record and become a part of
the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 422" and is as
follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 422

[FROM NEW MASSES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1945]

NOW AVAILABLE FOR CIVILIAN USE

ARMY TALK, ORIENTATION FACT SHEET NO. 70:

PREJUDICE—ROADBLOCK TO PROGRESS

The complete text of this important Army education pamphlet. The answer to
Bilbo and Rankin.

Reprinted by permission of the War Department by International Labor
Defense, 112 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y.—100 for $1; 500 for $16; 1,000
for $30.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

There are no further questions. You may stand aside.

Mr. FANELLI. We have some documents to be submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. You can submit them to the committee and we will
determine whether or not they may go into the record.

Mr. FANELLI. Do you want them now?

The CHAIRMAN. You may stand aside, Doctor. We will not excuse
you at this time.

Any documents you wish to, you may submit them to the committee.

Mr. FANELLI. When do you want me to do that?

The CHAIRMAN. You may submit them to the committee now.

Mr. FANELLI. May we have just a moment?
The CHAIRMAN. Surely.
In the meantime, we will complete the record here. Go ahead, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. I would like to place into the record previous testimony that the committee has received from other witnesses who were in the Orientation and Information Section. I quote first the testimony of Jerome A. Oberwager, who testified before the subcommittee on February 19, 1953. He said, in answer to questions:

Mr. MORRIS. What was your assignment while you were in the Army?
Mr. OBERWAGER. Production of audio-visual material, charts, and film scripts.
Mr. MORRIS. To what base were you assigned?
Mr. OBERWAGER. Aberdeen Training Center.
Mr. MORRIS. In other words, all your actual Army work was from the Aberdeen Training Center?
Mr. OBERWAGER. That is correct.
I produced film scripts, not films, and other audiovisual devices for training.
Mr. MORRIS. Training with the United States Army personnel?
Mr. OBERWAGER. That is correct.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you, during that period, a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. OBERWAGER. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.¹

Then we had testimony by Alexander Svenchansky. The testimony of Mr. Svenchansky is as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you have held employment with an organization called the All Russian Textile Syndicate; have you not?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. I did, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. That was in September 1928?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. Yes, I believe so.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Communist Party in September 1928 when you commenced that employment?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. I plead the same privilege.
The CHAIRMAN. The same record, Mr. Reporter, fifth amendment against self-incrimination.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, you worked for the Amorg Trading Corp., New York City, from March 1932 to April 1932; did you not?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you a Communist Party member at that time?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. I refuse to answer, sir, on the same ground.

* * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly about your Army experiences?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. I got my basic training, I believe it was in Georgia, then I transferred to Fairbanks, Alaska, and then to Tanacross, Alaska.
Mr. MORRIS. Spell that Tanacross.
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. T-a-n-a-c-o-r-s.
Then I was transferred to White Horse, to Great Falls and released, having received an honorable discharge.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you an education and information officer in the Army?
Mr. SVENCHANSKY. Yes, sir, I was.²

Then we have the testimony of George A. Faxon, who testified in 1953.³ His testimony is as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. When did you serve in the Army, Mr. Faxon?
Mr. FAXON. From January of 1943, I believe, to January of 1946.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, what kind of service did you render while you were in the United States Army?
Mr. FAXON. I was an officer in the Information and Education Branch.
Mr. MORRIS. Officer in the Information and Education Branch of the United States Army? Where were you stationed?
Mr. FAXON. I was stationed at a lot of places.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us some of the places you were?

¹ P. 454, hearings on United States citizens employed by the United Nations.
² Ibid., p. 670.
³ Subversive Influences in the Educational Process, p. 682.
Mr. Faxon in the course of his testimony pleaded the fifth amendment when he was asked about his Communist affiliations. The last one that I would like to put into the record is Diana Wolman, who testified before the Senate Committee on Government Operations. She also pleaded the fifth amendment and stated she was employed as follows:

Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been employed by the Army Signal Corps?
Mrs. Wolman. Yes; I have. But contrary to the lies which was told after the other hearing, I was never in Fort Monmouth and I never worked in the radar laboratory.

Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been employed by the Army Signal Corps?
Mrs. Wolman. Yes, I have.
Mr. Cohn. When?

Then she goes on further and states that, as advertised by the Jefferson School for Social Science, a Communist organization, she taught at Brooklyn College and the Central Army Induction Station in New York City.

I would like to have those in the record.
The Chairman. All right.
Do you gentlemen have your material that you want to submit?
Mr. Fanelli. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Will you pass it up?
Mr. Fanelli. This bears on various aspects.
The Chairman. You may stand by for the time being.

At an open hearing September 28, 1954, the following record was made:

Mr. Carpenter. And for the I. and E. record, we have the testimony of Benjamin Holmes Haddock on February 1, 1954, before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. We would like to have an excerpt of about 2 pages from that testimony entered into the record at the proper place.

The Chairman. At the proper place in the I. and E. record it will be inserted and made a part of the record.
(The testimony referred to was marked "Exhibit 442-B" and is as follows:)

Exhibit 442-B

Mr. Tavenner. You joined the party after you were discharged from the United States Army?
Mr. Haddock. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you tell the committee, please, the circumstances under which you became a member?
Mr. Haddock. May we be off the record a minute?
Mr. Tavenner. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Tavenner. On the record.
Mr. Haddock. In answer to your question, I walked into the party office in San Diego and asked for an application form, and signed it. The person who accepted it was Mrs. Lolita Bunyard. Her name now is Gibson. She married after the time of my joining.

*Army Signal Corps—Subversion and Espionage, p. 213.
Communist Activities in the State of California, pt. 2, pp. 4597, 4598.
Well, I became interested in the Communist Party through men who were in the information and education section of the Army. I had more education than most of the men in my outfit, even though it was only a B. A., and then we went to the Gilbert Islands; I was on that invasion and was stationed there for 8 months following the invasion, so while there they needed someone to do the information and education, which I volunteered to do. There wasn't much else to do, and I also found it quite interesting. There weren't any libraries there.

Well, I might interject here the comment that the person who really gave me the introduction to this was a little fellow named Solomon Kantor, from New York City, who was a subscriber to this little labor paper called In Fact, and he gave me copies of that, and he gave me a book by Seldes, I think, Facts on Fascism, so this was interesting. I don't know how leftist this boy was, but this was certainly the kind of thing that appealed to him, and although most of my activity on Makin was fairly intellectual in terms of presenting factual material and had no leftist tinge, as far as I was able to discern, I had no introduction to anyone who might be described as a real leftist; however, when I got back to Hawaii it was purely by accident that I met a man, whose name I have been trying to think of for the last week, who was in the information and education section of the Antiaircraft Command, and he came in and talked to me one day. I was just about to take a 5-day pass to Hawaii, that is, the Island of Hawaii, and he told me he was organizing a school for officers and enlisted men as a part of the information and education program so that the two groups could be brought closer together so they could function more effectively.

I don't know whether I met him again or not—I may have—but if I did it was in passing, because he was returned to the mainland; but he said, "You come up to the information and education shack; there are several other fellows who meet here whom you will get to know." And sure enough, I was interested; and I met three fellows, one or whose name was Martin Mitchnick; another one was Robert Gould—and both of these, incidentally, are from Detroit—and then a third one who I think was like me, sort of excited by this new area, a fellow named Murray Crummins.

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know where he was from?

Mr. Haddock. No; I don't. The last time I heard, he was living with his mother in a hotel in New York City, which was used by one of the social organizations that handle refugees when they come in.

TESTIMONY OF CARL FENICHEL, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, JOSEPH FORER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Forer. Mr. Counsel, may we ask for the usual instructions to photographers?

The Chairma. The witness does not care to be photographed. We will comply with his request.

Will you be sworn and testify. Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Fenichel. I do.

The Chairman. Be seated.

Let the record show that Mr. Fenichel is here with his counsel, Mr. Forer.

State your name.

Mr. Fenichel. Carl Fenichel.

The Chairman. Where do you reside?

Mr. Fenichel. New York City, 166 Second Avenue.

The Chairman. What is your business or profession?

Mr. Fenichel. Right now I am a director of a school for disturbed children.

The Chairman. Director of a school for disturbed children. All right, proceed with the question.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Fenichel, you were in the armed services during the last war?

Mr. Fenichel. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Carpenter. World War II?

Mr. Fenichel. Yes.

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first enter the service?

Mr. Fenichel. I was inducted in January 1943, at Fort Dix. Do you want me to give a history of my Army career since then?

Mr. Carpenter. Just in summary.

Mr. Fenichel. Brief, yes. From there I was sent for basic training to Kearns, Utah. After I completed my basic training I was sent to Jonesboro, Ark., to an Army Administration School. Then I was assigned to Syracuse, to some company, as a company clerk. The company was then moved to Ardmore, Okla.

From Ardmore, Okla., we went to Charleston. At Charleston the company was broken up and I was assigned to Charleston headquarters.

The Chairman. May I interrupt at this time and go back to the record on Dr. Schreiber. We have just received a communication from the Office of the Department of the Army, office of the counselor, stating that Julius Schreiber's appointment and reserve commission expired on April 1, 1953, by operation of law. So that clears up that point.

Mr. Fenichel. In Charleston I was assigned to the headquarters. I think it was because of overage, I was about 38 at the time, and typed special orders and did clerical work.

At that time, I also helped write a musical play for the base. I used to write jingles that we put in the Daily Bulletin selling war bonds. A lieutenant there, I don't recall his name, I think it is Lieutenant Arthur, but I am not sure, who ran the Army film office, came to the office and asked me if I would, when some Army films came, introduce the Army films. He wanted some one who could present a little introduction, which I did.

At that time there was an order, I think, for some one to go to Washington and Lee, to the I. and E. School. He sent me to the school.

I remember at that time the first time I went, I was told to go back because it was only for commissioned officers, that type group. I remember coming about 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning and being told I had to go back. A few months later I went to the school again, where enlisted men were now taken.

Following that, I went back to Charleston and about 2 weeks later I received orders to go to 205 42d Street, and then I was——

Mr. Carpenter. New York?

Mr. Fenichel. New York City.

And then I went to Washington and I was told I was assigned to this Division involving the writing of Army talks and training discussion leaders. That is the work I did from about August, I think, 1944, around that time, I am not too clear, up until the time I was discharged in 1945.

Mr. Carpenter. Was Colonel Schreiber your immediate superior officer?

Mr. Fenichel. I wouldn't say he was my immediate. I didn't have a very clear picture, honestly, of who was my immediate superior. It was a rather flexible setup. We had in New York City a group of
people who were assigned to writing talks, and we also had the pilot team which operated from there.

In New York City there were a number of commissioned officers, I know, who were immediate superiors, but then Dr. or Colonel Schreiber came from Washington sometimes, or sometimes we were told to go to the Pentagon to do some writing. He was certainly superior to me, as was a lot of other people in the I. & E.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever confer with Colonel Schreiber in your work?

Mr. Fenichel. Yes.

Mr. Carpenter. How about Col. Fred Herzberg?

Mr. Fenichel. I never met the man. I think he had been at the school before I did, maybe, or the I. & E. Division. I heard the name but never met the man.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Fenichel, were you a member of the Communist Party when you were in the Armed Forces?

Mr. Fenichel. No, sir; I wasn't.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party prior to your entry into the Armed Forces?

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself. However, I would like to say that during the last 10 years I have been completely inactive and disinterested politically.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party a week before you entered the armed services?

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

The Chairman. The day before?

Mr. Fenichel. The same.

The Chairman. Two minutes before?

Mr. Fenichel. The same.

The Chairman. Before you held up your hand to take your oath, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of the Army Talks?

Mr. Fenichel. I did, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. I show you a copy of the Army Talk 1 through 100, and ask you to look through and list for us the Army Talks which you worked on and describe the nature of the work.

Mr. Fenichel. May I look just at the table to make it easier?

The Chairman. You may.

Mr. Fenichel. I do recall the title "From D-Day to D-Plus 337," Army Talk No. 77. I worked on Army Talk 64. I worked on Army Talk 70, the one on prejudice. I know I worked on an Army Talk on lend-lease, and I wrote or helped write an Army Talk on manpower. Those are the only ones I can recall doing any kind of work on.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Carpenter. That was all you did any kind of work on.

Do you know anything about securing these documents for reprinting by an organization known as the International Labor Defense, with offices at 112 East 19th Street, New York?

Mr. Fenichel. Any of these documents from there?

The Chairman. For example, Army Talk 70, I think you referred to, you said you had something to do with the preparation of that?
Mr. Fenichel. That is right.
The Chairman. Did you know this organization reprinted that Army Talk?
Mr. Fenichel. This took place during the war? I wasn't aware of it. The only thing I was aware of, and I know we resented it, was the fact that In Fact reprinted one of our Army Talks. We weren't told about it. I heard about it later, and many of us talked about it and did not like it.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has a reference he wants to put into the record.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a copy of In Fact for August 27, 1945, which is headed "The War Department Has Sent Its Complete Set of Orientation and Education Documents. 74 Pamphlets in All, to This Weekly, With Written Permission To Reprint All Its Restricted Material."

This sheet reprinted parts of Fact Sheet No. 8, Fact Sheet No. 29, Fact Sheet No. 34, Fact Sheet No. 53, on our Soviet Ally. I offer this for the record.

Mr. Fenichel. Gentlemen, I had nothing to do with those.

The Chairman. I would like for the staff to make some research on who gave permission to this magazine, In Fact, to reprint these restricted documents of the United States Army.

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Chairman, we have asked the Defense Department who gave permission to these organizations, and thus far they have not been able to find any written permission or who was responsible.

The Chairman. I would like that to be pursued until we determine who was responsible.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Fenichel, were you a teacher in the New York City school system?

Mr. Fenichel. I was.

Mr. Carpenter. When and for how long were you employed?

Mr. Fenichel. From about 1929 or 19—even, maybe 1930 or 1931, until the time I went into the Army. And then after the war I went into the national institute for a few months. I left, I think it was about a year or so later, after I went back to the school system.

Mr. Carpenter. What were the circumstances surrounding your leaving the New York City school system?

Mr. Fenichel. I will tell you. After I got out of the Army I had 2 heart attacks, 1 shortly after and 1 a few years ago. I was beginning to feel the same kind of pain again, chest pains, pains here [indicating], and my doctor recommended that I get out of the school system.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you resign?

Mr. Fenichel. I retired on disability.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you under a loyalty investigation at the time?

Mr. Fenichel. I wouldn't call it that. What happened was this: After I had seen my doctor, about a month and a half after, I did get a letter asking me to appear, as did hundreds of other teachers, many of whom are still in the school system. Because my retirement went through, I didn't appear before the board.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. Fenichel. No, I was not.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you in fact a member of the Flatbush-Browns Height section of the Communist Party in New York?
Mr. Fenichel. I was not.
Mr. Carpenter. Was your wife a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Fenichel. Are you referring to what time now? After 1943?
Mr. Carpenter. At any time?
Mr. Fenichel. Well, I can answer questions beyond 1943, which is the time I said I have been completely disinterested in politics,
Mr. Carpenter. Prior to 1943?
Mr. Fenichel. I use the fifth amendment, sir, before that,
Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the New York Teachers' Union?
Mr. Fenichel. I was.
Mr. Carpenter. Do you know that it has been expelled because of its Communist control from both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations?
Mr. Fenichel. I know that.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the executive board of the teachers' union in 1939?
Mr. Fenichel. I was.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the executive board, together with the following individuals who invoked the fifth amendment before this committee with regard to the Communist Party membership.
Meyer Case?
The Chairman. What was your answer?
Mr. Fenichel. Was I a member of the executive board with Meyer Case? That is right.
The Chairman. You were?
Mr. Fenichel. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. Abraham Lederman?
Mr. Fenichel. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. And the following officials: Charles J. Hendley?
Hendley was president?
Mr. Fenichel. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. Eugene Jackson, vice president?
Mr. Fenichel. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. Also Bella Dodd, legislative representative, who admitted her former Communist Party membership?
Mr. Fenichel. Was I a member with her, do you mean? That is right. She was on the executive board.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you attend Communist Party meetings with them?
Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason.
Mr. Carpenter. Was Hyman Forstenzer associated with you in the Education and Information Division in the Army?
Mr. Fenichel. He was.
Mr. Carpenter. Was he also a member of the executive board of the union?
Mr. Fenichel. He was, as far as I can remember he was; yes.
Mr. Fenichel. That is right.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you write for the New York Teacher?
Mr. Fenichel. The Teacher News I wrote for.
Mr. Carpenter. You didn't write the New York Teacher?
The Chairman. At that time were you a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer any question up to 1943.
The Chairman. Under your rights of the fifth amendment, that your answer might tend to incriminate you.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you employed by the Executive Office of the President's National Resources Planning Board?
Mr. Fenichel. The President of the—
Mr. Carpenter. The National Resources Planning Board.
Mr. Fenichel. I never heard of the organization as far as I can remember.
Mr. Carpenter. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel?
Mr. Fenichel. I was never employed by either one.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have something for the record?
Mr. Mandel. I have here a memorandum dated July 3, 1942, from the Executive Office of the President, National Resources Planning Board, National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, addressed to the Personnel Procedure Section, Office of the Adjutant General, re Registrant, Carl Fenichel. It says:

The above man probably will be inducted into the Army on the date indicated. Our records indicate that Mr. Fenichel received a B.S. degree in English and economics from the City College of New York in June of 1928. Mr. Fenichel is now employed by the Board of Education.

Mr. Fenichel. But I was never employed—that was the question you asked. Was I ever employed by them. I may have applied. I may have applied to them. I don't know what the procedure is. But I was never employed by them as such. That was the question you asked me.

Mr. Carpenter. You said you never heard of this organization; is that right?
Mr. Fenichel. That is true. Now that you recall it, I think there was an organization like that many years ago, but I don't know how it happened, whether I was asked to apply or not.
The Chairman. That may go into the record and become a part of the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 423" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 423
Executive Office of the President,
National Resources Planning Board,
National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel,
Washington, D. C., July 3, 1942.

Personnel Procedures Section,
Office of the Adjutant General,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
(For the attention of: Lt. Col. Frederick S. Foltz.)
Re: Registrant: Fenichel, Carl.
Address: 106 Second Avenue, New York, N. Y.
Order No. 2205.
Registered with Local Board No. 11 of New York, New York County, N. Y.
Probable date of induction: July 7, 1942.
The above man probably will be inducted into the Army on the date indicated.
Our records indicate that Mr. Fenichel received his B.S. degree in English and economics from the College of the City of New York in June 1928.
Mr. Fenichel is now employed by the Board of Education, Public School 246, Veronica and Snyder Avenues, Brooklyn, N. Y., where he is a teacher of English and health education. He supervises the central library and conducts the boys' athletic and health program. He is also editor of Teachers News. Public speaking and photography are his hobbies.

Yours sincerely,

STEUART HENDERSON BRITT,
Consultant.

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT,
War Manpower Commission,
Washington, D. C., January 7, 1943.

Classification and Enlisted Replacement Branch,
The Adjutant General's Office,
War Department, Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

Re: Registran : Fenichel, Carl.
Address : 166 Second Avenue, New York, N. Y.
Order No. 2265.
Registered with Local Board No. 11 of New York, New York County, N. Y.
Probable date of induction, January 11, 1943.

The above-named man probably will be inducted into the Army on the date indicated. Our records indicate that Mr. Fenichel received his B. S. S. degree in English and economics from the College of the City of New York in June 1928.

Mr. Fenichel is now employed by the board of education, Public School 246, Veronica and Snyder Avenues, Brooklyn, N. Y., where he is a teacher of English and health education. He supervises the central library and conducts the boys' athletic and health program. He is also editor of Teacher News. Mr. Fenichel is experienced as a teacher of geography and indicates that public speaking and photography are his hobbies.

Yours sincerely,

STEUART HENDERSON BRITT,
Consultant.

Mr. Carpenter. After you left the Armed Forces, were you associated with any one from the information and education division in an organization known as the National Institute of Social Relations?

Mr. Fenichel. That is right, I was for a short period of time, for about 5 months.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you associated with Julius Schreiber and Hyman Forstenzer in that organization?

Mr. Fenichel. That is right.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you at any time make your Communist record known to the Army authorities?

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

The Chairman. The same answer, the fifth amendment, that it might tend to incriminate him.

If there are no further questions, you may stand aside.

The committee will stand adjourned. All witnesses will be excused at this time. One witness will be called at a later time.

You may consider yourself, Mr. Gandell, under subpoena. You will be called at a later time and we will give you ample notice through your attorney, Mr. Forer.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a. m., the committee was recessed subject to call.)
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 5, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
Present: Senators Jenner and Welker.
Present also: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; Robert C. McManus and Dr. Edna Fluegel, professional staff members.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Gerson, will you come forward, please? Will you be sworn to testify?

Do you swear that the testimony given before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Gerson. I do.

TESTIMONY OF SIMON W. GERSON, BROOKLYN, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, ROYALE W. FRANCE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The Chairman. Give us your full name.
Mr. Gerson. Simon W. Gerson.

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Gerson?
Mr. Gerson. 8860 18th Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y.

The Chairman. What is your business or profession?
Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on two grounds, both constitutional grounds.

The first is on the first amendment grounds—that this or any other congressional committee has not the power to inquire into the opinions, beliefs, or associations of any American under our Constitution.

Secondly, I respectfully decline to answer the question and invoke my right under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself. I might state to the committee that I regard the fifth amendment, along with millions of other Americans, as a shield of innocent as well as of the guilty.

The Chairman. The committee made inquiry of what you did, what your business is. We would not recognize your refusal to answer or recognize your refusal to answer under the first amendment. We would recognize your refusal to answer under the fifth amendment,
providing you think that whatever you do might tend to incriminate you.

Mr. Gerson. I renew my answer, sir.
The Chairman. That is your testimony?

Mr. Gerson. I renew my answer, sir, on both grounds.
The Chairman. All right.
Proceed, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel at this time has a clipping he would like to read.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Mandel. The Daily Worker of August 4, 1954, page 4, in an article headed “Questions and Answers on the New York Election Campaign,” by Simon Gerson, has this footnote:

Because of the interest of our readers in the 1954 New York election campaign, we are reprinting in two installments a series of questions and answers on the campaign by Simon W. Gerson, legislative director of the Communist Party in New York City.

In the same paper, on page 3, I find that there is a little publicity on this hearing, saying as follows:

Simon W. Gerson, who will chair the National Communist Party election campaign rally of August 6, has been subpoenaed by the Jenner Internal Security Subcommittee.

I ask that those two items be placed into the record, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. They will go into the record and become part of the record.

(The articles referred to were marked “Exhibits Nos. 435a and 435b” and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 435-A

[From the Daily Worker, Aug. 4, 1954]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW YORK ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Because of the interest of our readers in the 1954 New York election campaign, we are reprinting, in two installments, a series of questions and answers on the campaign by Simon W. Gerson, legislative director of the Communist Party in New York State. They are published in the July issue of Party Voice, publication of the New York Communist Party

(By Simon Gerson)

Question. What about the American Labor Party in New York State?
Answer. Its role was well defined by one of its leaders, Paul L. Ross, at its opening campaign rally at Manhattan Center, May 6, Ross said:

“The ALP enters the 1954 election campaign determined to fight every manifestation of the program of McCarthyism, without regard to the political label it bears.

“On the other hand, we still join forces, or fight independently, along the same lines, with all those people and organizations who will fight McCarthyism, whatever the segment of the program they may attack.”

Question. Will the ALP have a candidate for governor in this election?
Answer. Paul Ross, in the major policy speech quoted above, made it plain that the best way to defeat Dewey in New York would be a common front of the Democratic, Liberal, and Labor Parties, backed by the trade-union movement. At the same time, however, he pointed out that it is virtually impossible at this moment to obtain such formal agreement. He therefore suggested—and the ALP is following this suggestion—that while the ALP direct its main fire at Dewey and McCarthyism, it run its own candidate for Governor.

Failure to run a candidate—and obtain at least 50,000 votes for that candidate—would mean the loss of official status as a ballot party.
It is the position of the ALP that it is possible to attain a powerful anti-Dewey movement which will accomplish both objectives: (1) Defeat Dewey; and (2) obtain more than the requisite 50,000 votes for the ALP candidate.

Question. Isn't that a risky policy?

Answer. Of course it is. But no policy in this period can be devised that is free of the element of risk. To fail to run a candidate would mean: (1) The death of the ALP; (2) the loss of a powerful voice raising the most vital issues of the day.

For example, many Democrats will attack McCarthy but most will concentrate on his methods. The ALP alone has been battling not only the methods but the aims of McCarthyism.

While many Democrats may attack, as Senator Lehman has done, the Know-land proposal to leave the U. N. if People's China is given its rightful seat, few, if any, Democrats will advance a rounded-out peace program. The ALP does just that. By so doing, it forces the pace of the whole campaign, drives the Democrats forward and compels reluctant candidates to accept portions of its anti-McCarthy, peace program. To that extent it strengthens the entire anti-Dewey camp, including the Democrats. The Truman-Dewey-Wallace campaign of 1948 was a classic example of this. By forcing the issues in 1948, the Progressive Party compelled the adoption of a portion of its program by the Democrats. This clearly helped the defeat of Dewey.

Question. Some trade unionists say such a policy will isolate the ALP and the left. What about that?

Answer. Difficult and complex as the problem is, the implied "solution" is really no solution. It would mean that there will be no statewide force to the left of the Democrats. This leaves the New Dealers under the Farleyite pressure from the right wing of their organization without any mass pressure exercised by a statewide party under conditions where labor has not yet sufficiently organized itself as an independent force.

Specifically, on the issue of peace, the tendency on the part of the FDR-Wagner-Harriman group will be to subordinate the issue in the State campaign.

Looking beyond the 1954 campaign, the failure of the ALP to run a candidate and maintain its own legal status will create a political vacuum into which Trotskyites, Titelites, and similar grouplets will attempt to mislead a substantial number of New York progressives who today accept the leadership of the ALP.

Question. How does the situation vary from 1953 when we differed with the ALP tactic of running a candidate at the top of its city ticket?

Answer. The stakes are considerably different, although the main direction of the struggle is essentially the same. In 1953 it would have been possible for the ALP to unite with the bulk of the organized labor movement against Dewey's mayorality candidates. It could have at the same time rolled up a substantial vote for its other citywide candidates. Without taking any responsibility for Wagner, it could have shown its kinship with CIO, AFL, and New Deal forces who were seeking the defeat of Dewey's mayorality candidate, Harold Riegelman, and Dewey's stooge, Vincent Impellitteri. Instead, it adopted a go-it-alone policy, ignoring the attitude of the organized labor movement, and lumped together all candidates and the forces behind them.

This was not the attitude of the ALP in the regular mayorality election in 1949. In 1949, when the ALP was running Vito Marcantonio for mayor, it correctly left the senatorial line blank, since it did not wish to come into collision with the masses of labor and New Deal voters who supported Herbert Lehman against his Republican opponent, John Foster Dulles.

The same flexible tactic of 1949, which unfortunately was rejected by the ALP in 1953, is now being followed in California by the Independent Progressive Party. The IPP is not running a candidate for Governor or Lieutenant Governor and is, instead, leaving a blank line so as not to oppose the candidates backed by the labor movement, Richard Graves and Edward Roybal, both Democrats.

But this same flexible tactic is not available to the ALP due to New York's rigid election laws. In California any statewide candidate polling the required minimum keeps a party officially on the ballot. In New York the law requires 50,000 votes for the gubernatorial candidate only. The ALP plans, therefore, to run a gubernatorial candidate on a platform essentially anti-McCarthy, anti-Dewey, while sharply critical of the Democrats in a number of respects. It also plans to advance its coalition policy on a congressional and legislative level.

This is not an ideal or a simple policy (real politics rarely provide ideal and simple solutions) but it accords with the present stage in the complex process of
creating a powerful political realignment. It indicates that the ALP is breaking with the paralyzing go-it-alone concept—which is a healthy step forward and will bring the ALP closer to developments in the labor and Negro people's movements.

Question. What is the possibility of Vito Marcantonio's reelection to Congress? Answer. The situation has altered considerably in the last 4 years. It may be useful to recall that in 1944, in a period of national unity, Marcantonio won all three party designations (Republican, Democratic, and ALP). In 1946, when the cold war had already begun, Marcantonio lost the Republican primary, won a close Democratic primary and went on to win the general election on the Democratic and Democratic-Labor lines.

In 1947 the legislature passed the Wilson-Pakula law, which was openly labeled an anti-Marcantonio law, to prevent Marcantonio and others from cross-filing in major party primaries. In 1948, however, Marcantonio running on the ALP line against a Republican and a Democratic opponent, was able to win.

In 1950, after the Korean War had begun, the major parties and the Liberal Party ganged up on Marcantonio, nominating the reactionary James Donovan. The latter, at that time, got support from both the Liberal Party and some of the leaders of organized labor.

In 1952 the gang-up continued and Marcantonio chose not to run. In 1954, however, the following happened: The Liberal Party withdrew from the gang-up; the CIO announced its opposition to Donovan, and a group of liberal Democrats broke with the Tammany leadership to announce they were supporting Caspar Citron in the Democratic primary against Donovan.

These changes indicate clearly that political relationships are beginning to unfreeze in the 18th Congressional District—as they are, in truth, virtually everywhere. The cold war spell is being broken. Many who were deluded by war hysteria 4 years ago now recognize the validity of Marcantonio's position against the Korean war in 1950.

The trend in the district is anti-McCarthy and anti-Donovan. It is up to progressives, particularly in the trade unions, to give the required support that will not only defeat Donovan but will elect Marcantonio. That new opportunity now exists.

Question. What are the possibilities for increased political representation for the Negro and Puerto Rican peoples?

Answer. The fight for Negro and Puerto Rican representation is definitely on the upgrade. In 1952 a 165-year-old tradition of a lily-white State senate was smashed with the election of Senator Julius Archibald. Bronx Assemblyman Felipe N. Torres gave the Puerto Rican people their first representation in years in 1953. In 1953 the first Brooklyn Negro elected to the bench was Municipal Court Justice Lewis S. Flagg. In 1953, finally, for the first time in the city's history, a Negro was elected to the board of estimate—Hulan Jack—as borough president of Manhattan.

But these, while advances, are still pitifully inadequate. The Negro people and their white supporters are raising a series of broadened demands (as evidenced by a recent Amsterdam News series). These include nominations for supreme court and for other courts as well as increased representation in the congress and the legislature. Finally, there has been advanced by the American Labor Party the demand for nomination of a Negro among the four top candidates on the statewide ticket.

In Brooklyn, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Political League, an independent body, is waging an aggressive fight for increased Negro representation.

Among the Puerto Rican people, the fight may not be so advanced, but here, too, some gains have been registered. Tammany has been forced to concede a Puerto Rican leader in the 14th assembly district of Manhattan and increasing attention is being paid to the demands of the Puerto Rican people by both city hall and Tammany Hall.

Question. What about other candidates for Congress from New York? What about the legislature?

Answer. We propose to discuss those in some detail next month. But the basic framework is contained in our policy—to defeat the McCarthyites and outstanding reactionaries and elect a bloc of Congressmen and legislators committed to the struggle against McCarthyism and for a policy of coexistence.
Exhibit No. 435-B

[From the Daily Worker, Aug. 4, 1954]

SUMMON GERSON ON RALLY EVE

Simon W. Gerson, who will chair the national Communist Party election campaign rally August 6, has been subpoenaed by the Jenner Internal Security Committee 1 day before the rally, it was learned yesterday.

Gerson is to appear Thursday in Washington.

A bread hint that the subpoena was in the offing was given by Walter Winchell in a coast-to-coast Sunday night telecast just before the Hearst commentator went off the air for the summer. Winchell indicated that Gerson would be probed about his Army activity in World War II.

The committee has been recently investigating the Army's Information and Education Division activities during the war, particularly its strict adherence to President Roosevelt's line of American-Soviet-British unity against the Axis.

A number of officers have been hauled before the committee and been given hostile treatment. Committee Chairman Jenner has attacked wartime commander, Gen. George C. Marshall, as "a front man for traitors."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gerson, are you the Mr. Gerson referred to in the Communist Daily Worker?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the committee will not recognize the witness' refusal to answer the question under the first amendment, but we do recognize his right not to answer under the fifth amendment, that his answer might tend to incriminate him.

Senator Welker. Do you know any other Simon W. Gerson, living in New York or any place else in the United States?

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. You may consult your counsel if you desire.

Let the record show that he does wish to consult his counsel and does consult him.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I have heard that there is one or more persons of the same name, but I don't know that to be a fact of my own knowledge.

Senator Welker. Have you heard where they lived?

Mr. Gerson. In one instance I was told that one lives in the same borough in which I live.

Senator Welker. Have you ever heard that he was the legislative chairman of the New York Communist Party?

Mr. Gerson. I have heard nothing beyond the existence or the possible existence of such a person or persons.

Senator Welker. The possibility?

Mr. Gerson. Yes.

Senator Welker. Have you ever read any articles by anyone under the byline of Simon W. Gerson, other than yourself?

Why do you hesitate? You can answer that question without hesitating.

Mr. Gerson. I don't have any recollection, sir, of having read any such articles.

Senator Welker. Have you ever written any articles for the Daily Worker or Time magazine, or Police Gazette, or any other periodical or newspaper?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Senator Welker. Sir?
Mr. Gerson. On the grounds hitherto stated by myself.

The Chairman. Just a minute. What are those grounds? We have told you that this committee does not recognize your refusal to answer under the first amendment. Is it under the fifth amendment because your answer may tend to incriminate you?

Mr. Gerson. I stated both of my grounds.

The Chairman. State them again.

Mr. Gerson. If the committee sees fit to reject them, I am awfully sorry. But I wish to restate for the record—

The Chairman. State it.

Mr. Gerson. That I am declining to answer the question because, No. 1, that I believe that neither this nor any other congressional committee has the right to investigate or to legislate in respect to my beliefs, opinions, and associations.

The Chairman. Even if your beliefs might be such that they would tend to destroy and overthrow this country, you think we as a congressional committee have no right to inquire into something which might devastate and destroy our country?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully suggest to the committee that beliefs never destroyed any nation, but that—

The Chairman. How about the Communist Party and its beliefs?

Mr. Gerson. * * * but that acts do.

The Chairman. How about the Communist Party and its beliefs?

Mr. Gerson. Are you asking for my opinion, sir?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Gerson. This is strictly an opinion question?

The Chairman. Yes.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness, before responding to the question, conferred with his counsel.

Mr. Gerson. May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that my conference with counsel is perfectly permissible and according to the rules of this committee.

The Chairman. You may confer with your counsel when you want to.

Mr. Gerson. Very good, sir. There is nothing prejudicial about my conference.

The Chairman. We want your testimony and not your counsel's testimony.

Mr. Gerson. I assure you you are getting my testimony and solely my testimony. My counsel here is solely present for the purpose of advising me about my legal rights.

I am a layman, myself, and I require legal assistance as would any other person in this position.

The Chairman. It is perfectly proper.

Mr. Gerson. Very good, sir.

Would the reporter reread the original question propounded by the chairman, please?

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

The Chairman. All right. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you affirm or deny that you are the same Simon Gerson who was mentioned in those two articles just submitted to you?
Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Armed Forces during World War II?

Mr. Gerson. I was, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first join the Armed Forces?

Mr. Gerson. I was inducted in January 1944.

Mr. Carpenter. During part of your service were you stationed at Camp Upton, N. Y.?

Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir; and let me be precise. Camp Upton, N. Y., was my reception center for the first 7 days of my entrance into the service. Thereupon, I went to basic training camp, and thereupon I went overseas where I served with the 24th Division. I was hospitalized back to the United States, and Camp Upton was my convalescence center, to which I was assigned. I returned there somewhere in the late spring or early summer of 1945, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Carpenter. What division or type of work were you assigned to at Camp Upton?

Mr. Gerson. After my recuperation and convalescence, I was assigned to the Orientation Branch, as I recall it, of the Information and Education Division.

Mr. Carpenter. Normally called the I. and E. Division?

Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir; I believe it was generally called I. and E.

Mr. Carpenter. What actual work did you do in the I. and E.?

Mr. Gerson. I was an administrative noncom.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you give lectures?

Mr. Gerson. On some rare occasions I did.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do any writing?

Mr. Gerson. At Camp Upton?

Mr. Carpenter. Yes.

Mr. Gerson. I don't recall any, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you consult with the troops in connection with your I. and E. work?

Mr. Gerson. Did I consult with them?

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Confer with them.

Mr. Gerson. I saw them; yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Well, what was the actual work that you did with them? You had some job to do?

Mr. Gerson. Part of it was straight office work in the Orientation Office. Some of it was, as you said, consultation with the troops. As I explained earlier in the private hearing, or rather the executive hearing, this was a convalescent center. We had two main battalions of troops. One battalion was composed of men who had leg wounds. Another was composed of men who were neuropsychiatric patients, men suffering from various degrees of battle fatigue. All of the troops received therapy. Some was medical, some of it was occupational, and some of it took on the aspect of orientation work.

In the latter branch I would include things like holding current event discussions, quiz contests, concerts, amusements of various sorts. I was involved in the latter.

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, you were to assist in the orientation of these sick troops, and prepare them mentally to take up their regular duties in the Army or elsewhere?
Mr. Gerson. I didn't quite get that. To dig up, did you say? To take up?

Well, I did whatever work was assigned to me, based on directives handed down from higher echelons.

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Mandel has a document he would like to have placed into the record.

The Chairman. We will hear it, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Mandel. I have here an affidavit dated July 2, 1954, from a Mr. Walker L. Kirschebaum, who is ready to appear, if necessary, and who is on tour. I will read the affidavit:

This will confirm your telephone call to me of this date informing me that I should appear in Washington, D. C., at a hearing of your committee on Wednesday, July 7, in order to give certain testimony with regard to my service in the Armed Forces between late October 1945 and the date of my honorable discharge therefrom late in December of the same year. The facts I am about to furnish you have already appeared in one form or another in the press. However, in order that the record might be accurate and in view of the fact that I would have to appear under orders from your committee I am making these facts known:

(1) I am not and have never been a member of the Communist Party and have been consistently and historically opposed to its tenets and policies.

(2) I have also consistently and historically opposed all forms of totalitarianism actively and overtly. I have also engaged in covert activities against both fascism and communism.

(3) Upon return from overseas duties I served in the Armed Forces of our Nation from May 15, 1943, until December 22, 1945, I was sent to Camp Upton, N. Y., late in October 1945. A very close friend of mine who knew that I was awaiting honorable discharge and would have to "sweat out" two points for as many months, spoke to the captain in charge of Information and Education at Camp Upton, N. Y. Since I had been a regular contributor to the prolabor and antitotalitarian periodical, the New Leader, had been abroad during the war where I took an active journalistic interest when military duties permitted of conditions in the countries I visited, he suggested that I might be a valuable asset to I. and E. The captain's name, to my best recollection was Posner. He is supposed to be a Yonkers teacher. My friend, now deceased, had shared the billets with Captain Posner. My friend was as violently antitotalitarian as I am. He warned me, however, that I would find that the sergeant in charge of the whole operation was one Simon W. Gerson, known to both of us as an open member of the Communist Party. When I inquired of my friend why Gerson was there, he told me that he, my friend, had nothing to do with I. and E., but that post G-2 had apparently cleared him. I do not remember the names of the others assigned to the jobs there, but I do recall that at least one other had pro-Communist affiliations.

(4) At the time, during the course of a telephone conversation with Fred Wolman of the Scripps-Howard alliance, I mentioned the fact that Gerson was in charge of this important position. Wolman told me later that he had phoned Upton Intelligence, had been told that Gerson had a fine war record and that Russia was our ally. That, pretty much, was the sentiment at Upton when I raised the issue.

(5) I recall only twice—although there might have been other times—when the Communist line was injected into our work. One time when we were instructed by Gerson, who apparently was guided by Army Talks, that we tell the GI's who came to our classes to be recreatted into enlightened civilians that the Chinese in the north who were stirring at that moment were "Agrarian reformers, like Jefferson." I had known Mao-tse Tung's record from reading Comintern material and I recall raising the issue privately with Gerson. * * *

Senator Welker. May I interrupt? I notice the witness is smiling. What do you see about that statement that you think is funny?

Mr. Gerson. The statement about agrarian reformers, sir; I don't have the slightest recollection of it. I recall it subsequently, sir, as having appeared in the press. If I may so so, and I shall have something to say on this, with the committee's permission, later—
Senator Welker. We will be glad to get your observations.
Mr. Gerson. I believe it is ludicrous.
Mr. Mandel. (continuing):

* * *

It was then that he asked "What is your background, anyway?" I do not recall my precise answer, but it stirred suspicion in Gerson's mind. On another occasion, during an Information Please-type program, GI's were asked this question: "Who is the labor leader who is urging that all GI's be brought home from the Pacific?" There was a pause of silence. "Come, come," Gerson exhorted. "Let's not burn our Bridges until we come to them. Let's not burn our Bridges!" Obviously the winner had the name of Harry Bridges on his lips.

The above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I hereby swear to that effect.

WALTER L. KIRSCHENBAUM.

The Chairman. Is that a sworn statement?
Mr. Mandel. A sworn statement.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 463-A" and was read in full above.)

The Chairman. Mr. Gerson, you have heard the affidavit read. What have you to say about it?

Mr. Gerson. Just one or two brief observations, if I may, sir.

The Chairman. You may.

Mr. Gerson. The affidavit is inaccurate in a number of respects. I was never a sergeant. I appreciate the promotion. My rank, however, was that of corporal.

Secondly, I haven't the faintest recollection of having made any such statement as attributed to me in respect to so-called agrarian reformers.

Thirdly, whatever lecturing I did was strictly on the basis of Army bulletins or outlines, handed down to us, and strictly adhered to by us from higher echelons. It was the policy of the Army under those circumstances, to support President Roosevelt's policy of a firm alliance between Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and we, as GI's, followed that policy.

Finally, sir, in respect to Mr. Kirschenbaum, perhaps I did not get it, but I got the implication he was rejected for this work. Is that correct? Does he so affirm in his affidavit?

The Chairman. I do not recall that.

Mr. Gerson. All right. Then let me state for the record that to the best of my recollection, Mr. Kirschenbaum was a neuropsychiatric patient, and the orientation branch there apparently had a solid policy of not permitting neuropsychiatric patients to serve as instructors.

The Chairman. All right. Proceed.

Senator Welker. May I have a question?

The Chairman. Senator Welker.

Senator Welker. I am concerned with the affidavit of Mr. Kirschenbaum.

Were you at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer the question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Senator Welker. You decline?

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1 The affidavit was sworn to before Betty Kaye, commissioner of deeds of the city of New York.
The Chairman. That is under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you in November 1929, endorse the line of the Communist International?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated in respect to all other questions concerning political affiliations and views.

The Chairman. Senator Welker?

Senator Welker. Did your counsel tell you to decline to answer that question?

Mr. Gerson. Senator, my counsel is here solely to give me specific advice.

Senator Welker. I asked you a question. Did he tell you to decline to answer that question?

Mr. Gerson. I made the suggestion to him, after some thought, and he concurred in the suggestion.

Senator Welker. And he stated to you, in an audible voice to you, at least, and I saw it from here, "Decline to answer"? Is that correct?

Mr. Gerson. He concurred in my suggestion. The initiative in declining to answer, sir, was my own.

Senator Welker. I want to tell you and your counsel, as I am sure your able counsel knows, the privilege afforded to you under the fifth amendment is a personal one, and is not one granted to your counsel to suggest to you. So hereafter, if you decline to answer upon your constitutional rights, you please do the answering and not your counsel. He cannot suggest to you, sir, to take advantage of any provisions provided by the fifth amendment.

Mr. Gerson. It was my impression, sir, that counsel under these circumstances, as under all circumstances, may indicate what the alternatives are.

Senator Welker. I have told you the law on this matter. We have had this before us many times. We do not want to argue about it, because I am certain that counsel will agree with me on that. It is just so we keep the record straight.

Mr. France. I agree with you, Senator. My purpose was to advise him that he had a right to decline to answer. If I said anything—

Senator Welker. I understand. I did not want it to happen again. I am sure able counsel will not permit it to happen.

Mr. Mandel. I should like to present for the record a photostat of the Daily Worker of November 21, 1929, page 4, a long time before Mr. Gerson was in the Armed Forces, and I read from this photostat under the column Party Life:

Workers of the North and South alike, help your party cleanse itself and march with Atlanta.

The correctness of the new line of our party, as laid down by the Sixth World Congress of the CI, the 10th plenum, and the address to our party, was never brought out more clearly than in the Atlanta unit of the party and its work.

This article, which I will not read in full, has below it the name of Si Gerson. I offer that for the record.

Senator Welker (presiding). It will be admitted. Show it to the witness and his counsel.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 436-B," and is as follows:)
The correctness of the new line of our party, as laid down by the sixth world congress of the CI, the 10th plenum, and the address to our party, was never brought out more clearly than in the Atlanta unit of the party and its work.

Years ago the unit was composed of a few businessmen, and was a tail to a local Workmen’s Circle. With the change in party line necessitated by the sharpening class battles ahead and the riddling of the party of the opportunist Lovestone group, many of the little-business men withdrew. The unit was reorganized with proletarian elements taking an active part in it. The unit orientated itself on mass work—“Toward the oppressed Negro masses and the workers in the basic industries” was the slogan.

Today the unit is overwhelmingly proletarian. Half the members are Negro workers, right from factories, railroad shops, etc. Only a few days ago the Atlanta unit carried through a successful 12th anniversary meeting where both black and white workers came together and celebrated the 12th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union.

Anyone who knows the South knows that this was nothing short of a little revolution—to hold a Communist meeting south of the Mason-Dixon line where both Negro and white workers would sit in the same hall. But the fact that the party is leading both white and Negro workers in the struggle in the South is directly a result of the new line of the party and the throwing overboard of the old, petty-bourgeois elements who waxed fat and lazy in the party under the benevolent gaze of Jay Lovestone, whom they instinctively recognized as their ideological leader.

Today some of the elements who were expelled from the party unit in Atlanta—the very same ones who used to scoff at the notion that it was possible to unite white and Negro workers or to lead the “backward American workers”—have crystallized themselves into parlor radical groups bitterly fighting the Atlanta unit of the party, boycotting meetings, etc. This is typical of the times and period—the sliding back of these elements into “disguised” reaction. In Atlanta, however, these elements masquerade under the protection of bona fide leftwing organizations, the leftwing Workmen’s Circle and the Icor.

The Atlanta unit of the party, while not neglecting to expose these elements, as forging ahead with its work among the bitterly exploited Negro and white workers. Special attention is being given the textile workers and the work of the NTWU is supported to the utmost. Marked success has already been achieved among the Negro workers, 6 Negro workers having joined the party in Atlanta as a result of the work of the party in the last 2 weeks.

The conclusions are very clear:

Under Lovestone and his rightwing line—stagnation, petty-bourgeois sectarianism, actual decay.

With the new line of the party—growth and development.

Si Gerson.

Senator Welker. Without objection, it is so admitted.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you affirm or deny that you are the same Si Gerson whose name appears on this news item?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question, sir, on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were in the armed services of the United States?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a candidate for the city council in New York on the Communist ticket in 1948?
Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the New York State committee of the Communist Party, or are you?

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the national committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you arrested in 1928 in connection with demonstrations conducted by the Young Workers League, a Communist organization, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard?

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me a moment, Mr. Chairman?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member——

Senator Welker. Do you mean if you were not arrested at that demonstration that that might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. Gerson. No, sir. But with my layman's understanding of the tricky law of waiver, I have decided that that is the only answer which can protect my constitutional rights.

Senator Welker. Would you deny it if we gave you at a later date a certified copy of the arrest report?

Mr. Gerson. I would prefer not to answer hypothetical questions. I will meet that when I come to it, sir.

Senator Welker. Thank you.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Young Workers League at that time?

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has something.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat from the Daily Worker of February 1, 1928, page 5, and I wish to read part of it and put the entire article into the record:

CCNY behind student jailing. That pressure was exerted on the part of the authorities of the College of the City of New York to obtain a conviction in the case of a student of the college, S. W. Gerson, arrested in a demonstration of young workers and students in front of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, January 14, was indicated yesterday in the evidence of William Lindsay, the policeman who arrested the student.

I offer that for the record.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you affirm or deny the statements in that news article?

Mr. Gerson. The same answer as to all other questions in respect to political beliefs and associations.

Senator Welker. Don’t get yourself in trouble. We do not recognize that. You should go ahead on the fact that we do recognize the fifth amendment. You can make that one, but we do not recognize it, and we do not want you to get into difficulty, if you want to preserve your right under the fifth amendment.

Mr. Gerson. I am invoking my rights under the first and fifth throughout, sir, and I want that distinctly understood, when I say the same answer, I mean my original answer which included both the first and fifth.
Senator Welker. Don't go into the first amendment because we do not recognize that, and to save time you will say "I decline to answer on the grounds heretofore given," and we will get along more speedily. Without objection the article will be made a part of the record.
(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 437" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 437
[From the Daily Worker, Feb. 1, 1928]

CCNY BEHIND STUDENT JAILING

The pressure was exerted on the part of the authorities of the College of the City of New York to obtain a conviction in the case of a student of the college, S. W. Gerson, arrested in a demonstration of young workers and students in front of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, January 14, was indicated yesterday in the evidence of William Lindsay, the policeman who arrested the student.

As Judge Farrar, of the Gates Avenue Court, Brooklyn, was about to dismiss the case or discharge Gerson with a suspended sentence when Lindsay came rushing up to the bench after having had something whispered into his ear. "Your Honor," he said, "this man has been convicted in his college of distributing inflammatory literature."

SENTENCED THURSDAY

Although challenged to produce the actual evidence, Lindsay could not do so. Nevertheless Farrar declared Gerson guilty of disorderly conduct. Sentence will be pronounced February 2, pending investigation by a probation officer of Gerson's past record.

The pressure is being exerted on Gerson by the college authorities because of his activity in connection with the student struggle against military training in the college. He has already been threatened with suspension on this account. A prominent reactionary professor at the college was present in court the first time the case was brought up.

AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE

Gerson, when reached last night by a Daily Worker reporter, told him that the dean of the college had already quizzed him on the matter. He stated that a conviction would be no surprise to him. "It is evident that a conviction of 10 days or 30 days would please a lot of people at the college who want nobody to challenge imperialism there," he declared.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you arrested in Winston-Salem, N. C., on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon in 1930?
Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you at that time the district organizer of the Young Communist League?
Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has something.

Senator Welker. Just a moment. Have you ever been to Winston-Salem, N. C.?
Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me, sir.
(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I have been in Winston-Salem on occasion, sir.

Senator Welker. What year?
Mr. Gerson. I should say about a quarter of a century ago, sir.

Senator Welker. About 25 years ago?
Mr. Gerson. Perhaps 24.

Senator Welker. That would be pretty close to the time in the question just propounded to you by counsel.
Mr. Gerson. Arithmetically it would appear so, sir.

Senator Welker. Would you mind telling the committee what you were doing there?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the ground hitherto stated.

Senator Welker. You were down there just for a visit or playing golf, visiting friends?

Mr. Gerson. Well, the committee wouldn't regard playing golf as subversive; would it?

Senator Welker. It depends a little bit on who you played with.

Let's go into that. Did you play golf while you were there?

Mr. Gerson. I honestly don't recall, sir.

Senator Welker. Do you recall anything you did at Winston-Salem, N. C.?

Mr. Gerson. Would you excuse me?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated, sir.

Senator Welker. You do not recall whether or not you played golf, you do not recall whether or not you made the clink or were arrested in other words?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully declined to answer the question, sir, on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a clipping from the Daily Worker of May 2, 1930, page 1, headlined "ANLC Organizer Missing in South." I want to read part of the article:

Si Gerson, district organizer of the Young Communist League in North Carolina, was arrested Wednesday afternoon after the car in which he and two local workers were riding was stopped.

Later on in the account it says, and it is dated from Winston-Salem, N. C., May 2—

While Gerson was in jail, his room was raided by a number of detectives—

Senator Welker. While who was in jail?

Mr. Mandel. Gerson. [Reading:]—

While Gerson was in jail, his room was raided by a number of detectives who claimed to be searching for arms.

I offer the whole article for the record.

Senator Welker. Without objection, it is accepted.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 438" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 438

[From the Daily Worker, May 2, 1930]

ANLC ORGANIZER MISSING IN SOUTH—POLICE TRY TO PREVENT MAY 1 DEMONSTRATION

WINSTON-SALEM, N. C., May 2.—Paul Beverhardt, Negro organizer of the American Negro Labor Congress is still missing. Local police admit having arrested him, but claim to have freed him and that now they do not know his whereabouts. Beverhardt was held incommunicado with no charges brought against him.

Si Gerson, district organizer of the Young Communist League in North Carolina, was arrested Wednesday afternoon, after the car in which he and two local workers were riding was stopped. Gerson was held incommunicado until the night of May Day, the police not even bothering to book him on the
police blotter. E. R. Whitman, local International Labor Defense attorney, was refused permission to see Gerson. The obvious intent was to prevent Winston-Salem workers from holding a May Day demonstration.

While Gerson was in jail, his room was raided by a number of detectives who claimed to be searching for arms. They tried to intimidate the landlady by telling her that “she was harboring dangerous people,” but the working-class landlady couldn’t see it that way and refused to be bluffled.

Senator Welker. Do you know a man by the name of Paul Crouch?

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Senator Welker. I take it you would not want to say whether or not you ever met him down in the South, either Winston-Salem or Chapel Hill?

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.

Senator Welker. The same?

Mr. Gerson. The same answer, sir.

Senator Welker. Thank you.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you the same Gerson who appears in this news item that was just handed to you, the one that Mr. Mandel just read?

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. In 1927 were you a reporter for the Daily Worker?

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me, sir?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has something.

Mr. Mandel. I have a photostat of a clipping from the Daily Worker dated December 22, 1937, page 1, the headline is “Daily Worker reporter named to city position.” Attached to the article is a photograph of S. W. Gerson. I offer that for the record.

Senator Welker. Show it to counsel and the witness.

Without objection it will be so entered.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 439” and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 439

[From the Daily Worker, Dec. 22, 1937]

Daily Worker Reporter Named to City Position

Stanley M. Isaacs, president-elect of the Borough of Manhattan, yesterday announced the appointment to his staff of S. W. Gerson, Daily Worker city hall correspondent, in the capacity of confidential inspector.

Gerson will also take charge of the press relations work of the borough president’s office.

Isaacs also announced that he had completed all the appointments for the various other positions to be filled in his office.

Gerson will assume his new office January 1. He has been a member of the Daily Worker staff since December 1933, and covered city hall and city politics for 3 years. He is 28 years old and a member of the New York State Executive Committee of the Communist Party.

Names Others

Isaacs announced the appointment 10 days ago of Walter D. Binger as commissioner of borough works.

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Mr. France. May I say, Senator, when you say “without objection,” I don’t understand that I have a right to keep anything out of the
record that the committee wishes to put in. So if I fail to object, it is not because I admit the relevancy of anything.

Senator Welker. We do that for the benefit of the staff, if there is an objection from one of the staff. And I might say to you, counselor, that we try to get along with able counselors like yourself. If you have an objection, we will certainly listen.

Mr. France. Thank you.

Senator Welker. Mr. Gerson. I have listened attentively to your testimony here and I am unable to determine whether or not you are the man who has been arrested in Winston-Salem, or has taken any part in any Communist activities. For the conclusion of this interrogation, I must step down and show you a little matter I want to interrogate you about.

Did you or did you not in 1954 write for the New York State Communist Party, 268 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N. Y., an article named "The Rights You Save May Be Your Own," by Simon W. Gerson. I am asking you that question. When I get through interrogating you, then you can see it.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. The same reply as given hitherto to questions in respect to matter of this sort.

Senator Welker. Are you now or have you ever been legislative chairman of the New York Communist Party?

Mr. Gerson. The same reply, sir.

Senator Welker. Have you ever been a city hall reporter in the city of New York, or Brooklyn, or anyplace else?

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Senator Welker. Have you ever been legislative correspondent and city editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Senator Welker. Mr. Gerson, I ask you whether or not you have ever been assistant to the borough president of Manhattan in the years 1938-48, during the LaGuardia administration?

Mr. Gerson. Would you repeat that, please?

Senator Welker. Mr. Gerson, have you ever been, or were you ever assistant to the borough president of Manhattan during the years 1938-40, during the LaGuardia administration?

Mr. Gerson. The same reply, sir.

Senator Welker. Do you mean if you told us the truth on that, you might tend to incriminate yourself?

Mr. Gerson. In the present McCarthyite atmosphere, I believe I would.


Mr. Gerson. Unfortunately, Senator, Senator McCarthy has tended to poison the American atmosphere, making it necessary for American citizens to invoke their constitutional rights.

Senator Welker. How would he cause anything to incriminate you if it were the truth?

Mr. Gerson. In view of present inquisitions into political beliefs, I regard it as the best protection of American rights of citizens to invoke the constitutional rights handed down to us by the Founding Fathers.

Senator Welker. Even though if you told us the truth, you think it is still best for you to invoke the fifth amendment?
Mr. Gerson. I did not create this McCarthyite atmosphere in the
country, sir.
Senator Welker. Do you know who did?
Mr. Gerson. I have a sneaking hunch that political inquisitions of
this sort tend to poison the atmosphere, sir.
Senator Welker. I have a little intimate idea that people who will
not answer questions truthfully may have had something to do with it,
too.
Mr. Gerson. Very well, sir, that is a matter of opinion.
Senator Welker. Yes, it is. You are, of course, a New Yorker
and an ex-GI?
Mr. Gerson. I have testified to that.
Senator Welker. Have you ever engaged in politics? I mean seek-
ing public office.
Mr. Gerson. Now, sir, my offhand reaction would be that that
should not be an incriminating question in a meeting of Senators.
But I will discuss the matter with counsel, with your permission.
Senator Welker. Fine.
(The witness conferred with his counsel.)
Mr. Gerson. I regret to say that I have to give the same reply as
I did to the other questions.
Senator Welker. We will agree that had you sought public office
of any office, that would be a matter of public record and we could
find that out very easily?
Mr. Gerson. But insofar as I am concerned, my understanding of
our laws and our basic law, I am not required to testify against
myself.
Senator Welker. I will ask you if it isn’t a fact that in 1948 you
received over 150,000 votes as a candidate for city council for Brooklyn
on the Communist, American Labor Party ticket.
Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the
grounds hitherto stated.
Senator Welker. And that you have appeared frequently before
various Government bodies on legislative matters?
Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.
Senator Welker. Now, Mr. Gerson, I am not having much success
with you as to what you have done and where you have been. Or,
really, who you are. So I now direct your attention to a picture
appearing on page 2 of the document I read to you a moment ago, and
ask you whether or not that is a picture of you, the witness before
this committee.
(The witness conferred with his counsel.)
Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.
Senator Welker. You will deny that that is a picture of you?
Mr. Gerson. I have neither affirmed or denied. I have given you a
particular reply, sir.
Senator Welker. You are using your fifth amendment on it? Is
that right?
Mr. Gerson. I am using my constitutional right.
Senator Welker. Under the fifth amendment?
Mr. Gerson. Your right and mine, sir.
Senator Welker. Very well, sir. You wouldn’t say it was a picture
of Joe McCarthy?
Mr. Gerson. No, that would be stretching constitutional immunity a little too far.

Senator Welker. Well, I believe you are stretching it a little too far, if I may be argumentative like you, because if I can see correctly, and I have fairly good eyesight, that is a perfect resemblance of you, the witness, before this committee.

Now, would you care to comment on the introduction to this article, The Rights You Save May Be Your Own, with the initials S. W. G. appearing at the bottom?

Mr. Gerson. The question was would I care to?

Senator Welker. Yes.

Mr. Gerson. The answer is "No."

Senator Welker. Upon what grounds?

Mr. Gerson. The same grounds as hitherto stated concerning all questions with respect to my political views and affiliations, and the fifth amendment.

Senator Welker. And I take it you would not care to discuss anything else in this document which is alleged to have been written by one Simon W. Gerson, whose picture allegedly appears on page 2 and in the opinion of the acting chairman is very, very similar to the witness we have before our committee.

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Senator Welker. Thank you very much.

Without objection we will introduce this entire document, The Rights You Save May Be Your Own, by Simon W. Gerson, and make it a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 440" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 440

The Rights You Save May Be Your Own

(By Simon W. Gerson)

SIMON W. GERSON is legislative chairman of the New York Communist Party. A former City Hall reporter, legislative correspondent and city editor of the Daily Worker, Gerson was assistant to the Borough President of Manhattan, 1938-40, during the LaGuardia Administration. A New Yorker and an ex-GI, Gerson has run for public office. In 1948 he received 150,000 votes as a candidate for City Council from Brooklyn on the Communist and American Labor Party tickets. He has appeared frequently before various government bodies on legislative matters.

INTRODUCTION

This statement of the Communist Party's opposition to 10 bills designed to outlaw the party was delivered to a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on April 7, 1954.
Since its delivery, Attorney General Herbert Brownell has also testified before the same committee. Mr. Brownell differed with the committee, but not in principle. He proposed a series of bills to accomplish the same objective in a different way.

Whether it is the crude way of Representative Martin Dies or the slick way of the Attorney General, this type of legislation adds up to the same thing—the strangling of the rights of all Americans. No American who seeks to express himself against the Dulles-McCarthy type of policy on foreign or domestic affairs will be secure.

To defeat McCarthyism, the American form of Hitlerism, is the issue of the day. To unite against McCarthyism, of which these outlawry bills and the Brownell program are but parts, is to unite in defense of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

And to defend the Constitution today is to defend our right to have a voice in shaping the answer to the crucial issues of today: Will our sons fight in the jungles of Indochina? Will there be an H-bomb war? Will there be jobs tomorrow?

Our civil liberties, our living standards, yes, our very lives, are bound together. To defend the one, we must defend all.

S. W. G.

My name is Simon W. Gerson. I am legislative chairman of the New York Communist Party, and appear here today on behalf of the national committee of the party in opposition to the 11 bills designed to outlaw the Communist Party and now before your committee.

While these measures may seem to touch only one small section of our population, their implications are of far-reaching national importance. One of your colleagues, Representative Harley O. Staggers, warned the committee against blazing through such bills. He put the question correctly when he told this subcommittee on March 18 that "it is the most important thing that comes before us. It will affect our way of life."

The issue, gentlemen, is not simply the legal existence of a single political party. That in itself would merit deep consideration. The issue, as Mr. Staggers indicated, is the infinitely deeper one of the continued existence of a constitutional way of life in the United States.

For what we have here is a legislative hellbomb that would pulverize our constitutional liberties. The radioactive dust of such measures would not settle for a long time. Significantly, these bills are advanced precisely at a time when America and the world are in a great debate over the issues of the H-bomb and Indochina. People are asking whether the awful power of the H-bomb—from which no hide-or-run schemes can protect us or anybody else—will be controlled. People are debating the issue of whether the administration will drag our sons into a new war in Indochina.

The question, therefore, arises: Are these bills designed to strangle public discussion and opposition to such a war?

It is precisely at this time that the constitutional guaranties of free discussion, as set forth in our Bill of Rights, are so essential to our national life. That is why we emphasize today, at the very threshold of our argument, that we call not only for the defense of the rights of the Communist Party but the defense of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. We ask you constantly to remember the point made by Supreme Court Justice Jackson, in another connection, that the rights of all Americans are tied up in one bundle with the rights of the Communists.

BILLS CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

We regard these bills as fundamentally unconstitutional. They are bills of attainder in direct violation of article I, section 9, of the Constitution. They are, for the most part, vague and indefinite and obviously destructive of the rights of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. No legislative tinkering can make them even plausibly constitutional, since they are squarely directed at ideas and associations of Americans—a realm forbidden to Congress by the Constitution.

But it is not primarily the unconstitutionality of these bills that I wish to emphasize today. It is the broad question of public policy that I want to stress. These bills, we submit, are far worse than the ill-famed sedition law of 1798. They move in a dangerous direction—the direction of fascism. A detailed examination of these bills indicates that the pattern is essentially that of fascism—first, the outlawing of the Communists, and then, swiftly in turn, every other group which opposes fascism or its American variant, McCarthyism.
These bills, if enacted into law, would represent a sinister and qualitative change in American legal processes. They would open jail doors for literally tens of thousands of Americans. In fact, their enforcement would probably require a concentration camp system as an auxiliary to the present Federal prison system.

Mere membership in organizations whose nonconformist activities are frowned upon by the powers that be would lay the basis for heavy prison terms. As any detailed examination of the measures will show, these are dragnet bills going far beyond the Communist Party and affecting millions of Americans of all points of view.

In terms of world esteem, enactment of this type of legislation would be the sign absolute that McCarthyism, which the peoples of the globe equate with fascism, has made seven-league strides in the United States of America. For, as the world knows, fascism has always begun by outlawing the Communist Party, as in Mussolini Italy and Hitler Germany, and then proceeded to destroy every other movement—the trade unions, the cooperatives, the liberals, the church groups—in opposition to its policies of aggression abroad and fascism at home.

Significantly, in those nations where the contrary is true, where fascism or military dictatorships have not come to power—as in England, France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Holland, Mexico, etc.—there, legal Communist parties exist, with their rights in the market place of ideas. There too, exist trade unions. There, too, one finds a relatively high degree of public discussion about all problems, domestic and foreign. In those countries where McCarthyism is anathema today, it is not considered treasonable to discuss publicly the possibility of negotiations, East-West trade and coexistence of differing social systems.

THE TWO BIG LIES

Fascism, which always began by demanding "only" the outlawry of communism, based its action on two big lies—the first, on the alleged danger of external aggression, generally from the Soviet Union; and second, on the alleged danger of violent overthrow of the government by the Communists.

On such bases all antidemocratic actions were justified. It was on such a basis that the aggressive Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis was formed. History has demonstrated with crystal clarity that Hitler's aim was world conquest; his method was anticommunism. The Red scare was the means he used to crush democratic opposition at home in order to serve a handful of German bankers and the great Ruhr industrialists. The Red scare was the means he used to organize aggression abroad—against both West and East.

Substantially the same assumptions are the basis of our native repressivists' proposals. Let us examine them briefly.

Is there a danger of aggression against our shores? There is not a single responsible authority who thinks so. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, testifying July 18, 1953, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, said flatly: "I do not think a war is ever going to come."

Steel magnate, Ernest Weir, writing in Harpers magazine, December 1953, associating himself with the widespread European conviction that the Soviet Union wants peace, said: "*** Europeans are convinced that Russia is not marking time while she awaits the opportune moment and place to start war. On the contrary, they are convinced that Russia actually is eager for peace and will make concessions to get it."

Every sign points to a certain relaxation of tensions, whatever frustrations those relaxations may induce in some of our big business or big brass circles. Only last Friday, April 2, 1954, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, Harrison Salisbury, wrote that the Soviet Union was seeking sincerely to end the cold war and resolve problems by negotiation. Repeated warnings from Soviet leaders that war under H-bomb conditions would mean the end of civilization correspond to the deepest feelings of many Americans, including some Congressmen. Clearly, any policy premised on the theory of Soviet aggression against us is a policy based on a colossal historical lie.

THE "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" FABLE

What of the other "big lie"—the assumption that the Communist Party represents a clear and present danger of the overthrow of our Republic?

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, we reject the notion that we are a clear and present or an obscure and remote danger to the Nation. We say this not because we are a small party. Large or small, a political party which
bases itself on advocating its views and winning the majority of the people to its side can never be a clear and present danger to democratic processes.

If size were the sole criterion, then the Italian and French Communist Parties would be reckoned as clear and present dangers. But in their respective countries these parties are part of the normal political life of the Nation. They publish newspapers, lead trade unions, sit in parliamentary bodies, etc. The sole danger, according to some correspondents in Italy, for example, is that the Communist Party and its allies will legally win control of the Government through constitutional processes.

But if a large Communist Party does not constitute a clear and present danger, it is hard to see how a small party can. Some people cannot accept for a moment the weird notion that the smaller the party, the greater the danger.

Both basic assumptions, both "big lies," must therefore be rejected and the entire structure of exceptional laws built upon them must necessarily collapse.

The bills before you are predicated on the assumption—which we vigorously reject—that the party teaches and advocates the overthrow of our government by force and violence. This is sheer slander and is in sharp conflict with the real truth. This slander is most assiduously circulated by those elements in our Nation and life who do not oppose antilabor violence against strikers or the persistent, shameful violence of thelynch system against the Negro people.

WHAT DO COMMUNISTS REALLY ADVOCATE?

The Communist Party has just published its new draft program, entitled "The American Way," in a quarter of a million copies. It represents the considered viewpoint of the Communists and their proposals for meeting the critical problems now facing the American people—the issues of peace, democracy, and jobs. The Communist Party does not hold that the issue of today is the question of socialism.

"The choice before the people today," says the program, "is peace, security, democracy versus the grip which the monopolists have on the country and their plans of fascism and war."

What does this draft program say about the advocacy of the Communist Party in respect to a transition to socialism? I quote the pertinent section—and submit the entire draft program as part of my testimony—at this point:

"The Communist Party advocates a peaceful path to socialism in the United States. It brandishes as a lie the charge that it advocates the use of force and violence in the pursuit of any of its immediate or long-range goals. It declares that socialism will come into existence in the United States only when the majority of the American people decide to establish it. The Communist Party affirms its deep and abiding faith in the American people and their ultimate decision to establish socialism. The needs of our Nation cannot be served by any sect or conspiracy. For no progress, whether of a minimum or of a more far-reaching nature, can come other than through the will and action of a majority of the American people.

"The Communist Party has no blueprint for the path to socialism in the United States. The American people will move along the path to socialism as inevitably as other peoples and nations have done because ultimately there is no other solution to their problems. But they will do so in a form and manner which will be determined by the history, the traditions, and the specific needs of the American people. No social system can be imported from abroad. Nor do we propose to do so."

THE MATURING OF A CONCEPT

Communists have taught this for years. Thus William Z. Foster, national chairman of the Communist Party, wrote in 1949 in his book, Twilight of World Capitalism (p. 125):

"* * * In all good time the American people, on the basis of their existing conditions, will decide how and in what form they will introduce socialism. The way our party foresees the possible development of the future is along the following general lines:

"First, we propose the regular election of a democratic coalition government, based on a broad united front combination of workers, small farmers, Negroes, professionals, small business groups, and other democratic elements who are ready to fight against monopoly, economic breakdown, fascism, and war. * * *

"Second, our party contends that such an anti-Fascist, antiwar, democratic coalition government, once in power, would be compelled to move to the left."
Substantially the same position was developed by Mr. Foster in his authoritative work, History of the Communist Party in the United States, published in 1952.

Election through democratic processes of a people’s front government and the concept of the American road to socialism are not gimmick theories to avoid prosecution. The concept of the American road to socialism—i.e., the orientation upon a peaceful and democratic accession to governmental power of the working class and its allies, and the use of its lawful governmental power to advance toward socialism—has been maturing in Communist teaching and advocacy for at least 19 years.

THE “TREASON” LIE

Branding as false the charge that the Communist Party teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence, I now want to turn to the loosely hurled charges of “treason,” etc. Here there is a very short answer.

The charge of treason is one with which the Founding Fathers were completely familiar. That was why they defined treason very carefully not by statute but in the basic charter of our Government, the Constitution. The writers of the Constitution made it clear that treason was not dissent but a clearly demonstrable crime that required a certain minimum of objective proof.

In the 35-year history of the Communist Party there has not been a single Communist ever convicted or even indicted on that charge. In the more than 100 Smith Act indictments drawn by various Federal United States attorneys there is not a single allegation of anything remotely resembling treason, sabotage, violence, or espionage.

Will any rational man argue that a succession of United States Attorneys General under Republican and Democratic administrations have permitted treason to flourish for the last 35 years, or that the FBI has been unable to discover it?

Of course, not. The simple truth is that the Communist Party has not advocated or practiced treason, sabotage, violence, espionage, or any other crimes.

Quite the contrary. In the hours of our Nation’s gravest peril, in World War II, 15,000 American Communists served in the Armed Forces of our Nation. A number of them were decorated for heroic service above and beyond the call of duty. The late Captain Herman Botcher, killed in action in Leyte, was a well-known Communist. So, of course, is Robert Thompson, now a Smith Act victim in Atlanta penitentiary, and winner of the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in New Guinea.

MARTIN DIES ON SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

At this point I would like to examine some of the bills in detail as well as the legislative intent as expressed by their sponsors. I said earlier that the bills were a dragnet menace to the freedom of many Americans to speak and associate and that these bills go far beyond the Communist Party.

Representative Martin Dies, speaking before your committee on March 18 in behalf of his bill, H. R. 7084, made it clear that he regards Socialists as substantially in the same category as Communists. In answer to a question from a committee member, Mr. Dies said:

“The Socialist Party is the Communist Party. Socialism touches communism. Up until the Third Communist Internationale they were in the same Communist movement.”

At another point, Mr. Dies said, “All of them recognize Marxism.” From the context it is clear that by “all” Mr. Dies was referring to both Socialists and Communists.

Now, who is a Socialist these days? According to some pundits, the last two decades have been years of “creeping socialism.” According to some, the TVA is an example of “creeping socialism.” On April 26, 1950, Edwin S. Friendly, president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, attacked the so-called welfare state of the administration and “communism disguised as democratic socialism.” It is a matter of record that public housing is persistently denounced as “socialistic” by the real-estate lobby and their political agents.

Under Mr. Dies’ definition of socialism and communism are advocates of TVA, public housing, and such allegedly “socialistic” projects to suffer 10-year jail sentences? What would happen to trade unionists, New Dealers, liberal Republicans, and independents who advance such “socialistic” proposals? What
would happen to supporters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People who, along with millions of supporters, Negro and white, advance such a “socialistic” proposal as full economic, political, and social equality for the Negro people, one-tenth of the population of the United States? If all this alleged socialism “touches communism,” will all these groups not be guilty under Mr. Dies’ curious definition?

Is not this type of argumentation just another way of advancing Senator McCarthy’s incredible thesis that the four administrations between 1933 to 1953 were “20 years of treason”?

Lest it be said that Mr. Dies’ definitions are somewhat unique, let us examine both the bill, H. R. 7080, and the views of a member of this committee, Representatives Francis Walter. Representative Walter seeks to avoid a crude and unconstitutional bill of attainder. His bill does not mention the word “Communist” and he told the committee quite frankly on March 18 that “it is utterly impossible to outlaw the Communist Party as such.” He also stated candidly that his statute would cover persons about whom it would be difficult to find “any evidence of teaching the overthrow of the Government by force and violence.”

Mr. Walter states that he wants to outlaw the “activities” of “these people” since he admits that “you cannot outlaw a party any more than you can outlaw a chair.”

**WHAT ARE THE “OUTLAW” ACTIVITIES?**

Now, what are these “activities” that H. R. 7080 would make punishable by a 10-year sentence?

Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee January 9, 1953, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover defined—and I quote his language—the “principal Communist activities and objectives in the United States” as the following:

“1. Its peace objective geared primarily to raising nationwide appeal for a settlement of the Korean war;

“2. The recall of American troops from abroad;

“3. A five-power peace pact, including Communist China;

“4. The resumption of trade with the Iron Curtain countries.”

Referring to the national scene, Mr. Hoover said:

“On the domestic front, the Communists have also directed their attention to urging repeal of the Smith Act, the Taft-Hartley law, and the Internal Security Act of 1950.”

These are the “principal activities” of the Communists—and, incidentally, of many, many more people beyond the Communist Party—as defined by J. Edgar Hoover. Presumably, these must be the “activities” which Mr. Walter’s bill would outlaw and make punishable by 10-year sentences.

Examine each of these “principal activities.” Aren’t there millions of Americans, including Congressmen, who want “a settlement of the Korean war”? Doesn’t the entire Nation look with revulsion at what the late Senator Taft called “a bloody, useless war”? Doesn’t the Nation shudder at the thought of involvement in another Korea, this time in the jungles of Indochina?

**CONTROVERSIAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL**

And what is subversive about seeking a five-power peace pact, including the government of People’s China, the effective government of the mainland of China? Controversial, yes; criminal, no.

And if the resumption of East-West trade to help American workers, farmers, and business is a criminal activity, then some administration officials and Congressmen may as well get themselves measured for prison denims now. At least one of your members, Representative Thurmond Chatham of North Carolina, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told a big dinner in New York on January 25 last that he favored trade with Russia in nonstrategic items. In fact, he made his speech available for readers nationally by insertion in the Congressional Record. Are Americans who want to sell butter and other American products to Russia now to be guilty of “activities” which would bring them under Mr. Walter’s ban?

As far as the domestic activities of the Communists, as defined by Mr. Hoover, is there anything criminal in seeking the repeal of the Smith Act, whose advocacy section was denounced by at least two Supreme Court judges, a CIO national convention, the NAACP, and many newspapers throughout the country? Is there anything criminal in seeking the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, the announced objective of all sections of the organized labor movement as well as
considerable portions of the Democratic Party? Or is there anything criminal in seeking repeal of the McCarran Act which, like the Taft-Hartley law, was vetoed by then President Truman?

Simply to examine these bills is to see how far America has gone in the direction of surrender to McCarthyism. If these "principal activities" of the Communists become illegal, then no American who has any independent views on foreign or domestic policy is safe. Opposition to involvement in the Indo-Chinese war on the side of French colonialism and efforts to stimulate our economy by East-West trade will both be virtually equated with treason or subversion.

M'Carthyism—the real danger

Gentlemen, there is a clear and present danger in our Nation. It is the danger of the McCarthyean destruction of basic American constitutional rights. It is, of course, designed first of all to prevent the election of a Congress in 1954 devoted to the return to the policies of the New Deal. McCarthyism throws out a smokescreen behind which the most powerful elements in American political life, the huge banks and trusts, America's financial oligarchy, advance against the interests of the American people. The effect of these McCarthyite bills and the whole hysterical and artificial clamor about the menace of communism is to divert attention from the real problems that concern the American people:

Will our sons be fighting in the Indo-Chinese jungles tomorrow?
Will we have our jobs tomorrow?
Will we have our liberties tomorrow?

This McCarthyite danger does not come primarily from one or another head-line-hunting Congressman. It represents the extreme right in American politics—and is not limited only to a few millionaire Texas oilmen, either. William A. White was quite correct when he wrote of McCarthy's supporters in the New York Times magazine March 21, 1954:

"Some rich and cogent men support him in full awareness of what they are about—which is an attempt to raise up what they believe to be a puissant symbol of right-wing thought and action in government."

Nor is this extreme right wing in American politics the creation of a moment. This is the same section of American big business which 18 years ago fought President Roosevelt tooth and nail through the American Liberty League. They bitterly opposed New Deal social legislation and any concessions to organized labor.

Later, many opposed any real effort to halt nazism and many actively supported the America First crowd. This extreme right feels that in World War II we fought the wrong war with the wrong allies against the wrong side.

It is this basically pro-Fascist antiliberal extreme right wing big business crowd which inspires the present series of violently antidemocratic bills.

A step to fascism

If enacted into law, these bills will mark the farthest step down the road to fascism that the United States has yet taken. The United States will then have the dubious distinction of being the first non-Fascist country in the world to outlaw the Communist Party. The world will see it for what it is—an effort to terrorize the country so that we may not debate freely the issues of the day: the prohibition of the H- and A-bombs; intervention in Indochina; a five-power peace pact; East-West trade; a genuine antidepression program to meet mounting unemployment; and quick passage of an FEPC law and a full civil-rights program.

Whether this bill passes or not, the Communist Party will continue to fight for its legal existence. In so doing, it is mindful that it represents the fight of all Americans, irrespective of party, for the right to speak, organize, write, and assemble.

We know, of course, the present temper of this committee. We are aware that to a man this committee is anti-Communist. But the issue here is not communism; it is the defense of the Constitution. Rejection of this fantastic legislation is not approval of the Communist Party; it is reaffirmation of the basic validity of the Bill of Rights. Rejection of these bills will be a signal to the world that McCarthyism has not conquered our Halls of Congress.

To defeat these bills is to defend the rights of all Americans to speak their minds on the issues of the day. To defeat these bills is to defend your own rights, gentlemen. Remember—the rights you save may be your own.

Published by the New York State Communist Party, New York, N. Y.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Gerson, have you ever had occasion during your lifetime to attend Communist meetings in Russia?

Mr. Gerson. Might I consult with counsel on that question?

Mr. Carpenter. What was that?

Mr. Gerson. Might I consult, sir?

Senator Welker. At any time, Mr. Witness.

(The witness consulted with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I will respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been in Russia?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you use a passport if and when you went to Russia?

Mr. Gerson. What was that?

Mr. Carpenter. Did you use a passport, if and when you went to Russia?

Mr. Gerson. Isn't that a hypothetical question? To be frank with you, I don't understand it.

Senator Welker. I think we better strike the last part, "if and when you went to Russia." That is a double-barreled question. You can ask that in some other way: Has he ever used a passport.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever used a United States passport in traveling?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. The same reply, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. If you ever used a passport, did you tell the truth to all the questions that were asked you concerning the procuring of that passport?

Mr. Gerson. I make it a habit generally to tell the truth, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Well, did you on the occasions of asking for a passport?

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever use a passport under an alias?

That is, a name other than your own name?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. Categorically, no.

Senator Welker. How was that?

Mr. Gerson. Categorically no, to the best of my recollection.

Senator Welker. Counselor, we have opened up the subject of passports, and I think now I will direct the witness to answer the counsel's question with respect to whether or not he ever asked for or received a passport to go to Russia. I am sure able counsel realizes, once you open up the subject matter——

Mr. France. Senator, I would agree with you if he had said no, which did not concede that he had ever used any passport for any purpose.

Senator Welker. I will ask the witness a question:

Did you ever apply for or receive a passport to go to Russia?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. The question pertained: Did I make an application under my own name for——
Senator Welker. Read the question to him, will you, Mr. Reporter?

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. Gerson. I applied for an American passport.

Senator Welker. What year?

Mr. Gerson. In 1927, sir.

Senator Welker. And was the passport granted you?

Mr. Gerson. It was, sir.

Senator Welker. And did you answer all the questions truthfully propounded to you before you received the passport?

Mr. Gerson. To the best of my present recollection, I did.

Senator Welker. Did you go to Russia in 1927?

Mr. Gerson. I visited Europe in 1927; yes, sir.

Senator Welker. I asked you, did you go to Russia in 1927.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. The answer is, sir, that I visited the Soviet Union among the countries of Europe; yes.

Senator Welker. Did you go to school there?

Mr. Gerson. I did not.

Senator Welker. Why did you raise your voice on that? I merely wanted to find out what you were doing there.

Mr. Gerson. I beg your pardon, sir. I think this whole thing—Senator Welker. Would you mind telling the committee what you did in Russia there, who you saw?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. Repeat the last question, please.

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir. I traveled thousands of miles in the Soviet Union, visiting various sections of the Soviet Union, particularly its national minorities.

Senator Welker. National what?

Mr. Gerson. Minorities.

Senator Welker. Did you pay your own expenses?

Mr. Gerson. The bulk of them.

Senator Welker. Who paid the balance?

Mr. Gerson. The college.

Senator Welker. What college?

Mr. Gerson. The college club to which I belonged.

Senator Welker. What?

Mr. Gerson. A college club to which I belonged.

Senator Welker. Let's have the name of the college club and its address.

Mr. Gerson. The Social Problems Club, the College of the City of New York.

Senator Welker. That was in the year 1927?

Mr. Gerson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Welker. Did you visit with, or talk to, any officials of the Communist Party in Russia?

Mr. Gerson. I don't recall visiting Communist Party officials. I recall a group of students and professors visiting whatever officialdom was on hand in any town we went to.

Senator Welker. You went with a group of students, am I correct, Mr. Witness?
Mr. Gerson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Welker. And you met with officials who were present?

Mr. Gerson. The local mayor might turn out and people like that.

Senator Welker. They treated you quite splendidly at that time; did they?

Mr. Gerson. They treated all Americans who were there, including one gentleman who is now a Member of the United State Senate, quite splendidly.

Senator Welker. Who was that?

Mr. Gerson. He wasn't a Senator then, so the reference may be unfair. It was Paul Douglas, of Illinois. Just to be strictly accurate, he was not a member of the particular delegation that I was on.

Senator Welker. He happened to be visiting there at the same time?

Mr. Gerson. That is correct, sir, with some others.

Senator Welker. Is this this only time you ever visited Russia?

Mr. Gerson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Welker. Did you ever hear of the Lenin School in Russia?

Mr. Gerson. I have heard, sir, that there was such a school, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

Senator Welker. You did not visit that school while you were there?

Mr. Gerson. Absolutely not.

Senator Welker. From your information received about the Lenin School, you knew, did you not, that that was a school that trained Americans and other people in espionage and sabotage—

Mr. Gerson. No, sir; I knew no such thing.

Senator Welker. You never heard anything about that?

Mr. Gerson. No, sir.

Senator Welker. Did they ever tell you what they taught in the Lenin School?

Mr. Gerson. No, sir.

Senator Welker. You did not inquire about it?

Mr. Gerson. No, sir.

Senator Welker. But you were there to seek to learn?

Mr. Gerson. I traveled all over the Soviet Union, sir, and I had a special interest. I indicated what that interest was.

Senator Welker. That was the minority?

Mr. Gerson. That is correct.

Senator Welker. Did Mr. Harold Ware go with you on that trip?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Senator Welker. I will call attention to the code of fair ethics. I think we are fair when we let you sit there and discuss matters of law which you want to. I am not going to object to it. You may now proceed, Mr. Witness.

Mr. Gerson. I recall no such person.

Senator Welker. Did you know that at that time Hal Ware was then an agricultural expert for the Soviet Union?

Mr. Gerson. I don't think I had the faintest knowledge at that time—

Senator Welker. Did you ever have any other knowledge of Mr. Harold Ware, either in Russia or any other place?

Mr. Gerson. I have no recollection of such an individual, sir.

Senator Welker. You have seen his name in print, of course.

Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir.
Senator Welker. Have you ever in your lifetime ever known a member of the Communist Party outside of Russia?

Mr. Gerson. I think I am going to have to decline to answer that question on the grounds hitherto stated.

Senator Welker. Mr. Carpenter?

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been in contact with agents of the Soviet Military Intelligence?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I have never been in contact with such people.

Senator Welker. Have you ever visited at any time the Soviet Embassy in the United States or——

Mr. Gerson. No, sir.

Senator Welker. Any of its representatives?

Mr. Gerson. Any of its representatives?

Senator Welker. Yes. Any of its counselors or attachés.

Mr. Gerson. I don't recall, sir, having made any visits to the type of organization you refer to.

Senator Welker. Have you ever met or visited with any of the membership, the attachés, the workers, even the janitor or anybody else connected with the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Gerson. I have no independent recollection of any such visits.

Senator Welker. Have you ever at any time either distributed yourself or had distributed by your order Soviet Communist propaganda coming into the United States?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I am frankly a bit at a loss, sir, on what you mean by Soviet Communist propaganda. Would you define that a little for me?

Senator Welker. Had you been at one of our hearings over at New York, you would have seen 2 million pieces of Communist propaganda that had come into one customs office——

Mr. Gerson. I wasn't there, sir.

Senator Welker (continuing). In less than 2 days, and it included magazines, articles, such as the one we described in my interrogation of you, only some were printed in Peking, some were printed in Poland, and other captive states which are behind the Iron Curtain.

I have asked you, have you, or have you under your orders ever distributed any of that sort of propaganda?

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Gerson. I have no recollection of ever having done so.

Senator Welker. In case there is some doubt in your mind as to what I mean by propaganda, I would say it is just about similar to that little pamphlet I interrogated you about, and where I directed your attention to a certain picture on it.

Mr. Gerson. I have no memory of such.

Senator Welker. Any further questions?

You are excused. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gerson. May I make one request of the committee, sir?

Since the question of my war service was entered into by Colonel Carpenter, with whom I served, I believe, in the same division in the Philippines, might I request that I reserve the right to enter into your record a photostatic certified copy of my honorable discharge, a simi-
lar copy of my war record, and such other relevant documents from
my superior officers that I may have in my possession?

Senator Welker. Would you care to save time, to certify any rec-
ords you may have with respect to any connection you have with the
Communist Party in the State of New York or the Communist Inter-
national? I will certainly happily make a bargain with you on that.

Mr. Gerson. I will be very happy, sir, to confine my request to my
war records, since that matter was originally raised by counsel.

Senator Welker. I certainly want you to have that right, and I will
order that you submit that and it will be made a part of the record.
But at the same time, the Chair would like to make the observation
that you are just not playing fair with me when you put into the
record the good part and hold out the part that I have interrogated
you about. If you were innocent of it, there certainly would not be
anything entered into the record. But if you were connected with the
Communist Party, I hope and pray that you will be fair and put that
in with your war record.

Since you insist upon your war record, we will happily order that
to be done.

(The following information on Gerson’s service record was fur-
nished by the Department of the Army at the subcommittee’s request.
No documents were received from Gerson.)

Department of the Army,

Hon. William E. Jenner,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate.

(Attention: Mr. Robert McManus.)

Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to a letter from Mr. Benjamin Mandel, re-
search director of your subcommittee, to Assistant Secretary of Defense Seaton,
dated April 29, 1954, there follows a résumé of information available at this time
concerning the service history of Simon W. Gerson. More complete details con-
cerning Gerson’s service at Camp Upton, N. Y., are not set forth in Gerson’s
personnel file, but this office will attempt to search any other records in the
Department of the Army to secure this information. If located, this information
will be furnished to your subcommittee without delay.

The records show that Simon W. Gerson, service No. 42067462, was inducted
January 19, 1944, at New York, N. Y.; transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps
the same date; entered on active duty February 9, 1944, at Camp Upton, N. Y.;
transferred to Company E, 218th ITB, 67th ITR, Camp Blanding, Fla., February
18, 1944; transferred to Company G, 2d Battalion, AGF, Replacement Depot No.
2, Fort Ord, Calif., August 10, 1944; departed for overseas service in the Southwest
Pacific area September 21, 1944; arrived in New Guinea October 16, 1944; trans-
ferred to the 43d Tng. Gp., APO 711, October 16, 1944; transferred to the 4th
Replacement Depot, APO 703, November 25, 1944; assigned to Company G, 19th
Infantry, APO 24, November 28, 1944.

While overseas Gerson participated in Luzon and Southern Philippines cam-
paigns. He received the Combat Infantryman Badge, American Service Medal,
Asiatic-Pacific Service Medal, Good Conduct Medal, Philippine Liberation Medal
with Bronze Star, and World War II Victory Medal. His military occupation
specialty number was 745 (rifleman).

On May 2, 1945, Gerson was evacuated to the United States as a result of
contracting epidermophytosis of the feet. He arrived at Letterman General
Hospital on May 22, 1945, and was transferred to the Detachment of Patients,
ASF Convalescent Hospital, Camp Upton, N. Y., on May 30, 1945.

On July 1, 1945, Gerson was assigned to Hq Detachment, 1234th SCU, Camp
Upton. His service record does not indicate the nature of his duties during
the period of this assignment. On January 25, 1946, he was transferred to
Separation Center, Fort Dix, N. J., and he was honorably discharged on Janu-
ary 20, 1946, at Fort Dix.
Gerson was promoted from private to private first class, October 22, 1945, and from private first class to corporal on November 6, 1945. He was discharged as a corporal.

Sincerely yours,

LEWIS E. BERRY, JR.,
Deputy Department Counselor.

Mr. Gerson. Thank you.
Senator Welker. Thank you.
Thank you, Counsel, for appearing.
Is there another witness?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. James, you have heretofore been sworn. For the purpose of the public record, I will ask you to state your full name, your residence, and occupation.

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL JAMES, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. James. My full name is Daniel James. My residence is 334 Riverside Drive, New York City. My occupation is writer.
Senator Welker. The record will show you are appearing without counsel.
Mr. James. Correct.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. James, when and where were you born?
Mr. James. I was born in Liverpool, England, October 26, 1914.
Mr. Carpenter. When did you come to the United States?
Mr. James. 1937.
Mr. Carpenter. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States?
Mr. James. I am.
Mr. Carpenter. Where did you go to school?
Mr. James. In Toronto; the University of Toronto.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you receive any degrees from that university?
Mr. James. No; I did not.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you enter the Armed Forces of the United States?
Mr. James. I did.
Mr. Carpenter. What time?
Mr. James. July 1943.
Mr. Carpenter. How long were you in the Armed Forces of the United States?
Mr. James. I was in from that point until January 1946.
Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work in the Armed Forces of the United States?
Mr. James. During most of the time I was connected with the Information and Education program.
Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed?
Mr. James. Originally I was stationed at Camp Reynolds, Pennsylvania, as an enlisted man, and entered the I. and E. program at that time, when it was known as the Morale Services Division.

From there I was sent to the Orientation School, Morale Services School, I believe, was the official name for it at the time, at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va.
I was graduated from that school and thereafter recommended for OCS. I took a course at OCS, entered the I. and E. officers replacement pool at Washington and Lee University for 2 or 3 days,
and thereafter was assigned to temporary duty with the Information and Education Division in the War Department.

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank at that time?

Mr. James. Second lieutenant.

Mr. Carpenter. Who was your commanding officer?

Mr. James. In the Pentagon, do you mean?

Mr. Carpenter. That is right.

Mr. James. Maj. Julius Schreiber.

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you there with Major Schreiber?

Mr. James. I was there for approximately 30 days and afterward transferred to the New York Branch of the Information and Education Division where I remained for about 6 months.

Mr. Carpenter. You were with Major Schreiber for about 6 weeks in Washington?

Mr. James. About 30 days.

Mr. Carpenter. About 30 days?

Mr. James. Yes.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work while here in Washington with Major Schreiber?

Mr. James. I was in the Orientation Branch, presumably to participate in the writing and publication of materials that were used for discussions and lectures among the troops.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do any of the writing?

Mr. James. I did some in the Pentagon. I don’t recall what was ever printed.

Mr. Carpenter. Was it accepted?

Mr. James. As I say, I don’t recall whether it was ever used.

Mr. Carpenter. While you were here in Washington, in the I. and E. Section, did you have occasion to wonder about some of the material that was being done and published or speeches that were being made?

Mr. James. Well, there were two incidents in particular that aroused my interest at the time. One was a discussion which I happened to get into with Major Schreiber at the time that the so-called Lublin Committee was formed in Poland, which I believed then had been formed by the Soviet Government and was a puppet committee, in opposition to the Polish government-in-exile then quartered in London. I made known that view to Major Schreiber. He happened to disagree directly with it, maintaining that it was a democratically constituted government, that is, this so-called Lublin Committee was.

During the course of our discussion, in order to indicate his disapproval of the position I took, he pointed to a book in the library up there in the Orientation Branch written by an anti-Communist author named David J. Dallin, and told me that I sounded like Mr. Dallin.

The second incident concerned a lecture that Major Schreiber delivered to officers at the Pentagon as part of his duty, during the course of which he used a chart setting forth the structure of the Soviet Government. The intent and purport of that lecture, in my opinion at that time, was to attempt to portray the Soviet Government, the Soviet State, as democratic. The chart consisted of a breakdown of the various organs of the Soviet State.

Mr. Carpenter. This was to a group of officers, did you say?
Mr. James. This was to a group of officers in the War Department.

Mr. Carpenter. What were their ranks?

Mr. James. I am afraid I did not make a tally of their ranks, and I cannot recall, certainly at this time, what their ranks were. I would say there was a good sprinkling of colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants. I don't recall having seen any generals there, but there may have been.

Mr. Carpenter. About how many people were in this group?

Mr. James. That, too, is a very difficult thing to recall, since this happened 10 years ago. I would say there were probably a few dozen officers present.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to inspect the literature that was being used in order to build up these programs?

Mr. James. Well, in the course of my writing activities at the Branch I had recourse to the library facilities, and there I observed that there were a number of publications written by such people as Owen and Eleanor Lattimore, Lawrence Rosinger. I believe that these publications were put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. I also saw copies of Amerasia, which I encountered there for the first time, and of the Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. Carpenter. From your experience there, do you feel that the program they were outlining was definitely slanted toward the Communist thinking?

Mr. James. I don't believe that you can quite say that. I think that insofar as they possibly could, certain individuals who might have had an interest in portraying the Soviet Union in the best possible light attempted to do so. I don't think that you can say that the orientation program, as a program, was slanted in the direction——

Mr. Carpenter. I meant the particular individuals that you were associated with in that particular branch.

Mr. James. I would say this, that had I had the power of selecting individuals, I would not have selected some of these individuals to conduct the program.

Senator Welker. Why?

Mr. James. I think they had ulterior political interests.

Senator Welker. What were those ulterior political interests?

Mr. James. I think that certainly you could say that some of those people may have been classified as extremely friendly toward communism and Communist ideas, the Soviet Union, and all that sort of thing.

Senator Welker. And by their friendliness, they imparted it to their fellow officers and made their positions clear?

Mr. James. I would say, sir, wherever they could they probably attempted to do so.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you spend some time in New York at the New York office?

Mr. James. I spent approximately 6 months, from early January to June of 1945.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work in the New York office?

Mr. James. The nature of my work in the New York office was to participate in the writing and publication of the Army weekly discussion guide called Army Talk.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you find the same atmosphere in the New York office that you found in the Washington office?

Mr. James. Yes, I did. And to some extent it was even more pronounced.

Mr. Carpenter. How were you accepted among those who were working both in the Washington office and the New York office?

Mr. James. I would say that when I got to New York I very early discovered that I was not a member of the group that seemed to be running the show. That is to say it became clear to me that there were a number of individuals in the branch who operated as a sort of clique working together.

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, in that clique they had enlisted men, did they not?

Mr. James. Yes, they did.

Mr. Carpenter. And those enlisted men rated more favor than you as an officer, and their counsel was accepted more readily than your recommendations?

Mr. James. Well, there were any number of what you might call closed discussions that went on between members of this group, among the members of this group, from which just about everyone of us in the office outside the group was excluded. There were other officers there, too, and other enlisted personnel. They also were excluded.

I want it clearly understood, Mr. Counsel, that this was distinctly an impression I got. It is a very intangible thing, something that is difficult to put your fingers on.

Mr. Carpenter. Can you give the names of those people who seemed to be in the clique?

Mr. James. I know that frequently Major Schreiber would come up to New York and go into a huddle with Forstenzer, Hyman Forstenzer, and Carl Fenichel, particularly. I think possibly on one or more occasions Stephen Fischer was usually consulted. I better strike out usually, since perhaps it was just a few occasions.

That would be about it. They would have these discussions. They would go into one of the smaller offices in our establishment. Of course, I had no idea what they were talking about, but it was quite obvious that the rest of the office was excluded from these discussions.

Mr. Carpenter. Out of this office field trips were arranged to various installations, various Army installations, in the United States, and certain individuals went, is that right?

Mr. James. I did not hear that.

Mr. Carpenter. From this installation in New York there were certain individuals selected from the New York office to travel throughout the United States to the various camps and stations in order to carry out the work of the I. and E.?

Mr. James. That is correct.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever included on any of those trips?

Mr. James. I was included on only one inspection trip to Atlantic City and Fort Monmouth, which covered a period of perhaps 2 or 3 days. I was once scheduled to go on a trip to Texas, but for some unaccountable reason that was canceled. However, Forstenzer and Fenichel and other individuals in the office were frequently en route to some post or camp to give indoctrination courses and run orientation schools and so on.
Mr. Carpenter. They were the ones who belonged to this particular clique?

Mr. James. That is right.
I might add, Mr. Counsel, if I may, that I was not the only one so excluded to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Carpenter. There were others excluded?

Mr. James. I think there were others in the office. At least, I did not notice one other officer, at least, who ever went on such a trip. Again, I say to my knowledge. And perhaps there were even more individuals whom I can't recall at this moment.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to discuss with this clique their political ideas or the idea they were trying to inculcate into the minds of the American soldiers?

Mr. James. The very nature of our work—we were frequently engaged in discussions of one political issue or another. On more than one occasion I found myself discussing such things as the Soviet Union and Soviet policy, and communism, the Communist Party, with members of this group.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have a discussion with Forstenzer?

Mr. James. Well, on one particular occasion I was about to relate, we went to lunch together and had a rather lengthy discussion of the nature of communism and the structure of the international Communist movement. I exhibited a good deal of curiosity as to why the Communist Parties of the various countries of the world always seemed to act together, in concert, and I put the question to Forstenzer of whether or not there wasn't some central direction that would explain why all of these parties usually thought and acted alike. It was his opinion that they did so because they came to the same conclusions independently. That, I may add, is a favorite phrase that is used in Communist circles.

Mr. Carpenter. We have had several of those individuals before this committee from time to time. Many of them have taken advantage of the fifth amendment. I am wondering if you observed during your time in I. and E. how was it that those individuals gravitated into the I. and E. Division?

Mr. James. Well, it has been a question that I have thought about a great deal. I don't know that there is any one explanation for it. There are probably a number of explanations, one being apparently that personnel sympathetic to such ideas got in on the ground floor of the program, and naturally tended to obtain the assistance, aid, of others in the Armed Forces who may have thought like them. I think that would be a perfectly natural thing for them to do.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever hear any discussions wherein some member of the organization would suggest that some other member from the outside join the organization?

Mr. James. I never heard any such discussion, no.

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. James, are you or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. James. I not only never have been, but I have always opposed communism and any other form of totalitarianism.

Mr. Carpenter. That is all.

Senator Welker. Any further questions?

If not, the witness is excused, and the meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:25 p. m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. Friday, August 6, 1954.)
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

FRIDAY, AUGUST 6, 1954

United States Senate,

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m., pursuant to call, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Hon. William E. Jenner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.
Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Robert C. McManus, professional staff member.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Call the first witness.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Gandall.
The Chairman. Do you swear the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Gandall. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM P. GANDALL, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, ATTORNEY

The Chairman. Will you give the committee your full name?
Mr. Gandall. William Gandall.
The Chairman. You may be seated.
Mr. Gandall. May I stand? I have an intestinal disorder.
The Chairman. Yes; you may.
Where do you reside?
Mr. Gandall. 225 West 12th Street, New York.
The Chairman. What is your business or profession?
Mr. Gandall. I am a publicist.
The Chairman. You are here today with counsel, Mr. Forer?
Mr. Gandall. Yes.
The Chairman. You may proceed with the questioning, Mr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. When and where were you born?
Mr. Gandall. October 4, 1908, New York City.
Mr. Carpenter. Where did you attend school?
Mr. Gandall. I attended school at William Penn Grammar School in Chicago, Ill.; and Wilson Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio; New Utrecht High in Brooklyn, N. Y.; Palm Beach High in Palm
Beach, Fla.; a number of Army schools; the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England; and Trinity College. Roughly, that is it. I may have attended school a month or two at some other place, small location.

Mr. Carpenter. By whom are you now employed?
Mr. Gandall. I am employed by Universal Pictures.

Mr. Carpenter. How long have you been employed by Universal Pictures?
Mr. Gandall. Is that temporary or permanent? I was employed in two capacities.

Mr. Carpenter. Both.

Mr. Gandall. About 2½ years this time.

Mr. Carpenter. Where have you been employed since 1935, up until the time you joined Universal Pictures?

Mr. Gandall. 1945?

Mr. Carpenter. 1935.

Mr. Gandall. I did a lot of odd jobs in my time, and you are asking me something offhand that you did not ask before. I will have to recollect now, if you do not mind, just where I was employed. I think I drove a taxi in 1935, among other things.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

In 1939 I was employed by the Transport Workers Union as an international and legislative representative.

In 19—well, I think it was either 1939 or 1940, somewhere right around there—I was delegated by the CIO and then the leader of the CIO at that time, John L. Lewis, to the farmers' union as a representative of the Trade Union Movement to the Dairy Farmers' Union of the New York milkshed.

Mr. Carpenter. Is that the National Farmers' Union?

Mr. Gandall. It is now, but it was not then.

Mr. Carpenter. From 1936 until 1939, where were you employed?

You said you drove a taxi for 1 year.

Mr. Gandall. Yes; and I was not employed for 2 years there.

Mr. Carpenter. Which 2 years?

Mr. Gandall. 1937 and 1938.

Mr. Carpenter. In 1936 where were you employed?

Mr. Gandall. I was employed as a taxi driver, and I did a lot of other odd jobs that I would have to recall if you want them. If you want them, I will gladly think it over and try to find them.

Mr. Carpenter. Will it take you long to think it over?

Mr. Gandall. Let me think. It is a long time ago; 1936—let me see. This is 1954. It is damn near 20 years. You may have been an attorney all your life, but I am just—in those days I was a working stiff. I naturally did a lot of odd jobs wherever I could find them. It was a pretty tough time, if you remember. I have been in many, many jobs. So, among others, I drove a taxi. I am trying to recall the year. I did some organizing work, too, in that year.

Mr. Carpenter. For whom?

Mr. Gandall. Workers’ Alliance. That was an organization of WPA employees, I believe. I am not quite certain now. I think that is what it was at that time. The alphabets escape me at this stage.

I did some other union work around there. I was very active in union activities. I was also active in the Fusion campaign around
that period or after that period, during that period; active with a lot of Republicans, by the way, as well.

The Chairman. What do you mean "as well"?

Mr. Gandall. I was active with other people there, and among the other people I met were a lot of good Republicans, including Joseph Clark Baldwin III. I was very interested in legislative matters that affected the taxi drivers. I consulted with them and tried to get legislation that would be on our side, favorable to us, just as everybody has a right to do.

Mr. Carpenter. Are you a member of the Communist Party?

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness confers with his counsel before responding to the question.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. No.

The Chairman. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Gandall. I think I answered that question this morning, and I want to repeat that thing. First, I would like to say that I do not believe that the committee has a right—I do not think anybody has a right—to inquire into your political or religious beliefs. I think we were taught that in grammar school, and we were taught right through our whole educational process that political and religious beliefs are supposed to be your own. However, we are living in different times and I want to claim, I want to refuse to answer on the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States not to be a witness against myself.

The Chairman. The committee recognizes your right to refuse to answer under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, but it does not extend the privilege of refusing to answer to your political and religious belief because it happens to be the belief of this committee that communism is not a political belief because it has been known and declared to be a conspiracy designed to overthrow and destroy this Government by force. That goes beyond the ground of political belief.

Mr. Gandall. I believe that is a matter of opinion, but I am not prepared to discuss or argue the case with you.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been employed by the Communist Party?

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.

The Chairman. The same, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in service during World War II?

Mr. Gandall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed?

Mr. Gandall. Do you want every station?

Mr. Carpenter. For any reasonable length of time; say 3 months?

Mr. Gandall. I was stationed in a heck in a lot of places then in 3 years and 6 months. I want to point out I may miss a spot or two because I was getting the treatment and naturally got bounced around from post to post.

I was drafted in the Army. I tried to reenlist in the Marines but I was drafted into the Army in January 1943. I was stationed at Fresno, Calif., Basic Training Center No. 8, United States Army Air
Force. It is a training command. I drilled troops there for around 9 or 10 months. I was made a sergeant almost immediately due to the fact I had a lot of military background.

I requested overseas service after I saw they were not going to ship me. I got over to England, and one of the first places I hit in England was Marbury Hall where I met Captain Jenner, Capt. Bill Jenner, or William Jenner. I guess Captain Jenner started the treatment. I was acting special service officer for the camp, appointed by the colonel, and almost immediately Captain Jenner started to ride me. From that time on it was every day that we had a staff meeting. Jenner was on my neck, and I guess he is still keeping it up.

The Chairman. You were a member of the Communist Party then; were you?

Mr. Gandall. I said I was not.

The Chairman. It was the policy of the Communist Party that when a man went into uniform to say he was not a member of the Communist Party; is that correct?

Mr. Gandall. I do not know about that. All I am talking about is the camp.

The Chairman. Is that not correct?

Mr. Gandall. I do not know anything about that policy.

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party before you took the oath to go into the uniform of the United States Government?

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.

The Chairman. The same record, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. Gandall. At Marbury Hall the captain finally had me shanghaied but not before I had accused him of being a subversive. He was the subversive element in the Army and a couple of others like him. They tried to divide the Army and tried to get us not to fight with a hundred percent cooperation behind Roosevelt because essentially he is an anti-Roosevelt man.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work? Were you in the I. and E.?

Mr. Gandall. Not when Captain Jenner started the treatment. When he started to give me the business and got me kicked around from pillar to post, I was not in the I. and E. It was only General Eisenhower that put me into the I. and E. after guys like him, Charlesworth, and Colonel Hudson started to give me the treatment because I had some independence of ideas and did not knuckle under all the time like a lot of stoolpigeons and misfits.

I got kicked around. I got kicked around all over England and Ireland, all starting with Jenner. I was transferred to Langford Lodge. I was given posts out in a remote area with 2 or 3 people who said, "Stay away." I had commanding officers show me the documents and say, "Will you please go on leave? Don't come around the post. We want you in a nonsensitive position. We don't want you around."

The Chairman. Nonsensitive?

Mr. Gandall. Yes, sir. "We haven't got any positions, so won't you take a leave?"

Mr. Carpenter. You did some lecturing there?
Mr. Gandall. I sure did. I gave an Army talks program for the benefit of the men. That is another thing we had to fight on. Before the Army talks program came in, I tried to get an orientation course started there at Marbury Hall while the men were stewing around, going on drunks—including Jenner, by the way. I had to pull him out of a pub tight as hell and also——

The Chairman. You know you are lying now.

Mr. Gandall. I am not lying, sir. We were over there and you remember it.

The Chairman. You are under oath.

Mr. Gandall. I remember it, and there is many a sergeant that saw you drunk and disorderly. We saw you with your hair down. We did not call you the captain of the night for nothing.

The Chairman. You are trying to provoke a scene.

Mr. Gandall. I am not. I am irritated by your riding me, not only in the Army but in civil life.

The Chairman. Please, you are trying to provoke a scene. We must have order here. We have come here to ask for certain information. My record is clear as far as the Army is concerned.

Mr. Gandall. My record will stand up to yours.

The Chairman. We know about you.

Mr. Gandall. I know about you.

The Chairman. All we ask you to do is answer the question, and we do not care for any scene.

Mr. Gandall. You don't care if you crucify somebody.

The Chairman. Mr. Forer, your counsel, will tell you how this committee has conducted its proceedings.

Mr. Gandall. You have not been fair. You gave me 48 hours to get down here. I had an hour with him.

The Chairman. You were down here the other day.

Mr. Gandall. Yes, and I was under the impression you dismissed me.

The Chairman. You tried to get me—you asked me before this hearing if you could not possibly postpone.

Mr. Gandall. Darn right, so I could talk to my attorney. I had asked for a postponement, but I——

The Chairman. You cannot use any influence with this committee. We are here to do a job for the United States, and we are looking into the internal security of this country. We have asked you certain questions. Are you a Communist now?

Mr. Gandall. I said I was not.

The Chairman. When did you resign from the Communist Party?

Mr. Gandall. What has this to do with the question just asked about the Army? Which question do you want to have answered?

The Chairman. When did you resign from the Communist Party?

Let the record show the witness is conferring with counsel before responding to the question.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. Sir, that is an unfair question because I never said I was a member. I ask you to withdraw it.

The Chairman. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Let the record show the witness is conferring with counsel.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.
The Chairman. Under the fifth amendment?
Mr. Gandall. Among other things.
The Chairman. The same record.
Mr. Gandall. Do you want the rest of my Army career?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Were you a member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?
Mr. Gandall. I said the United States Army. I had a long career there.
The Chairman. Please do not try to provoke a scene.
Mr. Gandall. He does not want the answers. He asked me about 15 other MOS's I was in, different places. I was over in Europe in the ETO in the Chador Base.
The Chairman (to Mr. Forer). You are his counsel. You have been before this committee many times. We would like some cooperation. You were asked a question. Will you repeat the question, Mr. Reporter?

Were you a member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?
(Witness conferred with counsel.)
Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.
The Chairman. Under the fifth amendment of the Constitution?
Mr. Gandall. Yes.
The Chairman. That your answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Gandall. I did not say that.
The Chairman. What did you say?

Mr. Gandall. I will repeat it. On the basis of my privilege under the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States not to be a witness against myself.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever apply for a passport to travel to Spain or any European country?
(Witness conferred with counsel.)
Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.
Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever issued a passport to travel to Europe?
Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.
The Chairman. Same record.
Mr. Carpenter. Was passport No. 358978 issued to you to travel to Spain?
Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.
The Chairman. Same record.
What did you do in Spain?
(Witness conferred with counsel.)
The Chairman. Let the record show the witness smirked and laughed and then conferred with counsel.

Mr. Gandall. I refused to answer for the reason I gave before. That struck me funny. You ask me a question and I refused to answer. Then you go ahead and ask me another question that if I did answer I would be—you asked me about a passport. Then you asked me about something else that relates to the passport. Obviously, one question is related to the other. I refused on those grounds.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever had any contact with Soviet military officials?
The Chairman. Let the record show the witness confers with his counsel before responding to the question of counsel.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. I again refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.

The Chairman. Same record, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been given any training in guerrilla warfare by the Soviet officers?

Mr. Gandall. United States Marine Corps officers?

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness confers with counsel before responding.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason given before.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever get any instructions in dynamiting, espionage, by representatives of the Soviet military forces?

The Chairman. Let the record again show the witness confers with counsel before responding to the question.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.

The Chairman. Same record, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. Carpenter. When were you discharged from the Army?

Mr. Gandall. I think it was May 28—I am not a 100 percent certain of that—1946.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you join the Communist Party in 1946 after you were discharged from the Army?

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness conferred with counsel before responding.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.

Mr. Carpenter. I have a news item from the CIO News that I would like Mr. Mandel to read and introduce it into the record.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a clipping from the CIO News of May 15, 1944, page 8 with a photograph—and I read the caption of the photograph:

Army Leader: A former CIO organizer and editor, Sgt. William Gandell, "somewhere in England" gives American GI's the lowdown on how the Nazis fight. Gandell, who received his experience during service with the International Brigade, is in charge of all Army talks given at an air service command where he is stationered. He is a former associate editor of the Transport Bulletin.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.
(The clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 441" and is as follows:)

**ARMY LEADER:** A former CIO organizer and editor, Sgt. William Gandell, "somewhere in England" gives American GIs the lowdown on how the Nazis fight. Gandell, who received his experience during service with the Intl. Brigade, is in charge of all army talks given at an Air Service Command where he is stationed. He is a former associate editor of the "Transport Bulletin."

The **CHAIRMAN**. Does that article refer to you?  
(Witness conferred with counsel.)  
Mr. **GANDALL**. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before.  
The **CHAIRMAN**. The same record, Mr. Reporter.  
Mr. **MANDEL**. The Transport Workers Union in a report dated March 29, 1944, by the House Committee on Un-American Activities was cited at that time as a union in which Communist leadership is strongly intrenched.  
Mr. **CARPENTER**. Mr. Mandel has a letter from the Department of the Army, and I would like for him to read the last paragraph.  
Mr. **MANDELL**. This is a letter to Mr. Jenner dated June 30, 1954, from C. A. Haskins, assistant department counselor. The letter recites the service of Mr. Gandall, and the last paragraph refers to the topic we are investigating, so I would like to read it.
While Gandall's service record does not specify the precise nature of his duties while assigned to the various stations listed above, it does indicate that as of March 22, 1943, Gandall was assigned military occupation specialty (MOS) 566 (duty noncommissioned officer), which involved the supervision of details performing general military and fatigue duties. His service record further shows that, as of February 1, 1944, Gandall was assigned MOS 274 (Information specialist). The words "public relations" which appear in the same entry on his service record indicate that, as of that date, Gandall was probably participating in the preparation of public information material. He attended a course for education officers and discussion leaders on May 21, 25, and 26, 1944, while assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, BADA, ASF, USSTAF. Gandall's discharge certificate indicates that the most highly skilled duty performed during his Army career was MOS 274 (information specialist), with the duty position of information and education noncommissioned officer, a position which may have included either troop or public information responsibilities, or both.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 442" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 442

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR,

HON. WILLIAM E. JENNER,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

(Attention Mr. Robert C. McManus.)

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to letters from Mr. Robert C. McManus of your subcommittee staff to this office, dated June 4, 1954, and June 7, 1954, the following résumé of the service record of former S. Sgt. William P. Gandall, 39554255, is provided for the use of the subcommittee.

Gandall was born on October 4, 1908, at Brooklyn, N. Y. Several years prior to his Army service, he served a 4-year enlistment in the United States Marine Corps, from November 9, 1926, to November 8, 1930. He also served a 4-year enlistment in the United States Marine Corps Reserve (inactive status) from August 19, 1932, to August 15, 1936.

He was inducted into the Army at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1943, and was attached to Service Command Unit 1930, Arlington, Calif., on January 22, 1943. On January 25, 1943, he was attached to the 779th Technical School Squadron, Fresno, Calif.; he was later assigned to this same unit, where he served until approximately March 1, 1943. He was then assigned to the Army Air Forces Basic Training Center at Fresno until October 27, 1943, at which time he was sent overseas to the European Theater of Operations (ETO).

Upon his arrival in the ETO, Gandall was attached on November 2, 1943, to Squadron B, 17th Replacement Control Depot (Aviation). On November 27, 1943, he was assigned to Headquarters, 8th Air Force Service Command. On January 23, 1944, he was attached to Detachment A, 8th Air Force Base Air Depot Area.

On March 1, 1944, Gandall was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Base Air Depot Area, Air Service Command, United States Strategic Air Force (BADA, ASF, USSTAF). Subsequent European assignments were: 97th Airdrome Squadron, from June 22, 1944; Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 401st Air Depot, from July 26, 1944; Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 401st Base Air Depot, from August 5, 1944; Base Air Depot No. 3, from September 16, 1944; Detachment B, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 401st Base Air Depot, from August 5, 1944; Detachment C, same squadron, from September 16, 1944; Detachment B, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, BADA, ASC, USSTAF, from December 18, 1944; Detachment G, same squadron, from April 9, 1945. He was attached to the 1917 Ordnance Ammunition Company (Aviation) on April 20, 1945, and assigned to Headquarters Detachment, Chanor Base Section, on September 14, 1945. On September 17, 1945, he was attached to the 16th Major Port.

From October 8, 1945, to April 1, 1946, Gandall was assigned to Headquarters Company, 16th Major Port, APO 562, for purposes of attending a liberal arts program at Cambridge University (Training Within Civilian Agencies Program,
UK Region). From April 16, 1946, to May 28, 1946, he was assigned to the 14th Major Port, and on May 28, 1946, he was honorably discharged at Headquarters 14th Major Port, Processing Center, Southampton, England.

Gandall was promoted to corporal on March 22, 1943, to sergeant on May 1, 1943, and to staff sergeant on May 21, 1944.

While Gandall's service record does not specify the precise nature of his duties while assigned to the various stations listed above, it does indicate that as of March 22, 1943, Gandall was assigned military occupation specialty (MOS) 566 (duty noncommissioned officer), which involved the supervision of details performing general military and fatigue duties. His service record further shows that, as of February 1, 1944, Gandall was assigned MOS 274 (information specialist). The words "public relations" which appear in the same entry on his service record indicate that, as of that date, Gandall was probably participating in the preparation of public-information material. He attended a course for education officers and discussion leaders on May 24, 25, and 26, 1944, while assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, BADA, ASF, USSTAF. Gandall's discharge certificate indicates that the most highly skilled duty performed during his Army career was MOS 274 (information specialist), with the duty position of Information and Education noncommissioned officer, a position which may have included either troop or public-information responsibilities, or both.

Sincerely yours,

C. A. Haskins, Assistant Department Counselor.

Mr. Carpenter. Is that a fair statement of your service?

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness confers with counsel before responding.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. Gandall. It is not correct, of course. It gives me a lot more credit, I imagine, than I had in the service. Notice I stopped at staff sergeant almost immediately, despite my requests for a commission, et cetera. I never got any further than that, and I do not think I was that important. But it sounds good.

Mr. Carpenter. While you were in the Farmers' Union, did you know an Archie Wright?

Mr. Gandall. Yes; I knew Archie Wright.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you associated with him?

Mr. Gandall. Well, as far as associated with him, I was up there and knew him. That is my association.

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work with him?

Mr. Gandall. Do you want the complete picture of this? I will give it to you. I do not mind. I was trying to form—I first contacted the Dairy Farmers' Union, trying to form a farmer-labor party because I believed that the farmers and labor had a lot in common. I tried to get some backing in that idea. Later on, because of my familiarity with the farm problem, and the dairy problem especially—we have a real problem there in the surplus production of milk that occurred in those years, and I made a rather thorough study of the farm problem at that time when I was a legislative representative of the Transport Union—because of that background, I believe I was appointed as the CIO representative to the Farmers Union, and, naturally, I tried to do a number of things that would help us and help them. I then knew Archie Wright in that connection.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever a member of the NKVD?

Mr. Gandall. The what?

The Chairman. The NKVD.

Mr. Gandall. What the heck is that? I heard a lot of alphabets. Explain that.

The Chairman. That is a Russian military organization.
Mr. Gandall. That is silly.
The Chairman. Your answer is, "That is silly"?
Mr. Gandall. No; I was not.
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything on the Workers' Alliance?

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Gandall mentioned he was working for the Workers' Alliance, and I would like to place in the record the fact that the Workers' Alliance was cited as subversive and Communist by Attorney General Clark in the Loyalty Review Board releases of December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948, and also, by Attorney General Biddle, cited as a Communist-penetrated organization.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

The Chairman. Any further questions?
That will be all, Mr. Gandall. You are excused.

Mr. Gandall. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a part of an editorial from the Saturday Evening Post which is germane to the subject we are on, and I wanted to read a paragraph from the Saturday Evening Post of February 3, 1945, which says as follows:

ARMY USES SNOW BOOK

Associate Editor Edgar Snow's new book, People on Our Side, is being used by Army lecturers in schools for Information-Education Personnel in the 13th Armored Division and in the 7th Headquarters, Fourth Army, Capt. Mitchell Lindemann, Division IE officer, writes. The book, composed largely of material Mr. Snow wrote as Post articles, is of "inestimable value," Captain Lindemann says. A special edition of 200,000 copies of the book is also being printed for distribution to the armed services.

I might add Mr. Edgar Snow was mentioned in our IPR hearings as one of the writers for the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we have testimony to show his pro-Communist opinions and slant.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The material referred to was read in full above by Mr. Mandel, and was filed for the record.)

Mr. Mandel. We have a mimeographed copy of what is labeled "Orientation Course—Headquarters, Central Signal Corps School, Camp Crowder, Mo.—For Week Ending August 26, 1944," and part 2, "For Week Ending September 2, 1944." The topic of this course is "Russo-American Relations in War and Peace."

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read just a few excerpts and then place the entire document in the record.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Mandel (reading):

The weight of evidence discloses most definitely that there is a fundamentally sound basis for collaboration with Russia, and little or no reason for fearing enmity.

In consideration of these questions, this paper has been prepared in 2 parts by 2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbrod and Pvt. Edward Dassin, of Company D, 804th Signal Training Regiment.

The Bolshevist bogey: We have been well taught in the past to have our hate aroused by the words, Bolshevist, Communist, Red, Soviet, and Russia. Just how concrete has been the basis for this hate?

We are in no position to judge how much of the program of the American Communist Party was inspired by Moscow, whether entirely or not at all.
The fact that the Communist Party was dissolved as a political organization and that the Comintern was disbanded removes one of the most important barriers toward a friendly relationship with Russia.

I give these few to give the flavor of the document, and I ask that the entire document be placed in the record.

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document, which is an excerpt prepared by the subcommittee staff from the Camp Crowder document printed in full below, was marked "Exhibit No. 443-B" and is as follows:)

**Exhibit No. 443-B**

The weight of evidence discloses most definitely that there is a fundamentally sound basis for collaboration with Russia, and little or no reason for fearing enmity.

In consideration of these questions, this paper has been prepared in 2 parts by 2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbrod and Pvt. Edward Dassin, of Company D, 804th Signal Training Regiment.

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**PART I—A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS**

_The Bolshevik bogey._—We have been well taught in the past to have our hate aroused by the words, Bolshevik, Communist, Red, Soviet, and Russia. Just how concrete has been the basis for this hate?

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We are in no position to judge how much of the program of the American Communist Party was inspired by Moscow, whether entirely or not at all. *** The fact that the Communist Party was dissolved as a political organization and that the Comintern was disbanded removes one of the most important barriers toward a friendly relationship with Russia.

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Is it not a fact that every Fascist and would-be Fascist used this anti-Bolshevist bogey technique in his climb to power?

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Why then does such a thought persist? Perhaps it has been because an excellent job of miseducation has been perpetrated upon us. Perhaps we have been ill-informed and misinformed. Perhaps we have been too quick and too ready to see something black in anything red.

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When the Soviet Union first came into being, there were some who said, "It is doomed to failure; Marxist principles won't work." Then when apparently socialism had been made to work, we were told that it is not socialism, or that the fine principles of Marx and Lenin had been ignored and Stalin is not following the Marxian line.

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But when the Loyalists, the Spanish Government, asked for our aid only to the extent of selling them materials they needed, only to permit them to import vital supplies, in adopting an attitude of strict neutrality, we were, in effect, blind to their struggle and deaf to their entreaties. Why? Because someone sold too many of us a bill of goods that the Loyalists were Reds. The American men who volunteered to fight against France and survived to return found a great number of Americans and virtually the entire press very unsympathetic to the role they had played in attempting to prevent the spread of fascism.

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And whose voice could be heard above all others imploring the League time and time again to take a firm stand and to employ sanctions against aggressor nations? It was the voice of Maxim Litvinov, Russia's representative, preaching the philosophy of the indivisibility of peace and the doctrine of collective security.
On repeated occasions the Soviet Union beseeched the great powers to embark
on a program of international disarmament, a program with which it seemed
only the United States sympathized.

How different might have been the course of history had there not existed such
distrust of Russia and unwillingness to cooperate with her.

How confused our thinking was, when so many of us were saying that Hitler
and Stalin would get together—that Nazi Germany and Communist Russia were
of the same ilk. And how sure we were that we were right when the Nazi-Soviet
pact was signed in 1939. We see those things in retrospect, but at that time
we said, "Well, the two thieves finally got together." However, the fact re-
 mains that Russia got what she was bargaining for, a little longer breathing
spell to build her defenses.

But are we not beginning to understand how natural it was for Russia not to
have trusted the Western Powers after such things as the failure of the League,
the betrayal at Munich, and their obvious distrust of her?

And when the Russian strategy began to give evidence of its wisdom and the
tide began to turn against the Nazis, those same people began to fear that
Russia was too strong.

EXHIBIT No. 443-C

ORIENTATION COURSE

Headquarters, Central Signal Corps School, Camp Crowder, Mo.

(For week ending August 26, 1944)

RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN WAR AND PEACE

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that upon the successful conclusion of World War II, the
United States and Russia will emerge as two of the greatest powers on earth.
Of paramount concern to all of us, therefore, is the question: Can these two
great nations live together harmoniously in the postwar world and thus provide
the foundation for a permanent and equitable peace? If not, the only conclusion
which we can draw is that we had better start preparing now for world war III.

"Well, after this war is over, we'll have to fight Russia." You have heard that
said often—too often. Perhaps you have even said it or thought it yourself.
It is reported in the June issue of Fortune magazine in an article on Russo-
British relations that the British are very worried by the anti-Soviet sentiment
and statements of many American soldiers. One Cabinet minister is quoted as
saying that if the America people continue to say that war with Russia is inevi-
table, it will be inevitable.

But what facts can prompt one to feel that we have to fight Russia—over
what land, over what grievance shall we take up arms against the U. S. R.? On
the other hand, is there a good basis for believing that we can cooperate with
Russia in building a lasting peace? The weight of evidence discloses most defi-
nitely that there is a fundamentally sound basis for collaboration with Russia,
and little or no reason for fearing enmity.

In consideration of these questions, this paper has been prepared in 2 parts
by 2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbord and Pvt. Edward Dassin, of Com-
pany D, 804th Signal Training Regiment. In part I is discussed some of the
distorted appraisals of Russia that have been made in the past and the mistakes
in the policies resulting from them. Part II contains a discussion of the prac-
ticability and need of collaboration between Russia and the United States in
building and maintaining the structure of world peace.

PART I. A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

The Bolshevist bogey.—We have been well taught in the past to have our hate
Just how concrete has been the basis for this hate?
Let us analyze briefly whence grew this hate and fear. In the United States proper, the activities of the American Communist Party created resentment, chiefly because it was felt that it was acting under the direction of the Communist International. We are in no position to judge how much of the program of the American Communist Party was inspired by Moscow, whether entirely or not at all. It is certainly true that there is no place in the American scene for a political party which acts under the orders of a foreign government. The fact that the Communist Party was dissolved as a political organization and that the Comintern was disbanded removes one of the most important barriers toward a friendly relationship with Russia. However, the fact remains that the past resentment did create distaste and prejudice and those words became labels of stigma. While there may have been some substance to those labels, the unfortunate result was that they were so exploited, misused, and grotesquely overemphasized that the net confusion became inestimable. For example, by taking advantage of the prejudices aroused by the application of such labels, too often movements, organizations, and individuals, liberal and progressive in character, were condemned unfairly and without hearing by merely the device of such name calling. This was true not only in the United States, but internationally as well.

Does not the fact that Hitler fanned the hate inspired by such words to divide and conquer make us wonder whether or not the world has been victimized by this propaganda device? Is it not a fact that every Fascist and would-be Fascist used this anti-Bolshevist bogey technique in his climb to power? Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Barons Von Mannerheim are only some of the most prominent of them. The Nazis insist that their mission is to save the world from communism, and made some desperate and almost successful attempts to wipe out the Russians. If the Nazi mission is to our advantage, are we not playing a peculiar role in fighting Germany and preventing the accomplishment of that mission?

But on the contrary, at this moment we are engaged in a titanic struggle to wipe out the menaces of nazism and fascism, and by our side doing a magnificent job is the Red Army of the Soviet Union. What a queer tribute we pay to the heroism and sacrifice of that country and its people, who are fighting our fight as we fight theirs, by saying that after this war is over we will fight them. Surely this must be some sort of insanity, and yet we still hear people saying it, and in the newspapers and magazines we still read more or less subtle references to it. However, it must be admitted that some of those publications have been suppressed and some of the writers of such sentiments have been jailed or are being tried as pro-Nazi saboteurs.

Why then does such a thought persist? Perhaps it has been because an excellent job of miseducation has been perpetrated upon us. Perhaps we have been ill-informed and misinformed. Perhaps we have been too quick and too ready to see something black in anything red.

Consistent inconsistency.—Let us look at some examples of the type of thinking which led us on the road to the conclusion that we will fight Russia next, and determine some of the mistakes which resulted from it. Let us review some of the actions of the Soviet Union in recent years and appraise her position in the family of nations—as a nation of peace or of war.

When the Soviet Union first came into being, there were some who said, “It is doomed to failure; Marxist principles won't work” Then when apparently socialism had been made to work, we were told that it is not socialism, or that the fine principles of Marx and Lenin had been ignored and Stalin is not following the Marxist line. We rallied against the doctrine of world revolution. But when he was expelled from the Soviet Union, we sympathized with Trotsky, who was, we said, the true Marxist. Trotsky, it appears, preached world revolution and was willing to sabotage the national interests of Russia for the sake of his fine principles. For some strange reason a number of our publications took Trotsky to their bosoms. Was it because we admired his principles or because he sniped at the U. S. S. R. Evidently it was because it made good reading material, for so many of us were pleased to read unfavorable reports of the Soviet Union and thus have our opinions vindicated.

Aid to Fascists as anti-Bolsheviks.—Hitler rose to power in Germany, and there were many who aided him from without that country as well as from within, particularly certain elements in France and Britain. Was it because they were misled as to the meaning of nazism, or were they blinded to it by the great desire to build a power that would turn to the East and crush communism? Whatever it was, Hitler was aided and abetted; but he turned into a Frankenstein monster, striking his very makers with great zeal and little gratitude.
We realize now that the war in Europe had been brewing since the signing of the Versailles Treaty and that the first shots were fired in Spain. The so-called civil war in that country was the proving ground for Nazi and Fascist military strategy and tactics when Hitler and Mussolini came to Franco's aid against the legally elected Republican government. But when the Loyaltyists, the Spanish Government, asked for our aid only to the extent of selling them materials they needed, only to permit them to import vital supplies, in adopting an attitude of strict neutrality, we were, in effect, blind to their struggle and deaf to their entreaties. Why? Because someone sold too many of us a bill of goods that the Loyaltyists were Reds. The American men who volunteered to fight against Franco and survived to return found a great number of Americans and virtually the entire press very unsympathetic to the role they had played in attempting to prevent the spread of fascism. Now Fascist Spain is an extremely sore thrust in our side, a source of more than mere embarrassment.

Russia urges world to stop aggression.—Woodrow Wilson had the tremendous foresight to realize the need of a League of Nations and it was he who almost single-handedly made its creation a part of the Versailles Treaty—practically the only constructive statesmanship incorporated in that doctrine. And then what happened when the opportunity came for the League to prove its ability to stop aggression and wars? The country of its creator, the United States, was not even a member. And whose voice could be heard above all others imploiting the League time and time again to take a firm stand and to employ sanctions against aggressor nations? It was the voice of Maxim Litvinov, Russia's representative, preaching the philosophy of the indivisibility of peace and the doctrine of collective security. It should be noted that some of the leaders in the United States also recognized the validity of those principles, as evidenced by the now famous "Quarantine the Aggressor" speech made by President Roosevelt in Chicago in 1936 and the subsequent statements of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who believed that "war anywhere in the world threatens peace everywhere in the world." But too many could not see the need of such principles at that time.

On repeated occasions the Soviet Union beseeched the great powers to embark on a program of international disarmament, a program with which it seemed only the United States sympathized. Had there been such a program, this war might well have been averted. When the great powers of the world refused to adopt such a policy Russia besought them individually to accept the idea of collective security, that is, joint military action against any or all aggressors. This goal has finally been achieved under the stress of war at terrific cost, and is our surest guaranty of victory. But had this policy been adopted before Hitler and his legions became powerful, this war might well, even then, have been averted.

Russia never wearied of criticizing England and France for their tolerance toward Hitler, their lenient attitude to his acts of aggression. After every act of Fascist or Nazi aggression the Soviet Government proposed far-reaching measures of resistance, measures which at the time were considered too radical. When Italy invaded Ethiopia the Soviet Government advocated the application of sanctions or economic blockade. When German troops occupied the Rhineland the Soviet Government proclaimed that action must be taken immediately or it would be too late. When Germany and Italy intervened in Spain the Soviet Government insisted on active opposition instead of a policy of nonintervention.

Mutual assistance program fails.—Then there was Munich—where Chamberlain and Daladier purchased a hollow mockery when they thought they were buying "peace in our time." At that time the Soviet Government demanded armed resistance on the part of France and Czechoslovakia and promised its aid according to the mutual assistance pact she had with those countries. But France preferred to appease Germany rather than protect Czechoslovakia.

When Hitler was poised on Poland's borders, England, France, and Poland could not come to an agreement with the Soviet Government for their mutual protection. We were told that one of the reasons was that Poland did not want Russian soldiers on its soil—an event now heartily welcomed; and reports were widely circulated and believed that Russia was too weak to be of much value as an ally—her air force negligible, her mechanical equipment defective, and her military leadership unsound. Could it have been possible that even then there was hope that Hitler's ambitions would turn to the East? As a matter of fact, United States Ambassador to Russia Joseph Davies reported at the time that the actions of Chamberlain and Daladier were causing a growing suspicion in Russia that "Britain and France were playing a diplomatic game to place the Soviets in the position where Russia would have to fight Germany alone."
In view of all this, it is hardly conceivable that Russia would have been contemplating aggression as its own program. On the contrary, the truth is that Russia needed peace and consistently fought for peace. Ambassador Davies stated in his book, Mission to Moscow, "Litvinov's able and persistent ideas at the League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the Soviet Government in being prepared to fight for Czechoslovakia were indications of real sincerity of purpose and a marked degree of high-mindedness. The dominant motive of the Soviets is and always has been 'self-interest.' For a time they were ardent advocates of active militant hostility against aggressors in order to preserve peace. This was not only because of love of peace per se, but also because it was to their interest." How different might have been the course of history had there not existed such distrust of Russia and unwillingness to cooperate with her.

How confused our thinking was, when so many of us were saying that Hitler and Stalin would get together—that Nazi Germany and Communist Russia were of the same ilk. And how sure we were that we were right when the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed in 1939. Of course the Western powers resented it, but do we realize now that Russia was virtually forced into it by the unwillingness of those powers to cooperate with her? We see those things in retrospect, but at that time we said, "Well, the two thieves finally got together." However, the fact remains that Russia got what she was bargaining for, a little longer breathing spell to build her defenses.

Russia upsets the military dopesters.—When Hitler turned on his so-called pal and the Nazis marched into Russia, we said, "The thieves have fallen out; it serves Stalin right for having trusted Hitler instead of us." But are we not beginning to understand how natural it was for Russia not to have trusted the Western Powers after such things as the failure of the League, the betrayal at Munich, and their obvious distrust of her?

The Wehrmacht strode through Russia with seven-league boots and the consensus of so many of our armchair authorities on military strategy gave Russia a fighting chance to last a few weeks or months. And there were many who advised against granting lend-lease to Russia because they had no faith in her power to resist. They claimed it would amount to handing over such supplies to Germany. Fortunately such advice was not heeded, for we were beginning to reverse our opinion of the U. S. R. How many were there who hoped Germany and Russia would cut each other to pieces, but with the reservation that Germany might have just a little the better of it? Even then there were those who preferred a strong Germany to a strong Russia, or at least nursed the hope that they would neutralize each other.

And when the Russian strategy began to give evidence of its wisdom and the tide began to turn against the Nazis, those same people began to fear that Russia was too strong. Yes, that is true—many of our writers feared in their columns that Russian troops would overrun Europe when some big Russian victory was announced. Many of these same writers also voiced the opinion when there was a lull in the fighting that Russia was not in this war for ultimate victory, but intended to stop after the Nazis were thrown across Russia's borders. We know now that the Red army does not recognize any borders as a stop signal. There was even the thought that once we committed ourselves to a second front, the Russians would sit back and let us carry the burden. This, of course, has been completely refuted by the tremendous summer drive of the Red army.

Summary of the contradictions.—How peculiarly inconsistent thinking. How peculiarly inconsistent has been too much of our thinking as evidenced by such examples as those mentioned. How peculiarly consistent then it is that some of us should now be toying with such thoughts as that after this is over we will have to fight Russia.

In summation, we see that at one time writers told us that Russia cannot survive under socialism, and then they told us that Russia does not have socialism; on the one hand they told us that Russia was too weak to count on as an ally, and then on the other hand they told us that Russia was too strong not to be feared as an enemy; first they told us that there was no difference between nazism and communism, and then they told us that they knew all along that the two were mortal enemies and eventually would come to blows; they informed us that it is to Russia's interest to sue for a separate peace with Germany at any price—no, to stop fighting at her borders—no, to stop fighting when we committed ourselves to an invasion—no, to have her armies overrun all of
Europe. One begins to wonder whether our writers or the Russians are more confusing. We now realize that the cloth of these inconsistencies were woven out of the warp of a dislike of Russia and the wool of a distrust of her.

Why the contradictions?—Why have there been so many contradictions in reports concerning the U. S. R.? Perhaps one explanation is the statement that is often made: Only angels can discuss the Soviet Union impersonally and without heat. Many books and articles have been written about the U. S. R., but perhaps the chief reason for our distorted appraisal of that country is that its sympathizers have been too enthusiastic in singing praises and its critics too persistent in assigning faults. As a result we received conflicting reports and believed the ones which vindicated our prejudices in favor of or against Russia.

It is true that Russia, herself, contributed to some of the mystery in which she was cloaked. For example, under a strict censorship only vague and general information was issued to the rest of the world as to the extent of her industrial accomplishments. We knew of her several 5-year plans and of percentages of increase, but we did not have a definite and complete picture of the potential output. We knew that the Russian Army was large, but we were given hazy information of the extent and efficiency of its training and equipment. Russia apparently made a decided effort to conceal any information which could be of value to an enemy as to her industrial and military strength.

Misunderstandings in the past have not been altogether one-sided. There have been instances when Russia has misunderstood actions or policies of the Western Powers. There was, for example, the instance when the English and the American public were incensed over the report that appeared in the Russian press that Nazi agents were negotiating with the British for a separate peace. This misunderstanding was not completely dissipated until July 21 of this year, when the Week of London reported: "It was in November that the first serious offer by the (Nazi) generals to remove Hitler and withdraw from occupied territories in the West was made to the British and Americans through Ankara and Lisbon. The offer was countersigned by Von Runstedt, and it was for this reason that it was received with almost laughable credulity in London. The proposal did not in essence differ from those originally brought to Britain by Hess. It envisaged a state of affairs in which, following a complete withdrawal in the West, the Germans would—at unofficially—he given a free hand to conduct their war in the East without serious interference by the Western Allies. * * * "The German proposals were reported in March and April * * * at Lisbon and Estoril, continued until the very eve of D-day. There is some ground for believing that whereas in the first phase the British were to some extent foiled by the Germans, in the second phase it was the Germans who were led up to the garden path. It may in fact turn out that * * * it was at Estoril (near Lisbon) that Von Runstedt really lost the battle of Normandy." The Week explains that the British representatives led Runstedt to believe that there was a chance for a negotiated peace, that even the Normandy landings would be only a "limited maneuver."

There was the instance when the American public was disturbed by the report from Admiral Standley in Russia that America's contribution by way of lend-lease to the Russian war effort was either being concealed from the Russian people or at least not being publicized by the Russian press. However, Russia was quick to rectify the situation and immediately after the admiral's protest, publications in the Soviet Union carried full reports of lend-lease aid.

Until Russia entered the war, the most widely accepted version of the Soviet Union was the one stressing the darker side of that country and its policies. With the magnificent fight the Red army is making has come a new appreciation of Russia, of what she must have accomplished, and of her unequivocal stand against nazism and fascism. Perhaps now, with a better understanding of the U. S. R., we will be less likely to commit such tragic mistakes as those that have been made in the past in our relationship with her.

Armed with greater objectivity, and stripped of the prejudices which led to so many of those tragic mistakes in the past, we are then better equipped to analyze the next phase of this discussion—that is, whether the Soviet Union is our potential enemy or ally after the war.
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT

(For week ending September 2, 1944)

PART II. FRIEND OR FOE?

With a spirit of greater understanding and the realization of the tremendous need to avoid the mistakes of the past, let us turn to the question of the possibility of collaboration with Russia in the future.

No territorial dispute.—Is there a clash of interests that would prevent the two countries from working together to construct and preserve the future peace?

Walter Lippmann, in his book, U. S. Foreign Policy, states: "Is there a conflict of vital interest [between the United States and Russia] which could cause enmity? One thing can be said at once: There is no boundary dispute, no American territory which Russia covets, no Russian territory to which the United States has laid any claim whatever."

Looking back to the time when the Colonies were first established in America, one sees a period of unbroken peace between the United States and Russia. There are very few other instances in the history of the world of two great powers enjoying such a lasting peace between them. Why has it been so? A principal and necessary cause of war has always been an irreconcilable conflict between the vital interests of the societies involved.

The one bit of territory over which we might have quarreled with Russia is Alaska, and it was ceded to us at a nominal sum of $7 million. Certainly it was not done under threat of military pressure. Alaska fitted better into our scheme of things politically, economically, and geographically, and Russia did not need Alaska. Thus, the only possible conflict area was settled amicably. In short, the only territory which could be the basis of hostility between the United States and Russia is Alaska, and that hostility could only exist as a potential threat against us if Alaska were Russian.

No clash in world markets.—What of the possibility of economic controversy? Again we cannot find a basis for conflict, for actually our interests have been complementary rather than competitive. We have never engaged in any extensive competition with Russia for foreign markets, since both countries possess vast territory and clearly defined areas of primary economic influence which do not overlap. As a matter of fact, Russia is a market for our industrial products, and American industry can count heavily on the Soviet Union, as it has in the recent past, as a potential customer, according to Eric Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, recently returned from a tour of Russia. Certainly it would be rather bad business tactics to attempt to throttle a good customer. Vice President Wallace, on his return from visits to Soviet Siberia and China, spoke most enthusiastically of the possibilities of cooperation with Russia and China in building up the Pacific area. He stated that there was a great desire on the part of both peoples to collaborate with us and each other.

Pressure of common enemies.—We are also allied to Russia by the pressure of common enemies, including Japan. The fact that the U. S. S. R. is not at war with Japan can be explained only on the basis of better military judgment on the part of both countries, since each has her hands full fighting present opponents. There were some who believed that Russia was our inevitable enemy and Japan our ultimate ally, as evidenced by the amount of pro-Japanese sentiment in the United States in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, and throughout the series of Japanese aggressions. Perhaps that sentiment is one of the explanations of our failure to fortify some of our outposts in the Pacific.

On the other hand, some of the leaders in Russia apparently foresaw our battle with Japan, for as far back as 1918 Lenin in an address before the central executive committee in Moscow stated, "An inevitable conflict will arise between Japan and America for the supremacy of the Pacific and its coasts." As for the conflict between Japan and Russia, many reports have come to us in recent years of border incidents between Russian and Japanese troops, and in 1938 the clashes took the form of a small war, in which the Russians decisively defeated the Japs. Again in 1939 a large battle occurred between the Japanese-Manchurian forces and the Red army in which two Japanese divisions were annihilated.

No fundamental conflict.—There is an increasing growth of opinion in the United States amongst scholars of international affairs that war with Russia is far from inevitable. Professor Sorokin, of Harvard University, states in his book Russia and the United States: "The United States is less likely to become involved in war with Russia than with any great power." Walter Duranty in his book The U. S. S. R. writes, "There are no causes of fundamental conflict
between the two countries ••• It will be to their (Russia's) interest to co-operate with the United States, because—if for no other reason— they and the United States want peace for development of their own resources.” Albert Rhys Williams in his work the Russians avers, “Between the two countries (Russia and the United States) exists no fundamental conflict of interest; on the contrary, there are countless reasons for collaboration.” Even writers who are extremists in their distrust of Russia state that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if Russia and the Anglo-American countries collaborated in the forthcoming peace.

Does Russia plan aggression?—Is there some menace which prevents collaboration with Russia? Such a menace could only be based on the fear that she plans some form of aggression.

Of course, no one can predict with certainty future events—what Russia, the United States, England, or any country will do after the war. However, there is a valid basis for predicting general policies, that is, consideration of what the best interests of the particular country dictate.

Is Russia imperialistic?—Having that criterion in mind, let us determine whether the Soviet Union would be interested in embarking on a program of imperialism. Perhaps the answer lies in asking ourselves several questions: Does Russia need more territory, particularly at the price or risk of war? The Soviet Union comprises half of Europe and half of Asia—one-sixth of the land mass of the world. Certainly we must conclude that she has more than sufficient "Lebensraum" for many generations to come. Does she need more resources? Geologists inform us that Russia contains vast reserves of practically every raw material required by industry. Will she look for places to invest her money?

While the Soviets have granted small loans to Turkey and Mongolia, these are not important because Russia has no firms or monopolies with surplus moneys. All of her capital is required and used for internal development. Does Russia have a crying need for foreign markets where she can dispose of surplus production? By the very nature of her economic structure there cannot be overproduction in the U. S. S. R. economists tell us, for the money gets back into the hand of the people to buy all the goods produced, giving her an insatiable domestic market. Williams states, "It is apparent that none of the usual motives for imperialism exist in Russia."

Will Russia promote world revolution?—However, what about the doctrine of world revolution? Can that be a basis for future aggression on the part of Russia? Will she interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in order to spread socialism?

Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated, "Revolutions cannot be carried to other countries in a suitcase." History discloses that revolution has never been an exportable item but rather one of domestic production.

It has been feared that Russia intends to promote Pan-Slavism under the Socialist banner, and will therefore seek to subjugate her immediate western neighbors. Ralph Parker, Moscow correspondent for the New York Times for a great many years, wrote in a recent article in Liberty Magazine, “Russia believes in her interest that the Slav nations should be strong. A weak Poland, events of the past 25 years have shown, is a danger to Russia. A Czechoslovakia on which a Munich can be forced, a Yugoslavia which, through internal disunity, can be toppled, a Bulgaria so internally corrupted that its rulers are forced to lead it into adventurous policies are dangerous to Russia. If they are strong internally, these lands, Russia believes, can never be turned against her or go down one by one before the Germans. Thus measures to strengthen her western neighbors take precedence, in Russian postwar policy, because this concerns her own security.”

The Baltic problem.—The question arises: If this is the policy of the Soviet Union, how can Russia's attitude toward the Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia be reconciled with it? Russia has definitely made it clear that the Baltic States are to be incorporated within the Soviet Union as autonomous republics. We are inclined to forget that these countries and their people were forcefully taken from Russia at the end of the last war, after having been Russian for a period several times as long as the United States has been in existence.

Gregory Melksins in his book, The Baltic Riddle, states, "The existence of the Baltic Republics as 'independent' and isolated states has proven to be a pathetic fiction, false and harmful in effect. ••• Everyone seemingly must know that this liberating army (freeing the Baltics from Nazi occupation) will and can be only the Red Army with its Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian troops in
the vanguard marching home again. ** It is certain that the inhabitants who had been oppressed under the German yoke will meet them as their own longed-for deliverers. ** It is time for sound thinking people to realize that history has passed her verdict on the Baltic problem, and the Baltic people will not appeal for a retrial."

In his book, *They Shall Not Sleep*, Leland Stowe writes: "The Baltic States ** were improvised as separate national states for the first time after the last war, and have been an integral part of Russia for more than 700 years. ** If we are at all realistic, and if we have any proper appreciation of our need of Russia's good will, we shall not stir up acrimony and dissension by entering into any such futile debate (whether Russia is entitled to the Baltics). As a matter of cold fact and whether we like it or not, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already federated republics of the Soviet Union and they are certain to remain so. If we were to insist that they be restored to a status which before 1918 they had never had for hundreds of years, the Russians might as logically reply: 'First, we suggest that you Americans return Texas and parts of Oklahoma and New Mexico to Mexico.' To the Russians that would make quite as much sense."

The Polish dispute.—The same question that arises over the Baltic States may be posed concerning the area in dispute between the Russian Government and the Polish Government in exile. Authorities seem to agree that both sides have their arguments but that the great power of Russia makes the question practically academic. The dispute over these territories is not of recent origin; it does not arise from a new policy conceived by the Soviet regime. It is important to note that the Russians demand a boundary which is practically the same as the Curzon line established as the equitable boundary by the committee which Lord Curzon headed after World War I. Certainly Lord Curzon was not pro-Russian. The evidence discloses that a great majority of the people in the disputed area (which was wrested from Russia after the last war) is Russian. This apparently was the basis for Lord Curzon's decision.

Prof. Oscar Lange, of the University of Chicago, who returned recently from Russia, where he discussed with Premier Stalin the subject of Soviet-Polish relations, has stated: "Stalin intends Poland to be an independent nation. He has not the slightest intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the Polish nation, nor will he dictate the political, economic, or social forms of the new Polish State. He wants her to be strong externally and internally and to play an important part in the concert of nations." Lange does not believe that the boundary problem is the main one. "The real problem," he states, "is whether Poland will have a government friendly to the Soviet Union or not. Provided friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland are established, the boundary problem can be solved in a way which will satisfy the Polish people as well as the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian nations." (Recent reports disclose that the Soviet Union has recognized a Polish government of liberation as representative of Poland and has affirmed the stand that she is desirous of seeing a strong Poland built and will not interfere with her internal affairs.)

The Finnish question.—As far as Russo-Finnish relations are concerned, there no longer seems to be a serious doubt that the U. S. S. R. is not intent on destroying the independence of Finland. The terms of the armistice recently proposed by the Soviet Union to Finland, and previously approved by the United States and Great Britain, demonstrate this. It must be remembered that the Soviet Union has never claimed Finland as part of Russia, but actually was the first country to recognize Finland's independence.

Russia's interests in the war.—The actions of the U. S. S. R. since the expulsion of Trotsky indicate a definite trend away from the doctrine of world revolution. Recent Soviet pronouncements contain no ambiguity in stating that Russia is not interested in the local affairs of other countries, and her actions thus far bear out this statement. Stalin is quoted as saying, "Our aims are clear and noble. Our first task is to liberate our own people from the Fascist yokes. We have no idea of imposing our own regime on other peoples, Slav, or otherwise. Our aim is to help liberate them from Nazi tyranny and then to leave them free to live in their own land as they wish."

Henry Cassidy, Associated Press correspondent with the Red army in Rumania, has given us very tangible evidence that the policy announced by Stalin is being practiced. Cassidy reported in July of this year, "It can now be said with complete conviction that the Russians in the initial venture of this war beyond their borders have adopted a strict attitude of nonintervention in local affairs.
**It was the unanimous consensus of American, British, and Chinese observers (In Rumania) that the Russians are not interfering with the political, economic, or social life of Rumania.**

**Russia's state in the peace.—Durany writes, "The Russians, I think, have abandoned their first fanatical impulse to impose their ideas and methods upon the Western Powers. They have before them a tremendous and most difficult task of national reconstruction."**

Williams states, "The exile of Trosky virtually brought to an end the notion that the Russians must force their institutions and ideas on other peoples." This does not imply that the Soviets have renounced their principles. To be sure they hope and expect socialism to spread. They hope it will spread because they hold it provides a final solution of unemployment, strife between races, nations, and classes. They expect it to spread because they believe one country after another will be forced by failure of capitalism to try socialism. As America rejoices to see any country become a republic, so Soviet Russia would rejoice to see any country socialized. But Williams does not believe Russia will "engage in any revolutionary knight errantry" to spread socialism, that rather her policies will be dictated by her own national interests and needs in reconstruction and development.

Ralph Parker also stated in his article in Liberty magazine that "Russia doesn't want future relations with her allies to be spoiled by the suspicion that she is using her influence on the leftwing to spread revolutionary doctrine. Recent developments in Soviet foreign policy will make it difficult for any radical leftwing group to convince London and Washington that it has Moscow's support."

**Leonard Stowe writes: "Soviet Russia must preoccupy herself chiefly with peace, security, and rehabilitation because her war losses and sacrifices have been so staggeringlously. It seems almost impossible for Americans, in our remote security, to comprehend what these losses are. But we cannot measure Russia accurately, we cannot deal with her intelligently, and we cannot treat her fairly unless we make an effort to comprehend them."**

**The tremendous task of reconstruction.—"A territory almost as large and as industrially important as a strip of the United States of America from Maine to South Carolina and as far west as Tennessee and Indiana has been occupied and fought over in Russia by more than 200 Nazi-Axis divisions for considerabably more than 2 years. If we could transpose these long months of savage warfare into the above-mentioned section of the United States and substitute Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Detroit for Dnieprostroy, Kharkov, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, with these great American industrial centers lying in ruins, we should still scarcely have begun to appreciate what war has done to Russia.**

We should still have to picture thousands of towns and small villages laid waste in New England, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, and several other States. We should have to imagine that approximately one-third of the population of the United States (equivalent to some 60 million people in Russia) had been swallowed by the Nazi invaders, that millions had been sent to Germany in slavery and that the fate of some 25 million Americans was still unknown. We should have to imagine another 15 million American civilians, with nothing left of their possessions save a few bundles and the clothes on their backs, swept from the Eastern States by the tide of war and pushed back across the Middle West and across the Mississippi—a helpless horde of refugees, existing under any kind of roof for more than 2 years. The equal of all this, and more, has happened in Russia since June 1941.

**"Supposing that America, in less than 3 years of war, should lose 1 out of every 12 persons in our population of 130 million people. If all these tragedies and disasters had been suffered by us, can you imagine with what stupendous relief we should greet the end of the war? Can you conceive what would be our consuming desires and necessities? They could not fail to be anything else but—peace, security, and rehabilitation."**

**"This is why the Soviet Union's need for many years of peace is cruelly imperative. No government, of whatever ideology, could ignore its obligations to a huge population emaciated and weakened to such a degree. The Soviet regime won the confidence of Soviet Russia's masses by its leadership in the war. It can only retain their confidence by an equally energetic leadership in the nation's reconstruction. But only a long-term and herculean program can ever rebuild Russia's ravaged cities and towns or reclothe and revitalize her scores of millions of civilians."**
Is there mutual trust?—In the program to build the postwar world which is being developed the Soviet Union has indicated her intentions to cooperate in many ways. For example she has participated in and has shown her willingness to continue this participation in various conferences on postwar problems. Her representatives have attended the World Food Conference, the Monetary Conference, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and are active in the UNRRA and she has entered into various treaties and agreements with the United Nations. But will Russia live up to her agreements, can she be trusted? Ambassador Davies has said, "Of all the nations of the earth, none has a finer record of living up to its treaty promises than the Soviet Union." To refer again to Williams, he writes, "Live up to our obligations as partners and allies, and they will do likewise."

Fortune magazine reports in its June issue that Churchill and England have decided that they can trust Russia and relates a story of an industrialist who was asked to turn over a process to Russia which would be worth millions commercially after the war. In a conference with Russian representatives the industrialist hesitantly suggested that there be a postwar settlement of the process. Almost immediately he received the answer, "Of course." Later he met Churchill who asked him how he was coming along with his negotiations. "Do you know," he said to Churchill, "I have decided that the Russians can be trusted," Churchill bit into his cigar and answered, "So have I."

Does Russia trust us? Drew Pearson reports Stalin as saying recently in answer to the question whether he was worried about the danger of harmony breaking up between Russia and the Anglo-American countries: "This alliance is not built merely on an agreement between three men. It is the result of a deep and compelling fundamental community of historical interests. It is assured by the fact that we all need each other. As one of your American statesmen once said, 'If we do not hang together, we will hang separately.' So I am confident that, despite minor disturbances and occasional irritations, our friendship will continue and assure peace to the postwar world."

Hands off domestic issues.—Will the fact that Russia’s social and economic institutions differ from ours prevent our collaboration with her? Certainly we would be narrow-minded were we to think that we have the answer to all the social and economic problems of the world here in the United States. We would resent any interference by Russia in our internal affairs and by the same token Russia would resent interference on our part. Obviously the only effective agreement between the two countries must be based on a hands-off attitude toward each other’s domestic affairs. What will work for the United States may not work in Russia and vice versa, and since the domestic policies of either country are not predicated upon aggression, as is the case with any Fascist nation, there is no purpose to be served in concerning ourselves with Russia’s internal structure or they with ours.

Distrust has arisen in the past because of such interference. We have bitterly resented the activities of the American Communist Party when he felt that its program was dictated by Moscow. On the other hand, we too have been guilty of interference in Russia’s affairs, for shortly after World War I we permitted our military forces to intervene on the side of the White Russian army in its attempt to destroy the young Soviet Government. Past distrusts can and must be forgotten, so that the two countries may be able to work side by side.

However, an attempt should be made to evaluate the Russian institutions for the purpose of promoting a better understanding of the Russian people. They have profited by studying our methods, and in the field of industry, for example, it is well known that American engineers, equipment, and ideas contributed greatly to their tremendous technological progress. Let us profit from the lessons that may be learned from the Russian experiment as they have profited from studying us. Henry Wallace has stated, "We must deal honestly and fairly with Russia and be tolerant and even helpful as she works out her economic problems in her own way."

How to preserve our own way of life.—It seems apparent that we have no need of fear of the spread of socialism in this country as long as we continue to build under our own system. We have the highest standard of living in the world, and if we maintain our place, certainly we would not want a lesser substitute. The task before us is to maintain and improve our way of life. By so doing, we will be protecting ourselves from any menace of foreign ideas far better than by engaging in war with Russia.

Sir Samuel Hoare, British Cabinet Minister who is certainly not noted for being pro-Russian, has said: "Communism, for all the claims of its propagandists, is
a national and not an international product. It is brought about by internal conditions. If you fear it, you should so set your house in order that your social and political conditions will silence any demand for its introduction."

Professor Sorokin writes: "If the respective governments do not commit the stupidest blunders, Russia will constitute in the future our best and most important ally. In the interests of both nations and of humanity at large, the most wholehearted cooperation is not only possible and desirable but essential."

Wendell Willkie in his book, One World, writes: "I don't know the answers to all the questions about Russia but there is one thing I know; that such a force, such a power, such a people cannot be ignored or disposed of with a highhat or a lifting of the skirt. We cannot act as if we were housewives going into an A. & P. store, picking and choosing among the groceries displayed; taking this, leaving that. The plain fact is: We have no choice in the matter. Russia will be reckoned with. That is the reason why I am constantly telling my fellow-Americans: work in ever-closer cooperation with the Russians while we are joined together in the common purpose of defeating a common enemy. Learn all we can about them and let them learn about us."

"There is still another thing I know: Geographically, from a trade standpoint, in their similarity of approach to many problems, the Russians and the Americans should get along together. The industrialization of Russia will require a limitless amount of American products, and Russia has unlimited natural resources that we need. The Russians, like us, are a hardy, direct people, and have great admiration for everything in America, except the capitalistic system. And, frankly, there are many things in Russia that we can admire—its vigor, its vast dreams, its energy, its tenacity of purpose. No one could be more opposed to the doctrine of communism than I am, for I am completely opposed to any system that leads to absolutism. But I have never understood why it should be assumed that in any possible contact between communism and democracy, democracy should go down."

At the moment of this writing the fall of Warsaw, Paris, and Florence is imminent. On all fronts the flags of the United Nations are moving forward. We can now feel well certain that ultimate victory is ours, but while congratulating ourselves upon our successes there is not one among us who is unmindful of the fact that those successes would not have been possible if it were not for the heroic sacrifices of the Russian people and the valiant achievements of the Red Army. Had the Soviet Union, instead, succumbed to the onslaught of the Nazi blitzkrieg, the course of the entire war would have undoubtedly been vastly different. Perhaps this gratitude may prove to be an important factor in overcoming the last vestiges of the Bolshevist bogey and in insuring that the words "Bolshevist," "Communist," "Red," "Soviet," and "Russia" can no longer be used to lead the world into mistakes such as those that were made in the past.

If the millions of victims of the present war are not to have died in vain, if we are to keep faith with the ideals for which they have sacrificed their lives, it is imperative that we discard past prejudices of Russia so that we may, for the sake of a lasting peace, make an ally of her in the future as she is in the present. We must, if we seek equity, deal equitably. Only then can we face the future with confidence and leave to the generations to come a heritage of a better world.

Addenda

Excerpt from news story by George Gallup, director, American Institute of Public Opinion:

"PRINCETON, N. J., July 14.—Although sentiment favorable to Russia has increased as compared to 2 years ago, there is still rather widespread questioning throughout the country as to the postwar intentions of the Soviet Union.

"A national survey by the institute shows that whereas the weight of opinion is that Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us after the war, nevertheless about half the country either thinks she definitely cannot be trusted or is not sure about it.

"This skepticism represents a factor which Washington will have to reckon with in our dealings with Russia after the war.

"Whether the doubts concerning Russia's intentions are justifiable or not, their very existence poses a problem for realistic statesmanship.

"In answer to the question, "Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us when the war is over?" the poll disclosed that 47 percent stated "Yes"
and 36 percent "No" and the balance were undecided. There was no marked difference of opinion in geographical sections or among age levels.

"The most important difference is found by educational level. Anti-Russian sentiment is concentrated mainly in that section of the adult population which has had only grammar-school education or no schooling. College graduates, on the other hand, show the highest inclination to trust Russia's intentions.

Can Russia be trusted?

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<tr>
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<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
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<td>Those with college training</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Grammar school or no schooling</td>
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Anticipated question:

If our viewpoint in the past has been distorted, how are we going to know whether we have an accurate perspective now and in the future?

In the past we have had contradictory reports, and, as has been demonstrated, blind acceptance of derogatory views of Russia has resulted in many costly errors. Now it is not necessary to swing to the opposite pole and believe only the enthusiastically favorable reports. It is not necessary for us to believe that Russia is a land of milk and honey for us to work with her. Russia, herself, has stated that she has many tremendous problems to overcome internally to raise the standard of living of the Soviet peoples.

We would have the Soviet people accept us at face value and we should be willing to accept them the same way. As long as Russia's interests and our interests do not clash there is no reason to believe either country will be making a mistake in adopting that attitude.

A determined effort must be made by the press and the Governments of both nations to obtain and present the truth about each other so that false or biased reports will not be disseminated. As for the individual, on the basis of experience with those newspapers which have distorted news of Russia and those which have presented news fairly, he should be able to discriminate between publications. It is up to the individual to do a little thinking for himself and not fall for propaganda which appeals to his blind prejudices. The man who refuses to look beyond his prejudices is permitting another to rob him of one of the most important freedoms: Freedom of opinion, that freedom enjoyed by thinking men who attempt to arrive at the truths with open minds and not the falsehoods dictated by appeals to their prejudices.

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Davies, Joseph E., former United States Ambassador to Russia, author of Mission to Moscow.

Duranty, Walter, author of several books on Russia, including The USSR, and American correspondent in Russia for many years.

Fortune magazine (June issue), The British Look at Russia, by Charles J. V. Murphy, member of the board of editors of that magazine.

Inside Europe, by John Gunther, world correspondent and author of several books on world affairs.

Johnston, Eric, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, widely quoted by the United States press upon his return from a recent visit to Russia.

Lippmann, Walter, author of U. S. Foreign Policy, one of the foremost scholars of international affairs.

Lange, Oscar, member of the University of Chicago faculty, lecturer and writer on international affairs.

Meiksins, Gregory, author of The Baltic Riddle, student of the problems of the Baltic nations.

Parker, Ralph, Moscow correspondent for the New York Times over a period of many years.
Pearson, Drew, student of national and international affairs whose syndicated column appears in a great many newspapers.
Williams, Albert Rhys, author of a number of books on Russia, including The Russians, The Soviets, etc., student of Russian affairs for over 25 years. Willkie, Wendell, 1940 Republican candidate for President, author of One World.

The Chairman. Is there anything further?
If not, the committee will stand in recess.
(Whereupon, at 3 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to call.)

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